Free and Fair Elections – A New Database
Codebook
Sylvia Bishop and Anke Hoeffler
[email protected]
Coding decisions: additional guidelines used
Conditions for assuming an election to be entirely clean:
Either
Keesings Contemporary Archives and United States Department of State Human Rights
Reports raise no issues, and there is no other reason to suppose potential malpractice (e.g.
malpractice at past or future elections)
or
*the two databases* agree that the election was clean, and there is no other reason to
suppose potential malpractice (e.g. malpractice at past or future elections)
1. Legal framework
Assume these conditions have been met if a comprehensive observer report is available and
does not state otherwise
Do not code as 0 if the following cannot vote: expats, prisoners, military.
Code as 0 if the clergy cannot vote (but not if they can vote but cannot stand)
Code as 0 if the eligibility requirements include past political actions of candidates, e.g.
engagement in a previous regime, where these actions did not entail human rights
violations or subvert an existing democratic regime.
2. Electoral management bodies
Code as -33 if no relevant body exists.
3. Electoral rights
Assume these conditions have been met if a comprehensive first hand observer report is
available and does not state otherwise, and turnout is over 50%
4. Voter register
Any registration of under 80%: code as 0. For over 80%, only code as 0 if there is evidence
eof deliberate malpractice.
5. Ballot access
Assume that these conditions have been met if a comprehensive first hand observer report
is available and does not state otherwise, and there is no reason for doubt
6. Campaign process
Where there is ongoing violence and intimidation against political dissidents initiated by
the government on account of their political views, code as 0. However, do not code as 0 for
ongoing violence by armed forces that do not pertain to the citizen’s political views.
Do not code as 0 on the basis of generalised terrorist violence, if citizens are not in more
danger of this violence if they choose to vote or engage in political activity than if they
abstain (note to self, Bhutan, Honduras)
Do not code as 0 on the basis of limited and isolated violent incidents that are ambiguously
election-related, e.g. between clashing gangs where motivations are usually complex
Assume these conditions have been met if a comprehensive first hand observer report that
covers the campaign period is available and does not state otherwise
7. Media access
Do not code as 0 on the basis of complaints that all larger parties, including non-ruling,
received more media coverage than significantly smaller parties.
8. Voting process
Code as 1 if independent sources state as free and fair without giving details, as this is a
minimal condition. Do not use this guideline if opposition claim fraud.
Do not code as 0 for the following:
Reports of procedural irregularities in vote process if they are deemed by the reporter have
neither a) been intentionally fraudulent, nor b) distorted the outcome.
Anecdotal reports of violations of ballot secrecy if their presentation suggests that they are
anomalous or estimated to occur in less than 10% of cases, and they are not maliciously
intended
9. Role of officials
Ignore inadequate training not deemed to have affected the outcome
Assume these conditions have been met if both voting and counting are held to have been
entirely trouble free
10. Counting of votes
Code as 1 if independent sources state as free and fair without giving details, as this is a
minimal condition. Do not use this guideline if opposition claim fraud.
Do not code as 0 for the following:
Procedural irregularities in the counting process if they are deemed by the reporter to have
neither a) been intentionally fraudulent, nor b) distorted the outcome
Isolated irregularity rectified by a court or similar without quarrel or obstruction
CODING NOTES
These notes provide sources used, explain which conditions were violated in cases of a 0 coding,
and provide detail of reasoning for any potentially controversial cases of a 1 coding.
Afghanistan
2009
Sources
EU election observation mission to Afghanistan in 2009, Final Report (primary)
IRI Observer mission (secondary)
NDI The 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan (secondary)
OSCE/ODIHR Election Support Team, Final Report, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Provincial
and Presidential Elections, 20 August 2009 (for ‘observer rating’ corroboration only)
Notes
2. EMBs,0: violation of c (EU)
3. Electoral rights, 0:systematic difficulty in securing suffrage for women (EU)
4. Voter register, 0: violation of all three conditions (EU)
6. Campaign process was coded as 0 due to violations of a and b (EU, IRI), also somewhat d (IRI)
7. Media access, 0: violation of b (EU)
8. Voting process. 0: violation of c (EU)
9. Role of officials, 0: violence obstructing observer’s access to polling stations, violating e (EU)
10. Counting of votes, 0: violation of d (EU)
Observer Rating 0: based on the agreed opinion of all 4 reports listed.
Albania
1991
Sources
IPU parline: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2001_91.htm (last accessed 13th May)
National Republican Institute for International Affairs: The 1991 elections in Albania (online)
Notes
2. EMB -22: concerns about gerrymandering, could not be verified
3. Electoral rights, 1L inferred from the exceptionally high turnout (98.92%)
4. Voter register, -22: IRI report explicitly noted the impossibility of verifying the voter register
6. The campaign process, 0: violation of a and, overwhelmingly, d
7. Media access, 0: violations of b, and to some extent c
9. Role of officials, 0: ad hoc de facto violation of d. While it is not always clear why only ruling
party observers are present, the cumulative evidence of the report supports this coding
1992
Sources
U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1993 - Albania
Notes
NB have not coded the ban on ethnically based group (see Human Rights Watch report) as a
restriction on ballot access
2. EMBs, -22: some complaints about constituency discrepancies in favour of the Party of Labor,
but we are not sure from the stats along if this was justified (Krisofi)
7. Media access, 0. ‘the ruling Party of Labor completely controlled and used for its own
purposes the most important medium, the Albanian State Radio-Television company RTS’
(Klosi)
8 and 10 assumed on the basis of judgement by observers as free and fair
1996
Source
IRI Observation Report on the Albanian Parliamentary Elections of May 26, 1996 (online)
Notes:
1. Legal framework,0: implementation of lustration laws, which allowed the banning of former
government officials, with ‘Verification of Moral Character’ effectively carried out by members
of the ruling party
2. EMBs, 0: gerrymandering
4. Voter register, 0: violations of a and b
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process, 0: violation of c
7. Media access, 0: violation of b
8. Voting process, 0: violation of b
9. Role of officials, 0: due to violation of a, and b by secret police
10. Counting of votes ,0: violation of d
2001
Sources
OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights: REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: violation of c
4. Voter register , 0: violation of a
6. Campaign process, 1: ‘Opposition parties complained about harassment and minor
obstruction such as the removal of posters... Although regrettable, these actions did not appear
to be significant enough to undermine the integrity of the elections in the first round.’
7. Media access, 0: violation of b
8. Voting process ,0: violation of a (through prevalence of family voting)
9. Role of officials, 0: violations of c, and the interference of police in voting
10. Counting of votes, 0: concerns about tabulation, although limited in geographical scope,
were ‘serious’
2005
Sources
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. 3 July 2005. OSCE/ODIHR Election
Observation Mission Report (online)
Statement of the NDI pre-election delegation to Albania(online)
Notes
4. Voter registration, 0: deficiencies in registers, although the implication is that these are not
politically motivated
6. Campaign process, 0: intimidation and bribes
8. Voting process, 0: Similar deviations from the secrecy of the vote to 2009 but on a greater
scale, at 13%.
10. Counting of votes, 0: ‘Observers reported a number of serious irregularities, particularly
regarding the party list election in zones where the completion of the count was delayed. These
included nine zones where observers reported that votes were not being counted honestly, as
required by paragraph 7.4 of the 1990. Similarly, allegations were made to observers in a
further ten zones.
‘The 3 July 2005 parliamentary election complied, only in part, with OSCE commitments and
other international standards for democratic elections, and marked some progress in the
conduct of elections in Albania’ – coded as 0 for observer rating
2009
Sources:
Council of Europe parliamentary assembly, Observation of the parliamentary elections in
Albania, 28th June 2009 (online)
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. 28 June 2009. OSCE/ODIHR Election
Observation Mission. Final Report (online)
Notes:
4. Voter register, 0: controversy over the issuing of documents which excluded thousands,
although progress had been made in this area since previous elections.
6. Campaign process, 0: threats to public sector workers and students
7. Media access, 1: notwithstanding media bias as this was not through government media
8. Voting process, 1: as although procedural issues were noted at length by the OSCE, they
conclude that ‘there was no evidence of irregular counting or manipulation of results’ – this is
somewhat out of step with the tone of the rest of the report but have taken them at their word.
Deviations from voting secrecy of under 5% disregarded
Observer rating not explicit. ‘Progress’ described as ‘overshadowed’ by politicisation in both
reports. Coded 0.
Algeria
1995
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1995 – Algeria
Youcef Bouandel (1997): Algeria's first free presidential election, November 1995,
Representation, 34:3-4, 173-179
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly. Also, spouse must be Algerian and
participation in the War of Independence is a requisite if born before 1st July 1942
5. Ballot access, 0: one major party banned and another credible candidate ruled ineligible on
contested grounds
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The murder of many political activists has been reported in different
parts of the country’(Bouandel)
7. Media access, 0: press not free
8 and 10 assumed from US dep description as free and fair
1999
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999 – Algeria
Volpi: Democracy in Algeria:Continuity and Change in the Organisation of Political
Representation
Bouandel, the presidential election in Nigeria, April 1999
Notes
On the eve of the election, 6 of the 7 candidates withdrew. The remaining candidate was
military backed so does not constitute major change.
1. Legal framework, 0: restrictions on the constitutional right of citizens to run for office,
particularly requiring their engagement in the War of Independence or, if they were born after
this time, that their parents did not collaborate with colonial powers.
6. Campaign process, 1: ‘. The conduct of the campaign – although regulated as to the use of
languages other than Arabic, and as to the timing, location and duration of meeting – was free,
and all candidates traveled extensively throughout the country.’ US state dep
7. Media access, 1: Notwithstanding - ‘The Government also continued to restrict freedom of
speech, press, assembly, association, and movement, although to a lesser degree than in
previous years’ (US state dep) – as the report also emphasises that ‘the campaign had been
conducted fairly, with all candidates widely covered in both state-owned and private media’
8. Voting process, 0: candidate withdrawal was protest over serious fraud at the military
elections which were held the night before (as part of an effort to keep the military out of the
polling stations) – see Volpi and US state dep. US dep considers these complaints ‘credible’.
10. Counting process, 0: See 10.
2004
Sources
Inmaculada Szmolka. The Algerian Presidential Elections of 2004: An Analysis of Power
Relationships in the Political System. Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 11, Iss. 1, 2006
OSCE PA electoral observation, January 24 – December 2007 – accessed May 2013 here
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 – Algeria
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: restrictions on the constitutional right of citizens to run for office,
particularly requiring their engagement in the War of Independence or, if they were born after
this time, that their parents did not collaborate with colonial powers.
5. Ballot access, 0: violation of d
6. Campaign process, 0: “Opposition candidates also complained that the Ministry of the Interior
regularly blocked registered parties from holding meetings; denied them access to larger and
better equipped government conference rooms; and pressured hotels into not making
conference rooms available, while facilitating the activities of the pro-Bouteflika FLN.” – US state
dep
7. Media access, 0: not free
Observer rating, 1
2009
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009 – Algeria
Bouandel, Youcef “Algeria's Presidential Election of April 2009”, Mediterranean Politics, Volume
14, Issue 2, 2009
Global Integrity Report http://report.globalintegrity.org/Algeria/2009/scorecard/23
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: restrictions on the constitutional right of citizens to run for office,
particularly requiring their engagement in the War of Independence or, if they were born after
this time, that their parents did not collaborate with colonial powers.
2. EMBs, 0: a political body, see Global Integrity Report
5. Ballot, 0: over 75%. Also the conspicuous absence of certain figures suggests violation of (a).
6. Campaign process, 0: obstruction of opposition activities.
7. Media access, 0: High degree of self censorship and favourable coverage of government by
state media. In terms of time allocation, access was broadened during the election (US State
dep)
Andorra
All years sourced from IPU Parline, Keesings contemporary archive and US Department of State
Country Report on Human Rights Practices
1992, 1997, 2005, 2009, 2011 Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
(No Keesings entry was available for 2001. 8 and 10 assumed from US dep recording as free
and fair)
Angola
NB that the Angola election of 1992 was never completed: a second round was required, but due
to the Civil War the incumbent (and first round leader) continued as President. As this election
never concluded we have not coded it here.
Antigua and Barbuda
1984
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1984 – Antigua
and Barbuda
Keesings contemporary archive
Notes
2. EMBs, -33: as the Election Commission was not established until 2002.
7. Media access, 0: state media bias
All else clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1989
Sources
Supervisor of elections, Election Report For The 1989 Election (online)
(Written by the supervisor, but as only negative claims have been coded from this, data
confidence remains)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1989
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: violation of d
4. Voter register, 0: violation of b
7. Media access, 0: state media bias
8. Voting process, 0: frequent violation of a
1994
Sources
Douglas W. Payne. THE FAILINGS OF GOVERNANCE IN ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA - The
Elections of 1999. Policy Papers on the Americas. Volume X Study 4. June 1, 1999 (online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: violation of b
6. Campaign process ,0: violation of d
7. Media access, 0: violation of b
8. Voting process, 0: violation of a
1999
Sources
Supervisor of elections, Election Report For The 1999 Election (online)
The general election in Antigua and Barbuda, 9th March 1999 : report.
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999 – Antigua
and Barbuda
Notes
2. EMBs, -33: no independent electoral commission exists. Us dep: ‘The observer group
recommended the establishment of an independent electoral commission to improve the voter
registration process.’
4. Voter register, 0: inflated (acknowledged by all parties, not presented in report as an issue of
bias)
7. Media access, 0: state-owned electronic media bias
2004
Sources
Antigua and Barbuda General Election. 23 March 2004. Report of the commonwealth team
(online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘The members of the Electoral Commission seem unable to transcend their
party/political affiliations to function in an impartial and united manner.’
6. Campaign process, 0: violations of d. Allegations of violations of a were also made.
7. Media access, 0: violation of b
8. Voting process has been coded as 1 despite some concerns over the use of assistance for
‘incapacity’ which may have resulted in some deliberate instances of public ballot casting. This
has not been included in the coding as a single anecdote is the only evidence provided.
9. Role of officials has been coded as 1 despite notes of poor training (a), because it was held
that this did not affect the result
2009
Sources
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA GENERAL ELECTION- - Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team
(online)
Notes
3. Voter register, 0: some confusion over the cut off date
Argentina
1989
Sources
Ed McCullough, Associated Press, May 15: Peronists Sweep to Victory; Menem Calls for Unity
Levitsky, Steven, “The 'Normalization’ of Argentine politics’, Journal of Democracy Volume 11,
Number 2 April 2000
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1989 – Argentina
The Rutherford Institute's Handbook on Religious Liberty Around the World: Argentina (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: President (who is indirectly elected by the Parliament) required to be a
Roman Catholic
8 9 10, 1. Clean by assumption (see guidelines), supported by description as ‘free, fair’ (US dep),
affirmed by Associated Press above. Unwilling to assume campaign process given info from
2007 citing as common practice the use of state resources, unlikely to be picked up by Keesing
and US dep.
1995 – in addition to databases – ‘The election campaign was conducted in a fair and open
manner; all political parties had full access to the communications media. Representatives from
the major parties were stationed at polling places to insure an honest vote count’ – US dep
1999
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999 – Argentina
October 26, 1999. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Interior minister declares De la Rua
presidential election winner
Notes
BBC may be of interest, statement from interior minister that no votes were challenged.
8 9 10, 1. Clean by assumption (see guidelines). Unwilling to assume campaign process given
info from 2007 citing as common practice the use of state resources, unlikely to be picked up by
Keesing and US dep.
2011
Sources
Global integrity report http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/Argentina/2010/scorecard
Freedom House, Freedom in the world report 2011
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2011 – Argentina
Notes
7. Media access, 1. While Freedom House’s summary conclusions are more negative than US
dep’s, in both we find no substantive instance of concern for the election
8 and 10, 1: ‘polling described by media and various NGOs as free and fair’ (US dep), and
freedom house ‘The midterm legislative elections in June 2009 were considered free and fair.’
Armenia
1991
Sources
Herzig and Kurkchiyan. ‘The Armenians: Past and present in the making of national identity’.
2005
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
5. Ballot access, 0: winner over 75% of vote
7. Media access, 0: tight control of TV and radio (nb “golden age” of freedom of press – Herzig
and Kurkchiyan
2007
Sources
Gerardo Scherlis, 2009. Neopatrimonialism in Argentina: persistence and change
ARGENTINA PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. October 28, 2007. Report of the
electoral observation mission. Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas. (Online)
Notes
4. Voter registration, 0: violation of b, voter registers included non eligible voters
6. Campaign process, 0: the Guardian article above cites use of state resources, and Scherlis’
article corroborates that this is common practice
9. Role of officials, 0: violation of e, observers had a strictly controlled and inadequate agenda
Observer rating was coded as -22 as the reporters explicitly claimed to have had inadequate
access to info to make a judgement.
Australia
United States department of state, Keesings Contemporary Archives
1975, 1977, 1980, 1987, 1990, 1992, 2010: clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Austria
1975 and 1979:
1. Legal framework, 0: You may not vote (and, a fortiori, stand) if ‘confined to a workhouse’ or if
you are a parent who has lost custody of their child
3. See 1
United States department of state, Keesings Contemporary Archives
1979 (except 1 and 3), 1983, 2006, 2007, 2008: clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Azerbaijan
1992
Sources
United states department of state country report on human rights practices 1992 – Azerbaijan
Curtis, Glenn E. (1995). "Azerbaijan: Government and Politics:The Presidential Election of
1992". U.S. Country Studies, Library of Congress
The New York Times. June 8, 1992, Monday, Late Edition – Final. Azerbaijanis Pick President;
No Voting in Disputed Area
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: constitutional provision barring candidates over sixty-five years of age.
3. Electoral rights, 0: no elections in conflict region, Nagorno-Karabakh
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1. Candidate banned on this account
1993
Sources
United states department of state country report on human rights practices 1992 – Azerbaijan
Agence France Presse – English. October 6, 1993. Helsinki Watch says Azerbaijani election
undemocratic
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: found no evidence that constitutional provision of 1992 was altered.
Data confidence impacted
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75% of vote.
7. Media access, 0: bias and restrictions on freedom
2010
Sources
European Parliament: Election observation delegation to the parliamentary elections in
Azerbaijan
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘The Election Code was amended a few months before the elections,
contrary to the good practices in this respect. Those last-minute changes resulted in a
shortening of the campaign period, reduced to 23 days, and the end of the allocation of a limited
state funding to the candidates.’ (emphasis added)
2. EMBs, 0: ‘The Election Code was amended a few months before the elections, contrary to the
good practices in this respect. Those last-minute changes resulted in a shortening of the
campaign period, reduced to 23 days, and the end of the allocation of a limited state funding to
the candidates.’
3. Electoral rights, -22: it is unknown how eligible voters who were not registered were handled
4. Voter register, 0: 4.8m registered, 6m estimated to be eligible. NB that the report notes that
‘serious efforts’ were made
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘The deficient candidate registration process at the constituency level has
further aggravated this context of inequality by leading to the registration of almost all
nominated candidates of the majority party and less than half of the opposition candidates.’
6. Campaign process, 0: Unequal resources, interference with political gatherings, intimidation
of voters and candidates
7. Media access, 0: harassment, and bias
8. Voting process, 0: ballot-stuffing, carrousel voting, assisted voting, group voting, multiple
voting
9. Role of officials, 0: presence of unauthorised persons and instances of international observers
unable to view parts of the process
10. Counting process, 0: ballot box stuffing, vote counts higher than signatures
The Bahamas
For all elections:
2= -33: ‘The Election Management Body in the Bahamas is called the Parliamentary
Registration Department. This is a Department of the Central Government and comes
under the oversight of a Cabinet Minister.’ Appointed by governor-general on PM’s advice.
Source: “The Structure of The Bahamas Electoral Body” http://www.oas.org/sap/docs/DECO/7_EMBs/presentaciones/Bethel_e.pdf
1977
Sources
IPU Parline
Keesing contemporary archives
Notes
KCA raised no complaints, but with no further source and with allegations of fraud in later
years, unable to code.
1982
Sources
IPU Parline
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
NB Opposition allegations of ‘victimization, intimidation and ‘a tremendous amount of cheating’
(allegedly involving illegal transfers of voters from constituencies in which they were
legitimately registered into marginal constituencies) in order to secure their return to office’
(Keesing). No further info, unable to code.
1987
Sources
IPU Parline
Associated Press, Ike Flores, June 20th 1987. Pindling Party Sweeps Back Into Power
Keesing Contemporary Archives
Notes
Observers saw admin problems that could seriously impact the results, but in the end concluded
it was fair. Opposition claimed the election was ‘one massive fraud’. With this controversy, we
could not assume the election clean and have no further information.
1992
Sources
IPU Parline
U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1993 – Bahamas (sic)
Keesing contemporary archives
Notes
7. Media access, 0: ‘Prior to the 1992 election, however, the then-ruling PLP also received far
more television coverage than did its critics.’ (where TV is state owned) (US dep)
1997
Sources
IPU Parline
U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1997 – Bahamas
Notes
7. Media access, 0: ‘There is a government-run radio station and five privately owned radio
broadcasters. The country's sole television station, the state-owned Broadcasting Corporation of
the Bahamas, presented a variety of views, although opposition politicians claimed, with some
justification, that their views did not receive as extensive coverage as those of the Government.’
2002
Sources
IPU Parline
U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 – Bahamas
Notes
7. Media access, 0: ‘There is a government-run radio station and five privately owned radio
broadcasters. The country's sole television station, the state-owned Broadcasting Corporation of
the Bahamas, presented a variety of views, although opposition politicians claimed, with some
justification, that their views did not receive as extensive coverage as those of the Government.’
8 and 10 from “observers found to be generally free and fair”, US dep
2007
Sources
IPU Parline
U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 – Bahamas
http://www.bahamaslocal.com/newsitem/51693/Election_observers_hand_in_reports.html
Notes
6, Campaign process, 0: ‘The election campaign, however, was marred by instances of violence…
and allegations of vote-buying.’ (US dep)
7, -22: ‘the influential state-owned electronic media's alleged favoritism toward government
candidates’ – unclear whether these allegations are reasonable
8 and 10 assumed from ‘generally considered free and fair’, US dep. OAS mission agreed (see
Bahamas local). Opposition challenged three constituencies, but the only one that had gone to
trial concerned whether some voters had fulfilled residency requirements. We take it that if
such technicalities were being disputed, no greater fraud had been suspected.
Bangladesh
1978
Notes
Keesing Contemporary Archives
Sources
United States department of state country report on human rights practices 1978 - Bangladesh
5. Ballot access, 0: Rahman won 76.6% of the vote
7. Media access, 0: Some limitations to freedom of speech and to opposition access to
government media
NB allegations of violence during campaign and of electoral fraud by opposition. Opinion of
press/observers is that these may to some extent be true but did not change the outcome. Too
unclear to code but see Keesing for details.
1986
Sources
Syed Serajul Islam. ‘Bangladesh in 1986: Entering a New Phase’. Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 2, A
Survey of Asia in 1986: Part II (Feb., 1987), pp. 163-172
United States department of state country report on human rights practices 1986 – Bangladesh
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
NB that all serious opposition boycotted.
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75% of vote
7. Media access, 0:’ The fourteen-day newspaper strike from September 20 to October 4 had
prevented the opposition from getting ample coverage of their antielection and anti-Ershad
views.’
8. Voting process, 0: ‘Reuters news agency… reported frequent instances of voting irregularities,
including the use of pre-marked ballots, forging of voting registries and multiple voting by
individuals’
10. Counting process, 0: turnout figures inflated.
(The Feb 1991 election was held when the country was still presidential. The subsequent
constitutional change was not assured during the election and so while this subsequently
produced an executive, it was not an executive election.)
Feb 1996
Major opposition parties boycotted this election
Sources
Muhammed Yeahia Akhter, ‘Electoral Corruption in Bangladesh’, Ashgate 2001
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: widespread violence and attacks on activists in violation of a (Akhter)
7. Media access, 0: government owned media bias (ie all TV and radio)
8. Voting process, 0: ballot box snatching and attacks on polling stations
10. Counting process, 0: ballot box stuffing
June 1996
Sources
The Parliamentary Election in Bangladesh. 12 June 1996. The Report of the Commonwealth
Observer Group. (Online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: problems in the Chittagong region for women and minorities, and
unsubstantiated reports of similar problems elsewhere
6. Campaign process, 0: violations of (a)
7. Media access, 0: government owned media bias (ie all TV and radio). One candidate banned
from appearing.
9. Role of officials, 0: some confusion over the army’s role, the presence of campaign posters in
the booths and inappropriate persuasion from some party agents.
2001
Sources
EU Election Observation Mission Bangladesh 2001: Final Report on the Parliamentary Elections
(online)
National Democratic Institute: The 2001 Bangladesh Parliamentary Elections
Notes
4. Voter register,-22: concerns were raised about voter register inflation but the reports did not
feel in a position to confirm – ‘It is not possible for the EU-EOMB to give a definite assessment of
the integrity of the voters’ roll. Many elements indicate that the flaws were numerous and
important, but the LTOs reported no concrete evidence nor have the parties substantiated their
allegations’
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and intimidation
2008
Sources
Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group (online)
National Democratic Institute. International Observation Mission. Final Report. June 2009
(online)
Democracy Watch: Monitoring Report of the 9th Parliamentary Election 2008 in Bangladesh
(online)
EU Election Observation Mission to Bangladesh Final Report. Parliamentary Elections – 29
December 2008 (online)
Notes
The incumbent was coded as standing but this issue was somewhat complicated. In Bangladesh,
it is usual for a caretaker government to preside after the dissolution of parliament before the
swearing in of a new government. On 11th January 2007, however, a state of emergency was
declared and the supposed interim government ruled until the elections on 29th Dec 2008. The
Prime Minister of the previous government was the BNP Khaleda Zia; the interim government
was headed by the BNP affiliated President at the time of that former government, President
Ahmed. It is Khaleda Zia who partook in the election. This has been coded as an incumbent
running as a) in Bangladeshi politics, the interim regime would usually not affect the coding, and
b) the potential political advantages to Khaleda Zia were similar to those enjoyed by current
incumbents.
1. Legal framework, 0: delayed elections, which should have been held in 2006
2. EMB, 1: notwithstanding appointment of commissioners being an executive prerogative, as in
practice this did not seem to affect partiality (see especially NDI, EU)
3. Electoral rights, 0: see 4
4. Voter register, 1: All reports lauded the enormous improvement in the voter register (see
especially NDI). However, the cut off date for registration and the failure to register appropriate
17 year olds meant that approx 3m who were 18 at the time of the election did not vote (CW,
EU).
6. Campaign process, -22: Commonwealth mentioned allegations of threats to candidate life, but
these were unsubstantiated and not reiterated in any other document.
Barbados
1976
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1976 – Barbados
Keesing Contemporary Archives 1976
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1981
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1981 - Barbados
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) except (2) due to opposition allegations of
gerrymandering, unsubstantiated, coded -22.
1986
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1986 – Barbados
Keesing Contemporary Archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines): 3 and 7 explicit
6, Campaign process, 0: ‘The final week of the campaign was marked by violent clashes between
supporters of the rival parties’ (Keesing)
1991
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1991 – Barbados
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1994
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994 - Barbados
Keesing Contemporary Archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1999
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999 - Barbados
IPU Parline
Keesing Contemporary Archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2003
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003 - Barbados
Notes
4, -22: opposition claimed an inflated voter register, EBC denied
2008
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2008 - Barbados
BBC Worldwide Monitoring. January 16, 2008. Democratic Labour Party wins Barbados
election - agency
Notes
8 and 10 concluded from the explicit endorsement of the election’s honesty from the losing
incumbent, who represents a genuine opposition and loser from the election. See BBC.
2008
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2008 - Barbados
IPU Parline
Keesing Contemporary Archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Belarus
1994
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994 – Belarus
Bunce, McFaul and Stoner-Weiss. ‘Democracy and authoritarianism in the postcommunist
world’. Cambridge University Press; 1st edition (30 Nov 2009)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
7. Media access, 1: ‘although major media outlets were controlled by the state, they respected
freedom of speech and provided fair campaign opportunities for all contestants’ (Bunce et al)
8 and 10 assumed given US dep ‘generally free and fair elections’ (also referred to as simply
‘free and fair’) (this is echoed elsewhere in multiple cases where the election is cited as an
exception to the subsequent pattern of elections that are not free and fair, and affirmed by
Bunce et al)
2010
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report
Notes
1. Legal framework, 1: Notwithstanding the following - ‘Persons in pre-trial detention and those
serving a prison sentence for any criminal offences do not have the right to vote or to be elected.
Denial of the right to vote to those in pretrial detention is not consistent with the principle of
the presumption of innocence, which is not in line with paragraph 5.19 of the OSCE Copenhagen
Document’ – as we have not in general coded 0 for denying prisoners the right to vote, it would
not be illuminating to code as 0.
2. EMBs, 0: ‘The Central Election Commission (CEC) lacked independence, impartiality and
collegiality’
3. Electoral rights, -22: see below
4. Voter register, -22: the report expresses serious concern that the registration process is
decentralised and it is impossible to assess its accuracy
5. Ballot access, 0: Alexander Lukashenko received 79.6%
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘pressure, harassment and misuse of administrative resources to
promote the incumbent.’
7. Media, 0: some legal constraints and intimidation
8. Voting process, 0: instances of multiple voting and ballot box stuffing (notwithstanding the
high percentage of positively rated polling stations)
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘Observers were not provided access to all stages of the electoral process,
particularly during the post-election period.’
10. Counting process, 0: ‘Observers assessed the vote count as bad and very bad in almost half of
all observed polling stations. Clear instances of ballot stuffing and tampering with the
results were noted by international observers’
Belgium
All years sourced from IPU Parline and US Department of State Country Report on Human
Rights Practices, Keesings Contemporary Archives
1977, 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1994, 1999, 2010: Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2003: 7. Media access, 0: ‘In the French-speaking southern region of Wallonia, the extreme-right
National Front scored 5.2 per cent despite an almost invisible campaign boycotted by public
broadcasters.’ (IPU)
All else clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Belize
1984
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1984 – Belize
Dec 14, New York Times, David Pitt: FREE BELIZE HOLDS FIRST VOTE TODAY
MONTE HAYES, Associated Press, 15th December
Notes
1989
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1989 – Belize
Notes
7. Media access, 1. Notwithstanding the rejection of some opposition adverts, after a screening
process for all such adverts by the BBA, on grounds of not being factual. We do not have enough
info to know if this ruling was fair, but as overall press freedom is stressed and the opposition
went on to win, we have concluded that this was not a case of significant muzzling of the
opposition.
All else clean by assumption except (2) and (4) (violated in subsequent years) (see guidelines)
1993
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1989 – Belize
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: violation of b through inclusion of ineligible voters. ‘Allegations that large
numbers of Central American immigrants were illegally naturalized in order to pad voter rolls
before the June general elections were investigated by an independent consortium of
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). The consortium discovered a pattern of irregularities
which lent credence to the charges, and the new Government promised to study and act on the
group's recommendations to prevent such abuses from occurring in the future.’ (US dep)
1998
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1998 – Belize
Notes
None
2003
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2003 – Belize
Myrtle Palacio, M.B.E. The Election Management Body: Belize’s Experience in PostIndependence. Conference on Improving the Quality of Election Management . February 2005.
(Online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: self reports member partiality in 05, at which point 03 was the most recent election
8. and 10. 1 for ‘generally free and fair’ in US state dep
2008
Sources
Belize General Election. 7 February 2008. Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team (online)
I. Myrtle Palacio, 0.B. E. Comments and Recommendations on the Commonwealth Secretariat
Belize 2008 Election Report. March 2008. (online)
IPU Parline: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2031_B.htm and
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2031_08.htm
Notes
2. EMB, -22: opposition and civil society dissatisfaction with the oversight role of the Office of
Good Governance. Report did not confirm.
Benin
1991
Sources
Allen, Chris. ‘Democratic renewal in Africa: Two essays on Benin’. Centre of African Studies,
Edinburgh University, Occasional papers no. 40. 1992. (online)
Wiseman. ‘Early Post-redemocratization Elections in Africa’. Electoral Studies (1992), 11:4, 279291
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: the expulsion of southerners in the North on election day denied them
their suffrage de facto. Strategically this was to the advantage of the incumbent and is thought
to have been deliberately orchestrated to that end.
6. Campaign process, 0: attacks on southerners in the North during the campaign
10. Counting process, 1: limited info - ‘the declared results appear to reflect the way votes were
cast in a relatively accurate fashion’, Wiseman
1996
Sources
Rapport de synthese de la mission d’observation des elections presidentielles- 18.3.1996
Report of the combined observation of the presidential elections-18.3.1996
Notes
4. Voter Register, 0: ‘les listes électorales mentionnaient des noms de personnes n’habitant plus
la localité (…)la date de naissance 00.00.77 et 00.00.78. (…) leurs possesseurs paraissaient,
parfois, plus jeunes que l’âge de 18 ans’: Registers included those not living in area, some
incorrect dates of birth, and some underage voters.
8. Voting process, 0: ‘le mécanisme du réceptacle des bulletins non utilisés ne garantissait pas
intégralement le secret du vote (…) permettait, en effet, de distinguer la couleur du bulletin non
utilisé’
’ The receptacle for unused ballot papers did not guarantee the secrecy of the vote (…) it was
possible to distinguish the colour of the unused ballot paper.
2001
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission Report – International Francophone Organisation
Notes
The candidates with the 2nd and 3rd highest number of votes in the first round withdrew from
the second round complaining of fraud.
2. EMBs, 0: EMB lacks effective autonomous structure and sufficient resources to carry out their
work. The independence of the organisation is not guaranteed. National and international
credibility of the process is seen as weak.
4. Voter Register, 0: The constitutional court recognised errors in the registration of voters in
two areas. The report acknowledged general problems with the electoral role due to lack of
effective resources and staff – lack of digitised list made accountability difficult. There were
concerns about the large number of voters registered through the testimony of village heads
(given lack of identity cards) Opposition groups claimed fraud, which was not verified in the
report.
7. Media Access, 1. The report acknowledges the important role the media played, noting that
there was effective oversight. No other info available.
8. Voting Process, 0: There is almost no security in place for voters.
9. Role of Officials, 0: Lack of adequate resources and training is highlighted but specific
incidents are not reported.
10. Counting of Votes, 0:Complaints of fraud and discrepancies were reported and verified in
two departments.
2006
Sources
Report on the Information Mission on the First Round of Presidential Elections – International
Francophone Organisation
Notes
8. Voting Process, 1: Late opening of many polling booths due to problems transporting
materials. Citizens voted peacefully except for some ‘bouts of rage here and there’. No other
problems noted.
10. Counting of Votes, 0: More than 1 million votes
2011
Sources
Rapport de la Mission francophone d’information et de contacts- Organisation international de
la francophonie
Report from the Francophone project for information and contacts- International organisation of
the Francophone world.
Notes
1. Legal Framework, 0: a number of electoral laws changed shortly before the elections. E.g.
‘l'adoption par l'Assemblée nationale de la loi n° 2011-03 du 04 mars 2011 autorisant
exceptionnellement la poursuite des opérations d'enrôlement des personnes en âge de voter
et de distribution des cartes d'électeurs au-delà des délais initialement arrêtés par les
autorités en charge de la gestion du processus électoral’;4th March 2011; the National
Assembly extends time frame for some electoral processes.
4. Voter Register, -22; in spite of significant efforts to produce a comprehensive electoral
register, its success is controversial. According to the opposition candidates, the list did not
take into account all eligible voters; ‘Lʼabsence dʼune liste électorale fiable prenant en compte
toutes les personnes en âge de voter’
8. Voting process, -22: according to the opposition there were some fictional voting offices
(more than 400 on some accounts) included in the count; ‘existence de bureau de vote fictifs
(plus de 400 selon Tchané) ‘ However objection was not sustained by the court.
Bhutan
2008
Sources
EU Election Observation Mission, Bhutan 2008. Final Report on the National Assembly
Elections – 24 March 2008 (online)
Nielson, Henrik. Bhutan Election Observation Report from the Liaison Office of Denmark.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2008. (online)
Notes
Incumbency 0: no incumbent could run as this was the first election for the position.
1. Legal framework was coded as 0 due to a) the denial of the vote to members of monastic
communities and b) limitations on standing as a candidate, such as the requirement of a degree
3. Electoral rights, 0: due to the previously noted restrictions on the vote, and the onerous travel
requirements for some voters – up to three days travel by car – a violation of b
4. Voter register, 1: The liaison office of Denmark concludes that this cannot be substantiated,
but the EU stresses the consensus approval of the register.
5. Ballot access, 0: the conclusion by EU monitors that both the refusal to register the Bhutan
People United Party and the (separate) de-registration of Garab Dorji were overly harsh, and
the rejection of candidature based on the restrictions noted above
6. Campaign process, 1: judged that the following violence was not sufficiently linked to the
electoral process, although not unrelated – citizens were not in greater danger if they took part
in the electoral process than if they did not.
Since the announcement of the date of the elections on 17 January 2008, Bhutan has suffered from
11 bomb blasts until the election day, some resulted in injuries and in the death of one man (the
dead was a home made bomb maker). An armed group, the United Revolutionary Front of Bhutan,
announced its intention to disrupt the election process and has claimed responsibility for most of
the blasts. As election day approached, the government took reinforced security measures. These
incidents did not appear to have an impact on turnout or election day activities(EU)
7. Media access, 0: to restrictions on freedom of speech, including the outlawing of certain
campaign issues and the forbidding of CSO engagement with elections
Bolivia
1978
Sources
Keesing Contemporary Archives
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: allegations by opposition, mining unions and the press of added names, and
underregistration in opposition areas vs high registration in government areas,
6. Campaign process, 0: see quotation for 8,9,10. Also opposition allegations of “threats,
intimidation, physical attacks and confiscation of their propoganda’
8, 9 and 10, 0: “ a team of nine foreign observers representing church and human rights
groups… issued a document protesting at the disappearance of ballot papers for opposition
candidates, the removal of ballot boxes, military intervention in polling stations, the
infringement of electoral secrecy, and intimidation, attacks and threats against party members
and their families’. The government’s preferred candidate himself, who was in the lead, back an
annulment, which subsequently took place.
2002
Sources
Organisation of American States: report on the electoral observation mission general elections
in Bolivia - 2002
Notes
(3 and 5 by assumption as per coding guidelines)
4. Voter register, 1: the report details the difficulties faced in purging names and it is clear that it
contains additional names. However, it is impossible to assess the scale. Given this we have
coded as 1 on the basis of the large and ongoing efforts to improve the register, and the errors
‘have not affected the transparency of the electoral process’.
2005
Sources
Organisation of American States: report on the electoral observation mission general elections
in Bolivia - 2005
Notes
(5 by assumption)
2. EMBs, -22: the opposition raised some concerns about partiality, but the report found no
further reason for concern.
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘The most important [complaint] was the many persons who were unable
to vote because of the purging of voters from the Voter Registration Rolls.’ – scale not clear
4. Voter register, 0: see 3
re 3 and 4: The implication is that this was not intentional, and notwithstanding party
complaints, ‘this Mission considers the matter to be too complex to be able to clarify, with total
certainty, whether one of the candidates was specifically more harmed than the others.’
6. Campaign process, 0: although ‘the mood of the campaign was not characterized by the
predominance of acts of violence’, in accordance with our guidelines we have coded as 0 on the
basis of some violent incidents which did occur.
9. Role of officials, 1: notwithstanding isolated complaints of campaign related activity in polling
station vicinity
2009
Sources Report from: Misión de Observación Electoral de la Unión Europea; European Union
Electoral Observation Mission
Notes
2. EMBs. 0: They are independent and impartial and in line with international standards; ‘la
CNE (Corte Nacional Electoral) ha demostrado independencia y neutralidad’; the CNE (National
Electoral Court) showed independence and neutrality. Report seems to be generally impressed
by them. However, it also states that its decisions are ‘obligatorias, irreversibles e inapelables’;
obligatory, irreversible and not subject to appeal. This is a violation of the final subpoint.
7. Media Access, 0: ‘se observó una clara violación (…) a favor del MAS por parte del canal de
televisión público’; There was a clear breach by public television, in favour of MAS.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Incumbent stand/win is na because presidency is tripartite.
1996
Sources
The Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 14 September 1996. Preliminary Statement of the
Co-ordinator for International Monitoring (Online)
The Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 14 September 1996. Second Statement of the Coordinator for International Monitoring. (Online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0:ethnic restrictions on candidacy (not explicit in report, unlike 2002 and
2006, but confirmed by checking constitution adopted 1995, Article V)
3. Electoral rights, 0: problems with freedom of movement; crossing the IEBL, necessary for
some to vote, was dangerous
4. The voter register, 0: serious violations of A
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process, 0: serious violations of A in some areas of the country
7. Media access, 0: particular problems of access to official media in RS
10. Counting of votes, 0: incidents violating d.
1998
Sources
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Elections 1998
12 – 13 September (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ethnic restrictions on candidacy
2. EMBs, 0: Decisions by the EASC, a judicial sub-commission of the electoral management body
which makes decisions such as the invalidation of candidacy, are not subject to appeal.
3. Electoral rights, 0: combination of the high number of voters who were not aware of their
polling station location (violating d), the high number of invalid ballots accompanied by
observations of voter confusion (violationg d) and the failure of some ballot stations to open at
all on the first day of voting.
4. Voter register, 0: high numbers of missing names.
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process,0: violations of (a)
8. Voting process, 0: observations of ‘group voting’ by 26.1% of observers – scale not indicated.
It should be noted that this was considered ‘benign’.
The report did not give a clear enough statement of their overall assessment to code observer
rating.
2002
Sources
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Bosnia and Herzegovina. General
Elections 5 October 2002. Final Report. (Online)
Notes
1. Legal framework,0: limitations on candidates related to ethnicity
3. Electoral rights, -22: The relatively high number of invalid ballots - over 5% - is cause for
some concern since it indicates that many voters did not understand how to vote correctly’
(OSCE)
4. Voter register, 0: ‘OSCE estimates that 10,000 may have been turned away from polling
stations, domestic observers estimate 25,000. ‘These figures suggest a continuing need to
improve the voters registers’ (OSCE).
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process, 0: incidences of intimidation as cited on p10 of the OSCE report
8. Voting process, 0: cases of husbands voting for wives, and group voting in 38% of stations
observed
9. Role of officials, 0: unauthorized persons in polling stations in 13% of observations in
addition to campaign activity within polling stations in 1%
10. Counting of votes , -22. Problems with the voting process seemed to be procedural rather
than fraudulent. However, the report references ‘a few troubling but isolated reports of PSC
members invalidating ballots or marking blank ballots during the count.’ Not clear how this
should be assessed.
2006
Sources
International Election Observeration Mission. Bosnia and Herzegovina – General Elections, 1
October 2006. Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. (Online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: limitations on candidates related to ethnicity
4. Voter register, -22. The report notes that despite improvements a ‘small number’ were not
included; this is deemed relatively unimportant by the authors, but later the report mentions
some voters being turned away when not on the list, and combined with voters who arrived at
the wrong station this occurred at 55% of stations. There is no indication as to how many at
each station, and how many of these were related to the register. It is not possible based on this
to assess the accuracy of the register.
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
8. Voting process, 0: group voting observed in 33% of polling stations, violating the secrecy of
the ballot. It should be noted that the process was nonetheless rated as “very good” or “good”
by 94% of observers
9. Role of officials, 0: officials attempting to influence voters in the booth, in violation of c; it was
not possible to assess the scale of this.
10. Counting of votes, 0: 2 known cases of deliberate falsification, in addition to widespread
irregularities
Observer rating, 1: based on the following statement; although it was subsequently noted that
the ethnicity requirement fell short of ‘international standards’.
The manner in which these elections were conducted was generally in line with international
standards for democratic elections.’
Botswana
1979
Sources
Molomo and Mokopakgosi, ‘Multiparty democracy in Botswana’
Holm, John: Elections in Botswana in Hayward, Fred M. ‘Elections in Independent Africa’
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: Molomo and Mokopakgosi claim that the Supervisor of the Elections is not
independent due to a) reliance on government departments and b) presidential appointment.
In 1994, the government addressed this issue, lending credence to their claims.
6. Campaign process, 0: Financial advantage to incumbent - see Holm and also Molomo and
Mokopakgosi, who note that no other party has a formal office and none could afford more than
15 parliamentary candidates in an election. NB ‘unfettered by violence’ (Holm)
7. Media access, 1: see 1989
8. Voting process, 1: Holm asserts the adequacy of the voting and counting and we have found
no reason to challenge this view
10. Counting process, 1: see 8
1984
Sources
Molomo and Mokopakgosi, ‘Multiparty democracy in Botswana’
Holm, John: Elections in Botswana in Hayward, Fred M. ‘Elections in Independent Africa’
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: Molomo and Mokopakgosi claim that the Supervisor of the Elections is not
independent due to a) reliance on government departments and b) presidential appointment.
In 1994, the government addressed this issue, lending credence to their claims.
6. Campaign process, 0: Financial advantage to incumbent - see Holm and also Molomo and
Mokopakgosi, who note that no other party has a formal office and none could afford more than
15 parliamentary candidates in an election. NB ‘unfettered by violence’ (Holm)
7. Media access, 1: see 1989
8. Voting process, 1: Holm asserts the adequacy of the voting and counting and we have found
no reason to challenge this view
10. Counting process, 1: see 8
1989
Sources
Molomo and Mokopakgosi, ‘Multiparty democracy in Botswana’
EISA Technical Assessment Team Report. Botswana. Parliamentary and local government
elections. Team Report.16 October 2009. (online)
African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/electoral_democracies.html
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: Incumbent financial advantage.
7. Media access, 1: Molomo and Mokapgosi’s discussion highlights that the state radio has been
accused of partisanship by both the opposition AND the governing party. Restrictions on
freedom of the press over all elections to time of writing (1991) are listed as a single court case,
and barring the press from the actual count. We take this to mean no more serious violations
occurred.
8. Voting process, 1 and 10. Counting process, 1: From the 2009 review, ‘Botswana has, since
independence, ably conducted free elections which have adhered to both the country’s electoral
law and general democratic-electoral practices.’ This conclusion is furthermore implied by the
wealth of literature which analyses the elections in depth without challenging this notion. In
addition met freedom house criteria which includes ‘elections conducted in conditions of ballot
secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and the absence of massive voter fraud’
1994
Sources
EISA Technical Assessment Team Report. Botswana. Parliamentary and local government
elections. Team Report.16 October 2009. (online)
Staffan Darnolf (1997). ‘Critics or megaphones? News coverage during the parliamentary
campaigns in Botswana 1994 and Zimbabwe 1995’, Democratization, 4:2, 167-191
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: contrary to previous elections, an Independent Electoral Commission is now
established. We have coded 1 in the absence of criticism and the agreement that elections were
well conducted.
8. Voting process, 1 and 10. Counting process, 1: From the 2009 review, ‘Botswana has, since
independence, ably conducted free elections which have adhered to both the country’s electoral
law and general democratic-electoral practices.’ This conclusion is furthermore implied by the
wealth of literature which analyses the elections in depth without challenging this notion. In
addition met freedom house criteria which includes ‘elections conducted in conditions of ballot
secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and the absence of massive voter fraud’
1999
Sources
The Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries: Botswana Elections Observer Mission
Report
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: notwithstanding government efforts, only approx. half eligible voters
registered
6. Campaign process, -22: allegations of use of government resources, unable to substantiate.
Known that there was some level of disparity in resources, and that it was a peaceful campaign.
7. Media access, -22: opposition allegations of skewed media presentation (not especially
severe).
2003
Sources
EISA Technical Assessment Team Report. Botswana. Parliamentary and local government
elections. Team Report.16 October 2004. (online)
Notes
6. Campaign process, -22: dominant presences of incumbent party is noted. Given that in other
years financial dominance has been noted, we were not comfortable coding this 1.
7. Media access, 0: state media bias
2009
Sources
EISA Technical Assessment Team Report. Botswana. Parliamentary and local government
elections. Team Report.16 October 2009. (online)
Notes
2. EMBs was coded as -22 due to references to discontent with the appointment process, on
which the report did not offer a final judgement
6. Campaign process was coded as 0 due to the financial advantages of incumbency in violation
of d
7. Media access was coded as 0 due to advantages to incumbents in violation of b
Brazil
1989
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1989 – Brazil
Keesings contemporary archives (first round only)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: the first direct presidential election since 1960
Clean by assumption, see guidelines, and “singularly free and fair” (US dep); media explicit.
2002
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 – Brazil
Keesings contemporary archives
Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report 2003 (online)
Global integrity report (online)
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines), corroborated by Freedom House (2003 sic) as ‘free, fair
and the cleanest ever’
10, 1: ‘A unified mechanism of electronic voting practically eliminates fraud in ballot counting’ –
global integrity report
2006
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006 – Brazil
Global Integrity Report (online)
Notes
8, 1: assumed form US state department description free and fair
10, 1: ‘A unified mechanism of electronic voting practically eliminates fraud in ballot counting’ –
global integrity report
Burkina Faso
1978
Sources
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11845902
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
1991
Sources
Notes
Opposition all withdrew in protest over lack of national conference, and called a boycott.
Exceptionally low turnout.
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
5. Ballot access, 0: 100% of the vote
6. Campaign process, 0: violence against opposition boycott leaders
1998
Source: Electoral Observation Mission Report – International Francophone Organisation
Notes
A number of major parties decided to boycott the elections, pointing to partisan EMBs, a
corrupted electoral role, lack of term limits and what they referred to as a ‘dialogue deficit’
1. Legal Framework, -22: Widespread complaints from opposition around the legal framework,
particularly the lack of term limits. It is unclear whether the law was changed ‘just before’ the
election, or whether, such a law did not exist prior to the election.
2. EMBs, 0: Entry into the organisation is related to the government’s choice, along with that of
the existing EMB committee. In addition perceived by opposition to be partial, although the
report does not evaluate the validity of these claims.
3. Electoral Rights, -22: All sub-points are contested by opposition groups. The report does not
evaluate these concerns.
4. Voter Register, -22: Opposition claimed the electoral role was rigged in favour of the ruling
party. Lack of opposition participation in the process of registration, and process conducted
over period of ‘wintering’, when communities are occupied with wet season crops. Validity of
these claims is not examined in the report.
6. Campaign Process, -22: Each of the three candidates received the same amount of money
from a public fund for campaigning purposes. No further information is available in the report.
8. Voting Process, 0: The report raised concerns with the lack of measures to ensure the secret
vote. Did not state what percentage of votes was affected.
9. Role of Officials, 1: Notwithstanding observers from different parties were generally absent.
But the voting process is commended in a number of respects (with the exception of vote
secrecy.)
10. Counting of Votes, 1: Scant detail but no reports of violations.
2010
Sources
Cedeao Ecowas. Release N°: 180/2010. ECOWAS DECLARES AS SATISFACTORY CONDUCT OF
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN BURKINA FASO. (Online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010 – Burkina
Faso
Freedom in the world
Global integrity report, Burkina Faso scorecard 2011 (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: CENI is not legally independent. Its membership has raised controversy.
4. Voter registration, 0: criticised as low. Freedom in the World cite an estimate that more were
unregistered than registered.
5. Ballot access, 0: incumbent over 75%
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘the ruling party's control of official resources and dominance in
government severely disadvantaged the opposition from mounting a credible challenge.’ (US
department of state)
7. Media access, 0: ‘The official media, including the daily newspaper Sidwaya and the
government-controlled radio and television stations, displayed a progovernment bias, but
allowed significant participation in their programming from those representing opposition
views.’ (US)
For both campaign and media: Burkina Faso is not an electoral democracy. International monitors
have judged the most recent presidential, municipal, and legislative elections to be generally free
but not entirely fair, due to the ruling CDP's privileged access to state resources and the media.
(Freedom in the world)
8. Voting process, 0: court ruled that ineligible voters had been allowed to vote. Generalised
reference to ‘irregularities’ (observers concluded that they did not affect outcome)
Burundi
1993
Sources
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. International Observer Delegation PostElection Statement. June 1, 1993 Burundi Presidential Election (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
4. Voter register ,1: ‘Although voter lists were not without error, the vast majority of eligible
voters were able to register’
6. Campaign process has been coded as 1 due to references to ‘an open and peaceful campaign
environment’, but note that this may gloss over details and has impacted data confidence.
Data confidence has been coded as 2 due to the brevity of this statement and vagueness of
relevant statements.
2005
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission – EU
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: Main legal body (Constitutional court) is inadequately structured and very poorly
funded (E850 per annum); difficulty in enforcing the electoral code, as a consequence the main
EMB is limited purely to a technical role – electoral law cannot be properly enforced.
4. Voter Register, -22: Highly unlikely that the voter register is accurate. The last census prior to
the election was in August 1990 – 12 years of large scale massacres followed, attempts to issue
identity cards were abandoned due to financial and logistical constraints. At the same time, the
observation mission received no formal complaints.
5. Ballot Access, 1: Parties have to meet complex requirements related to ethnicity in order to
stand or be accepted into parliament. In two cases candidate lists were rejected based on ‘ethnic
imbalance’. The rule was put in place through a peace process to resolve decades of conflict.
Under these circumstances and in the absence of substantial criticism here, we have coded as 1.
6. Campaign Process, 0: In a number of places the campaign was characterised by violent acts,
attacks were of an ‘opaque’ nature in which all political parties were involved. Seven dozen
confirmed deaths related party candidates, sympathisers and members.
7. Media Access, 0: Media access was not ensured and certain inequalities were noted in both
public and private media.
8. Voting Process, 1: Voting procedures were evaluated as positive or very positive in over 96%
of polling stations observed.
9. Role of officials,1: Notwithstanding: People bearing arms were present inside almost one
third of polling stations observed. Observers saw this generally not as intimidating, but as a
result of army and police personnel not taking the care to remove their weapons while voting.
Voting procedures at were evaluated as positive or very positive in over 96% of polling stations
observed.
10. Counting of Votes, -22: considerable confusion, which the report does not consider to have
affected the final results – but isolated confirmed cases of fraud and widespread inability to
account for ballots (from dozens to thousands depending on region).
2010
Sources
United States department of state country report on human rights practices 2010 - Burundi
Notes
Note that withdrawals after the municipal elections left the incumbent as the only competitor.
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75%
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘political parties engaged in intimidation and violence leading up to the
elections’ (US dep)
7. Media access, 0: freedom of press restricted
Cambodia
1993
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1993
Um, Khatharya. Cambodia in 1993: Year Zero Plus One. Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 1, A Survey of
Asia in 1993: Part I (Jan., 1994), pp. 72-81
Brown, F. Cambodia’s Legacy: Social and Political Turmoil. In Kumar, K (eds) Postconflict
Elections, Democratization and International Assistance. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998
IPU Parline
Notes
1. Legal framework 0: Elections not held regularly
2. EMBs, 1: election districts as described by Brown seem to give maximum opportunity to all
parties, and we take it that UNTAC control of the electoral administration assures impartiality
and accountability to electoral law
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘the PDK barred some people in the 10 to 15 percent of the country
(holding 6 percent of the population) it controls from participating’ (US state dep)
6. Campaign process, 0: violence.
7. Media access, 0: general opening up of freedom of speech, but no freedom of speech in PDK
controlled areas
8 and 10: 1. Initially contested by CPP when they realised they would not win, but Brown notes
that little evidence was produced.
1998
Sources
Kingdom of Cambodia Parliamentary Elections. July 26 1998. Observation Report.
International Republican Institute. February 1999. (Online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘constant changes to election regulations [which] caused confusion
among political parties’
2. EMBs, 0: partiality
4. Voter register, 0: duplicate registrations and the registration of ineligible voters
5. There was not sufficient information to code ballot access
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and intimidation
7. Media access, 0: disproportionate incumbent coverage and violation of freedom of speech
8. Voting process was coded as 1 but some controversy should be noted: ‘While some members
of the IRI/NDI delegation believed they witnessed instances of intimidation during the balloting,
the majority did not see’
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘many isolated reports of illegal campaigning’ and ‘interference by local
officials’ on voting day.
10. Counting of votes, 0: an accumulation of irregularities which the report viewed extremely
seriously, while acknowledging a lack of ‘concrete evidence’ for fraud. It also seems likely from
the report that b was violated.
2003
Sources
International Republican Institute. Cambia 2003. National Assembly Elections (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: concerns about their impartiality and their passivity with regards to ruling party
violations
3. Electoral rights, 0: there was some refusal to register both monks (a source of opposition
support) and those suspected of not supporting the ruling party
4. Voter register, 0: 395,000 voters were left off due to ‘inconsistently applied registration
procedures, the selective distribution of registration information, and in some cases direct
interference by province and commune level officials and village chiefs’
6. Campaign process, 0: widespread intimidation and bribery
7. Media access, 0: violation of b
9. It should be noted that although we have coded 9 as 1 as the conditions were not violated, the
presence of village chiefs was felt by the observers to be intimidating and so may have
functioned similarly to the presence of unauthorised personnel
2008
Sources
European Union Election Observation Mission. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: Cambodian
elections 2008 show some progress but still fall short of key international standards. 29 July
2008 (online)
(final statement link leads to press release, hence use of preliminary statement)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: combination of allegations of impartiality and inadequate appointment procedures
for avoiding impartiality.
3. Electoral rights, 0: see 4.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Despite the recognition of improper and mistaken deletion of voters from
the voter list the NEC refused to restore their names and thus disenfranchised around 50,000
previously registered voters.’
5. Ballot access, : some controversy - ‘The UPCP and three other political parties whose lists
were not registered by the NEC complained about misleading instructions and unequal
treatment of small parties by the NEC. The EU observer assessment is that this issue did not
significantly affect the rights of political parties to participate in the elections.’
6. Campaign process, 0: bribes, potential intimidation and abuse of state resources
7. Media access, 0: ‘The CPP dominated media coverage of the elections to the detriment of the
other parties to a degree which was not consistent with international standards on free and
equal access to the media.’
10. Counting of vote, -22. While the process was assessed as good in 84% of cases, the
irregularities noted appeared potentially serious and the preliminary statement was unable to
provide sufficient detail on the outcome of this.
Cameroon
1992
Sources
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. An assessment of the October 11, 1992
election in Cameroon (Online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: absence of an impartial body
3. Electoral rights, 0: violations of (a) through denial of the right to vote by polling officials, and
(d) through last minute changes to polling locations
4. Voter register, 0: severe irregularities
5. Ballot access has been coded as 1 but it should be noted that smaller parties objected to the
$6000 deposit requirement
6. Campaign process, 0: intimidation.
7. Media access, 0: violation of (b)
8. Voting process, 0: issuance of multiple voter cards
9. Role of officials, 0: de facto violations of (d)
10. Counting of votes, 0: The results of fictitious polling stations were reported and among real
polling stations some results were not credible.
1997
Sources
United Kingdom: Home Office, UK Home Office Immigration and Nationality Directorate Country
Report - Cameroon, 1 October 2003 (online)
United states department of state country report on human rights practices 1997 – Cameroon
Constitution of Cameroon
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘three major opposition political parties, the Social Democratic Front, the UNDP and
the UDC, declared a boycott of all elections, in protest at the absence of an independent
electoral commission’ (HomeOffice)
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75% of vote
7. Media access, 0: limited press freedom.
8. Voting process, 0: ‘procedural irregularities’ (US dep)
9. Role of officials, 0: The three major oppositions parties boycotted the elections, and the
election irregularities were especially egregious in opposition strongholds, with opposition
activists not present to monitor the process. (US dep)
2004
Sources
Cameroon Presidential Election. 11 October 2004. Report of the Commonwealth Observer
Group. (Online)
Notes
2. EMB, 0: heavily stressed concerns about the lack of an impartial electoral body
4. Voter register, 0: severely incomplete
5. Ballot access was coded as -22: only 16 out of 46 candidates were approved, which suggests
problems, but the report does not elaborate
6. Campaign process, 0: violations of d, incumbency financial advantage. There were also
allegations of intimidation.
7. Media access, 0: violation of b and c
8. Voting process, 0: instances violating a and b
9. Role of officials, 0: the poor training of officials was compounded by the fact that most were
party representatives rather than impartial officials
2011
Sources
Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team: Cameroon Presidential Election
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: independence compromised by the commission’s legal remit, also concerns that the
appointment of former members of the ruling party compromised autonomy
3. Electoral rights, 0: unregistered voters unable to vote
4. Voter register, 0: duplication and missing names. Scale is not clear but the report
recommends scrapping and beginning again.
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75% of vote
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘We appreciate the natural advantages that may accrue to an incumbent
government. However, the magnitude of resources that to us appeared to have been deployed
by the ruling CPDM party during the election campaign and its overwhelming advantage of
incumbency challenged the notion of a level playing field in the entire process.’
7. Media access, 0: state owned media bias
Canada
2006
Sources
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. CANADA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.
23 January 2006. OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report. April 2006.
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/canada/18817
Notes
1 and 3 were coded as 1 notwithstanding the report asking for ‘consideration’ of changing laws
regarding prisoners and Canadians living overseas long term.
1979, 1980, 2008 Keesing and US dep: Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Cape Verde
1991
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1991 – Cape
Verde
Keesings contemporary archive
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) – in addition ‘no evidence of electoral fraud’ (US dep)
1995
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1995 – Cape
Verde
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1996 – Cape
Verde
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) – could not assume 6 due to vote buying allegations
2001
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Cape
Verde
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
US dep describe as free and fair, nb opposition accusations of fraud
2006
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006 – Cape
Verde
Keesings contemporary archives
Baker. Cape Verde: the most democratic nation in Africa? The Journal of Modern African
Studies (2006), 44:493–511
Notes
2,3,6,8,9,10 clean by assumption (see guidelines) – all others explicit
2011
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2011 – Cape
Verde
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Central African Republic
1992
Sources
Notes
Incwin -22: the results of this annulled election are not known
1. Legal framework, 0: elections were not regular, property required to stand as president
2. EMBs, 0: constituencies redrawn to weaken opposition
5. Ballot access, 0: one party denied registration
6. Campaign process, 0: opposition activists were detained throughout the year and at least one
shot; while there is not specific evidence that this occurred during the very short two week
official campaign period, we coded as 0 on the grounds that the whole process of transition is
more meaningfully the campaign period – the incumbents had campaigned for months
7. Media access, 0: lack of access to state media and restrictions on freedom de facto – this was
remedied during the two week campaign period, but see 6
8. Voting process, 0: the election was annulled due to irregularities and these are thought to
have been orchestrated by the government for that purpose. It is difficult to clarify whether this
was in the voting or counting; it is described as “blatant fraud or electoral sabotage”,
“widespread irregularities”. The public nature implied suggests voting fraud is likely.
10. Counting process, 0: this could not be tracked, as required by (a) - results are not known.
1993
Sources
Investigative Presidential and Legislative Election Report - International Francophone
Organisation
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: property required to stand as president.
2. EMBs, -22: The report states that the main EMB has an effective institutional balance to carry
out its functions. Opposition leaders contest the fairness of the creation of around 20 new
electorates given their respective small populations. These claims are not evaluated in the
report.
3. Electoral rights, 1: There were logistical difficulties in ensuring access to vote in remote areas.
No significant breaches reported.
4. Voter register, 1: The report states that the electoral role is reliable and any errors are of
marginal impact. However, some concerns are worth noting. In the interior of the country
there was a very large discrepancy between the number of people voting and the number of
people of the electoral role. This represents a potential violation of citizen’s effective ability to
easily register on time. Nomadic populations also complicate the picture. A number of
opposition leaders saw the number of unregistered voters allowed to vote by the relevant
tribunal as suspicious.
7. Media Access, 0: There was a mass strike of public media workers that had been effective for
the eight months leading up to the election. The report underlines an ‘almost systematic
censorship of opposition party activities in the public media’.
8. Voting Process, -22. There was very limited effective use of indelible ink - possible breach of
one vote per person. 11 voting reciprocals were burnt. Secret vote was not guaranteed in an
unspecified number of cases- although according to the report, not enough or of a nature to put
the effective scrutiny of the process in doubt.
1999
Sources
Presidential Election Observation Report – International Francophone Organisation
Notes
Legal framework, -22: unable to find an unabridged copy of the 1995 constitution. NB property
required to stand in previous and subsequent constitutions
2. EMBs, 0: Opposition parties objected to the President’s decision to place the administration
of the main EMB under the control of local governments. Report cites the lack of adequate
funding, errors and deficiencies in the organisation, and concludes that its independence was
not guaranteed.
4. Voter Register, 0: Electoral roles were partially incomplete in a number of localities. Lists
were generally unreliable.
8. Voting Process, 1: Notwithstanding various large scale technical and logistical difficulties
10. Counting of Votes, -22: The report mentioned the effective presence of different party
representatives but there were complaints of fraud. These complaints were not evaluated
definitively.
2005
Sources
International Francophone Organisation
Notes
2. Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), 1: Some candidates raised doubts around the
independence of the body, but the EMB is praised in the report for its neutrality and
effectiveness.
5. Ballot Access, -22: 7 out of 12 candidates initially rejected, provoking widespread complaints.
All candidates, bar one – the President removed in 2003 coup – were allowed to stand. The exPresident was not able to stand due to impending legal actions, which are not detailed in the
report.
6. Campaign Process, -22: Candidates complained that private radio stations were used to send
messages inciting violence. Opposition candidates complained about laws restricting movement
for campaign purposes. One candidate was arrested during the campaign prohibiting campaign
activities– his supporters were unable to campaign for personal safety reasons. Opposition
candidates claimed to have been adversely affected by insecurity surrounding the campaign.
With the exception of a few isolated cases, the report doesn’t uphold these complaints as
substantial. There is little detail on campaign finances.
9. Role of Officials, 0: A number of officials were deemed incompetent in the first round of
voting and were replaced in the second round. The report notes an insufficient number of staff
in the polling stations. Main EMB observed a number of irregularities at a number of polling
booths, leading then to declare the results from 610 polling booths, out of 4143, invalid. Report
recommends that training of officials be a priority.
10. Counting of Votes, -22: There were more votes than voters enrolled. There were an
unusually high number of votes declared invalid. The results of 610 polling booths out of 4143
were declared invalid by main EMB. The official election results were ultimately accepted by all
parties.
2011
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices - CAR
Freedom in the world 2012 – CAR (Online)
Constitution of the Central African Republic 2004, Chapter 1 – The President of the Republic (Fr,
online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: need to own property (in CAR)
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Observers also reported irregularities, including an unexplained increase of
40 percent in registered voters between 2005 and 2010’ (US state department)
6. Campaign process, 0: freedom of assembly interfered with. In addition, it is noted that
membership of the President’s incumbent party secured resource advantages for all candidates,
so we presume this applied to the President.
7. Media, 0: restrictions on freedom
8. Voting process, 0: secrecy not assured, widespread ‘irregularities’
10. Counting process, 0: We take it that as the courts lowered the percentage of votes Bozizé
was declared to win, the original count was fraudulent
Chad
1996
Sources
GERDES – Africa & Electoral Observation Mission – International Francophone Organisation
Notes
4. Voter Register, 0: There were difficulties with the enrolment of nomadic and displaced
populations, which also ‘opened up the doors to fraud’. ‘Worrying’ numbers of these votes were
recorded.
5. Ballot Access, -22: One of the candidates was arrested in the 1st round. A number of
candidates boycotted the second round.
7. Media Access, 0: The national media oversight body observed that the coverage of events was
not impartial.
8. Voting Process, -22: Use of indelible ink was controversial; it was not indelible. There was no
observation of citizens voting from overseas. In one locality military members intimidated the
public into going to polling stations (in the context of opposition parties calling for a boycott).
9. Role of Officials, 0: Military members and armed guards were present in a number of polling
stations visited. Their presence was intimidating in some cases. General deficiencies in official’s
capacities were noted, including illiteracy.
10. Counting of Votes, 0: A number of opposition parties boycotted the second round of the
elections calling for a ‘ghost town’ on election day. They claimed that widespread fraud
occurred in the first round. Representatives of both candidates were not always present,
international observers were not always made welcome.
2001
Sources
Eriksson, Hans. Chad – from civil strife and electoral fraud to petro-dictatorship? News from the
Nordic Africa Institute: Commentaries: Number 1/2002, January. (online)
De Waal, Alex. Chad In the Firing Line. Index on Censorship, 35:1 p 58 – 65. 2006. (online)
Freedom House: Freedom in the World, Chad (2002). (online)
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
2. EMBS, 0: UNHCR report – ‘An ostensibly independent election commission law was passed in
2000, despite significant opposition. The law gives the predominance of seats to government
representatives and to those of parties in the ruling coalition.’
4. Voter register, 0: Erikkson notes that Deby retrospectively admitted the need to deal with
‘errors in the last population census’
7. Media access, 0: The UNHCR report shows that throughout the year freedom of the press was
restricted
8 and 10: voting and counting process have been coded as -22; although fraud on a large scale is
repeatedly alleged, it is not clarified whether this was a matter of voting or counting, nor is it
confirmed
2006
Sources
BBC news. Q&A: Chad Votes. 2 May 2006.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4957894.stm
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2007 - Chad , 11 January 2007
(online) United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006 Chad
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: ‘No registration of voters has been carried out ahead of polling day, another
reason the opposition decided to announce a boycott.’ (BBC above)
5. Ballot access, 0: The incumbent won over 75%
7. Media access, 0: ‘The government has placed limits on freedom of speech and the press;
journalists who are critical of the government have been arrested on charges of defamation, and
in some cases have been held in detention even after their charges have been dismissed.’
(Human Rights Watch)
8. Voting process, 0: ‘Observers noted low voter participation, underage voting, multiple voting,
and other irregularities.’ (US dep)
2011
Sources
IFES election guide
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2011
Mission d’Observation de l’Election Présidentielle du 25 avril 2011 en République du Tchad
DECLARATION PRELIMINAIRE
Notes
NB key figures in opposition boycotted
5. Ballot access, 0: incumbent over 85% of vote
Chile
1989
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1989 – Chile
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri)/ December 14, 1989. VICTORY BY OPPOSITION EXPECTED
IN CHILE TODAY
Paul Knox. The Globe and Mail (Canada). December 14, 1989. Chileans set to pick successor to
Pinochet after 16-year reign
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
6. Campaign process, -22: insufficient information on finance and bribery, however nb ‘generally
peaceful’(St Louis) and no contradictory evidence from human rights report, no restrictions on
rallies. ‘There has been no serious violence’ (Globe and Mail)
8 and 10 by assumption from free and fair
1993
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1993 – Chile
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) – 4 and 7 explicit
2000 (began 1999)
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Chile
Notes
7. Media access, 1: not withstanding concerns over a set of laws which do not appear to have
impacted discourse relevant to the election
8 and 10 1, state dep coding as free and fair
2006 (began 2005)
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006- Chile
Freedom House, Freedom in the World report 2006
Global integrity report scorecard 2008 (online)
Notes
7. Media access, 1: not withstanding concerns over a set of laws which do not appear to have
impacted discourse relevant to the election.
8 and 10, 1: free and fair (both US dep and freedom house)
2010 (began 2009)
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009- Chile
Global integrity report scorecard 2008 (online)
Barrionuevo, Alexei. ‘Children of Democracy’ Sitting Out Presidential Election. New York Times.
12 December 2009. (online)
Freedom House, Freedom in the World report
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: only 9.2% of 18-29 year olds registered to vote (as a result of their
voluntary decision not to register)
7. Media access 1, notwithstanding certain restrictions, which are not viewed as seriously by
Freedom House (compared to US dep) and which do not seem to have interfered with the
election process
8 and 10, 1: free and fair
Colombia
1978
Sources
Oppenheimer, Andres. 1990. The 1990 Colombian elections: post-election analysis. Washington,
D.C.: Center of Strategic and International Studies. p8. Found via: Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. LatinAmerican Statistics: A guide to sources. (online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices1979
Keesing contemporary archives
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: “In the past, voters walked into their voting booths with their
candidate’s ballot in hand, a practice that lent itself to widespread vote-buying by local party
bosses who used to stand in front of the voting places handing out ballots to their constituents"
– of 1990
Also violence, see Keesing.
1982
Sources
Oppenheimer, Andres. 1990. The 1990 Colombian elections: post-election analysis. Washington,
D.C.: Center of Strategic and International Studies. p8. Found via: Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. LatinAmerican Statistics: A guide to sources. (online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1982 - Colombia
Notes
6. “In the past, voters walked into their voting booths with their candidate’s ballot in hand, a
practice that lent itself to widespread vote-buying by local party bosses who used to stand in
front of the voting places handing out ballots to their constituents" – of 1990
1986
Sources
Oppenheimer, Andres. 1990. The 1990 Colombian elections: post-election analysis. Washington,
D.C.: Center of Strategic and International Studies. p8.
and
Hudson, Rex A. 1990. "Government and politics." Hanratty, Dennis M. and Sandra W. Meditz
(eds). 1990. Colombia: a country study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress. p219.
Both found via: Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources. (online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1986 – Colombia
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0. “In the past, voters walked into their voting booths with their
candidate’s ballot in hand, a practice that lent itself to widespread vote-buying by local party
bosses who used to stand in front of the voting places handing out ballots to their constituents"
– of 1990. In addition, ‘Although it was the left’s greatest electoral victory in Colombia’s history,
observers suspected that the FARC’s use of terrorist tactics…intimidated many voters into
voting for the UP’.
Also worth noting, US state dep note violence linked to political affiliation is ongoing.
1990
Sources
Kline, Harvey F. 1995. Colombia: democracy under assault. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 56.
Found via: Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources. (online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1990 – Colombia
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: three candidates assassinated
1994
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994- Colombia
Agence France Press, 20th June
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘Guerrilla threats also blocked some polls from opening. In the department
of Bolivar, northern Colombia, delegates and election officials resigned from 20 magistrate
offices, leaving some 12,000 people unable to vote.’ (Agence France)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘President Samper postponed elections in 10 municipalities due to
guerrilla violence during the campaigns’ (US state dep) – the concurrent congressional elections
saw assassinations of candidates, which while not strictly a case of violence against candidates
for the election in question, is indicative of the climate.
1998
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 - Colombia
Notes
6 Campaign process, 0: ‘Some vote buying and fraud took place, but neither significantly
affected the outcome of the elections.’ US dep
7. Media access, 1: Notwithstanding ‘The Constitution provides for freedom of the press;
although the Government generally respected this right in practice, there were significant
exceptions. Journalists regularly practiced self-censorship’ (US state dep)
8. Voting process, 0: ‘In spite of guerrillas' detention of 52 electoral workers and burning of
electoral materials and vehicles, normal elections were carried out in more than 90 percent of
all municipalities’, US state dep. Too high and too serious.
10, 1: assumed from ‘free, fair and transparent’
2002
Sources
Report of the electoral observation mission in the Republic of Colombia - 2002
Notes
*Overall note: ‘The Mission must be quick to point out that the Colombian government
authorities made an extraordinary effort to guarantee transparent and free elections’ – but
severe law and order problems enabled rebel groups to distort the process
2. EMB, -22: It is unclear from the report; political connections of board members are referred
to but abuse of this is not reported.
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘In general, the period of time between the filing of the application and the
actual issuance and delivery of the identification card may be more than six months; it is never
less than one month. This means that a significant number of citizens are prevented from voting
and the updating of the electoral census is delayed.’ In addition, ‘6 percent of the citizens who
went to the polls to cast their ballot were unable to exercise their right to vote because their
names did not appear on the voter rolls.’
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Colombian voter rolls... according to the competent authorities, have to be
purged.’ (notwithstanding government efforts)
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘Intimidation, violence, and kidnapping made it difficult for Colombian
citizens to freely exercise their right to vote and to be elected’.
6. Campaign process, 0: presidential candidate kidnapped by FARC, and ‘All during the period
leading up to the elections, the Mission witnessed threats of various kinds, targeted at most of
the presidential campaigns.’
9. Role of officials, 1: Notwithstanding training concerns, as ‘It has to be said, however, that the
election authorities, other government officials, law enforcement officers, officials from the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Ombudsman’s Office and the Office of the Attorney General,
were a constant and effective presence at many of the country’s polling stations. (Campaign
material in polling stations, but at only 2% this did not constitute a sufficiently severe breach to
code as 0)
2006
Sources
Report from: OEA (Organización de Estados Americanos – Organisation of American States)
electoral observation mission in Colombia
Notes
4. Voter Register, 1: Census did not include Colombians aged 18-19. Colombian Electoral
Organisation emphasised the need to bring the process of updating the electoral role forward. This
was not done in time for the elections. Non-deliberate, did not exclude more than 80% of voters.
6. Campaign Process, -22: Security was a big issue, due largely to ‘groups outside the law’, in a
number of districts (unspecified) monitoring was limited to metropolitan areas. MOE received
complaints of violent threats via pamphlets and emails. Complaints were made informally and not
verified by the report authors. It is unclear in the report whether violence and intimidation is targeted
at specific groups and whether it had any effect on the election outcome (although the authors seem to
discount this possibility in their language and general praise of official efforts). All other subpoints
were met
7. Media Access, 0: The issue of equitable treatment in the media was flagged as one which needs
attention. However, there is little detail of the media coverage and fair treatment of different
candidates in the report. The report states that there is no electoral authority with the tools to
sufficiently monitor the issue.
2010
Sources
Report from: OEA (Organización de Estados Americanos – Organisation of American States)
electoral observation mission in Colombia
Notes
2. Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), 1: Some controversy over Registraría, but considered
insignificant by report’s authors
3. Electoral Rights, 1: Some problems occurred with information flow and effective access to polling
stations, affecting an undetermined number of voters. However, report states that the vast majority of
voters were able to express their preferences without great difficulties.
4. Voter Register, 0: Out of date voter register, including unspecified number of deceased people
6. Campaign Process, -22. A number of complaints made by opposition parties around police and
military threatening candidates, voters and party officials as well as the unauthorised an illegal
destruction of political materials. These complaints were not verified by the authors of the report.
8. Voting Process, 0: Strong concerns were raised by the report authors around the lack of appropriate
facilities for polling stations, endangering free and secret voting and increasing the possibility for vote
buying, intimidation, manipulation and intervention.
9. Role of Officials, 0: A large number of polling stations were deemed inadequate and concerns
were raised about the lack of appropriate training for officials and structural weaknesses in the
process. The report argued that the lack of adequate training of officials threatened the equal treatment
of citizens as well as equity between political parties. There were also complaints made about
campaigning in polling stations that were not substantiated by the report’s authors. No concrete
evidence that the role of officials was widely compromised, but strong concerns that this was possible
and likely in some cases.
10. Counting of Votes, -22: The report highlighted concerns that the transmission of election data via
telephone was inappropriate for auditing and verifying the information and lacks the necessary
security requirements. There was an additional concern that there were not enough representatives
of different parties to verify the process.
Comoros
The Comoros operates a rotating system whereby each of the three islands takes it in turn to hold
the presidential primary, and in any given election only a citizen of that island may stand. This
seems to be in a democratic spirit, and as every citizen has the right to run when their island is
hosting primaries, we have not coded legal framework as 0 in response.
This restriction has been treated as a term limit and as such term limits are coded as 1.
1990
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1990
Notes
NB an earlier February election was scrapped due to irregularities.
Incumbent in this case is an acting president. Former president assassinated.
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
10. Counting of votes, 0: opposition allegations of tampering with ballot boxes are held to be
insufficient to alter the election by observers – implicitly corroborating their occurrence
1996
Source: Electoral Observation Mission Report – International Francophone Organisation
2. Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), 0: EMBs are made up of partisan representatives,
which make them vulnerable to politically motivated blockages – affecting impartiality.
Main EMB did not have the means to fully supervise the logistics of the electoral process,
including the distribution and verification of election material. International observers were
required to assist in basic logistical tasks.
4. Voter Register, 0: There were a number (unspecified) of formal complaints that citizens
were unable to exercise their right to vote given that their names did not appear on the
electoral lists. The reports states that it is difficult to determine the exact number of people
absent from the list.
7. Media Access, 1: According to the report all the available information indicated that the
candidates rights to equal coverage on public media had been respected. Nonetheless, the
mission received a formal complaint on the issue from one of the candidates – the national
body responsible for media oversight claimed not to have received the complaint. The
report’s authors seem to dismiss the veracity of the complaint.
9. Role of Officials, 0: The distribution of voting materials was ‘chaotic’ and a number of
polling stations did not have sufficient documents. A lot of officials were not well informed
of the correct procedures to follow.
2002
Source: Electoral Observation Mission Report – International Francophone Organisation
NB opposition boycotted second round
1. Legal Framework, 0: Unconstitutional delay between elections (1996-2002)
3. Electoral Rights, -22: could not assume. There were complaints about the deficiency of the
campaign informing voters of the electoral process. The report dismissed the validity of this
claim. Participation in the 2nd round was less than 30%
4. Voter Register, 1: According to the report the electoral role is ‘very accurate’. They also
concluded that there was sufficient time for a voter information campaign. The Mission
received complaints about the accuracy of the lists and the falsification of identity cards.
Complaints were received about the time frame in which voters who were not on the
(allegedly inaccurate) electoral role had to enrol.
6. Campaign Process, -22: The report notes ‘worrying rumours’ of violence threats and
intimidation – these were not detailed or confirmed. Opposition candidates boycotted the
second round of the election.
8. Voting Process, 0: In certain districts the correct use of indelible ink was observed in less
than 50% of cases. In around 30 of 534 polling stations irregularities were reported including forceful removal of opposition candidates voting ballots, destruction of ballot boxes
and the unauthorised removal of official documents. Nonetheless, the general process was
considered satisfactory. Concerns were raised about the lack of adequate security in certain
areas, accompanied by the persistence of ‘archaic practises’ (boycotts, sporadic violence) in
distinct zones of the country.
9. Role of Officials, 1: The vast majority of officials carried out their work with seriousness
and responsibility but there was not always adequate security in place around polling stations.
An international observer reported an individual who gave money to an official (no further
details). Additionally, the report identified a need for consistent training so that regulations
are enforced in the same way across different regions.
2006
Source: Electoral Observation Mission Report – International Francophone Organisation
2. Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), 0: Due to pressure from presidential candidates,
the main EMB, hidden from scrutiny, brought in new officials to work in polling booths, in
violation of national electoral laws and without sufficient time for adequate training.
6. Campaign Process, 1.Report highlights generally peaceful atmosphere. Some disparity in
campaign finances note but no particular incumbency advantages (incumbent did not stand).
8. Voting Process, -22: International security forces played an important role in ensuring a
peaceful voting process according to the report. No info on majority of subpoints
9. Role of Officials, 0: Officials were inadequately trained (no specific details).
10. Counting of Votes, 1: Only complaint raised is lack of adequate lighting for counting
process.
2010
Sources
(2011), COMOROS: Dhoinine Wins. Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series,
47: 18650B–18651B (online)
United States Department of State, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Comoros
Notes
6. Campaign process, 1: human rights reports commented on the year’s violence and restrictions
of assembly and did not highlight any relevant incidents. No incumbent stood so the question of
finance in their favour did not arise (although note that Comoros presidential candidates
affiliate with parties and the winner was formerly VP).
Congo, Democratic Republic of
2006
Sources
EISA. Observer Mission Report N0. 25. D. R. Congo. Presidential, parliamentary and provincial
elections. (Online)
Notes
(3 by assumption)
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
4. Voter registration, 1: ‘Figures released by the CEI indicate that out of an initial estimate of 28
million potential voters, a total of 25,712,552 Congolese citizens registered to participate in the
general elections’. This is over our 90% figure, and most stakeholders saw the process as
successful. It should be noted however that one party raised objections.
6. Campaign process, 0: violent incidents, particularly before the second round. Also financial
advantage to those represented in the transition government was stressed.
7. Media access, 0: ‘state-owned television and radio channels were dominated by the
incumbent president and his political partners’, and informal limitations on media freedom
8. Voting process, 1: irregularities noted were not of a type or scale to jeopardise the process
Observer rating: ‘conducted in a manner that allowed the people of the DRC to express their
democratic choices without major hindrance.’
2011
Sources
Carter Center: “DRC Presidential Election Results Lack Credibility”
Notes
9. Role of officials, 0: international observers unable to observe the whole process
10. Counting process, 0: serious irregularities and incredible results
Congo, Rep.
1992
Sources
Elections in Congo: The Winding Road to Democracy
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘Some legitimate voters were disenfranchised because of inaccuracies in
the lists used at the local polling places. Similarly, some citizens were unable to vote because of
the lack of a voter's card, or of a second form of identification.’ Attributed to logistical and
administrative difficulties rather than deliberate fraud; on a positive note, it is especially
notable that requirements for proof of ID were relaxed for Pygmies to ensure their inclusion.
4. Voter register, 0: see 3.
9. Role of personnel, 0: armed forces in polling stations. It is notable however that this was
assessed as more helpful than intimidating, although irregular.
2002
Sources
European Parliament, Account of the mission to observe the presidential elections held in the
Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) on 10 March 2002
United States department of state country reports on human rights practices 2002 – Republic of
the Congo
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
3. Voter rights, 0: Pygmies continued to be excluded effectively from social programs and the
political process, in part due to their isolation in remote forested areas of the country. (US state
dep)
4. Voter register, 0: this is based on a combination of the doubts about the procedure raised by
the EU prior, the extreme complaints of the opposition, and the note of 2009 United States
report (sic) that the exclusion of the pigmy population includes widespread nonregistration.
5. Ballot access, 0: incumbent over 75% of votes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘There were a few reports of intimidation of candidates and voters;
however, the opposition allegedly was responsible for about 40 percent of the incidents.’
7. Media access, 0: ‘The news coverage and the editorial positions of the state-owned media
reflected government priorities and views.’
Observer ratings varied.
2009
Sources
Presidential Election Observation Report – International Francophone Organisation
Notes
1. Legal Framework, 0: See 5
2. EMBs, 0: Opposition groups contested the neutrality of main EMB. Report concluded that
EMBs are fragile, lack autonomy, permanence, capacity and sufficient resources to carry out
their tasks.
4. Voter Register, 0: The updating of the electoral role was one of the most prominent sites of
discord between govt. & opposition groups. There are 2 300 000 people on the electoral role in
a country with an estimated population of 3 800 000 of which 70% are under 18.
5. Ballot access, 0: Incumbent wins with 78.6% of the vote.
The report states that eligibility requirements for candidature are one of its key concerns
regarding the electoral process. Candidates are required to demonstrate 24 months of
uninterrupted residence in the country and to be less than 71 years of age at the time of
nominating. These conditions lead to two prominent opposition candidates being rejected.
6. Campaign process, -22: Judging by the visibility of the incumbent’s campaign, the report
suggests he may have benefitted from a massive financial advantage. At the same time, they
mention that the fractured nature of the opposition and the large number of candidates could
also explain the disparity. The report highlights a lack of transparency in terms of campaign
finances.
7. Media Access, 0: Equal treatment and access for candidates of public media was not
guaranteed.
8. Voting Process, -22: Report notes general inadequacy of polling booths for the voting process.
10. Counting of Votes, -22: Very limited presence of opposition candidates’ representatives.
Report states that the results appeared credible. Govt. claims participation of over 66%,
opposition groups claim that it was less than 10%. Report does not confirm either claim, instead
highlighting the need a ‘better understanding of the electorate’.
Costa Rica
1978
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1978 – Costa Rica
Bertelsmann Transformation Index Costa Rica Country Report 2010
Electoral Justice Database http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) – 5 established independently.
2, EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
1982
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1982 – Costa Rica
Electoral Justice Database http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
4, 6, 8, 9, 10 clean by assumption –see guidelines – others established independently
1986
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1986 – Costa Rica
Electoral Justice Database http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
Clean by assumption, see guidelines
1990
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1990 – Costa Rica
Electoral Justice Database http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Bertelsmann Transformation Index Costa Rica Country Report 2010
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
4 6 8 9 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1994
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1994 – Costa Rica
Electoral Justice Database http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Bertelsmann Transformation Index Costa Rica Country Report 2010
Costa Rican president-elect pledges fight against poverty. Agence France Press. 7th Feb
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
8 Voting process, 1: ‘Foreign observers reported no irregularities in the vote.’ Agence France
Press
4,6,9,10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1998
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1998 – Costa Rica
Electoral Justice Database http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Bertelsmann Transformation Index Costa Rica Country Report 2010
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
4,6,8,9, and 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2002
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2002 – Costa Rica
Electoral Justice Database http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Bertelsmann Transformation Index Costa Rica Country Report 2010
Associated Press, Traci Carl, 3rd Feb: Costa Ricans Vote for President
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
8. Voting process, 1: ‘Some 200 international observers watched for abnormalities at nearly
1,900 voting places. However, the only incidents reported were a 4.9 earthquake that briefly
rattled homes and a small fire at a polling place. Neither disrupted voting.’ – Associated Press of
the first round. International observers also present at second round and we have found no
report of fraud.
4,6,8, 9, and 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2006
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2006 – Costa Rica
Electoral Justice Database http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Bertelsmann Transformation Index Costa Rica Country Report 2010
Associated Press, Traci Carl, 3rd Feb: Costa Ricans Vote for President
Global integrity report, Scorecard, 2007
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
8 and 10 1 ‘generally were considered free and fair’
2010
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission Report – Organisation of American States
Notes
2. EMBs, 1:Notwithstanding formal complaints received about bias within EMBs.
EMBs. Their independence is widely accepted by political actors, according to the report.
5. Ballot Access, -22: The OES Mission received a formal complaint from the leader of a smaller
party, highlighting the barriers they faced. The details of the complaint are not listed. Another
candidate complained that the main EMB ‘did everything it could to avoid registering (his party’s)
candidates’.
8. Voting Process, 1: A complaint was made that, in one polling booth, blind people were pressured,
through assisted voting, in to voting for a particular party by one of that party’s representatives.
Report considers that, generally, the secrecy and freedom of the voting process was guaranteed and
that adequate security was in place.
9. Role of Officials, -22. An incident was reported to the mission (not observed directly by the
mission) in which someone, wearing party ID, attempted to ‘buy’ the votes of two women, inside the
polling station, by promising them certain benefits. He removed his identification and ran away when
confronted.
The report raises some concerns over the level of training of officials.
10. Counting of Votes, 1: In around 18% of cases the report estimates that there were ‘administrative
or organisational problem’ but this, in no way, distorted the final result. Transmission of results
occurred in a ‘very satisfactory’ manner.
Côte d'Ivoire
1990
Sources
Widner, Jennifer. ‘The 1990 Elections in Côte d'Ivoire’. A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 20, No. 1
(Winter, 1991), pp. 31-40
Faure, Yves. ‘Democracy and realism: reflections on the case of Côte d'Ivoire’ Africa (1993), 63 :
pp 313-329
Notes
5. Ballot access, 0: incumbent wins 81.68%
6. Campaign process, 0: government interfered with opposition permission to hold rallies,
access telephone services, etc; blatant resource disparity; intimidation of opposition candidates.
7. Media access, 0: ‘Although greater press freedom accompanied the legalization of opposition
parties, the government controlled many of the printing presses whose services opposition
parties or independent news-gatherers required. Publication of alternative news was sporadic,
in consequence. Some of the main opposition parties could not find publishers or faced
substantial delays’ (Widner)
8. Voting process, 0: in addition to most sources assuming some form of fraud as evident, Faure
states more specifically that ‘In many areas members of the opposition were excluded from the
polling booths’
1995
Sources
United States Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1995
University of Pennsylvania, Ivory Coast Election Critique (online)
Freedom House, Worst of the Worst 2007 - Cote d'Ivoire , 9 May 2007 (online)
Cook, Nicolas. Cote d'Ivoire’s Post-Election Crisis . Congressional research service
Notes
NB boycott from key opposition figures
1. Legal framework, 0: Electoral code alters the previous practice of allowing African residents
of non-Ivorian origin (an estimated 40% of the population) to vote.
5. Ballot access, 0: Incumbent over 75% of vote. In addition, the concerns in (1) excluded an
important candidate.
6. Campaign process, 0: violence
7. Media, 0: press not free
Observer rating based on FH description as fraudulent
2000
Sources
U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 - Cote D'Ivoire
Notes
We have coded the incumbent as losing notwithstanding the announcement of his victory, as it was
clear that he did not in fact win the vote, and he was forced to step down immediately and never
gained power.
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘the election could not take place in 26 electoral districts in the north
because RDR activists disrupted polling places, burned ballots, and threatened the security of
elections officials.’, violating b (US department of state)
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘The presidential elections followed several postponements and a
controversial Supreme Court decision on October 6 disqualifying 14 of the 19 candidates,
including all of the PDCI and RDR candidates.’ (US department of state)
6. Campaign process, 0: harassment of opposition and restrictions on assembly
7. Media access, 0: press not free.
8. Voting process, 0: ‘the election could not take place in 26 electoral districts in the north
because RDR activists disrupted polling places, burned ballots, and threatened the security of
elections officials’, violating security requirement. Also unspecified ‘irregularities and violence’
marred the process throughout (US department of state)
10. Counting process, 0: When the incumbent’s opponent appeared to be winning, ‘during the
afternoon of October 23, soldiers and gendarmes entered the National Elections Commission
(CNE) to stop the count.’ The incumbent was declared the winner. Rioting followed until the
incumbent stepped down.
2010
Source: Electoral observation Mission - EU
1. Legal Framework, 0: Elections have not been held regularly. See also 5.
2. EMBs, 0: Central EMB does not systematically publish reports of its activities and decisions,
introducing uncertainties around election procedures and limiting the possibilities for
complaints to be made.
3. Electoral Rights, 0: Internally displaced groups are subject to violence and intimidation and
effectively prohibited from voting.
4. Voter register, -22: The accuracy of the electoral role is contested by a number of different
parties. The report could not verify or dispute this claim.
5. Ballot Access, 0: Mother and father of candidates must be ‘ivoriens d’origine’ – this excludes a
large portion of the population from eligibility (certain party members are exempted as a result
of 2007 Accord). 6 of 20 candidates were rejected. These rejections were the subject of
controversy.
6. Campaign Process, 0: Public finances for campaigns are regulated by national law; this law,
however, is not properly enforced. This ultimately gives the executive power over campaign
finances. The second round was marred by violence, which the report blames mainly on the
President’s supporters.
7. Media Access, 0: Report states that freedom of expression is poorly preserved in the country.
Incumbent is heavily favoured in public media.
8. Voting Process, 0: Voting procedures were respected in 75% of cases. 7% were affected by
acts of violence and intimidation. Security arrangements were deficient.
9. Role of Officials, 0: International observers are excluded from supervision of vote counting.
10. Counting of Votes, 0: Vote counting cannot be tracked either by citizens or international
observers
Croatia
Due to constitutional change, up to and including 2000 we have coded presidential elections,
and post-2000, parliamentary.
Current constitution: http://www.constitution.org/cons/croatia.htm
Previous – see point 0.7 http://www.cilevics.eu/minelres/reports/croatia/NGO/croatia_NGO.htm
2011
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report
Notes
Observer rating, 1: ‘The parliamentary elections took place in a pluralistic environment and
were administered in an efficient and transparent manner’
2007
Sources
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Republic of Croatia Parliamentary
Elections 25 November 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Report
(online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: notwithstanding criticisms of the short time frame allowed, as the job done by EMBs
was deemed to be adequate despite this
6. Campaign process, 1: despite allegations that incumbents had underreported their funds.
OSCE calculations suggest that ALL parties underreported and so there was not the incumbency
advantage this coding is intended to capture.
7. Media access, 0: despite the assessment of the report that coverage was fair: on national TV
channels, incumbents received 27% which opponents received 13%, 4% and 3% respectively
8. Voting process, 0: instances of group voting and stations where secrecy was not assured
2003
Source
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Republic of Croatia Parliamentary
Elections 23 November 2003. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Report
(online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: notwithstanding criticisms of the short time frame allowed, as this did not affect
results
4. Voter register is coded, -22: it was unclear what to make of the claim that ‘EOM for the 2003
elections found less evidence of defects in registers’ than in 2000
7. Media access, 0: the state owned TV channel gave the government 35% of airtime, and
opposition 13%
Remaining aspects were coded -22 as the OSCE did not cover the voting day widely or report in
much detail.
2000
Sources
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Republic of Croatia Parliamentary
Extraordinary Presidential Elections 24 January & 7 February 2000. OSCE/ODIHR Limited
Election Observation Mission Report (online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: discriminatory allocation of polling stations in Serb areas, both abroad and
within the country
4. Voter register, 0: underregistration problems, reiterated in the 2003 report
8. Voting process, 0: instances of group voting and inadequate secrecy
9. Role of officials, 0: due to violations of b
1997
Sources
Organisation for Security and Co-Operation In Europe. Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights. Observation Delegation to the Croatian Presidential Elections 1997.
STATEMENT, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, 15 JUNE 1997 (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘ongoing concern’ about their impartiality
3. Electoral rights, 0: the unequal decision to enfranchise ethnically Croat refugees still living
outside Croatia, but not ethnic Serbs. This has not been coded as a denial of citizen’s right to
vote (1) as the report implied that either disenfranchising Croats or enfranchising Serbs would
be acceptable, and we do not take a position on denial of voting rights abroad; but we take the
inconsistency to be in violation of A.
4. Voter register 0: incomplete
5. Ballot access was coded as -22 as candidate applications were not discussed and the report is
not comprehensive
6. Campaign process was coded as 0 due to attacks on candidates (b) and excessive use of
government resources (d)
7. Media access was coded as 0 due to violations of b
8. Voting process was coded as 0 due to insufficient provisions for secrecy, and group voting
1992
Sources
Elections in the Republic of Croatia. 2 August 1992. Report of The International Republican
Institute (online)
Notes
2. EMB is coded as 0 due to concerns about partiality (c) and the abrupt timing of the election
which was seen as ‘detrimental’ (d)
3. Electoral rights was coded as 0 because of the unequal application of efforts to include Croat
voters in occupied territories (which were elaborate) and Serb (which were nonexistent). Due
to lack of clarity over the relationship between these territories and citizenship rights we have
not also coded this as a violation of 1.
4. Voter register has been coded as 0 due to inadequate registration
5. Ballot access was not covered, -22
6. Campaign process was coded as 0 due to violations of d
7. Media access was coded as 0 due to violations of b
9. Role of officials was coded as 0 due to lack of training (a) and problems with (d) de facto as
parties remained unsure of important details of the polling stations
10. Counting of votes is necessarily -22 as the ballots were not printed appropriately to ensure
validation
Cyprus
1993
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practice 1993
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
3. Ballot access, 0: to vote, Greek Cypriots in the north must travel to the South.
Remaining variables clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2008
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practice 2008
Notes
3. Ballot access, -22: unsure whether past problems with this variable have been dealt with
Remaining variables clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Czech Republic
1990
Sources
IPU Parline
Keesings contemporary archives
Scot Herron. Palm Beach Post. Jun 11 1990.CZECH ELECTION WAS `CLEAR, FAIR,'
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS REPORT
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines). Also eg “"This was as clear and as fair an election as
you'll see in any country, including our own," said Sen. Christopher Dodd, D-Conn., one of the
observers… "It was quite obvious that the problem of fraud and corruption that we had to be
aware of in other countries simply was not the case here," Dodd said. "We wholeheartedly
endorse the results of this election.”
1992
Sources
IPU Parline
Keesing contemporary archives
Elections in Czechoslovakia June 1992: A report prepared by the Staff of the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Denmark
All years sourced from IPU Parline, US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights
Practices and Keesings contemporary archives
1975 (no USD) , 1977, 1979, 2005, 2007 Keesing and US dep: Clean by assumption (see
guidelines)
2011: 8 and 10 assumed from US dep recording as free and fair (no Keesings available at time of
writing)
Djibouti
1981
Sources
Notes
Elected unopposed
1. Legal framework, 0: elections for president not regularly held
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75% of the vote
1993
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1993 – Djibouti
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The Government employed economic coercion to stifle freedom of
speech, firing public sector employees who supported opposition candidates or unwelcome
political ideas.’ (US department of state)
7. Media access, 0: ‘the official media devoted disproportionate coverage to the activities of the
ruling party.’ (US department of state)
8. Voting process, 0: ‘President Gouled was reelected to a fourth term on May 7 in a tightly
controlled multiparty presidential election. He was endorsed by about 60 percent of the 50
percent of the registered voters who went to the polls. The President secured only 53 percent of
the votes in the capital where, by all accounts, the balloting was fair, but he claimed more than
80 percent of the votes in the rebellious Afar-inhabited northern districts where international
observers detected widespread fraud.’ – we took this to be fraud via balloting, given that it was
contrasted to a statement about fair balloting.’ (US department of state)
1999
Source: Electoral Observation Mission – International Francophone Organisation
2. EMBs, -22: Opposition claim that EMB is ineffective, while the govt. effectively manages the
election. This claim is not evaluated
3. Electoral Rights, 0: The report notes the inadequacy of voter education, which lead to the
widespread misuse of ballot papers.
4. Voter Register, 0: Opposition claimed not to have been allowed access to official
documentation of electoral role. Opposition also claimed that the administration had given out
too many voting registrations, with the intention of allowing people to vote multiple times.
Report recommends improvements in the accuracy of the electoral role that takes into account
nomadic populations.
5. Ballot access, -22: could not assume as winning candidate gets 74.09% of the vote
6. Campaign process, -22: Concerns from opposition that public resources would be used to
favour the ruling party candidate. Claim not examined in the report.
8. Voting Process, 1: Secret vote was ensured. NB: Opposition claimed that the ink was not
actually indelible – this claim was confirmed by observers on the day.
9. Role of officials, 0: Misuse or non-usage of indelible ink was noted, particularly in rural areas,
voters were not asked to provide identity cards in a number (unspecified) of polling booths.
Report lists training of election officials as a key priority.
10. Counting of votes, -22: Opposition claimed that ballot box stuffing and tampering occurred.
In observed polling stations, counting occurred in a transparent fashion.
2005
Sources
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: Opposition disputed the neutrality and effectiveness of the main EMB. The
governing administration ultimately has regulatory power over the elections in which they take
part.
4.Voter Register, 0: Opposition claimed electoral roles didn’t reflect the reality of the
population. By the government’s admission, the electoral role contains deceased people,
doubles and doesn’t accurately represent the nomadic population (20% of total pop.). The
report notes a significant number of people on the list whose age significantly exceed life
expectancy in the country.
5. Ballot Access, 0: Only one candidate stands for election. Opposition parties boycott the
process.
7.Media Access, 0: Opposition claims that free and fair access to public media was not in place.
The report noted that the opposition’s perspective was completely absent from public media.
There is no real private media in the country.
9. Role of Officials, 0: Campaigning occurs within polling stations, security forces were present
inside all the polling stations visited, presence of local leaders inside polling stations was
considered inappropriate by the report’s authors, given that they may influence voting
2011
Sources
Intergovernmental Authority on Development: JOINT STATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
OBSERVER MISSIONS OF THE DJIBOUTI PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HELD ON APRIL 08, 2011
(online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2011 – Djibouti
Child Soldiers Global Report 2008 – Djibouti (for population stats) (online)
African Elections Database:
http://africanelections.tripod.com/dj.html/#1981_Presidential_Election
Notes
NB all but one opposition leader boycotted.
3. Electoral rights, 0: presumed given low registration and observer criticism regarding the
distribution of voter cards
4. Voter register, 0: 152,000 registered voters. In 2008, population 793,000, with 383,000
under 18. We conclude that this cannot be adequate registration.
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75% of vote
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The government arrested, harassed, and threatened opposition leaders,
restricted the operations of opposition parties, and denied opposition groups permits to
organize protests’ – US department of state
7. Media access, 0: Closure of most private press, government control of only radio and TV
which were dominated by positive coverage of government.
9. Role of officials, 0: presence of security at polling stations criticised
Dominica
Legal framework, 0 for all: ministers of religion may not vote
1980
Sources
IPU Parline
http://www.lennoxhonychurch.com/heritage.cfm?Id=214
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1980 - Dominica
Notes
Legal framework, 0: “ministers of religion” prohibited
8 and 10 assumed from US dep “free and fair”
1985
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1985 – Dominica
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1990 - Dominica
Notes
8 and 10 assumed from US dep “free and fair” in 1990
1990
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Dominica
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption except 4 and 7 (see guidelines)
1995
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1995 – Dominica
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Clean by assumption except 4 and 7 (see guidelines)
2000
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 - Dominica
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines), nb US dep “free and fair”
Clean by assumption except 4 and 7 (see guidelines)
2005
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 - Dominica
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines; media explicit) except 4, 8,9,10:
US dep: In May the ruling DLP won 12 seats in parliamentary elections, defeating the United
Workers' Party (UWP), which won 8 seats. An independent candidate affiliated with the DLP
also won a seat. The opposition UWP complained of electoral irregularities and challenged in
court the results in five constituencies. In October a high court judge dismissed the UWP's
petition, citing a lack of evidence, but the opposition planned to appeal the decision. Although
the country has a history of holding free and fair elections, impartial election observers were
not present to verify the results.
2009
Sources
Final report of the OAS electoral observation mission to the general elections in the
Commonwealth of Dominica
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: names of deceased present
7. Media access, 0: state media biased towards government’s campaign – it should be noted that
this is not explored thoroughly or substantiated, resulting in a data confidence of 3
Dominican Republic
2, 0 for all: electoral commission was final court of appeal on electoral matters until 2010, violating E
http://www.bti-project.de/laendergutachten/lac/dom/2012/#chap2
1978
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1979 (sic) – Dominican
Republic
Nohlen, D (2005) Elections in the Americas: A data handbook, Volume I, p247Republic
Keesing Contemporary Archive
Notes
6. Campaign process, 1: ‘the campaign preceding the election was free and open’ – in the absence of
any negative allegations concerning our specific subpoints we have accepted this verdict
10. Counting process, 0: votecount interrupted by army. Later resumed and correct candidate
nonetheless installed under pressure. The incumbent, who lost, admitted to ‘grave irregularities’:
not clear whether these were counting or voting, but we have coded 0 here to register this point and
take account of the army interference.
1982
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1982 – Dominican
Republic
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘several’ deaths from confrontations at rallies etc
8 and 10 assumed from ‘free and fair’
1986
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1986 – Dominican
Republic
May 17, 1986. Ed McCullough, Associate Press. Majluta And Balaguer Running Neck-and-Neck in
Early Returns
May 18, 1986. Ed McCullough, Associated Press. Balaguer Leads in Presidential Race, Vote Count
Suspended
MAY 19, 1986. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service: balaguer leads in dominican election
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: Incidents of campaign violence. Also see Associated Press May 18th - 12
killed.
8. We have coded the voting process as 1 notwithstanding opposition complaints. All opposition had
claimed prior to the election that they could only lose by fraud, and newspaper reports show that
foreign observers and the internal monitors led by the Archbishop deemed the election to have
been conducted fairly.
1994
Sources
http://www.ndi.org/files/263_do_94elections.pdf
Notes
1, 5, 7, 8 and 9 were not sufficiently covered to code: -22.
2. EMBs, 0: while not explicitly stated this was assumed from the decision making, and the call for
urgent reform of the commission
3. Electoral rights, 0: turning away of voters not on lists (see below), disproportionately
disadvantaging the opposition
4. Voter register, 0: Around 45,000 voters that had been on the electoral lists submitted to parties
were not on the final list. They were disproportionately opposition supporters. This number is
substantially greater than the margin of victory.
6. Campaign process, 0: violent incidents
10. Counting of votes, 0: lack of transparency over how the JCE reached its final vote count, violating
b.
As the results were so questionable government was formed through a temporary pact and new
elections were held in 1996.
1996
Sources
http://www.ndi.org/files/DR1996English.pdf
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/electionreports/democracy/FinalReportDominicanRepublic19
96.pdf
Notes
Insufficient information was available on 1, 3, 5 and 7 to code.
4. Voter register has been coded as 1 despite the exclusion of some voters mistakenly listed as
deceased; the scale of this is not given but the overall description of the register is overwhelmingly
positive so we take it that it was not excessive.
6. The campaign, 0: instances of political violence
9. Role of officials, 0: instances of campaigning at polling stations
2008
Sources
MOE (Electoral Observation Mission)– OEA (Organisation of American States) report
Notes
2. EMBs, 0. The report states that there is no appropriate body to follow up specific complaints
related to the electoral process and this is little likelihood of reprimanding organisations and
individuals who breach electoral laws, violating e. NB: At the same time the report praises the
work of the main electoral body responsible for organising the process and responding to more
general complaints. Ultimately, despite some problems, the report claims that election was
successful and that the existing bodies acted with independence and impartiality.
4. Voter Register, -22. Various NGOs claimed that Dominicans descended from Haitians often
had difficulty registering to vote. One formal complaint was received. The report does not go
into more detail on the issue.
6. Campaign Process, 0: Government finances were used to favour the incumbent.
7. Media Access, 0: All parties had access to the media and there were a plurality of voices
heard. Nonetheless, there was a clear bias in favour of the ruling party.
9. Role of Officials, 1: The authors received complaints and witnessed sporadic irregularities –
campaigning within polling stations – but this was thought to have little effect on the outcome.
The work was of officials generally commended despite some irregularities mentioned.
Ecuador
1979
Sources
Corkill, David. ‘Democratic Politics in Ecuador, 1979-1984’ Bulletin of Latin American
Research, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1985), pp. 63-74
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1979 – Ecuador
Keesings Contemporary Archive
Notes
NB began in 1978, considerable delay until run off
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
2. EMBs, 0: timing of the runoff and recognition of parties tailored to suit military, via TSE
(Corkill)
6. Campaign process, 0: one candidate assassinated, another incident at a rally where bullets
were fired seemingly at the candidate and injured supporters
7. Media, 1: not withstanding some ad hoc restrictions mentioned that do not seem related to
the election
10 Counting process, 0. Corkill notes that ‘Amid charges of fraud and irregularities
the TSA annulled some 100,000 votes(over three quarters of them for the Roldos?Hurtado
ticket), but the result was not affected.’ We accept here his description of the military’s
partisanship and therefore the telling nature of the figures, in the absence of either
contradictory or corroborating evidence. Data confidence has been impacted.
1984
Sources
Fenton Wheeler, the Associated Press, Jan 29th
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1984 – Ecuador
Keesings Contemporary Archives
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Two people were slain in pre-election violence during the long
campaign that began Oct. 31 in this South American country of about 9 million people.’
NB opposition allegations of fraud (Keesings)
1988
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1988 – Ecuador
United Press International, Hernando Rocha, Socialist wins Ecuador's presidential election
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The accusation reflected the volatile nature of the campaign in recent
weeks, when several political demonstrations for both candidates erupted into violence in
which at least three people were killed.’ – United Press International
1992
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1992 – Ecuador
Conservative rivals leading in Ecuadoran vote, Agence France Press, May 18th
Polity IV report 2010
ECUADOR: MASSIVE SWING TO THE RIGHT IN GENERAL ELECTIONS, Diego Cavellos,
International Press Service, 18th May
Notes
1 Legal framework, 1. (Nb active duty military cannot vote)
4. Voter register, 0: Agence France Press reports that ‘Scattered irregularities were reported,
such as the names of minors and deceased people showing up on voter registration lists.’ This is
insufficient info by itself, but we note that in 1996 the inflation figure was 1m. It therefore
seems probable that the number of deceased was already high by this election. Data confidence
impacted.
For the following two quotes we have coded 8 and 10 as 1, in the absence of contradictory
evidence, but data confidence has been impacted:
‘Commenting on the elections, which it judged as fair, the Latin American Society for Human
Rights (ALDHU) said here today that the polls would motivate other Latin American countries to
continue their democratic processes.’ - IPS
And: ‘both the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections were deemed to be “free and fair” by
international observers’ – Polity IV
1996
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1996 – Ecuador
http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/VRC/Reports/1996/R01585/R01585.pdf
IFES technical mission
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: local electoral tribunals had partisan propaganda on the walls
4. Voter register, 0: missing names and obsolete names
7. Media access, 1: after a mixed discussion, ‘Ecuador has a free and vigorous press. Ownership
of the media is broad based, and editorials represent a wide range of political views and often
criticize the Government. However, some degree of self-censorship in the print media occurs,
particularly with respect to politically sensitive issues or stories about the military and its
related industries.’ (US state dep)
10, 1: assumed given a description of the counting that only made complaints about speed.
1998 – in addition to databases, pronounced transparent by OAS according to US dep, and no
problems noted in either US dep or Keesing. NB that opposition disputed. EMBs has been coded
as -22 in respect of previous year’s 0s.
2002
Sources
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/Ecuador's%202002%20Presidential%20Elections.pdf
Notes
2006
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission – OES
Notes
2. Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), -22. One of the major parties, Alianza Pais, had no
representation in the major EMB, unlike the other major parties, and claimed that the organisation was
biased against their party. The party, nonetheless, went on to win the election. The report recommends
better communication between the body and different political actors and transparency in its internal
organisation.
3. Electoral Rights, 0: In areas with large indigenous populations a general lack of materials in
indigenous language, and the inability of officials to speak these languages, hindered voting for nonSpanish speakers. Violates d.
4. Voter Register, 1: Some complaints were made about errors in the voter register but the percentage
was minimal and in the majority of cases complaints were adequately dealt with.
7. Media Access, 1: The report laments the generally poor political coverage in the media but there is
no indication that certain candidates receive preferable treatment on state-owned media or that certain
candidates are denied access.
8. Voting Process, 0: In an unspecified number of cases the secrecy of voting could not be
guaranteed.
9. Role of Officials, -22: The report notes that campaigning occurred in a way that contravened
electoral law. It is not cleat in the report, whether that entails campaigning inside polling stations or
other forms of campaigning deemed inappropriate.
2009
Sources
http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/missions/final_report-ecuador-2009_english.pdf
Notes
2. EMBs has been coded as 1 notwithstanding some popular mistrust: ‘Overall, NEC and its
decentralized bodies operated independently and transparently.’ The report implies that NEC
made a concerted effort to increase its transparency and that it was an unintentional lack of
clarity that left it vulnerable to criticism.
4. Voter register, 1: exclusion of approximately 500,000 voters but ‘generally considered to be
inclusive’
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying (violating a), attacks on candidates (violating b) and the use
of state resources (violating c).
7. Media access, 0: violation of b.
8. Voting process, 0: secrecy of the ballot compromised in 16% of cases. However it is not
alleged that this was abused.
9. Role of officials, 0: campaigning within polling station
El Salvador
1977
Sources
McClintock, Cynthia. 1998. Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and
Peru's Shining Path . Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. via UCSD
Anderson, Thomas P. 1981. The war of the dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador,
1969. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Both via Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources. (Online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1977 – El Salvador
Electoral Justice database: http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Amnesty International Human rights report 1977
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
4. Voter register, 0: 150,000 phantom voters (widely attested, see e.g. McClintock)
5. Ballot access, 0: major opposition leaders were in exile
6. Campaign process, 0: Amnesty International reports that ‘Spokesmen for UNO protested
about the arrests of hundreds of supporters before the elections, and of poll-watchers during
the election itself.’ While this is not as such a corroboration of the claims, later harassment of
opposition is affirmed and the implication is that Amnesty finds the claims credible.
8. Voting process, 0: voter intimidation and ballot box stuffing recorded by multiple sources
listed by UCSD
9. Role of officials, 0: denial of opposition UNO’s right to observe recorded by several sources
listed by UCSD
10. Counting process, 0: see 8, ballot box stuffing
1982 elections were indirect
1984
Sources
Recap of the month. February, March and April Latin American Regional Reports. Caribbean &
Central America report February 17, 1984
Via Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources. (Online)
Moderate Leads in El Salvador Election but Runoff Assured; Voting Takes Place Amid Confusion
– Facts on File World News Digest, 30th March
Head of Canadian observer team describes frustration of elections – The Globe and Mail, March
30th
Road Minings Vowed On Eve of Vote; Rebels in El Salvador Launch 2 Attacks - Edward Cody,
Washington Post – 6th May
Rebels step up attacks on eve of election - Tony Espetia, United Press International 5th May
Electoral Justice Database: http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
3. Ballot access, 0: at least 58 municipalities were not able to vote, with congestion and
confusion plus some voters with individual difficulties
Also, “Some 20% of the electorate was thought to have been disenfranchised because of
bureaucratic mix-ups” – Facts on File
4. Voter register, 0: “the same two parties tacitly agree not to question Either the Absence of a
specific electoral law or the serious deficiencies of the electoral register ... The Central Election
Council (CCE), afflicted by a spate of resignations in late 1983, admits That the electoral register
will be less than perfect. " – regional report
6. Campaign process, 0: guerrilla attacks intended to intimidate voters into abstaining
9. Role of officials, 0: inadequate training (see Globe and Mail)
1989
Sources
McClintock, Cynthia. 1998. Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and
Peru's Shining Path . Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Central America report March 31, 1989
Both via Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources. (Online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1989 – El Salvador
Ruling party concedes defeat in El Salvador – Douglas Tweedale, United Press International
In One Town, Election Fear And Charges – Mark A Uhlig, New York Times, 20th March
Observers Call Salvadoran Elections Free and Fair Associated Press, 20th March
Electoral Justice Database http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
3. Electoral rights, 0: “In 1989, 17 percent of Salvadorans who applied for their voting cards
could not return to pick them up. The onerousness of the new procedures was an important
factor in the declining turnout in El Salvador’s 1989 and 1991 elections” (page 125). “It also
became much more difficult for unsophisticated Salvadorans to locate and reach their voting
table” (McClintock, via UCSD)
5. Ballot access, 1
7. Media access, 1.
6. Campaign process, 0: Guerrilla threats and violence were used to try and block the election,
political leaders assassinated.
8 Voting, 0: inadequate security: “The national elections commission suspended voting in 22
municipalities under guerrilla control, and rebel forces launched attacks in 20 towns””
9. Role of officials, 0: Large numbers of officials resigned due to insecurity. ‘But in many others
the vacuum in authority was filled by convoys of political party workers who set up voting on
their own, certifying ballots and policing voting areas in what some officials described as a
brazen attempt to commandeer the vote.’ This violates the criteria that officials fulfil their roles
properly – authorised personnel did not fulfil them and authorised personel overstepped their
mark.
10 has been coded as 1, as international observers described the election variously as clean, free
and fair.
1994
Sources
IFES: Election Observation El Salvador, March 20 - April 24, 1994
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
1 and 5 by assumption
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘IFES delegates also observed citizens with voting documents (carnet
electorales) who were unable to vote because their names were not on the electoral registry.
The United Nations Electoral Observation Mission (ONUSAL) noted the same problem, citing
25,000 citizens with carnets who did not find their names on the electoral list at 3,000 voting
centers.’
4. Voter register, 0: ‘The electoral registry closed on January 19, 1994, with 2.7 million citizens
inscribed to vote. This figure represents 80 percent of the estimated eligible voters... Although
the electoral registry includes 2.7 million names, the President of the Tribunal estimated that
the effective list is 2.2 million voters. ONUSAL estimated that some 300,000 to 400,000 names
on the list correspond to defunct citizens alone.’ This is presented as a logistical challenge
rather than deliberate manipulation.
6. Campaign process, 0: activists were killed but the report explicitly notes controversy over
whether this was politically motivated or part of a more general crime problem. Keesings cites
clashes between supporters around the time of the second round as serious and also notes
accusations of vote buying. Combined to suggest poor campaign environment
7. Media access, -22: (a) and (c) are met, but there is reason to suppose (b) may be violated as
general bias in favour of the incumbent is noted. However, it is not clarified whether this media
is state owned.
1999
Sources
Central America report March 12, 1999 , via Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A
guide to sources. (Online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1989 – El Salvador
Electoral justice database http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/index.cfm#
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions cannot be appealed to another institution
4. Voter register, 0: “No major Irregularities Were Reported, although civic action groups
complained That was not the electoral register updated. They Said That, of three million people
Authorized to vote, a third of These Were Dead or living abroad ... There is no provision in El
Salvador for a home vote, For those unable to get to the polling station” – Central America
Report
2004
Sources
http://www.commonborders.org/_pdf_/Salvdor_2004_report.pdf
Information confirmed by: http://www.rehberg.net/nonviolentways/elsal-032004.html
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: All TSE members operating on party lines, which although of conflicting parties,
caused deadlock. Also assume given 1999 and 2009 that decisions could not be appealed.
6. Campaign process, 0: violence, minor. Widespread reports of bribery. Dominance of RENA
advertising suggests incumbent financial advantage.
7. Media access, 0: bias.
2009
Sources
European Union Election Observation Mission, El Salvador 2009: Final Report on the General
Elections
Notes
(5 by assumption)
1. Legal framework, 1: notwithstanding ‘The amendments of the Electoral Code that were
introduced for the recent election process, the latest of which was issued 18 days prior to the
presidential elections, enabled Salvadorans residing abroad to vote and also clarified the
criteria for the validity of ballots as well as Closing and Counting Protocols’. As this change
raised no complaints from stakeholders we have not coded as 0.
2. EMBs, 0: ‘there is no further external appeal against the TSE’s resolutions other than, in certain
cases, a petition for the enforcement of constitutional rights (recurso de amparo) before the
Supreme Court of Justice, alleging the violation of fundamental rights.’ (emphasis added)
3. Electoral rights, 1: notwithstanding ‘Despite the explicit recognition of the right of universal
suffrage, the exercise of this right is limited, in practice, for several groups of Salvadoran
citizens. The largest group is undoubtedly that of Salvadoran citizens living abroad, whose
number is estimated at approximately two and a half million.’ We have not been coding as 0 for
differences in legal and practical arrangements for voting while abroad.
4. Voter register, 0: parties complained of ‘the existence of a large contingent of deceased
persons in the Electoral Register’, the continued need for purging is emphasised by the report
6. Campaign process, 0: financial disparities to the point of ‘clear imbalance’, and also ‘The
excessive distribution of material goods in the poorer neighbourhoods’ by all parties
7. Media access, 0: state media bias (and more general media bias in this case)
2012
Sources
Final report of the 9th International Mission of Electoral Observation -Centre for Exchange and
Solidarity -Centro de Intercambio y Solidaridad (CIS)
Notes
2. Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), 0: EMBs did not aid the enforcement of certain
electoral laws. There were also general problems of disorganisation and lack of accountability.
3. Electoral Rights, 0: Citizens must pay a private company to get identity documents, excluding
those who can’t or don’t want to pay.
4. Voter Register, 0: included large numbers of dead and ineligible voters
6. Campaign Process, 0: A number of candidates received death threats before the elections. In
some cases, groups campaigning on behalf of, or with candidates acted in an intimidating way.
7. Media Access, -22. NB It was briefly mentioned that the media was generally highly partisan
8.Voting Process, 0: The secret vote was not guaranteed, allowing voting to be observed by
vigilantes
9. Role of Officials, 0: In some areas there was an unnecessary and intimidating military
presence. A lot of officials at voting centres didn’t follow the guidelines of the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal in the vote counting, counting methods were improvised and, in some cases, this
process was unreliable. Officials in some cases gave voters directions on who to vote for and
even marked ballots.
10. Counting of Votes, 0: Inconsistencies in vote counting process - a large number of votes
were declared void due to ink stains. General lack of confidence in the reliability of the counting
process.
Equatorial Guinea
1997
Sources
IFES Equatorial Guinea Assessment Report, November 1997 (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘That the Junta lacked popular credibility as a neutral body was clear to IFES
observers in February 1996 who were told repeatedly by opposition members and other
citizens that they felt the Junta represented only government and PDGE party interests.’ The
election was also arguably a ‘snap’ election, although this upset opposition rather than the JEN.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘an electoral census whose creation and use is perceived universally as
lacking credibility’
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘lack of an equal distribution of resources’ including funding and
mobility, opposition allegations of widespread violence and intimidation
7. Media access, 0: unequal access to the media
8. Voting process, 0: ‘IFES observers also felt that despite verbal assurances by the JEN, voters
not only were not given the choice at the majority of polling stations to cast a ballot in secret,
but they were pressured to vote publicly by PDGE polling station officials and armed military
men at the mesas.’
9. Role of officials, 0: on the strength of the notes about pressure above.
10. Counting process, 0: the whole process could not be tracked violating A: ‘Even with the
satellite equipment, ballot boxes were reported missing between the polling station and the
district headquarters (Luba) and aetas were counted without any verification from sources
outside of the government, since the opposition had very little, if any, representation in the
polling stations due to the fact that three fourths of the opposition abstained from participation’
2002
Sources
Electoral Observation Report – International Francophone Organisation
Notes
5. Ballot Access, 0: Wining candidates gets over 97% of final vote
7. Media Access, 0: A clear bias in public media was observed, in favour of the ruling party.
8. Voting Process, 0: The report suggests widespread violation of the secret ballot
9. Role of Officials, 0: Outside the capital, an intimidating military presence inside polling
centres was observed.
2009
Sources
Constitution:http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Equatorial%20Guinea%20Constitution.pdf
United States Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Equatorial Guinea
Human Rights Watch. Equatorial Guinea: Human Rights Concerns Taint Election. 25 November
2009. (Online)
Guardian. Mark Tran and Agencies. Equatorial Guinea's ruler extends 30-year term in
contested election. 30 November 2009. (Online)
Polity.org.za. Bradley Dubbleman. Postelection Report: Equatorial Guinea. Presidential
Election Results (online)
Notes
2. EMBs 0: ‘No independent and impartial body exists in Equatorial Guinea to oversee the
electoral process or consider election-related complaints, raising additional serious doubts
about conditions for a genuinely free and fair vote numerous irregularities at polling places.’
Human Rights Watch.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘The voter registration process, an important part of the preparations for
elections in the country, was seriously flawed. The registration committee was composed
primarily of PDGE members and routinely decided issues in favor of the PDGE. When registering
a PDGE member, the committee registered all members of the family as PDGE voters, including
children. Persons who were dead, underage, or living abroad were included as PDGE
registrants.’ (US Dep)
5. Ballot access, 0: incumbent over 75%
6. Campaign process, 0: harassment, limits on freedom of assembly, government abuse of state
resources
7. Media access, 0: ‘Ahead of the vote, Human Rights Watch, based in New York, said the
government had stifled and harassed the country's political opposition, denying it equal access
to the media’ (guardian, see also US Dep)
8. Vote process, 0: ‘Procedural irregularities at some polling stations included multiple voting,
failure to respect secrecy of the vote, and the absence of a posted list of registered candidates. At
some stations voters were allowed to vote for family members, unregistered voters were
allowed to vote, and ballot boxes were unsealed.’ (US Dep)
9. Role of officials, 0: international observers not allowed, military inside stations (see eg polity)
Estonia
1992
Sources
Republic of Estonia: An Assessment of the Election to the Riigikogu and the Presidency.
September 16 – 24, 1992. (Online)
Notes
Incumbency: the incumbent party contested (ignoring the interim government) and as far as we
can discover continued to be led by the former Prime Minister – he certainly continued in
politics.
1. Legal framework, 1: we have coded as 1 as all citizens are entitled to vote, but it should be
noted that thousands among the resident population are not citizens as establishing citizenship
requires proof of descent from pre1940, and there is a large settle population of ‘Soviet’
Russians (as opposed to the ‘historic’ Russians who may vote in recognition of their pre-war
connections). This citizenship law was relatively new and controversial and disenfranchised
those who had earlier voted. We have coded as 1 here in keeping with our policy elsewhere of
not attempting to make judgements about appropriate citizenship laws, although this is an
extreme case.
3. Electoral rights is coded as 1 notwithstanding 4, as these citizens were assisted in
establishing their citizenship and voting
4. Voter register, 0: ‘On polling day and despite previous reminders an, as yet, unknown
number of voters found that they were not on the electoral registers and were directed to
the citizenship committees’
6. Campaign process, 1: information here is scarce, but as the report dwells on campaign
rhetoric, we presume that no more serious concerns were brought to their attention
8. Voting process, 1: voting secrecy violations seem to be the result of citizens choosing to mark
their ballots publically while waiting for the private booth to become available
1995
Sources
United States Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1995 – Estonia
CNN election watch - http://articles.cnn.com/2000-0223/world/election.watch_europe_estonia_1_parliamentary-elections-system-of-proportionalrepresentation-unicameral?_s=PM:WORLD – used to establish that incumbent had run (ie was
still a party leader)
Constitution of Estonia
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines), except 4 due to problems in previous election
2011
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report
Notes
1. Legal framework, 1: notwithstanding ‘While citizenship is recognized as an admissible
restriction to suffrage, in particular for elections for national office, it is of concern that a
significant group of long-term residents with undetermined citizenship, amounting to some
seven per cent of the total population, do not have the right to vote or stand as candidates in
national elections. They can however vote, but not stand as candidates, at local elections.’ This
does not violate our criteria and we do not attempt to assess the validity of citizenship
requirements here.
Ethiopia
1995
Sources
Abbink. ‘Elections in federal Ethiopia’ in Abbink and Hesseling, ‘Election Observation and
Democratisation’
Lyons, Terrence. ‘Closing the Transition: the May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia’. The Journal of
Modern African Studies (1996), 34 : pp 121-142
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1995 - Ethiopia
Constitution: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/et00000_.html
For numbers of voters registered:
Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Amhara in Ethiopia, 2004 (Online)
For population under 18, used in conjunction with the above for pt 4:
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ethiopia_statistics.html
Notes2. EMBs, 0: Abbink refers to the ‘EPRDF-led local electoral committees’
4. Voter registration, 0: of a population of 55m, ‘more than 15m’ registered. Today, over-18s
make up a little over half of Ethiopia’s population. We have assumed that the demographic
balance was sufficiently similar that approximately 15m does not come close to universal
registration.
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘For example, 12 members of the Omo People's Democratic Union were
detained for 10 months in Jinka on questionable evidence in a move widely believed to preclude
their participation in regional elections. Similarly, credible reports indicate that ethnic Nuer
candidates of the Gambela People's Democratic Unity Party (GPDUP) were denied registration
in Gambela.’ (US dep)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘there were certainly cases of pre-election disappearances and even
killings of...political opposition figures, arrests of campaigners, and the prohibition of holding
party rallies or opening branches of opposition parties’ (Abbink)
7. Media access, 1: while it is not possible to be sure of balance, we have coded as 1 given
‘Government media reporters practice self-censorship; but covered both government and
opposition candidates during the election. The official media attempted to make space and
broadcast time available and even proposed working with the candidates through the National
Election Board (NEB), to improve their broadcast presentations.’ and later ‘Serious attempts
were also made to provide registered candidates access to official media’. (US department of
state human rights report)
8. Voting process, 0: ‘lack of privacy in polling booths’ (Abbink)
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘Insistence by election officials that the public vote for certain candidates’
(Abbink)
10. Counting process, 0: Contrary to our criterion that votes can be tracked, ‘The fate of ballot
boxes after closure of the polling stations was not known’ (Abbink)
2000
Sources
United States Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 (sic) - Ethiopia
For voter register: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/strp0200.html
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: reportedly approximately 14million registered. See our 1995 calculations
for our conclusion that this cannot be a sufficient percentage of the population, assuming that
the population at least did not diminish (note the slight disparity between the claim that more
were registered in this election than the last, and the figure of ‘over 15million’ given for 1995)
5. Ballot access, 0: arrest and detainment of candidates beyond time of voting
6. Campaign process, 0: an attack on candidates, voter intimidation and bribery, credible reports
of abductions and killings
7. Media access, 1: difficult to ascertain level of balance but the US human rights report states:
‘The Government established a donor supported fund for opposition party candidates, provided
opposition candidates access to state-owned electronic media, and changed the law to permit
civil servants to run for office without first resigning their positions. The Government was
willing to engage opponents in open debate at candidate and party forums. Many of these
debates were broadcast live on national radio and television and reported on in both
government and private newspapers. Free radio broadcast time was set aside for the elections,
and 225 independent candidates and 33 political parties made use of it.’
2005
Sources
EU Election Observation Mission Ethiopia 2005. Final Report on the Legislative Elections.
(Online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: overlap between election officials and the government, compromising c, and
between the commission and the judiciary, compromising the spirit of e
3. Electoral rights, 0: failure to register all citizens, a problem which applied more to women
4. Voter register, 1: 85% registered, within our threshold
5. Ballot access, 0: violation of b; with a cap of 12 candidates per constituency, party candidates
were explicitly prioritised over independents, violating equal treatment criterion
6. Campaign process, 0: intimidation of voters and candidates
8. Voting process, 0: ‘Campaign material was rarely seen in polling stations (5 per cent).
Observers witnessed intimidation in 4 per cent of polling stations visited, multiple voting 3 per
cent of polling stations visited and ballot stuffing 2 per cent of polling stations visited’
10. The vote count was considered not at all credible, 0
2010
Sources
EU: Preliminary Statement: High turnout on a peaceful and orderly Election Day marred by a
narrowing of political space and uneven playing field
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: NEBE staff are primarily government employees and this is not trusted by the
opposition. As per our guidelines we have taken the combination of these two conditions to
violate the requirement of independence.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘the lack of a national voters list does not allow for the purging of multiple
registrations’ (EU) (approx 86% registration if all entries were valid)
6. Campaign process, 0 – state resources used to a degree such that ‘the EU EOM considers that
the playing field for the 2010 elections was not sufficiently balanced’. In addition complaints of
harassment and violation that are of a ‘volume and consistency’ to be taken seriously.
7. Media access, 0: Over 50% of state media coverage to ruling party
8. Voting process, 0: ‘credible reports of ballot stuffing’. A court case was ongoing at time of
writing of two women killed at the polling booth, allegedly for a refusal to vote for the ruling
party.
9. Role of officials, 0: officials instructing voters who to vote for, campaigning at polling stations
10. Counting process, 0: ‘credible reports of ballot stuffing, vote count fraud’
Fiji
April 1977
Sources
Notes
We have coded incumbent as winning as he was invited to be the new PM, but nb the following
from IPU Parline: ‘Despite the fact that the NFP won the most seats (26), the Governor General
asked the defeated Prime Minister to form a minority Government. This touched off strong
protests by the NFP. On June 1, the Governor General dissolved Parliament after the
Government was defeated in a vote of confidence’
8 9 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines). Did not assume earlier variables as clean due to
the combination of registration problems in later elections, and complex issues of inclusion and
exclusion along racial lines, making us wary of assumption.
September 1977
Sources
Duncan, C. J. ‘Ethnicity, election and emergency: The 1987 Fiji general election in the context
of
contemporary political geographies’ POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY QUARTERLY. Vol. 10, No. 3,
July 1991, 221 -239
Notes
6. Campaign process , 0: ‘Faction fighting within the NFP resulted in numerous threecornered contests that ruined the party’s electoral prospects in September 1977. The
imprisonment of key figures within the Nationalist movement diminished its support and
allowed the Alliance a comfortable victory. ‘ (Emphasis added, )
8 9 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines). Did not assume earlier variables as clean due to
the combination of registration problems in later elections, and complex issues of inclusion and
exclusion along racial lines, making us wary of assumption.
1987
Sources
IPU Parline
FIREBOMBS THROWN IN FIJI ELECTION UNREST, Sydney Morning Herald, 8th April 1987
(available online via LexisNexis)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The campaign was marked by sporadic violence’ (IPU). Also see Sydney
Morning Herald for one specific instance.
8 9 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines). Did not assume earlier variables as clean due to
the combination of registration problems in later elections, and complex issues of inclusion and
exclusion along racial lines, making us wary of assumption.
1994
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
NB: ‘As the previous (May 1992) general elections, those of 1994 took place against a
background of ethnic rivalry due primarily to the constitutional provision which guaranteed a
majority of the 70 House of Representatives seats (and control of the government) for
indigenous Fijians although the country’s Indian population amounts to some 45% and runs
much of the country’s economy’ (IPU)
6. Campaign process, -22: unable to assume due to ‘allegations of unethical activities’ (Keesings)
7. Media access, 0: state TV bias
8 9 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines). Did not assume earlier variables as clean due to
the combination of registration problems in later elections, and complex issues of inclusion and
exclusion along racial lines, making us wary of assumption.
Observer rating 1 ‘the subsequent snap general election in February, considered free and fair by
all observers, returned Rabuka and his party to Parliament in strength’ (US dep)
2001
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Fiji Islands General Election. 25 August – 5 September 2001. The
Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group (online)
Notes
2. EMB has been coded as 0 as the exceptionally small size of the electoral body means that in
practice much of the work is completed by government departments
3. Electoral rights has been coded as 0 due to citizens who claimed to have registered finding
themselves unable to vote because they were not on the lists at the ballot station
4. Voter register coded as 0, see above – scale not clear but in combination with the fact that
2006 reached 90% only after further registration, we have taken this shortfall to merit 0.
2006
Sources
Fiji Islands General Election. 6-13 May 2006. Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group
(online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: the exceptionally small size of the electoral body means that in practice much of the
work is completed by government departments
3. Electoral rights, 0: nonregistration of some citizens
4. Voter registration 1: est 90%, which is within our threshold
Finland
All other years clean by assumption (see guidelines)
 1975, 1979, 1995, 1999, 2007: Keesings contemporary archives and United
States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
2011
Sources
Republic of Finland. Parliamentary elections, 17 April 2011. OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment
Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
None.
France
1995
Sources
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2002
Sources
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Republic of France Presidential Elections.
21 April and 5 May 2002. Report of OSCE/ODIHR assessment. 21 April 2002 (online)
Notes
9. Role of officials, 1: It was taken that as voting and counting was rated highly, officials
performed their function effectively
2012
Sources
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Republic of France Presidential Elections.
22 April and 6 May 2012. OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report. 20-22 February
2012 (online)
Gabon
1993
Sources
International Francophone Organisation – Electoral Observation Mission Report
Notes
2. EMBs, -33: The state, rather than a decentralised body, is responsible for the material
organisation of elections.
4. Voter Register, 1. In all the polling stations visited there were no electoral lists to verify
whether or not a voter was enrolled. For reasons of ‘national sovereignty’ the governing
administration refused the opposition’s demand to have the process of reviewing the lists
verified by international observers. Nonetheless, the report considered any errors to be minor
7. Media Access, -22. The lack of material resources and appropriate personnel meant that
political parties and candidates had to fund their own reports. It is unclear whether this gave
advantage to a particular group
8. Voting Process, -22. Indelible ink was not used and there was no verification to check
whether or not voters had already cast a ballot
9. Role of Officials, 0: Lack of training for official was noted, with most learning procedures on
the morning of voting day. Officials did not follow election procedure in verifying voters’
eligibility
1998
Sources
International Francophone Organisation – Electoral Observation Mission Report
Notes
3. Electoral rights, -22: Could not assume: Low levels of participation in some districts may have
been the result of inadequate distribution of voter identity cards and lack of effective
information on how and where to vote
4.Voter Register, 0: Opposition groups expressed concern over the accuracy of the electoral role
and the difficulty in enrolling due to the deficiency of enrolment centres. Report recommends
improvements to electoral role, without detailing flaws in the relevant list
7. Media access, -22: Opposition claimed that public media privileged the incumbent
8. Voting Process, -22. Opposition claimed that false identity documents were produced,
allowing for multiple votes. Report notes that voting secrecy was protected, there was no
external pressure on voters and there was adequate security in place for voters
9. Role of Officials, -22. Report recommends better training of officials, but does not detail
specific flaws
10. Counting of Votes, 1. Opposition groups claimed fraud. Report claims that despite lack of
electricity vote counting process was transparent and consistent but does not directly counter
claims of fraud.
Gambia, the
1982
Sources
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1982
FOROYAA Newspaper (Serrekunda): Gambia: 1982 Election Campaign - The Incumbent
Involved In Plane Crash While the Opposition Confined to Barracks (online)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: Major opposition candidate was in prison throughout campaign (while
still running). Also note claims of violence in Foroyaa, unsure of political position of this paper.
7. Media access, 0: restrictions on freedom under emergency powers.
8 and 10 from US state dep, ‘no serious allegation of electoral fraud or unfairness’
1987
Sources
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1982
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The opposition also charged, with some justification, that the PPP
benefited from its control of Radio Gambia and access to government vehicles for campaigning’
7. Media access, 0: See 6.
8 and 10, nb the opposition alleged fraud, but US dep noted that sufficient evidence was not
brought forward.
1992
Sources
Notes
8 and 10 assumed from ‘Observers as well as most participants declared the election free and
fair’
1996
Sources
Wiseman. ‘The Gambia: from coup to election’ in Diamond and Plattner, ‘Democratization in
Africa’
NY Times, Howard W. French, 28th September 1996. Military Ruler in Gambia Defeats Rivals in
Election. (Online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘Nobody who had ever been a member of any previous government was
permitted to run, whether or not they had ever been accused of any wrongdoing while in office’.
(Wiseman)
2. EMBs 0: independence compromised. ‘Jammeh was allowed to handpick the members of the
Provisional Independent Electoral Commission (PIEC), the body entrusted with organizing the
elections. (In the event, the PIEC did its best in very difficult circumstances).’
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘Most of these potential opposition leaders were released (without
explanation or apology) only after the elections’ (Wiseman) – so could not run de facto
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Blatantly using state funds for partisan activities’, ‘Campaign events
staged by the opposition, especially the UDP, often became targets of violent attacks by Jammeh
supporters. Deaths and serious injuries resulted’ (Wiseman)
7. Media access, 0: ‘-‘The government-owned media, especially the recently established Gambia
Television, blatantly touted Jammeh’s candidacy while ignoring the other contenders’
(Wiseman)
9. Role of officials, 0: NY Times reports ‘soldiers and intelligence agents’ instructing people how
to vote
2001
Sources
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/GFSR.asp?NodeID=141335
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: secondary education required to stand
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process, 0: isolated incidents of violence and incumbent resource advantage
7. Media, 1: public provision was fair, although the resource advantage of 6 led to
disproportionate government paid advertising
8. Voting process, 1: notwithstanding the following: ‘There were instances where secrecy was
jeopardised because windows had to be left partially uncovered to ensure adequate daylight in
the room. In some polling stations it was possible to discern different bell tones for different
drums, which might have been significant enough to determine which drum the token was cast
into.’ This was a minority situation and there was no report of its abuse.
2006
Sources
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Shared_ASP_Files/UploadedFiles/C6A2FCB0-A6E5-4389B264-16E54DD62F84_COGReportGambiaElection2006.pdf
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: secondary education required to stand
2. EMBs, 0: ‘Given the number of dismissals of IEC members that has occurred to date an
inference could be drawn that IEC Commissioners do not enjoy the security of tenure that is
suggested by the words of the Constitution.’
4. Voter registration -22: allegations that the underage and nonGambians had been registered,
were unsubstantiated beyond the team’s own observations of whether voters looked like they
could be underage.
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process was coded as 0 for infringements including: ‘While recognising the
advantage accruing to the President as the Head of State, a clear distinction between the ruling
party and the Government should be made during an election period. It was the considered
view of the Group that there was no level playing field during the campaign. The Group had
been informed during its meetings with civil society organisations, the media and opposition
politicians that there was a climate of fear arising from the arrest and detention without trial of
political opponents, journalists and others critical of the Government.’
7. Media, 0: ‘The Group concluded that media in The Gambia did not provide fair, accurate and
comprehensive information to enable citizens to make informed and intelligent political
decisions’
Observer rating was coded as 0 as although the report concluded that the wish of the people
was reflected, they also conclude that the campaign and media coverage fell short of fair and
level.
2011
Sources
Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team: the Gambia presidential election, 24 November
2011
Notes
(5 by assumption with explicit ‘candidate nomination section’ only discussing monetary issues)
1. Legal framework, 0: secondary education required to stand
2. EMBs, 0: ‘The IEC's independence is constitutionally guaranteed and in the exercise of its
functions is not to be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority. That said, the
manner of past dismissals of IEC members strongly suggests that Commissioners do not enjoy
the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution.’
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The Team is persuaded that the use by the APRC of government
resources and personnel to support President Jammeh‟s campaign was nationwide and overt.’
Also large financial disparity.
7. Media access, 0: informal inhibitions on media freedom
Georgia
1995
Sources
Notes
Our decision to treat the President as the executive was derived from the ARCHIGOS Data Set on
Leaders 1875–2004 (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009)
7. Media access, 0: The Government finances and controls many newspapers and most
television stations, and they reflect principally official viewpoints’
1995
Sources
A report by the British Helsinki Human Rights Group
United States department of state country report on human rights practices 1995 - Georgia
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: failure to follow up on important allegations, widespread perception of bias
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘The separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are ruled by
unelected leaders, and national balloting is not conducted in these areas.’ (US dep)
4. Voter register, 0: widespread use of handwritten voter lists on the day due to shortfall in
registration
6. Campaign process, 0: excessive financial advantage to incumbent, obstruction of opposition
activities
7. Media access, 0: bias
8. Voting, 0: multiple voting occurred
9. Role of officials, 0: police in station
10. Counting process, 0: one observer spotted irregularity (out of four observers); then unable
to trace the whole process as only the local count was open to international observers.
2000
Sources
Republic of Georgia. Presidential Election – 9 April 2000. OSCE/ODIHR Final Report (Online)
United States department of state country report on human rights practices 2000 - Georgia
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘Extensive amendments to the electoral laws were adopted less than
three weeks before the presidential election, causing confusion in the administration of the
election. There was inadequate time to implement some of the amendments properly’ – US dep
2. EMBs, 0: partiality at lower levels, and lack of clear appeals process for some powers
4. Voter register, 0: inaccurate
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75%
6 Campaign process, 0: ‘Some rallies of opposition presidential candidate Jumber Patiashvili
were disrupted, and in some areas he was denied permission to use public buildings’. Also
authority backing the incumbent in a manner which unbalanced the playing field considerably,
but unclear whether this involved the use of material resources.
7. Media access, 0: biased state media
8. Voting process, 0: multiple and group voting
9. Role of officials, 0: unauthorised personnel in polling stations
10. Counting process, 0: ‘Counting procedures lacked uniformity and, at times, transparency.
While in some polling stations the law was properly implemented, in others it became apparent
during the counting that ballot box stuffing had taken place. Tabulation procedures lacked
transparency and instances of protocol tampering were reported.’
2004
Sources
Georgia. Extraordinary Presidential Election, 4 January 2004. OSCE/ODIHR Election
Observation Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: concerns over partisan appointments and pressured resignations, and the
intermingling of this body with the government
4. Voter register, 0:for being ‘inaccurate and incomplete’
5. Ballot access, 0: Mr Saakashvili received 96.24% of the vote
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Observers reported that State administrative resources were at times
used in support of Mr. Saakashvili’, and there was clear resource disparity between Saakashvili
and his opponents
7. Media access, 0: imbalance on state TV and restricted freedom of speech in Adjara
8. Voting process, 0: irregularities including ballot box stuffing, open voting and group voting.
9. Role of officials, 0: presence of police and campaign materials in some polling centres.
10. Counting procedure, 0: irregularities including ballot box stuffing
2008
Sources
Georgia. Extraordinary Presidential Election, 5 January 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Election
Observation Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 1: notwithstanding changes of electoral law close to the election; the laws in
question were not explained here, but they were approved by some opposition and received
only mild concern from others.
2. EMBs, 0: ‘Although the new CEC composition formula resulted in greater political
inclusiveness, the commission’s members were often not observing the neutrality required of
election administration, and many decisions were voted on along political lines, and not based
on reasonable interpretation of the law.;
4. Voter register, 0: ‘perceived and real inaccuracies in the voter list remained a major concern’
to the team
6. Campaign process, 0: intimidation
7. Media access, 0: disparities in airtime on public TV, as well as the temporary closure of a proopposition channel.
8. Voting process , 0: ‘Observers also reported a limited number of serious violations, including
ballot box stuffing.’
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘The presence of unauthorized persons, mostly police, was observed in 8
per cent of polling stations. In 18 cases, such persons were interfering in or directing the work
of the PEC’. Also a minor number of cases where campaign material or campaigning was
observed in polling stations.
10. Counting process, 0: ‘IEOM observers reported cases of tampering with voter lists, results
and protocols’, and ‘A significant number of PECs reported unusually high turnout in the last
three hours of voting, and several DECs reported a turnout considerably higher than the
national average.’
Germany
2009
Sources
Federal Republic of Germany. Elections to the Federal Parliament (Bundestag), 27 September
2009,
OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report (Online)
Notes
None.
All previous years sourced from IPU Parline, Keesings contemporary archives and US
Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
For 2002, see also Global Integrity Scorecard 2004.
Notes:
1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
For 2005 – 8 and 10 assumed from US dep recording as free and fair
For all – 7 for media notwithstanding restrictions on media espousing Nazism.
Ghana
1979
Sources
Notes
Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
8. and 10., voting and counting, have been coded as 1 on the basis of the positive account of the
process given in the above article
1992
Sources
Carter Center of Emory University. Carter Center Ghana Election Mission. Executive Summary.
(Online)
This report was submitted before results were released and seems largely concerned to maintain
peace and cooperation.
Jeffries, Richard and Thomas, Clare. ‘The Ghanaian Elections of 1992’, African Affairs 1993, v92,
p331-366
Oquaye, Michael. ‘The Ghanaian Elections of 1992--A Dissenting View’, Africa Affairs 1995, v94,
p 259 - 275
As this latter article was a direct response critiquing the former, we have chosen both for balance.
They do not report contradictory facts on the points coded, but rather take contradictory views on
the overall evaluation of the process, except as noted on 8 and 10 which have been coded as -22
accordingly.
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: this was the first election after a dictatorship; hence elections have not
been held regularly
3. Electoral rights, 0: see 4
4. Voter register, 0: missing names on a large scale
6. Campaign process, 0: use of government resources and bribery (Jeffries and Thomas)
7. Media access, 0: violations of freedom of the press (Oquaye) (state media coverage on the
other hand was balanced – Jeffries and Thomas)
8. Voting process has been coded as -22. The two articles fundamentally disagree over the level
of safety of the ballot box and the credibility to afford the opposition’s compilation of offences.
9. Role of officials, 0: inadequate training and inappropriate interference of party officials.
10. Voting process has been coded as -22. The two articles fundamentally disagree over the
level of safety of the ballot box and the credibility to afford the opposition’s compilation of
offences.
1996
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Ghana. 7
December 1996. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group. (Online)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: primarily due to resource disparity; there were also clashes between
party workers for which little detail is given, and unconfirmed allegations of intimidation.
7. Media access, 0: imbalance on state coverage
2000
Sources
van Walraven, Klaas ‘The End of an Era: the Ghanaian elections of December 2000’. Journal of
Contemporary African Studies. Volume 20, Issue 2, 2002
J. Ayee (2002): The 2000 General Elections and Presidential Run-off in Ghana: An Overview,
Democratization, 9:2, 148-174
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: reports of violence, intimidation and harassment, from all sides
7. Media access, 1: Ayee gives the following description: ‘Although this was not carried out to
the letter because of exploitation of incumbency by the NDC (such as commissioning of projects,
greater media coverage and the durbars held by traditional rulers in honour of government
functionaries and candidates), there was a reasonable allocation of air-time to all the parties in
the state owned media’.
2004
Sources
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: incidents of violence
7. Media, 0: ‘The opposition NDC claimed that government media denied it equal access and
coverage on numerous occasions, and in practice the state-controlled media gave greater
exposure to government officials.’
8. We have coded voting process as 1 notwithstanding the theft of ballot boxes, as there is no
implication that this affected the result and should not detract from the generally nonabusive
set up of the voting procedure.
2008
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Ghana Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, 7 December 2008;
and
Presidential run-off elections, 28 December 2008. Reports of the Commonwealth Observer
Group. (Online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: the register was ‘bloated’
6. Campaign process was coded as -22. In the opening summary, there is the following
statement: ‘In the lead-up to the elections, there were increasing reports of isolated incidents of
violence, particularly in the strongholds of the two major political parties’. However, in the in
depth section on the campaign this is not raised again, and it is not clear from this that the
violence was sufficiently politically linked to the election to code as 0.
7. Media access, 0: ‘During the last week leading to the elections, however, a disproportionate
percentage of the news line up on the state-owned television was heavily biased towards the
ruling NPP.’
Greece
1977
Sources
United States Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1977 – Greece
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1981
Sources
United States Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1981 – Greece
Keesings Contemporary Archives
Notes
(Pre-January Premier treated as incumbent)
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1989, January
Sources
United States Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1989 – Greece
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
(No winner. Deadlock.)
Clean by assumption (see guidelines), media explicit. Unable to assume 6 due to a clash
reported between party supporters, unclear whether this is sufficiently politically motivated to
code 0.
1989, November
Sources
United States Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1989 – Greece
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines), media explicit
1990
Sources
United States Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1990 – Greece
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1996
Sources
United States Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1996 – Greece
Constitution of Greece
Notes
(Incumbent was a non-party interim prime minister)
7 Media access, 1: minor restrictions on freedom regarding sensitive topics are noted, but the
access of opposition to the media is also specifically mentioned, and there was no indication that
the restrictions were especially pertinent to the election
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2009
Sources
Greece. Parliamentary Elections, 4 October 2009. OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission
Report (online)
Notes
2. EMB has been coded as 1. The duties are taken care of by members of the judiciary chosen by
lottery: there is not a centralised body as such.
4. Voter register is coded as -22 due to unconfirmed suggestions by members of the OSCE team
that the surprisingly large voter register may include the deceased
2012
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report
Notes
(3 by assumption)
1. Legal framework, 1: although the report raises concerns about an extensive limitation on
grounds of state related professions – a grey area - we have not coded this as a restriction on the
right to stand as the requirement is that citizens resign, and so the prohibition is not absolute.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Most interlocutors met with by the OSCE/ODIHR EAM expressed concern
over the accuracy of voter lists. It was alleged by them that the number of registered voters was
implausibly high, which was attributed to a failure to remove deceased people and duplicate
records’
Grenada
1976
Sources
IPU Parline
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Opposition alleged ‘widespread electoral malpractices’ (Keesing). Nothing further found.
1984
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1984 – Grenada
Dec 6th 1984. The Globe and Mail. Few traces of socialism Euphoria wins in Grenada
The New York Times. Joseph B. Treaster December 4, 1984. CENTRIST PARTY SWEEPS TO
VICTORY IN GRENADA VOTE
Notes
UNHCR ref ‘according to international observers, were honest and free from violence’ combined
with NYT report that ‘There were no reports of voting irregularities or disturbances at the
voting places.’ Has led us to code (8) voting process as 1. Data confidence impacted.
1990
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1990 – Grenada
Keesings Contemporary Archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines); 1, 3,5 7 established explicitly
1995
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1995 - Grenada
Notes
1995 – Keesings contemporary archives – clean by assumption (see guidelines) except 4 and 7
given subsequent problems, -22
1999
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission of the Organization of American States to the General Elections in
Grenada January 18, 1999 (Online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: The voter register had not been fully updated due to the unexpectedly early
election and did not have the trust of opposition parties
6. Campaign process, 1: complaints were raised about the disparity in resources between the
ruling party and others, but it was not clear how great this was
7. Media access, 0: radio and TV put up their prices around election time ‘making it prohibitively
expensive to air campaign adds’ – state media is not referenced. Violates A de facto.
2003
Organization of American States. Report of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission General
Elections Grenada 2003. (Online)
Sources
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: the report refuses to state that the register is definitely inaccurate but
emphasises its chaos repeatedly and recommends it be ‘rationalised’. Inflation is the implied
problem.
7. Media access, 0: ‘coverage seen on the three nights immediately preceding election day was
almost completely dominated by one party, which happened to be the ruling party’
2008
Sources
Organization of American States. Final Report of the Electoral Observation Mission for the
General Elections in Grenada. July 8 2008 (online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices - 2008
Notes
4. Voter register, 1: the report does not attempt to estimate the final accuracy of the register, but
documents the extensive and transparent process of its compilation
Guatemala
1978
Sources
Bowdler, George A. and Patrick Cotter. 1982. Voter participation in Central America, 1954-1981:
an exploration. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.
Brockett, Charles D. 2005. Political movements and violence in Central America. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Both via Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources. (online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1978 – Guatemala
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: falsification and tampering with registration books, elimination of names
from the voter registration books raised by Bowdler. While fraud is certain, exact types appear
to be only allegations, so this has impacted data certainty.
5. Ballot access, 0: Colom Argueta and party excluded.
8. Voter process, 0: general fraud is attested to by multiple sources listed in the UCSD collection.
Bowdler specifically mentions that forged identity and multiple voting were among the
problems raised.
10. Counting process, 0: general fraud is attested to by multiple sources listed in the UCSD
collection. Bowdler specifically mentions counting of phantom precinct ballots among the
problems raised.
1982
Sources
Painter, James. 1987. Guatemala : false hope, false freedom. London: Catholic Institute for
International Relations, Latin American Bureau.
Montenegro Ríos, Carlos Roberto. 2002. Historia de los partidos políticos en Guatemala.
Guatemala: Mayaprin, S.A.
Both via Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources. (online
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1982 – Guatemala
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: violence due to internal conflict was ongoing; we specifically cite
Painter who notes that "120 Christian Democrat members WERE KILLED in the twelve months
before the March 1982 elections”, suggesting violence associated with partisanship. An
additional source is the US state dep report which notes the murder of a newspaper editor after
he became a campaign director for General Guevara.
10. Counting process, 0: while several entries in UCSD cite fraud, Montenegro Rios specifically
attributes this to counting
Note that this election was shortly overthrown by the military
1985
Sources
Jonas, Susanne. ‘Democratization through Peace: The Difficult Case of Guatemala’. Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 4, Special Issue: Globalization and
Democratization in Guatemala (Winter, 2000)
via Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources. (online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1985 – Guatemala
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: only candidates from parties reaching an agreement with the military
were permitted to run
4. Voter register,0: approx 78% of eligible voters registered. Context not clear.
5. Ballot access, 0: leftist parties excluded from running
1990
Sources
http://www.ndi.org/files/1382_gt_elec.pdf
Notes
Note that while the election year is listed as 1990, the second round was held early 1991 and so
this is the date coded.
As the report provided was written only after the first round, we have coded data confidence as
2.
4. Voter register, 0: names not appearing on the roles, but it should be noted that arrangements
were mostly made for these citizens to vote
5. Ballot access, 0: de facto impossibility of indigenous candidacy, which is described as
socioeconomic rather than legal but severe enough to raise a great deal of concern in the report
6. Campaign process, 0:serious violence including the assassination of 6 political leaders
7. Media access, 1:somewhat scarce information: major parties had ‘ample access’, and no
complaints are made in the report re balance or freedom of speech
1991
Sources
Jonas, Susanne. ‘Democratization through Peace: The Difficult Case of Guatemala’. Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 4, Special Issue: Globalization and
Democratization in Guatemala (Winter, 2000)
Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds. 1989. Elections and democracy in Central America.
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. Pages 93-125. – via UCSD
Both via Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources. (online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1991 – Guatemala
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1991 (Online)
Notes
5. Ballot access, 0: leftist parties excluded from running
6. Campaign process, 0: violence
1996 (begun 1995)
Sources
Boneo, H., Torres-Rivas, E., 2000. ¿Por que´ no votan los guatemaltecos? Estudio de
participacio´n y abstencio´n electoral, IDEA, Tribunal Supremo Electoral, PNUD, Guatemala City.
– cited in Lehoucq, Fabrice. ―The 1999 General Elections in Guatemala,‖ Electoral Studies, Vol.
21, No. 1 (January 2002): 107-14.
via Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources. (online)US
department of state country report on human rights practices 1995 – Guatemala (sic)
Notes
4 Voter register, 0. Boneo and Torres Rivas’ study points to a substantial number of both
erroneous and missing names.
6. Campaign process, 0: “there were several acts of violence, including assaults and murders
believed related to the campaign” US state dep
7. Media access, 0: press not free. ‘Journalists admit, however, that in some particularly sensitive
cases pressure and fears of reprisal result in self-censorship and limits on investigative
reporting’ (US dep)
8 and 10, 1: from US state dep reporting of observer appraisal as free and fair.
1999
Sources
Organization of American States. Report. Election Observation Mission of the Organization of
American States (OAS) to Guatemala. November – December 1999. (Online)
Notes
2003
Sources
Guatemala General Elections 2003. European Union Electoral Observation Mission Final Report
(online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: the inadequacy of the additional measures noted in 4, resulting in some
citizens unable to vote.
4. Voter register, 0: widely acknowledged shortfalls of the register, which were dealt with at the
last minute through an additional system of voting for the unregistered.
6. Campaign process, -22. The following allusion was given suggesting d may have been
violated: ‘After the elections, complaints have been investigated. ...Out of 30 cases only one was
passed to the Public Prosecutors Office, this being the case presented by OAS on usage of state
resources during campaigning.’ However this is insufficient information. Violence was
considered too endemic to establish the political intent, and the only recorded instance of
candidate abuse related to the concurrent parliamentary elections.
7. Media was coded as 0 due to violations of freedom of speech
2007
Sources
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 1: notwithstanding the below, there is no mention of attempts to vote being
foiled by nonregistration.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘significant anomalies appear throughout the process, particularly regarding
the duplication of cédulas’. In addition, ‘only 5.9 million of the approximately 12 million
Guatemalans are registered’
6. Campaign process, 0: murder of candidates and activists
2011
Sources
‘Guatemala’s Elections: Clean Polls, Dirty Politics’ – International Crisis Group, Latin America
briefing number 24 (Online)
Global Integrity Report scorecard 2010 (Online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2011 – Guatemala
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: Both ICG and the 2010 Global Integrity Report card describe the TSE as generally
trusted, but composed of individually partisan members with a lack of transparency
4. Voter register, 1: ‘international audits recently scored [the register] positively’(ICG) – 1 in the
absence of more detailed info, data confidence impacted
6. Campaign process, 0: intimidation of and violence against candidates. For some nonpresidential candidates this was fatal.
8 and 10, 1: International observers considered the election generally free and fair.
Guinea
1993
Sources
International Republican Institute. Guinea. Presidential Election Report. 19 December 1993
(online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: the commission was sworn in nine days before the election and ‘was unable to play a
meaningful role in the process’, in violation of d
4. Although voter register has been coded as -22, it should be noted that the secrecy of the
government over the compilation of this list received severe condemnation from the report
6. Campaign process, 0: violence against voters
8. Voting process has been coded as 1 on the bases of reports that it went ‘smoothly’ but
information is scarce –data confidence rating of 2
10. Counting, 0: ‘anomalies in election results’ which ‘call into question any credit the process
might have gained from smooth polling place operations’, and the annulling of certain results
which changed the winner
1998
Sources
IFES: Guinea Presidential Elections, December 14, 1998
United States department of state country report on human rights practices 1998 - Guinea
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: government refused at first to establish an independent commission. Some boards
were later established but ‘the Government retained exclusive control of all registration and
election procedures up to and including the casting of votes, as well as of the national tabulation
of election results.’ (US dep)
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘On election day, international observers noted a shortage of ballots for
opposition candidates in some pro-opposition districts of Conakry, but an abundance of ballots
for President Conte even in pro-PUP districts.’ (US dep)
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Some complaints were lodged with regards to the fact that it was
impossible for some citizens to obtain their card because their name did not appear on the voter
registration list. And yet, these persons declared that they had reported to the commission
during registration.
However, this information is nearly impossible to verify since people are not given a receipt
when they come to register.’ The key info is that their names were missing so we have
disregarded the uncertainty over whether they registered.
6. Campaign process 0: disruption of opposition rallies, violence, arrests
7. Media access, 0: restrictions on freedom of the press
8 Voting process, 1: there were serious concerns about conditions for military voting. As this
applied to a specific subset of voting, we have decided it would be more misleading than
illuminating to code as 0 when the voting as a whole merited a coding of 1. For more depth on
the Guinean election, however, the following paragraph is of interest:
Members of the armed forces were required to vote on the premises of the military installations
to which they were posted and were subject to strong pressures to vote for General Conte.
About 200 army soldiers assigned to Camp Alpha Yaya in Conakry tried to vote outside the
camp in order to avoid this pressure. As punishment for this action, many of these soldiers were
severely beaten by order of their battalion commander, Panival Sama Bangoura; one soldier
died of injuries sustained in this beating
9 Role of officials, 0: opposition allegations that poll workers were obstructed tallies with the
patterns of their absences on polling day
2003
Sources
Constition: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=193669
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Equatorial Guinea, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/79/GNQ (2004). (Online)
Mail and Guardian. 12 November 2003. LANSANA FOFANA. Opposition disqualified for Guinea
elections (Online)
African Elections Database:
http://africanelections.tripod.com/gn.html#1998_Presidential_Election
IRIN news. GUINEA: Rights group slams "caricature of democracy" (Online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: we gathered that no body existed that was independent from the following: ‘The EU
made its support conditional on the formation of an independent electoral commission, and on
all candidates being given equal access to state media. As the government rejected these
demands outright, it forfeited international assistance for the elections.’ (see mail and guardian,
above)
5. Ballot access, 0: the incumbent won 95.25% of the vote
6. Campaign process, 0:’ While the Committee has taken note of the introduction of a multiparty
system and of the adoption of the National Pact between the Government and the authorized
political parties, it regrets the continuing harassment of political opponents through, inter alia,
detentions, fines and difficulty in finding employment or leaving the country to attend meetings
abroad, for example.’ (human rights report, above)
7. Media, 0: we gathered that media access was unequal from the following: ‘The EU made its
support conditional on the formation of an independent electoral commission, and on all
candidates being given equal access to state media. As the government rejected these demands
outright, it forfeited international assistance for the elections.’ (see mail and guardian, above)
10. Voting process, 0: ‘several instances of blatant vote rigging’ and a wildly overestimated
turnout, see IRIN above
2010
Sources
The Carter Center: Observing the 2010 Presidential Elections in Guinea, Final Report
Notes
‘term limit’, 1: ‘The transitional government of Guinea adhered to the agreement — in particular
the stipulation that no member of government could be a candidate in the elections’
1. Legal framework, 0: contrary to the usual 5 year gap, an election had not been held for 7
years; after the former incumbent died, a coup d’etat and transitional council followed.
2. EMBs, 0: the ‘compressed electoral calendar’ is described as a problem for the commission’s
work, and between rounds ‘The CENI was paralyzed for weeks by political infighting between
camps loyal to one party or another’, ie members were not impartial
3. Electoral rights, 0: inadequate preparation disenfranchised some voters along with difficulty
in locating polling stations, while the flawed procedure and subsequent dismissed results in the
first round ‘represented the disenfranchisement of approximately 21.4 percent of all registered
voters.’
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Technical problems and inaccuracies of the voter registration process
became apparent in the subsequent troubled processes of polling station allocation, voter list
accuracy, and voter card distribution. Issues related to these shortcomings are detailed
elsewhere in this report, but the root causes link directly to inadequacies in the administration
of voter registration in Guinea.’ Efforts described as ‘good faith’
5. Ballot access, -22: the Supreme Court rejected 18 of 42 candidates. The report does not
explore why.
6. Campaign process, 0: incidents of violence between supporters, or against suspected
supporters, between the two rounds.
8. Voting process, 1: notwithstanding a process poorly managed in many respects – see 3 – it is
not recorded that any of our criteria are violated and the Carter Center note ‘Overall, the
process was largely transparent, with The Carter Center giving high ratings (85 percent) to the
transparency of the observed process.’
9. Role of officials, 0: poor training to a level which compromised elections, security
overstepping their role
10. Counting process, 0: widespread results transmission irregularities required the
overturning of first round results (see 3)
Guinea Bissau
1994
Sources
Forrest, Joshua. ‘Democratization in a Divided Urban Political Culture’, in Villalon and
VonDoepp, ‘The Fate Of Africa’s Democratic Experiments’
Andrea E Ostheimer (2000): Guinea‐Bissau's rocky path to peace and democracy, South African
Journal of International Affairs, 7:1, 107-121
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1995 - GuineaBissau
Amnesty International Report 1995 - Guinea-Bissau, 1 January 1995
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: regular elections not held de facto
6. Campaign process, -22: on the one hand, the combined human rights reports and Ostheimer’s
statement that ‘no major impediments were put in the way of the opposition during the election
campaign itself’. On the other, Keesings notes opposition allegations of intimidation and vote
buying
7. Media access, 0: Forrest describes the incumbent as ‘exploiting its dominance of the media’
8. and 10, 1: on the strength of references by both the human rights reports and Ostheimer to
the conclusion of observers that the election was fair. However ‘irregularities’ were noted
which we do not have sufficient information to assess.
2000
Sources
Forrest, Joshua. ‘Democratization in a Divided Urban Political Culture’ in Villalon and VonDoepp,
‘The Fate Of Africa’s Democratic Experiments’
Andrea E Ostheimer (2000): Guinea‐Bissau's rocky path to peace and democracy, South African
Journal of International Affairs, 7:1, 107-121
UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in Guinea-Bissau, 23
December 1999, S/1999/1276 (online)
Newsroom of the BBC World Service. Tuesday, 30 November, 1999, 12:59 GMT.
Guinea Bissau vote "fair" . (onlinehttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/539795.stm)
Notes
NB that these elections began in 1999.
4. Voter register, 1: Report of the Secretary-General notes 91% registered (worth noting that
Ostheimer refers to a ‘low registration turnout of approximately 525,000 registered voters’. As
the disagreement is not with respect to the figure, and the RSG report gives a percentage while
Ostheimer gives a qualitative judgement, we have coded as 1 in keeping with our quantitative
guidelines)
8. and 10, voting and counting, 1, on the strength of the following:
21. On the whole, voting proceeded in a peaceful and orderly manner and no major incidents
were reported. The overall situation in the country remained calm throughout the vote count,
which began immediately after the closing of the polling stations in the presence of
representatives of political parties and international observers.
22. On 30 November, international observers, in a joint communiqué, declared that the voting
had taken place in a "climate of civility, serenity, transparency and sincerity" and in accordance
with the electoral laws of GuineaBissau.
In addition see BBC link describing as fair.
2005
Sources
EU Election Observation Mission Guinea-Bissau 2005. Final Report on the Presidential Elections.
(Online)
Notes
6. Campaign process is coded as 0 due to bribery throughout the campaign, and violence
between the first and second rounds
7. Media has been coded as 0 as state run media was not balanced
2009
Sources
Guinea Bissau. Final Report. Early Presidential Election 28 June – 26 July 2009. European
Union Election Observation Mission. (Online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: in violation of Guinean law the 2008 list was not updated, and in addition
‘Both INEC and CNE were unable to come up with an explanation regarding the exceptionally
low number of youngsters and first time voters in the 2008 voters’ list’
6. Campaign process, 0:‘Gifting, or vote buying, was a commonly observed practice across the
country’; also some use of state resources.
7. Media access, 0: first round was balanced, ‘However, during the second round, the electronic
public media reversed its balanced reporting during the first round and openly leaned toward
the ruling party candidate.’
‘voters and candidates fully enjoyed during the entire process their rights to vote and to be
voted within an environment of freedom of expression, movement and association.’ – observer
rating coded 1.
2011
Sources
Notes
(3 and 5 by assumption)
2. EMBs, 0: ‘The current formula of having three Commissioners nominated by the ruling party and
three by the opposition is not conducive to a properly functioning and effective election management
body, which needs to be independent and more technically oriented’
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘As a consequence of the media bias and the resources at the disposal of the
incumbent, there was not a sufficiently level playing field for the campaign’ (emphasis added)
7. Media access, 0: state-owned media bias
Guyana
1980
Sources
Kemp Ronald Hope. ‘Elections and Electoral Politics in Post-Independence Guyana’. Electoral
Studies(1985). 4:1, 57-68
Notes
NB re incumbent stand/win: The new President was the former PM, but this was after a
constitutional change in which power was transferred from the latter position to the former.
For this reason we have coded the incumbent as standing and winning.
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘A large number of eligible voters were denied their right to vote as a
result of deletion of their names from the electoral list, abuse of proxy voting, abuse of
postal voting, being recorded as dead, being given wrong identification numbers, or of
fraudulent votes being cast in their names.’
4. Voter register, 0: see 3.
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75%
6. Campaign process, 0: harassment of the opposition
7. Media access, 0: bias, difficulties of access for opposition, impediments to free expression
8. Voting process, 0: see 3
9. Role of officials, 0: one of the complaints attributed to the Avesbury report is that many of the
staff for the whole polling process appeared to be supporters of the PNC. We take it that
this means it was manifest in their behaviour.
10. Counting process, 0: ‘Evidence was also found of tampering with the ballot boxes by the
military.’
1985
Sources
INCUMBENT DECLARES 'OVERWHELMING' VICTORY. Kernan Turner, Associated Press
Dec. 11, 1985 8:23 PM ET (online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1985 - Guyana
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: the opposition’s claim that their voters were frequently disenfranchised on
the day is met by the government with a counterclaim that they encountered the same, rather
than denial
5. Ballot access, 0: PNC won 78.%
7. Media access, 0: government news sources biased
8. Voting process, 0: multiple voting and intimidation
9. Role of officials, 0: ejection of polling agents according to a statement of religious and civic
leaders
1992
Sources
Observing Guyana’s Electoral Process, 1990 – 1992. Report of the Council of Freely Elected
Heads of Government (online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights were coded as 1 despite some confusion with local lists leading to some
voters being turned away (while others were more leniently allowed to vote) as this was minor
and not systematically disadvantaging any group. Confusion over the location of polling
stations is not reported to have actually affected the ability to vote.
6. Campaign process, 0: Remarks on the general lack of violence nonetheless noted the
exceptions of an attack on TUF workers and a presidential candidate, and the stabbing of an
activist.
7. Media access , 0: bias in favour of the ruling party in state media
2006
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Guyana General and Regional Elections. 28 August 2006. Report of
the commonwealth observer group (online)
The Carter Center. Final Report to the Guyana Elections Commission on the 2006 General and
Regional Elections. February 15, 2007 (Online)
Notes
2. EMB, 0: impartiality is compromised by a combination of its control by a line ministry, and the
following: ‘The political nature of the Commission’s composition created deadlock on many key
issues, which caused delays and contributed significantly to the lack of trust and confidence in
GECOM felt by the public.’ Both reports urged reform of these two points.
4. Voter register, -22: the report presents the different views of various groups in a
controversial process without reaching a conclusion.
6. Campaign process is coded as1 notwithstanding complaints that the government’s access to
state resources was an advantage, as this seems to have mainly concerned the media (below)
and the government’s advantage of countrywide networks and current control over social
policy. The issue was not raised at all by the Carter Center. As this cannot be totally eliminated
and the campaign was otherwise lauded for its success we decided to code as 1.
7. Media access has been coded as 0 due to government dominance of state owned media
2011
Sources
Notes
(3 and 5 by assumption)
2. EMBs, 0: ‘The current formula of having three Commissioners nominated by the ruling party
and three by the opposition is not conducive to a properly functioning and effective election
management body, which needs to be independent and more technically oriented’
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘As a consequence of the media bias and the resources at the disposal of
the incumbent, there was not a sufficiently level playing field for the campaign’ (emphasis
added)
7. Media access, 0: state-owned media bias
Haiti
2. EMB, 0: For all elections from 1988 until 2011: ‘Since 1988, however, that PEC has never been
convened according to these constitutional provisions because of foreign instigated political
interruptions. In the context of political upheaval, the president has always unilaterally selected
a Provisional Electoral Council from among an arbitrarily defined group of Haitian social
“sectors,” such as Protestants, Catholics, Episcopalians, Vodou practitioners, the handicapped,
women, unions, or political parties.’ (Unclear from this whether 1988 should be included but
for confirmation see Bazin in 1988 sources)
Annis and Ives. Haiti’s Election Debacle: A Coup Legacy. NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
Jan/Feb2011, Vol. 44 Issue 1, p22 (2011)
1988
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1988 - Haiti
Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government and the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs. The 1990 General Elections in Haiti
Bazin, Marc L . Democratic Transition in Haiti: An Unfinished Agenda. Yale Journal of
International Law. 303 (1988)
Jan 4th 1988. Globe and Mail. ‘Once again in Haiti’
Jan 5th 1988. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Haiti attack on PAIN offices.
Jan 15th 1988. The Times. Alan Tomlinson. Wave of pre-poll arrests in Haiti
Jan 15h 1988. Sydney Morning Herald. BODIES IN THE STREETS HEIGHTEN HAITI FEARS
Notes
NB that the 1988 election was held after an abortive 1987 attempt marked by violence. 5%
turnout.
6. Campaign process, 0: urging a boycott made illegal and arrests conducted on this basis. Also
see BBC for one party receiving ongoing threats, and Sydney Morning Herald linking disparate
violent events to an alleged intimidation campaign persuading people not to vote.
7. Media access, 0: government media bias
8. Voting process, 0: ‘widespread voting irregularities were observed on election day.’
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘The government's new election law bans independent observers from
polling stations and provides for armed soldiers in their stead.’ (international observers later
invited)
10. Counting process, 0: ‘the results were widely viewed as having been manipulated by the
military’ (uncertainty in this has impacted data confidence)
1990
Sources
The National Republican Institute for International Affairs. The 1990 elections in Haiti. Report
of the International Election Observer Delegation (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: controversial limitations on candidature on those involved in the
previous dictatorship.
2. EMBs, 0: violation of e
8. Voting process has been coded as 1 notwithstanding concerns over secrecy that were hard to
deal with due to an 80% illiteracy rate. This is not a straightfoward violation and the spirit of
the report is very much behind the credibility of the voting process.
This election result was negated by a 1991 coup.
1995
Sources
International Republican Institute. Haiti. Election Observation Report. December 17th, 1995.
(Abbreviated version) (online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: ‘faulty’
5. Ballot access, 0: Preval obtained 87.9% of the vote
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘a pattern of pre-election violence against public figures’, and the use of
state resources for partisan purposes.
8. Voting process, 0: the improvisation of new voters lists and the question of missing ID cards
meant that no limits were in place on multiple voting, whether or not it in fact occurred. In
general, the procedural breakdown and chaos was seen by the report to seriously damage
credibility.
10. Counting of votes, 0: violation of (a), the ability to track procedures. One instance of possible
fraud is specifically noted.
2000
Sources
Amnesty International Report 2001 – Haiti
U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Haiti
E. Mobekk (2001): Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti, Democratization, 8:3, 173-188
Notes
5. Ballot access, 0: winner 91.6% - opposition boycott
6. Campaign process, 0: violence
7. Media access, 0: violence and threats limiting freedom of the press de facto
10. Counting process, 0: ‘The dominant FL political party manipulated legislative and
exaggerated electoral participation in the presidential elections of 2000.’ (US dep)
2006
Sources
Warsinski, Maria Fuglevaag. Haiti: Presidential and Legislative Elections, February -April 2006.
NORDEM report 15/2006 (online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 1: 20% nonregistration, this is within our boundary.
5. Ballot access, 1: problems noted with candidate rejections applied to the concurrent
legislative elections rather than the presidential candidates
8. Voting process, 0: ‘Conditions for secret voting were not ensured in many of the polling
stations. Voting looked rather public and, at times, intimidating for the voter.’
9. Role of officials, 0: Party officials did not keep to their roles and interfered with voters
10. Counting process, 0: In violation of a, the process could not be entirely traced.
2011
Sources
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: decisions are not subject to appeal. In addition, ‘the mission identified the CEP's lack
of credibility in the eyes of the political parties as the principal challenge to the proper conduct
of the 2010-2011 electoral process in Haiti. It should be noted that the nine members of the CEP
were appointed by the President of the Republic’
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘The observers also reported that some voters were unable to find their
voting station or to locate their names on the partial voters list. The saturation of the call
centers, overwhelmed by the volume of voters' calls, the ill will and lack of knowledge on the
part of polling station officials, which kept voters from voting, served to increase voter
frustration.’
5. Ballot access, 0: high levels of unexplained rejections. Also one document requirement, only
applicable to candidates who had previously managed public funds, which could not be satisfied
as the institution which gave the document was not in session.
6. Campaign process, 0: violent incidents and misuse of government resources. (There were
also ‘unverified complaints of intimidation and aggression by certain candidates and their
sympathizers’)
7. Media access, 0: informal restrictions on freedom of speech, not necessarily state-directed.
‘These incidents of intimidation or violence against the media were completely at odds with the
freedom of the press that Haitians have enjoyed in recent years.’
8. Voting process, 0: ‘In the departments of Artibonite and Nord, the teams reported cases
where ballot boxes disappeared. The observers also witnessed the practice of repeat voting by
certain voters with the complicity of poll workers and unidentified party agents.’ Also,
‘destruction of polling stations in some places and the annulment of the vote in more than 10%
of stations because of insecurity and acts of violence’
9. Role of officials,0: see 8
10. Counting process, 0: an outside team checked the tally sheets. ‘The expert mission
recommended, among other measures, the exclusion from the final tabulation of 234 tally
sheets considered irregular’
Honduras
Clergy may not vote (or stand), which has led to codings of 0 for1 and 3.
1981
Sources
Observance of Honduran national elections : report of a congressional study mission, November
28-30, 1981 / submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives.
Available via the Hathi Trust.
Notes
1 Legal framework,0. Elections not held regularly
2. EMBs, 1: based on explicit statements of trust by all competing parties.
1985
Sources
Hondurans Elect President Today;
Dispute Over Election Procedure Not Settled – Washington Post, Edward Cody, 24th Nov (Used
for term limit)
Election in Honduras proceeds in confusion, The Globe and Mail, Nov 25th
HONDURAS: ELECTIONS PRAISED AS RESULTS COME IN – Peter Ford, InterPress Service, 25th
Nov
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: a (dealbreaking) decision on the manner in which the winner would be
decided was not announced until the eve of the election
8 Voting process, 1: ‘International observers to Honduras' general elections agreed here that the
vote went smoothly, with no serious irregularities’ – IPS
1989
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1989 - Honduras
Notes
8 and 10, 1: free and fair by US state dep
1993
Sources
http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/VRC/Reports/1994/R01653/R01653.pdf
Notes
1997
Sources
Country profile. Nicaragua, Honduras 1996-1997
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1997 - Honduras
Notes
5. In addition to clergy, five candidates disqualified in a widely condemned move
7. Media access, 1: media is free, although corrupt
8, 10, observer rating: ‘International observers found the elections to be free and fair’
2001
Sources
http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Reports/2001/Election-Observation-MissionHonduras-General-Elections-Nov-25-2001-Final-Report.aspx
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: The TNE is multi-partisan rather than incumbency dominated, but the partisanship
of members is seen to obstruct independent efficient administration
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘Numerous people, up to 150,000 according to some estimates, were
denied the right to vote’ because they were not registered
4. Voter register, 0: incomplete, despite a technical assistance mission
2005
Sources
Latin American regional report. Caribbean & Central America December 2005
Latin American regional report. Caribbean & Central America January 2006
via Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources.
http://libraries.ucsd.edu/locations/sshl/resources/featured-collections/latinamerican-elections-statistics/index.html
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2005 - Honduras
Hondurans end voting in national, local elections. Agence France Press 27th NovNotes
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: politicisation of EMB
7. Media access, 1: note that although media was free it was intensely corrupt and suffered from
lack of independence
8. Voting process, 1: ‘"There were minor problems, such as a lack of indelible ink at some polling
stations, but the rest went well," Organization of American States spokesman Carlos Flores told
AFP.’ – Agence France Press – data confidence impacted by ambiguity.
2009
Sources
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/Honduras'%202009%20Presidential,%20Congressional
%20and%20Municipal%20Elections%20Assessment.pdf
http://www.ndi.org/node/16060
Notes
4. Voter register has been coded as 0: ‘Due to a lack of funding, however, the RNP postponed this
process, leaving the TSE with no choice but to use a voter registry that many considered inflated
and outdated. Some analysts estimate that up to one million people in the voting registry have
either migrated or died, even as new voters coming of age are added to the registry...The voter
registry used in the 2009 general elections consisted of approximately 4.6 million citizens, out
of a population of almost 7.9 million people.’ (NDI)
6. Campaign process has been coded as -22. For 24 days a suspension of civil liberties could, if
properly applied, have violated c. However no observers were present for the process and there
is a sense in the reports that the restrictions may not have prevented activity of those
participating in elections (being primarily aimed at supporters of the ousted previous President
who wanted his reinstatement and opposed the elections). Not enough information to code.
7. Media access is coded as 0 due to the closure of some media and suspension of freedom of the
press among other civil liberties
Hungary
2010
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report
Notes
4. Voter register, 1: detailed description of voter registration process – accuracy implicit
8. Voting process, 0: secrecy of the vote is optional. It should be noted that this was a matter of
concern for the mission in principle but was not considered malicious.
Iceland
Aall years sourced from IPU Parline, Keesing Contemporary Archive and US Department of State
Country Report on Human Rights Practices
1978, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009 Clean by assumption (see
guidelines)
NB 2009 - Incumbent is the caretaker government leader in this case
India
1977
Sources
Alistair McMillan. The Election Commission of India and the Regulation and Administration of
Electoral Politics. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy. June 2012, 11(2): 187-201
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: Based on McMillian article about historically trustworthy Election Commission, in
the absence of reason for doubt
1980
Notes
IFES: The 1989 Indian National Elections: A Retrospective Analysis
Alistair McMillan. The Election Commission of India and the Regulation and Administration of
Electoral Politics. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy. June 2012, 11(2): 187-201
Christophe Jaffrelot (2002): Indian democracy: The rule of law on trial, India Review, 1:1, 77121
Keesing contemporary archive
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: Based on McMillian article about historically trustworthy Election Commission, in
the absence of reason for doubt
6. Campaign process, 0: violent incidents, some directed at candidates
8. Voting process, 0: booth capturing, see 1989 report and Jaffrelot
Could not code media: accusations of AIR bias
1984
Sources
IFES: The 1989 Indian National Elections: A Retrospective Analysis (online)
Alistair McMillan. The Election Commission of India and the Regulation and Administration of
Electoral Politics. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy. June 2012, 11(2): 187-201
Christophe Jaffrelot (2002): Indian democracy: The rule of law on trial, India Review, 1:1, 77121
Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA). December 13, 1984, Thursday. Reaching the voters:
TV, billboards, and above all, personal appearances
The Associated Press. December 4, 1984, Tuesday, AM cycle. One candidate killed, one
wounded as India prepares for national elections
The Associated Press. December 24, 1984, Monday, AM cycle. Heavy Turnout, Scattered
Violence As Voting Begins
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: Based on McMillian article about historically trustworthy Election Commission, in
the absence of reason for doubt
3. Electoral rights, 0: elections not held in Assam and Punjuab due to violence
6. Campaign process, 0: violence
7. Media access, 0: ‘According to Victoria Farmer (2000: 268) the 1980s saw an ‘‘erosion of the
credibility of [Doordarshan] news programming, through blatant use of the medium for
publicizing Congress party leaders and initiatives.’ (McMillan)
8. Voting process, 0: booth capturing, see 1989 report and Jaffrelot
1989
Sources
IFES: The 1989 Indian National Elections: A Retrospective Analysis (online)
Keesings Contemporary Archives
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: highly trusted central committee. NB concerns about partiality at lower levels.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Although we have seen no final definitive figures, it was estimated
that well over 100 Indians died in violent incidents more or less directly related to the
election campaign, and at least another 100 or more in communal incidents which may
have had some relationship to the upcoming election. A Janata Dal leader, Sanjay Singh,
was shot and seriously wounded on election day’ (IFES)
7. Media access, 0: biased state media
8. Voting process, 0: booth capturing, and ‘silent booth capturing’ where voters are coerced into
staying away and their votes cast illicitly by others. Note that this is not especially widespread
(although increased this election) and pulls in different directions as patterns of party
dominance vary across states.
1991
Sources
‘Communists split over Punjab poll, 23rd candidate killed’. Agence France Presse, June 15th
Alistair McMillan. The Election Commission of India and the Regulation and Administration of
Electoral Politics. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy. June 2012, 11(2): 187-201
Dennis Austin & Andrudha Gupta (1994): India—Once more to the polls, The Round Table: The
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 83:330, 213-221
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: Based on McMillian article about historically trustworthy Election Commission, in
the absence of reason for doubt
3. Electoral rights, 0: state of Assam did not vote, and neither did Punjab and Sikkim, the latter
two due to president’s rule.
6. Campaign process, 0: Rajiv Gandhi assassinated, along with many other candidates
8. Voting process, 0: booth capturing
1996
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. May 31, 1996, Friday. FOREIGN RELATIONS; Indian TV
details voting, violence, arrests
Agence France Presse – English. May 30, 1996 30:14 GMT. Three dead in final round of
Kashmir polls. Surinder Oberoi and Izhar Wani
Agence France Presse – English. May 31, 1996 31:12 GMT. Life inching back to normal in postpoll Kashmir
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: election-related violence in Jammu and Kashmir, and elsewhere (see for
example p43 Ajuha, claims 100 deaths in Uttar Pradesh)
7. Media access, 0: ‘National television and radio, which are government monopolies, are
frequently accused of manipulating the news to the benefit of the Government’ (US dep)
8. Voting process, 0: violence at polls violates requirement of adequate security
1998
Sources
Alistair McMillan. The Election Commission of India and the Regulation and Administration of
Electoral Politics. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy. June 2012, 11(2): 187-201
Ahuja, M. L. Handbook of General Elections and Electoral Reforms in India, 1952-1999
Agence France Presse – English. February 12, 1998. Separatists kill 22 as Indian pre-poll
violence escalates (cited with ref to assassinated candidates, not generalised separatist
violence)
ABC NEWS FEBRUARY 28, 1998 SHOW: ABC WORLD NEWS SATURDAY (6:30 pm ET)
INDIAN ELECTIONS
AAP NEWSFEED. February 28, 1998, Saturday. ASIA: FINAL MAJOR LEG OF INDIAN
ELECTIONS BEGINS
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: Based on McMillian article about historically trustworthy Election Commission, in
the absence of reason for doubt
6. Campaign process, 0: violence
7. Media access, 0: ‘National television and radio, which are government monopolies, are
frequently accused of manipulating the news to the benefit of the Government’ (US dep)
8. Voting process, 0: booth capturing. See for example pg 76 of Ahuja
1999
Sources
US state department
Alistair McMillan. The Election Commission of India and the Regulation and Administration of
Electoral Politics. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy. June 2012, 11(2): 187-201
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: Based on McMillian article about historically trustworthy Election Commission, in
the absence of reason for doubt
6. Campaign process, 0: violence leading to deaths, including of candidates
7. Media access, 0: ‘National television and radio, which are government monopolies, frequently
are accused of having a strong pro-Government bias.’ (US dep)
8. Voting process, 0: booth capturing. See for example pg 115 of Ahuja
2004
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
Alistair McMillan. The Election Commission of India and the Regulation and Administration of
Electoral Politics. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy. June 2012, 11(2): 187-201
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: Based on McMillian article about historically trustworthy Election Commission, in
the absence of reason for doubt
6. Campaign process, 0: violence
7. Media access, 0: combination of allegation of Doordarshan bias, harassment of journalists in
some areas, and a ban on privately owned radio stations broadcasting news
2009
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 2009 - India
Global Integrity Report scorecard, electoral commission
http://report.globalintegrity.org/India/2009/scorecard/23
BBC: Millions of Indians go to polls. 16 April 2009 (online)
The Times of India: With names missing, many left in lurch again. 1 May 2009. (Online)
Notes
Voter register, 0: names missing. While more than one report corroborates this, scale is unclear,
and this has impacted our data confidence.
Campaign process, 0: election related violence including the death of one political leader in April
Voting process, 0: violent disruption of some polling stations violates criteria of adequate
security
Indonesia
2004
Sources
The Carter Center 2004 Indonesia Election Report (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: on the strength of the following:
‘The imposition of educational and physical requirements to determine the suitability of
presidential candidates represented another source of concern for The Carter Center.
Candidates had to demonstrate they had at least completed their education to high-school level
(or equivalent) and prove they did not suffer from a serious physical disability. The educational
requirements are particularly discriminating toward women and those in religious education —
a common, and often only, option for people living in remote areas, such as Papua. As far as the
physical requirements are concerned, former President Abdurrahman Wahid’s blindness was
cited as justification for excluding him from the presidential race.’
2. EMB, 0: instances of partisan behaviour and corrupt behaviour (accepting bribes) by KPU
3. Electoral rights, 0: disproportionate disadvantage to IDPs in accessing their suffrage, due to
underregistration
4. Voter register, 0: ‘ghost voters’ and shortfalls in registration, notwithstanding a considerable
improvement between the legislative and presidential elections
5. Ballot access, 0: violations of c as detailed in 1.
6. Campaign process, 0: violation of c: ‘Prior to the runoff election, campaigning was limited by
the KPU. It accorded candidates no more than three days to present their case to the public, and
campaigning was only to be conducted in a format specified by the KPU. The Carter Center
strongly objects to such limitations. They infringe on the rights of free speech and assembly of
candidates and their supporters.’
7. Media access 0: ‘Government-owned TVRI used its programming to promote incumbent
President Megawati Soekarnoputri’. There were also concerns about freedom of speech.
8. Voting process has been coded as -22 as it was impossible to judge the scale, severity and
intention/outcome of the following: ‘Officials sometimes failed to check voter documentation or
the voter register. In some locations, the polling station layout did not ensure privacy in the
polling booth. Several polling stations closed well in advance of 1 p.m., and some began an early
count.’
10. Counting process, 0: isolated instances of outright fraud which were detected, in addition to
a widespread problem with accidentally invalidated ballots which was not responded to
uniformly.
2009
Sources
Asian Network for Free Elections. Indonesia Presidential Elections 2009. A short observation
report on the conduct of 2009 Presidential Elections (online)
Keesings contemporary archives
Mietzner, M. Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of the Party
System. Lowy Institute for International Policy. May 2009
Notes
1. Legal framework,0: no evidence of change concerning (1) in 2004.
3. Electoral rights, 0: many voters believed they could not vote due to the last minute ruling in
(4) – additionally ‘There were a few polling stations that could not operate as scheduled due to
logistics problems and some minor violence in West Papua’
4. Voter register, -33: In the end, a voter register was not used, making this criteria not
applicable. ‘The problem with the voter list was deemed bad enough that the Constitutional
Court removed the requirement that a person be on the voter list in order to vote.’
5. Ballot access, 0: tough requirements regarding support and reach noted but no arbitrary or
illegal barriers reported
8. Voting process, 1: ‘It is crucial to emphasise, however, that irregularities in the elections were
only rarely related to attempts of vote rigging. Rather, they were the result of poorly prepared
voter lists, lack of experienced staff at all levels of the Election Commission (KPU, Komisi
Pemilihan Umum), ageing technical equipment and the unavailability of funds for voter
registration at the grass roots. It is very unlikely that the overall will of the voters was severely
distorted by these weaknesses in electoral organisation’ (MIETZNER)
Aceh only: Although the polling ran smoothly – but there were breaches found at the polling
sites, there were
potentially serious irregularities which need to be addressed to improve the election system for
the future. Some
polling officers seems to be not well trained or seemly powerless in rule the station – allowing
unauthorized
people to enter polling stations and allowing the village security (Linmas) to interfere into the
voting process
and affecting the secrecy of voting. Numerous intimidations were also reported from observers
both
international and domestics. However the intensity were significantly lower compared with
April parliamentary
elections 2009. SBY-Boediono enjoyed victory in Aceh and marked the highest votes of 93,99
per cent from the
valid votes inAceh Provinces17
Iran
1980
Sources
Princeton University, Iran Data Portal
http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/1980/
Washington Institute. Mehdi Khalaji. June 10, 2009. Iran's Voting Manipulation Industry
(online)Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidates are subject to vetting by Guardian Council
2. EMB, 0: the Guardian Council is responsible for elections, and has heavy political interests
linked to the Supreme Leader
4. Voter register, na: voter registration does not occur. Eligibility is proved with a birth
certificate on the day.
5. Ballot access, 0: winner over 75% of votes
1981 – July
Sources
Princeton University, Iran Data Portal
http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/1980/
Used for voter register info:
United States department of state country report on human rights 1981 - Iran
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidates are subject to vetting by Guardian Council
2. EMB, 0: the Guardian Council is responsible for elections, and has heavy political interests
linked to the Supreme Leader
4. Voter register, na: voter registration does not occur. Eligibility is proved with a birth
certificate on the day.
5. Ballot access, 0: winner over 75% of votes
6. Campaign process, 0: harassment of dissenting citizens
7. Media access, 0: freedom of the press severely restricted
1981 – October
Sources
Washington Institute. Mehdi Khalaji. June 10, 2009. Iran's Voting Manipulation Industry
(online)
United States department of state country report on human rights 1981 - Iran
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidates are subject to vetting by Guardian Council
2. EMB, 0: the Guardian Council is responsible for elections, and has heavy political interests
linked to the Supreme Leader
4. Voter register, na: voter registration does not occur. Eligibility is proved with a birth
certificate on the day.
5. Ballot access, 0: winner over 75% of votes
6. Campaign process, 0: harassment of dissenting citizens
7. Media access, 0: freedom of the press severely restricted
1985
Sources
Princeton University, Iran Data Portal
http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/1980/
Washington Institute. Mehdi Khalaji. June 10, 2009. Iran's Voting Manipulation Industry
(online)
United States department of state country report on human rights 1985 - Iran
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidates are subject to vetting by Guardian Council
2. EMB, 0: the Guardian Council is responsible for elections, and has heavy political interests
linked to the Supreme Leader
4. Voter register, na: voter registration does not occur. Eligibility is proved with a birth
certificate on the day.
5. Ballot access, 0: winner over 75% of votes
6. Campaign process, 0: harassment of dissenting citizens
7. Media access, 0: media freedom restricted
1989
Sources
Princeton University, Iran Data Portal
http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/1980/
Washington Institute. Mehdi Khalaji. June 10, 2009. Iran's Voting Manipulation Industry
(online)
United States department of state country report on human rights 1989 – Iran
Amnesty International. Report on Human Rights Violations in Iran, 1987 to 1990. Dec 1st 1990.
(Online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidates are subject to vetting by Guardian Council
2. EMB, 0: the Guardian Council is responsible for elections, and has heavy political interests
linked to the Supreme Leader
4. Voter register, na: voter registration does not occur. Eligibility is proved with a birth
certificate on the day.
5. Ballot access, 0: winner over 75% of votes
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and intimidation against voters with dissident political views
7. Media access, 0: press not free
1993
Sources
United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1993 - Iran
Washington Institute. Mehdi Khalaji. June 10, 2009. Iran's Voting Manipulation Industry
(online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council
2. EMB, 0: the Guardian Council is responsible for elections, and has heavy political interests
linked to the Supreme Leader
4. Voter register, na: voter registration does not occur. Eligibility is proved with a birth
certificate on the day.
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1. Rejections are very common and reasons include religion.
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and intimidation against voters with dissident political views
7. Media access, 0: severe restrictions on the press
1997
Sources
United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1997 - Iran
Washington Institute. Mehdi Khalaji. June 10, 2009. Iran's Voting Manipulation Industry
(online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council
2. EMB, 0: the Guardian Council is responsible for elections, and has heavy political interests
linked to the Supreme Leader
4. Voter register, na: voter registration does not occur. Eligibility is proved with a birth
certificate on the day.
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1. Rejections are very common and reasons include religion.
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and intimidation against voters with dissident political views
7. Media access, 0: severe restrictions on the press
8. Voting process, 1: ‘‘the regime does not appear to have engaged in election fraud’, US
department of state
10. Counting process, 1: ‘‘the regime does not appear to have engaged in election fraud’, US
department of state
2001
Sources
United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2001 - Iran
Washington Institute. Mehdi Khalaji. June 10, 2009. Iran's Voting Manipulation Industry
(online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council
2. EMB, 0: the Guardian Council is responsible for elections, and has heavy political interests
linked to the Supreme Leader
4. Voter register, na: voter registration does not occur. Eligibility is proved with a birth
certificate on the day.
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1. Rejections are very common and reasons include religion.
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and intimidation against voters with dissident political views
7. Media access, 0: severe restrictions on the press
2009
Sources
United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2009 - Iran
Washington Institute. Mehdi Khalaji. June 10, 2009. Iran's Voting Manipulation Industry
(online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council
2. EMB, 0: the Guardian Council is responsible for elections, and has heavy political interests
linked to the Supreme Leader
4. Voter register, na: voter registration does not occur. Eligibility is proved with a birth
certificate on the day.
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1. Rejections are very common and reasons include religion.
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and intimidation against voters with dissident political views
7. Media access, 0: severe restrictions on the press
9. Role of officials, 0: International observers were not allowed entry to monitor the election
results.
10. Counting process, 0: announcement of results by government media prior to
commencement of counting, evidence of irregularities e.g. over 100% turnout at some polling
centres
Iraq
January 2005
Sources
Dawisha, A. and Diamond, L. Iraq's Year of Voting Dangerously. Journal of Democracy 17.2
(2006) 89-103
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices – 2005
Cole, J. An election in Iraq. Theory and Event, Volume 8, Number 2, 2005
Sir Harold Walker & Sir Terence Clark (2005) Elections In Iraq – 30 January 2005: An
Assessment, Asian Affairs, 36:2, 181-191
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidates must ‘have at least a secondary school education’
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘In the January elections, many of the mostly non-Muslim residents on the
Ninewah Plain were unable to vote.’ (US dep) ‘Significant parts of the electorate
were unable to participate because of violence and intimidation’ (Walker and Clark)
4. Voter register, 0: ‘According to the IECI, 14–15 million Iraqis were eligible to vote,
including an estimated one million expatriate Iraqis, but only about half seem to
have registered.’ (Walker and Clark)
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and intimidation by insurgents to discourage Sunni voting.
‘security was so bad that candidates could not reveal their names until the day before the
election’ (Cole) ‘Many election workers left their jobs before the elections due to threats’
(Walker and Clark)
7. Media access, 0: non-governmental violence against media seemed sufficient to warrant a 0
regarding freedom of speech
December 2005
Sources
Iraq: IMIE Assessment Team - Final Report (2006) (online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices – 2005
Iraqi Constitution (online)
Notes
NB that the winning incumbent lost power by April
1. Legal framework, 0: Prime Minister must have ‘college degree or its equivalent.’
2. EMBs, 1: extensive discussion of the IECE’s work is positive in tone and does not indicate
short comings
3. Electoral rights, 0: 227 polling stations had to be cancelled, disenfranchising these Iraqis.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘a serious effort should be made, as circumstances permit, to develop more
accurate voter lists’. ‘There were some problems with the voters’ list’
6. Campaign process, o: violence against candidates and supporters
7. Media access, 0: non-governmental violence against media seemed sufficient to warrant a 0
regarding freedom of speech
8. Voting process, 0: some fraud is known, and voting processes cancelled. Additional
undetected fraud considered likely.
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘The record shows that an undetermined number of the IECI’s 220,000
election workers engaged in questionable and legal practices’
2010
Sources
Freedom in the World 2011 – Iraq
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices – 2010
Iraqi Constitution (online)
Notes
Re incumbent win – note that the incumbent did not win the most votes, but was ultimately able
to form the new unity government and resume the premiership
Re 5, ballot access, -22: NB considerable controversy over suspension of some candidates due to
alleged connections with baath party. Most were reinstated
1. Legal framework, 0: Prime Minister must have ‘college degree or its equivalent.’
6. Campaign process, 0: violence
7. Media access, 0: some restrictions of freedom of speech, also nongovernmental intimidation.
FiW: ‘Iraq’s media regulatory body, the Communication and Media Commission, cracked down
on journalists in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary elections by denying journalists
accreditation and suing media that criticized government officials. Journalists regularly face
intimidation and harassment from security forces at checkpoints and as they report from the
field.’
8 and 10, 1: ‘International observer missions and indigenous observer networks declared the
elections free from widespread or systemic fraud’ – also used for observer rating. Also Freedom
House: ‘Although 38 people were killed on election day, the polling was generally seen as free
and fair. The electoral commission took candidates’ complaints seriously and conducted a
partial recount, but found no evidence of significant fraud.’ Data confidence impacted
Ireland
1977
Sources
IPU Parline
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1977 – Ireland
Keesing contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2007
Sources
Ireland. Parliamentary elections (Dáil Éireann), 24 May 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Election
Assessment Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
4. Voter register was coded as-22 as some complaints were raised but the differing opinions on
scale is highly ambiguous and no assessment was undertaken
2011
Sources
IPU Parline
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
Global Integrity Scorecard 2011
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Israel
1977
Sources
Notes
1984: The incumbent formed an alliance with his main opponent where the opponent took the
premiership first, with an agreement to rotate the position at a specified time in the term. As
this kept him in the executive we have coded as 0.
1996 – 2001: These elections were for a PM, but were direct. We have classified this as
presidential.
2009
Sources
IPU praline
Freedom in the World 2010 – Israel
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010 (sic) - Israel
Notes
7. Media access, 1. Notwithstanding restrictions on security issues
All else clean by assumption (see guidelines)
NB there was a vote to ban two Arab parties but the Supreme Court overturned this
2003
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2003 – Israel and the occupied
territories
Global Integrity Scorecard
http://back.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/israel/scorecard.cfm?subcategoryID=17&countr
yID=16 and
http://back.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/israel/scorecard.cfm?subcategoryID=21&countr
yID=16
Notes
4. Voter register, 1: this is on the basis of the GIS score of 100 for ‘In practice, there is a clear and
transparent system of voter registration.’ Data confidence has been reduced as this does not
guarantee that the register is in fact accurate, but we have no evidence to the contrary.
5. Ballot access, 1: assumed given the lengthy discussion of one candidate’s disqualification,
later reinstated by the court, which implies it was the only such issue (US dep of state)
7. Media access, 0: press not free
Italy
1976
Sources
IPU Parline
Keesing
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘marred by assassinations and bombings’ (Keesings) –nb only one
specific example, a ‘young communist’
1979
Sources
IPU Parline
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
Keesings Contemporary Archives
Notes
Most clean by assumption, 7 explicit (see guidelines).
6. Campaign process, 0: attacks against candidates and headquarters by the Red Brigade
2006
Sources
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/italy/19405
Notes
1. Legal framework was coded as 0 due to a controversial change of electoral laws four months
before the election, after planning for the campaign was underway, which opposition parties
objected to as it a) changed their campaign strategy and b) favoured certain parties
2. EMB has been coded as -22, no EMB
6. Campaign process was coded as 1. Two incidents of violence noted were wounds at a political
protest, and an incident at a primary of ambiguous intention; we did not deem these closely
linked. Worries about vote buying were raised by interviewees but not firmly alleged, let alone
substantiated.
7. Media access was coded as 0 due to a lack of balance
2008
Sources
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/italy/parliamentary_2008
Notes
Jamaica
1976
Sources
IPU Parline
New York Times, Dec 14th 1976. Available online via lexisnexis
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: Violence, see NYT article (also generalised references to the history of
violent elections are common.
7. Media access, 0: in an attempt to control violence, a censorship order was brought in
requiring that political ads and statements were submitted to security agencies at least 6 hours
before use.
1980
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1980 – Jamaica
Nov 2nd 1980, New York Times, Jo Thomas, AFTER BULLETS AND BALLOTS, JAMAICAN HOPES
RISE (available online via lexisnexis)
Nov 1st 1980, The Globe and Mail, A BIG WIN IN JAMAICA (available online via lexisnexis)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The subsequent election campaign was marked by considerable
violence’ (IPU). US State dep ‘Many people were killed during the long, violent election
campaign’
7. Media access, 0: state owned media bias
8 and 10, 0: ‘Ballot boxes were stolen, voters were intimidated by gunmen, election officials
failed to show up at the polls and the Electoral Commission's staff spent the night in their offices
pinned down by gunfire outside. Nevertheless, election officials reported that these incidents
affected relatively few votes, contending that the election had been the cleanest ever conducted
in Jamaica.’ (NYT)
See also – ‘There were, as both leaders recognized, some irregularities on the day of voting that
followed a campaign marked by violence on a scale that bordered on civil war. But, mercifully,
the
winner's margin of victory was broad enough to be secure against any threat of being upset by a
recount here or there.’ – Globe and Mail
1983
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1983 – Jamaica
December 19, 1983. Christian Science Monitor. Dennis Volman. Jamaica's stability: threatened
by a one-sided election?
December 20, 1983. United Press International. Caribbean News Briefs
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: It is not clear whether the opposition had sufficient cause to boycott
regarding the register, or whether other motivations were at play. However, it appears to be
agreed that the registers were from 1980 and missing younger voters. (3 not coded as it is not
clear how this was dealt with in practice)
5. Ballot access, 0: JLP won 89.7% of the votes. Opposition boycott due to accusations over the
voter register
1989
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1989 – Jamaica
Inter-Press Services, Feb 9th 1989. JAMAICA: SEAGA ALLEGES FRAUD, MANLEY SAYS ITS AN
EXCUSE
Inter-Press Services, Feb 9th 1989. JAMAICA: STEADY VOTING IN ELECTIONS; ONE DEATH
REPORTED
Keesings Contemporary archives
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: 12 people killed (Nb this was noted as an improvement, resulting from
concerted political effort)
8. Voting process, 0: while the losers’ claims of ‘intensive’ fraud are contentious, it seems that
some intimidation did occur – see two news reports – ‘Political analysts point out that open
voting and intimidation have been regular features of elections in some constituencies of this
capital for years’ (IPS, Jamaica: steady voting in elections). See also Keesings, director of
elections acknowledged unspecified irregularities in 5 constituencies. Data confidence
impacted
1993
Sources
Amanda Sives (2009): Electoral Reform and Good Governance: The Case of Jamaica,
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 47:2, 174-193
Amanda Sives (1999): Free and fair? Monitoring elections in Jamaica, Representation, 36:4, 315324
IPU Parline
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
Notes
3. Electoral access, 0: one ballot station closed due to violence. Voters reportedly turned away
en masse from others or in some cases unable to vote because they had supposedly already
done so
5. Ballot access, 0: winning party over 75%
6. Campaign process, 0: violence
8. Voting process, 0: impersonation of voters
10. Counting process, 0: ballot boxes stuffed and stolen
2007
Sources
Organization of American States. Final Report of the Electoral Observation Mission in Jamaica.
General Election 2007. (Online)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘violent acts and loss of life’. It should be noted that the small scale of
this was noted as a big improvement.
2011
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2011 – Jamaica
BBC Worldwide Monitoring. Dec 21st 2011. Jamaican election body threatens to ban political
marches ahead of polls
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: violence. See BBC.
8 and 10 assumed from US dep ‘International election observers from the Caribbean
Community and the OAS deemed the elections transparent, free and fair, and without violence.’
Japan
1976
Sources
IPU Parline
US department of state country report on human rights 1976 – Japan
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines). In addition: ‘elections are completely honest and open’
US State dep
1979
Sources
IPU Parline
US department of state country report on human rights 1979 – Japan
Keesing contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) – further affirmation, ‘elections are completely honest and
open’ US State dep. Did not assume (2) as keesing noted large disparities in constituencies
without exploring where the advantage lay.
1980
Sources
IPU Parline
US department of state country report on human rights 1976 – Japan
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Incumbent originally stood but died during campaign. Coded as incumbent not standing.
Clean by assumption (see guidelines): in addition ‘elections are completely honest and open’ US
State dep.
However, 6 as -22 due to the following from the BBC, unclear whether or not this is outright
vote buying:
Reporting from Tokyo for the home service, Vladimir Tsvetov said that the results of elections in
Japan had always been decided by money, but in the recent general election it had played a
more decisive role than ever before. The Liberal Democrats had received a "fantastic sum" from
the monopolies for their election campaign, and in addition had resorted to such well-tried
methods of winning votes as bribery and "free gifts" to voters.
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. June 24, 1980. The results of the Japanese
general election
2000
Sources
IPU praline
Keesing contemporary archives
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2005
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 2005 – Japan
Global integrity report 2004
http://back.globalintegrity.org/reports/2004/docs/2004/2004Japan.pdf
Notes
2. EMBs, 1 on the basis of the GIR scorecard
9. Role of officials, 0: no international observers permitted
All else clean by assumption (7 explicit) (see guidelines)
2009
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 2009 – Japan
Global Integrity Report 2008 http://report.globalintegrity.org/Japan/2008
Notes
2. EMBs, 1 on the basis of the 2008 GIR scorecard – as there is no evidence of for change
8 and 10, 1 on the basis of the statement of the US dep report that the elections were free and
fair
9. Role of officials, 0: no international observers permitted
2012
Sources
IPU Parline
Notes
The following was not reported elsewhere and has not been used to code 0 as scale is not clear
and response was proactive. However, it may be of interest:
Japanese police started raids on Monday to take action against people suspected of violating the
public offices election law during the House of Representatives election Sunday.
The police are planning full-fledged investigations into some 110 suspected cases across Japan,
such as vote buying, and searches related to two of these were under way as of 10 a.m. (1 a.m.
GMT), the National Police Agency said.
The cases come on top of 17 already uncovered, leading to 17 arrests, including for violation of
the freedom of elections, violence to staffers at polling stations and fraudulent voting.
- Jiji Press Ticker Service. December 17, 2012 Monday 4:36 PM JST. Japan Police
Start Raids on Election Law Offenders
Kazakhstan
2011
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report
Notes
(3 by assumption)
1. Legal framework, 0: requirements for Kazakh fluency do not include clear criteria and so this
is opens the right of citizens to stand to abuse
2. EMBs, 1: notwithstanding stakeholder concerns over composition, we have coded in line with
the report’s contention that ‘Election commissions at all levels, including the CEC, handled the
technical aspects of the election in a professional manner.’
. Voter register, 1: on the basis of a description of extensive registration efforts and no comment
that any stakeholder objected.
5. Ballot access, 0: 95.55% of the vote to the incumbent
6. Campaign process, 0: participants told them that they had been instructed to attend ‘In order
to secure legal restrictions on freedom of assembly’. ‘At several events where OSCE/ODIHR
LTOs were present a high turnout, the authorities used administrative resources to pressure the
electorate to turn out and vote’. Cases of intimidation of potential participants in some
opposition activity.
7. Media access, 0: legal restrictions on freedom of the press
8. Voting process, 0: ‘numerous instances of seemingly identical signatures on voter lists, cases
of ballot box stuffing, and proxy, multiple and family voting. The secrecy of the vote was not
always guaranteed.’
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘international observers were not given full access to the process in 133
cases, being told instead to remain in a reserved area from where they were unable to observe
all aspects of the voting process.’
10. Counting process, 0: ballot box stuffing, negative rating in one of five cases by OSCE, lack of
transparency. In addition, ‘Four of the five aggregation tables which the OSCE/ODIHR EOM was
able to obtain from the District Election Commissions (DECs) showed discrepancies between
the data in the table and the data of the results protocols received by international observers at
the polling stations... Unauthorized persons were identified in 152 polling stations visited and
were seen interfering in or directing the process in 16 instances.’
Kenya
2007
Sources
International Republican Institute. Kenya Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Elections.
December 27, 2007. Election Observation Mission Final Report (Online)
EU Election Observation Mission, Kenya, 27 December 2007. Final Report on the General
Elections (Online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0:gerrymandering
3. Electoral rights, 0: a pattern of difficulty in registering to vote for Hindus and Muslims, and
unequal voting access for IDPs
4. Voter register, 0: double and multiple entries and entries of the deceased.
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and attacks on candidates, and vote buying
7. Media access, 0: lack of balance on state owned radio
8. Voting process, 0: despite a general positive tone in the IRI report as we deemed ‘some
instances’ of the following to be serious: group voting, improper assistance to voters, bribing,
party agents going behind voter screens – and lack of voting secrecy in about ¼ of stations
9. Role of officials, 0: see 8
10. Counting process, 0: inflation of the incumbent’s vote described as ‘obvious fraud’ through
the results being ‘arbitrarily changed’. This subsequently led to widespread violence and a pact
in which the opposition leader affected was given the newly created post of Prime Minister.
1992
Sources
International Republican Institute. The December 29, 1992 Elections. (Online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
2. EMBs, 0: serious doubts about partisanship raised.
3. Electoral rights, 0: inefficient distribution of voting cards seen as a calculated act.( If displacement
was prior to the election this is 0 as a result of the 5 months in the area laws)
4. Voter register, 0: irregularities and unregistered voters, the latter arguably related to a (some say,
deliberately) short time span for registration and/or an initial opposition boycott.
5. Ballot access, 1: notwithstanding the obstruction of parliamentary candidates, which did not
directly affect presidential nominations. These ‘proceeded without incident’
6. Campaign process, 0: inefficiencies in distributing rally permits perceived as a calculated act, and
some rallies denied, although never for the ruling party. Also belated permission to open branches.
Obstruction particularly noticeable in ‘KANU zones’. State use of resources. Widespread and open
vote buying by all parties. Violence.
7. Media access, 0. ‘Grossly biased’
8. Voting process, 0. Ineligible (‘imported’) voters. Gross violations of secrecy of vote for illiterate
voters (about 40%) compromised not only by the presence of their assistant but by the marking of the
paper in front of all agents.
9. Role of officials, 0: Although the IRI team observed some good training, ‘on election day, the IRI
observed considerable confusion that can only be attributed to insufficient training of election
administrators’.
10. Counting process, 0: barring of party agents weakened transparency, violating a and b.
Korea, Rep.
1987
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1981 – Korea, Rep. of
West, James M.; Baker, Edward J. Constitutional Reforms in South Korea 1987: Electoral
Processes and Judicial Independence, The; 1 Harvard Human Rights yearbook 135 (1988)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘sometimes marred by violence’ (US state dep) ‘money and gifts… were
widely distributed’ (West and Baker)
7. Media access, 0: some tensions over press freedom, biased state TV
8. and 10. Voting process, 0: US state dep: ‘The opposition parties had observers in both voting
places and ballot counting posts. While there appear to have been numerous instances of
irregularities and abuses of Korean election laws, the available evidence does not suggest
systematic fraud of a kind which would call into question the overall election results.’ West and
Baker echo this assessment of the scale, concluding that it is ‘not negligible’ and providing
details – absentee ballot fraud, harassment and bribery of voters, multiple and relay voting, etc.
1992
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1992 – Korea, Rep. of
S. KOREA ELECTS NEW PRESIDENT; KIM YOUNG-SAM IS FIRST CIVILIAN IN 32 YEARS. St.
Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) December 19, 1992
EX-DISSIDENT WINS ELECTION IN KOREA. The New York Times. December 19, 1992
Notes
6. Campaign process, 1: no contrary evidence to the following two statements in the press:
‘If the post-election period remains peaceful, the transfer of power will be the first without
violence since the founding of the country in 1948.’ (St Louis)
‘"In 1987 there was a lot of vote buying," said Chung Won Bok, a 45-year-old worker at Korea
Telecom… But this year, he added, "I've seen very little of that." (NY Times)
Data confidence impacted
7. Media access, 1 – US state dep assessment of media freedom over the year in general is
somewhat equivocal, but it is noted that there was ‘extensive media coverage of the campaign
and all seven of the candidates’ so it seems that any restrictions were not bearing on the
campaign
8. and 10. 1: US state dep first writes that ‘voting and ballot-counting were conducted without
allegations of irregularities’ but later notes that there were in fact charges of voting
irregularities. However, this latter appears to be a reference to some specific incidents re
absentee votes and ‘a pattern of strong public reaction and legal action against the perpetrators
seemed to emerge’, so we have taken this to merit ‘1’ overall.
1997
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1992 – Korea, Rep. of
South Korean voters turn to opposition leader Kim Dae-jung to lead them out of financial
turmoil. Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, Dec 18 1997.
Notes
6. Campaign process, 1: in light of the following and in the absence of more specific info. Data
confidence impacted:
‘Although the campaign was the cleanest in South Korean history, offering extensive television
debates and new restrictions on campaign rallies, some voters complained that neither
candidate could solve the nation's massive economic problems. Remarkably, in a nation once
run by military junta, the election was carried out without any signs of tension or violence.’
(Knight Ridder Washington Bureau)
7. Media access 1, some caveats in US dep but not relevant
8 and 10 assumed from free fair, US dep
2002
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1992 – Korea, Rep. of
Global Integrity Scorecard 2009
http://report.globalintegrity.org/South%20Korea/2009/scorecard/23
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: see Global Integrity scorecard. Presumed to apply to at least last two elections.
7. Media access 1, some caveats in US dep but not relevant
8 and 10 assumed from free fair, US dep
2007
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1992 – Korea, Rep. of
Global Integrity Scorecard 2009
http://report.globalintegrity.org/South%20Korea/2009/scorecard/23
Agence France Presse – English. December 19, 2007. Presidential poll is watershed in SKorea
history: newspapers
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: see Global Integrity scorecard. Presumed to apply to at least last two elections.
8 and 10 assumed from free fair, US dep
6. Campaign process, 1: no evidence contradicting the following:
‘Chosun [conservative SK newspaper] noted a relative decline in support for candidates based
on regional affiliations, and the near-absence of vote-buying scandals… It also welcomed the
absence of violence and the lack of reports of illegal political donations, as well as the breaking
down of regional and generational barriers among voters.’ (AFP)
Kyrgyz Republic
1995
Sources
Koldys, Gregory. Constraining Democratic Development: Institutions and Party
System Formation in Kyrgyzstan," Demokratizatsiya 5, no. 3 (1997) (Online)
US department of state country report 1995 - Kyrgyzstan
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: last minute changes to the signature requirement, a court ‘explanation’
which introduced requirements of geographical spread as well as sheer quantity, made the
requirement insurmountable for much of the opposition (ie violation of c)
2. EMBs, 0: partisan (see Koldys)
5. Ballot access, 0: as per 1, candidates who should have been eligible found themselves unable
to stand
6. Campaign process, 0. ‘Opposition candidates protested the President's use of government
resources for his campaign, particularly his domination of the state-run media despite strict
rules calling for equal access by all candidates. Two opposition candidate campaign workers
were arrested just prior to the election and remained in detention at year's end.’ (US
department of state)
7. Media access, 0: see above
8. Voting process, 0: based on the US state department report, which notes in passing ‘Although
only isolated instances of fraud were reported on election day...’ Data accuracy has been
lowered by the lack of specificity.
2009
Sources
Kyrgyz Republic. Presidential Election, 23 July 2009. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘The election administration at all levels was dominated by the pro-presidential and
governing party Ak Jol. This raised questions about its impartiality and its independence from
state authorities’
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Despite some limited efforts to improve the voter lists, their quality and
accuracy remained a concern.’
5. Ballot access, 0: condemnation by the report of the methods used to turn away candidates; of
22 nominees, 6 were registered
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘obstruction of opposition campaign events as well as pressure and
intimidation of opposition supporters’. Legal restrictions on assembly exist.
7. Media access, 0: ‘state media displayed a strong bias in favour of the incumbent’
8. Voting process, 0: ‘evidence of ballot box stuffing and some evidence of multiple voting’
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘unauthorized persons were noted (24 per cent of cases), including
directing the process in some cases’
10. Counting process, 0:‘evidence of ballot box stuffing’ and ‘direct manipulation or falsification
in numerous instances’
2011
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report
Notes
2. EMBs 0: ‘While decision-making sessions were open to the public, the CEC regularly
conducted internal working sessions behind closed doors, contrary to the law.’, violation of the
criteria that the EMB abides by election law
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘A considerable number of voters were not able to find themselves on voter
lists, which became an issue on election day.’
4. Voter register, 0: See 3.
5. Ballot access, -22: uncertainty over the CEC’s methodology for checking signature lists, so it is
not clear if all those eligible to stand were permitted
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Allegations of misuse of institutional authority in the form of pressure
and intimidation were raised throughout the pre-election period, which undermined confidence
in the electoral process. In some cases, university students and staff were pressured to submit
applications to vote by electoral address. Moreover, in a few of these cases, they were also
reportedly directed to vote for one candidate in particular. Limited instances of intimidation
and attempted coercion were reported from staff at other academic institutions and by
healthcare workers.’ It is worth noting that other campaign aspects, such as freedom of
assembly and absence of violence, were positively assessed
7. Media access, 0: ‘vulnerability of the media to political interference is perceived as a danger to
preserving media freedom achievements’... ‘public Kyrgyz Radio overwhelmingly covered
activities of the authorities in its news program’
8. Voting process, 0: ‘a number of serious violations were reported by observers, such as ballot
box stuffing, multiple and family voting, and vote buying’
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘In a high 26 per cent of the polling stations observed, there were
unauthorized persons present. There was a clear correlation between a negative assessment of
polling procedures and the presence of unauthorized persons.’
10. Counting process, 0: ‘The situation deteriorated during counting and tabulation, with a
significant number of polling stations assessed negatively by observers. In many cases,
observers were restricted from observing the counting and tabulation. The negative
observations noted and unduly high turnout figures in some polling stations cast certain doubt
and raised concern regarding the level of integrity required for such a democratic contest.’
Laos, PDR
NB that although Laos is one party, non party candidates can (in theory) stand since 2002.
Prior to 2002 independent candidates could not run (http://www.ipu.org/parlinee/reports/arc/2175_06.htm). These elections were therefore pure one party state elections.
2002
Sources
The Economist. February 28th 2002. Not exactly a cliff-hanger (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: council approval required to stand
2. EMBs, 0: the low approval rate of non-LPRP candidates is strongly indicative that the committee is
partisan
5. Ballot access, 0: only one independent passed the scrutiny of the council. The criteria of ‘sufficient
knowledge of the party’ would not be internationally recognised.
7. Media access, 0: media not free
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘No foreign election observers were invited or allowed, as the National
Election Committee spokesman declared that there was no need for observers because
"elections in Laos are free and fair". (IPU-Parline)
2006
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2006 - Laos
Gunn, Geoffrey C. ‘Laos in 2006: Changing of the Guard’. Asian Survey Vol. 47, No. 1 2007 pp.
183-188
Agence France Press, 30th April 2006: Voters go to the polls in communist Laos
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: council approval required to stand
2. EMBs, 0: the low approval rate of non-LPRP candidates is strongly indicative that the
committee is partisan
5. Ballot access, 0: given 1, and that only two independent candidates ran according to Agence
France Press, we presume eligible citizens not close to party line could not de facto run
7. Media access, 0: press not free
2011
Sources
Stuart-Fox, Martin. ‘Countries at the Crossroads 2011: Laos’. Freedom House (online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2011 - Laos
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: council approval required to stand
2. EMBs, 0: the low approval rate of non-LPRP candidates is strongly indicative that the
committee is partisan
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘All NA candidates require endorsement by the party-controlled Lao Front for
National Construction, whose structure parallels that of the party. Only a handful of
independent candidates were permitted to stand’ (Freedom House)
7. Media access, 0: media not free
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘Independent observers were not allowed to monitor the election process.’
(US dep of state)
Latvia
2010
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report
Notes
(3 by assumption)
1. Legal framework, 0: lustration laws bar citizens who belonged to the salaried staff of the
former Soviet Union’s state security, intelligence or counterintelligence services from standing.
(Note also that 17% of the population cannot vote, as these residents are not considered
citizens, but that in keeping with our policy of not assessing citizenship definitions this would
not result in a 0 coding of itself)
4. Voter register, na: registers not used
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
8. Voting process, 0: secrecy of the vote often not assured. It should be noted that in general the
voting was nonetheless assessed positively.
2011
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report
Notes
(3 by assumption)
1. Legal framework, 0: lustration laws bar citizens who belonged to the salaried staff of the
former Soviet Union’s state security, intelligence or counterintelligence services from standing.
(Note also that 14% of the population cannot vote, as these residents are not considered
citizens, but that in keeping with our policy of not assessing citizenship definitions this would
not result in a 0 coding of itself)
4. Voter register, na: not registers used
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
8. Voting process, 0: secrecy of the vote often violated by both poll layout, and by family voting.
It should be noted that in general the voting was nonetheless assessed positively.
Lebanon
In Lebanon, three important posts are assigned to three major religious groups. As voters may
elect candidates to parliament (who indirectly elect the President) without restriction, we have
not coded this as a violation of legal framework.
1992
Sources
United States department of state country report on human rights practices 1992 – Lebanon
United States department of state country report on human rights practices 1993 – Lebanon.
el Khazen, Farid. ‘Lebanon's First Postwar Parliamentary Election, 1992: An Imposed Choice’
(1994)
(online)
Bassel F. Salloukh (2006). The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in
Postwar Lebanon. Canadian Journal of Political Science,39, pp 635-655 (online)
Statement of Bill Clinton http://www.lgic.org/en/lebanese_americans_clinton.php
Gale Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa. Entry: Rashid al-Sulh.
Macmillan reference USA. 2004.
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: no election for 16 years previously due to civil war
2. EMBs, 0: gerrymandering
3. Electoral rights, 0: the gerrymandering systematically disadvantaged along sectarian lines
and eroded equal suffrage de facto
4. Voter register, 0: ‘inaccurate voter registration’.
7. Media access, 0: Restrictions on press freedom
8. Voting process, 0: among general ‘tampering’ and ‘large-scale irregularities’ which could have
been voting or counting, the breaking and stealing of ballot boxes is specifically mentioned,
violating the requirement that they are secure
9. Role of officials, 0: no international observers allowed
10. Counting process, 0: artificially inflated totals
1996
Sources
United States department of state country report on human rights practices 1996 – Lebanon
Bassel F. Salloukh (2006). The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in
Postwar Lebanon. Canadian Journal of Political Science,39, pp 635-655
Salem, Paul. ‘Skirting Democracy: Lebanon's 1996 Elections and Beyond’ Middle East Report,
No. 203, Lebanon and Syria: The Geopolitics of Change (Spring,1997), pp. 26-29
Judith Harik (1998): Citizen disempowerment and the 1996 parliamentary elections in the
governorate of mount Lebanon, Democratization,5:1, 158-182
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: unlike men, women may only vote if they have proof of elementary
education
2. EMBs, 0: ‘the electoral process was flawed by serious shortcomings, because the elections
were not prepared or carried out impartially.’ Also, gerrymandering.
3. Electoral rights, 0: gerrymandering systematically disadvantaged along sectarian lines and
eroded equal suffrage de facto
4. Voter register, 0: false names and missing names (numbering thousands)
6. Campaign process, 0: suppression and use of state patronage, harassment
7. Media access, 0: ad hoc restrictions on freedom of the press
8. Voting process, 0: see point 8 from 2000, where this election is compared restrospectively.
‘voter fraud and tampering with ballots’
10. Counting process, 0: one case of ballot box stuffing acknowledged by the courts and
redressed; this was the only case of seven brought to the court which was upheld by the judges,
but then all others involved high level government figures, We consider this situation to have
violated the criteria for no evidence of fraud in any way.
2000
Sources
Bassel F. Salloukh (2006). The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in
Postwar Lebanon. Canadian Journal of Political Science,39, pp 635-655
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: 1. Legal framework, 0: unlike men, women may only vote if they have
proof of elementary education
2. EMBs, 0: gerrymandering
7. Media access, 0: ‘The Government also used the official television station, Teleliban to
promote progovernment candidates and to denigrate the leading opposition candidate, former
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.’
8. Voting process, 0: ‘There was some improvement in the parliamentary elections held in
August and September in that there were fewer incidents of voter fraud and tampering with
ballots than in the previous election; however, the electoral process was flawed by serious
shortcomings.’ (US department of state) – this implies still some such fraud.
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘Officials applied inconsistent voting regulations, often favoring
progovernment candidates.’
2005
Sources
EU Election Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005. Final Report on the Parliamentary Elections
(online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: unlike men, women may only vote if they have proof of elementary
education
2. EMBs, 0: not independent
3. Electoral rights, 0: some seats assigned a candidate in advance, and some voters without
voting cards
4. Voter register, 0: ‘chronic structural, procedural and material deficiencies’
5. Ballot access, :1 by assumption as there is a discussion of registration that does not raise
problems
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying
7. Media access, 0: state media bias (although less so than some private media)
9. Role of officials, 0:campaigning in station
2009
Sources
European Union Election Observation Mission to Lebanon. Final Report on the 7 June 2009
Parliamentary Elections (Online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: unlike men, women may only vote if they have proof of elementary
education
2. EMB, 0: not independent, but answers to a ministry
3. Electoral rights, 0: see 1
4. Voter register, 1: The method of updating the register systematically includes those not
eligible to vote, ie the military, but there was no suggestion that this caused problems of abuse.
6. Campaign process, 0: Although the report describes it as generally peaceful, we consider the
16 incidents of violence (including death) noted in a footnote to warrant considering condition
A to be contravened.
9. Role of officials, 0: presence of campaign materials and activities
Lesotho
1998
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. The Lesotho National Assembly Elections. 23 May 1998. The
Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group (online)
Notes
(Incumbency coding disregards interim prime minister)
4. Voter register, 0: 25% non registration. The registration exercise appears to have been
undertaken in good faith.
6. Campaign process, -22: to a) unsubstantiated allegations of use of state resources and
financial disparities and b) short term nature of the observer mission. The peacefulness of the
process was stressed.
NB that the 1985 ‘election’ is not coded here as although one was called and prepared for, after the
opposition withdrew the sole competing party were declared elected unopposed without an
election actually being held.
http://africanelections.tripod.com/ls.html#1985_National_Assembly_Election
2007
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team Lesotho Parliamentary
Elections held on 17 February 2007 (online)
United Nations Development Program. 13 March 2007. Lesotho’s General Elections of 17th
February 2007 free and fair (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: notwithstanding snap elections as the report judged that the commission dealt with
the short time frame adequately
6. Campaign process, 1: on the strength of the agreed opinion of observers as by UNDP.
2012
Sources
Commonwealth Observer Group: Lesotho 2012 Parliamentary Elections – Interim Statement
Preliminary Statement of the African Union Electoral Observer Mission to the 26 May, 2012
National Assembly Elections in the Kingdom of Lesotho
EISA Election Observer Mission to the Lesotho Parliamentary Elections of 26 May 2012
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: ‘The integrity of the current voter register remains a concern to us. Despite
the laudable efforts of the IEC to produce a clean and reliable register, more work needs to be
done to improve it prior to the next election.’ (COG)
6. Campaign process, 1: ‘the campaign was, on the whole, conducted peacefully, in spite of some
minor incidents of intolerance and violence between supporters of some political Parties’ (AU) –
coded as 1 in line with our guidelines concerning isolated clashes of ambiguous nature between
opposing factions
7. Media access, 0: bias in state media
8. Voting process, 0: both COG and EISA raise concerns that the secrecy of the ballot was not
assured. Otherwise the voting is assessed positively.
Liberia
1975
Sources
Notes
Incumbent elected unopposed, figures not available
1985
Sources
Innes, Michael. ‘Enemies of the Revolution: Radio, Propaganda, and National Development in
Samuel Doe’s Liberia, 1980-1989’ Paper presented to the Montreal Institute for Genocide and
Human Rights Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, 29 November 2002
The Fund for Free Expression: ‘Best friends: Violations of human rights in Liberia, America’s
closest ally’ 1986
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
5. Ballot access, 0: UPP and their leader Matthews were banned
6. and 7. Campaign process and media, 0: ‘Decree 88A gave security forces the power to “arrest
and detain any person found spreading rumours, lies, and misinformation against any
government official or individual either by word of mouth, writing or by public broadcast.” Doe
wielded 88A like a hammer of the Gods, bludgeoning his opponents into submission with it
during the run-up to the 1985 election. Editors and other political enemies were harassed,
jailed, or worse, and newspapers were shut down or their facilities burned to the ground.’
8. Voting process, 0: multiple voting and violations of secrecy (nb day described as running
relatively smoothly overall)
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘voters in numerous villages were forced to state their preferences in the
presence of soldiers’ – we treated this as the presence of armed personnel in the polling station
10. Counting process, 0: when the opposition began winning, the infiltration of the opposition
was alleged, and a new opposition-free ‘special panel’ was set up; ballot boxes disappeared and
some burnt remains were found.
1997
Sources
The Carter Center. Observing the 1997 Special Elections Process in Liberia. (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections were not held regularly
4. Voter register, 0: ‘not fully completed’
5. Ballot access, 0: Taylor won over 75% of the votes
6. Campaign process, 0: violence
7. Media access, 0: press not free
8. Voting process, 1: We have taken the report at its word in stating that only ‘minor
irregularities’ occurred, but insufficient detail has led us to code data confidence as 3. Also US
dep rating as ‘free and transparent’
2005
Sources
Observing presidential and legislative elections in Liberia. Final Report on the International
Observation Delegations Sponsored by the National Democratic Institute and The Carter Center.
October – November2 005. (online)
International Republican Institute. Republic of Liberia National Elections. October 11, 2005.
November 8, 2005. Election Observation Mission Final Report. (online)
EU Election Observation Mission Liberia 2005. Final Report on the Presidential and Legislative
Elections (online)
Notes
Term limit has been coded as 1 as the President of the interim government was barred from
running as part of the peace deal.
1. Legal framework, 0: elections were not held regularly
4. Voter register, 1: ‘It is estimated that approximately 10% of the population in Liberia had not
registered’ (EU), below our 20% threshold, and positive attitude of stakeholders.
6. Campaign process, 1: Allegations of the use of state resources, neither large nor substantiated,
appear to be aimed at parties competing for the concurrent legislative elections rather than
presidential.
7. Media access, 0: imbalance on state radio
8. Voting process, 1: There were some concerns in the first round about excessive assistance to
voters who requested help. However, voter assistance is an ambiguous issue and as steps to
correct this were uniformly observed in the second round we decided to interpret the
assistance as in good faith.
2011
Sources
Carter Center: National Elections in Liberia, Fall 2011. Final Report
EISA Election Observer Mission to the Liberia: Presidential, Senate and House of
Representatives Elections, 11 October 2011. Interim Statement
Notes
(3 by assumption)
1. Legal framework, 1: all citizens may vote, but nb racial requirements on citizenship, see
Carter Center.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘several minor attacks on candidates’ property’, abuse of state
resources, denial of opposition access to public facilities for campaign events
8. Voting process and 10. Counting process, 1, notwithstanding opposition challenges of fraud
(Observer rating, -22: Carter Centre did not give one, EISA was not based on the full election)
Luxembourg
All years sourced from IPU Parline and US Department of State Country Report on Human
Rights Practices. Until 2000, also Keesings contemporary archives
1979, 1984, 1989,1994, 1999, 2004, 2009: clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Macedonia
2008
Sources
FormerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Early Parliamentary Elections, 1 June 2008.
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
3 assumed
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Numerous violent incidents’, intimidation, blurring of state and
governing party
7. Media access, 0: public media bias
Observer rating 0: ‘As a whole, the early 2008 parliamentary elections did not meet key OSCE
commitments’
8. Voting process, 0: ballot box stuffing, violence and intimidation. Subsequent re-runs were
still not problem free eg widespread family voting
9. Role of officials, 0: unauthorised persons
10. Counting process, 0: ballot box stuffing and failures to reconcile. Reruns still not problem
free.
2011
Sources
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Early Parliamentary Elections, 5 June 2011.
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘certain provisions were significantly amended two months before the
elections and without opposition support’
2. EMBs, 1: partisanship on the part of individual members is noted, but as a whole ‘The SEC
operated in a largely collegial, efficient, and transparent manner’
3 assumed
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Concerns about the quality and accuracy of the voter lists were voiced by
many
OSCE/ODIHR EOM interlocutors and are longstanding. With a population of 2,052,722, it is
widely considered that voter lists are inflated.’
6. Campaign process, -22: allegations of intimidation not substantiated, and references to the
blurring of the boundaries between state and party are not clarified
7. Media access, 0: ‘OSCE/ODIHR EOM media monitoring revealed that the quantity and content
of campaign coverage by the public television broadcaster significantly favoured the
governing parties’
8. Voting process, 0: Group voting observed 15%. Otherwise good.
Madagascar
1982
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1982
EISA. Madagascar election archive. http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/madelectarchive.htm
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘From 1975 until 1990 no parties or political groups were permitted
except those affiliated to the National Front for the Defense of the Revolution’ (EISA)
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75%
1989
Sources
EISA. Madagascar election archive. http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/madelectarchive.htm
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1989
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘From 1975 until 1990 no parties or political groups were permitted
except those affiliated to the National Front for the Defense of the Revolution’ (EISA)
7. Media, 0: freedom restricted, bias in state owned media
8. Voting process, 0: widespread claims of fraud, 42 ‘voter irregularities’ were upheld by the
court and others dismissed on technical grounds eg incorrect filing of complaint
2006
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006
EISA Election Observer Mission Report
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘A large number of political parties, CSOs and the donor community believed that the
Mira is subject to undue political influence, which compromises its independence, legitimacy
and credibility.’ (EISA)
3. Electoral rights, 0: see 4.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘While acclaiming the positive move undertaken by the Mira in
computerising
the voters’ roll, the EISA mission, however, observed a high number of omissions from the
voters’ roll and errors in ID cards, which, as a result, disenfranchised a significant number of
potential voters.
5. Ballot access, 0: one major opponent rejected on a technicality regarding residence – but his
return to Madagascar had been obstructed by the government.
6. Campaign process, 0: incumbent had financial advantage (which was gained from private
sources)
7. Media access, 0: press not free (Nb that opposition access to media during the election WAS
secured) (Also, EISA report described media as generally free)
Malawi
1994
Sources
Cammack. ‘The democratic transition in Malawi: from single-party rule to a multi-party state’
in Daniel, Southall and Szeftel. ‘Voting for democracy: Watershed elections in contemporary
Anglophone Africa’. Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd (24 Dec 1999)
van Dijk, R: ‘Secret Worlds in Malawi’ in Abbink and Hesseling, Election Observation and
Democratisation. Palgrave Macmillan, January 2000.
Commonwealth Secretariat. ‘The Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Malawi: The
report of the Commonwealth observer group’.
Malawi: Campaigning for MultiParty Elections (1993-1994). Extracted from: "Malawi" IN
Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa (2002), edited by Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima and
David Pottie, EISA, 129-131. (online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 1: registration was approximated at 80%, which reaches our threshold. The
implication is that the shortfall is mainly due to apathy on the part of qualified citizens.
6. Campaign process, 0: attack of opposition leaders, opposition meeting barred by chiefs and
headmen, bribery
7. Media access, 1: Media guidelines for impartiality established for MBC and ‘by and large,
followed’, Cammack (notwithstanding that Cammack also notes some use of news to display
more of incumbent:, scale not clear, and the Commonwealth report mentions that coverage was
‘patchy’, it seems that on the whole this was an acceptably balanced media campaign)
8. Voting process, 1: van Dijk, Cammack and report all agree on the reliability of the voting day.
Two irregularities noted were ruled to require a repeat vote, which was duly held.
10. Counting process, 1: see 8.
1999
Sources
van Dijk, R: ‘Secret Worlds in Malawi’, in Abbink and Hesseling, Election Observation and
Democratisation’. Palgrave Macmillan, January 2000.
Cammack. ‘The democratic transition in Malawi: from single-party rule to a multi-party state’
in Daniel, Southall and Szeftel. ‘Voting for democracy: Watershed elections in contemporary
Anglophone Africa’ Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd (24 Dec 1999)
Malawi: Summary of the ECF Report on the 1999 Elections http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/mal1999ecf.htm
Malawi: 1999 Elections (1998-1999). Extracted from: "Malawi" IN Compendium of Elections in
Southern Africa (2002), edited by Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima and David Pottie, EISA, 133-136.
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/mal1999bg2.htm
With regard to the legal framework:
Constitution (online)
Malawi: electoral System http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/mal4.htm#fn14
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: sources concur that the committee was politically biased. Members had been
replaced 8 months before the poll.
3.Electoral rights, 0: see 4
4. Voter register, 0: the registration process was mismanaged and over 100,000 eligible voters
were not registered by closure
5. Ballot access; 1: this has been presumed given the absence of contrary evidence in an
extensive discussion of those candidates whose candidacy had a rough road to acceptance
(given in EISA: Lodge, Kadima and Pottie). This detailed account ends with all candidates
discussed being registered.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The 1999 electoral campaign was also marred by many reports of
violence and intimidation. In addition to anti-UDF violence in the north, Chakuamba and his
supporters were attacked in areas of UDF support.’ (EISA: Lodge, Kadima and Pottie )
7. Media access, 0: vonDoepp notes the bias toward the incumbent in the media
8. Voting process, 1: ‘most observers acknowledged that the general conduct of the elections on
voting day was relatively smooth’ ( EISA: Lodge, Kadima and Pottie).
9. Role of officials, 1: dedication of officials is complemented in EISA summary
10. Counting process, 1: see 8.
2004
Sources
EU Election Observation Mission Malawi 2004 3
Final Report on the Presidential & Parliamentary Elections
Notes
2. EMB, -22: serious flaws in its activity are raised but it is not clear whether this was in breach
of any of the relevant subpoints, ie accountability to the law or impartiality
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘different stations used different procedures for deciding whether a person
should be allowed to vote’ in the event of nonregistration, violating b
4. Voter register, 0: ‘people being brought in from outside the district, under age registration,
people registering twice, inconsistent processing of transfer applications, and purchase of
registration certificates by local politicians’.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘there was widespread and overt distribution of money to voters and
abuse of state resources by the ruling party in flagrant breach of international standards for
democratic elections. In some areas, the UDF also failed to follow the formal application
procedure for the holding of rallies. The EU EOM received credible reports of intimidation by
the Young Democrats (UDF), and campaign obstruction of opposition and independent
candidates by traditional chiefs.’
7. Media access, 0: ‘the state controlled electronic media showed substantial bias in favour of the
ruling coalition’ and ‘a number of journalists were detained by police and one radio station was
closed for more than a week by police without official authorisation’
9. Role of officials, 0: police engagement
10. Counting process, 0: ‘the tabulation of results seriously lacked transparency to the extent
that it is not possible to have full confidence in the accuracy of the results of the elections.’
2009
Sources
European Union Election Observation Mission. Final Report. Malawi 2009 (online)
Notes
4. Voter register, -22: Errors in the original meant that a last minute replacement was used and
there was not time to verify it.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘use of state resources for campaign purposes and a lack of a level
playing field for campaigning’
7. Media access, 0:‘the editorial policy of state owned broadcasters that excluded opposition
parties’
Malaysia
1978
Sources
US Department of State country report on human rights 1979 (sic) – Malaysia
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: Public rallies prohibited
1982
Sources
Mauzy, Diane K. ‘The 1982 General Elections in Malaysia: A Mandate for Change?’ Asian Survey,
Vol. 23, No. 4 (Apr., 1983), pp. 497-517
US Department of State country report on human rights 1982 - Malaysia
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: Public rallies prohibited, finance of Front far exceeded opposition
7. Media access, 0: press not free
1986
Sources
US Department of State country report on human rights 1986 – Malaysia
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: gerrymandering
7. Media access, 0: restrictions on freedom of the press
1990
Sources
US Department of State country report on human rights 1990 – Malaysia
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: Gerrymandering, see Grace in 2004 sources
4. Voter register, 0: ‘irregularities’, ‘problems’ (observers, cited in US dep of state)
7. Media access, 0: unequal opposition access to the media
9. Role of officials, 1: criteria (a) assumed from the coding of 8 and 10 and the description by
observers of the elections as ‘properly and impartially carried out’. International and domestic
observers present.
1995
Sources
US Department of State country report on human rights 1995 - Malaysia
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: Gerrymandering, see Grace in 2004 sources
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘In practice, however, it is very difficult for opposition parties to
compete on equal terms with the governing coalition (which has held power at the national
level since 1957) because of some electoral irregularities and legal restrictions on campaigning,
as well as restrictions on freedom of association and of the press.’ (US dep of state)
7. Media access, 0: see 6
1999
Sources
Malaysia: Final report, General Elections, ANFREL (1999) (Online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: Elections were called with 9 days notice. Also boundaries favour the ruling party.
3. Electoral rights, 0: see 4.
4. Voter register, 0: 680,000 voters who took part in a registration exercise were told that this
exercise could not be completed before the election and so they could not vote
6. Campaign process, 0: permits for rallies etc are at police discretion. While we do not have
details on implementation, the report is concerned that this hampered opposition, and as
requests must be made 14 days in advance and there was only 9 days notice for the election we
presume this was prohibitive.
7. Media access, 0: government controlled television, radio and print media refused to include
any opposition publicity.
8. Voting process, 0: voter impersonation, multiple voting and phantom voting. Scale not clear.
(The necessity of relying on other reports here has led to the DATA CONFIDENCE rating of 3).
9. Role of officials, 0: with one exception, ANFREL observers were not allowed to enter polling
stations – there is no indication that other international observers were treated differently.
10. Counting process, -22. ANFREL observers were not permitted but it is not clear whether the
results could be traced (condition a) by those who were allowed to attend eg party observerers.
2004
Sources
US Department of State country report on human rights 2004 – Malaysia
Grace, Jeremy ‘Malaysia: Malapportioned Districts and Over-Representation of Rural
Communities’ – USAid Delimitation Equity Project (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: Gerrymandering, in addition to opposition allegations of impartiality, which the US
State Department report seems to take seriously. Also, in violation of the criterion of redress,
‘In 2002, Parliament passed an amendment to the electoral law forbidding judicial scrutiny of
voter rolls after the Election Commission has certified them.’
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘Complaints included unregistered names, broken computers, and late
opening of polling stations, all of which prevented some persons from voting.’ These opposition
complaints were thought not to materially affect outcome by observers – we take it from this
that they concur that the events occurred. Lack of indicator of scale has reduced data
confidence.
4. Voter register, 0: see above. It is not possible to know the scale of unregistered voters, but
this is combined with opposition allegations that the register was also significantly inflated (an
allegation which the US Dep does not evaluate).
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘In practice, opposition parties were unable to compete on equal terms
with the governing coalition (which has held power at the national level since 1957) because of
significant restrictions on campaigning, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and access
to the media.’
7. Media access, 0: see above. Biased government owned media and difficulty for opposition
gaining access to any media
2008
Sources
US Department of State country report on human rights 2008 - Malaysia
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: distrust among stakeholders, and decisions which were shown to be dubious
validate this distrust
4. Voter register, 0: see 8.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Opposition parties were unable to compete on equal terms with the
governing National Front coalition, led by the ethnic Malay UMNO party, which has held power
at the national level since independence in 1957, because of significant restrictions on
campaigning, freedom of assembly and association, and access to the media’ (US dep)
7. Media access, 0: see above
8. Voting process, 0: illegal votes cast - ‘NGOs and opposition party leaders lodged allegations of
illegally registered "phantom" voters, reportedly brought in from other districts to vote in
tightly contested districts; inflated voter rolls; nonregistered voters using fictitious names or the
names of dead voters still listed on the voter rolls; and noncitizens registered to vote’ (US dep)
Maldives
2008
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Maldives Presidential Election. 1st Round of Voting, 8 October
2008 & Run-Off Election 28 October 2008. Reports of the Commonwealth Observer Group
(online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: requirement that presidential candidates be Sunni Muslim
2. EMBs, 0:due to the short time frame allowed for the election which ‘created major challenges
for the Elections Commission in terms of effectively implementing the election procedures and
in respecting such tight legal deadlines.’, violating d
3. Electoral rights, 0: problems with voter cards and registration obstructed equal suffrage (a);
in addition voter education was poor (d).
4. Voter register, 0: people missing and the entry of the deceased/underage/same citizen twice.
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process, 0: some instances of harassment and one attack on a candidate
8. Voting process, -22: suspicions of multiple voting were unverifiable, based mainly on the
commissions estimates of the number of voters vs the figures provided.
9. Role of officials, 1: poor training of officials does not seem to have affected the credibility of
the process
Mali
1992
Sources
Richard Sandbrook (1996): Transitions without consolidation: Democratization in six African
cases, Third World Quarterly, 17:1, 69-88
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1992 - Mali
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections had not been held regularly
6. Campaign process, 1: freedom of assembly was preserved, violence was not reported, and
financial questions do not arise as the incumbent did not run
7. Media access, 1: ‘The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press. The
Government controls the only television station, one radio station, and the only daily
newspaper, but these all operate on a semi-independent basis and are open to a wide range of
views, including those critical of the President, the Government, and other politicians... The
parties campaigned freely and had broad access to the state-owned media.’ (US dep of state)
8. Voting process, 1: Speaking of six elections including Mali 1992: ‘On the conduct of the voting,
only the Ghanaian and Tanzanian votes are open to doubt about their overall fairness. This was
the verdict of the various monitoring groups’
1997
Sources
Freedom in the World 2010 (sic)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1997 - Mali
Notes
NB that an earlier election was cancelled and this election was subsequently boycotted by the
opposition, leaving just one challenger.
5. Ballot access, 0: The winner gained 85% of the vote
6. Campaign process, 0: violence. Rallies banned (due to previous rallies turning violent).
8 and 10, 1: “free of evident fraud and manipulation” (US dep)
Observer rating noted in 2010 FIW
2007
Sources
Virginie Baudais, Enrico Sborgi. The presidential and parliamentary elections in Mali, April and
July 2007, Electoral Studies, Volume 27, Issue 4, December 2008, Pages 769-773
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2008 - Mali
Bleck, ‘Mali at the Cross Roads’, 2011 Freedom House, Countries at the Crossroads 2011 - Mali,
10 November 2011 (online)
Bertelsmann Transformation Index: 2010 Mali Country Report (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘The 2008 Diawara report, which was mandated by ATT to evaluate and improve
democratic institutions, recommended removing the partisan leadership of CENI to create a
single independent body capable of both electoral management and vote tallying.’ (Bleck)
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Weaknesses in the electoral list, however, mean that an accurate
assessment of turnout is difficult’ (Baudais and Sborgi); in 2011, ‘Mali's current voter rolls are
based on a census conducted prior to the 2002 presidential election; all adults over the age of
18 were automatically registered to vote.’ (Bleck)
7. Media access, 1: while we do not have information on the state media’s balance, the media’s
freedom is emphasised and we presume parties had access to the media as ‘In terms of content,
the mass media is largely independent of governmental influence.’ (BTI)
8. and 10. Voting and counting, 1: ‘Domestic and international observers characterized both
elections as generally free, fair, and without evident fraud, but there were administrative
irregularities.’ (US dep of state report, above)
Malta: all years sourced from US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights
Practices and Keesings contemporary archives
1981
Sources
United Press International. Jack R. Payton. December 12, 1981. Crucial Maltese election.
Notes
3 4 5 8 9 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
7. Media access, 0: state media bias
1987
Sources
Howe, S. The Maltese General Election of 1987 . Electoral Studies (1987), 6:3, 235-247
Notes
3. Ballot access, 1. Assumed from 97.3% turnout
6, Campaign: 0, violence
2 4 5 9 clean by assumption (see guidelines) others explicit. NB constituency boundaries were
an issue of controversy, but a system of ‘top up seats’ in the event of a party winning the
majority of the vote and a minority of seats ensured that this was not ultimately a problem.
7, -22: allegations of bias
8, -22:US dep notes charges being brought against opposition for ‘having prevented the free
conduct of voting procedures at certain polling stations’.
1992
Sources
The Associated Press. February 24, 1992, Monday, AM cycle. Adami's Nationalists Claim Malta
Election Win
Notes
3. Ballot access, 1: Assumed from 96% turnout.
1996
Sources
Agence France Presse October 26, 1996 26:11 GMT Malta goes to polls
Notes
3, Ballot Access, 1: Assumed from >97% turnout
All else clean by assumption (see guidelines). Lack of violence explicit in AFP article.
1998
Sources
Deutsche Presse-Agentur. New prime minister sworn in Malta after Sant concedes election.
September 6, 1998
Notes
3. Ballot access, 1: Assumed from 96% turnout.
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2003
Sources
Agence France Presse – English. April 12, 2003 Saturday. Turnout 96 percent in Malta election,
polls close
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) – 97% turnout, US dep described as free and fair
2008
Sources
Freedom in the World 2009 (online)
Notes
3. Ballot access, 1: Assumed from 93% turnout in context of turnout consistently over 90% and
over 95% all previous years
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Marshall Islands
2007
Sources
Commission of enquiry into the 2007 General Elections: Final Report (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: the appointment of the Chief Electoral Officer is heavily criticised as the result of
unconstitutional interference
3. Electoral rights, 0: problems occurred which resulted in the disenfranchisement of ‘confined’
voters, outer atoll absentee voters, and hundreds of postal voters
9. Role of officials, 0: incompetence of officials is stressed
10. Counting process, 0: ‘In this election, the CEO sat at his table alone and compiled the results
on a laptop computer. Poll watchers were not allowed to approach the table.’ Violation of b.
Mauritania
1992
Sources
Pazzanita, Antony. ‘Political transition in Mauritania: Problems and prospects’. The Middle East
Journal53. 1 (Winter 1999): 44-58.
Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 – Mauritania (online)
Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 – Mauritania (online) HRW 1992
Keesing contemporary archives
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections had not been held regularly
2. EMBs, 0: as the opposition (fruitlessly) demanded the establishment of a commission in 1997,
we take it that no such commission existed
3. Electoral rights, 0: see 4, and in addition, ‘Even managing to register to vote did not guarantee
receiving permission to vote. Many blacks were denied voting cards’ (HRW)
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Electoral malpractice began with voter registration. A variety of tactics was
used to prevent many blacks and supporters of the opposition from registering’ (HRW)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The government... made full and even extravagant use of the manifold
advantages flowing from the CMSN's incumbency in order to ensure its triumph in the
presidential elections’ Pazzanita, similar sentiment in both HRW reports
7. Media access, 0: freedom of the press restricted
NB that opposition alleged fraud and a European Parliament observer stated that there had
been ‘enormous difficulties for the population to participate’ in the poll
1997
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1997 –
Mauritania
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: opposition demanded the creation of an independent electoral commission and the
government refused
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75%
7. Media access, 0: Although there was criticism aired and the opposition, in response to a
specific demand, were given fair state media coverage, there were restrictions on freedom of the
press.
8. Voting process, 0: ‘The official turnout of 75 percent and winning percentage of 90 percent
were inflated, since many individuals voted more than once.’ (US department of state)
Observer rating, 0: ‘The Association of Human Rights in Mauritania accused the government of
widespread fraud (Keesing)
2007
Sources
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 2007 Mauritanian Election Assessment
Mission Report. May 2007 (online)
Notes
3. Electoral right, 0: ‘However, NDI found that a number of voters were turned away on election
day because the serial number on their duplicate ID card did not match the number inscribed on
the original card, which was recorded on the electoral list. These discrepancies, which are the
sole responsibility of the administrative authorities, caused the unnecessary
disenfranchisement of an undetermined number of registered voters’
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘Presence of security personnel inside polling station’
Data confidence is 3 as observation was for second round only
2009
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission Report – International Francophone Organisation
Notes
Coup leader stood for election and won: Coded as INCSTAND 1 INCWIN 1
2. EMBs, 0: EMB members were replaced as part of negotiations leading up to the elections, new
team lack time and skills to complete update of electoral role in regulated time – violating d.
3.Electoral rights, -22. Voter information is identified as an area that needs improvement,
insufficient detail.
4.Voter Register, -22: Opposition candidates claimed that the electoral role was manipulated in
the incumbent’s favour. Report only investigates certain aspects of electoral role (ie adequate
number of polling stations for voters)
6.Campaign Process, -22: Opposition candidates accused incumbent of using state resources for
campaign purposes, report does not verify.
8. Voting Process, 1: Controversy of ballot papers – opposition claimed many more ballot were
printed than needed (EMB could not confirm exact numbers)
In the absence of any more serious allegations we have note coded this as a violation.
9. Role of officials, 0: The report noted the massive, and sometimes invasive, presence of
security forces. It is unclear whether or not they were inside polling stations, but if invasive it
violates the spirit of this category.
Report notes that polling stations were generally well functioning and for the most part officials
followed procedures well, but expressed concern the party supporters were handing out
scanned ballot papers with voting instructions
10. Counting of Votes, 1: notwithstanding that opposition candidates claimed fraud. Report
notes transparency and rigor of counting process
Mauritius
1976
Sources
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections deferred
8, 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1983
Sources
Notes
Described as ‘free’ and ‘open’ in Bowman, ‘Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the
Indian Ocean’
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) -could not assume 9 (see 2010)
2010
Sources
SADC Electoral Observer Mission (SEOM) to the Republic of Mauritius: Preliminary statement
Electoral Commissions forum of SADC countries: The Observation Statement Submitted to the
Electoral Commission of Mauritius
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: ‘A lot of people may not be able to vote due to the early closure of
registration.’
7. Media access, -22: stakeholders raised concerns about media bias, and no legal framework is
in place to prevent it, but the reports do not investigate these claims
9. Role of officials, 0: no provision for political parties to have observers in the stations
Mexico
1976
Sources
Aguilar Camín, Héctor and Lorenzo Meyer. 1993. In the shadow of the Mexican revolution:
contemporary Mexican history, 1910-1989. Austin: University of Texas Press.
History of the Federal Electoral Institute, on Instituto Federal electoral website:
http://www.ife.org.mx/portal/site/ifev2/menuitem.cdd858023b32d5b7787e6910d08600a0/
#II
PETER EISNER, Associated Press, 5th July 1982
Notes
ONLY ONE CANDIDATE:
1 Legal framework, 0: clergy may not vote (presumed from 82)
2. EMBs, -33: election commission not established until 1990
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75%
10. Counting process, 0: in violation of d, rules for a valid ballot required that a valid vote for the
opposition party included the writing in of their name – they were not permitted a symbol.
Given illiteracy rates this was an obstacle, and one of the reasons the parties withdrew
1982
Sources
History of the Federal Electoral Institute, on Instituto Federal electoral website:
http://www.ife.org.mx/portal/site/ifev2/menuitem.cdd858023b32d5b7787e6910d08600a0/
#II
Middlebrook, Kevin J. 1986. "Political liberalization in an authoritarian regime: the case of
Mexico." Drake, Paul W. and Eduardo Silva. 1986. Elections and democratization in Latin
America, 1980-1985. La Jolla: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, Center for U.S.Mexican Studies, Institute of the Americas, University of California, San Diego. Pages 73-104.
Found via: Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources.
(online)
PETER EISNER, Associated Press, 5th July
Notes
1 Legal framework, 0: clergy may not vote
2. EMBs, -33: election commission not established until 1990
3. EMBs, 1: compulsory voting and considerable efforts to combat absenteeism (see eg
Associated Press)
6 Campaign process,0: reports of death threats against opposition candidates and their families,
in addition to disputed claims about campaign violence
7 Media access, 0: limited ad hoc/largely subtle or self-censorship based restrictions on freedom
of speech
(allegations of fraud)
1988
Sources
History of the Federal Electoral Institute, on Instituto Federal electoral website:
http://www.ife.org.mx/portal/site/ifev2/menuitem.cdd858023b32d5b7787e6910d08600a0/
#II
The 1994 (sic) Mexican elections: a question of credibility. Washington: Washington Office on
Latin America.
Gómez Tagle, Silvia. 1994. "Electoral violence and negotiations, 1988-1991." Harvey, Neil and
Mónica Serrano, eds. 1994. Party politics in ‘an uncommon democracy’: political parties and
elections in Mexico. London: Institute of Latin American Studies. Pages 77-92.
Gándara Terrazas, José Antonio. 1991. "The political future as viewed by the PAN." Butler, Edgar
W. and Jorge A. Bustamante, eds. 1991. Sucesion presidencial: the 1988 Mexican presidential
election. Boulder: Westview Press. Pages 205-210.
Both found via: Lindvall-Larson, UCSD. Latin-American Statistics: A guide to sources.
(online)
United States Department of State country report on human rights practices 1988 – Mexico
Keesings contemporary archive
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: clergy may not vote
2. EMBs, -33: election commission not established until 1990
6. Campaign process, 0: political shootings (v small in number)
7 Media access, -22:free but opposition alleged partisan reporting during election campaign in
state media
8. Voting process, 0: multiple voting, ballot boxes stolen
9. Role of officials, 0: problems for opposition party monitoring in the countryside
10. Counting process, 0: Large numbers of official votes never counted
2000
Sources
International Republican Institute. Mexico. Election Observation Mission Report. July 2, 2000
(online)
Voter turnout data for Mexico http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=157
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: groups voting at special polling stations were disadvantaged by an
underprovision of ballots that could have been antiticipated.
4. Voter register, 1: notwithstanding the missing names, this still puts registration at about 85%,
and ‘all of Mexico’s political parties agree that the integrity of the voter registry is no longer a
concern’
Moldova
2010
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report
Notes
Re the ‘incumbent’ we have coded as standing and winning was previously President, but
constitutional change means he simply moved from one executive office to a new one
(3 by assumption)
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘The system for allocating seats in parliament was changed four months
before the elections and without public consultations, in a way which favours small parties. This
led to the widespread public perception that the change was designed to benefit the parties in
power. While the choice of an election system is a prerogative of a State, this practice was not in
line with the Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters.’ – violating c.
4. Voter register, -22: ‘Currently, however, the compilation of lists is a highly decentralized
process, with no effective way to check systematically for duplicates’
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘There were several isolated instances of election-related threats and
intimidation, but the campaign atmosphere was peaceful overall.’ – in keeping with our
guidelines we have coded 0 for any intimidation
Mongolia
1993, 1997, 2001: Keesings contemporary archives, US department of state country report on
human rights practices
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) – except:
- Legal framework 0, elections not held regularly (1993)
-Voter register, -22: The Asia Foundation. Voter Registration in Mongolia Assessment of Policies
and Practices. A research report. 2009. (online)
- Media access (7) due to allegations in 1993 regarding the restriction of printing materials, and
‘occasional manipulation’ not expanded on in 1997
2005
Keesings contemporary archives
US department of state country report on human rights practices
Global Integrity Scorecard
Notes
2. EMBs could not be assumed due to opposition complaints about composition, reportedly not
supported by observers (keesing)
7, media: explicit
3,5,6,8,9,10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2009: Sources: Global Integrity Scorecard
Notes 8 and 10 assumed from observer description as free and fair
Montenegro
2008
Sources
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Republic of Montenegro, Presidential
Election. 6 April 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: government resources were used; there were also widespread
allegations of vote buying although the report did not confirm these
7. Media access, 0: imbalance in favour of the incumbent in the amount of time allocated by state
television
8. Voting process, 1: notwithstanding family voting in 6% of polling stations
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘unauthorized persons were observed in nearly 9 per cent’ of polling
stations visited.
Morocco
2011
Sources
National Democratic Institute: ‘Final Report on the Moroccan Legislative Elections, November
25th 2011’
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practice 2011 - Morocco
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: it is recommended that the government create an independent commission, from
which we surmise that an adequately independent process did not exist. It is worth noting also
that serious discrepancies in constituency size, an opaque decision making process and
stakeholder concern about the issue may point to gerrymandering.
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘Lack of clear information for voters across regions about the new voter
identification requirements and the location of their polling stations caused the greatest
confusion on election day.’ – see below also - violation of d, scale not clear
4. Voter register, 0: ‘At the end of the extraordinary review, the Ministry of Interior reported the
number of registered voters as 13,475,435—an estimated 67 percent of the eligible population’
and ‘many voters expressed confusion about the process for voter registration.’
6. Campaign process, -22: allegations of vote buying could not be confirmed but were not
dismissed
7. Media access, 0: de facto media freedom was somewhat restricted
Mozambique
1994
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994 Mozambique
Harrison, G. (1996): Democracy in Mozambique: the significance of multi‐party elections,
Review of African Political Economy, 23:67, 19-35
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
4. Voter registration, 1: actual proportion registered not clear. Coded as 1 based on the
following exert from Harrison, notably the phrase ‘vast majority’ – data confidence impacted.
‘However, it is clear that the state, and particularly the National Elections Commission, made
great efforts, despite very limited resources, to register people, set up voting booths, and
generally make it possible for the vast majority to vote. This was most marked in the voter
registration process, which involved distributing documents with a photograph to each citizen
over 18: this eventually meant creating 6,148,842 voter's cards’
7. Media access, 0: bias in state controlled media
2004
Sources
EU Election Observation Mission Mozambique 2004. Final Report on the Presidential &
Parliamentary Elections (online)
Notes
2. EMB, 0: delegation ‘noted that all but one of CNE’s members were from the two main political
parties and that appointments to STAE were frequently made on a political basis. This meant
that the election management arrangements were highly politicised. Further, decisions were
apparently not always made by consensus – resort was made to voting when agreement
between the two sets of party appointees could not be reached. Since the CNE majority was
from Frelimo, decisions that were put to the vote invariably went Frelimo’s way.
3. Electoral rights, 0: problems with the early closure, or occasional non-opening, of polling
stations, and considerable confusion among some voters about where to vote resulted in many
not voting. Not widespread.
4. Voter register, 0:‘STAE acknowledged that the Register contained a number of duplications
and omissions’
6. Campaign process, -22: allegations of violence and intimidation which observers could not
substantiate.
7. Media access, 1: notwithstanding complaints from the leading opposition about state
television, as ‘The various stakeholders that we met prior to deployment were quite satisfied
with the fairness displayed by the media generally’.
2009
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group. Mozambique
National and Provincial Elections. 28 October 2009 (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: violations of the law (subpoint b) regarding transparency measures.
4. Voter registers, 1: notwithstading a mention of voters unable to find themselves on the
register on the day: some of these were on an alternative register, the presentation is anecdotal,
and the registration exercise is positively assessed.
5. Ballot access, 0: the incumbent got 75.1% of the vote. Also: ‘Nine Presidential nominees
submitted applications for candidature, of which three were approved by the Constitutional
Council. The Election Law allows for rejected nominees to be given five days to rectify their
application, and resubmit. Affected parties claimed that the Constitutional Council did not
afford the rejected nominees this opportunity, as stipulated by the law.’
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘For instance there were reports of some violent clashes between party
supporters, damaging of party premises or disruption of rallies by groups of supporters. It was
reported by other observer groups and media that state resources were used by FRELIMO in the
conduct of its campaign.’
Myanmar
1990
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1990 - Burma
Notes
NB results of election ignored by military junta
1. Legal framework, 0: first multiparty elections in 30 years
5. Ballot access, 0: Aung San Suu Kyi banned, others effectively barred through arrest
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘harassment and arrest of opposition leaders and tight campaign
restrictions’ (US dep of state)
7. Media access, 0: restrictions on media freedom
8. Voting process, 1: ‘Several accounts have attested that the procedures employed by the
regime for voting and counting the ballots were free and fair’. (US dep of state)
10. Counting process, 1: see 8
2010
Sources
Thai Action Committee for Democracy in Burma: Burma Election 2010:
An Election of Generals. Election Summary Report, Burma Parliamentary & Local Assembly
Elections November 2010
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Spring 2010’s election laws included ‘a seemingly arbitrary rule that
eliminated National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming
president’ (indirectly)
2. EMBS, 0: UEC failed to display impartiality in any of its actions and is repeatedly treated as
associated with UDSP throughout the report.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘errors such as deceased family members being left on the voting roll or
instances where villagers found out only on Election Day that they were left off the roll will be
common...were commonplace’
5, 0: See 1.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Neither citizens nor parties had the freedom to debate and campaign
freely. Strict limits on campaigning and speech prevented the kind of national dialogue and
debate so common during the run up to elections in other countries’. ‘...the use of government
resources for political purposes, mostly by the USDP, was common’.
7. Media access, 0: The government’s tight grip on the media also helped foster this
environment where censorship and party propaganda, rather than healthy debate, was the
norm.
8. Voting process, 0: advance votes particularly abused to a great extent, including proxy voting,
ghost voting, coerced voting. Polling booths were not adequate to secure ballot secrecy. Abuse
of proxy voting laws on the day.
9. Role of officials, 0: international election observers were not permitted to watch the process.
Party agents helped voters with voting and placing in the ballot box.
10. Counting process, 0: process could not be tracked and was not all observed by witness; some
were irregularly counted at the township office, and some extra ballots arrived inexplicably and
witnesses were asked to leave the room at these times. Also 100% turnout reported at some
stations.
Namibia
2009
Sources
Pan African Parliament (PAP) Election Observer Mission to the Presidential and National
Assembly Elections in Namibia, November 27 and 28, 2009. Interim Statement. (Online)
Zimbabwe Election Support Network: Report of the Namibia Presidential and National
Assembly Elections 2009 (online)
Preliminary Statement by the Joint NANGOF Trust and SADC-CNGO Observer Mission (JOM) in
respect of the 2009 Namibian Presidential and National Assembly Elections (online)
African Elections Database: ://africanelections.tripod.com/na.html#2009_Presidential_Election
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: this was a controversial issue but concerns about both omissions and
duplications seemed widespread and sincere, and the ECN did not respond transparently.
5. Ballot access, 0: Pohamba received 76.42% of the vote
6. Campaign process, 0: abuse of state resources, intimidation of opposition, violence
7. Media, 0: state media bias in favour of SWAPO
Nauru
2000
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000
Notes
Re Incwin: nb, the incumbent resigned 5 days later
7. Media access, 1: NB that despite lack of government interference, no independent media
exists
8 and 10 assumed from US dep ‘free and fair’
2003
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003
Notes
8 and 10 assumed from US dep ‘free and fair’
2004
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004
Notes
8 and 10 assumed from US dep ‘free and fair’
2007
Sources
Report of the Pacific Islands forum election observer team to Nauru’s 2007 general elections
(online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying
7. Media access, -22: some conflict between report and US dep on issue of press freedom –
implication of the report is that there may be government restriction
2008
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2008
Notes
8 and 10 assumed from US dep ‘free and fair’
2010 (April)
Sources
Report of the Pacific Islands Forum Election Observer Mission to the April 2010 Nauru General
(online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010
http://ipu.org/pdf/publications/chronicle44_en.pdf
Notes
Incwin: deadlock lead to the next election. Coded -33 as no winner.
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying
2010 (Jun)
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010
http://ipu.org/pdf/publications/chronicle44_en.pdf
Notes
2010 (Nov)
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010
Notes
8 and 10 assumed from US dep ‘free and fair’
Nepal
1991
Sources
International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Kingdom of Nepal: Parliamentary Elections.
United States Observer Report. (online)
Notes
We have coded the incumbent as winning as the Prime Minister of the interim government
reportedly led the party into elections. However, it seems that another member of the party
became Prime Minister very shortly after.
3. Ballot access, 0: voters were turned away for not being on the list, violating A. Difficulties of
access with no system for absent voters may be considered to violate B.
4. Vote register, 0: ‘The issue of double entries on Nepal's voters' rolls also was acknowledged
to be a problem by political parties, by a foreign elections expert, and even by the Election
Commission itself.’ (Also nonregistration of 5-10%, but this would not in itself incur a coding of
0).
7. Media access, 0: NB that the informant for this statement in the report is an individual
member of the press.
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘It was reported to observers that in villages where one party was
particularly strong it was difficult for other parties to effectively carry out their pollwatching responsibilities. The impartiality of Chief Election Officers dictates that they ensure
equal access by all party representatives entitled to be present as provided by the election
law.’
1994
Sources
IFES: Technical Election Assessment and Observation of the Mid-Term Parliamentary Election
of the Kingdom of Nepal (online)
US department of state country report 1994 – Nepal
Dahal, D. R. (1999). Reforms in the Electoral Process of Nepal. DR Pandey, Anand Aditya
and Dev Raj Dahal (1999) Comparative Electoral Processes in South Asia. Kathmandu:
Nepal South Asia Centre (NESAC). (online)
Constitution of Nepal (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: considerable discussion of matters of autonomy in finance and staff selection served
mainly to highlight the impartiality of the central commission, including extension of discipline
to more dubious members of staff who flouted electoral law. We do not get the impression that
dependence on these other staff overwhelmed the electoral commission’s independence.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘The first was the inability of the Election Commission to update their voting
lists from their last enumeration held in the fall of 1993. Lists were only partially based on the
election lists of 1991. There was a general reluctance toward deletion of voters once they were
registered.
Consequently, the 1994 voters lists were likely to have included a considerable number of
people who had died over the past three years... Numerous errors resulted, including double
listing and omissions.
Voters who had reached their eighteenth birthday in this interim period were disenfranchised.’
(IFES)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Killings by political groups increased during and after the November 15
general elections’ (US dep) – party workers killed by other partisans. Also vote buying.
7. Media access, 0: restrictions on freedom and state owned bias – both relatively moderate
8. Voting process, 0: ‘Irregularities cited included "proxy voting, underage voting, multiple
voting, sale of votes, and entry of unauthorized persons into the polling stations"’ - IFES
2008
Sources
Observation Mission to Nepal. Final Report on the Constituent Assembly Election 10 April,
2008 (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
2. EMBs, 0: ‘For the campaign period there was also a lack of an adequate appeals process to
challenge the Election Commission’s decisions after rejection of jurisdiction by the Supreme
Court.’
3. Electoral rights, 0:‘Significant numbers of eligible voters among marginalised groups were...
left disenfranchised’ – see point 4.
4. Voter register, 0:‘Although the issuing of citizenship certificates was distinct from the voter
registration process, this distinction was unclear to voters with little access to information and
the confusion prevented them from registering on the voter register. Also, given the fluid
migration patterns of Nepalese society and the number of internally displaced persons, the
permanent residency criteria to qualify for registration excluded sections of this part of the
population from the voter register.’ (violation of c).
6. Campaign process, 0:‘there were numerous incidents of violence involving political parties. In
this respect, a general climate of fear and intimidation prevailed in many parts of the country
during the campaign period.’
7. Media access, 0: ‘at times attacks and threats to journalists continued during the campaign
period undermining the right to freedom of speech’ and ‘the state owned media failed to
provide balance in certain programming that fell short of international standards and
impartiality requirements’
8. Voting process, 1: notwithstanding ‘localised incidents and violence’; the scale is implied to be
small and it is not clear whether this merits rating security as inadequate.
Netherlands, the
2010
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report
Notes
(3 by assumption)
2. EMBs, 0: the complaints which may be heard by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of
the Council of State are limited, and for these there is no appeal. All other relevant complaints
may only be lodged with electoral commissions themselves (there is a decentralised election
administration)
All previous years sourced from IPU Parline, US Department of State Country Report on
Human Rights Practices and Keesings Contemporary Archives. Clean by assumption (see
guidelines). Notes and exceptions:
For all years: 1. Legal framework, 0: You may not vote if you are a parent who has lost custody of
their child
1977: see also US dep report 1980. Notwithstanding extremist South Moluccan attacks shortly
before the election: these were unrelated to election politics.
2002: 6. Campaign process, 0: popular prime ministerial candidate murdered
New Zealand
Sources: US dep state human rights report, Keesings contemporary archive, IPU Parline
1976, 1978, 2005, 2008: Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Nicaragua
1990
Sources
The Carter Center. Observing Nicaragua's Elections, 1989-1990 (online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 1: notwithstanding 11% of the population were not registered, this is within
our threshold
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and intimidation
2011
Sources
EU Election Observation Mission, Nicaragua 2011. Final Report on theGeneral Elections and
Parlacen Elections. (Online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ambiguity over party legality was constantly held as a threat over one
opposition party in particular, negating the guarantee for citizens that they can stand
2. EMBs, 0: ‘lack of transparency and neutrality’... ‘scant independence from the ruling party and
created unequal conditions for competition as well as outright obstructions to the opposition’.
Also, ‘An instance of gerrymandering took place prior to these elections’
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘EU EOM observers reported that in 28% of polling stations observed,
people who should have been allowed to vote in accordance with Article 41 were not allowed to.
This inconsistent application was of concern in a context where citizens have expressed the
view that the right to vote – enabled by being in possession of an identity card ‐ is provided‐for
in a discriminatory manner’
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Nicaraguan elections continue to be held back by the failure to cleanse the
electoral register, which currently lists some 4.3 million entries, of which approximately one
million are considered to be in excess.’
5. Ballot access, 1: notwithstanding the inhibiting threat of disqualification, ‘candidate
nominations for the various elections were regulated by the electoral law without
discrimination or excessive restrictions, but remained vulnerable to the implications of the
regulations on political parties’
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘observation of the campaign found that the FSLN disposed of
significantly more resources than other parties. This imbalance was compounded by the
numerous observed cases in which public resources were used for campaign activities,
primarily by the ruling party’. Some violent clashes.
7. Media access, 0: failure to abide by requirements on free state airtime, FSLN predominance
9. Role of officials, 0: in de facto violation of D, sometimes party representatives reportedly for
the opposition actually appeared to be ruling party supporters, and sometimes representatives
who raised concerns were expelled
10. Counting process, 0: voting could not be tracked, not entirely witnessed. 1/3 assessed
negatively
Niger
1993
Sources
National Democratic Institute for Electoral Affairs. Coordinating observers to the 1993
elections in Niger. (online)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: violence against candidates and party members.
9. Role of officials, 0: some potentially serious failures to follow procedures re identifying voters
1999
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission report – International Francophone Organisation
Notes
5. Ballot access, 1: nb military could not run
2004
Sources
BBC News. Saturday, 20 November, 2004, 03:34 GMT Niger's election goes to run-off (online)
Van Walraven, Klaas. Niger. In Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber, and Klaas Van Walraven,
Africa Yearbook, 2004. Brill.
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 - Niger
Afriquechos.ch : Election présidentielle au Niger : Mahamadou Tanja, le Président sortant,
vainqueur au 1er tour samedi 20 novembre 2004 Saïdou Djibril(AEM) Niamey-Niger (online)
Notes
7. Media access, -22: ‘The government operated multilingual national radio service generally
provided equitable broadcasting time for all political parties; however, opposition parties
complained of inequitable access to media during local and national elections during the year.’
8. Voting process, 1: All sources agree that observers found the elections to be free and fair and
the BBC describes the voting specifically as going ‘smoothly’. It is worth noting that the
observation of ‘some irregularities’ is mentioned but we were not in a position to assess these,
so accepted the observers’ assessment.
10. Counting process, 1: See pt 8, and also the positive comment on the counting specifically
provided by afriquechose.
2011
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission report – International Francophone Organisation Electoral
Observation Mission - EU
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: Decisions cannot be appealed to another body. NB EU report commends ‘rigorous
impartiality’ of main EMB. Difficulties in obtaining information from the EMB were noted.
3. Electoral rights, -22: 40% of voter identity cards weren’t distributed, raising questions about
the accuracy of the electoral role as well as the information available to voters. Unclear whether
these voters were able to vote?
4. Voter registration, 0: Voter register was not up-to-date. Deficiencies in its organisation meant
that the accuracy of the electoral role could not be verified – these deficiencies were accredited
to the weakness of the state bureaucracy. Voter identity cards were distributed without
regulation
8. Voting process, 1. According to the EU report, there were ‘minor irregularities, which did not
affect the final result’. NB concerns were raised by human rights NGO that voters were not
practically limited to one vote per person; one human rights NGO claimed that vote buying
occurred; secrecy of vote was not always guaranteed – proportion of cases not specified
9.Role of Officials, 1: notwithstanding lack of adequate training for officials was highlighted as a
problem. An NGO described officials training as ‘very unsatisfactory’. Officials did not always
respect election procedures but this was not considered to have affected final result
Nigeria
1979
Sources
Kurfi, Amadu. The Nigerian general elections 1959 and 1979 and the aftermath. MacMillan
Nigeria, 1983.
Adamu, Haroun al-Rashid, and Alaba Ogunsanwo. Nigeria: The Making of the Presidential
System: 1979 General Elections. Triumph Publishing Company, 1982.
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections had not been held regularly.
6. Voting process, 0: bribery and intimidation (Kurfi)
8. Voting process, 0: for extensive documentation of fraud, see Ademu. Multiple voting,
impersonation, failure to stamp votes on a large scale leading to invalidation of those votes. The
incidents proved and recorded by the authors are perhaps not of a sufficient scale to warrant
coding 0, but combined with opposition allegations it seems that this is the tip of the iceberg.
9. Role of officials, 0: failure to stamp votes as above
1983
Sources
Ekwe-Ekwe, H. ‘The Nigerian Plight: Shagari to Buhari’. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Jul.,
1985), pp. 610-625
Hart, Christopher, The Nigerian elections of 1983, Africa, 63:3 (1993) p.397
Nwabueze, B. O. Nigeria’s Presidential constitution 1979-93: the second experiment in
constitutional democracy.
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: federal electoral commission complicit in rigging (Ewke-Ekwe)
3. Electoral rights, 0: some polling centres opened for an inadequate amount of time, or did not
open. (Hart)
4. Voter register, 0: highly implausible numbers point to inflation (Hart, Nwabweze)
6. Campaign process, 0: intimidation of opposition (Ekwe-Ekwe), bribery and intimidation of
voters (Nwabueze)
8. Voting process, 0: illegal voting (Nwabueze)
9. Role of officials, 0: opposition party reps not allowed in collation centres (Hart)
10. Counting process, 0: Rigging (Ekwe-Ekwe, Hart, Nwabueze)
1993
Sources
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections had not been held regularly.
2. EMBS, 0: autonomy compromised by interference and overruling by military
5. Ballot access, 0: complex rules were in place concerning the NEC’s approval of parties,
requiring them to show national character. With more complex rules it is difficult to be sure if
rulings are in line with the law. However, given that only five of nineteen were permitted to
stand, we considered this to be indicative of either manipulation or inappropriate rules.
8. and 10. Voting and counting, 1: sources concur that these aspects were well conducted.
2007
Sources
International Republican Institute. Federal Republic of Nigeria State and National Elections.
April 14 and 21, 2007. Election Observation Mission Final Report. (Online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: the scathing account of their activities suggests they were not impartial or held
accountable
3. Electoral rights, 0: low registration, voters unable to find their polling booth, and absence of
voter education
4. Voter register, 0: less than 50% of the population were registered
6. Campaign process, 0: misuse of state resources and vote buying
7. Media access, 0: state media biased
8. Voting process, 0: lack of secrecy, underage voting, party official interference, group voting,
ballot box stuffing.
9. Role of officials, 0: party official interference with voting
10. Counting process, 0: the process could not be traced and boxes were stuffed
2011
Sources
Final Report: General Elections April 2011. European Union Election Observer Mission
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: tertiary education required to stand
2. EMBs, 0: despite the huge improvement of the appointment of Jega at the head of INEC, we
have coded 0 both for the partisanship of lower level officials which was pervasive, and the
short time frame which constrained INEC’s efforts
4. Voter register, 0: underage voters registered, due to area-specific deliberate efforts to include
non-eligible names. Also omissions. It should be noted that this was in the context of massive
register improvement efforts at the central INEC level, and was a large improvement on 2007.
5. Ballot access, -22: allegations were made at the courts that parties had not upheld the results
of their primaries. If so, this denies eligible citizens –ie those who have won a party primary –
the right to stand. However it is not clear from the report whether these allegations were
credible.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘there were reports of obstructions for opposition parties, such as denial
of venues, and misuse of state resources both at Federal and State level, for example merging
official duties with campaign activities. There were clashes among parties’ supporters and
attacks at campaign events’
7. Media access, 0: ‘The state-owned Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) lacked balance in the
coverage allocated to the candidates and their parties: 80 percent of the coverage devoted to
political actors was given to PDP, five to ACN and CPC each; 75 percent of the direct speech in
the NTA's news was dedicated to the President Jonathan; Buhari received eight, Ribadu and
Shekarau three percent each’
8. Voting process, 0: While the report expresses a positive conclusion with respect to the voting,
we cannot ignore the following: ‘In 17 percent of the sampled polling units, attempts to
influence voters were observed; in 26 percent there were instances of interference by party
agents in the process and in 47 percent the secrecy of vote was not respected... The share of
underage voting remained unchanged at 12 percent, while in a few cases serious malpractices,
such as double voting and ballot snatching were observed.’
9. Role of officials, 0: see 8.
Norway: IPU Parline, US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices,
Keesings contemporary archives. Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Pakistan
1977
Sources
Pakistan Institute of Legislative Democracy and Transparency. Citizens’ Group on Electoral
Progress. Background Paper. A dispassionate analysis of how elections are stolen & the will of
the people is defeated. Reflection on the electoral history of Pakistan (1970 – 2008). January
2008. (online)
M. G. Weinbaum. ‘The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost’. Asian Survey,
Vol. 17, No. 7 (Jul., 1977), pp. 599-618
IPU Parline: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/pakistan_1977_e.pdf
Notes
2. Electoral commission, 0: commission’s independence curtailed, seeWeinbaum
5. Ballot access, 0: PPP over 75%. Also the barring of some candidates. Some opposition in
prison.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Little effort was made to disguise the PPP's use of government vehicles
in the rural areas or its pressuring of civil servants to work for the party’ (Weinbaum)
7. Media access, 0: bias in government media
8. Voting process, 0: multiple voting, ballot box snatching
9. Role of officials, 0: uneven application of safeguards by officials to permit vote fraud
1985
Sources
Pakistan Institute of Legislative Democracy and Transparency. Citizens’ Group on Electoral
Progress. Background Paper. A dispassionate analysis of how elections are stolen & the will of
the people is defeated. Reflection on the electoral history of Pakistan (1970 – 2008). January
2008. (online)
William L. Richter. ‘Pakistan in 1985: Testing Time for the New Order’. Asian Survey, Vol. 26,
No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1985: Part II (Feb., 1986), pp. 207-218
Hasan-Askari Rizvi. ‘The Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan’. Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No.
10 (Oct., 1986), pp. 1067-1081
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘the arrest of several MRD leaders and other restrictions on political
activity’ – Richter. ‘No candidate was allowed to hold public meetings, take out processions, or
use a public address system (subsequently megaphones were allowed)’ - Rizvi
7. Media access, 0: biased government media
8. Voting process, 1: both the US state dep and ‘How Elections are Stolen’, a document dedicated
to documenting rigging in Pakistan, concur that there was no significant interference with the
polls.
10. See 8.
1988
Sources
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Pakistan Elections: Foundation for
Democracy. International Delegation Report. (online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights, -22: confusion over whether the ID card requirement would disenfranchise
voters, which a statistical analysis by the report was unable to settle
4. Voter register, 1: 90% registered and ‘still not perfect’, but as 90% is within our threshold we
have assumed these imperfections are not sufficient to code as 0.
7. Media access, 0: ‘none of the contesting parties were afforded access to the governmentcontrolled television and radio media... some candidates, however, were able to obtain access to
television and radio by virtue of their position as government officials’
1990
Sources
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. International Observer Delegation to the
Pakistan Elections. October 1990 (online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘the removal of legitimately cast ballots, and the disenfranchisement of
voters through violence and false procedural restrictions’
6. Campaign period, 0: ‘incidents of violence were directed against those participating in the
process, one of which resulted in the death of a candidate’.
7. Media access, 0: state coverage was skewed in favour of the IJI. Although the IJI were not in
fact the incumbents, they were the favoured party of the powerful presidency, and so their
position was equivalent.
8. Voting process, 0: security was inadequate, with violence where there was an ‘absence of
authority’. There were also ‘credible reports concerning the kidnapping of polling officials and
party agents, ballot stuffing and the removal of legitimately cast ballots, and the
disenfranchisement of voters through violence and false procedural restrictions’
10. Counting process, 0: the process could not always be tracked; in some constituencies (where
the international observers were not present) party agents were denied access. This violates A.
2008
Sources
EU Election Observation Mission, Pakistan 2008 Final Report. National and Provincial Assembly
Elections – 18 February 2008 (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘The right to stand as a candidate is also breached by the legal
requirement for a bachelor degree or madrassa qualification, which excluded the overwhelming
majority of the population (circa 95%)’
2. EMBs, 0: ‘There was a lack of confidence among election stakeholders in the independence
and efficacy of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)... the ECP lacked transparency in key
areas’
3. Electoral rights, 0: de facto ‘Insufficient measures were taken to meet legal obligations to
enable women to exercise their right to vote’
4. Voter register, 0: ‘riddled with duplications, errors and omissions’
5. Ballot access, -22: Over 5,000 were rejected and court appeals were ongoing at time of
writing. The report does not provide the reasons given.
6. Campaign process, 0: due to abuse of state resources, attacks on party supporters during
campaigns, and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto
7. Media access, 0: ‘bias in the state media in favour of the former ruling parties’, and
restrictions on freedom of speech
8. Vote process, 0: violations of secrecy in 13%, violence and conflict at polling stations and
“bogus votes”.
9. Role of officials, 0: presence of unauthorised persons in polling stations
10. Counting process, 0: the whole process could not be tracked, in violation of A. In addition
suspect results were reported.
Panama
1984
Sources
Scranton, Margaret E. 1991. The Noriega years: U.S.-Panamanian relations, 1981-1990. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Weeks, John. ‘Panama: The roots of current political instability’. Third World Quarterly, 9:3,
763-787. 1987
‘Panama: a country study’ - Federal Research Division. Library of Congress. Edited by Sandra W.
Meditz and Dennis M. Hanratty (Online)
Notes
2 EMBs, 0: we presume that refusing to count votes in elections ruled to be valid (see 10)
violates the requirement that EMBs are constrained by electoral law.
6. Campaign process, 0: use of government funds for campaign
7 Media access, 0: difficulty in getting access to electronic media – 90% owned by
progovernment individuals or groups, who largely refused the opposition airtime.
8 Voting process, 0: ballot boxes seized by the military (see Weeks). This presumably means
ballots were either stuffed or destroyed.
10. Counting process, 0: 60,000 votes were affected by complaints and so, although the
complaints were dismissed by the Electoral Tribunal, they were not counted – although
potentially valid. The margin of victory was 1713 votes. The President of the Electoral Tribunal
resigned, believing the opposition to have won. Evidence of fraud from a subsequent analysis
undertaken by Seymour Hersh (cited in Weeks)
1999
Sources
Organization of American States. Report: Electoral Observer Mission to the Republic of Panama.
General elections of May 2, 1999. (Online)
International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Panama General Elections. May 2nd 1999. IFES
Election Observation Final Report (Online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 1: on the strength of the following: ‘Persons from every sector who expressed
an opinion on the issue - press, political parties, and civil society - concurred that the
registration list was well done.’
2009
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission – Organisation of American States
Notes
5. Ballot access, 1: No subpoints violated, but controversy worth noting. Candidates from one
party were rejected by Electoral Tribunal because they did not take part in primary elections, a
legal requirement. Juan Jovane and supporters issued a formal complaint after his candidature
was rejected on the basis that he was not part of a political party (which needs 4% of voters at
last election enrolled as supporters). He described the Panama electoral system as a ‘partyocracy’.
9.Role of Officials, 1. Notwithstanding the following: A single isolated case was recorded where
an armed group entered a polling station. Shots were fired, but no injuries were reported.
Security forces were able to control the situation and voting returned to normal. A candidate
from a minor party claimed that he did not have a representative in the oversight process, due
to the central EMB failing to send official confirmation in times. In all other respects officials are
reported to have carried out their duties effectively.
Papua New Guinea
1977 – Keesings contemporary archives – clean by assumption (see guidelines) – Really might
want to query this and clean by databases
2002
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices - 2002
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘The elections were also marred by a lack of funding for transport and
personnel, as a result of which electoral officials were unable to access remote areas where
about one-fourth of the country's voters live.’ (IPU)
4. Voter register, 0: incomplete electoral roles
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘There elections were so marred by violence, deaths’ (IPU) UNHCR:
‘Voter intimidation… and violence including rape and murder marred the election in some parts
of the country.’
8. Voting process, 0: multiple voting
10. Counting process, 0: stolen ballot boxes
Observer rating, 0 - ‘observers declared them the worst ever. ‘ (IPU)
2007
Sources
Papua New Guinea National Election, June – August 2007. Report of the Commonwealth-Pacific
Islands Forum Election Assessment Team (online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: missing names, notwithstanding disputes over whether or not those citizens
had registered correctly or not, as our criterion does not stipulate who must be at fault
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘In certain places – particularly the Highlands, and most notably in Enga
Province – our Team members were told of both bribery and intimidation playing a strong role
in candidates’ campaign strategies. Such reports are extremely difficult to verify but the
atmosphere and activities in some polling places, and the results of certain counts, lent credence
to the proposition that not all campaigning was necessarily clean. Scrutineers for some
candidates in the Highlands told us they felt powerless in the face of the large-scale bribery and
intimidation practiced by dominant candidates.
At the national level, Transparency International (PNG) and the media raised concerns about
improper use of state funds by candidates and parties.’
8. Voting process, 0: instances of large group voting and disregard for secrecy; one specific
region, the Highlands, saw underage voting and multiple voting, vote buying and intimidation.
This region did not reflect the process in PNG as a whole.
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘Members of our Team often saw police, scrutineers and others assisting
voters or at least watching the provision of assistance with a clear view of the voter marking the
ballot paper’
2012
Sources
Commonwealth Observer Group: Papua New Guinea National Elections 2012 Interim Statement by Edward Natapei, Chairperson of the Commonwealth Observer Group
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: widespread disenfranchisement due to voter roll weaknesses, and other
issues with identification of voters and location of the correct ward.
4. Voter register, 0: omission of eligible voters
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Concerns were raised, however, with the Group about the rise of money
politics in these elections, including widespread reported attempts by candidates to bribe
voters directly, on a scale far greater than ever before’
8. Voting process, 0: in the Highlands, ‘Most of the polling stations we visited did not provide for
the secrecy of the ballot, with voting taking place in public and often being done by polling
officials or even by candidates or scrutinisers on behalf of voters. Our teams also saw multiple
voting, “bloc” voting, and apparently underage voters, in a number of locations.’ ‘We were also
concerned by reports of intimidation of voters by candidates and their supporters at certain
polling locations.’
9. Role of officials, 0: see 8 for inappropriate behaviour of officials
Panama
2009
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009 - Panama
Bertlesmaan Transformation Index (BTI) project - http://www.btiproject.de/laendergutachten/lac/pan/2012/#chap2
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘During the 2009 election campaign some decisions of the electoral management
body (Tribunal Electoral) were influenced by the incumbent government.’
6. Campaign process, 0:
7. Media access, 0: notwithstanding some instances of legal harassment, as these were the
exception and the media was sufficiently free for the purposes of electoral education
8 and 10 by assumption
Paraguay
1989
Sources
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. The 1989 Paraguayan Elections: A
Foundation for Democratic Change (online)
Nohlen, D. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. Vol 2. Oxford University Press 2005
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: President required to be Roman Catholic
3. Electoral rights, 0: cases of nonregistration were treated inconsistently, violating equal access
4. Voter register, 0: register ‘seriously flawed’
6. Campaign process has been coded as 1 on the strength of an emphasis on the improved
human rights situation and freedom to campaign. However it should be noted that information
here was scarce, and furthermore that the short timeframe of the elections when parties had
only just been legalised compromised the spirit of a fair campaign
8. Voting process has been coded as 0 due to multiple voting and violations of ballot secrecy
1993
Sources
The Carter Center of Emory University. Latin American and Caribbean Program. The May 9,
1993 Elections in Paraguay. International Observer Delegation of The Council of Freely Elected
Heads of Government and The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (online)
Needler, Martin C., Doubts About Paraguay's Election , Contemporary Review, 263:1532
(1993:Sept.) p.146
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: 3. manipulation of access to ballots alleged by Needle.
6. Campaign process has been coded as 1 on the strength of a note that the candidate’s
campaigns had been unencumbered and they were free to debate the most contentious issues,
and later references to the positive campaign environment. The lack of detail here, as well as in
other aspects, impacts data confidence.
8 and 10, -22. Positive in the report. Needle disputes this claiming that the observers simply
missed the real level of intimidation of voters.
1998
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 - Paraguay
Polity IV Country Report 2010: Paraguay
Agence France Presse. May 12, 1998. Fraud charges in Paraguay vote fail to mar apparent
ruling party win
Notes
Ballot access, 0: Violation of b – ‘It is widely recognized that General Oviedo manipulated the
primary process in 1992 that resulted in Carlos Wasmosy becoming the presidential candidate
of the ruling Colorado Party’ (Polity IV)
8 and 10 by assumption from US dep note that observers saw as free and fair. Note some fraud
allegations, but those that were raised proved minor enough for losing party, initially objecting,
to concede (see AFP). Data confidence impacted.
2008
Sources
Final Report of the Electoral Observation Mission of the Organisation of American States (OAS)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: The main EMB was deemed incapable of acting as an effective referee.
6. Campaign process, 0: The observation mission received complaints about the use of state
resources. Senior public servants were observed participating in campaigning activities.
7. Media access, -22. Some concerns were raised about access to media and breaches of
electoral laws, firstly, limiting the amount of campaign material that can be aired by any one
party, and secondly, connecting certain parties to overseas governments (in conflict with
national law). Not enough information to establish breach of subpoints.
8. Voting Process, 0: There were some (unspecified number) cases of voter intimidation and
pressure that compromised the freedom and secrecy of the vote.
9. Role of officials, 0: Officials in polling booths were inadequately trained, according to the
report. There were some cases (number unspecified) of campaigning within polling booths.
Peru
1990
Sources
Radu, Michael. 1990. The 1990 Peruvian elections. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic &
International Studies. Three volumes ("Pre-election analysis," "Looking toward the second round,"
"Post-election analysis.")
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1990 – Peru
Vargas Llosa Leads, but Faces a Runoff. New York Times, James Brook, 9th April.
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘On Saturday, interstate bus and train service from Lima was suspended for
security reasons, leaving thousands of people unable to return to their hometowns to vote. Voting in
Peru is obligatory and failure to do so carries a $25 fine, the equivalent of a week's salary for many
here.’ (NYTimes)
6. Campaign process, 0: the group Sendero Luminoso (among others) sought to intimidate voters and
electoral officials. Candidates killed by the group were congressional, but the intention to disrupt the
electoral process through intimidation and fear extended to the Presidential.
8,9, 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1995
Sources
International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Peru April, 1995 Election Assessment (online)
Nohlen, D. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. Vol 2. Oxford University Press 2005
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: violation of b, ‘More than 3,000,000 citizens were required to vote in the
so-called "red emergency zones" which are considered under the control of the Armed Forces
and/or the police. Hence, during election day, absenteeism was relatively higher in these zones
compared to the rest of the country’
4. Voter register, -22: a lack of transparency made it impossible to assess.
10. Counting process, 1: ‘irregularities’ were noted but the report concludes that there is no evidence
that this resulted from manipulation by the authorities.
All other -22s are due to the restricted nature of the report.
2001
Sources
European Union Elections Observation Mission. Final Report. Peru – General Elections 2001
(online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘Major deficiencies are found with regards to the electoral roll and the issue of
identification papers in remote peasant and native communities. Nor is the appropriate electoral
training provided in terms they can understand and benefit from. Polling Stations are not set up in a
great number of far-removed communities and there are some to which even the electoral
administration has no access.’
4. Voter register, 0: see 3.
2006
Sources
Electoral Observation Report, OAS
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: There were cases (unspecified number) of intimidation in rural
districts, by party supporters with the aim of coercing citizens to vote for a particular party.
Otherwise, the report generally praises the campaign process.
2011
Sources
European Union Election Observation Mission: Final Report: Second Round of the Presidential
Election, June 2011
United States Department of State Report on Country Human Rights Practices 2011 - Peru
Notes
8 and 10 from “free and fair” with only “minor irregularities” (US dep) and full report of second
round.
Philippines
1981
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1981 - Philippines
The Globe and Mail, June 17th 1981, Bryan Johnson. ‘'A colossal farce' Marcos repulses poll
boycott’.
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
4. Voter register, 0: the US state dep notes that among the opposition’s demands which were not
met, contributing to the boycott, were new voter registration. We take it therefore that a recent
registration exercise had not been conducted. Data confidence impacted.
5. Ballot access, 0: winner over 75% of the vote
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘‘The final three days of the campaign were marred by violence in which
at least 40 people were killed, including four boycott supporters’.
7. Media access, 0: parties advocating a boycott were obstructed in gaining media access. Some
governmental pressure on media despite lifting of legal restrictions.
1986
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1986
Villegas, B. The Philippines in 1986: Democratic Reconstruction in the Post-Marcos Era. Asian
Survey, Vol. 27, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1986: Part II (Feb., 1987), pp. 194-205
Notes
NB that after fraud and violence, the incumbent was announced the winner: however, these
results were later nullified, and incumbent Marco fled the country. This nullification led to the
coding of ‘0’ for incwin seen here.
1 – relevant laws are constitution of 1993 and law 883 - not clear
3. Electoral rights, 0: thousands of voters obstructed from voting
6. Campaign process, 0: violence
8 and 10: 0, both described as marred by fraud but no details. 9 cannot be true given 8 and 10.
1992
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1992 - Philippines
Tornquist, Olle (1993): Democratic ‘empowerment’ and democratisation of politics: Radical
popular movements and the May 1992 Philippine elections, Third World. Quarterly, 14:3, 485515
Timberman, David G. ‘The Philippines at the Polls’. Journal of Democracy, Volume 3, Number 4,
October 1992, pp. 110-124
Philippines constitution (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: although the difficulty of ensuring non partisanship at lower levels of the structure is
noted, the central commission appears to have been proactive in rectifying this situation, and
itself impartial – therefore b,c, d met, no complaints about a. (Timberman)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘credible reports’ of ‘vote buying’ (US dep of state, see also Tornquist
and Timberman)
7. Media access, 1: threats against journalists came from extra-government sources with no
direct relation to campaign issues (state media unknown – but ‘the media as a whole did not
favor any one presidential candidate’ – Timberman)
8. Voting process, 0: ‘In some places, however, voters arrived to find that they were not on the
voter list or that someone had already voted for them. There also were numerous reports of
"flying" (multiple) voters and vote buying.’ Timberman
10. Counting process, 0: ‘credible reports’ of ‘tampering with electoral tallies’ (US dep)
1998
Sources
US department of state country report 1998
Binghamton University, Elections Results Archive
http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/elections/phi98pres.html
Montinola, Gabriela R. ‘The Philippines in 1998: Opportunity amid Crisis’. Asian Survey, Vol. 39,
No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1998 (Jan. - Feb., 1999), pp. 64-71
Choi, Jungug. ‘PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACIES OLD AND NEW. Elections, Term Limits, and Party
Systems’ (Used for info on term limits). Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May/June 2001), pp. 488501
Case, William. ‘The Philippine Election in 1998: A Question of Quality’ Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No.
3 (May - Jun., 1999), pp. 468-485
Philippines constitution (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: Choi’s documentation of the EMB’s behaviour lends support to his conclusion that
the board were partisan
3. Electoral rights, 0: the constitution requires arrangements for absentee voting affecting 10%
of the electorate, and this constitutional requirement has not been met.
4. Voter register, 0: For example, the COMELEC refused to reorganize old voter lists or issue
identification cards, thus leaving the door open for so-called "flying voters" (i.e., those who vote
more than once).’ – (Choi)
6. Campaign process, 0: Violence and vote buying.
8. Voting process, 0 – ‘stuffing ballot boxes before polling stations were opened, circulating socalled "flying voters" through multiple precincts, vote-buying (or more commonly, paying voters
not to vote), lanzadera (paying a voter to submit an already completed ballot, then return with
the empty ballot so that it can be filled out and submitted by the next voter)’ (Case)
10. Counting process, 0 – notwithstanding Montinola’s comment that fears of ‘widespread’ fraud
did not materialise, and the evaluation of Case that cheating has gone down, we nonetheless
code as 0 as these judgements are relative, and we must take in to account the instances of
ballot box stuffing and ‘dagdas-bawa (shaving votes from one candidate's totals, then using
them to pad another's, thus leaving the total return unchanged)’ (Case).
2010
Sources
The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL foundation): Final Report of the International
Elections Observation Mission
Carter Center Limited Mission to the May 2010 Elections in the Philippines: Final Report
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: ‘NAMFREL estimates that there may be as many as 3 million multiple
registrants... Additionally, random inspections by NAMFREL’s Bantay ng Bayan teams showed
that CVLs in different parts of the country contained flaws including voters with identical
names, names of deceased persons, and towns with unusually large numbers of centenarian
voters.’
NB this is in the context of ongoing efforts and improvements which are applauded.
5. Ballot access, 1: the registration of one party was resisted on ‘moral’ grounds, but the
supreme court ruled in their favour
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and intimidation
8. Voter secrecy, 0: voters were handed a ‘voter secrecy’ folder that they could use to shield
their vote, but this was often used ineffectually or abandoned. This amounts to making ballot
secrecy optional. In addition, where machines rejected the ballot, it could not be effectively
shielded on its return and election officials would often look at ballots to determine the cause of
the rejection. There is no indication in the report that this failure to secure secrecy was abused.
(ANFREL take the more damning view that securing one’s right to privacy was ‘virtually
impossible’ in the crowded rooms)
9. Role of officials, 0: campaign material handed out within premises
Poland
1976
Sources
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: legal restrictions on opposition
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
1980
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1980 – Poland
Notes
7. Media access, 0: press not free
1. Legal framework, 0: legal restrictions on opposition
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
1985
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1985 – Poland
Notes
7. Media access, 0: press not free
1. Legal framework, 0: legal restrictions on opposition
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
1989
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1989 – Poland
Paul Lewis. Non-competitive elections and regime change: Poland 1989. Parliamentary Affairs
(1990) 43 (1): 90-107
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Right of Solidarity to run against approved Front restricted to 35% of
seats
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process, 0: bugging, subversion by state officials, intimidation
1991
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1991 – Poland
Notes
1993
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1993 – Poland
1992 constitution (online)
Notes
1997
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1997 – Poland
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Poland
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: see issues raised 2007 and 2011
10 assumed from free and fair (2001). Could not assume 8 in light of later elections
2001
Sources
F. Millard, Elections in Poland 2001: electoral manipulation and party upheaval, Communist and
Post-Communist Studies, Volume 36, Issue 1, March 2003, Pages 69
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Poland
Notes
10 assumed from free and fair. Could not assume 8 in light of later elections
For affirmation of peaceful campaign and critical media, see Millard. However US dep report
accusations of state media bias. -22.
2005
Sources
Global integrity scorecard. Poland: Integrity Indicators Scorecard, Assessment 2008. (online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 – Poland
Notes
10 assumed from free and fair. Could not assume 8 in light of later elections
2007
Sources
Republic of Poland. Pre-term Parliamentary Elections, 21 October 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Election
Assessment Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidacy requirement violating b: ‘Each candidate born before 1 August
1972 is required to submit a statement disclosing information on his or her past collaboration
with the communist secret services. Under the Lustration Act, a person loses his or her passive
electoral right for ten years if there is a valid court ruling finding that the statement was false.’
Rule unconstitutional but not yet changed.
2. EMBs, 1: a complex appeals structure whereby CEC decisions may be appealed to the higher
NEC, and some but not all of these may be taken to court. Although some of the complaints
structure is thus internal to the commission, there appears to be ample opportunity for review,
and we have coded this ambiguous case as 1.
7. Media access, 0: ‘Media monitoring by the OSCE/ODIHR EAM for the last two weeks of the
campaign showed a lack of qualitative balance by public television in the coverage of the three
main contestants’
8. Voting process, 0: ‘Family, group and open voting was witnessed by the OSCE/ODIHR EAM in
every polling station visited.’
2011
Sources
Republic of Poland. Parliamentary Elections, 9 October 2011. OSCE/ODIHR Election
Assessment Mission Report (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: people with mental disabilities and partially incapacitated people may
not vote
2. EMBs, 0: a complex appeals structure whereby CEC decisions may be appealed to the higher
NEC, and some but not all of these may be taken to court. Although some of the complaints
structure is thus internal to the commission, there appears to be ample opportunity for review,
and we have coded this ambiguous case as 1.
5. Ballot access, 1: notwithstanding a technical controversy over one party’s registration for
nationwide status, which does not appear to have affected their nomination of candidates
8. Voting process, 0: ‘The voting process was conducted in an orderly and peaceful manner in
the polling stations visited by the OSCE/ODIHR EAM. Nevertheless, in all visited polling stations,
most voters marked their ballots outside the voting booths in full view of others… Polling
stations frequently had tables with pens set up outside the booths, which appeared to
encourage open voting. The OSCE/ODIHR EAM also noticed on a few occasions that voters were
not forbidden from entering the polling booth with another person of their family’
Portugal
1976
Sources
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘in the only major violent incident during the campaign one man was
killed and 13 injured in clashes in Evora when extreme left-wing demonstrators attacked
General Eanes’s car and shots were fired by his bodyguard’.
Clean by assumption except media (see guidelines) (3 established separately)
1980 – Keesings contemporary archives - Clean by assumption except media (see guidelines) (3
established separately)
1996
Sources
Keesings contemporary archives
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2001
Sources
Keesings contemporary archives
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2006
Sources
Keesings contemporary archives
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Romania
2009
Sources
Romania. Presidential Election, 22 November and 6 December 2009. OSCE/ODIHR Limited
Election Observation Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
None
Russia
1991
Sources
United states country report on human rights practices 1991 – Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
7. Media access, 0: de facto restrictions on press freedom
2008
Sources
White, Stephen (2011): Elections Russian-Style, Europe-Asia Studies, 63:4, 531-556
Council of Europe: PACE pre-election delegation concerned by limited choice in Russian
Presidential election - http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Press/StopPressView.asp?ID=2008
Council of Europe: Russian Presidential election: for an election to be good it takes a good
process, not just a good election day http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Press/StopPressView.asp?ID=2013
Guardian. Luke Harding. Monday 3 March 2008. Russia election not free or fair, say observers
(online)
The Constitution of the Russian Federation
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: biased staffing
5. Ballot access, 0: PACE noted almost insurmountable difficulties registering as a major
problem
6. Campaign process, 0: abuse of state resources and pressure to participate in United Russia
activity
7. Media access, 0: severe incumbency advantages (White; see guardian for confirmation that
this is intended specifically about the 2008 elections, not only the 2007 duma) – public
demonstrations ‘severely curtailed’
8. Voting process, 0: illegal voters
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘There were even cases in which election observers who had drawn
attention to ballot stuffing were themselves obliged to leave the premises, placed under arrest
and threatened with criminal prosecution’
10. Counting process, 0: ballot box stuffing, other suggestive isolated instances of counting
irregularities
2012
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission: Final Report
Notes
NB Although the incumbent did not run, the candidature of the incumbent Prime Minister Putin
was perceived as a prearranged handover of power.
(5 could not be assumed due to the rejection of 11 candidates)
2. EMBs, 0: biased appointment of chairs
6. Campaign process, 0: state resources used for candidate of the ruling party, participants
attending campaign events under duress
7. Media access, 0: state media disproportionately covered ruling party’s candidate
10. Counting process, 0: ballot stuffing, and procedural irregularities that affected transparency
Rwanda
2003
Sources
European Parliament Committee on Development and Cooperation. Ad-hoc delegation to
observe the presidential election in Rwanda on Monday 25 August 2003. Rapporteurs: Glenys
Kinnock, leader of the Delegation, John Corrie, Johan Van Hecke and Nelly Maes (online)
Notes
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘the best-placed opposition figure was eliminated from the electoral contest
by the invalidation of his candidature before the start of the election campaign. He is currently
in prison’. Also Kagame won 95.05% of the vote
6. Campaign process, 0: arrest of provincial representatives and disappearance of opponents,
obstruction of rallies, one sided resources including state resource abuse, cases of vote buying
7. Media, 0: unequal treatment during news (compliance during official election broadcasts was
maintained)
8. Voting process, 0: ‘cases of irregularities and fraud’ in the voting process, including concerns
that the ballot paper was too transparent to preserve secrecy, suspicions of ballot box stuffing
9. Role of officials, 0: party representatives not adhering to their expected role
10. Counting process, 0: ‘The consolidation of the results did not take place with due
transparency’, violating A.
2010
Sources
Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group
Notes
1. Legal framework I THINK1 BUT CHECK WHAT THE IRREPROACHABLE MORALS AND
PROBITY IS ABOUT.
4. Voter register, 1: no information given to suggest problems, ‘The Voter List is to be updated
annually and the NEC did this’
5. Ballot access, 0: Kagama over 75% of vote. Also, three major parties unable to compete
through arrests and disruption of their registration process – claims and counterclaims made
about justice of this.
7. Media access, 0: two papers were still under suspension during the campaign
9. Role of officials, -22: allegations made that opposition observers were intimidated into
withdrawing, could not substantiate
10. Counting process, 0: instances where the process could not be tracked and witnesses not
present
Sao Tome and Principe
1991
Sources
Constitution (English summary online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Sao Tome and
Principe
Notes
1996
Sources
Constitution (English summary online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Sao Tome and
Principe
Notes
Presidential elections held in June and July were deemed generally free and fair by international
observers and the results were ratified in late August, despite allegations of an unconstitutional
modification of voter lists between the first and second rounds. – US dep
International observers judged the contest to be free and fair. The National Electoral
Commission acknowledged minor discrepancies in the registration process and in voter rolls
while asserting that these were insufficient to call the results into question. After some
controversy, the Supreme Court ratified the results – US dep
2001
Sources
Constitution (English summary online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Sao Tome and
Principe
Notes
On July 29, Fradique de Menezes, supported by the Independent Democratic Alliance (ADI), was
elected President for a 5-year term in an election deemed generally free and fair by
international observers. – US dep
2006
Sources
Constitution (English summary online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Sao Tome and
Principe
Notes
international observers deemed both elections to have been generally free and fair. – US dep
2011
Sources
Constitution (English summary online)
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Sao Tome and
Principe
Freedom in the World, Freedom House
Notes
Foreign observers deemed the highly contested elections credible and fair. (FiW)
‘The 2010 parliamentary elections were free and fair, as were the presidential elections in
2011.’ (FiW)
‘International observers deemed the election generally free and fair.’ US dep
Samoa
1976
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1976 – Samoa
So’o Asofou. ‘Samoa’. The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2001, pp.
246-255
Notes
1. Only the matai could vote
2. EMBs, 0: control of elections by government official, reformed in 2000 for being ‘blatantly
partisan’
3. See 1
1979
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1979 – Samoa
So’o Asofou. ‘Samoa’. The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2001, pp.
246-255
Notes
1. Only the matai could vote
2. EMBs, 0: control of elections by government official, reformed in 2000 for being ‘blatantly
partisan’
3. See 1
1982
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1982 – Samoa
So’o Asofou. ‘Samoa’. The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2001, pp.
246-255
Notes
1. Only the matai could vote
2. EMBs, 0: control of elections by government official, reformed in 2000 for being ‘blatantly
partisan’
3. See 1
8. Voting process, 0: Kolone (former PM) lost his seat due to ‘personation’ –ineligible citizens
voting for absent matai
1985
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1988 – Samoa
So’o Asofou. ‘Samoa’. The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2001, pp.
246-255
Notes
1. Only the matai could vote
2. EMBs, 0: control of elections by government official, reformed in 2000 for being ‘blatantly
partisan’
3. See 1
1988
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1988 – Samoa
So’o Asofou. ‘Samoa’. The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2001, pp.
246-255
Notes
1. Only the matai could vote
2. EMBs, 0: control of elections by government official, reformed in 2000 for being ‘blatantly
partisan’
3. See 1
1991
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1991 – Samoa
So’o Asofou. ‘Samoa’. The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2001, pp.
246-255
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: control of elections by government official, reformed in 2000 for being ‘blatantly
partisan’
1996
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1996 – Samoa
So’o Asofou. ‘Samoa’. The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2001, pp.
246-255
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: control of elections by government official, reformed in 2000 for being ‘blatantly
partisan’
5. Ballot access, 0: In practice the right to run for the 47 Samoan seats (there are 2 more
reserved for those not of Samoan heritage) is restricted to matai, a traditional leadership role.
In addition: ‘Although candidates are free to propose themselves for electoral office, in practice,
they require the blessing of the village high chiefs. Those who ran in the 1996 elections in spite
of fono objections faced ostracism and even banishment from their village.’ (US state dep)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Following the elections there were multiple charges of fraud and
bribery. Four elections were subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court, and by-elections
were held.’ (US State dep)
2001
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Samoa
Freedom in the World - Samoa (2002)
Morgan Tuimaleali'ifano (2001): 'Aia Tatau and Afioga Tutasi : 'Aiga versus Tama a 'Aiga .
Manipulation of Old and New Practices: An MP for Falelatai and Samatau in Samoa's 2001
Elections, The Journal of Pacific History, 36:3, 317-325
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1979 – Samoa
So’o Asofou. ‘Samoa’. The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 14, Number 1, Spring 2002, pp. 224236
Notes
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘While all citizens above the age of 21 may vote, the right to run for 47 of the
49 seats in the Legislative Assembly remains the prerogative of the approximately 25,000 matai,
95 percent of whom are men.’ US state dep. Also see Tuimaleali’ifano for an account of the need
for chiefly blessing as mentioned in the US State dep report 1996
6. Campaign process, 0: charges of bribery resulted in by elections. Citizens testifying were
banished from their villages.
7. Media access, 0: government-controlled media restricts opposition airtime
2006
Sources
IPU Parline
Freedom in the World 2007 – Samoa
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006 - Samoa
Notes
5. Ballot access, 0: in practice, 47 of 49 seats are for matai only
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The most recent elections, held in March, were marred by charges of
bribery. As a result of election challenges filed by losing candidates, the Supreme Court ordered
10 by elections.’ US state dep
8 and 10 assumed from FIW: ‘The 2006 legislative elections were deemed free and fair’
2011
Sources
IPU Parline
Freedom in the World 2012 – Samoa
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2011 - Samoa
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: right to run not guaranteed, see 5.
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘General election electoral amendments restricted some members of the
opposition from registering as candidates. The amendments required candidates to obtain the
signature and approval of a government-paid village representative, mayor, or church minister
in their respective candidate applications. Two opposition candidates were refused these
approvals when the village fonos agreed to have only one candidate run, waiving the need for
elections. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the electoral amendments.’ (US state dep)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘the electoral court found four lawmakers from both the HRPP and TSP
– including the head of the TSP – guilty of bribing voters, and stripped them of their seats’ (FIW)
Senegal
1978
Sources
African elections database:
http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html#1983_Presidential_Election
Fall, Hounkpe, Jinadu and Kambale. Election Management Bodies in West Africa: A comparative
study of the contribution of electoral commissions to the strengthening of democracy. A review
by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (2011) (online)
KESSLER, RICHARD J., Senegal in transition , World Today, [n.s.]:36:2 (1980:Feb.) p.59
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: legal limitations on the number of parties and the ideological positions
they must take.
2. EMBS, -33: no independent commission existed
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Voter registration, particularly in the highly urbanized area of Dakar, was
low’ – 1.5m out of an estimated 2m eligible. (Kessler)
5. Ballot access, 0: Senghor 82.20% of vote
8. Voting process, 0: ‘failure to promote secret ballots’
1983
Sources
Hayward and Grovugui: Senegalese Electoral Process, in Hayward, Fred M. ‘Elections in
Independent Africa’
African Elections Database:
http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html#1983_Presidential_Election
Fall, Hounkpe, Jinadu and Kambale. Election Management Bodies in West Africa: A comparative
study of the contribution of electoral commissions to the strengthening of democracy. A review
by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (2011) (online)
Notes
2. EMBS, -33: no independent commission existed
3. Electoral rights, 0: there is evidence that voting cards were withheld from likely opposition
supporters
5. Ballot access, 0: incumbent wins 83.45% of the seats
7. Media access, 0: the formal rules stipulated that the ruling party get half the media time and
the other 13 get the rest
8. Voting process, 0: Secrecy of ballot was ‘optional’ and in practice often not used
1988
Sources
OPPMANN, FRANZISKA, The Myth of Democracy?, Africa Report, 33:3 (1988:May/June)
Fall, Hounkpe, Jinadu and Kambale. Election Management Bodies in West Africa: A comparative
study of the contribution of electoral commissions to the strengthening of democracy. A review
by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (2011) (online)
IPU Parline: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/SENEGAL_1978_E.PDF
Institute for democracy and electoral assistance. Voter turnout data for Senegal.
http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=205
Keesings contemporary archive
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: only three parties were allowed to form. We cannot find evidence that an
independent candidate would have been entitled to run.
2. EMBS, -33: no independent commission existed
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘There were complaints by numerous voters that they had not received
their registration cards’
4. Voter registration 0: under-registration
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The campaign leading up to the elections went relatively smoothly,
despite some incidents at the very beginning... The mood soured on the last two days of the
campaign however, when violence erupted... after local government officials banned a scheduled
rally by PDS candidate Wade... there were numerous light injuries and arrests’. Not knowing
what the earlier ‘incidents’ were, we have erred on the side of taking this reported violation of
criteria a and c seriously and coded as 0.
7. Media access, 1: ‘all had equal access to radio and television’ (IPU-parline, in reference to the
combined presidential and parliamentary polls)
8. Voting process, 0: secrecy optional
NB widespread opposition allegations of fraud from opposition and commentators. For this, (9)
has been coded as 0. Unclear whether the fraud came in voting or counting.
1993
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission – International Francophone Organisation
Notes
2. EMBs, -22:NB According to opposition candidate, the administration still dominates the
electoral process, not verified
3. Electoral rights, -22: Unable to assume: high rate of illiteracy may be a barrier for many
voters, inhibiting an adequate understanding of how to vote.
4. Voter register, 0: Opposition candidate raised concerns that the vote of young people and
people in areas opposed to the government had been excluded from the electoral role. Nomadic
and displaced populations were also highlighted as excluded groups. Voting register clearly
needs to be updated, according to report.
6. Campaign process, -22: nb Opposition claims that the one-party culture predominates and
pervaded the state bureaucracy.
2007
Sources
BBC News. Thursday, 1st March 2007. Wade named as Senegal poll winner (online)
Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008: Senegal Country Report (online)
United States Department of State, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Senega
Global Integrity 2006 Country Report: Senegal (online)
Beber and Scaco, ‘What the Numbers Say: A Digit-Based Test for Election Fraud’, Political
Analysis (Spring 2012) 20 (2): 211-234
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘however, there were reports of preelection violence and irregularities,
especially in the issuance of voter registration cards... voter registration cards were deliberately
issued late’
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Preparations for the upcoming electoral year (2007) clearly reveals
mismanagement, including the inaccessibility of voters’ registrations offices, editions of the
voter cards’ (BTI)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Although the constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, the
government interfered with this right in practice. During the year the government repeatedly
denied public permits for civil society and opposition demonstrations.’ (US department of
state). In addition, ‘minor incidents of election related violence’
7. Media access, 0: restricted press freedom de facto
8. Voting process, 0: ‘numerous persons voted multiple times’ (US department of state) – scale
of this not clear, voting seen as ‘generally’ fair
10. Counting process, 0: opposition allegations of fraud are supported by Beber and Scacco’s
analysis of the numbers recorded, which uses psychological research to differentiate between
random and chosen numbers
2012
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission – EU
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Regulations are changed (in conflict with constitution) to allow
incumbent to seek re-election, provoking widespread street protests.
2. EMBs, 0: The Constitutional Court is responsible for validating the provisional candidate list
as well as having the authority to adjudicate over complaints made about its own decisions.
3. Electoral rights, -22: Young people, aged 18-23, are clearly underrepresented on the electoral
role. Information on voting and changes to the electoral regulation are not systematically made
publicly available.
4. Voter register, 0: The report notes a significant underrepresentation of the electorate aged
18-23. In the eyes of the report’s authors, this seems to be related to a lack of interest in
established political parties and the electoral process, rather than a deliberate exclusion.
Deceased people were noted on the list. Report estimates around 1 million voters are excluded
or incorrect.
5. Ballot access, 0: Three candidates were rejected on the basis that they did not meet the
requirement of 10 000 signatures each to support their candidature. The Report’s authors
investigated the claims of invalid signatures, taking a non-exhaustive sample and comparing the
names and details with those on the electoral role. They concluded, from the sample used, that
the names excluded were, in fact, registered on the electoral role, suggesting that the rejection
of candidature invalid.
6. Campaign process, 0: Six people were killed, several injured and there were a series of arrests
with regards to street protests around the candidature of the incumbent. President has the
power to restrict the freedom to protest in a way described as ‘arbitrary’ in the report. An
absence of legislation of campaign finances is noted as a major problem with the election
process. Government resources were inappropriately used.
7. Media access, 0: Notwithstanding that equal access and fair treatment on public media were
observed. A generally favourable climate for the media was punctuated by a handful of observed
attacks on press freedom. Street protests were banned and then violently dispersed. Confirmed
cases of threats to journalist were recorded.
8. Voting process, 0: Adequate security was not in place for voters. Voting buying was
confirmed by observers.
8. Role of officials, 0: Election procedures were not followed in a number of cases (ie fingers
were not checked for ink marks). The lack of access to all phases of the electoral process is
noted as an issue in the election.
10. Counting of votes, 0: The report congratulates the ‘exemplary quality of the transparency in
the handling of ballots and results’. Yet - Observers were barred from some elements of the
counting process. Certain results were partially annulled without legitimate reason or clear
criteria, according to the report.
Serbia and Montenegro
1997
Sources
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Republic of Serbia Parliamentary Election
September 21, 1997 and Presidential Election September 21 and October 5 1997 (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘the division of Serbia in 29 constituencies with the introduction of a
regionally proportional election system was elaborated very late and passed without sufficient
transparency and lacking a broad political consensus.’ (emphasis added)
2. EMBs, 0: appointment procedure compromises independence
3. Electoral rights, 0: some polling stations in South Serbia did not open.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Many complaints were made to the Election Observation Mission on the
quality of the voter register for previous elections including: [a] multiple occurrence of the same
name in one or several voter registers, [b] occurrence of names of deceased persons or people
living abroad
who were marked by the Polling Boards as having voted, [c] absence of names of young people
who have reached voting age. The Election Observation Mission was able to verify some of these
claims.’
7. Media access, 0: ‘The State Television and Radio are still strongly biased in favour of the
ruling party. The obstacles identified in the Gonzalez report for independent broadcasters to
register for frequency licensing still remain.’
8. Voting process, 0: Although it is generally considered high quality, ‘Other observations
included open voting outside the polling booth (13%), more than one person in the booth
(23%) and voting without appropriate ID (16%).’ Also considerably worse voting in South
Serbia.
9. Role of officials, 0: multiple procedural failures, and violence against international observers
in South Serbia
10. Counting of votes, 1: all irregularities mentioned are minor and there is no implication that
the final count was in fact incorrect
2000
Sources
Republic of Serbia – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Parliamentary Elections. OSCE/ODIHR
Final Report (online)
BBC News. Saturday 21 October. Milosevic ally steps down (online)
Notes
We have treated the status of the incumbent as a technocratic transitional government as a term
limit. Legal restrictions could not be established.
3. Electoral rights, 0: polling stations not opening in an insecure area
7. Media access, 0: ‘In contrast to the September elections, the media environment was
significantly improved. The State media was not subject to overt political interference...
Nevertheless, outside
the free airtime, the State-owned media provided an unbalanced amount of favourable
coverage to the Democratic Opposition of Serbia Coalition (DOS). ‘
8. Voting process, 0: ‘Observers often noticed more than one person in voting booths
simultaneously, mostly family members, thereby lessening the secrecy of the vote. These
problems occurred mainly in rural areas’. Scale is not clear from this and the report of the day is
overwhelmingly positive. Coding of 0 was influenced by the scale being in excess of our
minimum in both the previous and next election. Data confidence impacted.
2003
Sources
Parliamentary Elections – 28 December 2003. Republic of Serbia (Serbia and Montenegro).
OSCE/ODIHR Final Report (online)
The Centre for Peace in the Balkans. B92, November 22, 2003. Tadic to lead election bid,
Zivkovic for PM (online)
Notes
3 and 5 assumed
8. Voting process, 0: ‘In 13 per cent of polling stations visited, observers noted that the Polling
Board did not prevent “group voting” (more than one voter marking ballots at voting booths
simultaneously, usually members of the same family).’ Otherwise good.
2007
Sources
Election of Representatives to the National Assembly, 21 January 2007. Republic of Serbia.
OSCE/ODIHR Final Report (online)
IPU Parline: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2355_07.htm
Notes
3. 0 – see 4
4. Voting register, 0: ‘Officials acknowledged that there are difficulties in ensuring the accuracy
of the lists, particularly in relation to the removal of names of voters who have died outside
Serbia, and voters who do not register their changes of residency when they move from one
municipality to another. The EOM was also informed that there are still significant numbers of
Roma that are not entered in the civil registry, perhaps due to their own reluctance, with the
consequence that they are also denied the electoral franchise.’ NB that this was not seen by
report to be problematic or malicious.
8. Voting process, 0: ‘. Family and group voting appeared to be a widespread problem and was
observed in 23 per cent of polling stations visited.’ Otherwise good.
Serbia
2008
Sources
Republic of Serbia. Early Parliamentary Elections, 11 May 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
observation Mission Final Report (online)
IPU Parline: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2355_08.htm
Notes
3 assumed
6. Campaign process, 1: Notwithstanding: ‘As the campaign unfolded, personal verbal attacks
and insults intensified, and a number of death threats to senior officials were reported.’ There is
no suggestion that this prohibited any activity, no actual violence occurred, and the campaign
was otherwise positively assessed.
Voting and counting was not systematically observed: counting is not described at all, and in
voting the extent of non-private voting is not clear. -22.
2012
Sources
Republic of Serbia. Parliamentary and Early Presidential Elections, 6 and 20 May 2012.
OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: ‘Electoral commissions at all levels performed their duties efficiently and within
legal deadlines, despite the significant amount of work given the number of elections being held
concurrently. The commissions adopted most of their decisions in a collegial manner, although,
at times, decisions of the REC members appeared to have been influenced by political
considerations’ – notwithstanding this latter point, as the text implies that the set up of the REC
was such as to neutralise the effects of individual partisanship
3 assumed
4. Voter register, -22: some concerns due to ‘lack of clarity’, nothing substantiated
6. Campaign process, -22: Not clear – ‘Allegations of widespread vote-buying amongst Roma,
intimidation of employees by various sides and possible misuse of public resources, particularly
prior to 6 May elections remained, in most cases, unsubstantiated but raised concern.’
8. Voting process, -22: ‘some’ group voting, not clear (limited stations visited)
Seychelles
1998
Sources
Francophone Delegation Report, as part of the Joint, Commonwealth-Francophone, Preliminary
Mission Leading up to the Presidential Elections – International Francophone Organisation
Notes
2. EMBS, -22: Nb opposition allege bias
4. Voter Register, 0: Voter register needs corrections – deceased persons and people who have
left the country (and no longer have the right to vote) are registered on the list whilst eligible
voters are absent. The percentage of errors is not estimated, although they are noted as
‘considerable’.
6. Campaign process, -22: Nb opposition allegations: Opposition claims that one-party culture
pervades public institutions, effectively placing the resources of the state at the disposition of
the governing party. Oppostion parties claim that supporters and even candidates are
systematically threatened.
7. Media access, -22: Nb Opposition claims that public media favours the party in government.
10. Counting of votes, -22: NB opposition claims fraud is likely.
2001
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission – International Francophone Organisation
Notes
2. EMBs, -22: Opposition claims EMB is biased in favour of governing party
6. Campaign process, 0: NGOs and opposition groups interviewed were concerned with the
conflation of the state and the ruling party and the subsequent inappropriate use of state
resources. Report concluded that certain traits of a ‘non-pluralist’ system persisted, to the
advantage of the incumbent.
7. Media access, -22: insufficient info to code, but nb: NGOs interviewed expressed concerns
around press freedom. Report advocates for greater protection of press freedoms.
8. Voting process, -22: Private media expressed concern that ‘wards of the state’ (the elderly and
people with disabilities) would be pressured into voting for the ruling party. Security was
adequate and acted appropriately. Secrecy of the vote was assured by private booths, but
people in state care voted with an ‘assistant’, potentially in violation of their free choice. The
report was concerned that these groups of voters were vulnerable to pressure. The semitransparency of the ballot paper also allowed for the voters choice to be seen.
10. Counting of votes, -22: Vote counting was observed in some voting booths, the neutrality
and transparency of the process was noted. Representatives of candidates were present. The
Mission was informed of the refusal of one of the candidate’s representatives to sign the official
count record. The report was concerned with the lack of security around vote handling and
they were not able to observe the entire process.
2006
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Seychelles Presidential Election. 28 – 30 July 2006. Report of the
Commonwealth Expert Team. (online)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: reports of vote buying and generalised threats concerning state jobs to
opposition supporters.
2011
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team. Seychelles Presidential
Election 19 – 21 May 2011. (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, -22: ‘It should be noted that a constitutional challenge of certain sections of
the Elections Act concerning voter eligibility and voter registration has been made and has not
yet been dealt with by the Constitutional Court of Seychelles. The Expert Team is, therefore, not
in a position to comment further about this issue.’
2. EMBs, 1: there is no EMB as such, but the Commissioner’s independence and competence was
recognised
4. Voter register, -22: allegations of additional names could not be verified or falsified by the
observer group
5. Ballot access, 0: courts have retrospectively ruled that Dhanjee was denied his right to stand
despite being eligible. Report states: ‘The case of Viral V. Dhanjee is under appeal and we
therefore, cannot offer further comment. The case highlights, however, a need to amend the
Elections Act with regard to the nomination process and the need to review the Elections Act
more broadly to ensure that it contains fair, complete and satisfactory electoral rules and
procedures, as well as to ensure there is accuracy and internal consistency within the law.’
6. Campaign process, 0: re vote buying, ‘Most stakeholders we interviewed either alleged the
practices were rampant during this election, as well as in past elections, or claimed that they
had heard of it occurring. Even members of the public we spoke with less formally believed the
practices were wide spread.’
7. Media access, 0: ‘We noted that despite this new legislation, there is widely-held view that the
SBC media coverage is still overwhelming one-sided and dominated by the government with
limited opportunities for opposition parties to access and air their views outside the official
campaign period. We believe that there is a need for further reform of the SBC’
Data confidence reduced to 3 for the amount of this report which is based on allegations rather
than direct observation.
Sierra Leone
1996
Sources
Hirsch, John. ‘Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy’
Riley, Stephen. ‘The 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Sierra Leone’,
Electoral Studies, Volume 15, Issue 4, November 1996, Pages 537-545
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Voter turnout data for Sierra Leone
http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=203
WRITENET, Sierra Leone: From Cease-Fire to Lasting Peace?, 1 January 1997 (online)
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1997 - Sierra Leone, 1 January 1997
(online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: we gathered that INEC was independent of the government from the following
statement in Stephen: ‘Jonah's staff had increasingly difficult relations with the military regime
as the elections neared and as INEC sought to reduce the interference of the military and to
maintain its independence. The NPRC frequently used its powers of decree to undermine the
INEC, particularly in early 1996.’
4. Voter register, 0: under-registration
6. Campaign process, 0: candidate Bangura was pulled from his car and assaulted, leading to
hospitalisation. It is also worth noting that the population at large were terrorised by RUF with
antielection slogans carved into them in addition to other ad hoc injuries to deter voting.
8. Voting process, 0: attacks of voters at the polls
2007
Sources
EU Election Observation Mission, Sierra Leone 2007. Final Report on the Presidential and
Parliamentary Elections (online)
Notes
4. Voter registration, 1: at 9%, nonregistration is below our threshold
6. Campaign period, 0: violations of A: ‘There was a notable rise in tensions and voter
intimidation at the start of the second campaign period and an increase in isolated violent
clashes between rival supporters mainly, but not exclusively, in parts of the southern and
eastern districts. The level playing field for political parties to campaign was influenced by the
partisanship of a number of traditional leaders trying to control the campaign agenda for
political parties in their areas in favour of the incumbent party’
7. Media access, 0: imbalance on state TV: ‘As a percentage of all coverage in the monitoring
period on SLBS TV the SLPP received 50 per cent share followed by the PMDC with 13 per cent
and APC an 11 per cent share. On SLBS’s radio station SLPP was afforded 56 per cent share of
coverage of political actors, APC 14 per cent and PMDC 13 per cent. The other parties received
smaller amounts of coverage on SLBS Radio: NDA received 10 per cent and CPP 9 per cent with
the remaining political parties receiving below 5 per cent each. These smaller parties all
received below 5 per cent coverage on SLBS TV. However, in important areas such as news
programming SLBS’s coverage failed to fulfil the provisions in the Code of Practice of the IMC.
8. Vote process, 0: ballot stuffing in the second round. This was widespread, but these results
were annulled and the NEC states that this did not affect the outcome
10. Counting process, 0 – see 8
Singapore
General source: Yeo Lay Hwee, Electoral Politics in Singapore. In Croissant and John (eds),
Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2002.
Ballot access coded criteria a and b taken from the description of the ease of registration given
here. c and d are determined separately.
1976
Sources
Keesings contemporary archive
US department of state country report on human rights 1977 – Singapore.
Notes
NB opposition alleged a generalised authoritarian atmosphere leading to ‘trouble’ for PAP
opponents
7. Media access, 0: nearest available US dep report, 1977, describes restrictions on freedom of
press and gives no suggestion that these are a recent development. Data confidence impacted
1980
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1980 – Singapore. Available at: Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: defamation suits used to bankrupt opposition
7. Media access, 0: de facto restrictions on media freedom
1984
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1984 – Singapore. Available at:
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: defamation suits against opposition
7. Media access, 0: media freedom restricted
1988
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1988 – Singapore. Available at:
Notes
In this election, campaign and media restrictions are only reported as alleged by the opposition
rather than stated by the report. However, in light of later elections we have taken these
allegations seriously. See 1991 onward.
1991
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1991 - Singapore
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: pervasive non-violent intimidation of opposition
7. Media access, 0: government influence over media in evidence throughout campaign
1997
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1997 - Singapore
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘attempts to intimidate the members of the opposition through the
threat of libel suits and the subsequent loss of their political future, since large judgments in
libel suits can lead to bankruptcy, and under the law bankrupt persons are ineligible to sit in
Parliament. The Government also intimidates the opposition through the threat of potential loss
of employment or professional licenses. Opposition politicians report that potential employers
are reluctant to hire them or their supporters.’ (US dep of state)
7. Media access, 0: ‘political control of the press’ cited as an aspect of the government’s means of
dominance
2001
Sources
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. The Political Process and
the 2001 Parliamentary Elections in Singapore. November 2001. (online)
Notes
5. Ballot access has been coded as -22 due to missing information on a majority of subpoints, but
it is worth noting that the election almost violated d with 73.67% of votes for the ruling party
6. Campaign process has been coded as 0 due to ‘laws and practices ...[with]... the net effect of
limiting political discourse and sharply curtailing the ability of opposition parties to recruit and
mobilize supporters. As a result, Singapore’s electoral process falls considerably short of
meeting international standards for fair elections.’ In addition, ‘Perhaps the most controversial
tactic used by the PAP was the practice of offering benefits, such as upgraded housing, to
constituencies that supported the PAP, and threatening a loss of benefits to those that did not.
The tactic was especially persuasive since approximately 85% of all Singaporeans live in public
housing.’
7. Media, 0: ‘The government heavily influences print and broadcast media in Singapore. The
government-linked holding company, Singapore International Media Pte Ltd., for instance, has a
near monopoly on broadcasting... Typically, this has meant that the PAP receives well over three
times as many minutes of broadcast time than any other party.’
2006
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 2006 - Singapore
Notes
2. EMBs, -22: not clear whether 1988 boundary change was malicious and can be objected to.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The PAP maintained its political dominance in part by developing voter
support through effective administration and its record in bringing economic prosperity to the
country, and in part by manipulating the electoral framework, intimidating organized political
opposition, and circumscribing the bounds of legitimate political discourse and action’ – US dep
of state
7. Media access, 0: press face legal challenges from government if too outspoken and seen to be
heavily government influenced
2011
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 2011 - Singapore
Notes
6. Campaign process, 1: ‘The PAP maintained its political dominance in part by circumscribing
political discourse and action; however, restrictions were relaxed during the campaign period.
The belief that the government might directly or indirectly harm the employment prospects of
opposition supporters inhibited opposition political activity; however, there were no confirmed
cases of such retaliation.’
7. Media access, 0: ‘The constitution provides for freedom of speech and freedom of expression
but permits official restrictions on these rights, and in practice the government significantly
restricted freedom of speech and of the press with regard to criticism of the government.’
Slovak Rep
1994
Sources
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994 – Slovakia
Abrahám, S. (1995), Early Elections in Slovakia: A State of Deadlock. Government and
Opposition, 30: 86–100
Federal News Service. OCTOBER 3, 1994. STATE DEPARTMENT REGULAR BRIEFING BRIEFER:
MIKE MCCURRY MONDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1994
Associated Press Worldstream. October 01, 1994. Exit Polls Show Meciar Clear Winner in
Slovak Elections. Kevin Drew.
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
4 Voter register – -22 – the following was not sufficient to suggest incomplete registers on a
scale that we could code as 0, but it may be of interest: ‘The two-day elections were marred
somewhat by confusion over registration lists that kept hundreds of people, including Meciar
and some other prominent politicians, from voting Friday. Election officials later allowed them
to cast ballots if they could provide proof of residence in local polling districts.’ – associated
press
All others clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1998, 2002:http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/Slovakia
2006
Sources
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994 – Slovakia
Keesings contemporary archives
V Pcolinský, A Štensová. Slovak Parliamentary Elections 2006. Středoevropské politické studie
(CEPSR), 2007
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying
All else clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2012
Sources
Policy Brief by Robin Shepherd, Central European Policy Institute Senior Fellow (Online)
Notes
8 and 10 assumed from CEPI description as free and fair, and ‘the results uncontested’
Slovenia
2000: US department of state and Keesings contemporary archives. Clean by assumption.
2008
Sources
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009 – Slovenia
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) – 6 not assumed due to candidate’s description of
campaign as ‘dirtiest’, although there is no implication in Keesing that this is intended to convey
illicit tactics
2010
Sources
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010 – Slovenia
Slovak Republic. Parliamentary Elections, 12 June 2010. OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment
Mission Report (online)
Notes
10 assumed from US dep recording as free and fair
Some uncertainty over 8 in the report – scale of family voting not clear - -22
3 by assumption
Solomon Islands
1980
Sources
IPU Parline
Premdas, R. and Steeves, J. ‘The Solomon Islands: First Elections after Independence’. The
Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Oct., 1981), pp. 190-202
Notes
8 and 10 from ‘Election day passed without incident’, Steeves and Premdas, in an otherwise
detailed report.
1984
Sources
IPU Parline
Notes
1989
Sources
IPU Parline
Keesings Contemporary Archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines), except 4, 6 and 7 due to later problems
1993
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1993 – Solomon
Islands
Ralph R. Premdas & Jeffrey S. Steeves (1995): The Solomon Islands in transition: Aspects of the
1993 elections, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 84:333,
33-52
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Beyond this, however, it is clear that there is a considerable distance
between
the total population of each province and the number of registered voters. Even allowing for the
high preponderance of young people among the population, a large number of Solomon
Islanders were not officially registered for the 1993 election’ (Premdas and Steeves)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘A decisive element with a profound impact on the campaign was a
decision
taken by the Mamaloni government in the dying days of the last Parliament in March 1993 to
award each sitting MP a SI$100 000 'discretionary fund' to distribute in their constituencies for
development purposes. This 'discretionary fund' became a tool for MPs to cement their local
support. Sitting MPs engaged in the blatant distribution of development largesse in the form of
outboard motors, generators, boats and canoes, iron roofing, etc among one's supporters and
church groups considered crucial in each constituency.’ (Premdas and Steeves)
1997
Sources
IPU Parline
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1997 – Solomon
Islands
Keesings Contemporary Archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines), except 4, 6 and 7 due to previous problems
2001
Sources
International Republican Institute. Solomon Islands parliamentary election. December 5, 2001.
(online)
Notes
3. Ballot access, 0: exclusions resulting from 4
4. The voter register was coded as 0: ‘the most serious problem in this election was inaccurate
or incomplete voter lists’
6. Campaign process, -22: allegations of vote buying which the report could not confirm or reject
8. Voting process, -22: The voting process was such that multiple voting was not protected
against, and the report took the evidence of votes folded together as likely evidence that this
had occurred, but make no further comment regarding e.g. the regularity of the results
9. Role of officials, 0: police in polling stations. This is contrary to Solomon Islands law but it is
worth noting that their observers remarked that they were not seen as intimidating and that
they would otherwise have waited in blazing sun.
Data confidence coded as 2 as observers were unable to travel to one region deemed unsafe and
reports from the area suggested ‘substantial deviation from the election law and procedures’
2006
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Solomon Islands General Election 5 April 2006. Report of the
commonwealth observer group (online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: some citizens were not registered and unable to vote
4. Voter register, 0: ‘The registered voter population of 342,119 (2006 figure) out of the national
population of 470,681 (2005 figure) is unrealistically high. The median age in
Solomon Islands is 19.3 and the voting age is 18, thus we estimate that the maximum number of
eligible voters should be approximately 250,000’ – and ‘There were consistent widespread
reports and complaints of persons who claimed to have registered but could not find their
names in the register of their village at their designated polling stations’
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘The point was also repeatedly made to us that women candidates had far less
access to campaign resources than men and that some had had to withdraw for the race due to
lack of funds. It was also claimed that in many rural constituencies, women had to have the
endorsement of their male relatives before they could stand as candidates. Some women
candidates reported receiving threats while campaigning.
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying
2010
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Report of the commonwealth observer group . Solomon Islands
National Parliamentary Election 4 August 2010.
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: inflated
5. Ballot access, 0: considerable stress is placed on the difficulties de facto faced by women in
running for office
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying. ‘The Group is conscious that hospitality and provision of
gifts and refreshments to friends and associates is a part of Solomon Islands culture. Solomon
Islanders with whom the Group spoke, however, stated that the level and nature of gift giving
(in goods and cash) by candidates to voters went far beyond usual cultural norms and should be
viewed as deliberate attempts to influence voter behaviour. The use of gifts to buy votes is
contrary to the letter and spirit of Solomon Islands electoral laws and international democratic
standards.
South Africa
Apartheid era elections – our survey encompasses only the ‘white only’ elections as these were
the only elections to the house of representatives, which was responsible for electing the President
For all apartheid era elections:
1. Legal framework, 0 – Citizens are not constitutionally guaranteed the right to vote or stand
for office
3. Electoral rights, 0 – Limitations on voting are not based on internationally recognised norms
5. Ballot access, 0 – Limitations on candidate eligibility are not based on internationally
recognised norms
1977
Sources
Midlane, Matthew. ‘The South African General Election of 1977’. African Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 312
(Jul., 1979), pp. 371-387
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘Perhaps the most sensitive and as yet unresearched aspect of South African
electoral practises has been the operation of the Delimitation Commission to which the
Constitution gives the responsibility of drawing up constituency boundaries. Most popular
criticism has been levelled at the considerable over- loading of rural as opposed to urban
constituencies which has certainly been to the advantage of the Nationalists as the rural
population is predominantly Afrikaner’
6. Campaign process, 0: murder of a candidate
7. Media access, 0: banning of publications
1981
Sources
Stanley Uys (1985): A silenced voice, Index on Censorship, 14:4, 7-8
Notes
7. Media access, 0: censorship
1987
Sources
A Holding Operation: Surviving the State of Emergency,June 1986 - February 1988 – in Seekings, Jeremy. UDF: History Of United Democratic Front In South Africa 1983-1991. Ohio
University Press, 2000.
Keesing contemporary archives
Notes
6. Campaign process 0: due to violence and intimidation against voters involved in antiapartheid movements
7.Media access, 0: State of emergency restricted press freedom
8, 9, 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1989
Sources
Rupert Taylor (1990): Between apartheid and democracy: The South
African ‘election’ of 1989, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International
Affairs, 79:314, 157-166
Keesing contemporary archives
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: violence against voters who protested apartheid.
7. Media access, 0: emergency extended and state repression of media continued
8, 9, 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1999
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. The National and Provincial Elections in South Africa. 2 June 1999.
The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 1: as initial worries about its chain of accountability were changed by an act of
parliament and no other relevant concerns were mentioned.
3. Electoral rights, 1 notwithstanding (4) – alternative measures adopted
4. Voter register, 0: it is thought that about 20% of those with the correct identity document
were not registered, and while this just meets our threshold, further controversies were raised
about those without such documents.
2004
Sources
EISA. Election Observer Mission. South Africa National and Provincial Elections. 12-14 APRIL
2004
EISA Election Observer Mission Report No 14 (online)
Notes
3. Electoral access, 1: Notwithstanding point 4, under-registration, as ‘In all those instances
voters were allowed to cast their vote once proof of registration had been established by
verification of the sticker in their ID books’
4. Voter register, 0: ‘The total represents 75.3% of the estimated 27 436 898 eligible voters as
per the 2001 census’ (although ‘generally political parties expressed their satisfaction with the
roll’).
6. Campaign process, 1: ‘Incidents of political violence were described as isolated and of a
nature that did not affect in any substantial material way the freedom to campaign.’ No more
information on its nature available so we have coded in line with the sentiment expressed here.
8. Voting process, 1: notwithstanding the note that desks were sometimes not ideally positioned
for secrecy – no idea of scale given, but no hint that this was abused.
2009
Sources
Gabriel, Marian. FWC-LOT 7- Culture, governance and home affairs- n°2009/202498: “EU
Election Expert Mission to South Africa” Final report. For B&S Europe. May 2009. (online)
Notes
Note that the incumbent has been coded as not running because at the end of his term before
the election Zuma was recalled and Motlanthe took his place for the remainder of the term.
However, Zuma won both the previous election and this election, and both Presidents served
the same party.
3. Electoral rights, -22: it was not clear whether citizens could vote when not registered; voting
requirements state registration, but we are aware that in 1999 a tendered ballot option was
available.
4. Voter register, 1: 20% were not registered, which falls within our threshold. Furthermore it
is worth noting that the implication is that this was a choice of these citizens and it is noted that
‘The voter registration exercise was seen as successful by local stakeholders’.
5. Ballot access, 0: overturning an IEC decision, the court ruled that 110 candidates not
registered as voters could not be registered as candidates. Although this is not technically in
contravention of A as these candidates were not eligible to stand, we take it that as they were
presumably eligible to register as voters the same principle applies. The report does not give an
opinion on the controversy. In 1999, an opposite decision had been taken
6. Campaign and 7. media have been coded as -22 as observers were not present. ‘Isolated
violence’ at the beginning of the campaign was mentioned but there is insufficient information
to know how closely this was linked to electoral activity.
Spain
1977
Sources
IPU Parline
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1977 – Spain
Keesing Contemporary arhives
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘a predominantly peaceful election campaign which was, however,
disrupted by sporadic bomb attacks’
8. Voting process, 0: secrecy of the vote not legally required (extrapolated from reports on later
elections, and affirmed by a press comment)
1979
Sources
IPU Parline
US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1979 – Spain
Keesing Contemporary Archives
Notes
8. Voting process, 0: secrecy of the vote not legally required (extrapolated from reports on later
elections)
Others presumed clean by assumption except media which received opposition complaints (see
guidelines).
2008
Sources
Spain Parliamentary elections, 9 March 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final
Report (online)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0L despite being positive in most areas of the country due to the following:
‘While the campaign overall appeared to be conducted with respect for fundamental rights, the
electoral campaign in the Basque region took place in an ongoing atmosphere of intimidation,
especially in smaller towns, due to the activities of the terrorist group ETA. The PSOE and the
PP indicated that it was practically impossible for them to conduct outdoor rallies in the Basque
region and that their candidates had to travel with a security escort, which significantly limited
their ability to campaign freely. ETA detonated a bomb outside the office of the PSOE office in
the Basque town of Derio on 29 February.’
8. Voting process, 0: optional nature of the secrecy of the ballot; many voters chose to vote
openly. The report notes that this does not seem to be abused and is appropriate in the Spanish
context but ought to be reconsidered. It is, at any rate, in clear violation of point A.
2011
Sources
Spain Early Parliamentary Elections, 20 November 2011. OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment
Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
(3 by assumption)
8. Voting process, 0: secrecy of the vote optional and frequently ignored. No malignant use of
this reported.
9. Role of officials, -22: some over-involvement of party proxies is cited but there is insufficient
information to code as 0.
Sri Lanka
1982
Sources
W. A. Wiswa Warnapala and L. Dias Hewagama ‘Recent politics in Sri Lanka: the Presidential
Election and the Referendum of 1982’. Navrang, 1983.
US department of state country report on human rights 1982 – Sri Lanka.
Constitution: http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Chapter_14_Amd.html
Keesings contemporary archive
Notes
NB 9% of population are Indian Tamils and some significant portion of them – not clear – do not
have citizenship.
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘The failure to educate the voter – both by the Commissioner of Elections
and the political parties – resulted in a large number of ballots being spoiled’. The only
educational drive by the Commission –posters - was withdrawn before use.
6. Campaign process, 0: use of government resources (this appears to have been relatively
moderate, eg for transport and propaganda. However, given the absence of previous nationalunit elections, the national reach this provided the governing party is an important factor.
7 Media, 0: state controlled media (the Lake House and Times Group newspapers) were ‘openly
partisan’.
NB opposition filed a petition challenging the official electoral results.
1988
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1988 – Sri Lanka.
The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, December 21 1988: Saarc monitors' interim
statement on Sri Lanka's presidential election (available from LexisNexis)
The Associated Press. December 19 1988. Dexter Cruez. Fifteen Killed In Election-Day Attacks;
Sinhalese Blamed (available from LexisNexis)
The Times, Dec 20th 1988. Edward Gorman. Most disregard poll boycott ..; Sri Lanka election
(available from LexisNexis)
Presidential Election of Sri Lanka December 1998: Report of non-governmental observer group
from SAARC countries
Constitution: http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Chapter_14_Amd.html
Notes
NB the question of term limits is not entirely clear – the constitution at the time states ‘No person
who has been twice elected to the office of President by the People shall be qualified thereafter to
be elected to such office by the People.’ Technically, the incumbent’s first term to office was
indirect via the parliament.
3. Electoral rights, 0: The news article on Saarc’s statement reports: ‘the group pointed out the
"fact that polling cards were not distributed in a number of districts was one of the factors
which may have contributed towards reducing voter turnout."’ Not clear whether this merely
confused voters or whether they could not in fact vote, but even if the former, this still violates
d. In addition, access was not equal, as in areas of JVP strength turnout dropped dramatically –
‘in at least one southern village no one voted at all’
6. Campaign process, 0: intimidation of voters by opposition JVP
8. Voting process, 0: intimidation and violence against voters and officials, with some fatalities,
violating c, adequate security
9. Role of officials, 0: inadequate training highlighted by report, and many staff did not report to
fulfil their duties so a fortiori cannot be said to have fulfilled them properly.
1994
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1994 – Sri Lanka
Notes
3. Ballot access, 0: polling not held under areas of LTTE control
6. Campaign process, 0: violence
7. Media access, 0: press not free under areas of LTTE control
8 and 10 assumed from US dep ‘free and fair’
1999
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team. Sri Lanka Presidential
Election. 26 January 2010. (sic) (Online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Elections in Sri Lanka have historically been violent events… 48% of
incidents in the 1999 presidential election… were classed as major’. Violence also noted by US
dep. One assassination attempt.
7. Media access, 0: press not free
8. Voting process, 0: ‘irregularities’ (US dep)
2010
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team. Sri Lanka Presidential
Election. 26 January 2010. (Online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: against the constitution, an IEC was not appointed and the previous Commissioner’s
mandate renewed to perform the IEC’s role. The 0 coding comes from a violation of his
independence; the commissioner’s orders were frequently not followed through and it is clear
he had only limited control over election proceedings.
3. Electoral rights, 0: IDPs systematically disadvantaged, in part due to factors beyond
government control. ‘some problems were reported, including problems in registering a
transient community, ID card issues and transportation problems on election day for some of
those needing to travel to cluster polling stations’
4. Voter register, 0: probable inflation, and difficulty registering IDPs (notwithstanding
government efforts in this regard)
5. Ballot access, 1: only one candidate couldn’t register, no information given, presumed
acceptable.
6. Campaign process, 0: abuse of government resources for incumbent, widespread violent
incidents
7. Media access, 0: restrictions on freedom of speech, abuse of state media
8. Voting process, 0: while the report assessed the voting process positively, our criteria do not
allow us to ignore widespread inadequate assurance of ballot secrecy, although the report
explicitly withholds comment on whether this was used malignantly; in addition, ‘isolated
problems linked to a limited number of violent incidents and malpractices’ are noted.
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘Overall the Team reported positively on the role of the police, as being
helpful and discreet. However, in some instances police were inside the polling station, even
assisting polling staff in their duties. Again, the spirit of this was judged to be benign, but it is a
poor practice and outside the parameters of the regulations
St Lucia
1979
Sources
IPU Parline
United State Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1979 – St Lucia
4th July 1979. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. ST LUCIA ELECTIONS.
Keesing contemporary archive
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Although the campaign was marred by violence, all sides respected the
electoral process’ (US dep). In addition see BBC and Keesing contemporary archives.
Other clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1982
Sources
IPU Parline
United State Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1982 – St Lucia
Notes
Michael Pilgrim headed an interim government prior to this election. As he was not head of his
party, we take it that he was not the party’s candidate for PM at the election.
7. Media access, -22: minor interference in press freedom – prime minister ordered the banning
of sales of political party broadcasts on radio St Lucia and fired the chairman. This was
insufficient alone to merit a 0 but in the context of a relative small scale media sector, raised
sufficient concern of general interference that 1 could not be assumed.
All others clean by assumption (see guidelines).
1987
Sources
IPU Parline
United State Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1987 – St Lucia
Keesings contemporary archive
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1992
Sources
IPU Parline
United State Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1992 – St Lucia
Keesings contemporary archive
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1997
Sources
IPU Parline
United State Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1997 – St Lucia
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2001
Sources
IPU Parline
United State Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – St Lucia
Keesings contemporary archive
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2006
Sources
IPU Parline
Organization of American States. Final Report of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission for the
General Elections in Saint Lucia 2006 (online)
United State Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006 – St Lucia
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: ‘The discrepancy between the number of actual voters and the names on
the voter registry in many constituencies suggests that the electoral roll in St Lucia remains
inflated. The condition of the list did not negatively affect the integrity of the elections, although
it probably contributed in understating the percentage of voter participation. A thorough and
continuous revision and distribution of the complete list would help to eliminate potential
problems and contribute to the confidence in the electoral process’
2011
Sources
Organization of American States. Final Report of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission for the
General Elections in Saint Lucia. November 28, 2011.
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: ‘First, as observed in the 2006 electoral process, there were again concerns
raised by various sectors regarding the accuracy of the voters list... Existing legislation does not
clarify the issue of how to prove whether a particular voter lives abroad or has fulfilled the three
month residency requirement. Moreover, the procedure for culling the voters list is not efficient:
there is no system to remove deceased voters from the list. As in 2006, the condition of the list
did not greatly affect the integrity of the election but it may help to understand the 56% rate of
voter participation.’
St Vincent and the Grenadines
2005
Sources
Organization of American States. Report of the Electoral Observation Mission in St. Vincent and
the Grenadines. General Elections 2005 (online)
Notes
All codings of 1 are based on the general claim that the process went “without major incidents
or systemic irregularities’. Several -22 occur because ‘it is important to note the inability of the
team to observe pre-election processes and activities’.
Sudan
1996
Sources
Nohlen, D. Elections in Africa: A data handbook. Oxford University Press 1999
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections had not been held regularly
3. Electoral rights, 0: some constituencies unable to take part for security reasons (Nohlen: ‘The
elections did not include large parts of Southern Sudan and were widely criticized as having
been staged’)
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75%
6. Campaign process, 0: severe restrictions on assembly and dissent
7. Media access, 0: restricted press freedom
Observer rating, 0: ‘Although the 1996 elections were observed by delegates from the
Organization of African Unity who said they had been conducted without extensive
irregularities, the majority of the international community as well as the opposition groups
criticized the elections as rigged and invalid.’ (Nohlen)
2000
Sources
Joint written statement submitted to the UN Commission of Human Rights by the World
Federation of Democratic Youth and Interfaith International (online)
United States Department of State, U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights
Practices 2000 - Sudan
Notes
1. Legal framework, 1: on basis of 1998 constitution
2. EMBs, 0: concerns about impartiality
3. Electoral rights, 0: see register, and also some constituencies not electing for security reasons.
4. Voter register, 0: inadequate registration
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75%
6. Campaign process, 0: violence, intimidation, assembly restrictions.
7. Media access, 0: freedom restrictions, government owned media required to reflect
government policy
8. Voting process, 0: widespread irregularities are noted, which may be at voting or counting.
Specifically voting problems include a large loophole in use of registers which did not ensure
the limiting of one vote per person, and the requirement at some stations to vote in pencil.
9. Role of officials, 0: complicity of officials in 8/10 noted by the joint statement to the UN
10. Counting process, 0: widespread irregularities are noted, which may be at voting or
counting. The return of numbers much higher than is credible violates the requirement that
there is no evidence of fraud in any way.
2010
Sources
European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report
Carter Center: Observing Sudan’s 2010 National Elections, Final Report
Notes
The incumbency ratings are simultaneously true of both the Sudanese and South Sudanese
executives.
2. EMBs, 0: ‘Sudan’s election management body, the National Elections Commission, was
established to administer elections impartially, transparently, and independently, but did not
always meet these standards.’ (Carter). NB also allegations of gerrymandering, neither
confirmed nor dismissed by reports.
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘The NEC did not publish the final list of polling stations, thus depriving
both voters and observers of reliable and complete information on where voting would take
place. The actual number of stations open for polling remains uncertain.’ (EU) Also, ‘The NEA
did not establish any special arrangements for voter registration or voting by IDPs despite the
presence of nearly five million of them in the country and Sudan’s commitment to international
standards regarding universal suffrage’. (EU) Also see 4.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘A number of political parties and civil society organizations strongly
criticized the registration process, further weakening public trust in its credibility. The late
publication of the voter lists and their lack of accuracy during polling days justified those fears,
as nearly 10% of the voters observed were refused ballots because their names were not on the
voter lists.’ (EU)
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘Smaller parties faced obstructions from other parties or state authorities,
which prevented them from filing registrations. This was never legally challenged, in a serious
breach of international standards and Sudanese constitutional rights.’ (EU)
6. Campaign process, 0: harassment, intimidation, arrests
7. Media access, 0: restrictions on press freedom
8. Voting process, 0: organised groups of underage voters, in addition to large-scale wider
problems with safeguards and organisation which did not alone unambiguously violate our
criteria, including dubious assistance to disabled voters and lack of safeguards against multiple
voting
9. Role of officials, 0: armed personnel in polling stations, over-active party agents
10. Counting process, 0: violation of requirement that results can be tracked. ‘This lack of
transparency meant that many safeguards built into the system were bypassed; the whole
process was delayed and became untrustworthy and results were untraceable.’ (EU)
Observer rating, 0: Carter Center. ‘Although the election process was generally peaceful,
Carter Center observers found it fell far short of Sudan’s domestic and international obligations
in many respects’
Suriname
1977
Sources
Notes
2. -33 From OAS report 2010: ‘The district commissioner, appointed by the president, is the
highest government official in each district and also is responsible for election administration in
the district.’
1987
Sources
United States Department of State country report on human rights practices 1987 - Suriname
Notes
1 Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
2. -33 From OAS report 2010: ‘The district commissioner, appointed by the president, is the
highest government official in each district and also is responsible for election administration in
the district.’
7. Media access, 0: press not free
8 and 10, 1. US dep reports that US observers found them free and fair
1991
Sources
United States Department of State country report on human rights practices 1991 - Suriname
Notes
2. -33 From OAS report 2010: ‘The district commissioner, appointed by the president, is the
highest government official in each district and also is responsible for election administration in
the district.’
6. Campaign process, 0: financial disparities used by ruling NDP to woo voters via generous
government projects (perceived in this light by US dep)
7. Media access, 0: media self censored, state media manipulated
8, 10 = 1: ‘Widely praised by international observers as generally free and fair’ (US dep)
1996
Sources
United States Department of State country report on human rights practuices 1996 - Suriname
Notes
2. -33 From OAS report 2010: ‘The district commissioner, appointed by the president, is the
highest government official in each district and also is responsible for election administration in
the district.’
7. Media access, 1: self censorship mentioned but attributed to old regime
8,9, 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2000
Sources
Organization of American States. Report of the Electoral Observation Mission to Suriname 2000
(online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘the Mission also reported that a very sizeable number of persons were
unable to vote, either because their names had been stricken from the voters’ list before
Election Day or because the polling cards, which act as the ticket of admission to a polling
station, had not reached the potential elector before Election Day’
4. Voter register, 0: see above
7. Media access, 1: this was presumed from the following comment, after noting media vibrancy:
‘Furthermore, some of the smaller parties were of the view that access to the media was very
helpful in that it offset their limited manpower and organizational resources for campaigning.’
2005
Sources
Organization of American States. Report of the Electoral Observation Mission to Suriname 2005
(online)
Notes
Parliamentary despite executive powers of President, as the President is elected by the
parliament.
4. Voter register, 0: the accuracy of the list is controversial. As the report ends the even handed
section by offering evidence that seems to validated the concerns (namely, very large numbers
of polling cards that could not be distributed) we coded as 0. (In the concluding section: ‘The
Mission noted questions about the voter list and believes that the list was probably too large’)
2010
Sources
United States Department of State country report on human rights practices 2010 – Suriname
Notes
2. 0 From OAS report 2010: ‘The district commissioner, appointed by the president, is the
highest government official in each district and also is responsible for election administration in
the district.’
Sweden: all years sourced from IPU Parline and US Department of State Country Report on
Human Rights Practices
1976, 1979, 2006, 2010: Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Switzerland
2007
Sources
Swiss Confederation. Federal Elections, 21 October 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment
Mission Final Report
Notes
Incumbency has been coded as na as the Swiss executive is composed of seven members.
All other years sourced from IPU Parline and US Department of State Country Report on Human
Rights Practices
1975, 1979, 1983, 1988, 1991, 1995, 1999 Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
Tajikistan
1991 – note from Keesings contemporary archive – opposition complained of generalised
‘manipulation’ and was backed in this by observer from USSR supreme soviet
1994
Sources
Constitution of Tajikistan
U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994 – Tajikistan
Amnesty International Report 1995 - Tajikistan (online)
Human Rights Watch World Report 1995 - Tajikistan (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘The Government controlled all aspects of the planning for the election and openly
favored the incumbent.’ (US dep of state)
5. Ballot access, 0: Many opposition parties banned and members jailed
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The election was marked by open intimidation by government security
forces who, in some locations, threatened to kill anyone voting for Abdullajanov.’ (US dep of
state)
7. Media access, 0: restrictions on press freedom
8. Vote process, 0: ‘The stuffing of ballot boxes and the substitution of entire boxes was reported
at a number of polling stations.’ (US dep of state)
10. Counting process, 0: see 8 – in addition, ‘Vote-count rigging was also strongly suspected’ (US
department of state), meaning that at least criterion A, the ability to track results, is violated.
1999
Sources
Amnesty International (online)
Human Rights Watch World Report 2000 – Tajikistan (online)
U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999 - Tajikistan
Notes
5. Ballot access, 0: incumbent over 75%, and opposition could not all run de facto and were not
treated equally; large signature requirements in a short time period could not be met by anyone
but the incumbent, and one of three opposition candidate was arbitrarily allowed to run
nonetheless.
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and intimidation including arrests of members of opposition
parties and their relatives and the death in March of one leader rumoured to be planning to
stand in the election.
7. Media access, 0: press not free
10. Counting process, 0: ‘The Government claimed that 98 percent of the electorate voted and
that 96 percent of those voting supported Rahmonov; the claim lacked credibility.’ This
suggests violation of (d) through inflation, and also means (a), the requirement that results can
be tracked, has been violated.
Tanzania
1995
Sources
Commonwealth Secretariat. The Union Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Tanzania.
29 October 1995. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group. (online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 1: notwithstanding difficulties with late openings and inadequate materials
on the day, as these areas were annulled and repolled, so there was not absolute
disenfranchisement, although great inconvenience.
4. Voter register, 0: 20% nonregistration (within threshold) compounded by allegations of
multiple and underage registration ‘incidents’.
6. Campaign process, -22: allegations by each party of incidents of impropriety by the other, and
the opposition of the ruling party to the holding of certain rallies in stadiums belonging to the
party.
7. Media access, 0: imbalance in the quantity and attitude of state media.
8. Voting process, 0: violations of voter secrecy
10. Counting process, -22: not observed.
2000
Sources
The Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries: Tanzania Elections Observer Mission
Report
THE ELECTIONS IN ZANZIBAR, UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA. 29 October 2000. Report of
the Commonwealth Observer Group
Tim Kelsall (2003): Governance, democracy and recent political struggles in Mainland
Tanzania, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 41:2, 55-82
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: a high number of polling stations unable to operate due to missing
materials, some registered voters unable to vote
4. Voter register, 0: widely believed to be fraudulent, detailed by Commonwealth
6. Campaign process, 0: violence, abuse of state resources: noted to some extent by SADC forum,
a greater extent by Commonwealth in Zanzibar, and also by TEMCO as cited by Kelsall: ‘TEMCO
is of the opinion that, all considered, the elections on the Mainland were free but not fair. The
unfairness comes from the big state bias in favour of the ruling party, the heavy handedness of
the police in campaign rallies of opposition parties, and the incomplete separation of state
resources from those of the ruling party’
7. Media access, 0: state media bias
9. Role of officials, 0: poor training of the officials is stressed. In Zanzibar, some armed
personnel in stations.
Observer rating, 0: see TEMCO judgement point 6
2010
Sources
European Union Election Observation Mission: Tanzania Final Report, General Elections
October 2010
Commonwealth Secretariat. Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group. Tanzania General
Elections. 31 October 2010 (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: NEC decisions cannot be appealed
3. Electoral rights, -22: some problems with people missing from registers not able to vote, but
the scale is not clear
4. Voter register, 0: inflation and missing names, does not appear to be malignant
5. Ballot access, -22: ‘During this process, the NEC disputed a significant number of applications
that led to the dismissal of Union presidential and National Assembly candidates from
opposition parties. ...The EU EOM considers that the procedures for the verification of
supporting signatures should be reasonable and provide for opportunities to rectify technical
errors.’ It is not clear whether this opportunity for obstruction was malignantly exploited.
6. Campaign process, 0: some violence in the final week, huge financial advantage to incumbent
party
7. Media access, 1: notwithstanding threats of deregistration to one paper, and incumbent
dominance of private media – freedom of speech otherwise respected, and state owned media
balanced
8. Voting process, 0: notwithstanding an overall positive rating, ‘Unfortunately, the secrecy of
the vote was compromised in 12 percent of observed polling stations and EU observers
reported that in 20 percent of cases the layout of the polling station did not guarantee the
secrecy of the vote. In 11 percent of observed polling stations EU observers noted family and or
group voting.’
10. Counting process, 0: ‘During the final stage of aggregation and validation of the Union and
Zanzibar presidential elections results, both electoral commissions’ proceedings were not
transparent since political party agents or observers were prohibited from monitoring the
process.’ (EU)
Thailand
1976
Sources
Facts on File World News Digest, 10th April 1976: Kukrit ousted in elections
NEW YORK TIMES, 4th April 1976, p9
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: the Ministry of Interior ran elections up until the 1997. After this they were
replaced as they were seen to be abusive of their position. The uncertainty as to whether it is
fair to extrapolate that this position was always abused has impacted data confidence.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The campaign had been marked by violence, largely directed against
left-wing and reformist parties, forcing many candidates to curtail their campaigns.’ (World
News Digest, see also New York Times)
1975
Sources
Keesing Contemporary Archives 1975
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: the Ministry of Interior ran elections up until the 1997. After this they were
replaced as they were seen to be abusive of their position. The uncertainty as to whether it is
fair to extrapolate that this position was always abused has impacted data confidence.
6. Campaign, 0: violence
1979
Sources
Nicro, Somrudee. ‘Thailand's NIC Democracy: Studying From General Elections’. Pacific Affairs,
Vol. 66, No. 2 (Summer, 1993), pp. 167-182
Orathai Kokpol. 2002. “Electoral Politics in Thailand.” In Electoral Politics in Southeast and East
Asia, eds. Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Bruns, and Marei John. Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
Office for Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia.
Churdvit R. (1990). Election process in Thailand. In AMIC -TAF Seminar on Constitutional Law,
the Media, and the Electoral Process In ASEAN : 18-20 April 1990, Singapore. Singapore: Asian
Mass Communication Research & Information Centre. (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Buddhist priests, monks, novice and clergy may not vote (or run as a
candidate)
2. EMBs, 0: the Ministry of Interior ran elections up until the 1997. After this they were
replaced as they were seen to be abusive of their position. The uncertainty as to whether it is
fair to extrapolate that this position was always abused has impacted data confidence.
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying
7. Media access, 1: the US state department’s report includes caveats but the impression given is
that the elections would not have suffered as a result of limits on press freedom
‘generally considered fair and open’
1983
Sources
Nicro, Somrudee. ‘Thailand's NIC Democracy: Studying From General Elections’. Pacific Affairs,
Vol. 66, No. 2 (Summer, 1993), pp. 167-182
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1983 – Thailand
Orathai Kokpol. 2002. “Electoral Politics in Thailand.” In Electoral Politics in Southeast and East
Asia, eds. Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Bruns, and Marei John. Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
Office for Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia.
Churdvit R. (1990). Election process in Thailand. In AMIC -TAF Seminar on Constitutional Law,
the Media, and the Electoral Process In ASEAN : 18-20 April 1990, Singapore. Singapore: Asian
Mass Communication Research & Information Centre. (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Buddhist priests, monks, novice and clergy may not vote or run as a
candidate
2. EMBs, 0: the Ministry of Interior ran elections up until the 1997. After this they were
replaced as they were seen to be abusive of their position. The uncertainty as to whether it is
fair to extrapolate that this position was always abused has impacted data confidence.
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying
7. Media access, 1: the US state department’s report includes caveat but the overwhelming
impressions is that the elections would not have suffered as a result of limits on press freedom
1986
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1986 – Thailand
Orathai Kokpol. 2002. “Electoral Politics in Thailand.” In Electoral Politics in Southeast and East
Asia, eds. Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Bruns, and Marei John. Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
Office for Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia.
Churdvit R. (1990). Election process in Thailand. In AMIC -TAF Seminar on Constitutional Law,
the Media, and the Electoral Process In ASEAN : 18-20 April 1990, Singapore. Singapore: Asian
Mass Communication Research & Information Centre. (online)
United Press International, 28th July, Ted Chan: Nine people die during Thai election -- including
four slain by gunmen
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Buddhist priests, monks, novice and clergy may not vote (or run as a
candidate)
2. EMBs, 0: the Ministry of Interior ran elections up until the 1997. After this they were
replaced as they were seen to be abusive of their position. The uncertainty as to whether it is
fair to extrapolate that this position was always abused has impacted data confidence.
6. Campaign process, 0: violence and ‘charges of vote buying’ which are credible given the
pattern of Thai elections (as addition evidence see IFES 1996 report, Background section: ‘All of
these elections were marred by charges of vote buying and vote rigging’)
1988
Sources
King, Daniel E. ‘The Thai Parliamentary Elections of 1992: Return to Democracy in an Atypical
Year’ Asian Survey , Vol. 32, No. 12 (Dec., 1992), pp. 1109-1123
Orathai Kokpol. 2002. “Electoral Politics in Thailand.” In Electoral Politics in Southeast and East
Asia, eds. Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Bruns, and Marei John. Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
Office for Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia.
Churdvit R. (1990). Election process in Thailand. In AMIC -TAF Seminar on Constitutional Law,
the Media, and the Electoral Process In ASEAN : 18-20 April 1990, Singapore. Singapore: Asian
Mass Communication Research & Information Centre. (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Buddhist priests, monks, novice and clergy may not vote (or run as a
candidate)
2. EMBs, 0: the Ministry of Interior ran elections up until 1997. After this they were replaced as
they were seen to be abusive of their position. The uncertainty as to whether it is fair to
extrapolate that this position was always abused has impacted data confidence.
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The campaign leading up to the March 22 election was similar to the
1988 campaign in that vote buying was quite prevalent and there were charges and
countercharges that campaign workers of various parties had indulged in cheating and
disruptive activities, including violence.’
7. Media access, 1: the US state dep report equivocates on the gravity of caveats to media
freedom, but it is clear that criticism of the government was lively, so for our purposes we have
treated this as a free media.
March 1992
Sources
King, Daniel E. ‘The Thai Parliamentary Elections of 1992: Return to Democracy in an Atypical
Year’ Asian Survey , Vol. 32, No. 12 (Dec., 1992), pp. 1109-1123
Orathai Kokpol. 2002. “Electoral Politics in Thailand.” In Electoral Politics in Southeast and East
Asia, eds. Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Bruns, and Marei John. Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
Office for Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia.
1991 constitution of Thailand: http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/claw0015.pdf
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Buddhist priests, monks, novice and clergy may not vote (or run as a
candidate)
2. EMBs, 0: run by Ministry of Interior, who were perceived to abuse this position
4. Voter register, 1: the IFES 1996 report noted that ‘Typically there is 1-3% error on the list’,
which is an acceptable margin. We took it that a ‘typical’ figure must be based on at least two
recent elections, and have coded 1995 and 1992 accordingly, in the absence of contradictory
evidence
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The campaign leading up to the March 22 election was similar to the
1988 campaign in that vote buying was quite prevalent and there were charges and
countercharges that campaign workers of various parties had indulged in cheating and
disruptive activities, including violence.’
7, Media access, 1: the US state dep report is ambiguous as the state media is seen as ‘sometimes
biased’, but the scale and form of this is not clear. As the result was clearly not to block out the
opposition to any great degree we have coded as 1.
September 1992
Sources
King, Daniel E. ‘The Thai Parliamentary Elections of 1992: Return to Democracy in an Atypical
Year’ Asian Survey , Vol. 32, No. 12 (Dec., 1992), pp. 1109-1123
Japan Economic Newswire, 13th September: Antimilitary Parties Head for Majority in Thai
Election
Orathai Kokpol. 2002. “Electoral Politics in Thailand.” In Electoral Politics in Southeast and East
Asia, eds. Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Bruns, and Marei John. Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
Office for Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia.
1991 constitution of Thailand: http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/claw0015.pdf
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Buddhist priests, monks, novice and clergy may not vote (or run as a
candidate)
2. EMBs, 0: election administered by the interior ministry, and this resulted in a partiality which
impacted election fraud discipline
4. Voter register, 1: the IFES 1996 report noted that ‘Typically there is 1-3% error on the list’,
which is an acceptable margin. We took it that a ‘typical’ figure must be based on at least two
recent elections, and have coded 1995 and 1992 accordingly, in the absence of contradictory
evidence
6. Campaign process, 0. ‘The September campaign was similar to previous ones in several waysthe level of vote buying was high and violent incidents, while somewhat less frequent, still made
canvassing a dangerous occupation’
7, Media access, 1: the US state dep report is ambiguous as the state media is seen as ‘sometimes
biased’, but the scale and form of this is not clear. As the result was clearly not to block out the
opposition to any great degree we have coded as 1.
1995
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights 1995 – Thailand
Murray, David. ‘The 1995 National Elections in Thailand: A Step Backward for Democracy?’
Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Apr., 1996), pp. 361-375
1991 constitution of Thailand: http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/claw0015.pdf
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Buddhist priests, monks, novice and clergy may not vote (or run as a
candidate)
2. EMBs, 0: the Ministry of Interior ran elections up until the 1997. After this they were
replaced as they were seen to be abusive of their position. Uncertainty as to whether it is fair to
extrapolate that this position was always abused has impacted data confidence.
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘Ethnic minorities in the north often lack documentation of Thai
citizenship, effectively barring their participation in the political process’ (US dep of state)
4. Voter register, 1: the IFES 1996 report noted that ‘Typically there is 1-3% error on the list’,
which is an acceptable margin. We took it that a ‘typical’ figure must be based on at least two
recent elections, and have coded 1995 and 1992 accordingly, in the absence of contradictory
evidence
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying
1996
Sources
International Foundation for Electoral Systems. DeGregorio, P. Election Observation Mission.
November 1996. Kingdom of Thailand. Released February 1997. (Online)
1991 constitution of Thailand: http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/claw0015.pdf
Notes
1.Legal framework, 0: monks could not vote (or stand)
4. Voter register,0: errors, duplications
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying and violence
2001
Sources
Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) and Asian Forum for Human Rights and
Development (FORUM-ASIA). Observation Mission Report. Election for members of the House
of Representatives in Thailand. (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: a bachelor’s degree is required to stand by anyone who was not formerly
elected, and buddhist religious figures may not vote.
4. Voter register, 0: addition of phantom voters
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying and bribery, intimidation and violence, including against
candidates
8. Voting process, 0: widespread violations of secrecy
9. Role of officials, 0: officials in many places did not turn up and the centre’s president’s
appointees who replaced them were in fact party affiliates. Combined with the lack of secrecy
this created tension. This is an unusual situation; our coding of 0 strictly applies to point a in
that those officials who did not turn up failed to fulfil their duties.
10. Counting process, -22: ‘suspicions’ that certain confusions covered up cheating
2007
Thailand. Elections to the House of Representatives. 23rd December 2007. Report of the
International Election Observation Mission, by The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL).
Published March 2008. (Online)
Sources
1. Legal framework, 0: members of religious orders were not entitled to vote
3. Electoral rights, 0: many voters were observed being turned away for having a red line
through their names, which was intended to mark eg prisoners, but they claimed they did not
meet the criteria
4. Voter register, 0: missing names
5. Ballot access, 0; pre-coup Prime Minister Thaksin banned from standing along with 111 other
party members
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Despite the heated competition between political parties, the elections
were generally peaceful. However, Human Rights Watch have documented the killings of a
number of canvassers during the course of campaigning – three from PPP, and one each from
the Democrats and Chart Thai. Candidates themselves have been threatened and assassination
attempts made’. Also vote buying.
8. Voting process, 0: violations of ballot secrecy due to inadequate booth setup in 30% of cases.
This was not seen to be abused.
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘the presence of unauthorised individuals (i.e. not members of the PSC or
voters) was observed in 20% of the polling stations visited by ANFREL. Such individuals
included village headmen (phuyaiban), high‐ranking local government officials, and police and
army officers’
2011
Sources
Freedom House: Freedom in the World Report 2012
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Buddhist priests, monks, novice and clergy may not vote (or run as a
candidate)
6. Campaign process, 0: vote buying
7. Media access, 0: media freedom restricted
Timor-Leste
2001
Sources
Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) and Asian Forum for Human Rights and
Development (FORUM-ASIA). East Timor. Toward a new nation building. Report of
International Observation Mission on East Timor Constituent Assembly Elections 25 August – 2
September 2001 (online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: De facto 1/3 were unable to vote having been forcibly displaced
4. Voter register, 0: missing names and faulty inclusions
6. Campaign process, 0: incidents of intimidation and violence. (Assessment of the
improvement in security is generally positive; these incidents seem to be on the initiative of
activists at the local level).
NB that in this election there was no incumbent: position established
2007
Sources
EU Election Observation Mission, Timor-Leste 2007. Final Report: Presidential and
Parliamentary Elections (online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: names of the deceased – about 17,000
6. Campaign process, 0: incidents of violence and intimidation. There was also dubious use of
state resources and cases of potential vote buying but these are unconfirmed
Togo
1993
Sources
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. PDF of various documents, retrieved
from: http://www.ndi.org/files/831_tg_statements_090193.pdf
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
4. Voter register 0: ‘All major opposition candidates suspended their participation in the
election because of their concerns about the accuracy of the registration lists and distribution of
electoral cards’, and ‘voters lists contained significantly more names than could be expected by
demographic indicators’
5. Ballot access, 0: Gnassingbé Eyadéma (RPT) receiving 96.42% of the vote
(africanelections.tripod.com)
6. Campaign process, 0: state resources were used on the incumbent’s behalf
7. Media access, 0: it was only balanced in the final days
The observer mission refused to attend when the government refused to postpone elections. As
a result all other details are coded -22.
1998
Sources
STATEMENT OF THE NDI PRE-ELECTION DELEGATION TO TOGO'S 1998 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION: Lomé, June 11, 1998
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998
Constitution, English version available:
http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/togo/togo_constitution_extracts.pdf
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘Prior to the election, the National Election Commission (NEC), which was created in
1997 and most of whose members were chosen by the Government or the ruling party, did not
act on several recommendations of international observer groups’
3. Electoral rights, 0: exclusion through non-delivery of registration cards, polling stations not
opening (systematic and widespread)
4. Voter registration, 0: prevention of campaigning during registration period effectively
prevented opposition supporter registration. NDI noted that as of June 9th registration was not
up to date.
6. Campaign process, 0: violent intimidation
7. Media access, 0: press not free and state media bias
8. Voting process, 0: ballots burned (destruction of valid ballots)
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘At midday on June 22, officials suspended the vote count for Lome, sealing
and locking ballot boxes and tally sheets, after European Union (EU) observers refused to leave
the premises to permit unmonitored counting of the votes.’ – in violation of observers permitted
viewing of all parts of the process.
10. Counting process, 0: widespread miscounting.
2003
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 - Togo
Amnesty International Report 2004 - Togo
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Elections not held regularly
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘Voters also alleged that they were not allowed to vote because their voter
registration cards could not be found.’ (US dep)
5. Ballot access, 0: ‘Gilchrist Olympio, President of the Union des forces du changement (UFC),
Union of Forces for Change, was barred from contesting the election.’ (Amnesty)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘The President used the military to intimidate and harass citizens and
opposition groups’ (US dep)
7. Media access, 0: restrictions on freedom of press
9. Role of officials, 0: firing on voters who protested irregularities at the voting station
10. Counting process, 0: discrepancy between official figures and credible observation
2005
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 - Togo
Amnesty International Report 2006 - Togo
Notes
We have coded this as a case of incumbent victory, but it is complex. The previous President
died, and a quick constitutional change led to his son being appointed President. However,
under international pressure, another candidate was put in place as interim President. It is this
son who went on to win the election. We consider this to be effectively an incumbency win;
other constitutions also allow an interim President during the holding of elections, and in these
cases it is the President before the interim figure who counts as the incumbent.
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘Some registration centers required, in accordance with the law, only the
national identity card while others demanded several other documents... While voter
registration cards were readily available in the ruling party-dominated Kara region, the
government severely limited access for opposition supporters... Also, many polling stations
opened late, did not have the voter lists, or did not have ballots. A number of polling places
closed on time despite starting late and despite not accommodating all who wanted to vote.’ (US
dep)
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Although names of citizens eligible to vote did not appear on voter lists,
those of deceased persons did appear’(US dep)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘There were several claims that ruling party delegates had given voters
money and pre-marked ballots to cast.’ (US dep) ‘In the days following President Gnassingbé
Eyadéma's death and during the presidential election, the security forces and members of the
militias fired indiscriminately at opposition supporters on protest demonstrations.’ (Amnesty)
7. Media access, 0: press not free
8. Voting process, 0: Observers witnessed several underage children voting. There were reports
that some ballot boxes arrived already filled with ballots. There were numerous reports of
election officials adding ballots to the boxes during the course of election day (US state dep)
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘observers noted the presence of armed soldiers at polling
stations…Representatives of the opposition, legally permitted to be present inside the voting
station, were prevented from doing so.’ (US dep)
10. Counting process, 0: ballot box stuffing – see 8
2010
Sources
Electoral Observation Mission, Final Report – EU
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: The way in which the members of the central EMB are appointed does not guarantee
equal representation of political spectrum (12 of 17 members belong to governing party).
There is a lack of transparency in last minute decision-making.
3. Electoral rights, 0: There was insufficient information given to voters on how to enrol and
why it was important to confirm enrolment.
4. Voter register, 0: Opposition disputes accuracy of electoral role, inconsistencies’ were noted
in the report.
The verification of voter identity, whether they are deceased or of legal voting age, is seen as
very difficult to determine given the lack of data possessed by the state.
Significant disparities were noticed, with large enrolments in the North of the country, where
the ruling party is more dominant, and much lower enrolments in the central and southern
regions, where opposition groups hold more sway.
In the North, people who appeared to be minors, were observed enrolling, this was not
observed to the same extent in other regions.
5. Ballot access, 0: 2 candidates were rejected because they could not pay their ‘security
deposit’, a sum of approx. 25 000£. Another candidate was rejected on the grounds that there
was a discrepancy in the birth dates on his French and Togo Ids and he could not prove 12
months continuous residency in the country. Yet another was rejected because his name was
not listed correctly on identity documents. And another was rejected for lack of correct
documentation.
6. Campaign process, 0: The incumbent’s campaign benefitted from the use of state resources
and a significant financial advantage.
7. Media access, 0: The incumbent received a disproportionate amount of coverage across all
different forms of public media
8. Voting process, 0: Members of the security forces have the effective ability to vote multiple
times
9. Role of Officials, 0: Officials failed to adequately ensure a number of guards against fraud
were effectively implemented, including: correct authorisation of ballot papers, effective use of
indelible ink and confirmation of voter identity.
10. Counting process, -22: Opposition groups claimed fraud. Vote counting observed took place
in a ‘coherent and consensual’ manner, and was generally evaluated as positive by observers.
The process of transmission and centralisation of votes should be improved. The results for
each booth were generally not made publicly available or subject to recounting. There was a
lack of transparency in tallying up final results.
Trinidad and Tobego
1976
Sources
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) – 6 not assumed due to later problems.
1991
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1991 – Trinidad
and Tobago
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines) (media explicit) except 6:
Newspaper reports with regard to campaign process were inconclusive, with some referring to
the peaceful campaign and some to the moderate violence; the specific incidents cited were not
of sufficient severity or direct relevance to warrant a ‘0’.
2002
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 – Trinidad
and Tobago
Notes
8 and 10 could not be assumed from US dep description as free and fair, due to unsubstantiated
complaints raised about small-scale fraud. 6 not assumed due to later problems.
2007
Sources
IPU Parline
Keesings contemporary archives
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 – Trinidad
and Tobago
Freedom in the World 2010: Trinidad and Tobago (sic)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘In October some pre-election violence was reported. One UNC activist
was shot dead and one COP candidate was hospitalized after being severely beaten.’ (IPU
Parline)
8, 9, 10 assumed clean by assumption (see guidelines) and given:
‘The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was the only organization to send foreign observers. It
declared that the elections were "free and fair"’ (IPU) – US dep concurred, as did FIW – ‘The
November 2007 elections were generally considered to be free and fair by observers.’
2010
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010 – Trinidad
and Tobago
Freedom in the World 2011: Trinidad and Tobago (sic)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘during the campaign period, there were isolated incidents of vandalism
and violence’
8 and 10 assumed from US dep: ‘The Caribbean Community observers found the May 24
national elections to be generally free and fair.’ FIW also – ‘The 2010 legislative elections were
generally considered to be free and fair by observers.’
Turkey
1977
Sources
Keesing Contemporary Archive
Notes
The opposition were the first to attempt to form a government, but it lost a vote of no
confidence the next month after which the incumbent formed a government, so this has been
coded as an incumbent win.
6. Campaign process, 0: violence. This was continued from prior to the elections but was also
specific to the election in content including assassination threats against candidate Mr Ecevit
and violence at electoral meetings.
Did not assume clean due to serious problems of military control in next election.
1983
3. Electoral rights, 0: you could not vote if you had failed to vote in the 1982 constitutional
referendum
5. Ballot access, 0: military personnel vetoed some parties’ candidates and leaders. Only three
of sixteen parties permitted and 20% of their candidates rejected.
7. Media access, 0: some restrictions remaining on freedom of press, notwithstanding a relative
opening up directly related to the elections.
1987
Sources
The Guardian (London). Adrian Forman. November 30, 1987. Ozal tipped to win 'free and fair'
vote
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: bomb attacks targeted at ANAP
8 and 10 not assumed as wording of ‘free and fair’ was too caveated.
All earlier years sourced from IPU Parline, US Department of State Country Report on Human
Rights Practices and Keesings contemporary archives
All years Legal framework, 0: military personnel, including those on compulsory service, may
not vote
1991 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2007
Sources
Republic of Turkey. Early Parliamentary Elections, 22 July 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Election
Assessment Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: The overarching body administering the elections, the Supreme Board of Elections
(SBE) composed of senior judges, commands widespread confidence and respect, underscored
by the transparent, professional and efficient performance of the election administration as a
whole. However, decisions of the SBE cannot be appealed.’ (emphasis added)
4. Vote register, -22: ‘While representatives of the authorities informed the OSCE/ODIHR EAM
that all citizens of Turkey have already been registered in the system, other interlocutors
indicated that in some areas of southeastern Turkey considerable numbers of the population
may need still to be registered.
7. Media access, 0: moderate concerns about freedom of speech and disproportionate time
allocation in news coverage
2011
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report
Notes
Legal framework 1 but note that report recommends overturning the denial of vote to military
and the permanent barring from office of anyone imprisoned for over a year.
2. EMBs, -22: much of the commission’s work is reportedly de facto split with local
administrations, but it is not clear how this affected impartiality.
4. Voter register, 1: opposition concerns, but the report’s claim that they were addressed
‘openly’ implies that this was resolved.
5. Ballot access, -22: unable to assume as two parties were rejected and nine withdrew
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘A few violent campaign-related incidents occurred and a number of
attacks on party offices were reported.’
7. Media access, 0: legal limitations on freedom of the press
Turkmenistan
2007
Sources
Republic of Turkmenistan. Presidential Election, 11 February 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Needs
Assessment Mission Report (online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2007 – Turkmenistan
Reuters: Turkmen President Wins 97 pct of Vote in Election. 13th Feb 2012 (sic, references to
2007 election) (online)
RIA Novosti. 27/12/2006 Turkmen opposition presidential candidate reported missing (online)
Notes
Nb incumbent refers here to the interim President, after the death of the President.
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘This concern stems from the fact that, in accordance with the
Constitution, nomination of candidates is possible only by members of the PCT, that potential
candidates have to have served as state officials and that candidates registered subsequently by
the Central Election Commission (CEC) can be withdrawn at any time by the PCT.’ (OSCE)
5. Ballot access, 0: incumbent over 75%
6 Campaign process, 0: opposition leader arrested
7. Media access, 0: press not free
2012
Sources
Freedom House: Freedom in the World Report 2012
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2012 - Turkmenistan, 6 June 2012 (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: ‘A new, more restrictive law on presidential elections was passed in June,
2011, effectively barring members of the opposition-in-exile from running for the presidency.’
5. Ballot access, 0: winner over 75% of vote, and see 1; all candidates registered were ruling
party members.
7. Media access, 0: press not free
Tuvalu
2002
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2002 – Tuvalu
Notes
8 and 10 assumed from US dep ‘generally free and fair’
2006
Sources
The University of the South Pacific. Report: Electoral Systems Research Reference Group Meeting.
27th February 2009. (online)
Hassall, G. The Tuvalu General Election 2006. Democracy and Elections project, Governance
Program, University of the South Pacific (online)
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2006 – Tuvalu
Notes
4. Voter register, 1: on basis of a detailed description by Hassall that noted no problems, and a
comment in the USP report that ‘Presently, the voter registration system seems to be working well’
7. Media access, 0: ‘The constitution and law provide for freedom of speech and of the press, but the
government occasionally limited these rights in practice.’
8 and 10 assumed from US dep ‘generally free and fair’
2010
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2010 – Tuvalu
Notes
7. Media access,1: NB despite lack of government interference no independent media exists
8 and 10 assumed from US dep ‘generally free and fair’
Uganda
1996
Sources
IFES: Uganda: Long-Term Observation of 1996 Presidential and Legislative Elections
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: educational requirement of A level of equivalent to run
4. Voter register, 0: assumed from the fact that after the Presidential elections, further efforts to
correct the register for the parliamentary elections three weeks later was viewed as a priority
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process, 0: harassment of opposition supporters
2001
Sources
Human Rights Watch, Uganda: Not a Level Playing Field: Government Violations in the Lead-Up
to the Election, 1 February 2001, A1301 (online)
Select Committee to investigate causes of Election Violence and other related matters (online)
Human Rights Watch March 2004. State of Pain: Torture in Uganda. Vol. 16, No. 4 (A) (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: educational requirement of A level of equivalent to run
2. EMBs, 0: commission not independent
4. Voter register, 0: ‘The electoral process has also been marked by irregularities in the
registration of voters and the voter register’ (Human Rights Watch) – ghost voters and missing
names.
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘In addition to its financial and structural advantage, arbitrary arrests,
attacks, and intimidation have been directed against the political opposition and its supporters,
and campaign agents.’ (Human Rights Watch)
7. Media access, 0: ‘in the lead-up to the election, harassment of journalists and news editors,
and inequality in media access has intensified’ (Human Rights Watch)
8. Voting process, 0: multiple voting, voter impersonation, under age voting, ballot box stuffing
9. Role of officials, 0: interference by the army and candidate agents
10. Counting process, 0: ballot box stuffing, and allegations of miscounting (nb however that
‘only’ 18% of respondents saw the counting as not open, and the rest rated it highly)
Out of 5 judges, 2 considered the irregularities substantial enough to annul the election. ‘Even the
three judges who voted that the illegalities did not affect the result of the election in a substantial
manner agreed that there were illegalities and that “there was evidence that in a significant
number of Polling Stations there was cheating” and that in some areas of the country, “the
principle of free and fair election was compromised.”’ (HRW torture report)
2006
Sources
Peterson, C. Uganda: Presidential, parliamentary and local council elections 2006. NORDEM
Report 08/2006 (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: educational requirement of A level of equivalent to run
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘The DEMGROUP in their preliminary report stated that their observations
indicate that more than 150 000 Ugandans were disenfranchised because their names were not
in the register.’ This occurred despite the fact that they had inspected the voter register during
the display period and had been given voter cards. This is not thought to have affected any one
group disproportionately.
4. Electoral register, 1: an earlier figure of 10.45m, 90% had been registered; the final figure was
10.6m.
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1
6. Campaign process, 0: one key opposition candidate was arrested, and spent much of the
campaign in prison or dealing with court proceedings, in violation of b.
7. Media access, 0: disproportionate space in media, presumably including the many
government owned branches, to Museveni, and also isolated cases of infringements on freedom
of speech
2011
Sources
Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group
European Union Election Observation Mission: Final Report
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: A level of equivalent required to run
2. EMBs, 0: independence compromised
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘The delays in opening of polling stations and problems with the Voters‟
Register led to considerable disenchantment, and consequent disenfranchisement. While it is
not possible to quantify the number of disenfranchised voters, the numbers were significant
enough to cause concern.’ Commonwealth
4. Voter register , 0: see above, also thousands of duplicates and probably deceased. NB this is
in the context of a considerable improvement effort which achieved a great deal.
5. Ballot access, 0: see 1.
6. Campaign process, 0: instances of violence, financial advantage to incumbent including state
resources, bribery
7. Media access, 0: state media bias
8. Voting process 0 – secrecy not assured by layout – stressed by both reports although
manipulation of this is not recorded.
9. Role of officials, 0: widespread lack of knowledge of important procedures among officials
Observer rating, 0: commonwealth.
Ukraine
1994
Sources
Olena Nikolayenko (2004): Press freedom during the 1994 and 1999 presidential elections in
Ukraine: a reverse wave?, Europe-Asia Studies, 56:5, 661-686
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. July 12, 1994. "Advice from above" leads to electoral
violations in Odessa, more in Kharkov
Agence France Presse July 10, 1994 Kravchuk fights for post as Ukraine holds presidential
election
The Associated Press July 10, 1994 Ukraine Polls Open: G-7 Aid Boosts President
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Legal framework – unclear – new constitution not drafted until 1996, but former constitution of
1978 does not describe presidential elections
2. EMBs, 0: EMB criticised as ‘politicized’ (Keesing summarising observers)
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘rural communities had been subject to unfair pressure during
campaigning’ (Keesing description of observer conclusions)
7. Media access, 0: ‘Kravchuk received preferential treatment in state-owned publications.’
Nikolayenko.
9. Role of officials, 0: observers not allowed in all polling stations (Keesings)
Could not code 8 and 10 despite US dep free and fair due to opposition allegations of fraud (see
AFP, AP) and isolated incidents noted by BBC.
1999
Sources
International Republica Institute. 1999 Ukraine Presidential Election Observation Mission
Report. October 31, 1999 and November 14, 1999 (online)
Notes
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Throughout both rounds of the election, there were many troubling
reports of government employees and resources being used in favor of the incumbent’, and
distribution of cash to voters. In addition, ‘On October 2, 1999, Progressive Socialist Party
candidate Natalia Vitrenko was wounded during a campaign appearance in central Ukraine after
two grenades were launched into the crowd. Vitrenko was a leading contender to Kuchma in the
first round election’. Finally, ‘IRI observers heard many complaints that directors of schools and
universities, hospital administrators, factory directors, military commanders and others,
directed their subordinates to vote for specific candidates.’
7. Media access, 0: ‘State media was overtly biased in favor of the incumbent’. Harassment of
media arguably restricted freedom of speech.
8. Voting process, 0: group voting was common, and also there were concerns in institutions
such as prisons and hospitals about manipulation of the voter list,
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘The participation of unauthorized personnel in the operation of some
polling stations and the clear lack of designated commissioners for answering questions and
providing guidance contributed to an atmosphere of disorder, and ultimately to a lack of
transparency’
2004
Sources
Ukraine Presidential Election. 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004. OSCE/ODIHR
Elections Observation Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: ‘The CEC and a large number of Territorial Election Commissions (TECs) were not
transparent or politically neutral in the administration of the electoral process.’
3. Electoral rights, 0: ‘On 31 October, a relatively large number of voters were turned away from
polling stations because their names did not appear on the lists, lessening the ‘universality of
the vote’.’
4. Voter register, 0: ‘Voter lists compiled by local government authorities contained numerous
errors and omissions’
6. Campaign process, 0: abuse of state resources, coercion and restrictions on freedoms
(markedly improved for last round)
7. Media access, 0; ‘During the run-up to the first and second rounds of voting, the media,
including the state media, demonstrated an overwhelming bias in favour of Mr. Yanukovich’
(markedly improved for last round)
8. Voting process, 0: ballot box stuffing, violations of secrecy, multiple voting
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘the presence of large numbers of police and other unauthorised persons in
polling stations during polling and tabulation of results’
10. Counting process, 0: ballot box stuffing
2010
Sources
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 1: it seems that names missing from lists were allowed to vote under special
procedures. No other potential problems raised.
4. Voter register, -22: some unknown number of voters had trouble finding their names, in 14%
of polling stations in first round,12% in second. The process of register updating however was
extensive. It is not clear whether this is of a scale to code as 0.
5. Ballot access, -22: could not assume as the CEC rejected 50 out of the 68 nominees who
applied for registration, but the OSCE report describes this as mainly due to documentation and
describes the process as inclusive
6. Campaign process, 0: Prime Minister Yuschenko used state resources as a Presidential
candidate to an extent which prompted two warnings. This was in the context of an otherwise
positively assessed campaign.
7. Media access, 0: state owned media bias
8. Voting process, 1: family voting, at 5% in the first round and 2% in the second, was below our
threshold
United Kingdom
1979, Keesings Contemporary Archives and US dep, Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2005
Sources
General Elections, 5 May 2005. United Kingdom. OSCE/ODIHR Assessment Mission Report
(online)
Notes
Voting and counting procedures are described at length with no pronouncement either way
about their fairness. Given the overall positive view of the election in the report and the lack of
explicit mention of fraud despite close description, we presumed that voting and counting were
acceptable.
2010
Sources
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. General Election, 6 May 2010.
OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report (online)
Notes
Accuracy of voter registers difficult to establish, system theoretically open to abuse
United States of America
2000
Sources
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption – see guidelines – except 6 due to concerns of some NGOs that minorities
were intimidated, -22.
8 notwithstanding the controversy over dimpled ballots, due to the final ruling recorded in
Keesing that the difference would not have altered the outcome
2008
Sources
4 November 2008 General Elections. United States of America OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
4. Voter register, -22: There were court cases over some controversies, and the report notes that
‘In mid-October, the estimated number of registered voters was in excess of 180 million, with
the voting age population estimated at about 231 million (including non-citizens)’ – but we have
no information on the likely number of non-citizens. There is no conclusion in the report.
8. Voting process, 1: in line with our guidelines, instances of violation of ballot secrecy which
were isolated and were not abused have been ignored.
9. Role of officials, 0: some states did not allow international (or indeed, nonparty) observers.
10. Count, -22; observers did not stay for the count.
Uruguay
1984
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1984 – Uruguay
Bertelsmann Transformation Index
Keesing Contemporary Arcives
Notes
1 Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
2 BTI – ‘The electoral management body (the electoral court), appointed by the congress by a
two-thirds majority, enjoys a long tradition of impartiality and effectiveness.’
5. Ballot access,0: Perreira detained to prevent his participation. Others banned from
participation.
7. Media access,1: restrictions lifted for transition
1989
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1989 – Uruguay
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1994
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994 – Uruguay
Notes
Clean by assumption (see guidelines)
1999
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999 – Uruguay
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003 – Uruguay
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
3,4,5,6,8,9,10 clean by assumption (see guidelines)
2004
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 – Uruguay
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
(7 notwithstanding som charges against journalists)
Clean by assumption
2009
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009 – Uruguay
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumption
Uzbekistan
1991
Sources
Melvin, N. ‘Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road’ – Embassy of
Uzbekistan to the United States website - http://www.uzbekistan.org/uzbekistan/history/
Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 - Soviet Union
Polity IV Country Report 2010: Uzbekistan (online) (for observer rating)
Notes
Although this was formally a new post we have coded incumbent as winning as the individual
occupying the executive position remained the same
1. Legal framework, 0: elections not held regularly
5. Ballot access, 0: over 75%
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘restrictions were placed on opposition groups, particularly in the run
up to the elections’ (Melvin)
7. Media access, 0: freedom of press restricted
2000
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 2000 - Uzbekistan
Also see 2007 OSCE report
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: The referendum extending the President’s office by two years meant
elections were not held regularly.
4. Voter register, 0: extrapolated from the ongoing absence of a national voter register database
in 2007; the OSCE report for this year (see 2007) describes an ad hoc registration process
perceived to lead to inaccuracy
5. Ballot access, 0: incumbent over 75% of vote
6. Campaign process, 0: intimidation of dissident citizens
7. Media access, 0: press freedom limited
2007
Sources
Republic of Uzbekistan. Presidential Election, 23 December 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: The requirement that signatures of 5% of the population are collected
was deemed unacceptably restrictive by the report.
2. EMBs, -22: a lack of transparency left the report with no conclusions about the CEC
4. Voter register, 0: registers were not up to date, with hundreds of voters adding themselves on
the day by showing proof of ID
7. Media access, 0: ‘The OSCE/ODIHR monitoring of news coverage revealed that the main
broadcaster, Uzbekistan State Television, was distinctly biased in favour of the incumbent.’
8. Voting process, 0: multiple voting
10. Counting process, 1: while nothing on the counting day directly contravened our criteria, it
should be noted that a lack of clear procedure was a serious concern
Vanuatu
1983
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1983 - Vanuatu
Sources
Notes
7. Media access, 0: restrictions on freedom of the press
1987
Sources
Premdas, R. and Steeves, J. ‘The 1987 National Elections and Their Aftermath’. The Journal of
Pacific History, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Apr., 1989), pp. 110-117
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1987 - Vanuatu
Notes
7. Media access, 0: at time government restricts access to the media which it exclusively controls
Clean by assumption except 4 and 6 (see guidelines): additionally, ‘the campaign and voting
were considered by outside observers to be fair’.
1991
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1991 – Vanuatu
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
7. Media access, 0: press not free
Clean by assumption except 4 and 6 (see guidelines), supported by ‘the campaigns and voting
were considered by outside observers to have been fair’ (US dep)
1995
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1995 – Vanuatu
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
7. Media access, 0: ‘the Government's influence on the media prevented opposition parties from
fully publicizing their views.’
Clean by assumption except 4 and 6 (see guidelines), supported by ‘Outside observers generally
consider the 1995 campaign and voting to be fair’ – data confidence impacted
1998
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 – Vanuatu
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
7. Media access, -22: unclear from US dep whether state controlled media is abused
8 and 10: ‘Outside observers consider the 1998 elections to have been generally free and fair’,
however, Keesings notes that it was an election characterised by charges of voting rigging.
2002
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 – Vanuatu
Freedom in the world 2003. Vanuatu. (Online)
Saul, D W. Vanuatu Elections Observer Group for the 2002 National Elections. Overhead
presentation to Vanuatu Governance Update 2002, School of Law, University of the South
Pacific. 9th August 2002. (online)
Jowitt, A. ‘Vanuatu’, in ‘Political Reviews: Melanesia’, in The Contemporary Pacific, Fall 2003.
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: ‘fundamentally flawed’ (Saul)
5. Ballot access, 1: Jowitt goes in to some detail on rejected candidates and does not raise any
cases which would cause a zero rating
6. Campaign process, 0: one violent incident detailed by Jowitt has caused a zero rating because
the candidate concerned was publically defending the incident and threatening to deport the
citizen attacked, indicative of an insecure environment for campaigning. It should be noted
however that this incident was described as the ‘worst’ point.
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘significant’ cases where procedures were not followed, training and
instructions deemed inadequate (Saul)
8 assumed from US dep ‘National elections held in April were considered generally free and fair’
and the absence of specific issues raised by EOG in their discussion of polling.
2004
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 – Vanuatu
Keesings contemporary archives
Notes
Clean by assumptions except 4 and 6 (see guidelines) – media explicit
2008
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2008 – Vanuatu
Freedom in the World 2009 – Vanuatu (online)
Notes
3 Electoral rights -22 – nb allegations of fraudulent denial of some voters’ suffrage by claiming
that they weren’t on the list
8 and 10 could not be assumed:
‘The most recent national parliamentary elections were held in September and were considered
generally free and fair.’
HOWEVER “Although there were a handful of reports of fraud and irregularities, mainly from
opposition candidates, the elections were deemed credible.” “Parliamentary coalitions have
been formed and dissolved with increasing frequency since the 1990s, and fraud and bribery
are widespread in elections.” (freedom house)
Venezuela
1983
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1983 – Venezuela
Notes
6 – 10 clean by assumption (see guidelines). 3 and 4 not treated accordingly due to a later
theme of registration problems.
1988
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1988 – Venezuela
Notes
8 and 10, 1: free and fair
1993
Sources
United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1988 – Venezuela
Keesing contemporary archive
Notes
US dep described as free and fair but opposition alleged fraud, no assumptions possible.
Campaign period described as tense.
1998
Sources
International Republican Institute. Venezuela’s 1998 Presidential, Legislative, and
Gubernatorial Elections. Election observation report (online)
Nohlen, D (2005) Elections in the Americas: A data handbook. Oxford University Press.
Notes
3. We coded electoral rights as -22 as it is not known how the below were dealt with.
4. Voter register, 0: ‘It is widely agreed that as many as two million citizens are unregistered’
2000
Sources
Organization of American States. Report. Electoral Observation Mission in Venezuela. 2000
General Elections. (Online)
Nohlen, D (2005) Elections in the Americas: A data handbook. Oxford University Press.
Notes
2. EMBs has been, 1: the report attributes the first team’s resignation entirely to technical faults
rather than a violation of any of our conditions
4. Voter register, -22: there were some issues of double registration but no scale is indicated.
The claim that it was ‘not significant’ must be weighed against findings of registration problems
in other years.
2006
Sources
European Union Election Observation Mission. Final Report. Presidential Elections Venezuela
2006 (online)
Nohlen, D (2005) Elections in the Americas: A data handbook. Oxford University Press.
Notes
4. Voter register, 0: as ‘the CNE estimates that to date there are over 1 million youths, over the
age of 18, who have yet to be registered’ and inclusion of some deceased.
7. Media access, 0: ‘the great majority of the media, both public and private, did not comply with
their obligations, offering information that was often biased and partisan, and openly
supporting one or another of the main presidential candidates.’
9. Role of officials, 0: ‘In 34% of the visited Polling Stations campaign activities or party symbols
were observed’
Yemen
1999
Sources
US department of state country report on human rights practices 1999 – Yemen
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: candidates must be endorsed by at least 10% of parliament to run
4. Voter register, 0: ‘however, there were some problems, including the lack of a credible voter
registration list’ (US department of state)
5. Ballot access, 0: incumbent over 75% of vote
7. Media access, 0: limits on state freedom
2006
Sources
http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/missions/yemen-final-report_2006_en.pdf
http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/birthofmodernyemen/bmy14.htm#2006 presidential
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: Eligible candidates must be voted on by the Shura Consultative Counsel
before they may run, and ‘The procedure for presidential candidate nomination unduly restricts
the universal right of Yemeni citizens to seek election and may arbitrarily exclude eligible
citizens from standing, even in circumstances where they have notable levels of public or
political support.’. In addition, the practice of Islam is a requirement.
2. EMBs, 0: ‘there were real concerns at the partisanship within the SCER towards the ruling
General People’s Congress (GPC) and there were instances where opposition representatives on
election commissions were sidelined from decision-making.’
3. Electoral rights, 0:‘There exists widespread acknowledgement in the country that women’s
votes are directed by male family members’, violating A.
4. Voter register 0: ‘Despite the adequacy of the framework for voter registration, there is
political consensus that the voter register contains significant numbers of inaccuracies, such as
duplicate entries of eligible voters and the names of persons who are not eligible to vote,
including many minors.’ A cleanup exercise was carried out that did not meet any agreed
transparency standards.
5. Ballot process is coded as 0 as many eligible to stand may in fact not compete (see 1), and also
de facto difficulties in women standing. In addition Ali Abdullah Salih received 77.17 of the
official vote count
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘Several candidates and supporters of the JMP were arrested on charges
that would appear to have been politically motivated. There were credible reports of pressure
upon local candidates, especially women candidates, to withdraw their nominations. The
fairness of the campaign was undermined by the systematic and exclusive use of State resources
to favour the incumbent’
7.Media access, 0: ‘The State electronic media fulfilled obligations to provide access and free
airtime to presidential candidates but showed clear bias in the level of its news reporting of the
activities of the President Saleh and the GPC-led government.’
8. Voting process, 0: breaches of secrecy, intimidation, underage voting, attempts at influence,
limited ballot box stuffing and multiple voting.
9. Role of officials, 0: campaigning in the polling booths
10. Counting process, 0: credible reports of irregularities, limited ballot box stuffing,
discrepancies in results data
Zambia
1991
Sources
National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center. ZAMBIA: THE OCTOBER 31, 1991
NATIONAL ELECTIONS (online)
Notes
3. Electoral rights, 0: problems with the nonregistered voting.
4. Voter register, 0: use of a 1990 register.
5. Ballot access, 0: Chiluba obtained 75.76% of the vote (source: EISA)
6. Campaign process, 0: state allocated funds to UNP and not to other parties, which is
tantamount to the party using state resources; incident of violence targeted at supporters and
candidates; a state of emergency which allowed government to control rallies, meetings etc, and
which the opposition claimed was unfairly applied.
7. Media, 0: biased reporting on state television
9. Role of officials, 0: the failure to follow the procedure of official stamping in some cases was in
fact a serious oversight as these could then not be counted
1996
Sources
National Democratic Institute. FINAL REPORT: THE NOVEMBER 18, 1996 NATIONAL
ELECTIONS IN ZAMBIA A POST-ASSESSMENT REPORT (online)
Notes
1. Legal framework, 0: the changing of candidacy laws in May to require second generation
citizenship which disqualified the key opposition candidate. While we have not treated laws
pertaining to nationality as improper in all cases, this was clearly politically motivated to deny a
particular candidate the constitutional right to run.
2. EMBs, 0: widespread lack of faith in their impartiality
4. Voter register, 0: omissions and extra names
6. Campaign process, 0: ‘political repression of selected political and civic opposition leaders’
and restrictions on freedom of assembly
7. Media access, 0: ‘biased press coverage including the media’s refusal to run paid
advertisements by the opposition’
8. Voting process, 0: even with limited observer coverage there were reports of ‘duplicate voter
registration cards, the disappearance of a few ballot boxes, and some harassment and
intimidation’
2001
Sources
The Carter Center. Observing the 2001 Zambia Elections. Final Report. (Online)
Notes
2. EMBs, 0: widely shared concerns about impartiality
3. Electoral rights, 0: disenfranchisement of thousands through delays and inconsistent
applications of extended polling hours
4. Voter register, 0: ‘serious concerns about the registration process and the integrity of the
voters list’, and unnecessarily severe obstacles to registering in contravention of c.
6. Campaign process, 0: bribery, use of state resources and interference with rallies*
7. Media access, 0: media bias
10. Counting process, 0: violation of b, as ‘several observers concluded that the process did not
allow party agents and independent observers to inspect the ballot papers adequately’
*Data confidence has been coded as 3 as the Carter Center often simply passed on the views of
opposition members; however, these were presented as credible.
2006
Sources
Commonwealth Observer Group. 2006 Zambia Elections - Final Report. (online)
Notes
4. Voter register, 1:as the report is positive about the register while noting that logistical
difficulties may have hampered registration. As no estimate is given of the scale of potential
shortfall, we have coded with the sentiment of the report that this is closer to being a good than
a bad register. A later note that some were turned away on account of the register claims
numbers were ‘very small’ so we have not let this affect 3 or 4.
6. Campaign process, 1: notwithstanding isolated clashes between party supporters, as the
relationship between these incidents and engagement in election activity was unclear
7. Media access, 0: ‘there was still evidence of bias towards the ruling party on the part of the
government-controlled media, in terms of news coverage of the campaign.’
2008
Sources
EISA Election Observer Mission Report. Zambia Presidential By-Election. 20 October 2008.
(Online)
Notes
Incumbent did not stand: died.
4. Voter register, 0: time constraints on this election ‘could not allow for a specific voter
registration exercise to be conducted in time for the 2008 presidential election’, so the 2006
role was used.
7. Media access, 0: public media was unbalanced in favour of incumbent (in this case, private
media was biased in favour of the opposition)
2011
Sources
European Union Election Observation Mission: Zambia Final Report, General Elections, 20
September 2011
Notes
1. Legal framework, 1: notwithstanding a ban on civil servants running which extended to
teachers
2. EMBs, 0: impartial but capacity limitations required reliance on district structures,
compromising independence
4. Voter register, 0: ‘85 per cent, of the eligible population... There remain anomalies in the
register including details of a significant number of deceased persons and errors that have been
generated by clerical mistakes’
6. Campaign process, 0: large financial advantage for incumbent including use of state resources
7. Media access, 0: state-owned media bias
Zimbabwe
2008
Sources
Report of the PanAfrican Parliament Election Observer Mission (online)
World Council of Churches report (online)
EISA Election Observer Mission Report (online)
Notes
2. EMB, 0: ‘ZEC’s decisions and actions have been controversial and non-transparent. It is
believed that ZEC ordered the arrest of its own staff. Subsequently, new staff members were
recruited and trained.’ (PAP) Also, gerrymandering occurred in violation of a.
3. Electoral rights, 0: costs of registration were prohibitive and thought by WCC not to have
caused some not to vote. EISA notes that a substantial number had been inadequately informed
about where to vote (violating d) and returned home rather than travel long distances to
another station.
4. Voter register, 0: over registration in favour of the ruling party.
6. Campaign process, 0: although the first campaign was relatively peaceful according to the
PanAfrican report (albeit with ‘abuse of public resources’ mentioned), in the run off campaign
‘fundamental civil and political rights such as freedom of assembly, freedom of movement were
severely curtailed.’ (PAP) A presidential candidate was arrested. An opposition rally insisted
on by the Supreme Court while the mission were there – the only such event – was disrupted by
militias.
7. Media access, 0: in the run off campaign, ‘Both the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC)
and the main government newspapers aired no advertisement of the opposition, giving an
impression of a deliberate total black out. Regrettably, the state controlled media was used as a
vehicle to discredit the opposition candidate in all forms’ (PAP), and ‘Reports of death threats
and harassment against some media houses and journalists amounted to a clear violation of the
freedom of the press’(PAP)
8. Voting process,0: particular problems with police voting and postal voting where reports
suggest secrecy was not assured and the increase in postal votes suggests manipulation.
9. Roll of officials ,0: postal/officials voting could not be observed by international observers,
violating e. Police were present in polling stations.
10. Counting process, 0: in the first round ‘Other concerns included that the opposition,
including the MDC, was excluded from the counting of the V-11 forms for the presidency (Cross,
13 April 2008). ZEC barred all independent observers and moved the counting operation to a
secret, ‘high security’ venue.’ (EISA)