05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
European Union Politics
[1465-1165(200203)3:1]
Volume 3 (1): 81–111: 021226
Copyright© 2002
SAGE Publications
Page 81
Preferring Europe
Ideology and National Preferences on
European Integration
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
Mark Aspinwall
New Delhi
University of Durham, UK
ABSTRACT
This article takes issue with conventional explanations of
state preference formation on European integration. It tests
the hypothesis that Left–Right ideology is a better predictor
than nationality of party views on integration, then tests the
relationship between government ideology and government
position on several dozen proposals considered during the
intergovernmental conference leading up to the signing of
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. It finds no significant relationship between nationality and preferences on integration,
posing a challenge for liberal, functional and historical
theories of state preference formation. However, there
appears to be a significant and robust relationship between
party ideology (and the resulting ideology of governments)
and their preferences regarding integration generally, and
the Amsterdam negotiations specifically.
KEY WORDS
European integration
member state preferences
ideology
Amsterdam Treaty
81
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
82
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 82
European Union Politics 3(1)
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to examine the influence of political ideology on
the preferences of member state governments toward European integration.
Academic interest in ideology has waned since the end of the Cold War, but
there are good reasons to resuscitate it. In recent years, social movements,
non-governmental organizations, party factions, and other groups have
mobilized against the perceived injustices and excesses of major international
institutions, including the European Union (EU), the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. They justify
their opposition on a number of ideological grounds, but it is possible to
categorize and compare them in ways that illuminate similarities across
states and time.
The focus here is the EU. One of the central findings of this article is that
ideology matters: the location of parties and governments in Left–Right space
serves as a good independent explanation of preferences on integration. Integration refers to binding supranational rules that lead to a reduction or a
potential reduction in state power. Two sets of dependent variables are used
in this study: the first is responses to a survey asking experts to quantify the
level of support for European integration among national political parties
(Ray, 1999); the second is government preferences on an intergovernmental
conference culminating in the Amsterdam Treaty, signed by member states in
October 1997. In May 1997 the European Parliament published a document
detailing member states’ positions on dozens of proposed policy and institutional changes that would communautarise policy responsibilities or lead to
increased power for the supranational institutions (European Parliament,
1997). The document provides a rare glimpse into the intergovernmental conference and offers valuable information on the positions of participating
governments.
Member states are involved in all levels of decision-making in the EU
and therefore understanding how they reach their preferences is extremely
important. Several competing explanations of national preference formation
exist. Liberalism states that preferences are the product of the views of important domestic economic groups (Moravcsik, 1997, 1998). Preference formation
is part of a sequential process in which rational governments assimilate social
demands and then negotiate in a strategic bargaining context with other EU
states to achieve the maximum possible result consistent with domestic goals.
Liberalism makes the important and (to neo-realists) disputed assertion that
domestic interests are not exogenously given but rather are both variant and
relevant to the policy positions of nation states: ‘[t]he most fundamental influences on foreign policy are . . . the identity of important societal groups, the
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 83
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
nature of their interests, and their relative influence on domestic policy’
(Moravcsik, 1993: 483).
A second set of arguments is functional. Functionalists claim that changes
in transactions may create new demands for international cooperation, and
that the absence of these behavioural changes undermines the case for cooperation. This perspective suggests that growing interaction is a necessary but
not sufficient prerequisite for integration.1 Continuous social communication,
personal mobility and a wide variety of communication and transaction forms
are among 12 conditions Deutsch and his collaborators identified more than
40 years ago as improving the chances of developing an ‘amalgamated
security community’, by which they meant integration. The functionalist
argument is predicated on the notion that integration will be welcomed where
it is perceived to be useful as a pragmatic and instrumental step in securing
specific goals, such as dealing with changing national and international
circumstances and, above all, satisfying domestic interests.
A third perspective argues that preferences are derived from unique historical experiences, which create distinct approaches to European integration.
In the British case, historical experience lends a heightened sense of national
identity and greater awareness of the importance of preserving sovereignty,
which is socialized into succeeding generations of political leaders and the
general population. In turn, this means that national interests are defended
more vociferously in Britain than elsewhere, because the dangers of losing
identity and sovereignty are more readily apparent or less likely to be tolerated (Wallace, 1991; Young, 1993). In Germany, the horrors of Nazism led to
a wholesale transplantation of the political culture after the Second World
War; in France, a more gradual rethinking of the national role in world politics
led to a political realignment of much of the national élite (Marcussen et al.,
1999). In the Italian case, the failure of political institutions is thought to drive
Italy toward Europe. ‘In the minds of its people, Italy has been so poorly run
from Rome that almost any alternative would be acceptable. And the European alternative has paid off’ (Mancini, 2000: 131).
Theoretically, these perspectives encourage us to view preference
formation as ideologically immune. That is, by describing the predominant
cultural values or economic attitudes along with their views of European integration and relating them to government preferences, the causal link seems
to be established. By implication, competition between national parties on
ideological grounds does not exist or is relatively unimportant. Yet by downplaying ideological competition much explanatory value is lost. Even with a
given set of interests or behaviour or national experience, domestic political
leaders and parties hold different preferences on European integration. Intuitively we know that this is because leaders from different political parties
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
83
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
84
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 84
European Union Politics 3(1)
represent competing visions of the national interest based upon distinct
ideological worldviews. How important is ideology to the preferences of
political parties and governments?
This article begins to answer the question by testing the relationship
between party ideology and integration preferences. It shows that parties with
centrist ideologies tend to be favourable to European integration. Parties with
non-centrist ideologies tend to be unfavourable to integration. Thus, the
Left–Right location of governing parties is crucial to understanding member
state preferences. The article then tests the relationship between government
ideology and government preferences on several dozen proposals in the
Amsterdam intergovernmental conference in 1997. I do not seek to disconfirm alternative theories of preference formation; rather, by testing the
relationship between ideology and integration preferences, I seek to fill a
lacuna left by them.
Two dimensions of conflict: domestic/international and
Left/Right
In this section I map national political space along two dimensions, each of
which comprises an important cleavage. The first dimension is the trade-off
between domestic authority and international rules. The second dimension is
Left–Right space. This depiction is indebted to Hix (1999), who contrasts an
‘Integration–Independence’ dimension to a ‘Left–Right’ dimension (see also
Hix and Lord, 1997). The hypothetical expectation is that plotting national
political parties in this space will reveal a non-linear, single-peaked shape,
with centrist parties favouring integration and extreme parties opposing it
(see Figure 1). The precise shape of the curve will depend on which state is
being examined and at what period in time; only empirical results can confirm
the shape of the curve.
The domestic–international cleavage is emerging as one of the most important dimensions of national politics in recent years. All states face a fundamental tension between the desire for international cooperation and the desire
for domestic autonomy. Agreeing to abide by a set of rules or practices within
a community of states means that members forgo some types of behaviour.
This loss of autonomy has become more widespread as world politics has
grown increasingly institutionalized. The number, authority and scope of
international institutions has grown tremendously in 60 or so years, from a
weak if determined origin at Bretton Woods. The EU is an especially important example of international cooperation because in a variety of ways it has
gone further than any other international organization to curtail its members’
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 85
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
International
International
rules or
domestic
autonomy?
Domestic
Right
Left
Policy space
Figure 1
The domestic–international and Left–Right dimensions.
Note: The Bell curve represents a stylized depiction of views toward European integration in
Left–Right policy space, with those on the extremes more negative, and those in the middle more
positive.
authority to act independently. Certain of its decision rules remove the right
of member states to veto agreements. Moreover, the scope of policy areas
covered by EU decisions is far wider than in any other international organization, extending even to a single currency. The EU also incorporates an independent judiciary with powers superior to national courts in those areas in
which it is competent.
Therefore, the paradox of international cooperation – that supposedly
power-jealous states make a voluntary donation of autonomy to international
organizations – is nowhere more profound than in Europe. States benefit from
cooperation through increased economic stability, openness and transparency,
greater information about the behaviour of other states, and possibilities for
identifying and punishing defectors. European integration has reduced barriers to EU economic activity, and new opportunities are created for domestic actors poised to benefit from greater openness. But there is not a uniform
set of views among all domestic political parties about integration, because
not everyone benefits equally from greater openness. Some prefer domestic
autonomy over international cooperation. Others have the reverse position.
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
85
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
86
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 86
European Union Politics 3(1)
The Left–Right dimension is a remarkably resilient means of ideological
identification, both across time and between states. Left–Right space is not a
static or single conceptual space; as Laver and Hunt (1992) demonstrate, the
relevant issues in national politics vary according to place and time. Hix (1999)
reduces these issues to two main conflicts: the Libertarian–Authoritarian
conflict, and the Intervention–Free Market conflict. Yet despite its conceptual
fluidity it is an ideal metric for classifying political ideology. Even the ‘new
politics’ parties on the fringe of European party systems have been absorbed
into the Left–Right discourse because, as Oddbjorn Knutsen writes, ‘the
language of “left” and ”right” helps citizens as well as elites to orient
themselves in a complex political landscape’ (1998: 63; see also Klingemann,
1995). For the purposes of this study, Left–Right ideologies are categorized
here in three broad areas – centre, left and right – deriving from spatial theory.
The reason for doing this is heuristic: it simplifies the task of communicating
the expected effect between the Left–Right dimension and the domestic–
international dimension.
Centrist ideology is characterized by an acceptance of interdependence
as a fait accompli; interdependence is viewed as a positive development, provided that states act in a responsible and cooperative manner. Centrists see
interdependence as a byproduct of the increasing openness of the developed
world, including increases in trade, investment and financial capital movement. They accept the liberal arguments associated with this openness,
namely that it leads to aggregate welfare gains. The creation of binding rules
within international organizations is a necessary and welcome consequence
of interdependence because they lead to less free-riding, greater transparency,
lower transaction costs and other important common benefits. Thus, centrists
tend to take an instrumental, pragmatic view of integration, seeing it as a
useful step to ensuring economic prosperity and peace. They are supported
in this view by economic interests that gain from international stability and
openness, especially large export-oriented firms and international investors,
but also trade unions in competitive sectors. This view of integration is
common to centrist parties all over the EU.
Left ideology has elements of both ‘old politics’ anti-market socialism and
‘new politics’ anti-centralist activism. Market control is a common (though
by no means the only) theme of many of these forces, including socialists and
environmentalists, although at various times they have differed over whether
more internationalism or more localism is the appropriate solution to the
problems stemming from excessive market-oriented integration. Socialists, in
varying degrees, favour state intervention, income redistribution, national
ownership, Keynesian demand management and social protection.2 By
definition they prefer authoritative allocation of resources to market allocation.
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 87
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
Socialists have viewed international integration with suspicion because of its
market orientation and the potential erosion of state welfare institutions.
There is also hostility on environmental and other ‘new politics’ grounds,
whose main theme is opposition to the remote technocracy of the EU. New
politics leftism emerges primarily through Green parties. In some member
states Green parties may feel the EU offers greater hope for achieving their
goals than does the national government, and consequently they may see
integration as beneficial. In general, however, Green parties express scepticism
of economic integration because of the environmental consequences (MullerRommel, 1989; Rudig, 1996; Bell, 1996). A growing number of single-issue and
protest parties have also taken up the theme of anti-Europeanism, basing their
views on some mix of the issues above, including nationalism. Taken together,
these new politics parties have gained a great deal of support in recent years.
Green parties in Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Sweden all achieved electoral success, and single-issue protest parties
have made inroads into electoral support for traditional parties on both the
Right and the Left. Green parties in the Latin countries have been far less
successful (in the 1990s communist parties tended to do better in the
southern member states and Green parties in the northern).
The ‘neo-romantic’, emancipatory, quality-of-life egalitarianism of the
new politics makes it quite different from old politics socialism. However,
what connects the new politics to the old politics Euro-scepticism on the Left
is a concern over the liberal market orientation of European integration and
its imperatives of economic efficiency. There is a strong perception among
these groups that large multinationals have been behind the creation of the
single market and have benefited most from it. The relative weakness of intervention on behalf of non-market interests is of particular concern. The economic interests most supportive of the leftist ideological agenda are those
trade unions in the public or protected sectors that stand to lose from greater
international competition.
Right ideology is comprised of nationalist sentiment which seeks to preserve state autonomy, for both identity and economic reasons. Right-wing
political parties advocate more or less benign forms of national preservation,
economic protection, common identity and self-assertion (see Betz, 1994;
Fieschi et al., 1996; Taggart, 1998). Consequently, they oppose supranationalism because of the erosion of national power and the threat to national identity this entails, as well as the danger to economic well-being. Their main
concerns include increased immigration, demands on state services by poor
foreigners, increased terrorism and crime, further competition for what are
perceived as a finite number of jobs, excessive economic competition and a
general dilution of national identity. Small business is most closely associated
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
87
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
88
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 88
European Union Politics 3(1)
with this economic ideology, because it is the most likely to be harmed by
greater international competition from large efficient firms, and faces relatively
higher adjustment costs to binding supranational regimes such as the single
currency. Conversely, since small firms are less likely to be engaged in international trade, they do not stand to gain from open trade regimes or exchange
rate stability (see Frieden, 1997).
It is important to emphasize that this pattern of ideologically derived
views of European integration appears to be consistent across all member
states. Even in countries normally thought of as pro-European, there is
opinion that is opposed to some of the effects of integration, if not the entire
idea of membership of the European Union (on left- and right-wing opposition to EMU-inspired reforms, see Youngs, 1999). The EU’s particular combination of liberal market orientation and supranationalism is what unites
opposition. As one observer notes, the ‘red–brown–green coalition of integration opponents agree on little other than their dislike for integration’ (Ray,
1997: 163).
Taking both the nationalist and the anti-market views into account, we
can place them at opposite ends of the Left–Right policy scale, with liberalmarket/supranationalist opinion in the centre. In this typology the Left–Right
scale contains two cleavages. The first is between the anti-market Left and
the centrists over the appropriate role of the international market in domestic society. Those on the Left defend labour, environmental and citizen values
contra international market values, and see the EU as excessively favourable
to market values. The second cleavage is between the centrists and the
nationalist Right. Those on the Right defend the nation contra the supranation,
and see the EU as excessively favourable to supranational values. Some
overlap clearly exists between the Left and the Right in terms of their
objectives. For example, many (but not all) leftists also use the discourse of
protecting national interests against supranational incursion. Moreover, on
both Left and Right there is some hostility to the remote technocratic
characteristics of the EU, coming at the perceived expense of localism and
democratic values.
The two ends of the spectrum are expected to produce anti-integrationist
opinion, while the centre of the spectrum will be more favourably disposed
to integration. The relationship between Left–Right and EU preferences is
beginning to be explored by other scholars (see Ray, 1997, 1999; Hix and
Lord, 1997; Hix, 1999; Marks and Wilson, 2000; Pennings, 2001). However, the
findings of this study qualify or refute their research in several important
respects.3 First, I examine party ideology rather than party family as a determinant of position on Europe. Other research has raised questions about the
usefulness of party family as a predictor of position on Europe (one example
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 89
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
is the distinction between the pro-European Italian Communist Party and the
anti-European French Communist Party). This work, therefore, should be seen
as an effort to move away from party family and more firmly into the area
of ideology. Secondly, whereas some scholars claim that the Left has become
more pro-EU and the Right more anti-EU, I show that both extremes are
negative and that the centre is positive, although this research also qualifies
their findings to some extent.
Further research has examined the role of ideology in motivating legislative behaviour in the European Parliament (Noury, 2001). Several of the
empirical works examine roll-call votes and find evidence that coalitions
among European legislators are more likely to form on ideological than
national grounds (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Noury, 2001). Noury suggests
that this phenomenon is growing, and that the nationality link among legislators is weakening, with the European Parliament increasingly resembling a
‘normal European legislative body’. An important difference between this
research and that of others is that it endeavours to test correlations between
ideology and support for integration, rather than test the relative importance
of ideology and nationality among Euro-parliamentarians. Thus, it has much
in common with the work of Hix, Ray, Marks, Wilson, and others discussed
earlier.
Nationality, ideology and European integration
In this section I present some quantitative evidence to support the assertion
that party ideology matters to preference formation. The sources for the
data are Ray (1999) on preferences and Huber and Inglehart (1995) on party
ideology.4 There are three commonly accepted means of measuring party
ideology, none without some shortcomings (see Ray, 1999). The first is by
expert survey, in which political scientists, journalists or others from the
target country are asked to place national parties in Left–Right space.
Although this is a very useful tool, the problem is that there are very few such
surveys (see, for example, Castles and Mair, 1984; Huber and Inglehart, 1995).
Interpolations may be made for intervening years, but ultimately it is unclear
how useful these data are. The second is by manifesto research, in which
manifestos are coded according to ideological content (Pennings, 2001). Time
series data are much better here, but data for the most recent years are not
available. The third is by Eurobarometer survey, in which respondents’
Left–Right self-placement is matched with their voting intentions. Time series
data here are available, but it is unclear whether mass self-placement and
voting intentions are good proxies for party ideology. I have chosen expert
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
89
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
90
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 90
European Union Politics 3(1)
surveys because of their availability and the generally high regard in which
they are held by psephologists.5
The integration preferences of 92 national political parties are correlated
both to party nationality and to party ideology. The first test looks for a
relationship between party nationality and party support for European integration. The second test looks for a relationship between party ideology and
party support for European integration. The sources of these data are two
expert surveys: John Huber and Ronald Inglehart’s expert survey places
parties in Left–Right space, and Leonard Ray’s expert survey determines the
level of parties’ support for European integration.
These particular parties were selected for several reasons. First, only
parties from member states of the EU in 1997 were chosen. This is because of
the later test, which searches for a correlation between ideology and support
for integrative measures in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Both expert surveys
include data from political parties in Norway and Switzerland but, because
these states were not members of the EU, their governments did not help
negotiate the Amsterdam Treaty and so their parties have not been included
here. Secondly, parties were included in the test only if there were data on
both their ideology and their integration preferences. The Ray survey includes
data for Luxembourg’s and Greece’s political parties, for example, but Huber
and Inglehart’s survey does not. Moreover, some individual parties are in one
survey but not the other. Where this was the case the party was excluded.
Parties were not excluded for any other reason.
Finally, it would theoretically be possible to increase the number of cases
by examining the correlation between ideology as measured in Castles and
Mair’s 1982 expert survey and Ray’s survey of integration preferences, and
then by interpolating positions on both ideology and integration preferences
for the intervening years. However, as discussed above, interpolation carries
a serious risk of inaccuracy, and so that method has not been chosen.
In the first test I examine the relationship between the nationality of
parties and their preferences on European integration. If there is a ‘national
effect’ ascribable to economic or historical factors we should see this reflected
in the positions of national political parties on integration. The reason for this
is that the implicit ‘reading’ of the national interest by political actors would
result in a more or less similar interpretation of whether integration would
be good or bad for the country. Empirically we would find a clustering of
parties so that, in terms of integration preferences, national parties would be
grouped closely together and there would be marked distinctions between
the national groups.
Figure 2 is a standard scatterplot of the distribution of parties by preference and by member state. On the vertical axis (EU preferences), 1 represents
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 91
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
Extent of preference for integration
7
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Dk
Fi
F
D
*
*
*
*
*
*
A
Figure 2
*
*
*
*
*
*
1
*
*
*
*
*
*
B
*
I
Ire
N
P
Sp
Sw
UK
Scatterplot of party integration preferences, by member state.
Note: A = Austria; B = Belgium; Dk = Denmark; Fi = Finland; F = France; D = Germany; I = Italy;
Ire = Ireland; N = Netherlands; P = Portugal; Sp = Spain; Sw = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom.
very low support for European integration, 7 represents very high support.
The horizontal axis represents member states. The spread of party positions
appears to be random (the bivariate R correlation = .267), although the test
of standard deviations does indicate a clustering of Belgian parties, with a
mean level of EU support above that of all parties.6 However, there remain
several reasons why this result does not indicate a significant variation, even
for Belgium.
First, the Vlaams Blok and the Belgian Communist Party, both of which
were relatively unsupportive of European integration, were not tested
because of the lack of complete data on them, and this may have skewed
the results for Belgian parties as a whole. Secondly, the Anova test, which
takes account of small n samples, does not lead to the conclusion that Belgian
parties are collectively more pro-integration, and it is not possible to reject
the null hypothesis of no significant variation between national party
groups. Likewise, the f-test permits us to state that there are no significant
differences between the parties of any one member state (including Belgium)
and the others, even those from the two countries with the lowest average
support for integration. In a nutshell, despite the predictions of most mainstream theories of national preference formation, there is little correlation
between the nationality of a political party and its views toward European
integration. Something other than national interest must be driving preference
formation.
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
91
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
92
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 92
European Union Politics 3(1)
The second test of correlation is between party ideology and preferences.
In this test I examine whether a relationship exists between the Left–Right
spatial location of a political party and its views on European integration.
Recall that the prediction is that centrist parties will be favourable to integration, and non-centrist Left and Right parties will be increasingly hostile as
they move further from the centre. Ideological scores are derived from Huber
and Inglehart’s expert survey, which ranges from 1 (most left-wing) to 10
(most right-wing). Party rankings have been recalculated here to measure distance from the centre (5.5) in order to test for a curvilinear relationship. In
other words, we are testing whether the relationship between ideology and
support resembles an inverted ‘V’, where support for integration declines at
a constant rate as parties move away from the median ideological position.7
As predicted, regression scores indicate that a party’s ideology is closely correlated to its support for integration (R = .689; confidence at .01). This is far
higher than the correlate for nationality (R = .267). The coefficient for the
ideology–integration support correlation (–1.04) indicates a strongly negative
impact. The less centrist the party, the more it opposes integration, as
expected.
A second dependent variable was generated by squaring the original
dependent variable (support for integration). The purpose is to determine
whether support for integration declines exponentially as parties move away
from the centre of the ideological spectrum (in other words, whether an
inverted ‘U’ better represents the relationship between ideology and support
for integration). Regression analysis yields only a slight improvement in
correlation (R = .704). Robust regression analysis performed on both these
dependent variables only slightly lowered the standard error and had little
impact on the coefficient or the y intercept, suggesting a normal distribution.
Likewise, examination of the residuals shows no pattern.
However, there are five interesting outliers. Two Scandinavian parties –
the Finnish Rural Party and the Swedish Green Party – are more sceptical
than the model would predict given their ideology. The same is true of the
Portuguese Communist Party. On the other hand, the Swedish Conservative
Party and the Swedish New Democracy Party are both more positive than
the model would predict given their ideology. It is difficult to draw conclusions on the basis of these diverse outliers without case studies, which
might reveal the causes of these positions. One possible reason for these
outliers is measurement error. A second is that there are important national
influences (pace my predictions here), such as the belief among Scandinavian
environmental and agricultural parties that the EU harms their interests or is
contrary to their objectives, because of the relatively high level of support
there for the environment and for farmers. Thus, the precise nature and extent
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 93
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
of national-specific determinants in party positions on integration may be
best understood by examining the statements of those parties for which the
correlation is weak.
Given the putative assumption that left-wing parties have become more
pro-European and right-wing parties more anti-European, an interesting
result of this research is that little difference is evident between them. Figure
3 is a scatterplot showing the relationship between (a) left-wing parties and
integration preferences and (b) right-wing parties and integration preferences.
A simple bivariate regression analysis yields correlations that are fairly close
(R = .67 for left-wing parties; R = .71 for right-wing parties).
If anything, the Left is more anti-European than the Right. The distribution
for right-wing parties appears flatter in the scatterplot, whereas support
among left-wing parties appears to drop rapidly as they move away from the
ideological centre. Regression analysis confirms this impression. The variables
‘distance from ideological centre’ and ‘integration preferences’ were manipulated to try to get more information about the differences between left-wing
and right-wing parties. First, the dependent variable ‘integration preferences’
was squared, and then correlations were done against left-wing and rightwing parties. The correlation improved for left-wing parties (to R = .74) but
decreased for right-wing parties (to R = .69). What this means is that, as leftwing parties move away from the ideological centre toward the extreme Left,
support for integration tended to decrease exponentially.
Secondly, the independent variable ‘distance from ideological centre’ was
squared for both left-wing and right-wing parties, and this was correlated to
the unsquared dependent variable ‘integration preferences’. Here the correlation for right-wing parties improved (to R = .76) but the correlation for leftwing parties declined (to R = .62). This indicates that, as integration support
among right-wing parties declines, we find that they are exponentially further
from the ideological centre. These findings confirm the impression yielded by
the scatterplot that the decline in support among right-wing parties as they
move away from the ideological centre is more gradual than among left-wing
parties. In any case, the differences between left-wing and right-wing parties
are very small, and without further testing – and especially empirical analysis
of country-by-country findings – we should be cautious about these preliminary findings.
The significance of these results lies in the fact that they suggest a strong
relationship between ideology and support for European integration. The
assumption of much of the literature, that support for integration is related
to domestic economic or historical factors, has not considered why there is
little correlation between party nationality and integration support. Implicit
in these theories is the notion that domestic political actors interpret national
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
93
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
9:01 am
Page 94
European Union Politics 3(1)
Integration preferences and leftist parties
Extent of preference for integration
6.86
*
* *
*
*
*
**
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
** *
*
*
* *
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1
*
*
0.1
*
*
*
*
4.5
Distance from centre
Integration preferences and rightist parties
7
Extent of preference for integration
94
1/2/02
* *
**
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* * **
* *
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
**
*
*
*
*
**
*
*
*
**
*
*
*
*
*
* *
*
*
* *
*
1.13
*
0.1
Figure 3
Distance from centre
*
*
4.5
Integration preferences and leftist/rightist parties.
economic or social/cultural demands and needs, and then form their
preferences in such a manner as to act on them. Little or no attention has
been devoted to ideological competition between domestic political parties
over differing views of the national interest, nor (until recently) have
theorists examined the cross-national correlations between ideology and integration support. Obviously, different ideological strands may be representing
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 95
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
different conceptions of the national interest, but this simply reinforces the
hypothesis here: that integration preferences depend on the ideology of the
party, not the nationality of the party.
A possible criticism of these findings is that extreme parties should not
be considered on equal terms with mainstream parties, since they are selfconsciously anti-establishment. They have little or no effective chance of
governing, and so are free to be anti-system. Controlling for parties’ vote share
might erase the correlation between ideology and support for integration.
Extreme parties get few votes. They have little power. They are anti-system.
The purpose of weighting parties, therefore, is to reduce the influence of small
parties on the correlation. Ultimately, mainstream parties’ views would vary
more according to national interest since the effect of outsider parties (and
their corresponding ideologies) is removed.
There are three responses. First, this argument results in a tautology. Do
small extreme parties reject many of the tenets of the establishment because
they are outside the corridors of power or are they powerless because of their
extreme beliefs? To move toward power a political party must moderate its
ideological stance, including its views on European integration, as the Italian
Communist Party did in the 1970s. Secondly, although a full-blown test is not
performed here, analysis strongly suggests that the correlation between ideology and anti-Europeanism is powerful regardless of whether the party is
gaining few votes (the UK Independence Party) or many votes (the French
National Front). Therefore, controlling for vote share may in fact have little
impact on the results. Finally, to suggest that the strength of correlation varies
according to the size of the party is not meaningful to the analysis presented
above, which is simply to correlate ideology to integration preferences and
compare that with nationality. In the next section I correlate the ideology of
governments (i.e. coalitions of mainstream parties) to preferences on the
Amsterdam negotiations. Here the influence of small extreme parties
completely disappears, and this fulfils the requirement to control for party
importance.
Government ideology and European integration
If ideology is a good predictor of party preferences, does it also lead to predictions on government preferences? A report produced by the European
Parliament on interim national positions on the Amsterdam intergovernmental conference (IGC) negotiations provides valuable evidence on member
state preferences. The report is the one of the few (perhaps the only) quantifiable dependent variables indicating national preferences on a wide range of
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
95
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
96
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 96
European Union Politics 3(1)
issues. Member states are notoriously secretive about the positions they take
in discussions in the Council of Ministers and the European Council.
Positions on 135 issues in 14 areas (9 policy areas and 5 institutional areas;
see Table 1) were coded according to whether the government supported the
issue or not. The criterion for accepting an issue for coding was that it represented an increase (or potential increase) in the authority of the European
Community. Where new policies would be given a treaty base or where existing policies would be further communautarised, they were included. Where
the EU institutions were given increased powers, or national authority to veto
was potentially eroded, they were included. The trade-off therefore was
between supranationalization and national control. This set of criteria
excluded institutional ‘streamlining’ and, where the effect was uncertain, the
issue was excluded.8
Coding was as follows. Where the government favoured the adoption of
the measure it was given a value of 1. Where it opposed the measure it was
given a value of 0. Where it entered a reservation or a partial acceptance, it
was given a value of 0.5. If the government had no position then that particular issue was removed from the N for that government. For each of the
14 policy and institutional areas, a value of between 0 and 1 was obtained by
calculating the mean of positions in that area. Aggregate means were also
calculated for external policies, internal policies, all policies, institutional
change and all issues together. Obviously, those member states with values
Table 1
Amsterdam IGC negotiating areas
Policy/institutional area
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Defence
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
Citizenship
Environment
Employment
New policies
Budget
Fraud
European Parliament (EP)
Council
Commission
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and other institutions
Subsidiarity, transparency, flexibility
Total
Number of issues
18
5
17
18
8
10
9
2
4
15
4
4
14
7
135
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 97
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
closest to 1.0 were most supportive of integration; those with values closest
to zero were least supportive.
In Table 2 the value has been multiplied by 100 to give the percentage of
proposals each government was willing to support. Table 3 ranks member
states according to the percentage of all proposals they supported; Belgium
is at the top, supporting 86% of all proposals, and Britain is at the bottom,
supporting only 23%. Within certain areas Britain’s support was much higher
– for example, the British government supported 80% of the environmental
proposals and 100% of the fraud proposals. In general, however, the list corresponds with the putative rank of ‘Europhile’ and ‘Eurosceptic’ member
state, although some countries with strongly pro-European reputations, such
as Luxembourg, Germany and Ireland, show less support for the Amsterdam
proposals than might be expected.
Table 2
Government positions in 14 Amsterdam IGC areas, with aggregates
Percentage of proposals supported by government
Area
A
B
CFSP
Defence
JHA
Citizenship
Environment
Employment
New policies
Budget
Fraud
EP
Council
Commission
Misc.
Flexibility
64
20
81
94
71
100
63
0
100
50
25
67
100
79
81 32 38
100 67 20
79 38 96
88 50 88
100 86 80
100 100 100
75 20 17
100
0 0
75 100 33
75 70 33
75 17 44
100
0 0
83 100 57
92 70 80
Externala
Internalb
All policies
Institutionsc
All
50
83
76
71
74
86
87
87
84
86
Dk
39
60
55
57
54
Fi
33
73
61
45
57
F
D
Gr
Ire
I
L
35
80
69
77
67
60
25
0
50
14
31
0
25
20
61
80
81
89
85
75
40
0
50
67
50
33
79
100
64
50
96
93
80
100
80
100
100
92
50
67
100
75
25
13
86
58
100
100
67
100
100
63
38
67
50
83
77 81 82 54
69 30 14
80 100 90 40
80 30
0
86 77 77 65
80 71 24
93 79 92 90
86 55 34
100 83 100 75
75 86 80
100 100 88 100
96 100 69
89 17
0 83
38 20
0
100
0
0 50
0 50
0
100 75 100 100 100 100 100
78 56 67 38
71 50
0
100 75 63 63
17 50
0
50 75 100 38
0
0
0
33 78 75 58
86 70 25
95 75 100 100
57 71
0
47
60
57
18
47
66
73
71
68
70
60
93
85
81
84
21
84
68
61
66
78
93
89
69
84
N
86
72
76
70
74
84
75
78
79
78
P
Sp
50
78
71
57
67
72
75
74
65
71
Sw
30
68
59
51
56
UK
11
37
30
6
23
Notes: A = Austria; B = Belgium; Dk = Denmark; Fi = Finland; F = France; D = Germany;
Gr = Greece; Ire = Ireland; I = Italy; L = Luxembourg; N = Netherlands; P = Portugal; Sp = Spain;
Sw = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom.
a External policies = CFSP and defence.
b Internal policies = JHA, citizenship, environment, employment, new policies, budget, and fraud.
c Institutions = EP, Council, Commission, miscellaneous institutions and flexibility.
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
97
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
98
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 98
European Union Politics 3(1)
Table 3 also includes a characterization of governments according to
whether they were leftist or rightist. Most of the member states appearing at
the top of the list (i.e. those most supportive of the Amsterdam proposals) are
leftist governments, lending support to the view that left-wing governments
have become more pro-European. Moreover, the least supportive governments are right-wing. However, there is a lot of overlap between the two: the
Spanish (right-wing) government, for example, was seventh in the table,
supporting 71% of proposals, and Germany was eighth, at 70%. In addition,
the left-wing Scandinavian governments were less supportive than Spain or
Germany, and on balance there appears to be little obvious variation in
government support for European integration among left and right governments. This qualifies the data presented earlier on Left and Right parties and
their support for integration: whereas leftist parties seem to lose support for
integration more quickly than rightist parties as they move away from the
centre, the evidence suggests a mildly opposite effect for governments.
Governments of the Left appear very slightly more supportive of integration
than governments of the Right.
Table 3 Rank of member states by percentage of proposals supported and
government position
Rank
Member
state
% of
proposals
supported
Type of government
Deviation from
ideological centre
1
2/3
2/3
4
5/6
5/6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Belgium
Greece
Italy
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Austria
Spain
Germany
Portugal
Ireland
Finland
Sweden
Denmark
France
86
84
84
78
74
74
71
70
67
66
57
56
54
47
Left
Left (PASOK government)
Left (Olive Tree)
Left
Left (socialist/Christian social)
Left
Right
Right
Left
Right
Left
Left
Left
Right
15
UK
23
Right
0.91
N/A
N/A
1.27
N/A
0.75
2.00
0.95
0.62
1.52
1.51
1.42
1.11
2.38 (president)
1.83 (government)
2.21
Note: Left–Right location is derived from the Huber and Inglehart survey, with coalition parties
weighted according to the percentage of seats they hold. 1 is furthest Left, 10 is furthest Right;
median = 5.5.
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 99
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
The 14 issue areas in Table 1 contain very different numbers of issues at
stake, ranging from 18 in the cases of Common Foreign and Security Policy
and citizenship, to only 2 in the case of the budget. Limited changes to the
Council and the Commission were sought (only 4 issues each), whereas more
wholesale changes to the European Parliament were proposed (15 altogether).
Statistical results for each individual policy or institutional area should correspondingly be treated with caution. However, I have also included aggregates. They are: all external policies (Common Foreign and Security Policy
and defence), all internal policies (Justice and Home Affairs, citizenship,
environment, employment, new policies, budget and fraud), all policies (both
external and internal policies), and institutional change (European Parliament, Commission, Council, European Court of Justice and other institutions,
and subsidiarity/transparency/flexibility). In addition, an aggregate for all
135 proposed changes is calculated. This enables us to examine each individual policy or institutional area as a dependent variable, and also to
examine groups of policies/institutional changes as dependent variables.
Four independent variables were calculated to determine the cause of
member state support for European integration in the Amsterdam negotiations. One of them uses Leonard Ray’s survey of party preferences on integration (the dependent variable in the first part of this article). It acts as a
control or test, since it is closely related to the dependent variable in this
section. Two other independent variables place governments in Left–Right
space. The fourth seeks to determine the influence of public opinion on
government positions. It simply uses public opinion levels (from Eurobarometer in early 1997) on various policies under discussion at the IGC
(Commission of the European Communities, 1997).
The two variables that place governments in Left–Right space are derived
from different sets of data. The first is Huber and Inglehart’s 1993 expert
survey of party ideology (also used as an independent variable in the first
part of this article); the second is Eurobarometer data, which correlate respondents’ Left–Right self-placement to their voting intentions. In this latter technique, parties are placed by reference to their supporters’ self-assessments of
their own ideological position. Recall that for these two variables data are
available for parties rather than governments. The same is true of Ray’s expert
survey of party preferences toward integration (the Huber and Inglehart
survey was correlated to the Ray survey in the first part of this article, with
results showing a strong correlation).
Consequently, a weighting system was devised to help ascertain government positions. The parties in government at the time of the EP (1997) report
were weighted according to the percentage of the government that each party
represented. The weighting was calculated by dividing the number of seats
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
99
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
100
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 100
European Union Politics 3(1)
each governing party held by the total seats held by all coalition parties. This
ratio was then applied to the values from the expert surveys and the Eurobarometer calculations for the respective parties. Thus, in the case of Ray’s
survey of party preferences (which ranks parties from 1, least favourable to
integration, to 7, most favourable), the value attached to each party equalled
the survey figure weighted according to the percentage of the government
the party comprised. In the case of the Huber and Inglehart survey, the figure
used was the Left–Right score on their 1–10 scale. The same technique was
used for the Eurobarometer data.
The separate values for governing parties were then summed to give a
single composite Left–Right score for the government. The distance from the
centre of the spectrum was then measured to give a final figure on the ideological centrism of the government. Those governments closest to the centre
had a low figure and those furthest from the centre a high figure. ‘Levels of
centrism’ figures were obtained for each of the 15 EU member states governments and also for the French president, who plays an important role in the
major EU treaty negotiations.
An important methodological question arises in the case of the ideology
measures (the Huber and Inglehart expert survey and the Eurobarometerderived measure). It is whether to measure (a) the distance from the centre
of the spectrum of the coalition parties before weighting, or (b) the distance of
the government after weighting. For single-party governments there is no
difference between the two values, but for coalition governments there is at
least some difference. In certain cases there could be enormous differences in
the final values.
For example, assume a government was formed by two parties, each
holding 50% of the seats. Party A had a value of 1 (furthest left) and party B
had a value of 10 (furthest right). Applying the weighting (0.5 for each) to
their ideological values and then summing the result would produce a
government Left–Right position of 5.5. We would then predict that this
government would be strongly pro-European, since it is perfectly centrist
(deviation of 0 from the centre). But the positions of the two individual parties
are likely to be extremely hostile to integration. If instead we measure their
individual distance from the centre (4.5 in each case) and then weight and
sum that figure, we obtain a far different result. The government’s deviation
from the centre in this case will be 4.5 (the maximum possible value), and we
would then predict the government to be strongly hostile to integration.
The method used depends on assumptions about the behaviour of parties
in government. Coalition partners on opposite sides of the centre may compromise toward a policy between their individual positions, or instead they
may retain their individual positions on integration. In practice, the more
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 101
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
coalition partners there are, and the wider their ideological spread, the more
difference there is between the two values. For most member states the difference between the values is not large. Regression analysis performed on results
using both methodologies revealed small differences in R, with a very slightly
better correlation for the latter methodology; that is, the one that assumes that
parties do not compromise their positions in coalition government. On
balance it seems safer to assume that this is the correct approach, and so the
correlates reported in this section reflect the use of this weighting methodology. Table 4 shows the ranking of governments’ positions according to the
different data sources and methodologies.
Some shortcomings with the independent variables should be mentioned.
Data from the Huber and Inglehart expert survey are not from the same time
Table 4
Government preferences and ideology ranking
Member state
Ray a
Huber/Inglehart b
Eurobarometer c
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
France (president)d
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
UK
7.00
6.43
5.88
5.96
5.68
5.25
6.63
6.70
5.63
6.39
6.89
5.66
6.71
6.31
6.14
3.50
0.75
0.91
1.11
1.51
1.83
2.38
0.95
–
1.52
–
–
1.27
0.62
2.00
1.42
2.21
0.38
0.15
0.36
0.09
1.38
1.80
0.88
0.77
0.35
1.73
0.66
0.41
0.82
1.80
1.52
1.78
Sources: Ray (1999); Huber and Inglehart (1995); Commission of the European
Communities (1997).
Notes:
a The ‘Ray’ value measures the government’s preferences toward European integration, with 1
being the least favourable and 7 being the most favourable.
b The ‘Huber and Inglehart’ value measures the government’s ideology. The closer to zero, the
more centrist the government.
c The ‘Eurobarometer’ value also measures government ideology in the same parameters as
Huber and Inglehart.
d The French president is included as a separate independent variable because of his importance
in intergovernmental conferences.
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
101
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
102
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 102
European Union Politics 3(1)
period as the EP’s Amsterdam report. The survey was conducted in 1993, four
years before the IGC. Therefore, it is possible that it does not accurately represent party preferences or ideology at the time of the negotiations. In
addition, some data are missing from the Huber and Inglehart survey, which
does not include placements for Luxembourg, Greece and Italy’s new party
groups. Nonetheless, given the lack of complete time series data, it seems
reasonable to use these measures as approximations of party positions.
Results
The bivariate regression conducted on the Ray survey shows that party preferences on integration account for a very high proportion of all government
positions taken in the negotiations (R = .81). This is unsurprising given the
likely connection between the two variables. The fact that it does not explain
100% of variation in government support for the Amsterdam proposals may
plausibly be due to several factors: (1) the time lag (a difference of one year
between the survey results and the negotiations); (2) inaccuracies in the expert
surveys on which the Ray study is based; (3) change in parties’ support for
integration once they achieve governing status, because of the demands of
coalition partners or the demands of important interest groups, for example;
(4) the difference between generalized support for integration and the
specifics of proposals in a negotiating environment. Nevertheless, the result
helps to confirm the validity of the data by demonstrating the strong correlation between the two variables.
Huber and Inglehart’s measure of party ideology is also strongly correlated to government preferences (R = .69). This is significant at the .05 level,
permitting us to reject the null hypothesis that government ideology does not
account for variation in government positions. Regressing Eurobarometerderived party positions does not, however, lead to the same conclusion. The
relationship is too weak on this measure to state with confidence that party
ideology is associated with government positions. This may be because citizens hold different Left–Right views from the parties for which they vote, or
alternatively it may be caused by measurement error. Finally, there appears
to be no relationship at all between the positions of governments at the IGC
and the general measure of citizens’ support for EU integration. Examination
of the residuals indicates no underlying pattern in either Huber and Inglehart’s survey or Ray’s survey as explanations of the dependent variable ‘all
policies’.
On specific policy and institutional areas the Huber and Inglehart extrapolation of government ideology is (with varying degrees of strength) correlated to government preferences, while Eurobarometer-derived government
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 103
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
ideology is a poor predictor. The Huber and Inglehart variable helps explain
a number of dependent variables, especially in the areas of institutional
change, where it accounts for 56% of variation in government preferences. In
the JHA proposals, it explains 50% of variation; in environmental policy 58%,
and in employment policy 69%. In certain other policies the Huber and Inglehart ideology variable explains somewhat less variation (‘new policies’, 44%;
citizenship, 41%; budget, 39%). Nonetheless, the results suggest that ideology
as an explanatory variable extends beyond economic policy to include other
policy areas.
The Eurobarometer data on public opinion were also tested against areas
in which the IGC was negotiating (including action on unemployment,
support for policies in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs, greater powers
for the EP, and more power in foreign policy). Eurobarometer surveys taken
at the time of the negotiations revealed general national views on these
matters and therefore might plausibly be connected to government preferences. However, these tests showed no relationship whatsoever between
public opinion and government preferences, with the exception of foreign
policy, which is discussed later.
This interesting result confirms some of the research undertaken on
public attitudes to Europe and their connection to government preferences
(see Hewstone, 1986: esp. 18–20; and Wessels, 1995, for reviews). Little if any
research suggests a strong ‘push’ role for public opinion, in which citizens
drive integration by influencing government preferences. Nugent, for
example, in the British case explains, ‘with most voters largely uninterested
in, and uninformed about, Community affairs it was inevitable that many
should, on the Community issue, tend to follow the lead and reflect the views
of their chosen political leaders and parties’ (1992: 191). Wessels (1995) suggests that parties are responsible for mobilizing the support of their
constituencies on European integration.
Other research has examined the cause of public attitudes to Europe,
notably Inglehart (1990), Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), and Gabel (1998).
These important works help clarify the social roots of public opinion, but they
do not answer the question of causality in our case: where do government
preferences come from? Governments in the Amsterdam negotiations, like
many other sets of negotiations, were able to keep their preferences largely
secret from the public. The lack of correlation between public support for
integrative proposals and government preferences (in most cases) suggests
that the public had little effective influence on government preferences.
One of the most interesting results is for the aggregate of all internal
policy proposals (see Table 5). Here the relationship between the Ray survey
independent variable and government preferences was very weak. An
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
103
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
104
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 104
European Union Politics 3(1)
Table 5
Amsterdam preferences (bivariate regression). R correlations reported
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Ray survey
(Party
preferences)
Huber/Inglehart
survey (Ideology)
Eurobarometerderived government
positions (Ideology)
Eurobarometer
survey (Public
opinion)
Internal policies
External policies
All policies
Institutional change
All proposed changes
.1723
.5956**
.8039*
.7633*
.8099*
.4647
.3500
.6191**
.7402*
.6907**
.3220
.1640
.3423
.5778**
.4267
Data unavailable
.7065a
Data unavailable
.2621b
.3814c
*p < .01; **p < .05.
Notes:
a The independent variable is public support for a European foreign policy.
b The dependent variable is member state support for increased powers for the EP. The
independent variable is public support for greater EP importance.
c The independent variable is public support for EU membership.
examination of the residuals showed a strong relationship except for two outliers: the UK government and the French president. The French president was
far more positive on internal policies than his ideological position would lead
us to predict; the UK government was far more negative on internal policies
than its ideological position would lead us to predict. This result may lend
support to explanations that draw from national experience: namely that
French political élites have become Europeanized for economic and other
reasons; and the British Conservative Party was increasingly trapped by a
powerful Eurosceptic wing in the mid-1990s. When internal and external
policies are combined, however, this independent variable accounts for more
than 80% of variance in government position. Examination of these residuals
indicates a random distribution. The Huber and Inglehart independent
variable accounts for 62% of variation on all policies.
Correlations are weaker for external policies (CFSP and defence policy).
Ray’s expert survey accounts for 60% of variation on these policies, but the
Huber and Inglehart independent variable accounts for only 35%.
Interestingly, Eurobarometer survey data of individuals indicate that 71% of
variation in government support for these policies is explained by variation
in public support (75% for CFSP alone). The t-test also indicates that this is a
strong relationship. It is very likely that some national-specific factor such as
traditional approaches to foreign policy and defence, rather than ideology,
accounts for much of this variation. Evidence for this includes the fact that
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 105
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
Ireland (a strong supporter of integration in other areas) and the other neutral
countries were not supportive of increased EU competence in the areas of
foreign policy and defence.
This result does not mean that public opinion is necessarily causing
government positions on foreign policy and defence matters, simply that they
are strongly correlated. However, it would appear to lend support to the
historical/cultural theories of preference formation, discussed earlier in this
article, in which government position is derived from national experience.
Ideology is a far less satisfactory explanation of government preferences in
these areas, and this result helps demonstrate the limitations of the approach
set out here.
Conclusion
A number of points emerge from this research. First, ideology appears to be
a good indicator of position on European integration: centrists favour
integration; left-wing and right-wing extremists oppose it. Ideology is an
important transmission device between voter choice and party, and between
parliamentary parties and coalition government. In domestic politics ideology serves as a means of reducing transaction costs in determining political
support. Yet it also correlates to EU preferences, consistently explaining nearly
70 per cent of both party positions on European integration and government
positions on the Amsterdam IGC. This correlation is far better than either
nationality of party or public opinion, neither of which is helpful in knowing
the positions of parties and governments respectively.
This partially confirms recent research on ideology and integration
support (see Ray, 1997), but it is at odds with much of the literature, which
presumes that governments represent some conception of the national interest in an environment free of ideological competition. Of course, since not all
variance in preferences is explained by ideology it is quite likely that the views
of domestic social groups also play a part in determining government positions. The correlation between ideology and integration support extends
beyond economic policy, where it is most intuitively obvious, and includes
justice and home affairs, among other policies. A strong correlation between
government ideological position and support for these policy changes was
evident. In addition, a strong relationship exists between ideology and
support for institutional strengthening at the supranational level.
On the other hand, the correlations are far weaker in the areas of foreign
policy and defence. This is plausibly due to national differences on issues of
neutrality, relations with external actors and similar issues. Examination of
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
105
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
106
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 106
European Union Politics 3(1)
residuals in other correlation tests also shows outliers that are likely to be the
result of national differences. Future case studies would do well to examine
the extent and cause of these national idiosyncracies.
Party preferences on European integration were consistently the best predictor of government positions on the Amsterdam IGC, with the ideology
ranking derived from Huber and Inglehart a close second. The link between
ideology and both party and government preferences is important, because
it may help explain integration, particularly in cases where there is not some
overriding pan-ideological national interest at stake. For example, those
member states with governments consistently comprised of centrist coalitions
(Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, for example) also tend to be the most
‘pro-European’. However, this theory is partial – it does not account for
bargaining, or for the fact that member states may rank preferences and
sacrifice some of them in the bargaining process in order to achieve others.
A second conclusion concerns the way in which political institutions
influence the ideological make-up of governments. Because the data point
strongly to the fact that centrist governments support integration whereas
governments composed of more extreme parties oppose it, ultimately it is
worth investigating how governments come to be centrist in the first place.
If member states with long-standing pro-European reputations have achieved
this reputation because they have centrist governments, rather than because their
histories or economies determine a national interest that is pro-European, a
major challenge to the theoretical canon would be posed.
Although it might be argued that governments inevitably become centrist
once they take office (that is, they represent important economic producers
who favour international stability), it is equally possible that centrists are
elected in a predictable manner. Proportional representation electoral systems
are biased toward centrist government (Lijphart, 1994), which, as we have
seen, is supportive of integration. In contrast, first-past-the-post (FPTP)
majoritarian systems include Euro-sceptics in the governing party, who then
exert an influence on decision-making, particularly in cases where the government’s majority is low.
Finally, a third conclusion concerns those member states with broadchurch centre-left or centre-right parties, such as France and the UK. As
political integration in Europe becomes more profound and the cleavages
between centre, Left and Right correspondingly sharper, managers of these
parties are less likely to enjoy a quiet life. The reason is that members of
their parties span one of the two cleavages, leading to greater intra-party
squabbles and making party unity on Europe ever more difficult. A strong
leader with a large majority (such as Tony Blair) may be able to accomplish
the feat, but in more difficult times Labour leaders, like socialist leaders in
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 107
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
France, have had great difficulties. Likewise, the British Conservative Party
nearly split over the matter, held together only by the FPTP electoral system
and its rewards for the party. Without the same electoral incentives to hold
them together, the RPR party in France was unable to prevent a Euro-hostile
wing from hiving off and creating a new party, the Rassemblement pour la
France.
How generalizable is this study? It is possible that ideological location
can help explain the governmental preferences of advanced industrial
societies in a wide range of international forums, such as trade agreements
and currency stabilization regimes. For example, the views of centrists such
as President Clinton might be compared with ideological outliers such as
Reform Party member Patrick Buchanan and consumer advocate Ralph Nader
on questions relating to NAFTA or the WTO to determine whether the same
ideology–integration nexus is at work. Absent further study, however, my
conclusions must be confined to the narrower issues discussed above.
Appendix
The EP report on the Amsterdam negotiations provides an important quantifiable dependent variable – member state preferences – which may be correlated to government ideology. As discussed in the text, the criterion for
including an Amsterdam proposal was that it represented a real or potential
increase in supranational authority. The trade-off, therefore, is between supranational and national authority. Supranationalism is taken as synonymous
with support for integration. Thus, the hypothesis that governments of a
centrist ideological make-up will favour supranationalism can be tested
quantitatively, since both the ideological position of the government and its
position on the proposed measures are measurable.
However, this leaves some proposals open to interpretation, since it is
not always explicit or clear whether a proposed policy or institutional change
will affect supranational or national power. The rule of thumb in selecting
proposals, therefore, was that they clearly represent an increase in supranational power (or potential increase, in the case of institutional change such
as increased qualified majority voting).
For example, within the negotiations on citizenship and fundamental
rights, one proposal concerned the replacement of national citizenship with
European citizenship (of course all member states taking a position opposed
this). Because it would have represented a transfer of citizenship to the supranational level it was included. Another proposal would remove the right of
veto for article 8E matters (on citizenship rights). This represented a loss of
institutional power by member states and so was also included. On the other
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
107
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
108
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 108
European Union Politics 3(1)
hand, a proposal to add a general statement of fundamental rights (social,
cultural and religious rights, as well as rights to a healthy environment) was
not included, since it was unclear how or whether this would change the
balance between national and supranational power.
In the area of changes to the Council, a proposal to extend qualified majority voting was included, since this removes the right of veto from individual
member states. On the other hand, a proposal to maintain the status quo of
six-month presidencies was not included because it did not represent a shift
in power from the national to the supranational levels.
Notes
For their comments on earlier drafts I am grateful to Cliff Carrubba, Simon Hix,
Leonard Ray and Paul Taggart, as well as several anonymous referees. An earlier
version of this article was presented at the University of Sussex, and benefited
from comments received there. Much of the research for this article was conducted
at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, which provided a Visiting
Scholarship in 1999–2000. My thanks to them.
1 Deutsch et al. (1957: 46–59); for a more recent Deutschian view in the European
context, see Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997); for a functionalist argument
relating to European monetary integration see Frieden (1997).
2 Although many socialist parties have become social democratic, I refer here to
socialism primarily as a means of state control, which still animates some leftist
parties.
3 My thanks to Simon Hix for raising this point.
4 Both are expert surveys. The data from Ray’s survey scored parties from 1 (least
favourable to integration) to 7 (most favourable) in 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996.
I have used data in this part for 1992 since it is closest in time to the Huber and
Inglehart survey, which collected Left–Right party placements in 1993 and
ranked them from 1 (most leftist) to 10 (most rightist).
5 Gabel and Huber (2000) provide a thoughtful analysis of several techniques for
extracting Left–Right party positions from manifestos. They use expert surveys
as their benchmark for comparison.
6 The lower confidence limit of the mean ideological position for Belgian parties
is above the upper confidence limit for both the Netherlands and Austria.
7 This is an arbitrary value; space permitting we would examine the empirical
‘reality’ for each state to determine where the peak support for integration falls
in terms of ideology.
8 There are inevitable value judgements about which proposals to include and
which to leave out. See the Appendix for further discussion of criteria for
inclusion.
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 109
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
References
Bell, David (1996) ‘Western Communist Parties and the European Union’, in John
Gaffney (ed.) Political Parties and the European Union. London: Routledge.
Betz, Hans-Georg (1994) Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. London:
Macmillan.
Castles, Francis and Peter Mair (1984) ‘Left–Right Political Scales: Some ”Expert
Judgements” ’, European Journal of Political Research 12(1): 73–88.
Commission of the European Communities (1997) Eurobarometer 47.1. Luxembourg:
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, March–April.
Deutsch, Karl (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International
Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Eichenberg, Richard and Russell Dalton (1993) ‘Europeans and the European
Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration’, International Organization 47(4): 507–34.
European Parliament (1997) Positions Résumées des Etats Membres et du Parlement
Européen sur la Conference intergouvenmentale de 1996. JF/bo/290/97. Luxembourg, 12 May.
Fieschi, Catherine, J. Shields and R. Woods (1996) ‘Extreme Right Wing Parties
and the European Union’, in John Gaffney (ed.) Political Parties and the European
Union. London: Routledge.
Frieden, Jeffry (1997) ‘Economic Liberalization and the Politics of European
Monetary Integration’, in Miles Kahler (ed.) Liberalization and Foreign Policy.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Gabel, Matthew (1998) Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public
Opinion, and European Union. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Gabel, Matthew and John Huber (2000) ‘Putting Parties in their Place: Inferring
Party Left–Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos Data’, American
Journal of Political Science 44(1): 94–103.
Hewstone, Miles (1986) Understanding Attitudes to the European Community.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hix, Simon (1999) ‘Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics:
Cognitive Constraints and Partisan Responses’, European Journal of Political
Research 35(1): 69–106.
Hix, Simon and Christopher Lord (1997) Political Parties in the European Union.
London: Macmillan.
Huber, John and Ronald Inglehart (1995) ‘Expert Interpretations of Party Space
and Party Location in 42 Societies’, Party Politics 1(1): 73–111.
Inglehart, Ronald (1990) Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (1995) ‘Party Positions and Voter Orientations’, in HansDieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (eds) Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Knutsen, Oddbjorn (1998) ‘Expert Judgements of the Left–Right Location of
Political Parties: A Comparative Longitudinal Study’, West European Politics
21(2): 63–94.
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
109
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
110
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 110
European Union Politics 3(1)
Kreppel, Amie and George Tsebelis (1999) ‘Coalition Formation in the European
Parliament’, Comparative Political Studies 32(8): 933–66.
Laver, Michael and Ben Hunt (1992) Policy and Party Competition. London:
Routledge.
Lijphart, Arend (1994) Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-seven
Democracies, 1945–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mancini, G. Frederico (2000) ‘The Italians in Europe’, Foreign Affairs 79(2): 122–134.
Marcussen, Martin, Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans Joachim
Knopf and Klaus Roscher (1999) ‘Constructing Europe: The Evolution of
French, British and German Nation State Identities’, Journal of European Public
Policy 6(4): 614–33.
Marks, Gary and Carole Wilson (2000) ‘The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory
of Party Response to European Integration’, British Journal of Political Science
30(3): 433–59.
Moravcsik, Andrew (1993) ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community:
A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies
31(4): 473–524.
Moravcsik, Andrew (1997) ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics’, International Organization 51(4): 513–53.
Moravcsik, Andrew (1998) The Choice for Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Muller-Rommel, Ferdinand (ed.) (1989) New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise
and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Noury, Abdul (2002) ‘Ideology, Nationality and Euro-Parliamentarians’, European
Union Politics 3(1): 33–58.
Nugent, Neill (1992) ‘British Public Opinion and the European Community’, in
Stephen George (ed.) Britain and the European Community: The Politics of SemiDetachment. Oxford: Clarendon.
Pennings, Paul (2002) ‘The Dimensionality of the EU Policy Space: The European
Elections of 1999’, European Union Politics 3(1): 59–79.
Ray, Leonard (1997) ‘Politicizing Europe: Political Parties and the Changing
Nature of Public Opinion about the European Union’, Ph. D. thesis, University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Ray, Leonard (1999) ‘Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration:
Results from an Expert Survey’, European Journal of Political Research 36(2):
283–306.
Rudig, Wolfgang (1996) ‘Green Parties and the European Union’, in John Gaffney
(ed.) Political Parties and the European Union. London: Routledge.
Stone Sweet, Alec and Wayne Sandholtz (1997) ‘European Integration and Supranational Governance’, Journal of European Public Policy 4(3): 297–317.
Taggart, Paul (1998) ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary
Western European Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research 33(3):
363–88.
Wallace, William (1991) ‘Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United
Kingdom’, International Affairs 67(1): 65–80.
Wessels, Bernhard (1995) ‘Support for Integration: Elite or Mass Driven?’, in Oskar
Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (eds) Public Opinion and Internationalized
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
05 Aspinwall (jr/d)
1/2/02
9:01 am
Page 111
Aspinwall
Preferring Europe
Young, John (1993) Britain and European Unity, 1945–1992. London: Macmillan.
Youngs, Richard (1999) ‘The Politics of the Single Currency: Learning the Lessons
of Maastricht’, Journal of Common Market Studies 37(2): 295–316.
About the author
Mark Aspinwall is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Durham,
Durham, DH1 3LZ, UK.
Fax: +44 191 374 2810,
E-mail: [email protected]
Downloaded from eup.sagepub.com at Charles University in Prague on February 18, 2015
111