Six Day War:
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Israel vs. the Arabs
June 1967
By Joseph Miranda
Background
T
he Six Day War was the culmination of a series of crises in the Middle East, mainly
focused on Israel, though also reflecting the struggle for geostrategic position among
the various Arab powers. The First Arab-Israeli War, fought in 1947-49, confirmed
the United Nations’ declaration of Israeli statehood. It also indirectly brought about the
overthrow of several of the Arab governments that had led their countries to defeat.
The most notable of those coups was in Egypt, where the “Free Officers Movement” seized power in 1952. One of that movement’s leaders, Gamal Abdel Nasser, became president (dictator) two
years later and began to promote radical Arab pan-nationalism. He saw Egypt as the center of the
overlapping spheres of the Arab states, the Islamic cultural realm and Africa. His objectives were to
Israeli tanks advancing on the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War.
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destroy the last vestiges of European
colonial power, modernize Egypt and
establish a unified front of former
colonial countries in Asia and Africa.
A major realignment of international power relations in the Middle
East ensued. Nasser cleared the British
from Egypt and nationalized the Suez
Canal in July 1956. He also called on
the Soviet Union to provide military
and economic support. Those moves
had considerable impact on the Cold
War, the undeclared conflict between
the communist powers and the West.
The United Kingdom had established the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) in 1955, made up of a tier
of states directly facing the USSR in
southwest Asia: Turkey, Iraq, Iran
and Pakistan, and supported by the
United States. Nasser, by bringing
the Soviets into Egypt, effectively
allowed Moscow to leapfrog CENTO.
Egyptian ports were also opened to
the Soviet Navy, thereby allowing it to
potentially challenge the US Navy’s
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
The turning point came later in
1956, when Britain and France, allied
with Israel, attempted to retake the
Suez Canal in Operation Musketeer.
The Anglo-French expeditionary force
easily seized Port Said while the Israelis
cleared the Sinai; however, US and
international opposition was then sufficient to force the withdrawal of those
forces from Egypt. With the former
imperial powers out of the way, and the
Israelis back on their side of the border,
Nasser staked claim to the moral
leadership of the entire Arab world.
Those events ultimately led the US
into a de facto alliance with Israel, as
a counterbalance to both the Soviets
and radical pan-Arab nationalism.
While Washington was moving closer
to Jerusalem, though, the Americans
couldn’t get too close for fear of fully
alienating otherwise pro-Western
Arab countries. If nothing else, those
countries controlled petroleum
resources vital to the Western world.
In 1958 Nasser masterminded
a union between Egypt and Syria,
calling the new federation the
United Arab Republic (UAR). With
the founding of the UAR came the
implication the other Arab states
would ultimately join in order to form
one combined regional hegemon.
Underneath the façade of unity
there was considerable infighting
among Syria’s and Egypt’s leaders.
Nasser’s status was also disputed by
the heads of the other Arab countries,
many of whom had their own claims
to make. For example, in 1960 the
Syrians sponsored an attempt to
assassinate King Hussein of Jordan,
who was considered by them as too
pro-Western. The attempt came close
to killing the monarch, who nearly
went to war in retaliation. Further,
Egyptian dominance of the UAR was
increasingly resented by the Syrians,
who finally withdrew from it in 1961.
As for Nasser, since he’d declared
himself the moral leader of the Arab
world, he couldn’t afford to back down
without loss of prestige, something
that might then easily rebound into a
coup or revolt against him in Egypt.
Consequently he upped the rhetoric
against Israel, reaffirming his credentials as the most militant of the Arabs.
Even so, throughout the early 1960s
Nasser wasn’t really preparing for war
against Israel. Much of the Egyptian
Army was tied down in Yemen, supporting that country’s government in
a civil war against deposed royalists.
Nasser was also realistic enough to
understand that, until there was a
single united Arab military command
An Israeli armor unit mobilizing for deployment.
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The 1956 War
The Six Day War wasn’t the first time the Israelis fought their way across the
Sinai. In 1956, Britain, France and Israel formed an alliance to take on Egypt. The
governments of all three had reasons to be rid of Nasser. He had nationalized the
Suez Canal, a vital strategic thoroughfare for Britain, which still had imperial interests
around the globe. France saw Nasser as a threat due to his support of insurgents
in their colony of Algeria. The Israelis were dealing with Palestinian guerillas who
were infiltrating across the border from Egyptian-administered Gaza.
The plan the three countries adopted was codenamed Operation Musketeer.
According to it, the Israelis would drive across the Sinai while an Anglo-French airborne
and amphibious force, supported by both those nations’ fleets and airpower, would
land at Port Said and advance up the canal. The political and media cover story for
that portion of the invasion was that it was a necessity in order to shield the canal
from being engulfed in the Sinai fighting. The combined effect was hoped to be a
destabilization of the Egyptian government that would force Nasser from office.
Musketeer began on 30 October 1956, with the Israelis driving across the Sinai
as planned. British and French airpower then quickly destroyed the Egyptian Air Force,
while their airborne and amphibious units seized Port Said. As has often been the case
historically, though, military success turned into political disaster. International—particularly American—pressure forced the Anglo-French expeditionary force to withdraw.
The Israelis, thereby left isolated, then also evacuated the Sinai. A United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF) eventually moved into the peninsula as peacekeepers.
Both sides drew lessons from the 1956 war. For the Egyptians, they proved to be the
wrong ones. Nasser was hailed as a hero throughout the Arab world for having successfully
defied the former imperial powers of Europe. The defeat of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai
was attributed throughout the Arab world as having been due to the need to fight Britain
and France as well as Israel. The deficiencies of the Egyptian armed forces were glossed
over in the euphoria about the political outcome that had won the day for Nasser.
As for the Israelis, they were impressed by the power of the Anglo-French
air forces as well as that demonstrated by their own mobile units on the
ground. Over the next decade the IDF built up its airpower and armor, and
then used them as a war-winning combined arms force in 1967.
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Israeli civilian militia mobilize to guard their rural kibbutz just prior to the start of the war.
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Always a popular subject for Western photojournalists in those days: a unit of Israeli female soldiers during the initial mobilization.
(preferably under Egyptian control), a
war against Israel couldn’t succeed.
Throughout the Arab world,
Nasser’s rivals were maneuvering for
position. One of the main criticisms of
him was that, in the wake of the 1956
crisis, he’d agreed to the demilitarization of the Sinai, withdrawing the
Egyptian military from the entire
peninsula and allowing in the United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).
With UNEF stationed along the SinaiIsraeli frontier, Nasser couldn’t actually
launch a war against the Israelis no
matter how hot his rhetoric became.
Nasser’s rivals exploited that
gap between his stated policy and
the situation on the ground. They
claimed that, while Nasser made
propaganda about liberating
Palestinians living under Israeli rule,
he wasn’t willing to go to war over
the issue. In comparison, the Syrians
were actively supporting Palestinian
raids into Israel from their territory.
Tensions escalated to the point where,
in April 1967, the Israelis launched
some air attacks in retaliation.
Seeing the Syrians taking the lead
in the Arab world, Nasser upped the
ante. In May 1967 he ordered UNEF
out of the Sinai, and on 22 May
declared a blockade of the Straits
of Tiran in order to effectively close
Israel’s southern port of Eilat. He also
ordered mobilization of the Egyptian
armed forces, moving several divisions
into forward positions in the Sinai.
Syria and Jordan followed suit with
their own mobilizations. Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia and Algeria also offered
troops to support the coming war.
In response the Israelis mobilized,
but in doing so they faced a dilemma.
While the Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
was more combat effective than its
Arab opponents, its full mobilization
couldn’t be maintained for long without considerable negative impact on
the country’s economy. Yet to demobi-
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Egyptian planes destroyed on the ground during the first Israeli air strikes.
lize and accept the blockade of Eilat,
as well as the threat of Arab armies
converging on Israel, seemed only to
invite further aggression. The Israeli
government, with Prime Minister
Levi Eshkol and Minster of Defense
Moshe Dayan in the lead, therefore
decided to preemptively launch what
already appeared inevitable—war. The Brink
As June 1967 began, Nasser seemed
to have the upper hand, with the Arab
world rallying behind him; however,
there were weaknesses in his ability to
actually wage war. Theoretically there
was a United Arab Command (UAC),
continued on page 13 »
Numbers
The relative sizes of the forces engaged in the Six Day War
appeared to give the advantage to the Arab powers. There were
numerous other factors, however, which mitigated against that.
Among all the Arab countries, only Egypt, Syria and Jordan were
fully committed to the war, and even the Egyptians had a portion of
their armed forces off fighting in Yemen suppressing an insurgency.
The Iraqis committed the equivalent of a division, along with a few
aircraft, to fight on the Jordanian front. The Saudis, Algerians and
Kuwaitis sent only token forces that had no impact on the fighting.
Among the opposing ground forces a good comparison can be
made in terms of divisional equivalents, the common combined
arms independent maneuver formation for that era. The Egyptians
had seven divisions in the Sinai. The Syrians fielded three
“brigade groups,” which were administrative agglomerations
of brigades each roughly equivalent in size (but not combat
effectiveness) to divisions. The Jordanians didn’t use the division
echelon but, figuring three brigades as being roughly equal to
one division, they could put together roughly three divisions.
The Israelis had available about 25 brigades. From them
they organized five ugdah (division-sized task forces averaging
three brigades each), with various other brigades committed
independently. They could also mobilize several more brigades
from reservists, as well as using kibbutz (communal farm) militia
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1967 Armed Forces Comparisons
for static defense. All told, then, the Arabs had the edge in
the number of divisions, but that seeming superiority was
deceptive due to the reasons described in the main article.
As for equipment, both sides had various advantages and
disadvantages. For example, the Egyptians deployed modern
Soviet armored fighting vehicles, while the Israelis made do
with World War II-era American halftracks. Again, though,
that simple comparison doesn’t account for the vastly
superior Israeli training in handling their older vehicles.
The Israelis had another advantage in superior logistics.
For example, around half the tanks in the Syrian Army were
out of commission at any one time, even during peacetime,
owing to maintenance issues. The IDF was able to keep
a higher percentage of its vehicles up and running.
Such discrepancies were especially noticeable when it
came to airpower. The Israeli Air Force was highly trained and
well supported logistically. Each aircraft could fly a mission,
land, be serviced, and then be ready to fly again more quickly
than any of the Arab air forces. Often single Israeli aircraft flew
up to six sorties (missions) per day. That was further facilitated
by the Israelis having more than one pilot per aircraft, thereby
minimizing the impact of pilot exhaustion. In comparison, Arab
aircraft were doing well if they could fly two sorties per day.
MODERN WAR 4 | MAR–APR 2013
Country
Military Manpower
Tanks
Combat Aircraft
Artillery Pieces
Warships
Israel
264,000
800
250
200
22
Egypt
240,000
1200
450
600
60
Syria
50,000
400
120
315
15
Jordan
50,000
200
40
72
0
Iraq
70,000
400
200
500
15
Saudi Arabia
50,000
100
20
?
?
Algeria
60,000
100
100
?
?
Kuwait
5000
24
9
?
?
Note. Numbers vary depending on sources. Israeli combat aircraft include converted trainers. “Warships” includes patrol boats.
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