The Leadership Quarterly 24 (2013) 822–841
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
The Leadership Quarterly
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/leaqua
Assassination and leadership: Traditional approaches and
historiometric methods☆
Francis J. Yammarino a,⁎, Michael D. Mumford b, Andra Serban c, Kristie Shirreffs a
a
b
c
Center for Leadership Studies & School of Management, State University of New York at Binghamton, USA
Department of Psychology & Center for Applied Behavioral Studies, University of Oklahoma, USA
Warwick Business School, The University of Warwick, UK
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 23 April 2013
Accepted 14 August 2013
Available online 24 September 2013
Editor: Chet Schriesheim
Keywords:
Assassination, attempted assassination, and
assassins
Leader power orientation
Outstanding leadership
Personalized and socialized leaders
Charismatic, ideological and pragmatic
leaders
Leader paranoia
Historiometric methods
World class leaders
Political leaders
U.S. Presidents
a b s t r a c t
Research on the assassinations and attempted assassinations of leaders seems warranted, as
leaders and their interactions with extreme followers (e.g., fanatics) and non-followers
(e.g., assassins) can have tremendous consequences not only for the leaders but also their larger
collectives (e.g., nations, social movements). Based on the traditional and established leadership
approaches of power orientation and outstanding leadership, we explored whether particular
types of leaders were more likely victims of assassinations and targets of assassination attempts.
Using historiometric methods, we found that socialized as well as pragmatic and ideological
leaders were the most frequent victims of assassinations; but personalized as well as pragmatic
and ideological leaders were the most frequent targets of assassination attempts; and for U.S.
Presidents, socialized charismatics were the most frequent victims of assassinations and targets of
assassination attempts. Results regarding leader paranoia, regions of the world, and assassins
operating alone or as a group in relation to assassinations and leadership approaches also are
presented. Implications of these findings for future leadership research involving leaders and their
extreme followers, non-followers, and larger collectives are discussed.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The assassination of leaders seems to be a worthy topic of leadership research given the tremendous consequences for leaders,
followers, non-followers, and their larger collectives, including political, social, and economic systems. Despite this importance, there
are relatively few broad-based systematic studies of assassinations. Most work on assassinations comprises individual case studies or
historical biographies of the victims and assassins which typically espouse the uniqueness of each assassination and the individuals
involved. The few larger-scale quantitative studies that look at deaths (natural and accidental, excluding assassinations) of leaders in
general (e.g., Jones & Olken, 2005) and at multiple assassinations in particular (see Bob & Nepstad, 2007; Iqbal & Zorn, 2006, 2008;
Simonton, 1994), essentially examine post-death and post-assassination political, social, and/or economic consequences. In addition,
to date, broad-based systematic empirical studies of what might be termed precursors, antecedents, or indicators of assassinations
and attempted assassinations, especially in the leadership realm, are generally not available.
☆ The authors thank Chester A. Schriesheim and the anonymous reviewers for their positive comments and helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this article.
⁎ Corresponding author at: Center for Leadership Studies & School of Management, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000,
USA. Tel.: +1 607 777 6066; fax: +1 607 777 4422.
E-mail address: [email protected] (F.J. Yammarino).
1048-9843/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2013.08.004
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Our purpose here is to start to address this void in the literature. To begin this potentially controversial and new line of work
on assassination and leadership, it seems useful to return to the basics and foundations of leadership research found in traditional
and established leadership approaches (for reviews, see Bass, 2008; Yammarino, 2012, 2013; Yukl, 2010). In particular, we are
interested in whether leadership style, in terms of power orientation (personalized or socialized power) (e.g., Bass, 2008; House &
Howell, 1992) and mode of outstanding leadership (charismatic, ideological, or pragmatic leadership) (e.g., Bass, 2008; Mumford,
2006), as well as related variables and concepts (e.g., leader and assassin characteristics), will be indicative of the likelihood of
assassination or attempted assassination for leaders in a variety of political arenas.
Power orientation in general, and personalized as compared to socialized power orientation in particular, have a long and
established history in leadership research, dating to some of the oldest leadership studies in the early 1900s (see Bass, 2008;
Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989; Stogdill, 1974; Yukl, 2010), and are the precursors to current transformational, charismatic, and
authentic leadership approaches (e.g., Bass, 1985, 2008). Charismatic leadership is a traditional and established leadership
approach dating to the early work of Weber (1924, 1947) in sociology and House (1977) in the organizational sciences. House
(1996) noted that his charismatic leadership view traces its roots to path-goal theory (House, 1971; Schriesheim & Neider, 1996;
Schriesheim & Von Glinow, 1977), another traditional leadership approach. Ideological leadership is another traditional and
established leadership approach with a long history particularly in sociology (see Weber, 1924, 1947) and the political sciences
(see Bass, 2008; Gerring, 1997; Rejai, 1991). Pragmatic leadership also is a traditional and established leadership approach with
its foundations and manifestations at least as early as the time of Benjamin Franklin (see Mumford & Van Doorn, 2001) and with a
long history in sociology (e.g., Jacques, 1976) and political science in terms of negotiation and deal-making (see Yammarino &
Mumford, 2012).
To our knowledge, there is currently no literature that addresses this issue of assassination and leadership directly. After considering
multiple alternatives, we formulate our ideas in the form of research questions, rather than specific hypotheses, to provide an initial
exploration of the connection between traditional leadership approaches and assassination. Then, using historiometric methods
(e.g., Ligon, Harris, & Hunter, 2012; Simonton, 1990) and quantitative analyses, we conducted a large-scale and broad-based empirical
study to explore these traditional and potential leadership-related precursors and antecedents of the assassination and attempted
assassination of leaders.
2. Assassinations and attempts
An assassination is usually defined as the killing of a public figure or private individual for political reasons; i.e., while an
individual is killed, the motives are generally political in nature, target some larger collective for impact (e.g., nation, social
system), and are aimed at large-scale political and social change (see Bob & Nepstad, 2007; Iqbal & Zorn, 2006, 2008; Simonton,
1994). As such, assassinations are not random events; but rather are systematic, though rare, occurrences influenced by social,
political, and economic conditions.
Assassinations and assassination attempts, to some extent, also can be considered as an “ultimate” criterion or measure of the
success and failure of leadership. For example, Simonton (1994) notes that systematic analyses of U.S. Presidents and absolute
monarchs reveal that successful assassination is one of the “best things” that can happen to enhance a leader's reputation and
greatness rating; and for some public figures (e.g., Martin Luther King), while short-term reputation may suffer, long-term
reputation is enhanced (p. 76).
Iqbal and Zorn (2006, 2008) indicate that the killing of a head of state is one of the most severe and consequential forms of political
violence, and has substantial political, social, and economic effects on nations. In terms of consequences, for political assassinations after
WWII, they report an interactive relationship among assassination, type of leadership succession (e.g., constitutional succession,
hereditary ascension), and political turmoil (e.g., government protests, riots, civil war) such that the effects of assassination on political
instability are greatest in nations in which the leadership succession process is informal and unregulated (Iqbal & Zorn, 2008). In terms of
potential indicators, they also found that institutional factors related to types of leadership succession, degree of institutionalized power,
and levels of repression interact to influence the occurrence of assassinations. In particular, Iqbal and Zorn (2006) note that while
repressive leaders are at greater risk for assassination, the effect of repression is moderated by executive power so that weak, repressive
leaders in non-democratic nations have the highest assassination risk.
Just because someone is identified as a leader by some sources, not everyone universally follows leaders in general or a
particular leader (see Bass, 2008). In a traditional leadership sense, leaders can be thought of creating in-groups and out-groups of
followers and non-followers, using a VDL (e.g., Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975) or LMX (e.g., Schriesheim, Castro, & Cogliser,
1999) approach, both up-close and at a distance (e.g., Yammarino, 1994). Assassinations are extreme examples of not following or
endorsing a leader and how leaders do not obtain all that they want from other individuals; extreme non-followers assassinate or
attempt to assassinate individuals who they do not perceive as their leaders. In terms of individualized leadership, leaders who
are perceived as enhancing or building the self-worth of individuals, create followers; leaders who are perceived as violating or
denigrating the self-worth of individuals, create non-followers; and the same leader may do those very different things for different
individuals (see Dansereau, 1995; Dansereau et al., 1995). Extreme followers can then become fanatics; extreme non-followers can
then become assassins.
Assassinations are also especially potent events that create “flashbulb memories” for large numbers of individuals, both
individually and collectively, but the recollections are far from photographic and are subject to (positive and negative) bias and
distortions (Simonton, 1994, pp. 68–70). Assassinations and attempts impact the leader and his/her immediate followers, the
larger collective (e.g., society, nation) politically, socially, and economically, and more distant supporters connected to that leader.
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For example, the U.S. as a nation suffered tremendous ill effects from the John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King assassinations,
but the citizens of Dallas, Texas and Memphis, Tennessee, respectively, also suffered years of collective guilt, stress, health
problems, and pathological behaviors (e.g., higher coronary disease and suicides rates) not attributable to other factors (see
Simonton, 1994, p. 329).
Simonton (1994, p. 74) notes that “a successful assassination is a more horrendous effect than a mere attempt.” But, as both
types of events, while different, can have devastating consequences, it seems important to account for assassinations as well as
assassination attempts. As such, the study of assassinations may lead to predictions of assassinations and attempts that save
leaders' lives and benefit followers and larger collectives, i.e., enhanced multi-level benefits. Moreover, the study of assassinations
of leaders may provide insights about non-followers in general and extreme non-followers/non-supporters (e.g., assassins) in
particular; and both types of non-followers are highly under-researched in the leadership literature as compared to both immediate
and distant followers (see Bass, 2008; Yammarino, 1994; Yukl, 2010). In addition, the study of assassinations may identify types and
styles of leadership and leaders that engender extreme love and hate and fanaticism (positive and healthy or negative and unhealthy)
in others, both followers and non-followers. In particular, different types of leaders displaying various styles of leadership may be
more or less likely to be the victims of assassinations and the targets of assassination attempts.
3. Leadership and assassinations
We were unable, however, to identify any leadership or related literature that addressed this issue directly. As such, we assert
that a potential and useful starting point for an exploration of the connections between leaders, leadership, and assassinations are
the traditional and established leadership approaches noted above that focus on leadership style in terms of personal power
orientation of leaders, i.e., personalized or socialized power (e.g., Bass, 2008; House & Howell, 1992), and type of outstanding
leadership, i.e., charismatic, ideological, or pragmatic leadership (e.g., Bass, 2008; Mumford, 2006). These traditional aspects of
leadership that leaders exhibit, display, and espouse are based on their visions and messages and the form or type of connections
with both immediate and distant followers and non-followers (e.g., Yukl, 2010). Thus, these traditional leadership dimensions can
provide a reasonable starting point and the potential to offer insights to assassinations and attempted assassinations of leaders.
3.1. Power orientation: personalized and socialized leaders
Simonton (1994, p. 130) states that the higher a U.S. President's power drive, the greater the likelihood that he would be the
target of an assassination attempt, successful or not. Iqbal and Zorn (2006) note that powerful leaders can exercise their power in
ways to mitigate their chances of assassination. By creating personality cults and atmospheres of fear, for example, assassinations,
assassination attempts, and even thoughts and plans of these can be dissuaded by powerful leaders.
Two primary types of power orientation are personalized and socialized power (e.g., Bass, 2008; Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999;
Eubanks et al., 2010; House & Howell, 1992; Ligon, Hunter, & Mumford, 2008; O'Connor, Mumford, Clifton, Gessner, & Connelly,
1995; Strange & Mumford, 2002). Personalized leaders seek power and control, satisfy their ego, and seek personal outcomes and
often short-term gains for themselves. They frame actions in terms of their own self-aggrandizement seeking to enhance their
power and control regardless of the costs to others and the broader social system. In contrast, socialized leaders share power and
control, empower others, and seek social or collective outcomes and often long-term gains for others and the larger collective.
They seek to enhance others and the broader social system by building capabilities in others that transcend themselves.
Personalized and socialized power orientations in leadership also have integrity-related aspects and implications (see Bass,
2008; Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Palanski & Yammarino, 2009). Personalized leaders typically hide and disguise their real
intentions and personal gains, use a directive communication strategy that emphasizes propaganda (Mumford, 2006), and
ultimately are viewed as unethical, unprofessional, and even immoral. If found out or exposed for who they are, personalized
leaders are likely to suffer dire consequences. Socialized leaders, on the other hand, are much more open and believe in full
disclosure about their intentions and the outcomes for all. They use a positive prosocial communication approach to engage
others in a cooperative enterprise (Mumford, 2006) and are typically viewed as very ethical, professional, and even as moral
compasses. Because of the value placed on the outcomes to others, followers and the social system, socialized leaders may foster
extreme devotion in followers who value the outcomes.
In summary, personalized power oriented leaders focus on themselves, personal interests, and the short term; tend to be
dominating, exploitative, and controlling; are more likely low in integrity and high in paranoia; and they can be narcissistic. In
contrast, socialized power oriented leaders focus on others, the greater or collective good, and the long term; tend to share power
and empower others; are more likely high in integrity and low in paranoia; and they can be trustworthy and ethical.
As a result of the above, a first alternative for consideration is that personalized leaders should be more likely than socialized
leaders to be victims of assassinations and the targets of assassination attempts.
Alternative 1a. Assassinations and assassination attempts are greater in number for Personalized Power Orientation Leaders as
compared to Socialized Power Orientation Leaders.
However, consider the following: First, leaders with a socialized power orientation offer a more wide-ranging set of outcomes
for all, individually and collectively, than leaders with a personalized power orientation (e.g., Bass, 2008; Bass & Steidlmeier,
1999; House & Howell, 1992). Socialized leaders thus offer, and ultimately should provide or at least try to provide, an enhanced
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set of multi-level benefits for followers and non-followers. But some of these many outcomes promised by socialized leaders may
be perceived by others as particularly risky and uncertain. In contrast, leaders with a personalized power orientation often are
more conservative in their actions and offerings, and typically provide followers and non-followers with fewer promised
outcomes. As such, these leaders may be perceived as less risky and more certain by others. So, the “devil we know”
(i.e., personalized leaders with fewer and less risky outcomes) is safer than the “devil we don't know” (i.e., socialized leaders with
more and riskier outcomes).
Second, and more importantly, leaders with a personalized power orientation may do a better job of disguising their intentions
(“playing things closer to the vest”); hiding their actual actions and real levels of integrity, morality, and professionalism (e.g., Bass &
Steidlmeier, 1999; Mumford, 2006; Palanski & Yammarino, 2009); and may be quite secretive, keep things to themselves, and rely
solely on a few close-at-hand devoted followers (e.g., fanatics) for support and protection.
In particular, for personalized leaders, less disclosure of actual intentions and actions may eventually result in more
competition elimination by personalized leaders, fewer assassinations, and perhaps even fewer assassination attempts per se as
compared to socialized leaders. In this way, personalized leaders may not have many known or extreme detractors because they
appear to be wonderful leaders surrounded by devoted followers. In other words, by eliminating potential competition and
detractors, personalized leaders may thus reduce assassination attempts (“get them before they get me”); and by keeping a tight
inner circle, they may also be better protected by a core of fanatical followers. In contrast, socialized leaders, because they have
little to hide, also have less of a perceived need to be protected by insiders and devoted followers. But, as a result, they are also
more exposed to outsiders, may foster extreme hate in those (non-followers) at a distance, and thus may be more likely victims of
assassinations and assassination attempts.
Given these reasons, a second alternative for consideration is that socialized leaders should be more likely than personalized
leaders to be victims of assassinations and the targets of assassination attempts.
Alternative 1b. Assassinations and assassination attempts are greater in number for Socialized Power Orientation Leaders as
compared to Personalized Power Orientation Leaders.
These two competing alternative sets of arguments (Alternative 1a and Alternative 1b) suggest our first research question for testing:
Research Question 1: Are assassinations and assassination attempts greater in number for Personalized or Socialized Power
Orientation Leaders?
3.2. Outstanding leadership: charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders
Outstanding leadership can take a variety of forms, and much work on this topic focuses on charismatic, ideological, and
pragmatic leadership as alternative pathways to leadership effectiveness (e.g., Bass, 2008; Ligon et al., 2008; Mumford, 2006;
Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, & Caughron, 2009; Simonton, 2009; Strange & Mumford, 2002; Yukl, 2010). Charismatic, ideological,
and pragmatic leaders can all be successful and effective but do so in very different ways and beginning from quite different
foundations (see Mumford, 2006).
Charismatic leaders are affective and vision-based leaders, who are future oriented and can foster extreme love and hate in
followers and non-followers, respectively (Bass, 1985, 2008; House, 1977). At the extreme, the “love” may be strong enough to
create fanatics who would be willing to do anything for the charismatic leader; and the “hate” may be strong enough to create
potential assassins who would be willing to kill them.
Charismatic leaders have both the vision and plan (i.e., cognitive element) that is a positive image of the future and appeals to
followers and the emotional connection to followers that enhances the attachment to and love for them in supporters (Mumford,
2006). But, charismatic leaders also have the lack of vision appeal (i.e., a negative image of the future) to non-followers and the
emotional repulsion to non-followers that enhances the detachment from and hate for them in their detractors. In brief, a key
issue for charismatic leaders is the protection of the vision; and emotional appeals to followers, which are typically positive and
individually-targeted, are one way to help accomplish this purpose.
Ideological leaders are belief-based leaders, with strong values and deeply held beliefs, who are past oriented and steadfast in
their views (Bass, 2008; Gerring, 1997; Mumford, 2006; Rejai, 1991). Values and standards of the past must be maintained to
build a just society, strong social movement, etc. for ideological leaders. At the extreme, ideological leaders have strong support
from (fanatical) followers with similar values and beliefs, who defend them endlessly and often unquestionably based on the
vision and plan (i.e., cognitive element or the ideology per se) or based on emotional appeals.
But ideological leaders often lack the ability to form ties and attachments with followers based on both cognitions and emotions
(Mumford, 2006; Strange & Mumford, 2002). For example, Mitch McConnell's connection to followers is based on cognitive and not
emotional elements, while Sara Palin's attachment to followers is based more so on emotional elements and not cognitions per se.
Those extreme non-followers who disagree with ideological leaders, often do so strongly based on either the plan, vision, and
cognitions (but without the emotional involvement) or emotions (but without the cognitive element), see them as a real danger and
threat to the larger collective, and could be motivated to ostracize or eliminate them completely (e.g., assassination). In sum, a key
issue for ideological leaders is the employment of tight, close-knit groups of followers to protect the ideology; and this can be
accomplished with external emotional appeals that are negative about the present and positive about the past.
Pragmatic leaders are problem-based leaders, who are present oriented and offer a careful analysis of and solutions to
problems for the “here and now,” recognizing the practical aspects and constraints involved (Mumford, 2006; Mumford, Zaccaro,
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Harding, Jacobs, & Fleishman, 2000; Strange & Mumford, 2002; Yammarino & Mumford, 2012). As the “great compromisers” and
social problem-solvers often with very good communication skills, pragmatic leaders tend to both annoy and please everyone
(close and distant followers and non-supporters) to some extent (somewhat similarly) and at moderate levels.
This occurs because followers as well as non-followers of pragmatic leaders never receive all that they desire, but everyone,
followers and non-followers alike, get something they want; this is the nature of compromise per se for all parties involved. While
such leaders can foster dislike, the degree of distaste is unlikely to result in a large number of assassinations and assassination
attempts on pragmatic leaders as even non-follower and non-supporters tend to benefit somewhat from pragmatism. In all,
pragmatic leaders are more than willing to make deals, bargains, and compromises to accomplish their purposes; and this can be
accomplished without any emotional or affective appeals (Yammarino & Mumford, 2012).
In summary, the mental models of charismatic leaders have a future-oriented time frame, focus on many goals, target the
masses, and use positive emotional appeals. Their problem solving behaviors include idea generation and seeing and using people
as change agents; their communication behaviors involve personal, emotional appeals and positive imagery; and their political
tactics include the use of a shared vision with positive emotion to unite others and appeal to the personal needs of followers. In
contrast, the mental models of ideological leaders have a past-oriented time frame, focus on few goals, target similar believers,
and use negative emotional appeals. Their problem solving behaviors include changing the current situation to how it used to be;
their communication behaviors involve negative events, negative emotions, and stating the problems with the current situation;
and their political tactics include articulation of problems with the current system, blaming others, and persuading others with
rigid personal beliefs. Alternatively, the mental models of pragmatic leaders have a present-oriented time frame, focus on many or
few goals depending on the situation, target experts or elites, and use rational or stoic appeals. Their problem solving behaviors
include the use of expertise and rational thought and seeing and using people and the system as change agents; their communication
behaviors involve sharing information in a clear, rational way; and their political tactics include negotiation and the use of knowledge,
expertise, and rational explanations.
As a result of the above, a first alternative for consideration is that, in terms of assassinations and assassination attempts,
charismatic leaders and ideological leaders may be more similar to one another but very different from pragmatic leaders.
Alternative 2a. Assassinations and assassination attempts are similar in number for Charismatic and Ideological Leaders and
greater in number for both as compared to Pragmatic Leaders.
Holding pragmatic leaders aside, it is possible to consider further the differences between charismatic and ideological leaders.
In particular, charismatic leadership uses both cognitions (visions and plans) and emotions (attachment appeals) in combination
to attract followers (Bass, 2008); and this same cognitive–emotional approach tends to repel non-followers. In contrast,
ideological leadership employs an appeal to followers, both nearby and at a distance, primarily in terms of either cognitions
(ideology per se) or emotions (an attachment to the past), but not necessarily in terms of both together (see Mumford, 2006);
and this same cognitive or emotional approach tends to repel non-followers. Thus, by “tugging at both the heart and the head,” it
might be that the hate toward charismatic leaders displayed by extreme non-followers can be even stronger than that for
ideological leaders.
For example, Simonton (1994, p. 130) states that powerful, charismatic U.S. Presidents are more likely targets of an assassination
attempt due to the attention they attract from “too many mentally deranged personalities.” Also, for social movements, Bob and
Nepstad (2007) note that assassinations can have a profound impact, at some times repressing the movement, and at other times
strengthening the commitment and bolstering the protest. Among the key factors determining these divergent outcomes are the
importance of the type of leader assassinated and his/her embodiment of the shared identity of the movement. Specifically, Bob and
Nepstad (2007) assert that the assassination of a prophetic leader (i.e., Weberian charismatic leader) rather than an administrative
leader (i.e., Weberian rational-legal leader) will have a more profound impact (e.g., greater outside attention and moral outrage) on
the movement, members, media, and third parties.
In addition, while ideological leadership relies on a vision that looks to the past, charismatic leadership employs a vision that
looks to the future (Mumford, 2006). The past may be perceived as more safe and relatively risk free (“the devil we know”), while
the future may be perceived as more uncertain and relatively risky (“the devil we don't know”) by both followers and
non-followers alike. As such, charismatic leadership involves selling and promoting, based on affect, an uncertain future as well as
a vision and plan, based on cognitions. Moreover, charismatic leaders are unwavering (Bass, 2008); i.e., they are so sure of their
vision that they are reluctant to change it or let others alter it. In contrast, ideological leaders are selling and promoting a more
certain past, based on either affect or cognitions, but not necessarily both, and are more willing to let at least insiders (those close
at hand) influence a change or modification in their vision.
Given these reasons, a second alternative for consideration is that charismatic leaders are more likely victims of assassinations
or targets of assassination attempts than ideological leaders.
Alternative 2b. Assassinations and assassination attempts are greatest in number for Charismatic Leaders, next in number for
Ideological Leaders, and least in number for Pragmatic Leaders.
Still holding pragmatic leaders aside, consider the opposite case; i.e., the likelihood of ideological leaders being targeted and
assassinated more frequently than charismatic leaders. Charismatic leaders are unconcerned with the past, or perhaps more
accurately, merely refer to the past to identify unsolved problems and failed prior solutions of previously employed visions and
plans (Mumford, 2006). In contrast, ideological leaders embrace, revere, and wish to recreate and live in the past. As a result of
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this strategy, however, a key challenge for ideological leaders is not to be viewed as abusing or altering the past in the eyes of their
followers. There are at least two possibilities for unfavorable outcomes for ideological leaders here.
In one scenario, if this does occur, and the visions, plans, and ideology offered by the leader do not align directly with
followers' recollections of the past, then these followers can become alienated non-followers. Such former followers, when
alienated to the extreme, may strike out at the ideological leader that they once embraced. In another scenario, because of the
steadfastness of beliefs and in visions of the past for ideological leaders, only followers close at hand may be allowed the
opportunity to be involved in altering these beliefs and visions. As a result, followers at a distance can become alienated from the
ideological leader; and once again, in extreme cases, the possibility is created for developing ardent non-followers who may strike
out at the ideological leader that they once respected.
Given the above, a third alternative for consideration is that ideological leaders are more likely victims of assassinations or
targets of assassination attempts than charismatic leaders.
Alternative 2c. Assassinations and assassination attempts are greatest in number for Ideological Leaders, next in number for
Charismatic Leaders, and least in number for Pragmatic Leaders.
These three competing alternative sets of arguments (Alternative 2a, Alternative 2b, and Alternative 2c) suggest our second
research question for testing:
Research Question 2: Are assassinations and assassination attempts greater in number for Charismatic, Ideological, or Pragmatic
Leaders?
3.3. Power orientation and outstanding leadership in combination
There is no current literature that directly links the aspects of power orientation and modes of outstanding leadership to
assassinations and assassination attempts. Likewise, there is no available research on their combined effects in this regard. It seems
logical, however, since both traditional dimensions can be relevant and operating simultaneously for leaders and leadership (see Bass,
2008; Ligon et al., 2008; Mumford, 2006; Strange & Mumford, 2002), that both dimensions may also be interacting and operating
jointly (whether independent dimensions or not) to help provide a better understanding of the reasons underlying assassinations
and assassination attempts. While even more speculative than but nonetheless relying on the above discussion and alternative
arguments, there are several possibilities to consider, some of which are highlighted here.
In particular, a specific dimension of leadership, although interacting with the other aspect of leadership, may nevertheless
dominate what leaders do and how they operate, impacting assassinations and assassination attempts. For example, suppose that
the power orientation of leaders is more important than but still interacting with outstanding leadership. In this case, and if
personalized leaders are unable or unwilling to disguise or hide their focus on individual outcomes and lack of integrity, then
perhaps personalized charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders will be more likely targets of assassinations and attempts.
Alternatively, it might be that outstanding leadership is more important than but still interacting with the power orientation
of leaders. In this case, and based on the highest degrees of risk and uncertainty in visions of leaders and outcomes for followers
(or lack thereof for non-followers), then perhaps charismatic leaders, both personalized and socialized, will be the more likely
targets of assassinations and assassination attempts. Ideological leaders, both personalized and socialized, being the next most
risky and uncertain in the outcomes offered in their visions, might also be next in terms of likely targets of assassinations and
assassination attempts. In comparison, perhaps due to some accrued benefits for both followers and non-followers as well as
some potential sacrifice by both followers and non-followers, pragmatic leaders, both personalized and socialized, may be the
least likely targets of assassinations and assassination attempts.
Clearly, there are many more ways to speculate about the potential interactions between power orientation and outstanding
leadership to determine the likelihood of leaders being the targets or victims of assassinations. These multiple competing alternative
sets of ideas suggest our third research question for testing:
Research Question 3: For which of the Power Orientation and Outstanding Leadership combinations (i.e., Socialized and
Personalized Charismatic Leaders, Socialized and Personalized Ideological Leaders, Socialized and Personalized Pragmatic Leaders)
are assassinations and assassination attempts greatest, least, and similar in number?
In addition to the potential combined effects of leader power orientation and type of outstanding leadership style on assassinations
and attempted assassinations, there may be other mitigating factors connected to these traditional leadership approaches that may
influence whether leaders are targets or victims of assassination. While the variety and number of these additional factors can be quite
large, we consider three key factors based on both some limited prior work and speculation on assassinations and attempted
assassinations; i.e., paranoia levels of the leaders involved, regions of the world where these events occur, and characteristics or motives
of the assassins involved.
3.4. Paranoia
Elements of power orientation and outstanding leadership (e.g., degree of loyalty of followers, riskiness of leader visions and
follower outcomes, benefits and costs to the larger collective) may be linked to the general paranoia levels of leaders (cf., Bass,
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2008; Iqbal & Zorn, 2006; Mumford, 2006). At the extreme, leaders can display evidence of a paranoid personality disorder (see
American Psychiatric Association, 2000) in which there is a tendency to be suspicious, mistrustful, hyper-vigilant, and
preoccupied with being exploited or betrayed by others. In less extreme cases, leaders may be quite secretive, keep things to
themselves, and rely solely on a few close-at-hand devoted followers (e.g., fanatics) for support and protection. Paranoia indicates
levels of worry and anxiety on the part of leaders who then may want to have control of the opposition to protect themselves;
thus, paranoia levels may be more strongly linked to attempted assassinations than successful assassinations.
The general paranoia levels of leaders also may influence how the various dimensions and aspects of leadership interact to
impact assassinations and assassination attempts. Personalized leaders, given the elements of this leadership orientation, might
be expected to display higher paranoia levels than socialized leaders. In this case, personalized leaders might disguise or hide well
their actual intentions as a result of elevated paranoia levels, while socialized leaders may have lower paranoia levels and lack
motivation to mask their actual intentions. Then perhaps socialized charismatic, socialized ideological, and socialized pragmatic
leaders will be more likely targets of assassinations and attempts.
As socialized charismatic leaders would be expected to display low (perhaps the lowest) levels of paranoia given the elements
of this type of leadership, then they might be the most likely targets of assassinations and assassination attempts because they are
the least concerned with self-protection. In comparison, given devotion to the vision of the past, ideological leaders, both
personalized and socialized, may be protected better by followers (especially insiders and fanatics) than other types of leaders. As
such, they may be less likely targets of assassinations and assassination attempts. Personalized ideological leaders, in particular,
perhaps are the least likely targets, as these leaders would be expected to display high (perhaps the highest) levels of paranoia
given the elements of this type of leadership and thus are most concerned with self-protection.
These ideas suggest our fourth research question for testing:
Research Question 4: What is the connection among paranoia, the leadership approaches of power orientation and outstanding
leadership, and assassinations and attempted assassinations? Is paranoia a more critical factor for attempted assassinations
than assassinations?
3.5. Regions of the world
Assassinations and attempted assassinations appear to occur at differential rates around the world (see Bob & Nepstad, 2007; Iqbal &
Zorn, 2006). Some countries and regions of the world have an almost regular or recurring rate of assassinations and attempted
assassinations throughout their history; while for other countries and regions, assassinations and attempted assassinations are
non-random but very rare events over the course of time. This may be the case because, while countries in the same region share
political and cultural values including leadership-based ones, these values differ from region to region (see GLOBE project, House,
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). Thus, in some countries and regions, assassinations may be viewed as an acceptable political
tool for change; in other regions and countries, assassinations would never be viewed as acceptable (cf., Iqbal & Zorn, 2006, 2008).
In addition, the role of leaders in general, and of heads of state and prominent government officials in particular, differs in
more democratic as compared to more autocratic or totalitarian countries and regions of the world. Key differences may occur, for
example, in constraints placed on the leader's power, how leaders are elected or selected, the ease with which leaders can be
removed from office or power, and the extent to which the state or government offices and institutions control the leader and his/
her actions and behaviors. In totalitarian countries and regions, for instance, heads of state and prominent government officials
are very well protected, weapons are often not readily available (e.g., strict gun control), and the opposition, if it exists at all, is
well controlled (e.g., by secret police or state security). So assassinations and attempted assassinations are less likely in these
cases; and when they do occur, it is often a coup d'état.
In contrast, in tribal-based countries and regions (i.e., family, extended family, or clan based in which the family is embedded
within the clan within the city-state; e.g., Middle Eastern and African tribal regions, Iraq, and Afghanistan; see Markham, 2012),
assassinations and attempted assassinations may be quite common and acceptable “tribalism” and viewed as a way to replace
unwanted leaders, including heads of state and prominent government officials. In addition, Iqbal and Zorn (2006) concluded that
while repressive leaders are at greater risk for assassination, weak repressive leaders in non-democratic countries face the highest
risk of assassination. They also note that in countries (and presumably regions) with great political unrest and instability,
assassinations are more likely; and the effects of assassinations on political instability are greater in systems where leadership
succession is informal and unregulated (e.g., repressive or totalitarian countries) (Iqbal & Zorn, 2008).
Although these ideas suggest the plausibility of a specific hypothesis, we keep with the exploratory nature of this study and
offer our fifth research question for testing:
Research Question 5: What is the connection among regions of the world, the leadership approaches of power orientation and
outstanding leadership, and assassinations and attempted assassinations? Is world region a more critical factor for assassinations
than attempted assassinations?
3.6. Assassins
While large-scale systematic studies of assassins are generally not available, historical and biographical treatises of individual
assassins, or a particular group of assassins, suggest that their characteristics may be a key factor in the occurrence of assassinations
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(e.g., Bass, 2008; Simonton, 1994). Assassinations may be the effort of a sole assassin operating alone (e.g., “lone gunman”) or a group
of assassins (e.g., conspiracy plot). In either case, the assassins' motives can be political in nature, often targeting some larger collective
for impact (e.g., nation, social system) and aimed at large-scale political and social change, or may be the work of the mentally
deranged personalities of the assassins involved (see Bass, 2008; Bob & Nepstad, 2007; Iqbal & Zorn, 2006, 2008; Simonton, 1994).
In general, there seems to be a parallelism, though not perfect, that occurs regarding the number of assassins and their mental
states and political motivations as follows: Lone assassins tend to be identified as mentally unstable and acting for non-political or
irrational reasons; a group of assassins tends to be identified as an organized conspiracy and acting for political or rational reasons.
These characteristics and motivations seem important because, for example, ideological leaders may be more likely victims of
assassinations from politically motivated individuals and groups. In contrast, charismatic leaders, because they trigger extreme
reactions based on affect, are more likely victims of assassinations from mentally deranged individuals (e.g., Simonton, 1994).
These ideas suggest our sixth research question for testing:
Research Question 6: What is the connection among assassin characteristics (e.g., number involved, mental states, political
motivations), the leadership approaches of power orientation and outstanding leadership, and assassinations?
4. Method
4.1. Historiometric approach
To examine the research questions of interest which deal with inherently rare events, assassinations and assassination
attempts, we used historiometric methods (Ligon et al., 2012; Simonton, 1990). A historiometric approach can be viewed as a
specialized form of qualitative content analysis and meta-analysis in which general conclusions are obtained by quantitatively
cumulating results across multiple historic cases or biographies (see Ligon et al., 2012; Mumford, 2006; Simonton, 1990). For the
leaders here, using the methodological best practices outlined by Ligon et al. (2012), we converted historical and qualitative
information to quantitative indicators for the study of individual differences in leadership and assassinations. Using biographical
material from a variety of sources (detailed below), we were able to focus on and make judgmental evaluations (i.e., coding
decisions) about the behaviors and perceptions of interest regarding leaders, their leadership, assassinations, and related
variables of focus; and then quantitatively analyze these resulting data to draw broad-based, systematic conclusions regarding
assassination and leadership.
4.2. Sample and population of political leaders
The sample investigated was limited to prominent political leaders, broadly defined, where assassinations and attempts are more
likely and it is possible to obtain sufficient variability on measures of interest. In addition to elected, appointed, and anointed political
leaders, we considered leaders who seized their positions (e.g., by military takeover or coup d'état). Moreover, political leaders operate in
a range of different arenas, both formal and informal, where they attempt to achieve outcomes to satisfy multiple stakeholders in a
pluralistic and polycentric context (see Hartley & Benington, 2011). As such, rather than being responsible to a single organization or
group, political leaders are accountable to multiple stakeholder groups that are semi-autonomous. Beyond leaders at various levels of
governments and of nations, Hartley and Benington (2011) note that political leaders are also concerned with orchestrating and leading
inter-organizational partnerships, neighborhoods, communities, established and nascent social movements, political parties, religious
organizations, and so forth.
As such, our working definition of a “political leader” is an individual who impacts multiple different stakeholders, typically in
a variety of arenas. So, politicians such as U.S. Presidents and various Prime Ministers are included; but also some Popes and Kings,
successful and failed revolutionaries, and several social movement leaders are included; and some judges (e.g., U.S. Supreme
Court), labor leaders (e.g., head of major labor unions), military commanders (e.g., generals), business and media leaders, and
even organized crime figures (e.g., Mafia dons) may qualify as “political leaders” if they were engaged in political activities
beyond the typical activities in their focal or primary domains. Regarding organized crime figures including Mafia dons, although
they do not seek political office, they are dependent on those who do for support and special treatment, are active in the campaign
and election process, and seek regulations and concessions that advance their own and their multiple constituents well-being.
(For a fictitious example, consider the case of Don Vito Corleone in The Godfather movies.) Thus, these individuals are included
here as they meet the criteria of being political leaders as defined above.
We sought to cast a wide net in the search for and inclusion of political leaders. To limit any bias on our part in the selection of
leaders and ensure enough available historical and biographical information on them, we identified and included prominent
political leaders who were part of prior historiometric studies (i.e., Eubanks et al., 2010; Ligon et al., 2008, 2012; Mumford, 2006;
O'Connor et al., 1995; Simonton, 2009; Strange & Mumford, 2002). In addition, as these prior studies did not provide enough
political leaders in all the leadership classification categories in which we were interested (i.e., personalized and socialized
charismatic, ideological and pragmatic leaders), we supplemented them with lists of prominent individuals and political leaders
from several other sources.
Specifically, Iqbal and Zorn (2006) employed a database of all assassinated heads of state post-WWII. We included in our work
all individuals from this database that we did not already have represented based on the above prior studies. Moreover, we were
able to locate several sources that provided lists of political leaders, such as the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) World Leaders
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site and the Wikipedia site for Current Heads of State and Government, as well as various lists of prominent individuals who were
victims of assassinations or survived assassination attempts (see References for List of Assassinated American Politicians, List of
Assassinated People, List of Assassinations and Assassination Attempts, List of Current Heads of State and Government, List of
People who Survived Assassination Attempts, Presidents Assassinated and Assassination Attempts, Wikipedia Biography Searches
from Main Wikipedia Page, World Leaders).
Using these sources, we first generated an integrated alphabetical list of names of all political leaders. These leaders were then
all coded for a variety of variables, which are described below. Because our period of interest was the eighteenth century to the
present, and primarily post-WWII, we eliminated leaders whose period in power or office was prior to 1700. We also eliminated
those leaders who were not political, broadly defined, or for whom we could not determine, due to insufficient biographical and
historical information, their power orientation and outstanding leadership type, as these variables were critical for our study.
The final sample comprises a total of 390 political leaders from a variety of arenas, of whom 272 were not assassinated and 118
were assassinated. In addition to analyses of the full sample, from the 272 non-assassinated leaders, we selected a stratified
random sample by leadership classifications (i.e., personalized and socialized charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic) for a direct
comparison group of 118 non-assassinated leaders in cell sizes matched to the analogous assassinated leaders. As such, this
sample of 236 leaders (118 assassinated and 118 non-assassinated in matched leadership categorization cell sizes) is also
analyzed to compare leaders. Moreover, and importantly, our data also are obtained from four populations (not samples) of
political leaders: (1) population of U.S. Presidents (whether assassinated or not) (N = 43, including Barack Obama and counting
Grover Cleveland, who had a split-term presidency, only once), (2) population of prominent political leaders for all nations for the
study time period who were assassinated (N = 118), (3) population of modern day (post-WWII) political leaders for all nations
who were assassinated prominent government officials (N = 100), and (4) population of modern day (post-WWII) political
leaders for all nations who were assassinated heads of state (N = 81) (also see Iqbal & Zorn, 2006).
Clearly, the latter three populations have considerable overlap but offer some unique features as well based on their positions. In the
case of all four populations, inferential statistics are obviously not required, so we report actual data, counts, and indicators, interpreting
magnitudes of results in terms of Cohen's (1988) relative effect sizes (i.e., about .10 as small/weak, .30 as medium/moderate, .50 as
large/strong) and the Dansereau, Alutto, and Yammarino (1984) and Yammarino and Markham (1992) magnitude R-tests based in
coordinate free geometry (i.e., about .25 for a 15-degree test as moderate, .50 for a 30-degree test as strong). This seems to be a
reasonable strategy as, although populations are involved, we nevertheless will likely have measurement error and other potential
biases involved in the data, and thus the population effect sizes are not necessarily totally accurate.
4.3. Coding
The 390 political leaders were coded for a variety of biographical, demographical, and historical information, their leadership
positions and styles, assassinations and assassination attempts, and where possible, information about their assassins. The source
materials were generated from Google searches regarding websites on the prominent political leaders. Given the large number of
leaders, to standardize information gathering and coding, the primary source material in each case was the Wikipedia entry or
biography of the individual. If this was not available or contained insufficient information to code the leadership classifications
and the other variables described below, then the coders employed an established protocol to seek out secondary sources. In
particular, university website biographies and then various historical biographies were consulted for expanded and confirmatory
information.
Following procedures and best practices described by Ligon et al. (2012), all content coding was completed by two to four
trained coders who were doctoral students and faculty with expertise in leadership and historiometric methods. The extensive
training occurred over several weeks and consisted of numerous readings on the relevant leadership approaches and content
coding procedures, familiarization with the source materials as well as the definitions and operationalizations of the variables,
extended discussions, example and detailed practice coding, post-coding analysis and debriefing, review of common errors to
avoid and strategies for reaching consensus codes, and so forth.
Upon completion of training, the coders worked independently to evaluate the source materials, and initial inter-rater
reliabilities for the various variables were all above .70, often about 75% agreement. After additional training and practice for
several weeks, the independent coders achieved inter-rater reliabilities of over .90, often about 95% agreement, for all variables;
and with minimal post-coding discussion, consensus codes were easily reached in virtually all instances. Faculty members also
served as additional independent coders in random checking procedures and as “tie-breakers” in those very rare instances where
ambiguity in the source materials made clarity and consensus codes a challenge. Ultimately, 100% agreement was reached on all
codes for all variables for all 390 leaders included in the study.
4.4. Measures
4.4.1. Positions
Individuals coded as prominent government officials included traditional political leaders, such as heads of state and officials elected,
appointed, or anointed to lesser public and government offices, including cabinet members, ministers, judges, and heads of government
departments (e.g., FBI or secret police). Those who were not government officials included individuals such as heads of labor unions,
business leaders, heads of social movements, and Mafia dons, who operate outside the government, but who may interact with the
government or have political agendas. A leader was coded as the head of state if he/she were the king/queen, president, prime minister, or
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other chief of a state or country/nation. The exact position and title of each leader were coded as the last or highest position that they held;
there were 92 different positions identified.
4.4.2. Assassination
Whether a political leader was a victim of assassination or not was treated as categorical variable (No = 0, N = 272; Yes = 1,
N = 118). We only coded those deaths where another person or group deliberately murdered a leader and the incidents were
labeled an assassination by reliable sources. Not included as victims of assassinations were those leaders who committed suicide,
whether it was before the opposition could reach them, while in prison, or when given the option to do so to spare their family
shame or more dire consequences; those who died as the result of their sentence after a trial; or those whose deaths were
considered as occurring under mysterious circumstances where not all of the facts were known to be conclusively viewed as an
assassination.
4.4.3. Attempted assassination
We coded the actual number of attempted assassinations on political leaders' lives, where only failed assassination attempts
were considered. Whether a political leader was the target of assassination had to be documented, credible, and reported by
multiple sources. While the actual numbers of assassination attempts were originally recorded for each leader, the final data and
analyses use a recoded variable (i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3 to 5, 6 to 10, and more than 10 attempts) that was more realistically distributed
(M = .36, SD = .86) and dealt with an extreme outlier (i.e., well over 600 attempts on Fidel Castro's life).
4.4.4. Power orientation
The leader's power orientation was coded as personalized (0, N = 161) or socialized (1, N = 229). Based on the above
conceptualization and description, a political leader was considered as having a socialized power orientation if the majority of actions
taken when in office were directed toward the greater good and the benefit of his/her country and citizens. A political leader was
considered as having a personalized power orientation if the majority of actions taken when in office were directed toward his/her
personal benefit. Where possible, we used and then independently verified our codes with those from prior historiometric studies
(i.e., Eubanks et al., 2010; Ligon et al., 2008; Mumford, 2006; O'Connor et al., 1995; Simonton, 2009; Strange & Mumford, 2002).
4.4.5. Outstanding leadership
The leader's outstanding leadership style was coded as charismatic (0, N = 70), ideological (1, N = 142), or pragmatic
(2, N = 178). Based on the above conceptualization and description, a political leader was considered as having a charismatic
style if there were signs of him/her being future oriented, inspiring and motivating followers, earning their trust and solidarity,
signs of personality traits which made him/her liked, loved, or worshiped by his/her people, or if his/her behavior indicated the
ability to communicate on a powerful emotional level (e.g., giving inspiring speeches). A political leader was considered as having
an ideological style if he/she was past oriented, and a founder of a political party, movement or ideology in which he/she truly
believed and followed in his/her rise to power and throughout the in-power period. A political leader was considered as having a
pragmatic style if he/she was present oriented and his/her behavior consisted more of practical actions rather than a certain
ideology or future vision. Thus he/she would focus more on successful programs of economic reforms rather than founding
ideologies or visions. Involvement in negotiation processes and willingness to solve conflicts in a peaceful manner would also
result in a leader being classified as pragmatic. When characteristics of more than one outstanding leadership style were present,
we have coded the leader's prevailing or primary outstanding leadership style. Moreover, if the leader's style has changed over
time, we have coded for the leadership style in the last period in which the leader has held a political position. Where possible, we
again used and then independently verified our codes with those from prior historiometric studies (i.e., Eubanks et al., 2010; Ligon et
al., 2008; Mumford, 2006; O'Connor et al., 1995; Simonton, 2009; Strange & Mumford, 2002).
4.4.6. Combination of leadership approaches
Given the power orientation and outstanding leadership dimensions, it is possible to identify political leaders in one of six
leadership classifications: socialized (N = 43) and personalized (N = 27) charismatic leaders, socialized (N = 93) and personalized
(N = 49) ideological leaders, and socialized (N = 93) and personalized (N = 85) pragmatic leaders. Again, where possible, we
confirmed and independently verified our codes with those from prior historiometric studies (i.e., Eubanks et al., 2010; Ligon et al.,
2008; Mumford, 2006; O'Connor et al., 1995; Simonton, 2009; Strange & Mumford, 2002).
In Table 1 we present the numbers of political leaders in all the leadership classification categories, some examples of political
leaders, and indicate if the leaders were victims of assassinations or targets of assassination attempts. For purposes of illustration,
10 leaders were randomly selected from each of the six leadership classifications to be shown in the table. As such, only 60 of the
390 political leaders included in the study are listed in the table. In addition, given the long history of presidential research (see
Bass, 2008; Simonton, 1994, 2009), power orientation, outstanding leadership style, and leadership categorization for all U.S.
Presidents are presented in Appendix A.
4.4.7. Paranoia
The general paranoia level of leaders was coded as follows: not enough information to reach a conclusion (0); and no signs of
paranoia (1), some signs of paranoia (2) (i.e., less than four behaviors noted below), and signs indicated a high level of paranoia
(3) (i.e., four or more behaviors noted below) (M = 1.49, SD = .78). To determine the level of paranoia for the political leaders,
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Table 1
Numbers and examples of political leaders.
43 Socialized charismatic leaders: Mustafa Ataturka,
David Ben-Gurion, Cesar Chavez, Winston Churchill,
John F. Kennedya, Jomo Kenyatta, Martin Luther Kinga,
Franklin D. Roosevelta, Anwar Sadata, Margaret Thatchera
93 Socialized ideological leaders: Susan B. Anthony,
Betty Friedan, Indira Gandhi, Mohandas Gandhia,
Charles de Gaullea, Dag Hammarskjold, Ronald Reagana,
Eleanor Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelta, Lech Walesa
93 Socialized pragmatic leaders: Richard Daley,
John Foster Dulles, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Felix Frankfurter,
Oliver W. Holmes, Mikail Gorbechev, George Soros, Josip Tito,
Harry S. Trumana, Booker T. Washington
Total socialized leaders: 229
27 Personalized charismatic leaders: Idi Amin,
Francois Duvalier, Adolph Hitlera, Jimmy Hoffaa,
J. Edgar Hoover, Ferdinand Marcos, Benito Mussolinia,
Eva Peron, Juan Peron, Malcolm Xa
49 Personalized ideological leaders: Fidel Castroa,
Francisco Franco, Heinrich Himmler, Ho Chi Minh,
Vladimir Lenina, Joe McCarthy, Josef Stalin,
Leon Trotskya, Deng Xiaoping, Mao Ze-Dong
85 Personalized pragmatic leaders: Konrad Adenaura,
Al Capone, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Lyndon B. Johnson,
Carlo Gambino, Reinhard Heydricha, Robert Moses,
Rupert Murdoch, Jackie Presser, Richard Nixona
Total personalized leaders: 161
Total charismatic leaders: 70
Total ideological leaders: 142
Total pragmatic leaders: 178
Total political leaders: 390
Note: Numbers of political leaders are shown for each classification category. To illustrate the range of leaders included in the study, 10 randomly selected
political leaders for each leadership category are listed.
a
Political leader who was either a victim of assassination or a target of an assassination attempt.
we created behavioral anchors for paranoia based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th edition text
revision; DSM-IV-TR) diagnostic criteria for Paranoid Personality Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Paranoia is
characterized as “a pervasive distrust and suspicion of others such that their motives are interpreted as malevolent, beginning by
early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by four (or more) or the following: (1) suspects, without
sufficient basis, that others are exploiting, harming, or deceiving him or her; (2) is preoccupied with unjustified doubts about the
loyalty or trustworthiness of friends or associates; (3) is reluctant to confide in others because of unwarranted fear that the
information will be used maliciously against him/her; (4) reads hidden demeaning or threatening meanings into benign remarks
or events; (5) persistently bears grudges, i.e., is unforgiving of insults, injuries, or slights; (6) perceives attacks on his or her
character or reputation that are not apparent to others and is quick to react angrily or to counterattack; and (7) has recurrent
suspicions, without justification, regarding fidelity of spouse or sexual partner” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 356).
Relatedly, we found that a large number of those leaders identified as paranoid exclusively exhibited strategies and tactics to
control the (political) opposition, so we also coded for control of opposition as follows: not enough information (0); and no
control of opposition (1) and control of opposition (2). As the paranoia and control of opposition measures were very highly
associated, we focused on the more general and comprehensive paranoia measure in subsequent analyses.
4.4.8. Regions of the world
The political leader's country was coded as the nation or state where his/her highest or greatest political position was held.
There were 106 countries represented in the data. Because of the (limited) number of cases for any one country as well as the
commonalities of cultural and political values of countries within regions as identified by House et al. (2004), we grouped
countries by regions of the world. Our 11 region classification (Anglo, N = 142; Germanic Europe, N = 20; Latin Europe, N = 28;
Nordic Europe, N = 4; Confucian Asia, N = 19; Sub-Sahara Africa, N = 33; Eastern Europe, N = 40; Middle East, N = 33;
Southern Asia, N = 39; Latin America, N = 28; Colonies/Multiple Influences, N = 4) based on House et al. (2004) was very
highly associated with the original country codes here, so it was used in subsequent analyses. For additional analyses, based on
Markham (2012) as well as the GLOBE work, we also considered non-tribal (Anglo, Germanic Europe, Latin Europe, Nordic
Europe, Confucian Asia) as compared to tribal (Sub-Sahara Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, Southern Asia, Latin America,
Colonies/Multiple Influences) regions, which was very highly associated with the more general region measure.
4.4.9. Assassin characteristics
For those leaders who were assassinated, where available (N = 110) we also coded information on the assassin(s)
demographics (e.g., gender, age at the date of the assassination) as well as motivations and the numbers of assassins involved. In
particular, the assassin's motivation was coded as follows: not enough information (0); and assassin was mentally ill (1), assassin
was politically motivated (2), and assassin had another motivation (3). In this latter case, assassins were considered to have other
motivations when there was something other than mental illness or political motivations, such as personal disputes, wage
disputes, or job disputes, that led to the assassination of the leader. Also, the number of assassins was coded for those who
operated or worked alone (1, N = 37) or when they operated or worked as part of a group or conspiracy plot (2, N = 73).
Ultimately, because of limited data availability from source materials, only the number of assassins measured was included in
subsequent analyses as it was the more objective, reliable metric. In cases where data were available, it also aligned well with the
notion that assassins' mental states and political motivations seem to show a parallelism with their numbers such that lone
assassins tend to be mentally unstable, non-political or irrational, while groups of assassins tend to be an organized conspiracy,
political or rational.
4.4.10. Controls (other variables)
Eubanks et al. (2010), Ligon et al. (2008, 2012), Mumford (2006), O'Connor et al. (1995), and Strange and Mumford (2002)
employed a large number of control variables in their historiometric analyses of leaders. Although none of these controls
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833
displayed a significant impact on the coding or their general study results, we nevertheless coded a number of these in our study.
These control variables consisted of several demographic and biographic indicators for the political leaders (e.g., gender, birth and
death years, whether currently alive or not, start of rise to power, start years in power, pinnacle of power years, end years in
power) and their assassins (e.g., gender, age). In addition, data on both the source(s) of information about the leader and assassin
and the number of sources used to collect information necessary to perform a complete coding on the leader and assassin were
coded. Cognizant of the misuse of control variables (see Spector & Brannick, 2011), however, only specific (not all) control and
other variables were included in analyses when they were conceptually linked and statistically related to assassinations and
attempted assassinations.
5. Results
To explore the research questions of interest, results are presented for two samples and four populations of political leaders
within the data: overall sample of 390 political leaders (of whom 118 have been assassinated), sample of 236 political leaders
(which combines the 118 assassinated leaders and the matched stratified random set of 118 non-assassinated leaders), and
populations of 118 assassinated political leaders, 100 assassinated prominent government officials (PGO), 81 assassinated heads
of state (HOS), and 43 U.S. Presidents (given prior presidential research). In addition, we focused on the following variables in the
research questions: assassinations and attempted assassinations; power orientation, outstanding leadership, and their combination;
and paranoia of leaders, regions of the world, and assassins operating alone or as a group. The remaining variables that were measured
and coded, generally demographic and control measures, did not substantially impact the overall results, and as such are not reported.
Likewise, we conducted a series of logistic (for assassinations) and standard (for assassination attempts) regressions, with and
without control variables, which did not yield any substantially different results than those from the more basic analyses below, and
so are not reported here.
5.1. General results
Given the categorical or nominal nature of some variables and the interval or continuous nature of other variables, we used counts,
frequencies, ratios and appropriate non-parametric (e.g., coefficient of contingency, and phi and point-biserial coefficients) and
parametric (e.g., Pearson product moment correlations) indicators. Examination of these results among the variables of focus for the
two samples and four populations yielded nine general findings relative to the six research questions in this study. These general
findings are summarized and then elaborated with additional analyses and results that are tabled.
First, if we think of assassinations and assassination attempts as the key outcome or dependent variables (i.e., consequences,
criteria) in this exploratory study, it is important to note that they are not related in the samples or for U.S. Presidents. Thus they
are unique outcomes and can be examined separately to better understand the phenomena in the six research questions. Second,
if we think of power orientation and outstanding leadership as the key antecedent or independent variables (i.e., precursors,
predictors) in this exploratory study (RQ1 and RQ2), it is important to note that they are not related in both samples or in the four
populations. They are actually independent dimensions of traditional and established leadership approaches. Third, if these
independent leadership dimensions are considered in combination or as an interaction (RQ3), power orientation is a two-to-three
times stronger component than outstanding leadership of the combined six-category leadership classification in the samples and
populations.
Fourth, an association between power orientation and attempted assassinations (RQ1) holds in the overall sample and for
assassinated PGOs and assassinated HOSs. In these cases, personalized leaders are more frequent targets of assassination
attempts than socialized leaders (details below). Fifth, an association between outstanding leadership and both assassinations
and attempted assassinations (RQ2) holds for U.S. Presidents. In these cases, more charismatic than pragmatic Presidents have
been assassinated (no ideological Presidents have been assassination victims); and charismatic and pragmatic Presidents, more
so than ideological Presidents, have been the more frequent targets of assassination attempts (details below). Sixth, an
association between the six-category leadership classification and attempted assassinations (RQ3) holds for assassinated PGOs
and assassinated HOSs. In these cases, personalized ideological and personalized pragmatic leaders are the most frequent
targets, and socialized pragmatic and socialized ideological leaders are the least frequent targets, of attempted assassinations
(details below).
Seventh, paranoia (RQ4) typically is associated with attempted assassinations but not assassinations, and generally with power
orientation but not outstanding leadership, in the samples and populations (Presidents excluded as only one was coded as having any
level of paranoia). In these cases, more paranoid and personalized leaders are the more frequent targets of assassination attempts
than less paranoid and socialized leaders (details below). Eighth, region of the world (RQ5) typically is associated with assassinations
in the samples but not attempted assassinations in the samples and populations. In these cases, Sub-Sahara Africa, Southern Asia,
Eastern Europe, Middle East and tribal regions have more assassinations than the other seven world regions and non-tribal regions
(details below). Ninth, the number of assassins (RQ6) is obviously associated with assassinations, but, in limited cases where data are
available, not with attempted assassinations in the samples and populations. Except for U.S. Presidents where attempts and
assassinations have been by a lone assassin, in the other cases, a group of assassins or conspiracy plot rather than a lone assassin is
more prevalent (details below).
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F.J. Yammarino et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 24 (2013) 822–841
Table 2
Assassinations by power orientation and outstanding leadership.
Personalized
Socialized
Per.-soc. comp.
Charismatic
Ideological
Pragmatic
C-I-P comparison
Per. charismatic
Per. ideological
Per. pragmatic
Soc. charismatic
Soc. ideological
Soc. pragmatic
Style comparison
a
Assassinated leaders (118)a
Assassinated PGO (100)a
Assassinated HOS (81)a
51
67
Soc N Per
16
56
46
INPNC
6
21
24
10
35
22
SI N PP N SP N PI N SC N PC
45
55
Soc N Per
10
44
46
PNINC
4
17
24
6
27
22
SI N PP N SP N PI N SC N PC
36
45
Soc N Per
8
35
38
PNINC
3
13
20
5
22
18
SI N PP N SP N PI N SC N PC
Populations of assassinated leaders. PGO = Prominent Government Officials, HOS = Heads of State.
5.2. Specific results
To pursue RQ1 to RQ3 further, in Tables 2 to 4 we present counts and ratios of power orientation and outstanding leadership in
relation to assassinations and assassination attempts for the samples and populations of leaders. For assassinations (Table 2),
socialized leaders, and pragmatic and ideological leaders, are more frequent victims of assassinations than personalized leaders
and charismatic leaders, respectively. Socialized ideological and personalized pragmatic leaders are the most frequent, and
socialized and personalized charismatic leaders are the least frequent, victims of assassinations. For Presidents (Table 4),
socialized, charismatic, and socialized charismatic Presidents are the most frequent victims of assassinations.
For assassination attempts (Table 3), the sample results are non-significant. When considering counts and ratios for the
populations, personalized leaders, and ideological and pragmatic leaders, are more frequent targets of assassination attempts
than socialized and charismatic leaders, respectively. Personalized ideological and personalized pragmatic leaders are the most
frequent targets, and socialized pragmatic and socialized ideological leaders are the least frequent targets, of assassination
attempts. For Presidents (Table 4), considering both counts and ratios, socialized, charismatic and pragmatic, and socialized
charismatic and socialized pragmatic Presidents are the most frequent targets of assassination attempts.
To pursue RQ4 further, in Table 5 we present counts and ratios of assassination attempts for various levels of paranoia and power
orientation for the samples and populations of leaders. We focused on this analysis as there is an association among paranoia,
assassination attempts (but not assassinations), and power orientation (but not outstanding leadership), with personalized leaders
being more paranoid than socialized leaders. For assassination attempts, the sample results are non-significant. When considering
counts and ratios for the populations, personalized leaders with high levels of paranoia are more frequent targets of assassination
attempts than personalized leaders with only some (lower) levels of paranoia. This pattern does not hold for socialized leaders and
Table 3
Assassination attempts by power orientation and outstanding leadershipa.
Personalized
Socialized
Per.-soc. comparison
Charismatic
Ideological
Pragmatic
C-I-P comparison
Per. charism.
Per. ideolog.
Per. pragm.
Soc. charism.
Soc. ideolog.
Soc. pragm.
Style comparison
a
b
All leaders (390)
Assass. & select
non-assass. (236)
Assassinated
leaders (118)b
Assassinated
PGO (100)b
Assassinated
HOS (81)b
40 (.25)
42 (.18)
Per N Soc
χ2 = 2.77 (1 df) n.s.
11 (.16)
30 (.21)
41 (.23)
PNINC
χ2 = 1.49 (2 df) n.s.
4 (.15)
15 (.31)
21 (.25)
7 (.16)
15 (.16)
20 (.22)
PI N PP N SPN
SC&SI N PC
χ2 = 6.67 (5 df) n.s.
25 (.25)
23 (.17)
Per N Soc
χ2 = 1.93 (1 df) n.s.
4 (.13)
25 (.22)
19 (.20)
INPNC
χ2 = 1.33 (2 df) n.s.
1 (.08)
14 (.33)
10 (.21)
3 (.15)
11 (.16)
9 (.20)
PI N PP N SPN
SI N SC N PC
χ2 = 6.73 (5 df) n.s.
12 (.24)
9 (.13)
Per N Soc
12 (.27)
6 (.11)
Per N Soc
11 (.31)
6 (.13)
Per N Soc
2 (.13)
12 (.21)
7 (.15)
INPNC
2 (.20)
9 (.20)
7 (.15)
C&INP
2 (.25)
8 (.23)
7 (.18)
CNINP
1 (.17)
6 (.29)
5 (.21)
1 (.10)
6 (.17)
2 (.09)
PI N PP N PC&
SI N SC N SP
1 (.25)
6 (.35)
5 (.21)
1 (.17)
3 (.11)
2 (.09)
PI N PC N PPN
SC N SI N SP
1 (.33)
5 (.38)
5 (.25)
1 (.20)
3 (.14)
2 (.11)
PI N PC N PPN
SC N SI N SP
Number of leaders who have had attempts on their lives—counts (ratios).
Populations of assassinated leaders. PGO = Prominent Government Officials, HOS = Heads of State.
F.J. Yammarino et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 24 (2013) 822–841
835
Table 4
Assassinations of and assassination attempts on U.S. Presidents (43)a.
Personalized (14)
Socialized (29)
Per.-soc. comparison
Charismatic (9)
Ideological (13)
Pragmatic (21)
C-I-P comparison
Per. charismatic (3)
Per. ideological (2)
Per. pragmatic (9)
Soc. charismatic (6)
Soc. ideological (11)
Soc. pragmatic (12)
Style comparison
a
Assassinations
Attempts
0
4
Soc N Per
3
0
1
CNPNI
0
0
0
3
0
1
SC N SP N PC,PI,PP,SI
5 targets (.36), 9 attempts
10 targets (.34), 14 attempts
Soc ~ Per
4 targets (.44), 7 attempts
2 targets (.15), 2 attempts
9 targets (.43), 14 attempts
C&PNI
1 target (.33), 4 attempts
1 target (.50), 1 attempt
3 targets (.33), 4 attempts
3 targets (.50), 3 attempts
1 target (.09), 1 attempt
6 targets (.50), 10 attempts
SP&SC N PP,PI,PC N SI
Population of U.S. Presidents. Number of U.S. Presidents and ratios for targets are in parentheses.
levels of paranoia which appear to be unrelated regarding targets of assassination attempts. (As only one U.S. President was coded as
having any level of paranoia, a similar analysis was not conducted for Presidents.)
To pursue RQ5 further, in Tables 6 and 7 we present assassinations by regions of the world, and by tribal/non-tribal regions
and power orientation and outstanding leadership, for the populations of assassinated leaders. When the 11 GLOBE regions are
considered (Table 6) for all assassinated leaders, Sub-Sahara Africa, Southern Asia, Anglo, Eastern Europe, and Middle East are the
regions with the most assassinations. But when only assassinated PGOs and especially when only assassinated HOSs are
considered, there is a dramatic drop-off in assassinations for the Anglo region and, to some extent, for Latin America. Given the
above discussion, we explored assassinations for tribal as compared to non-tribal regions in conjunction with the various
leadership types (Table 7). Tribal regions have more assassinations than non-tribal regions for both personalized and socialized
leaders, and for both ideological and pragmatic leaders, but not for charismatic leaders where assassinations in non-tribal regions
are more frequent.
To pursue RQ6 further, in Table 8 we present assassinations by the number of assassins and power orientation and outstanding
leadership for the populations of assassinated leaders. Groups of assassins are more prevalent than lone assassins for all
leadership types (personalized and socialized leaders as well as charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders); and this pattern
of differences is somewhat enhanced when only assassinated HOSs are considered. In contrast, all assassinated U.S. Presidents are
typically viewed as having been the victim of a lone assassin.
6. Discussion
6.1. Key findings
In Table 9, as a summary of all the results and analyses, we present a set of tentative conclusions for the six research questions
regarding assassinations, attempts, and leadership for all political leaders and assassinated leaders in the first column of the table,
and for U.S. Presidents in the second column of the table. In general, socialized as well as pragmatic and ideological leaders were
the most frequent victims of assassinations; but personalized as well as pragmatic and ideological leaders were the most frequent
targets of assassination attempts; and for U.S. Presidents, socialized charismatics were the most frequent victims of assassinations
Table 5
Assassination attempts by power orientation and paranoiaa.
Pers. & no paranoia
Pers. & some paranoia
Pers. & high paranoia
Soc. & no paranoia
Soc. & some paranoia
Soc. & high paranoia
Comparison
a
b
All leaders
(380; 10 NA)
Assass. & select
non-assass. (236)
Assassinated
leaders (118)b
Assassinated
PGO (100)b
Assassinated
HOS (81)b
15/65 (.23)
7/30 (.23)
18/64 (.28)
35/197 (.18)
5/21 (.24)
2/3 (.67)
Per & High N Per & Some
χ2 = 7.19 (5 df) n.s.
12/50 (.24)
3/19 (.16)
10/31 (.32)
19/112 (.17)
2/12 (.17)
2/3 (.67)
Per & High N Per & Some
χ2 = 7.91 (5 df) n.s.
3/19 (.16)
3/15 (.20)
6/16 (.38)
8/54 (.15)
1/7 (.14)
0/0 (.00)
Per & High N Per & Some
3/15 (.20)
3/14 (.21)
6/15 (.40)
5/43 (.12)
1/7 (.14)
0/0 (.00)
Per & High N Per & Some
3/12 (.25)
3/11 (.27)
5/12 (.42)
5/33 (.15)
1/7 (.14)
0/0 (.00)
Per & High N Per & Some
Number of leaders who have had attempts on their lives—counts (ratios).
Populations of assassinated leaders. PGO = Prominent Government Officials, HOS = Heads of State.
836
F.J. Yammarino et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 24 (2013) 822–841
Table 6
Assassinations by regions of the world.
Region of world
Assassinated leaders (118)a
Assassinated PGO (100)a
Assassinated HOS (81)a
Anglo
Germanic Europe
Latin Europe
Nordic Europe
Confucian Asia
Sub-Sahara Africa
Eastern Europe
Middle East
Southern Asia
Latin America
Colonies/multiple influences
19
3
6
3
5
21
15
14
20
11
1
12
2
6
3
4
20
12
14
19
7
1
5
0
5
2
3
20
10
12
17
6
1
a
Populations of assassinated leaders. PGO = Prominent Government Officials, HOS = Heads of State.
and targets of assassination attempts. Also, higher levels of paranoia are associated with personalized leaders and more frequent
assassination attempts. Moreover, both tribal regions of the world and groups of assassins are associated with all leadership types
and more frequent assassinations.
6.2. Tentative interpretations
In terms of power orientation (RQ1), socialized leaders are assassinated more frequently than personalized leaders. This
finding suggests that socialized leaders may not protect themselves because they trust others, and these leaders believe that they
are doing the right thing. This finding is important as it suggests that socialized leaders, while helping the collective or society,
may be placing themselves at risk and hindering their chances of success. For assassination attempts, however, personalized
leaders are more frequent targets than socialized leaders. In this case, it may be that personalized leaders are “found out” at some
point, with followers recognizing that they are not really interested in them or the greater good, and that these leaders are
actually interested in only themselves. Because personalized leaders are more paranoid (RQ4), they may protect themselves
better, surrounding themselves with loyal fanatics, which then can yield less successful assassinations but more assassination
attempts.
In terms of outstanding leadership (RQ2), pragmatic leaders and ideological leaders are assassinated more frequently than
charismatic leaders. This may occur because charismatic leaders must protect their visions and so must likewise protect
themselves as the embodiment of those visions. They win over and maintain followers with both cognitive (i.e., visions) and
emotional appeals, thus tugging at both the “head and heart” and having two chances, so to speak, to keep followers engaged and
content. In contrast, pragmatic leaders, who need to make deals and compromises to succeed, can please everyone somewhat, but
run the risk of annoying everyone as well. And, if they fail to keep those deals, or non-beneficial details of the deals come about or
are found out, the likelihood of assassination can increase. Likewise, for ideological leaders, the past is a mixed bag—it is the “devil
you know”, but the past has known positive and negative features. Followers who know the past well and may not have fully
benefited there, then can potentially become a danger to ideological leaders, enhancing the likelihood of assassination.
In terms of the combination of leadership approaches (RQ3), socialized ideological leaders and personalized pragmatic leaders
are more frequently assassinated than other leaders. These findings suggest that “the past is good for everyone” argument by
socialized ideological leaders does not hold, nor does “cutting deals and not keeping them” for personalized pragmatic leaders.
Socialized ideological leaders have a rigid adherence to the past, but their followers also know the past, as they have lived through
it too; and if these followers have been hurt in the past, they will not want to return to it. Thus, assassinations of these leaders are
Table 7
Assassinations by power orientation, outstanding leadership, and regions.
Personalized & non-tribal
Personalized & tribal
Socialized & non-tribal
Socialized & tribal
Comparison
Charismatic & non-tribal
Charismatic & tribal
Ideological & non-tribal
Ideological & tribal
Pragmatic & non-tribal
Pragmatic & tribal
Comparison
a
Assassinated leaders (118)a
Assassinated PGO (100)a
Assassinated HOS (81)a
17
34
19
48
T N N-T for P & S
10
6
13
43
13
33
T N N-T for I & P not C
13
32
14
41
T N N-T for P & S
6
4
8
36
13
33
T N N-T for I & P not C
7
29
8
37
T N N-T for P & S
5
3
3
32
7
31
T N N-T for I & P not C
Populations of assassinated leaders. PGO = Prominent Government Officials, HOS = Heads of State.
F.J. Yammarino et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 24 (2013) 822–841
837
Table 8
Assassinations by power orientation, outstanding leadership, and assassins.
Personalized & alone
Personalized & group
Socialized & alone
Socialized & group
Comparison
Charismatic & alone
Charismatic & group
Ideological & alone
Ideological & group
Pragmatic & alone
Pragmatic & group
Comparison
a
Assassinated leaders (110; 8 NA)a
Assassinated PGO (94; 6 NA)a
Assassinated HOS (77; 4 NA)a
11
39
26
34
G N A for P & S
6
8
15
38
16
27
G N A for C,I,P
10
34
22
28
G N A for P & S
3
6
13
29
16
27
G N A for C,I,P
8
28
15
26
G N A for P & S
2
5
10
24
11
25
G N A for C,I,P
Populations of assassinated leaders. PGO = Prominent Government Officials, HOS = Heads of State.
a way to try to prevent a return to the past. Personalized pragmatic leaders make deals, and these deals benefit them; but if the
deals are violated or the excessive advantages to the leader at the expense of the followers and collective are discovered, followers
can react extremely negatively. Assassinations of these leaders are extreme examples of this negativity.
Noteworthy regarding this research question is that socialized and personalized charismatic leaders are the least frequently
assassinated leaders. Apparently charismatic leaders, whether socialized or personalized, do not foster the extreme hate in some
(in addition to the extreme love by others), resulting in assassinations, as may have been thought given prior literature on
charismatic leadership (see Bass, 2008, but also see Presidents below). Relatedly, and generally consistent with results regarding
other research questions (RQ5 and RQ6), assassinations are more frequently completed by groups of assassins rather than lone
assassins, and are more frequent in tribal as compared to non-tribal regions, for all leadership types except charismatic leaders
(but see Presidents below).
Personalized pragmatic leaders and personalized ideological leaders are the targets of assassination attempts more frequently
than other leaders. In the case of personalized pragmatic leaders, this may simply be the result of not fulfilling the deals they have
made; and in the case of personalized ideological leaders, it may be primarily the outcome of not completing their mission to
return to the past. In both cases, however, it also may be the leader putting himself/herself (i.e., personalized) before the greater
good or collective, coupled with these personalized leaders proclivity for paranoia (RQ4), that creates situations conducive to
assassination attempts.
For U.S. Presidents (RQ1 to RQ3), of the four assassinated, three were socialized charismatics (Lincoln, Garfield, Kennedy) and one was
socialized pragmatic (McKinley). Of the 15 Presidents who were targets of assassinations one or more times, six were socialized
pragmatics (Truman, Ford, Carter, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton, Obama), three were socialized charismatics (Lincoln, T. Roosevelt, F. Roosevelt),
three were personalized pragmatics (A. Johnson, Hoover, Nixon), and one each was socialized ideologue (Reagan), personalized
charismatic (G.W. Bush), and personalized ideologue (Jackson).
Looking across all the results for U.S. Presidents, there are several unique features as compared to the results for the other political
leaders whether assassinated or not. First, the outstanding leadership dimension, rather than power orientation dimension for other
political leaders, appears to be more important for understanding presidential leadership and its positive and negative consequences
(also see Simonton, 1994, 2009). Second, in contrast to other political leaders, charismatic Presidents and socialized charismatic
Table 9
Summary of tentative conclusions.
All & assassinated leaders
RQ1 Socialized leaders more frequent victims of assassinations than personalized
leaders; but personalized leaders more frequent targets of attempts than
socialized leaders
RQ2 Pragmatic and ideological leaders more frequent victims of assassinations and
targets of attempts than charismatic leaders
RQ3 Socialized ideological and personalized pragmatic leaders most frequent
victims, and socialized and personalized charismatic leaders least frequent
victims, of assassinations; personalized ideological and personalized pragmatic
leaders most frequent targets, and socialized pragmatic and socialized
ideological leaders least frequent targets, of attempts
RQ4 More paranoid and personalized leaders more frequent targets of attempts
than less paranoid and socialized leaders
RQ5 Tribal regions (e.g., Sub-Sahara Africa, Southern Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle
East) have more assassinations than non-tribal regions for all power
orientation and outstanding leadership types except charismatic leaders
RQ6 Group of assassins more prevalent than lone assassin for all power orientation
and outstanding leadership types
U.S. Presidents
Socialized Presidents more frequent victims of assassinations and
targets of attempts than personalized presidents
Charismatic and pragmatic presidents more frequent victims of
assassinations and targets of attempts than ideological presidents
Socialized charismatic and socialized pragmatic presidents are most
frequent victims of assassinations and most frequent targets of
attempts
No paranoia
Not applicable
Lone assassins only
838
F.J. Yammarino et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 24 (2013) 822–841
Presidents are the most frequent victims of assassinations. Third, contrary to the majority of other assassinated political leaders, lone
assassins rather than groups of assassins are the norm for assassinations of Presidents. These points seem to fit well with Simonton's
(1994) notion of mental deranged personalities (“lone crazies”) being attracted to charismatic Presidents. This also may be partially
explained by the non-tribal and future-oriented nature of the United States; i.e., lone assassins strike at Presidents who really believe
in and offer a risky, uncertain, extreme and perceived threatening future to the potential assassin (RQ5 and RQ6).
6.3. Implications
A key research implication of the results of this exploratory study is the importance and value of using traditional and
established leadership approaches when pursuing new and potentially controversial venues of leadership work. Such approaches
can lend credibility to novel endeavors and provide a solid foundation for additional follow-up research. In our work here, leader
power orientation, personalized as compared to socialized, has a well-established tradition from the early 1900s in leadership
research and is a key precursor to more recent transformational and authentic leadership approaches (see Bass, 2008; Stogdill,
1974; Yukl, 2010). Likewise, outstanding leadership—in the forms of charisma, ideology, and pragmatism—has a well-established
tradition dating to early work by Weber (1924, 1947) and House (1971, 1977) and numerous historical perspectives in sociology
and political science (see Bass, 2008; Gerring, 1997; Jacques, 1976; Mumford & Van Doorn, 2001; Rejai, 1991; Yammarino &
Mumford, 2012).
Importantly, all of these traditional and established leadership approaches were, in several ways, associated with assassinations
and assassination attempts of prominent political leaders and the nuances regarding the victims and targets in terms of paranoia,
regions of the world, and numbers of assassins. Clearly, beyond power orientation and outstanding leadership, which have provided a
solid foundation and some promising results in this regard, there is room for additional explanatory variance to be accounted for by
newer, non-traditional approaches. But, beginning with traditional and established leadership approaches, rather than solely focusing
on recent or new leadership approaches, may hold promise for scholars venturing in new, controversial, and other unique leadership
research directions.
Another research implication is the potential role that traditional power orientation and outstanding leadership approaches can
play to enhance understanding of prominent leaders, extreme followers (i.e., fanatics), and extreme non-followers (i.e., detractors
and assassins) in extreme leadership related behaviors (i.e., assassinations and assassination attempts). Leader styles may contribute
to extreme behavior on the part of both fanatics (e.g., generating unwavering loyalty to and providing personal protection for leaders)
and detractors (e.g., creating assassins who plan and plot assassinations whether successful or not). Our preliminary results thus
suggest new directions for exploring leader–extreme follower (fanatics) and leader–extreme non-follower (detractors) interactions.
More generally, there is a suggestion to study leader–follower relationships not only in terms of bright (“positive and perky”)
but also in terms of dark (“doom and gloom”) dimensions. There seems to be a need to study negative and “neutral” and not just
positive elements about leaders, leader–follower relationships, and leadership (see Yammarino, 2013; Yammarino & Mumford,
2012). Assassinations and assassination attempts are very negative events in the eyes of leaders, for their close-up and distant
followers and fanatics, and for larger collectives (e.g., nation, social movement) that are presumably triggered by other negative
events (e.g., positions, visions, actions of the leaders) in the eyes of the assassins. There is currently over-representation of
positive and bright-side research and an under-representation of negative and dark-side research in the leadership literature.
Both aspects of leadership, as well as more neutral ones, are important for understanding leaders, followers and non-followers
(close, distant, and extreme), and their interactions.
Another more practical implication from our work is for prominent leaders in general and political leaders in particular.
Since leadership styles and approaches appear to have a connection with or contribution to followers and extreme
non-followers behaviors, leaders would be well-advised to understand, articulate, and practice these styles knowing that
everyone is watching. Being a “me vs. we” leader (i.e., personalized vs. socialized power orientation), being a “past, present, or
future” oriented leader (i.e., ideological, pragmatic, or charismatic outstanding leader), or being some combination thereof, has
consequences that can be very dire or very beneficial. As such, the protection of political leaders and the articulation of the
consequences, both positive and negative, of their leadership approaches for followers (close and distant) and the larger
collective seem critical.
6.4. Limitations and future directions
This study has a number of potential limitations which suggest a variety of additional directions for future research on
assassination and leadership. First, we employed merely research questions and not hypotheses per se in our exploratory study.
While these notions were guided by traditional and established leadership theory and logic on power orientation and outstanding
leadership for political leaders, specific hypotheses for testing in future work may now be possible giving the current findings.
Second, a potential limitation of our work is the focus on only two traditional or established dimensions of leadership—power
orientation and outstanding leadership—and their interaction to classify and study prominent political leaders and explain assassinations
and attempted assassinations. Obviously, this is only a beginning, a place to start such a line of research, as there may be many more
traditional and established (e.g., behavioral styles and exchange-based views) as well as contemporary (e.g., transformational and
authentic-based views) leadership approaches worthy of inclusion for investigating assassinations, attempted assassinations and
leadership in future work.
F.J. Yammarino et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 24 (2013) 822–841
839
Third, the qualitative–quantitative, historiometric approach used here is not the only plausible methodology to study
assassination and leadership. As noted at the outset, there is a traditional literature using historical biographies, and by extension,
qualitative case studies of a single political leader, that could be applied to this topic area in future work. In addition, survey-based
approaches, where subjects provide questionnaire ratings of prominent assassinated individuals from written descriptions or
videos of their lives, are plausible. Likewise, perhaps building from our data and variables here, computational agent-based
modeling and simulations of assassination and leadership are also possible in future work.
Fourth, the current approach required us to classify prominent political leaders in terms of their primary leadership styles via
two traditional leadership views, but not all readers and leadership scholars may agree with our leadership categorizations. To
enhance the validity of these classifications, beyond coder agreement, we also relied, to the extent possible, on similar
categorizations in prior historiometric studies. If we have misclassified some political leaders, however, the likelihood of finding
differences in assassinations and attempted assassinations across types of political leaders (i.e. personalized vs. socialized, and
charismatic vs. ideological vs. pragmatic) is actually decreased (rather than increased), so our findings are more conservative than
they would be otherwise.
Fifth, the choices of the prominent political leaders included here also can be considered a potential study limitation. While we
realize that the notion of “populations within samples” is unusual to say the least, there are several populations (perhaps
narrowly defined) of political leaders in our data. Regardless, the samples and populations of political leaders studied here,
whether assassinated or not, may not be representative of all political leaders, especially when longer historical periods (i.e., prior
to 1700) are considered. The populations in this study could also be considered samples collected for a particular time period that
exclude political leaders from other time periods and future political leaders in particular. As such, the conclusions drawn from
these populations could change as future political leaders join the population; and thus, our findings are potentially transitory and
time-bounded subject to future assassinations and attempted assassinations. Nevertheless, to help eliminate selection bias for the
time period examined, we relied to the extent possible on prior historiometric studies and published lists of political leaders, not
lists generated by us for only this study. Relatedly, there may be other meaningful ways to partition the samples and populations of
political leaders here that we have not explored (e.g., using multiple rounds of randomly selected political leaders for comparison
purposes).
Sixth, coding information from Google searches and websites as well as Wikipedia entries, just as coding traditional (books)
historical biographies and other documents (e.g., letters, newspaper accounts, interviews), has all the same limitations of other
historiometric studies. For example, only behaviors and events recorded, selected, and reported by and in the source materials can be
coded; and important things may be missing, mistaken, or misreported. Also, a same or single source may have provided information
about multiple sets of variables, such as those considered to be dependent (e.g., assassinations and attempted assassinations),
independent (e.g., power orientation and outstanding leadership) and other (e.g., paranoia) or control (e.g., in-power years) variables
here (also see Ligon et al., 2012; Mumford, 2006; Simonton, 1990). While we tried to separate the sources for historical materials as
much as possible (e.g., leadership approaches of political leaders identified from prior studies), coders had to (re)classify leaders, and
some of the same coders have made coding judgments on more than one set of variables and measures. These issues could all be
addressed in future work.
Seventh, while it seems that assassinations (i.e., deaths by “unnatural” causes) of political leaders can be accurately
reported and coded, this may not always be the case. Thus, some deaths of political leaders may have actually been by
assassinations but we do not positively know that. For example, there are some suspected assassinations that have not been
publically disclosed or kept as state secrets (i.e., some suspected deaths of a Pope, assassinations by undetected poisoning that
seemed to be naturally occurring deaths and are reported as such, and even, for instance, Jimmy Hoffa's “disappearance” that
may be an assassination). Likewise, the determination and coding of assassination attempts can be even more difficult. The
credibility of the attempted assassination and then credibility of the reporting source material need to be established. Also,
many attempts may go unreported for political reasons, withheld as state secrets, or kept quiet for the protection of a political
leader in power and to prevent disruption of the larger collective (e.g., political unrest of a nation). For some leaders (e.g., Mafia
dons, and perhaps President Obama), attempts are known or thought to be numerous or many, but there is no way to know or
independently verify how many attempts have occurred exactly and with certainty, especially if the political leader is still in
power or currently alive.
Finally, we focused on political leaders, their leadership in terms of two traditional and established approaches, and to some
extent their assassins, but we did not delve directly into the extreme leader–follower (fanatic) or leader–non-follower (assassin)
relationships or interactions per se. Although these relationships and interactions are implied and underlie the traditional and
established leadership approaches discussed and analyzed here, they are not addressed specifically. So, this study has primarily
been an investigation from an individual-level perspective about individual differences in the assassination and leadership of
political leaders. Future work could focus more directly on higher-level effects in leadership (whether traditional or contemporary
approaches) and assassination of political leaders in terms of dyadic-, group-, collective-, and multi-level effects that may be meaningful
and more fully account for these extreme leader–fanatic and leader–assassin relationships, interactions, and the contexts within which
they occur.
We hope that this study of assassination and leadership, focusing on traditional and established leadership approaches and
broadly defined political leaders, and its promising results, serves as a good start for future research on this topic. In particular, we look
forward to future investigations that include leader–extreme non-follower relationships and leader–extreme follower relationships,
with broader samples using additional leadership approaches and alternative methods, to replicate and extend the findings and
further enhance our understanding of the relatively unexplored area of assassination and leadership.
840
F.J. Yammarino et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 24 (2013) 822–841
Appendix A
Power orientation, outstanding leadership, and leadership categorization of 43 U.S. Presidents.
U.S. President
Power orientation: Socialized
(S)–Personalized (P)
Outstanding leadership: Charismatic
(C)–Ideological (I)–Pragmatic (P)
Leadership
categorization*
Washington
J. Adams
Jefferson
Madison
Monroe
J.Q. Adams
Jackson
Van Buren
W. Harrison
Tyler
Polk
Taylor
Fillmore
Pierce
Buchanan
Lincoln
A. Johnson
Grant
Hayes
Garfield
Arthur
Cleveland
B. Harrison
McKinley
T. Roosevelt
Taft
Wilson
Harding
Coolidge
Hoover
F. Roosevelt
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
L. Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
G. H. Bush
Clinton
G. W. Bush
Obama
S
S
S
S
S
S
P
P
S
P
S
P
P
S
P
S
P
P
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
P
P
P
S
S
S
S
P
P
S
S
S
S
S
P
S
C
P
I
I
I
I
I
P
P
C
P
P
P
I
P
C
P
P
I
C
I
I
P
P
C
I
I
I
C
P
C
P
P
C
P
P
P
P
I
P
P
C
P
SC
SP
SI
SI
SI
SI
PI
PP
SP
PC
SP
PP
PP
SI
PP
SC
PP
PP
SI
SC
SI
SI
SP
SP
SC
SI
SI
PI
PC
PP
SC
SP
SP
SC
PP
PP
SP
SP
SI
SP
SP
PC
SP
*PC = Personalized Charismatic, PI = Personalized Ideological, PP = Personalized Pragmatic, SC = Socialized Charismatic, SI = Socialized Ideological, SP =
Socialized Pragmatic.
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