International Studies Review (2016) 18, 655–680
ANALYTICAL ESSAY
How China Understands Public Diplomacy:
The Importance of National Image for
National Interests
FALK HARTIG
Goethe University Frankfurt
The image of a nation is crucial in the conduct of international relations.
As a rising power, China is increasingly concerned about its image, due
to which it is increasingly investing into its public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, broadly understood as a country’s engagement and communication with foreign publics, has become one important part of China’s
overall diplomacy in recent years. This article introduces the Chinese debates on public diplomacy. In doing so, it helps to better understand
how China sees itself in the world (mainly misunderstood), how China
perceives the international environment (potentially hostile), and how
China wants to be seen by the outside world (as a friendly, peaceful, and
reliable partner). Furthermore, this article demonstrates that in China,
public diplomacy is understood more as an instrument to fulfill strategic
and functional purposes and less as an instrument of mutuality.
Although the non-Chinese discourse focuses on mutuality, exchange,
and reciprocal communication, China is more concerned with getting its
message out and convincing the world of its benign intentions.
Keywords: China, public diplomacy, academic discourse.
Introduction
In June 2015, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia vowed to step up
media cooperation in order to reduce misinterpretation by Western media. At a
China-Russia Media Forum, Liu Qibao, Head of the Publicity Department of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, called on media of both
countries to improve international communication capacities. Lu Xinning,
Deputy Editor-in-Chief of People’s Daily, the CCP’s official newspaper, furthermore urged the media to provide “a fully rounded national image for the world”
because the international images of China and Russia presented by Western media are “occasionally mysterious and ambiguous, even negative and vicious”
(People’s Daily 2015). Chinese President Xi Jinping himself frequently encourages Chinese media to strengthen its international communication capacities in
order to explain China’s story and to spread its voice well (Xinhua 2013). During
a meeting of senior CCP leaders in late 2014, Xi highlighted the importance of international communication for China when saying, “We should increase China’s
Hartig, Falk. (2016) How China Understands Public Diplomacy: The Importance of National Image for National Interests.
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How China Understands Public Diplomacy
soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s message to the world” (Xinhua 2014b).
These statements illustrate that the Chinese leadership “is aware that China’s
reputation in other countries can be a major factor in their assessments of
Chinese intentions and in their corresponding responses to China’s rising capabilities” (Ross and Johnston 2006, 5). Scholars increasingly acknowledge that
China’s concern over its international image and status is “a driving force in
China’s foreign relations” (Li 2012, 33). Several studies (Ding 2008; Li 2009; Barr
2011; Wang 2011) suggest that the PRC in “its search for status as a global power
[. . .] has discovered the importance of international image and soft power”
(Shambaugh 2013, 207) and argue that “image considerations weigh heavily on
the minds of Chinese decision-makers” (Rabinowitch 2008, 32). Those considerations are reflected in the increasing awareness of the importance of public diplomacy, gonggong waijiao, in China.
Public Diplomacy—Conceptual Outline
Public diplomacy can be described as a country’s engagement and communication with foreign publics for the sake of communicating certain narratives and images of the country to promote its soft power and thereby national interests. The
instruments to achieve those objectives include listening and advocacy, international broadcasting and international exchange, cultural diplomacy, and other aspects of strategic communication such as media/psychological warfare (Cull
2009). As public opinion is crucial in contemporary international relations, communication becomes a vital means of generating influence and an ever-more powerful aspect in the conduct of foreign affairs. This makes public diplomacy “one
of the most salient political communication issues in the 21st century” (Snow and
Taylor 2009, ix) and the “most debated topic in the field of international communications” (Taylor 2009, 12), which leads to ambiguities and confusion regarding
its definitions, instruments, and approaches (Fitzpatrick 2010). International relations scholars regard public diplomacy as an instrument to cultivate soft power
(Nye 2004; Mor 2006; van Ham 2010), media and communication scholars apply
the concept of media framing to the study of public diplomacy (Entman 2008;
Sheafer and Shenhav 2009; Brüggemann and Wessler 2014), public relations
scholars study public diplomacy (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, and Kendrick 2013;
Golan, Yang, and Kinsey 2016), and there are increasing calls to evaluate public
diplomacy activities (Banks 2011; Pamment 2013, 2014).
The most important addition to the field, however, is the development from
old to new public diplomacy (Melissen 2005). Old public diplomacy is understood
as a government-centric endeavor, characterized by a one-way flow of information
in which actors control the messages. In this old form of public diplomacy, there
is only limited interaction between the sending and the receiving sides (Pamment
2013). New public diplomacy, on the contrary, focuses more on exchange and collaboration and emphasizes dialogue, relationship building, and the role of nonstate actors (Cull 2013). New public diplomacy furthermore stresses the use of
new technologies and the opportunities provided by social media. This conception mainly occurred after 9/11 when scholars started to stress reciprocal understanding and two-way communication as a means to develop more relational strategies (Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher 2013).
The crucial point, however, is that this new public diplomacy is normative in
the sense that it does not explain how public diplomacy is actually practiced but
much more “how it should be practiced in a changing environment” (Pamment
2013, 8, emphasis in original). While proponents of new public diplomacy highlight, for example, the potential of social media, recent studies indicate that new
technologies do not necessarily bring a new style of communication (Khatib,
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Dutton, and Thelwall 2012; Kersaint 2013). Conceptually, the idea of a new public
diplomacy highlights the shift toward greater dialogue and engagement, but in
practice, strategies of public diplomacy remain locked in simplistic one-way communication approaches, which merely “have been updated with new delivery
methods rather than systematically re-imagined” (Pamment 2013, 127).
The fact that this (academic) paradigm shift is closely linked to 9/11 points to
one of the crucial limitations of current public diplomacy scholarship: the predominance of studies related to the United States. This dominance was noted
some time ago (Gilboa 2008) and was recently confirmed by Metzgar and Hayden
(2013, 16) who surveyed 600 academic articles on public diplomacy and also
found that “the scholarship is looking predominantly at the United States.” This
is surprising as China, for example, has embraced the concept of “public diplomacy with an enthusiasm rarely seen in other parts of the world” (Rawnsley 2012,
126) and presents interesting insights into this growing field of scholarship.
The literature on Chinese public diplomacy outside of China is growing but still
limited. There are studies of public diplomacy instruments such as Confucius
Institutes (Starr 2009; Yang 2010; Hartig 2016), the role of media in China’s public diplomacy (Zhang 2011), or the overall public diplomacy system (Wang 2011;
d’Hooghe 2015), but so far little is known concerning how the concept of public
diplomacy itself is understood in China. This article addresses this limitation as it
analyzes the academic understanding of public diplomacy in China and thereby
contributes to the growing field of public diplomacy literature and the scholarship concerned with China’s foreign affairs more generally. It will, however, not
focus on China’s actual practice of public diplomacy, nor will it venture on the
task of public diplomacy theory building, as others have done recently (Yun 2006;
Entman 2008; Graham 2014).
Decoding the Chinese discourse not only highlights the growing importance of
communicative practices in contemporary international affairs but also contributes
to the debate surrounding the outlined paradigm shift from old to new public diplomacy. As this article will show, the Chinese understanding of public diplomacy,
although also referring to the notion of new public diplomacy (xin gonggong
waijiao), strongly falls back on the traditional understanding of public diplomacy:
as a means of persuasion characterized by a one-way flow of information during
which certain actors control the message in order to win over international audiences. The case of China therefore illustrates that public diplomacy essentially is
undertaken to pursue national interests and clearly is not an altruistic affair.
Comprehending the Chinese conceptualization of public diplomacy is furthermore important because it helps to better understand how China applies noncoercive strategies to shape the international environment along its long-term interests.
To achieve this aim, China is investing an estimated US$10 billion annually in its
public diplomacy efforts (Shambaugh 2015). The analysis of China’s understanding of public diplomacy also provides insights into how China sees itself in the
world (mainly misunderstood), how China perceives the international environment (potentially hostile), and how China wants to be seen by the outside world
(as a friendly, peaceful, and reliable partner). These aspects are of importance to
retrace China’s foreign affairs and its behavior on the global stage more broadly.
The article’s structure is as follows: after introducing its methodological approach, this article briefly discusses the “research-policy interface” (Eriksson and
Norman 2011) to contextualize the relationship between domestic debates and
China’s public diplomacy. The main part then focuses on the Chinese academic
understanding of public diplomacy. First, it discusses the underlying purposes of
China’s public diplomacy and then outlines the major debates in the academic
discourse. These include debates surrounding the obstacles for China’s public diplomacy and how (and if) it can be separated from propaganda. Related are debates concerning the conduct of public diplomacy, including questions of
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instruments and audiences. A discussion on whether public diplomacy is necessary at all for China and concluding remarks round up the article.
The Political Utilization of Public Diplomacy in China
The academic debate takes place in a variety of Chinese academic and policy journals and found its way into general periodicals and media commentaries. This article focuses on academic publications and consults different sources. In particular, this study refers to textbooks, dealing solely with either public diplomacy
(Han, Zhao, and Ke 2012) or diplomacy more broadly and what they have to say
about public diplomacy (Yang 2009; Zhao K. 2010). In addition, single-authored
monographs on public or cultural diplomacy (Li Z. 2005; Zhao Q. 2010, 2014;
Zhang D. 2013) and edited volumes dealing with public diplomacy (Pang 2013)
were taken into account. The bulk of the literature considered, however, focuses
on material that was published in academic journals. I derived the articles from
the database China Academic Journals, a repository for academic publications
that compares with JSTOR. I searched for the keyword “gonggong waijiao”1 in article titles and selected articles from top-ranked journals based on the Chinese
Social Sciences Citation Index2 and those from less prominent journals to get a
more comprehensive understanding of the academic debate.
The academic debates clearly do not take place in a vacuum and are influenced
by external factors, including state ideology (such as references to China’s
“Peaceful Rise,” its “Harmonious World,” and most recently the “China Dream”
and the “One Belt, One Road” initiative), the ongoing developments in China’s
public diplomacy, and Western publications dealing with public diplomacy.3 The
discussion is becoming increasingly detailed and vibrant, which makes it hard to
clearly identify mainstream and less mainstream voices. Yet, one can identify some
leading voices such as Zhao Kejin, Wang Yiwei, Han Fangming, or Zhao Qizheng.
Zhao Qizheng, for instance, the former minister of the State Council Information
Office of China and current dean of the School of Journalism of Renmin
University of China, illustrates the linkage between the discourse community and
the foreign policy decision-making process.4 This setting apparently functions as a
feedback loop through which leaders seek the advice of civilian experts. It is, however, impossible to illustrate whether and how scholars’ ideas result in actual foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, the relative influence of particular analysts is
variable. Without elaborating too much on the discussions of how academic debates may or may not influence foreign policy (Risse-Kappen 1994; Kitchen 2010),
it is safe to assume that a “research-policy interface” (Eriksson and Norman 2011)
does exist in China as it does elsewhere. Although it is clear that the Chinese leadership consults researchers and demands input from them (Jakobson and Knox
1
Additionally, I also consulted publications dealing with cultural diplomacy (wenhua waijiao), which I understand
as a subset of public diplomacy, and national image (guojia xingxiang), which is a major concept in the Chinese public diplomacy literature.
2
In its 2014–2015 list, the Index ranks a number of journals in which public diplomacy-related articles were published. These include, for example, Dangdai Shijie yu Shehui Zhuyi (No. 2) and Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu (No. 6) in the category Marxism; Dongbeiya Luntan (No. 4), Guoji Guancha (No. 8), and Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (No. 10) in the category
Political Science; Xiandai Chuanbo (No. 9) in the category Journalism and Communication; Lanzhou Xuekan (No.
20) and Shehui Kexue (No. 26) in the category Comprehensive Social Sciences, and Henan Shifan Daxue Xuebao
(Zhexue Shehui Kexue ban) (No. 16) and Hubei Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue ban) (No. 17) in the category
Comprehensive College Journals.
3
Next to older writings such as Hans N. Tuch’s Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas, more
recent writings from scholars based in the United States (especially at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the
University of Southern California) and in Europe (at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Clingendael) have caught the attention of Chinese scholars.
4
While Zhao Qizheng can be described as a politician-turned-scholar, Wang Yiwei, for example, took a leave of
absence from his former university, Fudan, to work as a diplomat at the Chinese mission to the European Union
and therefore is an example of how scholars become active in China’s foreign policy.
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2010; Kristensen and Nielsen 2013), due to the opaque nature of policy processes
in China, “it is impossible to credibly evaluate the degree of influence” of specialists on foreign policy decision makers (Jakobson and Knox 2010, 1).
Although there is no agreement on the causality of ideas in political processes
(Kitchen 2010) and some note that “research only very rarely leads to direct implementation of policy recommendations” (Eriksson and Norman 2011, 421), one
can find indications that conceptual thoughts provided by scholars have an impact
on China’s foreign policy making. The most prominent example is the idea of
China’s “Peaceful Rise,” originally developed by Zheng Bijian from the Central
Party School, which was picked up by the senior leadership for a certain time. Yan
Xuetong’s5 ideas on how to use traditional Chinese culture also made its way into
Chinese politics as the Chinese Defense Ministry included some of his proposals in
its 1998 National Defense White Paper (Callahan 2005). Furthermore, a book by
Zhao Tingyang, a prominent philosopher at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, may have inspired Hu Jintao’s idea of a “Harmonious World” (Callahan
2008). Another example for the political utilization of scholarly ideas concerns
one of China’s most recent public diplomacy instruments: the use of the first lady
to shape China’s image globally. In March 2013, Zhao Kejin, Director of the
Center for Chinese Statecraft and Public Diplomacy Studies at Tsinghua
University, told me that he was advising the government to focus more on the role
of first lady Peng Liyuan in China’s conduct of public diplomacy and that it would
be necessary to institutionalize the role of the first lady.6 The dynamic, however,
may work both ways, and it can be argued that Hu Jintao’s call for the creation of a
“Harmonious World” explains why academics started to theorize Chinese culture
and harmony as they are important components of this idea (Kristensen and
Nielsen 2013, 31). The most recent example for this direction of influence can be
seen in the academic engagement with the “One Belt, One Road” strategy. After
the strategy was put forward by Xi Jinping in fall 2013, scholars started to engage
with it and a first book length study was published in spring 2015 (Wang 2015).
Although it is hard, if not impossible, to gauge whether and how scholarly ideas
have discernible influence on foreign policy, it is undeniable that the notion of
public diplomacy (as well as soft power) is politically utilized by the Chinese leadership. The concept increasingly appeared in official statements in recent years,
including those by members of the most senior leadership like former foreign
minister Yang Jiechi (2008) or former CCP general secretary and Chinese president Hu Jintao (Qian 2009). The importance of public diplomacy became clear
eventually when Hu Jintao noted in his report to the 18th Congress of the CCP in
November 2012 that “public diplomacy and cultural exchanges should be pushed
forward” (Hu 2012b). The fact that public diplomacy was mentioned, for the first
time, in such a highly official document illustrates the “signifying integration of
public diplomacy into China’s national strategy” (Han 2013, 2; see also Yu 2014).
The current Chinese leadership is equally aware of the importance of public diplomacy. In October 2013, Xi Jinping addressed a conference on neighboring diplomacy where he “highlighted the importance of public diplomacy from a strategic perspective” (Han 2013, 3). The fact that all seven members of the CCP
Standing Committee were present proves, according to Chinese analysts, “the
amount of attention state leaders devote to public diplomacy” (Han 2013, 3). In
May 2014, Xi noted that China’s rapid development in recent years lead people
outside of China to assume that the country will follow the historic logic after
which “a strong nation is bound to seek hegemony.” According to Xi, this
5
Yan is dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing and is considered as one of China’s leading scholars of International Relations and a proponent of the realist school of
International Relations.
6
Zhao Kejin, in discussion with the author, Beijing, March 25, 2013.
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understanding further fuels debates about China as a threat (Xinhua 2014a).
Therefore, Xi noted, it is important for China to pay attention to public diplomacy and spread China’s voice well throughout the world (Xinhua 2014a).
This brief outline illustrates how public diplomacy is politically utilized. It
found its way from academia into the official discourse although official statements only generically refer to the term. Therefore, to comprehend the Chinese
understanding of public diplomacy, it is necessary to decode the related academic
debates.
The Purpose of Chinese Public Diplomacy: Achieving National
Interests by Correcting Negative Images
The main reason for China to engage in public diplomacy is its potential to
achieve national interests (guojia liyi) (Liao 2009; Qiao 2010; Zhao K. 2012b; Zhao
Q. 2012). According to former foreign minister Yang Jiechi (2011), public diplomacy’s “highest priority goes to safeguarding and promoting China’s national interests” while Tan Youzhi (2011, 37) even describes public diplomacy as a
“weapon to enhance national interests.” This understanding differs considerably
from Western conceptualizations of public diplomacy. Although Western scholars
tend to highlight its idealistic dimension in the sense of creating mutual understanding and “looking for areas where we can find common cause” (Leonard,
Stead, and Smewing 2002, 8), Chinese scholars frankly state that the principal
goal of public diplomacy, similarly to that of traditional diplomacy, is to “safeguard and promote national interests” (Zhang 2009, 12).
Although the basic assumption is clear, scholars normally do not clearly state in
detail what these national interests actually are. Yan Xuetong (2002, 11) describes
national interests as the “common material and spiritual need of all the people of
a nation state.” In material terms, a nation “needs security and development [and
in] spiritual terms, a nation needs respect and recognition from the international
community” (Yan 2002, 11). Especially for a big country like China, Yan notes,
“spiritual needs can be as important as material needs” (Yan 2002, 11). Overall,
Yan understands economic interests to be the primary interests followed by security interests, political interests, and less importantly, cultural interests.
In this regard, public diplomacy may contribute to national interests as it can
enhance trust and understanding. This in turn dispels suspicion and distrust
(Huang 2005; Luo 2014), which is necessary for international interactions. Public
diplomacy then brings “huge economic benefits” and may have a huge impact on
China’s long-term development for a “small price” (Huang 2005, 32). In this setting, it is argued that public diplomacy may contribute to a better environment
for China’s business development, for example on the African continent (Luo
2014, 132) because it is seen as a means to “win and safeguard national security”
(Huang 2005, 31). Others go one step further and argue that public diplomacy
can assist in reducing security costs and costs for national defense as it promotes
dialogue and understanding (Wu Z. 2012, 34; see also Liao 2007).
Many of these rather generic statements link public diplomacy with national interest without further elaborating on how public diplomacy can actually contribute to achieve national interests. According to Chinese scholars, the most important benefit of public diplomacy is its positive repercussions on China’s national
image. While Li and Li (2012, 76) note that national image (guojia xingxiang) is of
crucial importance for China’s overall diplomacy, Liao Hongbin (2007, 111–12)
relates China’s image to its international influence (guoji yingxiangli) and argues
that promoting these aspects China’s public diplomacy promotes the country’s
national interests (Liao 2007, 111–12). Han, Zhao, and Ke (2012) argue that national image is essential for achieving national interests because it supports the
country’s ability to achieve its economic, political, and diplomatic goals in the
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world. This argument can be considered as the mainstream idea to explain why
China should engage in public diplomacy (Lian and Li 2013).
The way a country is perceived in the world essentially shapes the interaction
between nation-states on the global stage (Jervis 1970). Furthermore, with “the
coming of globalized communication, there has been a surge in national image
construction” (Li and Chitty 2009, 1). Put simply, a good image generates trust
and cooperation, helps to build alliances, fuels the economy, and thereby contributes to national interests. In contrast, a bad image provokes hostile reactions,
damages the economy, and undermines the state’s security.
According to Hu Xiaoming (2011, 22), a national image consists of a person’s
knowledge about a country, and this knowledge “is based on the learning, personal experiences, booklore and knowledge from the media, and societal relations of this person.” Hu further outlines three understandings of national images
in China. One understanding regards a national image as the international audience’s relatively stable assessment of a certain country (Hu 2011, 23; see also Yang
2000). A second understanding defines national image as the appearance and
behavior of a sovereign state and its people on the international stage. In this understanding, these elements form the national image: the actual appearance and
behavior, as well as perceived global public opinion (Hu 2011, 23; see also Li S.
1999). A third understanding defines a national image as the sum of assessments,
evaluations, and convictions of both the domestic and international audiences toward a certain country. These assumptions concern the behavior of the country,
its actual activities, and the results of such activities (Guan 1999; Hu 2011, 23).
The concept of national image is especially important in China where the concept
of “face” carries great weight and memories of China’s century of humiliation remain at the forefront of the national psyche (d’Hooghe 2015). Finally, some argue that “China’s greatest strategic threat today is its national image,” and
how other nations perceive China will determine the future of the PRC (Ramo
2007, 12).
Based on the literature one can identify two approaches of China’s national image management by means of public diplomacy: proactive and reactive. Both
approaches are closely related but have different foci. For proactive, I describe
public diplomacy’s task to present a good image of China. There is consensus
that attempts to present a good or positive image of the country is clearly one major driving force behind China’s public diplomacy (Gao 2005; Huang 2005; Tian
2008; Li and Li 2012; Yin 2013; Huang and Tang 2014; Luo 2014).
There is, however, little mention what this good image actually consists of. In
the Chinese understanding, public diplomacy should explain and outline the real
conditions of China’s development, project China as a “responsible partner” (Gao
2005, 110), and bring to mind that China is contributing to the global development by developing itself peacefully. According to d’Hooghe (2011, 24), China
wants to be seen as a country “that works hard to give its people a better future,” a
“stable, reliable, and responsible economic partner,” and a “trustworthy and responsible member of the international community,” and finally China wants to be
“acknowledged and respected as an ancient, but vibrant, culture.” Taken together,
China’s public diplomacy is aimed at projecting “an image of strength, affluence,
and political responsibility that surmounts the popular impression of China as a
state which routinely violates human rights and threatens global stability”
(Rawnsley 2009, 282). Ultimately, public diplomacy should help with “promoting
business activities both within and outside China” (Aoyama 2007, 5).
The reactive approach to China’s image management is closely linked and is exemplified in China’s attempts to “present a truer picture of China” (Zhao Q.
2007). In this context, it seemingly goes without saying that the Western attributions form the negative image that China’s public diplomacy should correct and
remedy. It should furthermore change the global negative conversation about
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China, an approach that Gary RawNsley (2013) aptly describes as the “Don
Draper School of international communication.”7 This approach understands
public diplomacy as the tool to explain China to the world (Zhang 2009; Han
2011; Wang 2011; Han, Zhao, and Ke 2012; Lin 2012; Ye 2012; Zhao Q. 2012),
based on the implicit or explicit assumption that the world, especially the
Western world, does not understand China. Therefore, public diplomacy should
be used to help foreign publics to understand, or better understand, the “real
China” (zhenshi de Zhongguo) (Zhang 2009, 14; Lin 2012, 75; Zhao Q. 2012, 15). It
should help to “change the ‘marketplace of ideas’” (Zhou 2012, 45) and to increase China’s discourse power (Huang and Tang 2014, 39), which essentially
means that China should “talk back” (Zhao 2007). The fundamental desire behind all this is to not leave the prerogative of interpretation of what China is and
what it stands for to external stakeholders.
Although there is a general consensus regarding the question why China
should conduct public diplomacy, there is also a certain frustration that the increasing efforts have hitherto not paid off. Wang Yiwei (2014, 43), for example,
refers to the BBC Country Rating Polls and notes that in 2013 China’s image
score was the lowest since the polls started in 2005. He therefore asks why China
is investing so much money in its public diplomacy when the effects of improving
its image are so poor and China’s standing is still so negative (Wang 2014, 43).
Obstacles for China’s Public Diplomacy: Hostile Western
Media and Poor Performance
Wang’s assessment points to one major debate in the Chinese scholarly discussion: the questions of why China’s image is so negative and why China’s public diplomacy is not successful in changing the global conversation despite increasing
efforts. To answer those questions, Chinese scholars normally focus on the outside world rather than identifying mistakes from within, but there are also voices
discussing, quite self-critical, the insufficient shape of China’s public diplomacy
apparatus.
Chinese scholars generally accept that China has a negative image in the world,
especially in the Western world. The negative images are mainly reflected in the
China Threat Theory (Zhongguo weixie lun), which can be broken down into three
components: first, there is the perception of China as a political/ideological
threat, which sees the PRC as the “bad other” who violates human rights and is a
spoiler in international relations. China is furthermore perceived as a military/
strategic threat, a line of argument that refers to the PRC’s ever-increasing military spending and its assertive behavior in its neighborhood. And third, China is
seen as an economic/trade threat, exemplified for example in the assumption
that China is blamable for job losses around the world or that China in a neocolonial manner is exploiting the African continent. Whether such perceptions are
true or not does not matter as “the image of a certain nation exists in many people purely as affect with no knowledge basis whatsoever” (Kunczik 1997, 43).
In the Chinese understanding, those negative depictions are created in order
to influence foreign publics and policymakers to take negative positions toward
the country, an understanding that some Chinese scholars describe as a “new victim mentality” (Yu 2012, 85). This mentality holds that the international community not only misunderstands but also does not appreciate China’s development
and always criticizes the country. As Yu Wanli (2012, 85) puts it, after China solved
the problems of being beaten (by the Western powers) and being poor, China
currently has to deal with the problem of being insulted and verbally abused.
7
Rawnsley (2013) refers to the central character in the US television series Mad Men, Don Draper, who tells his
clients: “If you don’t like what they’re saying, change the conversation.”
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663
Another Chinese opinion in this regard is the so-called Conspiracy Theory (yinmou lun), which claims that the West, with its assumed superior values, discourse
sovereignty, and prerogative of interpretation, deliberately wants to create a media atmosphere that demonizes China. The alleged aim of this demonization is to
ruin China’s image and thus to damage China’s economic might, and to derail its
development (Yu 2012, 85). It is this line of argument that informs the explanation that the major reasons for China’s distorted image are abroad.
External Obstacles for China’s Public Diplomacy
This viewpoint is frequently outlined in the public diplomacy discourse. Wang
Yiwei, for example, notes that in order to understand why China’s image is still
perceived as bad, it is necessary to know who actually defines the image. In his understanding, the West defines China’s image, and the problem is that China’s
public diplomacy is facing a Western hegemonic discourse (Wang 2014, 42),
which complicates the task of presenting a positive image of China and changing
the global conversation.
According to Lin Kai (2012, 72), governments use public diplomacy to explain their
positions and viewpoints to the world. From the Chinese point of view, this is a crucial
aspect as China sees itself as not only misunderstood but also wrongly represented in
the global—especially Western—media (Su 2008b; Yu 2014). This leads to misunderstanding and misperceptions which, as outlined, should be eliminated via public diplomacy (Zhou 2012) in order to influence global opinion and thus to enhance the
world’s understanding of China (Liao 2007; Tian 2008). Misunderstandings concern,
for example, the assumption that Socialism with Chinese characteristics lacks democracy, that China builds up its military to seek hegemony, that China’s economic development will lead to job losses in other parts of the world, or that China’s engagement
in Africa is a form of neo-colonialism (Su 2008b, 74).
In this view, the fundamental reasons why Western people worry about the rise
of China are their “lack of understanding” and the various “misconceptions”
about China, resulting in “prejudices” (Liao 2009, 103; Zhang 2009, 13; Han
2011, 15; Lin 2012, 74). Prejudices are, as Zhao Kejin (2010, 301) argues, even
worse than a total lack of knowledge as they may create hostility, which in turn
fuels the China Threat Theory. To counteract the threat perception is therefore
seen as one fundamental task of China’s public diplomacy (Gao 2005; Zhong and
Jun 2006; Liao 2007; Yu 2014). Public diplomacy should also target the China
Collapse Theory (Zhongguo bengkui lun) (Liao 2007, 113; Zhou 2012, 42), and
Zhou Houhu (2012, 42) goes even as far as to reject the idea of China as a responsible stakeholder (Zhongguo zeren lun), referring to the idea put forward by former
US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in 2005.
There is consensus that negative perceptions of China result from negative
Western media reports about the country (Su 2008b, 74; Lin 2012, 74), rooted in
the fact that the international media landscape is dominated by precisely these
Western (especially US) media setting the international agenda (Ye 2012, 12;
Zhao Q. 2012, 43). The voice of China’s media in the world is still very weak and
aggravates this situation (Zhong and Jun 2006, 68). According to Su (2008b, 74),
Western politicians create an “ideological divide,” which in tandem with “powerful
media campaigns” create the described misperceptions, which lead to the China
Threat Theory.
This line of argument imputes that Western media is biased toward China and
has attempted to “demonize China” (yaomohua Zhongguo), as China’s former
Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Fu Ying, wrote in spring 2008 after negative,
and partly wrong, reports about China in the aftermath of the Tibetan riots in
March 2008 (Fu 2008; see also Li X. 1999). Therefore, it is argued, China should
engage in public diplomacy to counter those negative and demonizing images
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spread by Western media globally (Chen 2013; Ye 2014), and it should become active in presenting the “true image” of the “real China” (Zhao Q. 2010, 2012).
As Zhao Kejin (2012a, 58) points out, the Western media could theoretically
play a positive role in shaping a good image of China, but China should not rely
and depend on the Western media because Western values such as democracy
and human rights characterize them. Another reason why China should not rely
on them is that the West has “racial prejudices” and is afraid of Communism, a
mindset that can be traced back to the Cold War (lengzhan) and still influences
how Western media report about the country. A common reproach toward
Western media by both Chinese scholars and Chinese officials is that of lingering
“Cold War stereotypes” (Lin 2012, 74) or “Cold War thinking” (Su 2008b, 74;
Zhao 2009, 2). According to Zhong and Wang (2006, 67), the focus of the
Western “public opinion war” (yulun zhan) shifted after the end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union from former Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union to China. As China’s critics initially realized that Socialism in China would
not collapse, they hoped to “badmouth” China. Later, as they saw that China’s development was surprisingly good, they initiated the China Threat Theory (Zhong
and Jun 2006, 67).
Although there are undeniable issues with Western journalism portraying
China not simply as the other but as the bad other, one can notice a fundamental
misunderstanding regarding the Chinese view of Western media, which the statement, “one of the principles of Western media is to find fault and negative angles,” exemplifies (Qiao 2010, 9). It is correct that this is one principle of Western
journalism; nevertheless this argument points to one of the biggest sources of
Chinese misunderstanding of the Western world: the “failure to appreciate how
differently media systems work” in China and elsewhere (Wasserstorm 2013, 122).
The fundamental tasks of Chinese media are to introduce the party line to the
public and to educate the public (Zhao 1998). In Western liberal democratic systems, the media is seen as the fourth power, which is supposed to control the executive, legislative, and judiciary. It is this basic difference, which informs the
Chinese understanding that Western media may work on behalf of their governments and that demonizing China follows a political agenda. Although the understanding of Western media is flawed, the consequential argument that “it is up to
the Chinese people themselves—rather than Western media reports—to change
China’s image around the world” (Qiao 2010, 9) makes perfect sense. Zhao Kejin
(2012a, 162) predicts that as long as the Western Weltanschauung does not fundamentally change, China’s broken image will limit its development. In order to
change this situation, he contends that China has to spend time and effort in adjusting its diplomatic strategy. As he sees it, China should develop an image strategy that helps the West to better understand it. In this regard, it is the necessary
task of China’s public diplomacy to communicate with the West in a Western style
and to introduce an image that is plain and simple to understand (Zhao K.
2012a, 163).
Internal Obstacles for China’s Public Diplomacy
Although Chinese scholars tend to focus on the outside world when looking for
explanations why China’s public diplomacy efforts do not pay off, there are also
voices that identify mistakes from within, self-critically focusing on the shape of
China’s public diplomacy apparatus. This group of scholars identifies two related
problems for China’s public diplomacy: first, there is the insight that it suffers
from institutional–organizational limitations (Liao 2007; Su 2008a, 2008b; Li and
Li 2012; Wu 2012; Yu 2014) and, second, there is the awareness that the style of
China’s public diplomacy has to change (Zhou 2012; Zhang 2013; Zhao 2014).
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With regards to institutional limitations, scholars criticize the lack of a coherent
and unified strategy (Su 2008a, 2008b; Li and Li 2012; Wu Z. 2012) and call for a
special institution to develop and implement public diplomacy polices and to coordinate the various instruments and activities (Liao 2007; Su 2008a, 2008b).
According to Zhang Dianjun (2012, 2013) to be effective, public diplomacy needs
an independent institution to act as its guide. Developed countries, according to
Zhang, have unified institutions in command, but in China, the various actors in
this field are “decentralized” and “fragmented,” the “division of labor between different institutions is unclear and fuzzy,” and every institution works for itself
(Zhang 2012, 37). Zhang acknowledges that China has set up the Public
Diplomacy Division (Gonggong Waijiao Chu)8, which is run under the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. However, this office’s “administrative standing is rather low” and
it is “not authoritatively strong,” so it is hard for this office to take a nationwide
lead in coordinating the various activities across various sectors (Zhang 2012, 37).
The necessity to change the style of China’s public diplomacy is seen as another
crucial aspect to increase its potential. One important aspect in this regard is
what Zhang Dianjun (2012, 36) describes as the need “to water down strong official overtones.” Although the government should give full play to its political capabilities—such as efficiently and quickly mobilizing resources—if the “political
character” is too obvious, it will inevitably “reduce the credibility and objectivity”
of public diplomacy (Zhang 2012, 37). Similarly, Wu Z. (2012, 35) argues that
public diplomacy requires the need to “deemphasize the official character.” This
argument is closely related to the question of public diplomacy actors, which is
comprehensively debated in the Chinese discourse (Zhang 2009; Li 2010; Han,
Zhao, and Ke 2012; Zheng 2012), not least because it is understood as one important factor to change the style of China’s public diplomacy.
Although there is a tendency among Chinese scholars to broaden the scope of
actors, it is generally accepted that China’s public diplomacy is “guided by the
government” (Ye 2012, 11). It is widely noted that the government should provide
guidelines, strategic input, and general direction (Yang 2011, 262), as well as
funding and human resources for public diplomacy (Zhang 2009, 13; Zhao K.
2010, 309; Zheng 2012, 68). Chinese scholars also note that while the government
provides this kind of support and backing, it should remain “hidden” or “invisible” behind the scenes to forestall problems of too-obvious government involvement (Hu 2009, 35; Han, Zhao, and Ke 2012, 258).
Against this background, Ye Hao (2012, 11) calls for a change in style away
from “officials in charge” to “(private) people in charge,” meaning that the government should include various actors to execute public diplomacy such as nongovernmental organizations, companies, or individuals (Zhao K. 2010, 293–94;
Han, Zhao, and Ke 2012, 63). According to Tang Xiaosong (2007, 46), the government should conduct public diplomacy via independent actors that could act
as a more favorable “spokesperson” since they can create more trust than government bodies. In such a setting, “the government pays the bill and private institutions are responsible for the implementation” (Zheng 2012, 69). Zheng points
out that the biggest advantage of this approach is that the “political color dilutes,”
the culture of the host country is better understood, and it reduces government
engagement (Zheng 2012, 69). Those arguments consider the issue of source
credibility, which is a problem for any government communication, as people
tend to perceive any form of communication by governments as crude propaganda. The principle approach appears strategically clever; the problem, however,
is that these independent actors in China are not independent and are more or
less all under government control.
8
The Public Diplomacy Division was established in 2004 and was upgraded to the Public Diplomacy Office
(Gonggong Waijiao Bangongshi) in late 2009.
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How China Understands Public Diplomacy
Although Chinese academics do not openly critique or question this fact, they
are very aware that public diplomacy conducted by government-funded bodies
will not resonate, and therefore there are calls to work with “foreign forces” (Ye
2012, 11) and with a “clever use of foreign media” (Ye 2012, 11). Others highlight
the necessity to strengthen cooperation with Western public relations firms (Ye
2012; Zheng 2012), an argument similar to what Western scholars like Leonard,
Stead, and Smewing (2002) or Gilboa (2008) discuss in the context of outsourcing public diplomacy to local stakeholders, be it public relations firms or foreign
nongovernmental organizations.
Li Anshan (2007, 128) argues that from a “rational” point of view, the government should conduct propaganda9, but from a “tactical” point of view, it is more
efficient when done by nongovernmental forces (such as academics and NGOs).
Li further points out that propaganda done by Chinese people is not as efficient
as if done by foreigners. With regards to Africa, he argues that the best actors
would be Africans themselves, which would generate “double revenue for half the
effort” as their assessment would not cause antipathy in the Western media and
would at the same time not create the impression that the Chinese are “blowing
their own trumpet” (Li 2007, 128). Nevertheless, as their influence would be limited to Africa, China should also use the help of Western academics because while
some of them are biased against China, the majority respects the facts, which for
Li is a starting point to positively shape China’s image.
The necessity to change the style of China’s public diplomacy, according to
Chinese scholars, furthermore concerns the need to adapt to international or
Western audience customs (Wu Z. 2012, 35). Chinese scholars acknowledge that
the traditional propaganda character is still relatively strong (Zhong and Jun
2006, 68). The main reason for this is the insight that China “simply copies its domestic propaganda content and practices,” and therefore, no matter what China’s
intentions might be, it gives foreign audiences the impression of “forced indoctrination” which is “daunting” and scares them away (Zhong and Jun 2006, 68).
Others are not that outspoken, but there is general agreement that simply copying the domestic communication approach does not work on the international
stage and leads to misunderstanding (Qiu 2010). To solve this problem, it is necessary for China to understand the habits and needs of foreign audiences (Zhong
and Jun 2006, 68). Others more loosely call to improve the quality of content
(Zhou 2012) without closer examination on this.
Another issue is that “proactive public diplomacy” (jiji zhudong de gonggong waijiao) is still limited, which is a problem as public diplomacy in general emphasizes
“openness and transparency” (Wu Z. 2012, 34). Zhao Qizheng (2010) laments
that Chinese officials normally do not want to talk to foreign media and thereby
lose opportunities to introduce China. Next to government officials and press officers (Zhuang 2011), Chinese scholars also urge the domestic media to be more
open. It is noted that the media should report in a transparent way about domestic issues as this helps to improve China’s image. Bad reporting, on the contrary,
would damage the country’s image (Zhao 2014, 154). “If we talk only about our
successes and avoid explaining the problems, this is not telling the truth about
China and will be unconvincing. It might even affect the credibility of the totality
of the information we communicate” (Zhao Q. 2012, 46). Similarly, Zou Jianhua
(2011) calls for transparency in reporting and for balanced information, which
means not covering up problems and not exaggerating accomplishments. Next to
this qualitative dimension, which leaves out why the media does not report in
such a way, there is a focus on the quantitative dimension, which is reflected in a
9
Li uses the term xuanchuan—propaganda—mainly because as one of China’s most influential Africanists he is
more concerned with China’s image on the African continent and not so much with theoretical debates about public diplomacy or propaganda.
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call for more resources (Su 2008a; Zhang 2012, 2013) and the broadening of
China’s distribution channels, as well as the improvement of its technology, to
better reach out to international audiences (Zhou 2012; Yu 2014).
Is Public Diplomacy Just Another Word for Propaganda?
The understanding that it is necessary to change the style of public diplomacy in
order to persuade international audiences is also reflected in one of the most controversial debates in China’s public diplomacy circles concerning the linkage between public diplomacy and propaganda. Chinese scholarship discusses the relation between the two concepts similarly to non-Chinese debates in a way that
distinguishes, or attempts to distinguish, public diplomacy from propaganda,
mainly because China knows about the Western problems with the very term.
Outside of China, those attempts are informed by the perspective that sees propaganda as something done by “others” while “we” do public diplomacy. Gilboa describes this as the distinction between providing “‘civilized persuasion’ [thus public diplomacy] rather than distortions, half-truths, and innuendos [thus
propaganda]” (Gilboa 1998, 58).10
Basically, the same arguments can be found in Chinese debates. Huang Chao
(2005, 32), for example, notes that propaganda works with “false information
while public diplomacy is based on facts as well as on trustworthy and real information.” In China, however, the debate is further complicated by the fact that
public diplomacy is a foreign concept, and the Chinese prefer to use the term duiwai xuanchuan (or wai xuan), which is translated as “external propaganda” (Wang
2008, 259) and is closely linked to the rising use of mass media (Zhao K. 2010,
292). Unlike “its English translation, in Chinese, xuan chuan (propaganda) has a
positive connotation associated with such essentially benign activities as the release of news, general shaping of ideology, or even advertisement” (Wang 2008,
259). Despite this original understanding, Chinese scholars strongly argue for a
differentiation between propaganda and public diplomacy because “external propaganda” is a “contentious” activity (Zhao K. 2010, 292) and the term has a “pejorative meaning” abroad (Han, Zhao, and Ke 2012, 7). In this regard, some go as
far as to indicate “propaganda phobia” (xuanchuan kongjuzheng) in Western countries (Ye 2012, 14.).
The explanation for this follows the description in the Western literature,
namely that propaganda originated in relation to the Catholic Church with a neutral meaning, but received its negative connotations in World War II and during
the Cold War (Zhao K. 2010, 293; Ye 2012, 14), which led to the “universal detestation” of the term in Western societies (Ye 2012, 14). Tian notes that propaganda
normally has “a pejorative connotation related to inciting public opinion, deceiving the public and straining the truth, which lead to a highly negative and perfidious understanding of the term” (Tian 2008, 128).
A number of Chinese scholars seem to understand public diplomacy as a natural evolution of external propaganda, and some are “even often inclined to define
the issue as a simple terminological matter” (Zappone 2012, 15). One case in
point here is the very fact that the Central Propaganda Department issued a notice in 1997 that the English translation for the Chinese term xuanchuan was no
longer “propaganda” but “publicity,” an alteration subsequently implemented in
English names of Chinese organizations, most notably the Central Propaganda
Department’s changed to being the Publicity Department. For most Chinese
scholars, this actually proved that China has changed from the traditional
10
The reasons for those attempts are the term’s “historical baggage” (Melissen 2005, 17). Although there is a
scholarly debate about whether propaganda should be understood as a neutral or pejorative term, the “popular understanding” is that of “manipulation and deceit of foreign publics” (Melissen 2005, 17).
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How China Understands Public Diplomacy
external propaganda approach toward the more modern concept of public diplomacy (Zhong and Jun 2006; Su 2008b; Han, Zhao, and Ke 2012; Ye 2012). This argument is rather puzzling from a non-Chinese perspective as the simple change
in words does not reveal anything about a change in style. This is even more surprising as a number of scholars apparently realize that it is crucial to move
China’s public diplomacy away from an “external propaganda” mode to the mode
of “international dissemination of information” (Ye 2012, 11).
Ye (2012, 13) provides six differences between external propaganda and international dissemination of information: (1) the former focuses on the performing
country while the latter focuses on the international audience; (2) external propaganda concentrates on direct spread of information while international dissemination concentrates on indirect spread of information; (3) external propaganda
uses uniform media/mediums while international dissemination uses different
and pluralistic media/mediums; (4) external propaganda uses a rigid and stiff approach while international dissemination uses a more flexible one; (5) external
propaganda focuses on information selection and screening, international dissemination focuses on open information; and lastly, (6) although external propaganda outreach is unidirectional, international dissemination outreach is bidirectional. Tang Jiamei (2008) takes a look at the reporting style applied by Chinese
media during the reform and opening up period and provides some similar insights. She distinguishes China’s foreign media work into external propaganda
(duiwai xuanchuan), external communication (duiwai chuanbo), and public diplomacy (gonggong waijiao) (Tang 2008, 33). The first phase lasted until 1989, and
the aim was to “propagate China.” During the second phase until 2003, the goal
shifted from propagating China to “reporting about China,” or what Zhao Kejin
(2012b, 30) describes as the active matter of “explaining China to the world.” The
third and current phase started in 2003 and is characterized by presenting news
with a “Chinese perspective” (Zhongguo shijiao) to the world (Tang 2008, 31–32).
Although Zhao Kejin (2010, 295) admits that public diplomacy developed from
external propaganda and that both concepts try to “influence” foreign publics, he
also points to the differences between the two: external propaganda is normally
an “aggressive” undertaking which is “lying” while “targeting the masses”; public
diplomacy on the contrary emphasizes “cooperation,” “honesty and truthfulness”
and focuses on particular “target groups.” Furthermore, he sees public diplomacy
as a “reciprocal exchange process” while propaganda is “unilateral information
processing” (Zhao K. 2010, 304–305). Here Zhao and others implicitly or explicitly refer to the above-mentioned Western debates about new public diplomacy,
xin gonggong waijiao in Chinese.
The Conduct of China’s Public Diplomacy: Instruments and Audiences
Basically speaking, China uses similar public diplomacy instruments as other
countries, including international media, publications, academic exchanges and
seminars, international exhibitions, cultural and arts performances, and cultural
institutes abroad. China also conducts panda diplomacy and recently started to
engage in first lady diplomacy. The academic debate, however, highlights two major sets of instruments: mass media instruments and instruments dealing with
culture.
The Importance of Media
According to Wang Yiwei (2014, 44), it is crucial to have control over one’s story
because “if you are not able to express yourself, someone else will do it for you.”
This is, as pointed out, a fundamental reason for China to conduct public diplomacy: to communicate China to the world and to change the global conversation
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about China. From the Chinese point of view, the Western media report is tendentious about China, which is why the PRC has to build up its capacity to explain
the real China to the world. Or as Li Changchun (2008), former propaganda
chief, noted some time ago: “communication capacity determines influence.” In
this day and age, Li continued, the nation “whose communication methods are
[most] advanced and whose communication capacity is the strongest” will have
“the most power to influence the world” (Li 2008).
The fundamental importance of media is highlighted by Zhao Qizheng (2012,
45) who states the obvious but crucial fact that only a small number of people
may visit China personally and China therefore “cannot rely on visits by foreigners” to help them “to understand China.” While this argument ignores the
possibility that personal visits may also have negative effects, it points to the crucially important role of media in public diplomacy. As it has been discussed before, Chinese scholars acknowledge the fact that in order to communicate
China’s messages, it is necessary to know the “Western media rules of the game”
(Zhao Q. 2012, 109). The problem, however, is that it is not enough to know the
rules of the game, but in order to play it successfully, it is necessary to observe
those rules, which in the case of China is hampered by the inbuilt limitations for
Chinese media.
A number of scholars relate the role and power of media to China’s international discursive power—or its “international right to speak” (guoji huayu quan)
(Wang 2009; Zhao K. 2012b). Tan Youzhi (2013) argues that winning international discursive power is the ultimate goal of China’s public diplomacy. Others
are of the opinion that China should engage in a battle of political discourse with
the West (Chen 2010; Zhang W. 2010). In this understanding, as Li Changchun
has observed, the country that controls the global media sphere controls the
global discourse, and there is general agreement that China so far does not control the global information space. The reason for China’s voice not being heard
globally is directly linked to the limited impact and outreach of China’s media
(Liu X. 2010). Therefore, the argument goes, it is necessary to establish more
communication channels in the form of media outlets (Liang 2009; Liu X. 2010).
It is precisely this understanding that apparently informs the creation and expanding of China’s big media organizations such as Xinhua news agency, China
Central Television, China Radio International, or the various regional editions of
the English-language newspaper, China Daily.
The crux of the matter, however, is that this approach focuses solely on quantity
and does not consider quality. The issue that “outputs are privileged over impact”
(Rawnsley 2012, 132) is not only realized by Western observers but also criticized
within China. Zhao Kejin, for example, notes that there is not necessarily a causal
link between media power and discursive power. He notes that the United States
holds the “world’s largest media machine” and significantly increased its media efforts in the Middle East after 9/11, but as various opinion polls show, this did not
pay off and did not lead to a better perception of the United States in this region
(Zhao K. 2011, 5). The emphasis on quantity, which can be understood as the
mainstream view, is also criticized by Zhang Zhizhou (2010) who argues that
Confucius Institutes, CCTV, or English editions of newspapers such as the Global
Times all have one common characteristic, that is all are merely based on increasing the “propaganda sound volume” (xuanchuan yinliang) and expanding the
communication channels. In order to have an effect, however, it is necessary to increase the quality of China’s message (Zhang 2010).
The Importance of Culture
In late 2011, Hu Jintao gave a speech at a meeting of the CCP Central Committee
in which he outlined how China should become a “socialist cultural great power”
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How China Understands Public Diplomacy
(shehui zhuyi wenhua qiangguo) (Hu 2012a). Similar to Li Changchun’s 2008
speech about international communication capacities, Hu (2012a) discussed the
international cultural competition and stated that “he who takes the dominant
position in the cultural development has a strong cultural soft power and thus
can be the winner in the intense international competition.” The speech caused a
stir in the Western media mainly because of what followed; Hu (2012a) continued
by saying, “We must clearly see that international hostile forces are intensifying
the strategic plot of Westernizing and dividing China, and ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration.”
Hu’s speech highlights two interrelated aspects that are still valid in the Xi
Jinping era. On the one hand, China should engage in international cultural
competition, just as it should engage in the international communication competition. On the other hand, the international cultural arena is, just as the international information space, characterized as potentially hostile toward China.
Scholars note that Western nations, based on their political, economic, and cultural strength, hold a dominant position (Bian 2009), and some especially blame
US culture for its tendency to “wolf down local cultures and to influence local
people’s thoughts and behavior” (Li 2005, 3). In this understanding, US culture
is mainly spread via the “brutal information policy” of the “media power USA” (Li
2005, 3). It is in this light that Chinese scholars see the danger of cultural imperialism (wenhua diguo zhuyi) in relation to Western public diplomacy (Bian 2009).
To hold fast against such imperialism, the argument goes, it is necessary for
China to take part in this competition and promote its culture in the world (Bian
2009; Xu 2011; Zhang 2013). In the context of public diplomacy, one can detect
different understandings of culture. Zhang Dianjun (2012, 35), for example, understands culture with a realist flavor as an important means to participate in the
international cultural competition and to safeguard “China’s national cultural interests” while Pang Weihua (2012, 224) argues from a more idealistic perspective
that culture is a bridge to communicate with other countries. According to constructivist IR scholar Qin Yaqing (2012), culture “matters in all policymaking, although perhaps more importantly in foreign policy making.” Its most important
influence on foreign policy “is perhaps the gradual formation of one’s way of
thinking, which has a strong impact on one’s perception of the outside world and
interpretation of oneself and others” (Qin 2012).
The mainstream understanding among Chinese scholars clearly highlights the
strategic importance of culture in the conduct of public diplomacy. Culture is
seen not only as an important part of comprehensive national power but also as a
means to defend strategic interests against “fierce international competition” (Jia
2012, 216). In this regard, culture is also defined as an effective tool in the struggle of power and interests between nations (Li 2005, 7) as it can be used to attract
societies and people of other countries (Li 2005, 12). To put it more succinctly,
the country whose culture is the “mainstream and leading culture” is “the winner
in the international power struggle” (Li 2005, 2).
This realist view of culture as an instrument to pursue competitive self-interests
may appear rather unusual for some Western observers, especially where culture
is officially seen as a benign instrument used to conduct apolitical cultural exchange to be performed either for its own sake or in the more idealistic context
of equal exchange and engagement. China applies a more pragmatic approach,
which can be explained by China’s view of a skeptical global public opinion.
The Target Audiences of China’s Public Diplomacy
Related to the question of instruments is the question of who China wants to target with its public diplomacy. For the majority of Chinese scholars, public diplomacy concerns foreign audiences (Guo 2009, 23; Hu 2009, 35; Zhao and Zheng
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2010, 58; Ye 2012, 13; Zheng 2012, 68). The prevailing understanding is that public diplomacy should target foreign audiences and influence their opinion so that
this influences public opinion and has a positive impact on how the government
of the foreign country deals with China (Liao 2007, 112). There are, however,
also other voices describing public diplomacy as a means to target both international and domestic audiences. Han, Zhao, and Ke (2012, 63) note that public diplomacy is a diplomatic activity targeting “domestic and international audiences.”
As Gao Fei (2005, 106) notes, the goal of public diplomacy is to win public support for a country’s foreign affairs, and this support has to be generated not only
abroad but also at home. Tian (2008, 127) argues in a similar way noting that public diplomacy also has a domestic dimension in the sense that a government and
the public are interacting in the diplomatic realm, which reflects a certain degree
of democratization of diplomacy.
Zheng Hua (2011, 150) refers to the difference between public diplomacy
(gonggong waijiao) and public affairs (gonggong shiwu) when looking at the target
audience. Traditionally, these two activities had two different target groups: the
former is a cross-border activity targeting foreign publics while the latter traditionally refers to domestic public. In this regard, the main task of public affairs is “informing,” while public diplomacy is about “influencing” (Zheng 2011, 150).
However, due to the growing interdependence between countries, the increasing
flow of information, and frequent visits, links between the two concepts are becoming closer and a clear-cut distinction between the two becomes more complicated (Zheng 2011, 150).
The mainstream view defines foreign publics as the prime audience, but within
this camp, there are debates about whom to target abroad. While for some, the
audience includes both foreign governments and publics (Guo 2009, 23; Ye 2012,
11), Zhao Kejin (2010, 294) is very strict when he notes, “the target of public diplomacy is solely publics abroad and not governments abroad.” Without being
overly strict in their argumentation, the majority of authors emphasize that publics abroad are the targets (Zhang 2009, 12; Li 2010, 91) as they have the potential
to influence their home governments (Zhao and Zhang 2010, 58; Han 2011, 16).
In addition, some also see overseas Chinese citizens as both a potential target audience and group of actors for Chinese public diplomacy (Shi 2013; Zhao and
Liu 2013).
A number of Chinese scholars categorize the foreign public according to the instruments or tools to be used (Zhao K. 2010; Han, Zhao, and Ke 2012; Zheng
2012). One part of the target audience is “ordinary people,” a category that can
also include interested amateurs or “laypeople.” The mass media’s dissemination
of information mainly reaches this audience (Zhao K. 2010, 307; Han, Zhao and
Ke 2012, 85). Another part consists of so-called “elites” and “opinion leaders.” For
this group, information programs and various forms of exchange activities are
equally important (Han, Zhao, and Ke 2012, 85). Others argue more explicitly
that public diplomacy should not deal with the ordinary people directly: Zheng
Hua (2012, 68), for example, notes that the government’s budget is “limited,”
and therefore public diplomacy should only focus on “key people” and “opinion
leaders,” who in turn can influence ordinary people positively.
While one may dismiss those questions as academic trifle, Zheng’s point exemplifies the clear real-world implications of this discussion about audiences as it points
to the crucial aspect of public diplomacy funding. The fundamental point here is
that public diplomacy is normally always, by definition, financed from public funds,
that is, taxpayers’ money, and therefore questions of relevance and eventually questions of the fundamental meaningfulness of public diplomacy almost always play a
role. And even though China is currently investing extensively in its public diplomacy, one can also find voices within China questioning the whole undertaking although, admittedly, these are apparently less mainstream voices.
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Is Public Diplomacy Necessary At All?
Despite a general “public diplomacy fever” (Pang 2013, 2), there are also academics voicing less mainstream views as they question the actual importance of
public diplomacy. According to Zhao Kejin (2013, 128), who is a public diplomacy
advocate, realist scholars of International Relations “are generally not optimistic
about public diplomacy.” In the view of scholars like Yan Xuetong, public diplomacy should only be a supplementary diplomatic activity as it is not able to solve
the “complex problems” of conflicting national interest and thus does not deserve
much investment (Zhao 2013, 128). Others note that national interests play the
most crucial role in international politics and that public diplomacy “cannot effectively solve the problems in international politics” (Wu X. 2012, 42). Chinese intellectuals might admire German philosophy, American intellectuals might enjoy
Russian literature and music, and Hollywood blockbusters may be shown in the
Middle East, but these facts do not mean that there are no problems in international politics. Indeed, even when one country knows another country very well
and admires its culture, if fundamental conflicts of interest arise, communication
and culture do not help (Wu X. 2012, 42).
Two Chinese scholars I spoke with about the topic made similar statements and
both highlighted the importance of money involved. One echoed the view of Yan
Xuetong that the government should not spend so much money on public diplomacy, especially because it is hard—if not impossible—to evaluate its impacts.11
Another scholar, although not rejecting the importance of public diplomacy per
se, pointed out that the main reason why a lot of institutions (both academic and
administrative) are currently so interested in public diplomacy is precisely
because of the money the government is pumping into public diplomacy-related
research and institutions,12 which brings us back to the research-policy interface.
This development is reflected in the establishment of various nation-wide and local public diplomacy organizations as well as think tanks in recent years. There is,
for example, a Public Diplomacy Forum (gonggong waijiao jiangtan) and a China
Public Diplomacy Association (Zhongguo gonggong waijiao xiehui); currently, there
are about fifteen local public diplomacy associations across the country and think
tanks like the Charhar Institute and institutes at universities dedicated to the research of public diplomacy (Han 2013).
Next to the issue that public diplomacy is expensive and one may not see concrete results immediately—which is an issue and an objection to public diplomacy
not only in China—there are scholars who admit that public diplomacy as such is
not a universal remedy. With regards to the use of culture in public diplomacy,
some note that it can also cause conflicts (Pang 2012, 224) while others describe a
“dilemma” in the sense that if a country does not engage in public diplomacy, or
does only very little, it runs into the danger of not achieving its overall diplomacy
goals. However, where a country engages too much in it, there is the danger that
other countries will perceive such activities as “cultural invasion” or “cultural imperialism” (Zhao K. 2010, 300–301). Wen Nuo (2012, 58) describes these “negative effects” in a similar way and blames Western countries, claiming that they are
not just engaging in cultural exchange but practicing a strategy of cultural imperialism and, in doing so, trying to “control the world.”
These negative attributions are, at times more subtle and indirect, and at times
more upfront. In addition, they constitute a recurring theme in the academic debate on public diplomacy in China and are mainly directed at Western countries
and essentially duplicate the discussion surrounding the role and impact of
Western media. Some scholars identify a “destructive” (pohuaixing) form of public
11
Conversation with author, August 2014.
Conversation with author, September 2013.
12
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673
diplomacy, which aims at “transforming political and economic systems of the target country” or even “subvert the target country’s government and social system”
(Wu Z. 2012, 33). Qu Xing (2010, 16) notes that one “major difference” between
China’s public diplomacy and that of Western countries is that “China does not
use it to manipulate public opinions or influence political situation of other countries, not to say to fabricate facts and spread rumors, or incite other people to
overthrow their governments.” For Qu and the majority of Chinese scholars, as
outlined in this article, the major task of China’s public diplomacy is to “tell stories of a true China” (Qu 2010, 16), which is understood by some as constructive
public diplomacy (jianshexing gonggong waijiao) in clear distinction to its destructive dimension practiced by Western countries (Wu Z. 2012, 33).
Conclusion
The analysis of the Chinese academic public diplomacy debates highlights several
aspects, which are essential to better understand how states in the early twentyfirst century use communication to pursue their interests. The Chinese debate on
constructive and destructive public diplomacy clearly duplicates non-Chinese debates about the benignancy or evilness of government communication, be it described as public diplomacy or propaganda. And, similar to Western debates, and
quite naturally, China sees itself as the good guy whose only purpose is to convince the world of its friendly intentions, whereas Western countries, with the
United States leading the way, attempt to demonize China with its media and public diplomacy activities. This understanding clearly illustrates that “the principle
battle space, the place where disputes between China and the West will be joined
and where each will seek advantage, is the global information space” (Halper
2012, xxvii) in which communication is essential and success increasingly “depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins” (Nye 2005).
The second insight here is the very fact that Chinese academics are fully aware
that China’s story is currently not winning, which is why the majority argue in favor for public diplomacy. Although there are voices questioning the significance
of public diplomacy, the mainstream view is that China, on its way to become a
great power, should pay more attention to the influence of affinity, an appeal for
which public diplomacy is seen as the major instrument (Fu 2010).
A third point of interest concerns the strategic dimension of public diplomacy,
which is articulated more bluntly in the Chinese academic discourse than in
Western debates. As outlined in the introduction, the prevailing paradigm in
Western public diplomacy scholarship talks about new public diplomacy that emphasizes reciprocal understanding and two-way communication. This understanding, according to Davis Cross (2013, 4), “ties into constructivist IR theory, which
emphasizes how dialogue is necessary for norm diffusion.” Graham (2014, 527)
also argues that the new public diplomacy resonates “with IR constructivism [as it
regards] state identities as constituted through interaction and discourse.” While
it is correct that new public diplomacy, like constructivism, challenges the primacy
of material power in achieving outcomes as it highlights norms, values, and identities (Byrne 2012), the apparent problem here is that the idea of the new public diplomacy is normative in the sense that it mainly explains how public diplomacy
should be practiced, but at times, this understanding loses sight of the fact that
the actual conduct of public diplomacy is still very much about one-directional
communication and simply peddling information to foreigners, although using
the latest social media tools.
Chinese academics, on the contrary, tend to define public diplomacy more
functionally and in my understanding more upfront. Idealistic purposes such as
mutual understanding and engagement are mentioned; the focus, however, is on
functional aspects including publicizing China’s intentions to the outside world,
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How China Understands Public Diplomacy
forming a desirable image of the state, issuing rebuttals to overseas distorted reports about China, improving the international environment, and exerting influence on the policy decisions of foreign countries (Zhan Kun 1998, 73). By doing
this, China’s public diplomacy aims to contribute to national security and economic growth and thereby aims to advance national interests. These goals go beyond normative notions of new public diplomacy into realist calculations in which
world politics is driven by competitive self-interest.
There is, in my understanding, nothing wrong with this functional understanding of public diplomacy because public diplomacy is, quite naturally, not an altruistic endeavor and clearly serves national interests (Melissen 2005). The crucial
point for China’s public diplomacy is the fact—and a number of scholars are fully
aware—that it is not enough to detect hostile forces and to increase the message
output, but that messages have to be backed with credible political behavior at
home and abroad. As a matter of fact, actions speak louder than words. This
points to the fundamental crunch-point of China’s public diplomacy: its “problem
with credibility” (Rawnsley 2012, 126). The problem essentially is that while
Chinese culture and tradition are liked and admired by foreign publics, China’s
“politics and governance are at a much lower standing” (Wang 2011, 6). It therefore does not matter whether China steps up media cooperation with Russia,
opens Confucius Institutes around the world, or gives scholarships to African students; as long as the Chinese government is still arresting human rights lawyers, is
censoring journalists, or is bullying its East Asian neighbors, all efforts by China’s
public diplomacy to shape China’s image and thereby advance its national interest can only hit the wall.
Acknowledgments
I am is grateful for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts from Wang
Dandan, Chen Wei, and Christina Maags and I would also like to thank the editors and the anonymous reviewers of International Studies Review for their
detailed suggestions and constructive comments.
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