2017
BACKGROUND GUIDE
Military Committee
Further implementing the Readiness Action Plan
Developing security protocols in the Baltic, Black, and Arctic Seas
Planning NATO exercises into 2019
Identifying new framework nation concepts necessary for further
strengthening of the Alliance
Written by Henry Choisser
Chairperson of the Military Committee at NOR-NATO 2017
Letter from the chair
Honorable delegates,
Welcome to the inaugural 2017 NOR-NATO conference. It is my great pleasure to be serving as
your chair for the upcoming session of the NATO Military Committee, the organ of the Alliance
with the greatest personal interest to me. I’m a second-year International Affairs major and
Mechanical Engineering minor at Northeastern University, with a vast cluelessness about what
comes next in my life. This will be my first year with Model NATO, but fourth year in a model UN
program. From the moment I found the program in high school, it has had a profound impact on
my personal and academic life; analyzing the magnitude and multitude of issues that plague our
world, yet which go unreported in the sheltered echo-chamber of American media, has
broadened my perspective in a way that no class ever possibly could. Not dissimilarly, the
environment of the conferences I’ve been to have opened a window of my interpersonal
character I never knew I had. For these reasons and many others, I hope that all of you here will
use this conference to explore the more creative, ambitious, and empathetic sides of yourself, as
well as using the experience you gain as a means of self-reflection.
In this year’s session of the Military Committee, you will be tasked with analyzing a set of issues
that will guide the next decade of Alliance doctrine in almost every region of interest. The
decisions made here will have the capacity to set a precedent of long term peace, through any
number of innovative means, and de-rail the past decade of escalation. Furthermore, the very
composition of the Deterrence framework is under review, and as such, this presents an
unprecedented opportunity to create the change you wish to see in the Alliance.
As you prepare for the conference it is important to keep a few things in mind. Your ability to
engage with your fellow delegates, contribute to debate, and consequently have an enjoyable
time, is inherently dependent on your adequate preparation. This guide is a decent start to your
research, but woefully inadequate for understanding the complexity of each issue – I tell you
this because I intentionally withheld a certain degree of breadth in the hopes that you would
use the additional readings, and that which you find on your own, to bring a more diverse and
individual perspective to the debate (what’s the fun if we can’t learn from each other?). For this
purpose, journal articles are an excellent place to begin your search; a keen-eyed search of the
news can provide some of the more up to date and punchy information relevant to your
country; and going straight to the primary sources is never a bad idea.
I look forward to working with you all in the upcoming months. Getting to see the negotiations
and power brokering of a lively debate room is one of the more interesting things to observe, as
is the creativity that I’ve come to expect from both new and grizzled delegates. That being said,
everyone here will be representing a member of a coalition, your goals are aligned, and
cooperation is paramount. For this reason, I encourage you all to keep an open mind, seek the
compromises that are best for everyone involved, learn from each other; humans are imperfect
beings, and no one member of the room has the perfect solution. Challenge yourself and those
around you to be the best delegates you can.
Excitedly,
Henry Choisser
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Topic I: Finding ways to improve and expand the efficacy of the Readiness Action
Plan specified by the 2014 Wales Summit
General Background
In September of 2014, the heads of state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) ratified the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). The goal of this new strategy was to
improve the ability of NATO forces to rapidly deploy in any region of interest, to create
assurance measures for Eastern Allies, and to improve deterrence measures that were
deemed lacking in today’s evolving security climate. The measures pursuant to this goal
include the creation of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) within the NATO
Response Force, consisting of around 20,000 troops, of whom 5,000 are ground troops,
deployable within 2 days1. The remaining will provide logistical, maritime, and aerial
support for any missions carried out by the VJTF. Furthermore, in September 2015, 6
NATO Force Integration Units were established in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, and Romania as a means to improve coordination of VJTF and other follow on
NATO forces with the local military apparatus2. Similarly, High Readiness Multinational
HQs have been recently inaugurated and expanded in order to provide regional
command for NATO forces in eastern Europe, though some members would like to see a
larger and more permanent presence3.
The changes made by the RAP are not limited only to restructuring and force expansion.
In fact, a significant portion of the high readiness agenda involves the prepositioning of
key supplies and equipment in the case that rapid deployment is necessary on the
eastern or southern fronts. In December of 2016, the United States decided to return
tanks only three years after the last that remained from the Cold War were removed
from Europe4. These assets are seen by some as inflammatory to the Russian question,
and not without reason. Recently, President Vladimir Putin of Russia has accused NATO
of being overly aggressive in the forward positioning of their forces in the territory of
eastern Allies. However, these accusations may seem ironic to some when one considers
the fact that Russia has conducted “snap” exercises directly across the border from
Baltic member states with forces that nearly double the entire NATO Response Force5,
which numbers 40,000 troops (a dramatic increase from the 13,000 before the Wales
Summit).
The RAP, however, is not limited in its scope to purely eastern European defense. The
Southern Flank also poses unique risks and challenges highly dissimilar to those posed
by conventional Russian aggression. The region of North Africa and the Middle East
house numerous heterogeneous conflicts with a variety of security related risks.
1 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm
2 http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_02/20160205_1602-factsheet-rap-en.pdf
3 http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/security-baltic-defense-nato/EN/index.htm
4 http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-army-returns-tanks-europe-nato-eyes-assertive-russia-n696436
5 http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/security-baltic-defense-nato/EN/index.htm
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Namely, the increased prevalence of Terrorism in the 20th century is serious security
concern that comes from a myriad of non-state actors. As such it is imperative that the
Alliance finds new ways to deter attacks on member states.
These non-state actors have demonstrated a willingness and ability to attack the civilian
population of multiple Alliance members, and existing forms of deterrence - primarily
the threat of a declaration of war by all members of the alliance - are of little concern to
entities whom the Alliance cannot declare war on. Creative and effective uses of RAP
forces provide a possible solution to the problem, but may be unfavorable for member
states who do not wish to become entangled in a protracted conflict in the south, when
they believe the primary security concerns of the Alliance lie to the east.
History
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the role of NATO became far less clear. The
absence of a clear enemy led to a dramatic reduction in the military capacity of member
states, who no longer could justify such large military expenditure to their citizens, and
consequently the capacity of the organization as a whole. These issues will be discussed
more thoroughly in a later topic, but they are still relevant to the discussion at hand.
Primarily, we must look at how the current trends differ from those in the early postsoviet era. The 1997 Russia NATO Founding Act provides a strikingly different picture
of the security environment in Europe than the one seen today. The dialogue between
Russia and NATO was constructive, and the transparency promised by the founding act 6
was given openly by both sides.
Both side agreed to limit the positioning and usage of conventional ground forces near
respective borders in the form of permanent “substantial combat forces”, something
that the Russian Federation has accused the Alliance of violating. This however, is not
the case. The agreement specified troop numbers far exceeding their current or past
levels7, though the Russian’s attempt to cry wolf should not be seen as ignorance of the
particulars. Rather, such claims follow a long line of accusations of western aggression
likely meant to forestall the achievement of consensus, namely among members of the
alliance who fear the ire of Russia.
Finding a Solution to the Problem
In order to come up with an effective solution to the problem of Russian aggression,
which is one of the primary goals of the RAP, it is necessary to examine the
shortcomings and successes of previous NATO missions. There is no precedent of
conflict between NATO and Russian forces for us as a body to draw on and learn from,
but by examining missions like Resolute Support in Afghanistan, and the mission to
Kosovo, improvements in the command and support structure for NATO forces can
hopefully be found and implemented in the RAP.
6 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm
7 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm
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In the Alliance’s assessment of the Southern Flank, the last 15 years of conflict in the
Middle East and North Africa provide an excellent source of retrospect, hindsight,
evolution and moderate success in the region. From the annals of the numerous
conflicts, and even more numerous actors, conclusions about new and effective policy
can be drawn. Certain Areas of importance are the means by which power can be
projected into the region effectively and quickly. The Alliance must concern itself with
the question of what warrants a response by NATO forces, and which resources can
most effectively be deployed to achieve the organization's goals.
Questions to Consider in Your Research
● What does my country have to gain out of the RAP?
● How does the RAD fit into the greater picture of the Alliance’s deterrence
strategy?
● Is the current security paradigm as strong as your country would like it to be?
● What capabilities is your country able to provide to the RAP?
● Is the RAD capable of dealing with all the threats it expects to encounter? Are
there threats it is unprepared to counter?
● Who disagrees with the extent of the plan? Who agrees? Who wants more?
● Are there other national and international elements that could cooperate with
the RAP in the future?
● What would lead to the implementation of this plan?
Questions a Resolution Might Answer
● What areas of the program are currently underdeveloped?
● What can both small and large states contribute to any improvements in the
RAP?
● How can the RAP be expanded upon without increasing tensions unnecessarily?
● Is it possible to improve the adaptability of the RAP? Is it necessary?
● How will the plan implement follow on forces most effectively?
● What methods can be used to improve the deterrence and denial strategy of the
Alliance?
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Additional Resources
● http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/06/10/threat-based-strategy-for-nato-ssouthern-flank-pub-63785
● http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-army-returns-tanks-europe-natoeyes-assertive-russia-n696436
● http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm
● https://www.shape.nato.int/ongoingoperations
● http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/security-baltic-defensenato/EN/index.htm
● https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/europe/spooked-by-russiatiny-estonia-trains-a-nation-of-insurgents.html?_r=0
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Topic II: Developing protocols for the changing security environment in the Black,
Baltic, and Arctic Seas
General Background
NATO presently lacks much of the deterrence capability in its maritime forces that the
land based conventional armed forces provide. The forces comprised entirely of NATO
resources are limited to Maritime Groups I and II8, and their anti-mine counterparts.
Unfortunately, both of these groups have suffered from budget issues at home, and a
decreased emphasis on Alliance based security measures among some member states.
This unfortunately leaves a rather lackluster force, capable of doing very little on its
own should an armed conflict against more than pirates or terrorists arise. At the
moment, the mine countermeasure contingent of Maritime Group I has eight vessels,
which is fourfold the number in the actual maritime group itself.
After the termination of Operation Ocean Shield on December 15, 2016, both SNMG1
and SNMG2 are without a discreet mission. Operation Sea Guardian covers the
operational security in the Mediterranean9, but no explicit missions dictate permanent
security measures in the Black, Baltic, and Arctic Seas. In fact, NATO has yet to even
reference the Arctic as a security concern to date10, even though Moscow has articulated
the Atlantic and the Arctic as its two primary focal points for future maritime operations
and development. In 2017, the Russian Northern Fleet is preparing for the
establishment of two new Polar Stations at Kotelny Island and Alexandra Land11, and
furthermore, Russia has constructed 9 new arctic air bases, trained Special Operations
Forces (SOFs) for arctic warfare, and placed radar and s-300 anti-air missiles on polar
islands12. It is clear that Moscow considers the region of crucial importance during any
future conflict, and if the Alliance does not want to be caught flat footed it should as
well.
In the Black Sea, Russia has used the new Crimean ports to begin the construction of 1518 combat vessels to add to their existing Black Sea Fleet13. Contrariwise, NATO has no
such fleet whatsoever. The only activities in the Black Sea on the part of the Alliance are
the annual Sea Breeze training exercises and routine patrols made by national rather
than Alliance ships14. And even these light measures are controversial to Bulgaria, who
has also opposed the concept of a permanent Black Sea Fleet.
As this is the Military Committee, it is imperative that delegates pursue security
protocols and deterrence measures that are in the best interest of the Alliance as a
8 http://www.mc.nato.int/missions/maritime-groups.aspx
9 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136233.htm
10 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/06/nato-summit-2016-time-for-an-arctic-strategy
11 http://arctic.ru/infrastructure/20161223/514325.html
12 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/06/nato-summit-2016-time-for-an-arctic-strategy
13 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/06/nato-summit-focus-black-sea-security-160629071029770.html
14 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/06/nato-summit-focus-black-sea-security-160629071029770.html
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whole. However, one can not be naïve to the inherently political nature of military
action. A balance must be struck between nations who do not want to give non-polar
states political leverage in a region that they otherwise would not have and Alliance
security; likewise, such a compromise must be found in the Black Sea, lest NATO would
like to someday find itself without control north of the Bosphorus.
History
During the Cold War era, the Arctic was seen by the Soviet Union as a key staging point
for any conflict with the west. Almost a dozen military bases dotted the arctic circle15,
and since Russia lacks a plethora of deep water ports, a great emphasis has historically
been placed on the ones they do have. Heavy investment in icebreakers was undertaken
so that the Northern Fleet would not be trapped by winter ice and become inaccessible
if it was needed to support the Baltic fleet, located in St. Petersburg
After Turkey joined NATO in 1952, some of the Soviet emphasis on a Black Sea fleet lost
wind, but as the 21st century has progressed, a marked increase in interest in the Black
Sea has taken shape, primarily when the fleet was used during Russia’s invasion of
Georgia, and when a number of Ukrainian ships were stolen in the aftermath of the
Crimean Crisis.
As a mutual defense alliance, NATO has been focused throughout its history on the
development of effective deterrence and denial strategies that make the risk of
attacking any single member of the Alliance so great as to be strategically impossible. To
this date that has worked, and not simply because Russia has been a peaceful neighbor.
In 2008, Georgia was invaded in a blitz style campaign that combined swift
overwhelming force and electronic warfare to impair Georgian communications16. In
the 2014 Crimean Crisis, the other face of the Russian military strategy was seen;
namely the use of “Maskirovka”, which is a policy of deception and denial meant to
confuse and confound enemy reaction until the strategic victory has been secured17.
Moscow denied the any knowledge of the soldiers that crossed into Crimea until after
the referendum had been completed, at which point it had no qualms about
acknowledging Russian involvement.
Finding a Solution to the Problem
Determining the breadth, depth, and scope of security protocols is far from a new
endeavor for NATO. It has rather been the main endeavor for the majority of the
organization's existence. In order to determine the best course of action with regards to
the evolving and straining security environment two things must be considered. First,
what strategies have been most effective in deterring aggression, and second, what is
15 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/06/nato-summit-2016-time-for-an-arctic-strategy
16 http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/
17 http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31020283
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likely to become the next area of tactical importance. In plain terms, what worked, and
where might our enemies try to exploit us.
Such examinations of NATO security will require the ability to see the issue from a great
number of angles. The league must try to see beyond the national interests that drive so
much of the political side of things and see the ramifications of their decisions through a
multinational lens of cooperation. And most challengingly, the league must attempt to
analyze the issue from the perspective of its adversaries, so as to preempt their
advances.
Questions to Consider in Your Research
● What assets does my country provide in these security environments? What can
it provide?
● What has changed in the Baltic, Black, and Arctic seas in the last two years? Is
this concerning to my country?
● Will there be negative repercussions for my country if tensions escalate in any of
these theaters?
● Which countries are most affected by any new protocols? In what ways will they
be affected?
● What other national and international bodies operate in these areas?
● Which, if any, of the regions does your country consider to be most important?
Questions a Resolution Might Answer
● How can the intensified security concerns be met within a reasonable
timeframe? Reasonable cost?
● Which countries will be responsible for providing the security?
● What improvements can be made to secure these regions without unnecessarily
raising tensions?
● Would security be rotational, optional, compulsory?
● How would these new protocols fit into the existing command structure and
security paradigm?
● What organs would be responsible for these new concerns? New or existing?
Additional Resources
● http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/06/nato-summit-2016-timefor-an-arctic-strategy
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● http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/06/nato-summit-focusblack-sea-security-160629071029770.html
● http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31020283
● http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/07/2
6/russia-revises-navy-doctrine/30705553/
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Topic III: Planning NATO exercises in 2019
General Background
As a military organization, exercises play a crucial role in the upkeep and performance
of all current and future operations. Inherently, the training of a modern military in an
evolving security environment is a dynamic program. Among its many goals, any
effective program must be suitably adapted to changing role that it is asked to fulfill,
and make proper use of all its assets (i.e. the VJTF, NRF, SNMG1/2, ACO, etc.). In order to
maintain the extensive operative capabilities demanded of NATO, the command
structure of the entire organization is oriented around the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)18- established in 1951.
In 2016, the Alliance conducted roughly 150 discrete military exercises in order to
achieve its many strategic goals. These operations are meant, at their most rudimentary,
to test the capabilities of the different organs of the force and command structure and to
assure allies of the effectiveness of the strategic readiness of the many elements of the
alliance. More specifically, operations Noble Jump and Dynamic Manta19 focus on
demonstrating and honing the deterrence capabilities of the most high readiness
contingents of NATO, i.e. the air land and sea components of the VJTF. Ones such as the
CWIX – Interoperability Exercise are intended to provide elements of the NATO
command structure with the experience necessary to operate and navigate the complex
networks of her lines of communication and command hierarchy. The purpose of other
exercises are to assist and improve existing operations around the world, as is the case
with Resolute Support in Afghanistan. And furthermore, there are the integrally
important training exercises, such as Steadfast Cobalt, that improve the interoperability
and cooperation of NATO and national forces, thus strengthening the deterrence and
denial ability on each of NATO’s fronts.
As stated previously, NATO has been accused of being unnecessarily provocative with
the expansion of both the number and size of its annual training exercises. However, to
once again put into perspective, the Russian military conducted nearly 3,000 exercises
in the last year alone20. Furthermore, these operations have involved as many as
120,000 troops, dwarfing the largest NATO drills by almost fourfold; in 2016,
Anaconda-16 involved some 30,000 soldiers, and 20 countries constituting one of the
largest NATO maneuvers since the end of the Cold War21. Not to mention the fact that
the aforementioned Russian exercise took place in the Crimean province of Ukraine, yet
Moscow claims their actions are “not a provocation”22. It is up to the Alliance to
18 https://www.shape.nato.int/page136225017
19 https://www.shape.nato.int/nato-exercises
20 http://www.newsweek.com/putin-calls-snap-drill-russia-military-nato-470224
21 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/06/nato-troops-carry-military-exercise-poland-
160609070447894.html
22 http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-holds-biggest-military-drill-yet-annexed-crimea-n646086
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determine the true intent of such actions and how best to compensate for them: this is
the task most pressing for issue at hand.
History
Exercises have played a crucial role throughout the history of the Alliance - as both a
means of serious training, and as a projection of NATO power and cooperation. For the
sake of simplifying the complex history and motivations of the Alliance, the chronology
of NATO exercises can be divided into three distinct phases. First, during the majority of
the cold war period (1951-1989), exercises were a critical part of demonstrating
deterrence capacity against the Soviet Bloc. Exercises like “Strong Express” sought to
mobilize massive (64,000 soldiers, 300 ships, and 700 aircraft) numbers of troops in
operations that illustrated both area denial and second strike capabilities23. The second
epoch of NATO exercises existed through the 1990’s and into the early 2000’s. The focus
of this period was on peace-building, partnerships, deescalation, and a general
redefining of NATO’s purpose without the threat of a malicious Kremlin to motivate
cooperation. Operation “Cooperative Bridge 94” serves as a quintessential example: a
mere 600 soldiers from less than half the Alliance engaged in training for peacekeeping
missions24. Even the names of the exercises illustrate the change in intent and
organizational mentality.
The paradigm of this new third phase of NATO exercises has dramatically shifted
towards the Cold war mentality, devoid of peacekeeping training, and an increased
emphasis on the projection of Alliance power through the flexing of military capacity. As
has been routinely mentioned throughout, these escalations are not necessarily the fault
of NATO, or even of the Russian Federation. In fact, the last few years of jockeying have
been a nearly textb00k example of the security dilemma - a cycle the Alliance will have
to break if there is any hope for peace in the coming decades.
Finding a Solution to the Problem
As the Alliance looks for ways to bolster its exercises in the intensified security
environment that can be expected in 2019, a number of practical matters must likewise
be brought under consideration. Namely, what responsibility does the Alliance have to
prevent tensions from escalating, and thus internationally justifying the actions of our
adversaries? And contrariwise, what responsibility does it have to keep pace with an
opponent that has already shown a willingness to use extreme military force, and a
territorial ambition in eastern Europe? For these questions, looking back at the
strategies that were most effective during the Cold War may provide a lucrative starting
point, but too much stock cannot be placed on the past, for anyone seeking to
outmaneuver the Alliance will surely be looking at the weaknesses of those very same
strategies.
23 http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//RTV/1972/09/13/BGY508200425/?s=frigate
24 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_24256.htm?selectedLocale=en
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It may also be beneficial to look beyond the Alliance itself; in Anaconda-16 both Sweden
and Finland sent troops to participate in the exercise25. And to bolster international
cooperation in the Baltic and the Arctic, NORDEFCO remains a fledgling but possibly
profitable partner in future training exercises26. In developing stronger relationships
with other international bodies, the Alliance may be able to improve the deterrence
capacities of its own forces, as well as those of possible allies.
Questions to Consider in Your Research
● What kinds of exercises does NATO conduct beyond those already mentioned?
● Which exercises does your country take part in?
● What kinds of exercises do the Alliances adversaries take part in? anything to
learn?
● Are any aspects of NATOs force structure underpracticed? Underutilized?
● Are there any other international organizations that do similar exercises? Would
cooperation be useful?
Questions a Resolution Might Answer
● How can the exercises the Alliance plan adequately prepare for increasingly
credible threats without being provocative?
● Are there any unnecessary exercises? Will any be unnecessary by 2019?
● Which elements of the force structure need improvement?
● Can any exercises be used as a credible show of force without being too
provocative?
● How can future assets be incorporated into new exercises?
● Are exercises necessary in regions like the Arctic?
Additional Resources
● https://www.shape.nato.int/nato-exercises
● http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-holds-biggest-military-drill-yetannexed-crimea-n646086
25 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/06/nato-troops-carry-military-exercise-poland-
160609070447894.html
26 http://www.nordefco.org/
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● http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/06/nato-troops-carrymilitary-exercise-poland-160609070447894.html
● http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_24256.htm?selectedLocale=en
● http://www.newsweek.com/putin-calls-snap-drill-russia-military-nato-470224
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Topic IV: Identifying new framework nation concepts necessary for further
strengthening of the Alliance
General Background
In 2013 Germany proposed the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) to NATO for the first
time. In 2014 the Alliance adopted the idea wholeheartedly. Today, it is developing into
what could be a mainstay of the deterrence capacity of the alliance. The guiding
principles of the FNC focus on the deteriorating military capabilities of individual
members of NATO whose military budgets have suffered from years of cuts, due to
national budget problems, in an age high tech warfare where the costs of equipment
and assets are getting steadily higher. This problem has been affecting the smallest
members of the alliance hardest. For those most impacted, the effect has been a near
neutralization of their ability to take on the full logistical, and operative necessities of
war, if the need arose. What makes this trend so concerning is the fact that most often,
the first elements to go are those focused on support and logistics – what are referred to
as niche capabilities27. The result is a multitude of nations with handicapped militaries,
none of which can facilitate full scale deployment.
The goal of the FNC is for multiple smaller nations to pool their resources around the
backbone of some of the larger Allied militaries, who retain the ability to conduct war in
toto, and to focus their efforts on specialization28. In so doing, the organization hopes to
rebuff the ability of the Alliance to respond to any and all kinds of threat through the
removal of capability gaps across the board. Some members of NATO have expressed
concerns over the possibility that entering such arrangements will dramatically reduce
the autonomy of the smaller member states who provide the specialized function to the
main body of the framework nation that serves as the command of the new
intraoperative grouping of nations. The countervailing argument is that the larger
countries with wholly functioning militaries will become less able to act unilaterally,
since by incorporating the component nations into their force structures, they will be
required to give nations like the Balkan states a say in how when and why the joint
force will act29.
Everything thus stated is an explanation of the existing Framework Nations Concept
that is a cohesive element of the NATO force structure. What the Alliance needs to look
at now is how to capitalize on the newfound cooperation by either expanding the range
of the FNC or by improving the existing components.
History
The concept of pooling resources in order to achieve a better combined outcome is not a
new idea, nor is it limited to NATO or even to military resources. The EU has been using
27 http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=965
28 https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/25780/uploads
29 http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=965
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a system of “pooling and sharing” on a wide range of items, from infrastructural projects
to the assets of the European Defense Agency30. NATO has historically not shied away
from expansion of liberal cooperation, and as a whole, Europe has been at the forefront
of collectivism and liberalism. The CERN Supercollider is another excellent example of
how European nations, 17 in fact, pooled over $13 billion to create something that none
would ever have been willing and able to do alone31.
Until the second half of the 20th century Europe has been a very divided continent - the
birthplace of nationalism - and in the span of less than 30 years saw the two bloodiest
conflicts in history. Since then, through alliances and common interest, there has been
an almost Pax Europa as far as intrastate conflicts are concerned32. Today, neither the
alliances, nor the common interests have waned. They have evolved, but not
fundamentally changed.
Finding a Solution to the Problem
The last few years have proven the operability of the FNC as it is currently outlined, and
in the EU the concept of pooling and sharing has proven to be an effective method of
achieving communal goals that transcend unilateral aims. What the Alliance should be
looking at now are the areas that the existing FNC does not incorporate. Moreover, can
the Framework Nations Concept be used to more efficiently explore areas outlined in
the “Ghent Initiative” such as research and development, intelligence gathering, and
military training programs across Europe?
With any solution that the Alliance seeks to implement there is one predominant
question that must be asked: does cooperation improve the efficacy of operability
and/or reduce cost without incurring an operability cost? History has shown that
bureaucracy does not beget efficiency. However, if done properly, effective cooperation
can result in both improved flexibility and economies of scale.
Questions to Consider in Your Research
● Is my country a part of any framework nations group? If so, which one(s)?
● What niche capabilities can my country provide to the FNC?
● How can my country take advantage of any expansion of the FNC?
● What resources could my country provide to any new elements of the FNC?
● what other examples exist of effective resource sharing? Can they be applied to
NATO?
30 https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/eda-priorities/pooling-and-sharing
31 http://www.ibtimes.com/forbes-finding-higgs-boson-cost-1325-billion-721503
32 https://www.preceden.com/timelines/71548-european-wars
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Questions a Resolution Might Answer
● How will you regulate these new frameworks?
● How can the benefit of any new frameworks be maximized?
● Opt in or compulsory?
● Will any new frameworks use the existing structures formed around Germany
U.K. etc. or coalesce independently?
Additional Resources
● https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/25780/uploads
● http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=965
●
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/se
de260511deseinitiative_/sede260511deseinitiative_en.pdf
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