OLIGOPOLY OF SECURITY PROVIDERS
IN RIO DE JANEIRO
LINKSCK CONFERENCE
Panel: Chasing demons or creating them?
The unintended consequences of international
counter-narcotics policy in Latin America
19 June 2014
Verena Brähler
PhD Candidate
Institute of the Americas
University College London
[email protected]
TABLE OF CONTENT
 Oligopoly of security providers
 Complexo do Alemão (case study)
 Unintended consequences
 Conclusion
Pavão-Pavãozinho, Rio de Janeiro
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Drug
traffickers
Military
Police
Civil
Police
(incl. BOPE
& UPP)
Municipal
Guards
Oligopoly
of Security
Providers
in Rio de
Janeiro
Militias
Death
Squads
Private
Security
Companies
FNSP
Military
Federal
Police
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Drug
traffickers
Military
Police
Civil
Police
(incl. BOPE
& UPP)
Municipal
Guards
Oligopoly
of Security
Providers
in Rio de
Janeiro
Militias
Death
Squads
Private
Security
Companies
FNSP
Military
Federal
Police
4
DRUG TRAFFICKING FACTIONS
Drug gangs in Rio
• Comando Vermelho
• Terceiro Comando Puro
• Amigos dos Amigos
Dominion of Rio‘s favelas
(December 2013 estimates):
Drug traffickers:
370
Militias:
454
UPP police:
174
Total:
1,001
Wilton Junior/AE/Arquivo/28.12.2009
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MILITARY POLICE
Caveirão (military
police vehicle)
UPP pacification police
BOPE
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MILITARY
Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution, 1988:
“The armed forces … are permanent and regular national institutions, … and are
intended for the defense of the country, for the guarantee of the constitutional
powers, and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order.”
Military patrolling in the Complexo do Alemão
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TABLE OF CONTENT
 Oligopoly of security providers
 Complexo do Alemão (case study)
 Unintended consequences
 Conclusion
Pavão-Pavãozinho, Rio de Janeiro
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COMPLEXO DO ALEMAO
• Agglomeration of 13 favelas
• Min. 70,000 inhabitants
• Lowest HDI and highest crime
rates in Rio
Security providers
• Former stronghold of Comando
Vermelho drug trafficking faction
• Occupied by military
• Pacified by UPP
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Complexo do Alemão
PMERJ
BPM
BOPE
PCERJ GM Military Private Militias Drug
security
traffickers
UPP
companies
Most feared
24.4% 31.3%
4.4%
28.9%
11.1%
Most violent
12.8% 29.8%
6.4%
36.2%
14.9%
Biggest threat to
security
Most trusted
9.3%
2.3%
2.3% 4.7%
51.2%
30.2%
12.2%
9.8%
2.4% 9.8%
22%
14.6%
6.7%
11.1% 15.6% 6.7% 11.1% 17.8%
11.1%
Who should provide
security
Who is providing
security
4.9%
24.4%
2.2%
17.8%
100%
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TABLE OF CONTENT
 Oligopoly of security providers
 Complexo do Alemão (case study)
 Unintended consequences
 Conclusion
Pavão-Pavãozinho, Rio de Janeiro
11
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL
COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
Points to consider
• Counter-narcotics policy is dealt with at the state level
• Rio’s state government is very progressive in policing issues
(“they are teachers not students”)
Examples of international influence
• Research
• Bilateral exchange of expertise
• Best practises (example “pacification” idea from Medellin)
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TABLE OF CONTENT
 Oligopoly of security providers
 Complexo do Alemão (case study)
 Unintended consequences
 Conclusion
Pavão-Pavãozinho, Rio de Janeiro
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CONCLUSION
 Oligopoly of security providers in Rio
de Janeiro
 Complexo do Alemão as an example
of a locally-grounded analysis of
“Violent Pluralism“
(Arias & Goldstein 2010)
 Rio de Janeiro‘s authorities need
international expertise on human
rights and criminal justice more than
on counter-narcotics issues
(“Who is the real expert?“)
Complexo da Penha, Rio de Janeiro
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MUITO OBRIGADA PELA ATENÇÃO!
[email protected]
www.researchingsecurity.org
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