Ageism: Justice and Social Policy
Israel Doron
Introduction
Before I begin my lecture, I would like to say a few
personal words. First, as many people know, I am the son
of Professor Abraham Doron, Israel Prize laureate, who is
a former head of the School of Social Work here, at the
Hebrew University, and who is present here in the
audience. My father knew Dr. Pins and met him while he
was still alive. Given this personal history, one can
understand the great sense of respect that I feel today
over having been given the opportunity to speak within
the context of this honorable forum of the annual lecture
in memory of Dr. Pins, at the School of Social Work and
Social Welfare.
Second, despite the fact that am currently head of the
Gerontology Department at the University of Haifa, and a
full-time academic, I was never (nor, apparently, will I
ever be) “only” an academic. Previously, I was an
attorney (and I still possess a valid license to practice
law), and in my daily work I am deeply involved in
defending and representing older persons through the
Association of Law in the Service of the Elderly
(www.elderlaw.org.il), which I established with friends
and colleagues. On the ideological level, I believe that the
1
law is – on a certain level and in appropriate
circumstances – capable of serving as a tool for social
change and for promoting social justice. And therefore, in
my lecture here, I will try to include legal examples in
order to underscore how theory, research and action can
join together to promote social justice.
Finally, in my remarks I also intend to conduct a dialogue
with people, such as my father – Professor Abraham
Doron – who, in their pioneering papers in the field of the
welfare state in Israel, focused on discussing social
justice that places an emphasis on two central policy
characteristics for promoting social justice in Israel: the
importance of the universal welfare state; and the
centrality of a redistribution of means (see, for example:
Doron, 1995). It is not my intention to dispute the
cardinal importance of these two characteristics.
However, as I will attempt to point out in this lecture, it is
important to add an additional characteristic to them: the
importance of the politics of recognition as a critical
element of social justice.
I would like to emphasize that this lecture is not based on
empirical research, nor does it purport to present new or
original findings. The lecture is based on previous articles
and books that I have written, and it seeks to offer a new
insight by presenting a normative argument that is based
on a theory of the politics of identity: What the proper
way to conceptualize a social policy that purports to
promote social justice for the older population. The
lecture will comprise four parts: First, I will present the
2
demographic revolution and its implications; second, I
will present Professor Nancy Fraser’s model for social
justice; third, I will present the aspects of social injustice
from which older persons in Israel suffer; and fourth, I
will attempt to answer the question: What social justice
do older persons need in Israel today?
Part I: On the Old Age Revolution
I say nothing new by asserting that we are living in the
era of a demographic revolution: the revolution of ageing.
The data and the implications of the dramatic change in
the demographic composition of the human race are wellknown, and have been reviewed in recent decades in
innumerable articles, studies and books (see for example:
Brodsky, Shnoor and Be'er, 2011). I would go so far as to
say that there exists today a fairly broad consensus that
one of the most important social policy issues that will
engage the entire world in the 21st century is the issue of
the ageing of society (Doron, 2007). There are those who
say that this issue is no less than a “social revolution,”
and even if we do not agree with this term, it is
undoubtedly a change in the human experience of a type
that has never before been experienced in human history:
There has never before been a time when a person could
rise in the morning, go out into the public space, and
every fourth person he or she meets in the street is above
the age of 65.
In my recent book, Old Age in Halls of Justice (Doron,
2012), I presented matters in the following way: “As is
3
described by Bloom and Canning (Bloom and Canning,
2004), until the 18th century the size of the world’s
population was relatively static, and most people’s lives
were short. However, since then a dramatic change has
occurred in the structure and size of the world’s
population: More than three decades have so far been
added to people’s life expectancy, and it is expected that
approximately two decades more will be added in the
current century. Moreover, the world’s population
increased by more than 6 billion, and it is expected to
reach 9 billion people toward the mid-21st century. What
generated the change in the structure of the world’s
population was, among other things, a massive process of
ageing: In 1950, about 200 million people worldwide
were 60 years old and above, and constituted about 8.1%
of the world’s total population. However, by 2050 this
population will increase about nine times, will reach
nearly 1.8 billion people, and will constitute about 20%
of the world’s total population. The phenomenon of
ageing is, therefore, no less than a demographic
revolution (Auer and Fortuny, 2002).
There is currently almost no disagreement that the ageing
of the world’s population will, in the foreseeable future,
be one of the most important elements in the economic
and social aspects of the developed countries (Kinsella
and Velkoff, 2001). The dramatic demographic change
will substantively impact the future of work relations,
economic growth, and inter-state socioeconomic ties. It is
also liable to place a substantial economic burden on the
welfare and health budgets of the developed countries,
4
and will cause these subjects to be top priorities of social
policy makers in those countries. Looking inward, the
central challenges in the domestic political sphere will
therefore be connected to the various aspects of the
ageing of the societies, and for the broad implications that
this phenomenon will have on economics, health and
society.” (pp. 16-17)
In the book, I went on to describe how the ageing
revolution appears in its Israeli context: “Israeli society,
like human society in general (though at a slower pace),
is in the midst of a demographic revolution of the
population’s ageing (Brodsky, Shnoor and Be'er, 2009).
These matters were already mentioned in other legal
contexts (Doron, 2004), though it is worth reiterating the
demographic fundamental principles at issue. Israeli
society began as a young society, in which only about 4%
of its citizens were above the age of 65. It was a society
that, from the outset, was built on the image of the
"Sabra," which was characterized, at least partially, along
the lines of the New Israeli – young and strong –who was
the opposite of the Diaspora Jewish stereotype – old,
weak and detached from the land (Almog, 1997). It was
also a society in which many people grew up without a
father and mother figure, or an older grandfather and
grandmother alongside them, whether due to their being
Holocaust survivors whose parents perished in the
Holocaust, or due to their being young immigrants who
left behind their parents and their family in their land of
birth (Doron and Linchitz, 2008). In contrast, today the
older population has become the fastest growing group in
5
Israeli society. At the end of 2011 Israel’s population
numbered more than 7.5 million, and the older population
(those aged 65 and above) totaled about 750,000, which
was about 10% of the overall population in Israel
(Brodsky, Shnoor and Be'er, 2011).
From a socioeconomic standpoint as well, the
phenomenon of ageing had, and has, extremely
significant socioeconomic ramifications for Israeli society
(Ben-Israel and Ben-Israel, 2004). Thus, for example, it is
possible to note the crisis in the Histradrut labor
federation’s pension funds, which in its wake led to farreaching changes in everything related to the legal and
economic regulation of the right to social security in old
age. This crisis was caused, among other things, by the
rise in life expectancy and the dramatic change in the
social “mix,” and in the ratio between young workers and
retirees, who contribute to the pension funds or are the
beneficiaries of them (respectively) (Spivack, 1994;
Peleg, 2006). Quite naturally, then, the ageing revolution
has social and economic implications that are expressed
in nearly every sphere of life: health, education, housing,
transportation and more (Disney, 1997). Therefore, it is
impossible to discuss or to describe the future of Israeli
society without looking at, and contending with, the
aspects of its ageing and maturation.” (pp. 19-20).
In conclusion, then, I believe that there is a broad
agreement for the argument, according to which one of
the most important sociopolitical challenges for Israel in
6
the coming years stems from the need to contend with the
ageing of Israeli society.
Part II: On Professor Nancy Fraser’s Model for Social
Justice
After reviewing what is known as the “ageing
revolution,” I would now like to move on to a concise
and descriptive summary of a theoretical model of social
justice. This model, by Professor Nancy Fraser, which is
presented in her article (which was translated into
Hebrew) entitled, “From Redistribution to Recognition?
Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age” (Fraser,
1995). It is a philosophical argument, also comprising
four different parts, which I will briefly present below:
2.1
Injustice of Distribution vs. Injustice of
Recognition
In the first phase of the argument, Professor Fraser draws
a distinction between two different kinds of social
injustices: economic-distributive injustice and cognitivecultural injustice. According to her, the distinction is
based on the fact that, “The first is a socioeconomic
injustice, which is rooted in the political-economic
structure of society. Examples include exploitation
(having the fruits of one’s labour appropriated for the
benefit of others); economic marginalization (being
confined to undesirable or poorly paid work or being
denied access to income-generating labour altogether);
7
and deprivation (being denied an adequate material
standard of living).”
“The second kind of injustice is cultural or symbolic. It is
rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation,
and communication. Examples include cultural
domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation
and communication that are associated with another
culture and are alien and/or hostile to one’s own);
nonrecognition (being rendered invisible via the
authoritative representational, communicative, and
interpretative practices of one’s culture); and disrespect
(being routinely maligned or disparaged in a stereotypic
public cultural representations and/or in everyday life
interactions).” (pp. 70-71).
This distinction between two types of injustices is, in
itself, not new or original, and it was not “created” by
Professor Fraser. In this context, she relies on the work of
earlier philosophers, such as Karl Marx, John Rawls or
Amartya Sen (in the context of the distributive injustices),
or philosophers such as Charles Taylor or Axel Honneth
(in the context of cultural or symbolic injustices). At the
same time, beginning the discussion on understanding
and awareness of the fact that there are two different
conceptual types of “social injustice” is critical for
understanding the rest of the argument.
8
2.2
Exploited Classes,
Bivalent Collectivities
Despised
Classes
and
After Professor Fraser presents both types of the different
injustices, she then presents what is derived from them –
in other words, a spectrum of various types of
“collectives” or “classes.” At one end of this group
spectrum are the exploited classes: “At this end let us
posit an ideal-typical mode of collectivity whose
existence is rooted wholly in the political economy. It
will be differentiated as a collectivity, in other words, by
virtue of the economic structure, as opposed to the
cultural order, of society. Thus any structural injustices
its members suffer will be traceable ultimately to the
political economy.” (p. 75). In practice, the classic
example of such an exploited “collective” is, of course,
the “working class,” at least in its Marxist
conceptualization.
At the other end of the collective spectrum, Professor
Fraser describes the following group: “At this end we
may posit an ideal-typical mode of collectivity that fits
the recognition model of justice. A collectivity of this
type is rooted wholly in culture, as opposed to in political
economy. It only exists as a collectivity by virtue of the
reigning social patterns of interpretation and evaluation,
not by virtue of the division of labour. Thus, any
structural injustices its members suffer will be traceable
ultimately to the cultural-valuational structure.” (p. 76).
In practice, a good example of such a decentralized
collectivity is the group of homosexuals who, despite the
9
fact that they are dispersed across all parts of the
economic-standing class of capitalist society, still suffer
from scorn and humiliation due to their sexual
orientation.
Finally, in the rage between the two edges of the
spectrum, Professor Fraser presents the collectives that
she calls “bivalent,” which suffer both from economic
and cultural injustice. As she says: “When we consider
collectivities located in the middle of the conceptual
spectrum, we encounter hybrid modes that combine
features of the exploited class with features of the
despised sexuality. These collectivities are ‘bivalent’.
They are differentiated as collectivities by virtue of both
the political-economic structure and the culturalvaluational structure of society.” (p. 78). According to
Professor Fraser, belonging to a gender or racial group
are examples of bivalent collectivities, in which both
encompass dimensions of economic injustices alongside
cultural and symbolic injustices.
2.3
Affirmative
Remedy
Remedy
vs.
Transformative
After presentations of the various types of injustices, and
presenting the types of social collectives derived from
them, Professor Fraser goes on to present the various
types of “remedy,” which purport to provide a solution
for the various social injustices. Similar to the previous
phases, Professor Fraser “draws” a conceptual distinction
between to different “types” of social policy whose
10
purpose is to resolve or to remedy the injustice:
affirmative remedy and transformative remedy. Or, in her
words: “My aim is to distinguish two broad approaches to
remedying injustice that cut across the redistribution–
recognition divide. I shall call them ‘affirmation’ and
‘transformation’ respectively... By affirmative remedies
for injustice I mean remedies aimed at correcting
inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without
disturbing the underlying framework that generates them.
By transformative remedies, in contrast, I mean remedies
aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by
restructuring the underlying generative framework. The
nub of the contrast is end-state outcomes versus the
processes that produce them.” (p. 82).
2.4
Integration: The Results of an Intersection
between the Types of Injustices and the Types of
Remedies
After presenting the various types of injustices, the
various types of social collectivities that are derived from
them and the patterns of the “remedy” for the various
types of injustices, Professor Fraser, in effect, moves on
to the operative “result” of the integration of the matrix of
these classifications. The result is the following table (p.
87):
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Types of Remedy of Social Injustice
Affirmation
Transformation
Redistribution
the liberal welfare
state surface
reallocations of
existing goods to
existing groups;
supports group
differentiation;
can generate
misrecognition
socialism
deep restructuring
of relations of
production; blurs
group
differentiation; can
help remedy some
forms of
misrecognition
Recognition
mainstream
multiculturalism
surface
reallocations of
respect to existing
identities of
existing
groups; supports
group
differentiation
deconstruction
deep restructuring of
relations
of recognition; blurs
group
differentiation
As the table shows, each “intersection” of a type of
injustice with a type of change leads to a different pattern
of social policy. Thus, for example, where distributive
injustice intersects with an affirmative remedy, one may
find the liberal welfare state project. The reason lies in
the fact that this project concentrates on reallocating
distributive shares among existing groups. In contrast, the
12
“intersection” of the distributive injustice with a
transformative remedy leads to adopting the socialist
project: this project aims for a deep restructuring of
relations of production. In a similar vein, we can see that
the “intersection” of an affirmative remedy with the
cultural injustice leads to the multicultural project. This
project focuses on reallocating respect among existing
groups, but continues to support group differentiation. In
contrast, the meeting of the cultural injustice with a
transformative remedy leads to adopting the
deconstructive approach, since the objective of this
approach is to bring about a deep restructuring of the
relations of recognition, and to blur the very stability of
the existing group differentiations.
From a description of matters thus far, it is fairly clear
that Professor Fraser, on the conceptual level, supports a
policy that integrates a transformative remedy on both of
the injustice fronts – the redistributive as well as the
recognitive. Or, as she puts it: “For both gender and
‘race’, the scenario that best finesses the redistribution–
recognition dilemma is socialism in the economy plus
deconstruction in the culture.” (p. 91).
Professor Fraser is aware of the difficulties in the model
and of the criticism that is liable to be leveled at her. For
example, it appears that there is merit to the argument
stating that distinguishing between redistributive and
recognitive injustice is artificial, since matters are
intertwined in a way that is impossible to separate; or, for
example, the argument of the “price” that politics of
identity and recognition “exacts” in struggles for social-
13
redistributive justice and the exploitation that antisocialist
forces commit in discussing identity and recognition on
taunting and wearing down the universal welfare state;
and much more criticism. It is not my intention, in this
lecture, to address this criticism or to provide an answer
for it, among other things due to the fact that Professor
Fraser herself does so in her article. However, I would
like to argue that even if there is some truth to this
criticism, much can still be learned from the proposed
model, when examining and shaping social policy vis-àvis the older population in Israel.
Part III: Status and Injustice for the Elderly
At this point in my remarks, I would like to incorporate
the knowledge that I presented about the ageing of Israeli
and world society, along with Professor Fraser’s theory of
social justice that was presented above, and to ask first:
From what “injustice” do the elderly in Israel suffer? And
what “type” of social group are they? In this lecture I will
risk stating again that, generally speaking, older persons
in Israel suffer from what Professor Fraser would call
distributive injustice. The basis for this argument is
supported by a wide range of well-known data relating to
the elderly in Israel. I have previously written extensively
about this subject, as follows (Doron, 2012):
“The elderly, as a cultural group in Israel, are poor. As of
late 2009, it is possible to glean the following figures:
54.5% of all families in Israel headed by an elderly
person (men age 65+, women age 60+) are poor (in other
14
words, their monthly income level is below the poverty
line), and that is without taking into account transfer
payments and direct taxes (in other words, before
National Insurance payments). For comparisons sake, in
the overall population, this figure is only 33.2%. And yet,
even when the situation improves dramatically after the
National Insurance payments, even then the poverty rate
is still significant: 20.1% of all families headed by an
older person are still below the poverty line (compared to
20.5% among the overall population) (Brodsky, Shnoor
and Be’er, 2011).
Poverty is multifaceted. A lack of economic resources has
dramatic implications for daily life. Again, let us look at
additional relevant data: There is a reason why, in a
survey that asked about the extent of people’s ability to
cover monthly expenses, nearly 35% of all older persons
answered “not so much” or “not at all” (p. 223). More
concretely, in the sphere of nutrition for example, 19% of
all elderly people reported moderate or severe nutritional
insecurity (in other words, concern regarding the food
supply and managing the food budget, alongside a trend
toward reducing the scope of food consumption (p. 229).
Or regarding the ability to heat the apartment in winter,
for example, 32% of all elderly people reported that they
are sometimes (15%), frequently (9%) or always (8%)
cold (p. 229).
An exhaustive summary of the state of older persons in
early September 2003 appeared in the following press
report:
15
“Every third elderly person in Israel is in severe
economic distress, and lives on an old age allowance and
an assured income allowance. ... Many elderly people are
in a state of shameful poverty, have difficulty buying
medications and paying for dental treatments and medical
devices. Many of them live in neglected apartments and
are forced to eat in soup kitchens or to receive help from
various associations. Many days, they simply eat
nothing.” (Regev, 2003).
The severity of the Israeli reality becomes clear when we
examine the state of the elderly in Israel in comparison to
the situations of elderly in other developed countries
around the world. In wealthy, social-democratic countries
(such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway or Sweden),
poverty rates among the elderly are less than 10%. In
wealthy, industrialized countries (such as Germany, Italy
or France), poverty rates are close to 15%. And even in
Britain, which has the most capitalist orientation among
European countries, the poverty rate among the elderly is
under 20% (Forster, 2007).” (pp. 87-89).
In conclusion, then, it seems that there is truth to the
argument that the elderly in Israel suffer from
“distributive injustice” (for an elaboration on this matter,
see also Doron, 2005).
I now arrive at the central question of my lecture: Do the
elderly in Israel suffer – in addition to the distributive
injustice – from recognitive injustice as well? My answer
16
to this question is: Yes. The elderly in Israel are not only
an exploited class, but a disparaged class as well. They
are a disparaged class due to the fact that they suffer –
significantly and substantively – from what is called
“ageism”, which until not too long ago was closed off and
kept out of the social justice dialogue in Israel.
Ageism is a term that only recently has become part of
the public and research discourse in Israel (Doron, 2013).
I would like to refer to things that I recently wrote
regarding ageism, in my book “Old Age in Halls of
Justice” (Doron, 2012): “Ageism is a complex term,
which is not easy to define. One of the key figures in
connection with developing the boundaries of the term
ageism and defining it is Dr. Robert Butler, formerly the
first director of the National Institute on Ageing in the
United States. Dr. Butler was the one who conceived the
theory behind the concept of ageism (and even coined the
term). Butler attempted to construct an operative
definition for the term ageism. And indeed, one of the
first definitions, known as “Butler and Lewis’s
definition” of 1973, defined ageism thus (Butler and
Lewis, 1973):
Ageism can be seen as a process of systematic
stereotyping of and discrimination against people because
they are old, just as racism and sexism accomplish this
for skin color and gender. Old people are categorized as
senile, rigid in thought and manner, old-fashioned in
morality and skills [...] Ageism allows the younger
generations to see older people as different from
17
themselves, thus they subtly cease to identify with their
elders as human beings.
This definition by Butler and Lewis received a great deal
and variety of criticism, and led to the presentation of
alternative definitions (Levin and Levin, 1980). One of
the most important approaches that tried to unify the
various definitions for ageism states that ageism is, in
fact, a “catch-all concept” that includes within it four
different and separate elements from a conceptual
standpoint: (A) Negative social stereotypes about old age;
(B) Social prejudices about the elderly; (C) Personal fear
of ageing; (D) Stigmas connected with the elderly. Each
one of these elements has a different “scope of
application,” but only their comprehensive union enables
a worthy conceptualization of the phenomenon
(Braithwaite, 2002). More current approaches emphasize
the fact that ageism is not only negative, but rather can
also be “positive” (over-admiration of the elderly), and it
is also possible to identify it at all levels of social
functioning: on the personal, family and community
level, and on the institutional and policy level (Koren,
2012; Palmore, 1999; Iversen, Larson and Solem, 2009).
(p. 35-39).
Do older persons suffer from ageism in Israel? There is
much evidence to suggest that the answer is yes, and that
the older persons in Israel indeed suffer from ageism (for
a more lengthy discussion of this subject, see Doron,
2013). In my book Old Age in Halls of Justice I present a
string of legal decisions and stories, from which it may be
18
seen how Israeli society – in general, and the legal system
– in a concrete manner, are prisoners of a stereotypical –
and usually negative – structuring of old age. As an
example, I will relate the story of Dr. Kelner, as it was
described in my book (Doron, 2012).
“Dr. Kelner’s story began in July 2003, when Public
Tender No. 342/03 for a doctor in charge (civil aviation)
in the Civil Aviation Authority at Ben-Gurion Airport
was first published. The tender was published by the
Government Service Commission. The process of filling
the position was done according to a policy known in the
Government Service Commission as the “two circles”
policy. According to that policy, there was no age
restriction for candidates, and candidates over the age of
65 were permitted to submit their candidacy in the tender
– and were known as the “first circle.” However,
according to that policy, candidates over the age of 65
were not invited to the examination committee, i.e. the
“second circle,” unless a suitable candidate was not found
from among those under the age of 65 who participated in
the tender. Since an additional candidate, in his 50s, who
participated in the aforesaid tender was found to be
suitable for the position, Dr. Kelner was not even invited
to the examination committee. In effect, his candidacy
was not examined on its merits, and no check was
performed as to whether, and to what extent, he was
better or preferable in his qualifications, characteristics
and capabilities, compared with the “younger” candidate
who was chosen.
19
... Dr. Kelner is a man who has already proven his ability
to meet challenges, and therefore this time as well he
decided not to give up and he contacted the person
responsible for tenders at the Government Service
Commission many times, by letters and by phone. He
demanded that the results of the tender be canceled, since,
he claimed, it had been tainted by illegality by harming
the principle of equality and by prohibited discrimination
between the candidates. When he did not receive
substantive responses, on 14 September 2003 Dr. Kelner
filed an application with the regional labor court in Tel
Aviv to issue a temporary injunction to cancel the
tender’s results.
Dr. Kelner argued that failing to invite him to appear
before the examination committee pursuant to the “two
circles” policy means that the process of choosing the
winner
contravenes
the
Employment
(Equal
Opportunities) 5748-1988, since prohibited age
discrimination was committed, and that it runs counter to
the rules of administrative law, including principle of
equality between candidates in a tender. However, the
regional labor court dismissed his claim and held that
nothing improper had occurred in the state’s conduct in
the tender in dispute, and that the circumstances of the
matter indicate that there was no violation of equality or
prohibited discrimination. Moreover, the regional labor
court held that the failure to accept candidates over the
age of 65 should be seen as implementing the principle of
equality between civil servants, who are obliged to retire
20
on reaching retirement age, and job seekers who are over
the age of 65.
When his claim was dismissed, Dr. Kelner appealed to
the National Labor Court. Here too he was disappointed:
In a majority ruling issued by the Hon. President, Judge
Steve Adler, the court held that it would not interfere in
the regional labor court’s decision, so long as it rules that
no prohibited discrimination took place in the tender ...
Left with no choice, Dr. Kelner could do nothing but
appeal to the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of
Justice, in order to try and find there what he sought:
justice.
The panel that decided Dr. Kelner’s matter [before the
High Court of Justice] included Justices Rubinstein,
Joubran and Alon. Justice Joubran wrote the central
ruling. After reviewing the facts, and the legal context,
the honorable justice examined what he considered to be
the central question, which was that of proportionality: to
what extent was, the “two circles” policy, due to which
Dr. Kelner’s candidacy was never considered,
proportionate and reasonable? The answer that he gives
to this question is affirmative, and it is based on two main
reasons: The first – the very existence of the Retirement
Age Law makes the distinction between candidates on the
basis of chronological age a relevant distinction. Or, as
the justice stated:
First, the distinction between candidates above retirement
age and candidates below retirement age is a relevant
21
distinction when we reach the employment sphere.
Despite learned opinions stating that the age
consideration is irrelevant, since that factor is nothing
more than an expression of prejudice and a negative
image (Ruth Ben-Israel, Retirement Age in Light of the
Principle of Equality Test, Hapraklit, 43(3), pp. 251, 271
(1997)), the regulation in the Retirement Age Law, from
its considerations, makes the retirement age a relevant
factor.
The second – accepting Dr. Kelner’s appeal would harm
the equality between existing employees, who are obliged
to retire at age 67, and those who have already retired,
and can return to work by submitting their candidacy to
tenders. Or, as the justice stated:
Second, an examination of proportionality should address
the entire range of equality groups that are influenced
from the “two circles” arrangement. Therefore, the group
of candidates such as the appellant, whose age is above
retirement age, should be compared to two reference
groups – the first is the group of candidates below
retirement age, and the second is the group of employees
at the Civil Aviation Authority who, on reaching the
retirement age, are obligated to retire.
This led to the inevitable conclusion according to him
that:
Even if, in the appellants’ view, it would have been
possible to choose a better solution, which brings about
22
another balance between the two reference groups, the
authority possessed a “range of reasonableness” that
enables choosing one alternative from among a number
of possibilities.
In other words, at the end of the day, the Supreme Court
dismissed Dr. Kelner’s claim and confirmed the younger
candidate’s winning the position.”
In my humble opinion, the High Court of Justice’s
decision in this affair is one example (among many) of
ageism. As I explain in my book: “The obligation to
cease working solely due to reaching a certain age creates
a sense of a lack of belonging to the general society, a
lack of creativity and a decrease in self-worth.
Retiring from work has negative personal-emotional and
social implications. In many cases, a person who retires
from his job due to his advanced age feels that he is no
longer partner to society’s creative system. He feels that
he has been stripped of the satisfaction in work, of the
satisfaction in being remunerated for his labor. This
feeling grows stronger also due to the regard of society,
which often relates to him as an “old person” who has no
more utility. Matters are more severe in our day, when
the average lifespan has increased and a person’s health is
maintained even at advanced ages. As a result, the
number of years that an older person, strong in body and
spirit, is forced, despite his unique qualities, to retire from
his activity in the labor market and to look on, frequently
in frustration, at the active stream of life in which he can
23
no longer take part, has increased. (High Court of Justice
104/87 Dr. Naomi Nevo v. National Labor Court
Judgment 44(4), 749, pp. 755-756.)
Beyond its being discriminatory based on age, presenting
the demand to retire on reaching the chronological age is
a generalization that reflects a negative image vis-à-vis
the worker at an advanced age, and expresses a prejudice
according to which the worker at that age loses his
functioning ability. It reflects a social construct – without
empirical foundation – and according to which older
persons, solely due to their chronological age – are unfit
to work by the very fact of their being older people. Of
course, that assumption completely ignores the fact that
there are many people age 67+ who are strong and
healthy – no less, and occasionally even more so – than
those younger than they, and it ignores a broad body of
gerontological knowledge, according to which
chronological age – in and of itself – is an unsuitable
scientific predictor, and insufficient for assessing a the
person’s individual functional, mental and health state.”
I could give many additional examples, but I will suffice
by stating that there is currently an accumulated body of
evidence for the argument that the older population in
Israel suffer from a recognitive injustice, and that they are
a class that Professor Fraser would call a “bivalent
collective” that also suffers from exploitation and from
disparagement.
24
Part IV: What Kind of “Social Justice” Do Older
Persons in Israel Need? The Need for Changing the
Focus from Redistributive Remedy to Recognitive
Remedy
In this final part of the lecture I will seek not only to
analyze the reality but also to propose solutions. In the
earlier parts of the lecture I tried to show that, looking
ahead, the group of older persons is going to be a
significant and important group in Israeli society. I also
tried to show that, pursuant to Nancy Fraser’s model,
older persons in Israel suffer not only from distributive
injustice but no less importantly they also suffer from
symbloic injustice, and they suffer from disparagement
and humiliation in the public space in Israel.
In my humble opinion, the social policy solutions that
have been adopted until now in Israel in the sphere of
social justice in old age have focused on aspects of
affirmative remedy of the distributive injustice. Creating
a social security system that is based on old age and
survivor allowances alongside old age assured income
systems; adding social nursing care social insurance in
the community, alongside allocating resources to
financing institutional frameworks for nursing care and
mentally frail elderly; or creating a range of economic
discounts and benefits for “senior citizens” – all these
always focused on an attempt to redistribute revenues in a
manner that would “correct” the injustice of the elderly
poor.
25
On the other hand, thus far no effective, significant
action, done as part of a coherent and clear social policy,
that aimed to contend with the symbolic and culturalrecognition injustice of older persons, has been tried.
Quite the opposite: Social policy increased and
emphasized the aspects of weakness, illness and disability
of older persons in Israel, and in so doing, in effect,
reflected and bolstered the disparagement and the
humiliation from which older persons suffer.
I have previously argued at length (Doron and Shay,
2010) that: “For years, the discourse and the dialogue in
the old age policy sphere has been characterized by
focusing on the characteristics of the needs and the
weaknesses of the older population in Israel. These
discussions usually focused on older persons being poor,
ill, needy, exposed to abuse, etc. Focusing on the
dimensions of weakness and social structuring of older
persons as helpless or as people needing other people’s
help in making the decisions that are related to their
lifestyle enabled the State of Israel -- ... --- to base the
social policy that is, in effect, grounded on a combination
of objection and abandonment. The result of this state of
affairs is that even now the discourse in the sphere of
older persons’ rights places almost no emphasis and
weight on the aspects of older persons’ power and
strength, and on the inherent potential in this population
for continued activity and contribution to society and to
the community, alongside the right of older persons to
continue taking an active, participatory and contributing
26
part in the life of society and the community in Israel.”
(p. 249)
Therefore, on the policy recommendations level, I believe
that the necessary recommendation stemming from the
realization that in the sphere of social justice for older
persons, the focus should be shifted from the “wellknown failure” of redistributive justice to the “unknown
failure” of recognitive justice, is that social policy
regarding ageing in Israel should be changed. How can
this be done? I will reiterate the proposed policy principle
that I (along with additional partners) previously
suggested (Doron and Shay, 2010). The proposal attempts
to integrate redistributive remedy with recognitive
remedy, by enshrining the following principles (ibid., pp.
263-267):
1.
The Right to Active Ageing and to Substantive
Citizenship in Ageing:

The right of older persons in Israel to continue
living an active life as they age. Within this context, the
right of older persons in Israel to continue working,
volunteering, being partners in the decision-making
circles, and to be considered a substantive, contributory
and important part in the circle of economic-socialpolitical life in Israel.

Older persons in Israel are citizens – in the
substantive meaning of the word – of Israeli society. They
have the right to have their voice heard and taken into
27
account in any processing of policymaking and decisionmaking relating to their rights and interests. Within this
context, the state has an obligation to remove barriers and
failures – such as discriminatory or prohibitive
regulations – that prevent older persons in Israel from
continuing to be considered citizens who are partners to
processes that determine the future of the country, society
and the community.

The state is obligated to implement effective
measures that will not only enable but also encourage
older persons in Israel to continue taking an active part in
society and in the community, and to be partners in
shaping cultural and societal life. Within this context,
resources should be invested, and frameworks created,
that provide information and services that enable and
encourage the fulfillment of substantive citizenship of
older persons in Israel.

In order to realize these values we must work to
create and to legislate a completely new law (which, for
the sake of convenience only, will hereinafter be called
the Senior Citizens’ Rights Law), which will completely
supplant and annul the current Senior Citizens Law. This
new law, which will be drawn from existing legal models,
such as the US model that is enshrined in the Older
Americans Act, will work as follows:

An organizational and governmental framework
will be created and enshrined in new primary legislation
that:
28

Will be responsible for the entire sphere of
promoting rights, developing social programs and
encouraging the advancing of knowledge and research in
everything related to senior citizens in Israel;

Will pool and or be responsible for coordinating
the entire range of existing and future services that are
provided to senior citizens in Israel;

Will represent and reflect the interests of the
senior citizen population in Israel before the government
and the Knesset, and will take an active part in all
decision-making processes in the Knesset, in government
ministries, in local authorities and in public bodies that
are connected with senior citizen matters;

Will actively work to educate and to advocate
publicly to change the social construct of ageing in Israel;

Will enshrine in primary legislation the state’s
obligation to make a suitable allocation of resources that
will enable implementation of the social policy details in
this document.
2.
The Right to Equality, Accessibility and AntiDiscrimination in Ageing:

Older persons in Israel have the right to enjoy
equal regard in the range of social and other services that
are provided by the state and by other public authorities;
29

Older persons have the right to expect proactive
measures will be taken, including in the spheres of
education, professional training, supervision and
enforcement, to prevent discrimination against older
persons by public authorities and both public and private
bodies;

Older persons in Israel have the right to expect
that the physical surroundings and the environment in
Israel will be shaped in a manner that will provide them
with complete and safe accessibility, and with the ability
to enjoy and use them, and that the range of services will
be accessible to them from a physical, transportation and
other standpoint.

The right to equality in ageing requires special
regard to the lack of equality in connection with
subgroups among the population of older persons in
Israel. Thus, for example, gender deserves special
attention in order to create equality between women and
men in their old age. Within this context, it is worth to
completely eliminate gaps that currently exist in Israel
between women and men in contexts such as retirement
age, the rights of widowers and widows, rights to an
employment pension, etc.

In order to realize the rights detailed in this
section, a statutory authority should be created (whether
as part of the new Senior Citizens’ Rights Law or within
the context of existing legislation), that would serve as
30
the “senior citizens’ ombudsman.” This authority would
possess resources and statutory authority for public
education and information, and would possess authority
and resources for oversight and for enforcement of the
entire body of arrangements – existing and future –
whose purpose is to ensure the rights to equality,
accessibility and anti-discrimination detailed above.
3.
Social Rights in Ageing:

Older persons in Israel have the right to enjoy
basic social rights. These rights, which have previously
been reviewed many times, should be enshrined and
granted not out of benevolence or need, but rather out of a
sense of recognition of human dignity, social solidarity,
and from recognizing the connection that is between
creating an infrastructure for dignified human existence
and the ability to enjoy an active and successful life and
old age. Within this context, the call must be repeated to
enshrine rights in the social security sphere (both
regarding old age allowances and the right to an
employment pension), health (both regarding the
inclusion of long-term nursing care as part of a national
health insurance law, and as pertains to enhancing and
improving preventive medicine and public health), the
right to work, the right to housing, the right to age in the
community, the right to education and other rights.
31
4.
The Right to Information, Representation and
Access to the Justice and Legal System:

Older persons in Israel have the right to receive,
and it is the state’s obligation to create and to establish, a
system of knowledge and information services, advice
and representation regarding their legal rights (whether
within the context of amending existing laws, such as the
Legal Aid Law 5732-1972, or within the framework of
new laws), as well as by defining the obligation to
allocate suitable resources for establishing nongovernmental rights organizations that will provide a
wealth of legal information, advisory and representation
services to senior citizens in Israel.
5.
The Right to Respect, Personal Freedom,
Autonomy and Decision-Making while Ageing:

Older persons have the right to continue having
their independence, their personal freedom and their right
to autonomy respected, even in situations of illness,
disability, choosing a lifestyle with a dimension of
personal risk, and in end of life situations, including a
desire not to extend life artificially or a desire to die
outside of an institutional framework.

Within the context of fulfilling this right, a
number of new directions for action should be taken, such
as:
32

Far-reaching legislative reform in the existing
protective welfare laws, so far as they relate to the
population of older persons. Concretely, the provisions of
the Safety for Protected Persons Law 5726-1966 and the
Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law 5722-1962 should
be abolished and/or fundamentally changed, as pertains to
authority and possibility to impose treatment, intervention
or guardianship on older persons against their will and
unnecessarily;

New laws should be passed, existing statutory and
formal frameworks and tools should be amended and
bolstered, that will, as much as possible, enable older
persons to continue controlling their lives even in cases of
a loss of capacity and/or lucidity and/or even after death,
through legal planning and prevention tools, such as
power of attorney – in the property and health sphere –
advance directives, wills and other legal documents and
tools. Concretely, in this connection the Agency Law
5725-1965 should be amended, in such a manner as to
enable, in a detailed way, the granting of continuing
power of attorney in the economic sphere; and action
should be taken to implement and improve the Terminally
Ill Patient Law 5766-2005, in such a manner that it is
indeed implemented and will also be relevant for older
persons suffering from prolonged chronic illnesses.

The normative frameworks that oversee and
regulate the institutional system for older persons in Israel
(such as the host of regulations relating to hostels for
older person by virtue of the Hostels Supervision Law
33
5725-1965) should be changed, from frameworks that
focus on paternalistic aspects – i.e. that protect and grant
authority to the professional staff – to frameworks that
focus on older persons’ autonomy and freedom of choice
– i.e. that empower and grant standing and power to the
older persons who reside and live in these frameworks –
to shape their lives and to choose the manner and content
of the services that they will receive.
Concluding Remarks: On the Connection between the
Lecture and Dr. Arnulf M. Pins
I would like to conclude my lecture by attempting to
connect it back with the identity of the man in whose
honor it was presented: Dr. Arnulf M. Pins, of blessed
memory. As already mentioned, I did not personally
know Dr. Pins. However, while preparing this lecture I
read about him. It seems to me, with all due respect, that
my lecture today connects well with his personality and
his personal vision, in a number of contexts.
First, Dr. Pins believed in the connection between the
field and academia. In his personal activity he combined
many years of practical work in the field with a close
connection with academic research. In this lecture, too, I
attempted to underscore how empirical academic research
is fundamentally connected with practical work in the
field. Policy in the field of social justice in ageing cannot
be developed without grounding it in empirical
information and research. Data about poverty levels in
old age, the reasons for the poverty, alongside empirical
34
aspects of the social structure of ageing, cannot exist
detached from the activity of the welfare systems, and the
manner in which those systems shape the services that
they provide to older persons. On the other hand, social
policy cannot be shaped without listening, paying
attention, and the true cooperation – through work in the
field – of the people with whom we work and come into
contact, in this case: the population of older persons.
Second, from the impression I gained from reading his
resume, it appears that Dr. Pins was an idealist, and that
he believed in the place of values and ideals in the sphere
of knowledge and engaging in social work. The pattern of
his activity in academia and in the field expressed a deep
commitment to social justice and to a belief that it is
possible to effect changes in human society in order to
make it more just and fitting. He believed that social
work, and social workers, have a social mission, and that
they have the ability and the means to cause Israeli
society to become a more just and fairer environment, in
a way that will ensure for every person the freedom and
the ability to fulfill himself or herself in a complete
manner.
Therefore, I would like to believe that in the message that
I tried to get across in my lecture, that it is fitting and
possible to promote social justice for older persons – and
not just through remedying the distributive injustice, but
rather also through contending with and remedying the
cultural and symbolic injustices – I answered the ideal
and the vision in which Dr. Pins believed. I would again
35
like to thank his family and The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem School of Social Work and Social Welfare, for
granting me the honor and the possibility of delivering
these words.
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Doron, I. (2005). Law, Morality and Ageing: Failures in
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Doron, I. (2007). Demographic, social change and
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