OFFICIAL
Wai 1040, #E41
Aspects of Maori Economic Development and Capability
in the Te Paparahi o Te Raki Inquiry Region (Wai 1040)
from 1840 to c.2000
RECEIVED
Waitangi Tribunal
25 Feb 2013
Ministry of Justice
WELLINGTON
A Report Commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal
February 2013
Dr Nicholas Bayley
Contents
Preface........................................................................................................................................ 4
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 5
The Project ......................................................................................................................... 5
Research Purpose ............................................................................................................... 5
Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 6
An Interpretative Framework ........................................................................................... 10
Chapter 2: Contextual and Theoretical Background ................................................................ 14
Structural Context ............................................................................................................ 14
The State .......................................................................................................................... 14
Capitalism ........................................................................................................................ 21
Researching Maori Socio-economic Development ......................................................... 24
Comment on Historical Approaches to Northland........................................................... 24
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 28
Chapter 3: Early Period to 1840: Land and People.............................................................. 30
Relief ................................................................................................................................ 30
Climate ............................................................................................................................. 31
Soils and Vegetation ........................................................................................................ 32
The People and Economy ................................................................................................ 37
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 43
Chapter 4: 1840-c.1875 ............................................................................................................ 44
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 44
Economic Opportunities and Challenges ......................................................................... 45
Political Authority............................................................................................................ 57
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 62
Chapter 5: c.1875-c.1910 ......................................................................................................... 65
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 65
Economic Opportunities and Challenges ......................................................................... 67
Land Tenure Revolution .................................................................................................. 85
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 102
Chapter 6: c.1910-c.1950 ....................................................................................................... 106
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 106
Economic Opportunities and Challenges ....................................................................... 109
Vesting, Consolidation and Land Development ............................................................ 123
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 142
Chapter 7: c.1950-c.2000 ....................................................................................................... 146
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 146
Economic Opportunities and Challenges ....................................................................... 148
Note on Migration .......................................................................................................... 178
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 183
Chapter 8: Conclusion............................................................................................................ 187
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 211
Appendix: The Commission and Extensions ......................................................................... 220
2
Figures
Tables
Table 1: Bay of Islands Ship Visits, 1800-1840 – page 39
Table 2: Land Alienation prior to 1845 – page 50
Table 3: Land Alienation prior to 1865 – page 77
Table 4: Kauri Gum Tonnage and Price (£) Statistics 1860-1960 – page 83
Table 5: Land in Te Raki Maori Ownership in 1908 – page 94
Table 6: Showing for each County the Extent of Land in Cultivation and the Live-stock held by Maori,
according to Returns obtained at the Census of March, 1901 – page 96
Table 7: Showing for each County the Extent of Land in Cultivation and the Live-stock held by Maori,
according to Returns obtained at the Census of April, 1906 – page 96
Table 8: Showing for each County the Extent of Land in Cultivation and the Live-stock held by Maori,
according to Returns obtained at the Census of April, 1911 – page 97
Table 9: Te Paparahi o Te Raki: Total Maori and Pakeha Population 1936-1956 – page 117
Table 10: Disposition of Lands owned by Maori in Whangaroa, Bay of Islands, Hokianga, Whangarei,
and Rodney Counties, 1951 (acres) – page 137
Table 11: Main occupations, Maori males, Auckland Provincial District, 1926 – page 140
Table 12: Surveyed Employment Annual Growth Rates by Industry Group 1956-1974 – page 160
Table 13: Whangarei Population Growth in relation to Selected North Island Cities 1911-1996 – page
162
Table 14: Land in Te Raki Maori Ownership in 2012 – page 175
Maps
Map 1: The Te Paparahi o Te Raki Inquiry Region – page 8
Map 2: Distribution of Land Slope Classes in the North Island – page 33
Map 3: Distribution of Soils in the North Island – page 35
Map 4: Modern Main Vegetation Cover – page 36
Map 5: Te Ao Hou, Maori, Traders and Missionaries in the North 1814-1840 – pages 41-42
Map 6: Mineral and Geothermal Exploitation – page 70
Map 7: The Kauri Harvest – pages 72-73
Map 8: Maori Land Alienation in Northland from the 1860s to the 1880s – page 84
Map 9: The Status of Lands in the Northland Region, 1905 – page 99
Map 10: Northland Socio-economic Deprivation Map – page 100
Map 11: Maori Land Alienation in Northland at 1860, 1890, and 1910 – page 101
Map 12: Main Classes of Land Utilisation in the North Island – page 154
Map 13: Northland Maori Blocks Overview Map – page 176
3
Preface
Author
Dr Nicholas Bayley is a Senior Research Analyst/Inquiry Facilitator with the Waitangi
Tribunal Unit (Ministry of Justice). He holds a BA (Hons) from Victoria University and
a PhD from Trinity College, Dublin, both in history. He has written two scoping
reports, ‘Murimotu and Rangipo-Waiu’ (Wai 903, #48), for the Whanganui and
National Park inquiries, and ‘Tongariro National Park Management from 1980 to the
Present’ (Wai 1130, #A6), for the National Park inquiry. He completed a main report
on the Murimotu and Rangipo-Waiu blocks (Wai 903, #56(a)) for the Whanganui and
National Park inquiries. He assisted in the compilation of a document bank, ‘Indexed
Document Bank on Land Use in the Twentieth Century’ (Wai 1200, #G1), and coauthored a report ‘Maori Land Trusts and Incorporations in the Twentieth Century in
the Central North Island Inquiry Region’ Wai 1200, #G4), for the Central North Island
regional inquiry. Most recently, he completed a report ‘Aspects of the Economic
History of Whanganui Maori in the Whanganui Inquiry District’ (Wai 903, #145) for
the Whanganui district inquiry.
4
Chapter 1: Introduction
The Project
In a direction dated 15 July 2011 (Wai 1040, #2.5.89), the Tribunal recommended
further research to ensure the evidential casebook for the stage 2 Te Paparahi o Te
Raki inquiry was sufficient and adequate. In particular:
Our principal recommendation is that a regional economic history be undertaken as
an overview report covering opportunities for and obstacles to Maori engagement in
economic development from 1840 to the present. The report would draw largely on
information in other technical research, providing a regional synthesis. It would
include the principal economic sectors of the regional economy and examine the role
and capability of government in enabling Maori engagement and addressing
obstacles.
Research Purpose
This report considers how to address the role of the state in Maori economic activity
in the inquiry region from early engagement with the settler economy to the present
day. The overarching consideration is the government’s role in fostering and/or
inhibiting the economic activities of Te Raki hapu and iwi. The report considers how
to approach the question of government involvement within, and responsibility for,
Maori economic development.
This report is to supplement existing casebook reports on socio-economic themes in
particular those by David Alexander, David Armstrong/Evald Subasic, Terry Hearn
and Tony Walzl. 1 The report is to assist the Tribunal in addressing the question why,
in spite of apparently starting with a notable amount of land and resources, Te Raki
Maori communities appear to have suffered significantly from poverty over time. In
particular, the report examines what economic opportunities existed for Te Raki
Maori communities in using their remaining lands in whatever form, as well as the
nature and extent of economic opportunities for Maori within the wider economy of
1
Alexander D., ‘Land-Based Resources, Waterways and Environmental Impacts’, (CFRT,2006, (Wai 1040, #A7));
Armstrong D., and Subasic E., ‘Northern Land and Politics: 1860-1910’, (CFRT,2007), (Wai 1040, #A12); Hearn
T., ‘Social and Economic Change in Northland c1900 to c1945: The Role of the Crown and the Place of Maori’,
(CFRT,2006), (Wai 1040, #A3), and Walzl T., ‘Twentieth Century Overview Part II’, (CFRT,2009), (Wai 1040,
#A38)
5
the region between the 1840s and 2000 and the Crown’s role in creating and
enabling Maori access to such opportunities.
The general issue concerns the extent to which the Crown has promoted the
economic development of Te Raki Maori through legislation, policies and practices
that have assisted Maori to participate effectively in emerging economic
opportunities. In particular as directed by way of Commission (Wai 1040, # 2.3.5),
the report is to focus on the following questions:
a. What economic opportunities existed for Te Paparahi o Te Raki Maori
communities between 1840 and 2000? In particular, what Crown actions
promoted such opportunities? How did economic outcomes differ for nonMaori in Northland, and why?
b. What was the degree of Maori participation and capability at all levels of the
Northland regional economy, and the impact of Maori migration within and
outside of the Northland region? In what ways did Maori participation and
migration differ from non-Maori patterns in Northland, and why?
c. Did the Crown seek to inform itself of Maori economic status between 1840
and 2000, in particular of adverse aspects?
d. Did the Crown act to remedy any of the adverse aspects of Te Raki Maori
economic status between 1840 and 2000? What was the Crown’s capability
to take remedial action? What form did any such policies and actions take?
e. What international and national economic factors affected the Crown’s
economic actions towards Te Raki Maori?
f.
How did Crown economic policies and actions differ between Maori and nonMaori in Northland between 1840 and 2000?
Methodology
As noted, this report is intended to supplement existing casebook reports, in
particular those as noted of Alexander, Armstrong/Subasic, Hearn and Walzl. The
sources used by these reports and the document banks compiled for them have
been heavily relied on in this report. These provided the most comprehensive source
6
of material concerning the changing economic situation of Te Raki Maori over time.
For New Zealand general economic history, the major sources relied on have been
Hawke, Easton, Belich, King and relevant entries in the Oxford History of New
Zealand (2nd edition) and in the New Oxford History of New Zealand. 2 These sources
were supplemented by theses considering various aspects of Te Raki Maori regional
life and society, as well as a wide range of secondary literature dealing with the
general history of the region, reports commissioned by government and other
bodies, and government censuses and statistics. Sources used are noted in the
bibliography.
The geographical focus of this report is on the five Waitangi Tribunal-derived inquiry
sub-regions, namely Hokianga, Whangaroa, Bay of Islands, Whangarei and
Mahurangi/Gulf Islands, which form the Te Raki inquiry region (cf Map 1 below for
inquiry boundaries and some basic regional information). However, it has not always
been possible to remain strictly within those boundaries when considering sources
and interpretations, and sometimes direct comment and particular analyses used in
this report include material that covers a wider Northland area than the strict inquiry
sub-regions. While aware of this overlap factor, care has been taken as far as
possible to ensure that the interpretative focus of this report is derived principally
from primary and secondary sources arising from direct engagement with the area of
the five inquiry sub-regions.
2
Hawke G., The Making of New Zealand: An Economic History, (Cambridge,1985); Easton B., In Stormy Seas:
The Post-War New Zealand Economy, (Dunedin,1997); Belich J., Paradise Reforged. A History of the New
Zealanders From the 1880s to the Year 2000, (Auckland,2001); King M., The Penguin History of New Zealand,
(Auckland,2003); Rice G. (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, second edition, (Oxford,1992); and Byrnes
G. (ed.), The New Oxford History of New Zealand, (Oxford,2009)
7
Map 1: The Te Paparahi o Te Raki Inquiry Region
8
After general consideration of the state, the economy and Maori economic
development, this report offers a brief description both of the land of the Te Raki
inquiry region, and of its economic history to 1840. From 1840, the approach
adopted has been essentially comparative. Pakeha and Maori economic
development from 1840 to 1875 is outlined in one chapter, with a focus on factors
which explain its vigour or lack thereof. Developments that increasingly changed the
shape of this regional economy are covered in a further chapter from 1875 to 1910.
From 1910 to 1950, the new economic possibilities opened up within the region for
Maori and Pakeha are discussed, particularly as they impacted on Maori. Both
Pakeha and Maori economic development are compared together in one chapter
from 1950 to 2000, before final conclusions are drawn.
The methodology adopted relies substantially on reports and documents readily
available, but tries to draw out of the existing material a more focussed
understanding of the Te Raki economic situation so as to address the commission
questions as accurately as possible. Brief, sometimes tantalising, discussions of
economic consequences identified in existing casebook reports have been extracted,
compared with other economic material and contrasted, in an attempt to discover a
coherent economic understanding to the changing fortunes of Te Raki Maori
communities. Because this report is looking at aspects of the economic history of Te
Raki 1840 to 2000, it does not claim to be a comprehensive economic history of the
region, rather it seeks to outline and explain why Te Raki Maori economic
development took the course it did. The substantial number of figures, tables and
maps from other reports for this inquiry which cover in detail demographic change,
aspects of socio-economic developments, land alienation and land use are not
replicated in this report, except where particular selected examples may usefully
illustrate particular lines of discussion. Those other reports should be consulted in
conjunction with this report.
This report also does not attempt to summarise or tell again the story of the Native
Land Court in the region, the Maori Land Councils and Boards, the vesting of Maori
lands, the Stout-Ngata Commission, land development schemes, nor the changing
and evolving nature of Maori land law. These are already adequately covered by
existing reports. Rather, knowledge of these factors will be largely presumed and this
9
report will comment on aspects of their economic effects. Factors such as education,
health and housing will also be largely ignored, not because these have no bearing
on an economic history, but because to include them would take this report beyond
both its commissioned direction and manageable size. This report aims to
supplement discussion and analysis of those vital factors that are covered in other
reports for this inquiry. Its framework, discussed below, and interpretative analysis
provide a context into which other reports and evidence may be integrated, or
provide a critical benchmark against which other interpretations and evidence may
be compared.
An Interpretative Framework
Finally, it is apparent that socio-economic aspects cover a wide and significant range
of issues. The challenge is to find an approach to these issues for the purposes of
analysis that does not produce an extremely long and comprehensive coverage of all
aspects of Te Raki socio-economic experience. While context for understanding any
issue is important, the temptation to provide an immense, annotated document
collection covering every aspect of government/Maori engagement from 1840 to the
present is too time consuming to follow through. Furthermore, such an approach
does not necessarily add to understanding the key forces and factors that shaped
development.
In the area of economic change, there are multiple factors operating that have a
direct effect on whatever opportunities are available or not. The government is not
responsible for all economic outcomes whether good or bad. Consequently, a path
has to be found to disentangle government responsibility, where such might have
existed, from the many non-government factors that also explain why economic
development took the direction it did.
While other inquiries have identified a plethora of unfortunate economic outcomes for
Maori, it has not been straightforward to clearly establish the degree of government
responsibility. That the government has some responsibility is not generally denied,
but the devil has been in the detail as well as deciding on a conceptual framework
10
specifying the causal chain. The challenge for this report therefore is to tackle
questions of cause and responsibility, and to discriminate among the many factors
involved in producing particular economic outcomes.
A key question that informs this report is to what extent Maori had economic
capability. As Brian Murton has set out, economic capability is founded on
entitlements and empowerment. 3 Entitlements are the structure of rights that
characterises the social relationship between individuals, households, families and
other socially constructed entities, and to what they value. ‘Each set or bundle of
entitlements entails a socially recognised structure of institutional arrangements that
both constrain and liberate decision units [individuals, families etc] and their
behaviour with respect to other decision units’. 4 Empowerment follows when these
so-called decision units are involved in decisions concerning entitlement distribution
and enforcement. In other words, where individuals and groups can protect and
promote their entitlement rights, they are then empowered. While there may be
entitlements to land and other assets, political rights for example are also central to
the process by which claims can be made over resources, and to maintain and
defend entitlements. Being empowered is grounded in specific property rights or
specific bundles of entitlements. Being able to operate in an empowered manner
gives great weight to the notion of enfranchisement, since this is the process where
individuals or groups can participate in the decisions of their society about
entitlement.
If Te Raki Maori did not have economic capability, or had impaired economic
capability compared to Pakeha, what role did the government play in that outcome?
The reason why economic capability is such a key component for socio-economic
development is that it is the essential prerequisite for some form of autonomous
decision-making. Economic capability assumes some degree of political influence. If
decisions can be made about how to use one’s entitlements productively, then one
3
Murton B., ‘Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki 1860-1960 The Economic and Social Experience of a People’. Summary and
Answers to Questions Arising from the Waitangi Tribunal ‘Statement of Issues’, (Wai 814, #B1), p. 2. Murton’s
approach is explained and applied in: Murton B., ‘Aitanga a Mahaki, 1860-1960: The Economic and Social
Experience of a People’, (CFRT and Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki Claims Committee,2001), (Wai 894, #A82); and
Murton B., ‘The Crown and the People of Te Urewera, 1860-c2000: The Economic and Social Experience of a
People’, (CFRT,2004), (Wai 894, #H12)
4
Murton, ‘Summary and Answers’, ibid, p. 2
11
can plan for economic development as well as social development, for example what
to spend on education and health and what precisely to invest in. This is not to
suggest that one would have responsibility entirely for one’s economic and social
development but rather, like Pakeha in local government, that there would be a
capability to begin planning and contributing to economic and social outcomes for
which further government assistance might be forthcoming. Conversely it is likely
that limited economic capability will express itself not only in poorer economic
outcomes but also in more limited social development in health and education as the
economic power to mobilise around these concerns is weakened. If it were
established that Te Raki Maori had their economic capability weakened in
comparison to Pakeha through acts or omissions of the government over time, then
that would establish some degree of responsibility for poorer socio-economic
outcomes. If on the contrary, the government aided the development of Te Raki
Maori economic capability, then any negative outcomes are likely to be less a
consequence of government action or inaction.
Promoting Maori economic capability would involve the establishment and
maintenance of a property relations regime in which Maori could participate at least
as effectively as Pakeha. One might presume that legal and administrative
constraints did not impact specifically and negatively on Maori economic capability.
Or at least if they did so impact initially, remedial action would follow promptly so as
to prevent further negative consequences. If the government pursued certain policies
or enacted certain laws it considered justified that did have a particular and
specifically detrimental effect on the economic capability of Te Raki Maori, one might
ask about the level of support the government provided to compensate for the loss of
economic capability. If the government put in place particular Te Raki Maori
economic or social initiatives, the rationale for such intervention can be informative
as to the perceived obstacles to Te Raki Maori socio-economic development. A
concern with economic capability generates a more precise framework of analysis
around causes and responsibilities for economic outcomes.
There can be a further tension in investigating government involvement with Maori
economic development. Is the government expected to assist Maori in developing
what Maori might consider necessary or is the government expected to leave Maori
12
to develop what Maori consider necessary without interference? A focus on
economic capability cuts through this tension. If Maori have economic capability,
then a key requirement for advancing their own economic and social concerns is in
place. Maori would expect, as would Pakeha, to be able to at least plan for local
developments. Government involvement might be judged appropriate and even
necessary, but these discussions and decisions would take place as part of the
everyday cut and thrust of political decision-making.
As noted, there cannot be a guarantee of economic success, but one necessary
element of success, namely a basic economic capability, sufficient to at least
meaningfully contemplate economic development, is a crucial initial element. This
recognition of the importance of economic capability is not a recent discovery. The
right to form coherent legally recognised entities to make strategic investment
decisions, to take advantage of opportunities provided to similar groups, to not be
impeded administratively from making decisions that other competitors are
unhindered in making, to participate in decision-making structures that impact on
one’s own projects, to expect to flourish without impediments that others do not face,
to receive assistance where necessary as is available to others in similar need, and
to work within a system that holds out the prospect of participation and improvement
were all well understand and defended by Pakeha from the nineteenth century.
The rest of the report develops these general insights through engagement with
particular aspects of Te Raki Maori economic experience to assist understanding as
to how and why the region evolved as it did. This approach cannot exhaust the
possibilities for interpretative understanding of economic development and the
engagement of the Crown and Maori within that development but it offers at least
one useful means by which the interaction of complex phenomena and peoples may
be understood.
13
Chapter 2: Contextual and Theoretical Background
Structural Context
Before focussing on particular details of Te Raki Maori economic history, a brief
discussion introduces some major structural elements to help understand
developments within the Te Raki inquiry region’s economic and socio-economic
history. 5 These elements are the concerns and nature of an evolving state power in
New Zealand, the nature of the economic system that was to so powerfully transform
the Te Raki region, followed by some general observations on Maori economic
development. At this point, the discussion is quite abstract, essentially serving to
conceptualise major structural elements of state and economy that were developing
in the nineteenth century. The relevant reports produced for this inquiry would bring
life to these abstractions through a focus on Te Raki experience.
The State
This section 6 highlights some of the characteristics that an evolving state structure
was to acquire over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially in dealing with
land. These characteristics are generally shared in common by most nation states,
and so are not confined to the particular history of the nation state in New Zealand.
This alerts us to the fact that the state in New Zealand is a structure whose
characteristics are not unique. The state has been driven and shaped by forces and
needs, and has developed a number of broadly standardised responses.
Very briefly some of these characteristics have been as follows. If statecraft could be
described as becoming more sophisticated, the elements of this sophistication
included the standardisation of weights and measures, the establishment of
cadastral surveys and population registers, the invention of freehold tenure, the
standardisation of language and legal discourse, the enforcement of law and order,
the regulation of currency and banking systems, the design of cities and the
5
Much of the following discussion is drawn from Bayley N., ‘Aspects of the Economic History of Whanganui
Maori in the Whanganui Inquiry District (Wai 903) 1880-2000’, (Waitangi Tribunal, 2007), pp 8-21
6
Scott J.C., Seeing Like a State, (Yale University, 1998), chaps 1 and 2; Mulgan R. (updated by Aimer P.), Politics
in New Zealand, third edition, (Auckland, 2004), and Tilly C., Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 9901992, (Oxford, 1990) are useful introductory sources
14
organisation of transport. The New Zealand state invented none of these elements
but it applied all of them in New Zealand. While it might be argued that some of them
served to benefit Maori, Maori had little choice but to engage with the state on these
terms.
Generally speaking, the emerging nation state found accommodating the
extraordinary variety of customary land tenure wherever it existed virtually
impossible. It usually introduced a radically different system, typically individual
freehold tenure. ‘The fiscal or administrative goal toward which all modern states
aspire is to measure, codify, and simplify land tenure.’ 7 As a result of the
implementation of this process, the state sanctioned individual land ownership. It
endowed individuals with wide powers of use, inheritance, or sale and whose legal
ownership entitlement was enforced through the judicial and police institutions of the
state. In an agrarian setting, the state attempted to blanket the countryside with a
uniform grid of homogeneous land, each parcel of which had a legal person as
owner and hence taxpayer. The advantages for the state were significant. The state
could then assess such property and its owner on the basis of its acreage, its soil
class, the crops it normally bore, and its assumed yield rather than to untangle the
confusion of common property and mixed forms of tenure. Over time such
conversion has never been easy. People on the land often violently resisted, and
such conversion has not always been completely successful. Yet the state
consistently strove for this form of freehold tenure. In Britain’s case, this process of
conversion had brought about the Enclosure of the Commons and the Highland
Clearances. 8
The state ensured that common property became the subject of new property rights
in law. The history of property rights in this sense has meant the state’s inexorable
incorporation of nature, including forests, game, wasteland, prairie, subsurface
minerals, water and watercourses, into a property regime.
7
Scott, ibid, p. 36
For the Enclosure of the Commons, see Hobsbawm E., Industry and Empire, (New edition, London, 1999), pp
78-81; for the Highland Clearances, see Devine T.M., The Scottish Nation 1700-2000, (London, 1999), pp 105248, and; Brooking T., Lands for the People? The Highland Clearances and the Colonisation of New Zealand, a
biography of John McKenzie, (Dunedin, 1996), for the significance of the Highland Clearances in understanding
the motivations of a major New Zealand politician
8
15
The increase in modern state power allowed opportunities at a number of levels. The
state could sustain larger military forces if it raised finance more comprehensively.
By reducing barriers to trade, to internal communication, and population movement,
the state paved the way for economic development. A range of interests, especially
military, commercial and administrative, converged on the advantages that accrued
through a more coherent state structure that both fostered wealth creation and broke
down social, cultural and political obstacles to that wealth creation. In practice, this
gave particular force to those interests in society whose positions could be advanced
and strengthened through the expansion of the state. Therefore, the state structure
that evolved was driven both by certain imperatives of efficiency and development,
and empowered groups who could use state structures effectively to their own
advantage.
For example, while settlers in New Zealand placed significant pressure on the
government to secure a certain sort of property regime, it would be naïve to ignore
the state’s own imperatives for economic and social manipulation. Whatever the
establishment concerns and process inefficiencies of the Native Land Court, its
overall effect of creating measurable, taxable, saleable, freehold property accorded
precisely with state expectations, and further empowered those groups for whom this
form of land tenure system was the normal expectation.
Furthermore, the administrative process accompanying this land tenure revolution
flung Maori into a world of title deeds, land offices, fees, assessments, and
applications. They faced powerful new specialists in the form of land clerks,
surveyors, judges and lawyers whose rules of procedure and decisions were
unfamiliar, or at least less familiar than for Pakeha. A number of reports in this
inquiry, indeed in most Tribunal inquiries, cover the issues that arose for Maori
because of this land tenure transformation.
The state preferred this land tenure standardisation for another significant reason,
namely its convenience in turning land into a standardised commodity for the market.
The property grid created regular lots and blocks that were ideal for buying and
selling. This feature suited equally the surveyor, the planner, and the real-estate
16
speculator. Bureaucratic and commercial logic, in this instance, went hand in hand. It
was for this reason that Pakeha interests, so often competing at different political
and social levels, displayed a tight unity when confronting Maori land.
More broadly, and not just concerning land, dealing with the state became virtually
unavoidable for all but a small minority of the population. Petitions, court cases,
school documents, applications, and correspondence with officials gradually became
English language documents, or if not, required translation for a state response to be
given. Regardless of intention, this was a significant shift in power. Local systems of
knowledge and authority simply lacked competence in their own terms in dealing
with the state. Guides were often needed to address the state effectively, creating
dependency on surveyors, lawyers, bureaucrats, and schoolteachers. These official
professions in turn helped ensure the acceptance of official, ‘normal’ ways of
politically and socially organising to participate effectively within the state, operating
as gatekeepers to the state.
The state’s vision of its citizens also changed in line with the methods used to grasp
social reality. Individuals in a society were aggregated into particular state-usable
categories through which state understanding was derived such as tax proceeds,
lists of taxpayers, land records, average incomes, unemployment numbers, mortality
rates, trade and productivity figures, the total number of cases of influenza in a
certain district and so on. The government ‘saw’ Maori, as indeed it ‘saw’ any group
of citizens, through categories that the state itself imposed for its own convenience.
The extent to which the state’s characterisation actually corresponded to the alleged
social reality was itself always a question, but the state at the same time could not
afford to be too inaccurate otherwise social knowledge and control would be
weakened. Shifting emphases over time in census questions, for example, were
propelled by the state’s changing needs to understand better new aspects of social
reality.
The idea that one of the central purposes of the state was the improvement of all the
members of society – their health, skills and education, longevity, productivity,
morals, and family life – took some time to develop. When it did, the enhanced
power of the state in terms of its capacity to gather information about its citizens
17
made such objectives more feasible. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century
state developed in this way across the western world. The modern state demanded
the production of statistical knowledge about the population – its age profiles,
occupations, fertility, literacy, property ownership, law-abidingness (as demonstrated
by crime statistics) – allowing it to intervene in society even more effectively.
For the state to be aware of Maori, including their economic status, it had to
transform Maori society into components that the state could understand and
manipulate. The extent to which the state was able therefore to address Maori
society effectively was conditional on the extent to which Maori society had been
transformed into categories the state could recognise. Ironically, some of the very
social disruptions that transformed Maori society provided the basis for the state’s
ability to make Maori ‘legible’ to itself. Accepting that the state must play a part in
assisting social and economic development opens the way for categorisation within
state-driven imperatives. Finally, being recognised by the state within categories that
make sense to the state does not guarantee that the state will respond, or the
manner of response of the state, to issues arising for those so categorised. The
nature and extent of whatever state response to issues arising, for example with
Maori, is mediated through competing interest groups of varying political power and
access to the state. Priorities are not always set by need.
As Scott aptly summaries:
An illegible society, then, is a hindrance to any effective intervention by the
state, whether the purpose of that intervention is plunder or public welfare. As
long as the state’s interest is largely confined to grabbing a few tons of grain
and rounding up a few conscripts, the state’s ignorance may not be fatal.
When, however, the state’s objective requires changing daily habits (hygiene
or health practices) or work performance (quality labour or machine
performance) of its citizens, such ignorance can well be disabling. A
thoroughly legible society eliminates local monopolies of information and
creates a kind of national transparency through the uniformity of codes,
identities, statistics, regulations, and measures. At the same time it is likely to
create new positional advantages for those at the apex who have the
knowledge and access to easily decipher the new state-created format. 9
9
Scott, ibid, p. 78
18
The challenge for the type of state emerging through the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, and not only in New Zealand, was to reduce the chaotic, disorderly,
constantly changing social reality beneath it to something more closely resembling
the administrative grid of its observations. ‘In the period of movement from tribute to
tax, from indirect rule to direct rule, from subordination to assimilation, states
generally worked to homogenise their populations and break down their
segmentation by imposing common languages, religions, currencies, and legal
systems, as well as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade,
transportation, and communication.’10 This is a general observation, for which New
Zealand provides one of many case examples.
The aspiration to such uniformity and order is inherent in the progress of the state,
and is therefore not particular to the New Zealand state. The process could be
described, not over-dramatically, as a project of internal colonisation, to which all
peoples are subject until reformed as citizens. The builders of the modern nationstate in New Zealand and elsewhere did not merely describe, observe, and map.
They strove to shape a people and landscape that would fit their techniques of
observation. Nationally and regionally, New Zealand faced major challenges to the
expansion of a coherent state authority in the nineteenth century. Within Pakeha
society, there were different ideas competing about how New Zealand should be
organised, what interests should be advanced or retarded, what regions should
receive assistance, how finance was to be raised, and how development was to
proceed.
Indeed in New Zealand, particular political, social and economic development often
arose around the competing interests of local government authorities who were
seeking more autonomy, often through smaller councils or boards, as opposed to the
interests of central government which favoured larger entities to rationalise the
delivery of services and reduce costs. This long struggle between what might loosely
be called more local democracy and autonomy expressed through different local
bodies versus the central state’s desire to plan and control development nationally
10
Tilly, ibid, p. 100
19
still characterises New Zealand society. 11 Centralising tendencies were resisted,
modified and accelerated at different times. Maori participation, in whatever form
within the emerging state and local body structures, could not detract from the
challenge and even threat that such participation might pose to Maori economic,
social and cultural well being.
From the end of the nineteenth century, New Zealanders, particularly Pakeha New
Zealanders, developed a broad political consensus in favour of a relatively active
state. 12 From the mid-nineteenth century, the state was seen as a major agent of
economic and social development. It was the main organisation with the resources
capable of developing the country in a way that met the demands of the growing
number of settlers. There was widespread public support for state initiatives in such
areas as economic investment, the provision of commercial services such as
insurance and mortgage finance, the control of labour relations, and the payment of
old age pensions. The state became an important instrument for achieving social
egalitarianism and equal opportunity for all citizens. In the middle decades of the
twentieth century, this consensus was extended to cover state-provided health and
family benefits, as well as state housing and welfare benefits for those in need, a
combination of policies to be grouped under the general heading of the ‘welfare
state’. All these changes had implications for how the state viewed Maori and what
responsibilities the state believed it had in addressing Maori socio-economic
development.
As noted, this discussion has been of a general nature concerning the operation of
state authority. Relevant reports for this inquiry integrate these general observations
into more detailed and specific discussion arising from experience of Te Raki Maori.
Finally, a key consideration for a coherent state was the extent to which it was able
to co-ordinate the demands of a vigorous economic system, and merge New
Zealand more effectively within that system so as to ensure economic development.
11
Cookson J., ‘How British? Local Government in New Zealand to c.1930’, (New Zealand Journal of History,
41,2, 2007), pp 143-160 provides a fascinating discussion of this creative political tension
12
The following general description is adopted from Brooking T., ‘Economic Transformation’ and Olssen E.,
‘Towards a New Society’, in Rice (ed.), ibid, chaps 9 and 10
20
Capitalism
Briefly, some initial observations can be made about the economic system that was
in the process of transforming the world in the nineteenth century and still is, namely
capitalism, especially in its advanced industrial and financial forms. This is a subject
that has produced a vast amount of research, literature and debate. 13 Some
understanding of the dynamism of capitalism is crucial to understanding Te Raki
Maori economic development, as well as how some of the constraints and
opportunities created by international and national capitalism intertwined with state
authority.
In the broadest sense, New Zealand was formed as a colony of the most successful
capitalist power in the world for much of the nineteenth century, until competition
from other capitalist powers undermined Britain’s lead. British specialisation in
industrial capitalism meant that for New Zealand to participate in profitable market
exchange, it had to produce saleable products, products that Britain needed. After
some uncertainty in the nineteenth century as to what these products might durably
be, the invention of refrigeration provided the technological basis for the
development of small scale, owner-operator farming. This invention, subsequent
farming developments, and state support, became the means by which a peripheral
economy was comprehensively integrated into the international economy. This
fundamental commercially-driven requirement to compete profitably on world
markets, in order to sustain a viable New Zealand, is a key factor in understanding
the nature and shape of New Zealand society.
The need to compete economically for profit gives an advantage to those who can
create more effective means of competition or develop new commercial possibilities.
The drive to discover new technology has a major profit-making impetus given the
sometimes substantial financial rewards that can follow the application of new
technology. This competitive and creative drive is constantly destabilising as new
13
Useful general discussion can be found in Arrighi G., The Long Twentieth Century, (London, 1994); Ferguson
N., The Cash Nexus. Money and Power in the Modern World 1700-2000, (London, 2001); Hobsbawm E.,
Industry and Empire; Landes D.S., The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change and Industrial Development
in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present, (Cambridge, 1969); Mann M., The Sources of Social Power, vols 1
and 2, (Cambridge, 1986,1993); Polanyi K., The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of
Our Time, (Boston, 1957); and Wallerstein I., Historical Capitalism, with Capitalist Civilisation, (London, 1995)
21
technologies undermine former ways of working and living, and the social and
political authority that had hitherto integrated these two factors. Capitalism is not just
an economic option; it is socially and politically revolutionary for any society that is
exposed to it.
The energy unleashed by industrial capitalism cannot be contained within one
country. Capitalists created a world market, and expanded it to absorb and transform
whatever local or regional markets it touched. Production and consumption – and
human needs – became increasingly international and cosmopolitan. The capitalist
market drove the scope of human desires and demands to enlarge far beyond the
capacities of local industries, which consequently collapsed if they could not adapt.
Independent peasants and farmers, and artisans, competing with capitalist mass
production, were often forced to leave the land and close their workshops. In other
words, patterns of massive social transformation, as the life and traditions of the
countryside were transformed in order to become competitive for local, national and
international markets, emerged as standard features within a capitalist system.
Substantial migration characterised countries transformed by capitalism, and a small
steady stream of those migrants came to New Zealand. Capitalism moulded the
world of nineteenth century Pakeha, transforming their society in Great Britain, and
creating the networks and opportunities to transform another environment, New
Zealand, into a further link in the world market chain.
These economic and demographic changes were accompanied by a radical social
and economic rationalisation and standardisation. Some legal, fiscal, and
administrative centralisation must take place in order for these great changes to go
smoothly. This centralisation took place wherever capitalism went, although the
extent to which centralisation was contested served to modify its particular effect in
different societies. Nation states arose and sometimes accumulated great power,
although that power was continually undermined by capital’s international scope.
This integration of economic development and competition, and state authority, was
not without tension, and each country, each region expressed the tension differently.
The Te Raki inquiry region has a distinct history in part through the particular
interaction of political authority and economic development.
22
This extraordinary economic dynamism hit New Zealand in the nineteenth century,
reshaped it irrevocably, and continues to shape and reshape the country today. New
Zealand in the nineteenth century became progressively part of a newly emerging
and constantly changing economic order, for which it modified itself and in which it
played a subsidiary role. Although there have been various experiments to achieve
non-capitalist economic growth, New Zealand’s economic development has always
been set in the context of capitalism. But this meant different things at different times
of the country’s history, both nationally and regionally, depending on specific external
and internal factors of the time, and the course of prior development. When
investigating a geographically specific case study such as the Te Raki inquiry region,
the fact that it became integrated into a capitalist economy means that one should
expect to see some of the general features outlined here.
Integration into a capitalist economy will always be challenging, changing social
customs, land-use patterns, authority structures, migratory patterns, economic
stability and opportunity, down to elements such as housing, education, health, and
longevity. The arrival of capitalism has always and everywhere been revolutionary,
and inevitably provokes some form of resistance. One of the challenges for any
state, indeed part of the mandate of state authority, is not to allow the destructive
and creative forces unleashed by capitalism to overwhelm the social cohesion of the
nation state. On the whole the New Zealand nation state has been quite successful
in this endeavour, but in particular instances over time the economic benefits have
varied between groups and regionally.
Capitalism and the responses of the state to capitalism, which in turn impacted on
the decisions of multiple and competing capitalists both in the particular state and
outside it, set the scene for what, in particular cases such as the Te Raki inquiry
region, was unlikely to have been an entirely positive experience for all participants.
Only particular histories of local experience can reveal how these major elements
worked out in the specific context of the Te Raki inquiry region.
23
Researching Maori Socio-economic Development
Understanding Maori economic development in detail poses a particular set of
problems, as identified by John Macrae in 1975: 14 ‘Furthermore, whilst much has
been written in the post-war period on Maori questions, in reviewing the literature
one is struck by the absence of penetrating specialist studies relating to economic
development’. 15 Macrae notes a partial explanation for this absence of studies:
Part of the explanation lies in the deficiency of statistical information. For
example, at the start of the 1970s, it is not known how Maori incomes are
related to age, experience or education, what proportion still have interests in
Maori land, and the returns on these interests: how many Maori households
there are, what is their composition and so on. 16
The absence of detailed specialist studies and the deficiency of statistical information
for most of nineteenth and twentieth centuries concerning Maori socio-economic
development are a challenge for the writing of socio-economic reports. 17
Macrae also usefully identifies what he considers must characterise any such study,
namely that: ‘One cannot, in any case, effectively study Maori economic
development in isolation from either the historical context or from the general
situation of the dominant group, nor can one neglect other minority groups where
their existence affects resource allocations.’ 18 When economic development is
investigated in historical context and acknowledges the different roles of significant
groupings, then at least some of the obstacles to a better understanding of the
nature and process of Te Raki Maori socio-economic development are likely to be
overcome.
Comment on Historical Approaches to Northland
Finally, after considering the various understandings put forward in the literature
about the economic and social evolution of Northland, the impression gained is that
14
Macrae J.T., ‘A Study in the Application of Economic Analysis to Social Issues: The Maori and the New
Zealand Economy’, PhD thesis, (University of London, 1975)
15
Macrae, ibid, p. 9
16
Macrae, ibid, p. 9
17
Petrie H, Chiefs of Industry. Maori Tribal Enterprise in Early Colonial New Zealand, (Auckland, 2006) is a
welcome study of Maori economic development for the early and mid-nineteenth century
18
Macrae, ibid, p. 9
24
the story to be told is considered uncomplicated and uncontroversial. There are no
serious competing interpretations of what happened over time in Northland at the
broadest level. The following long extract is taken from a government publication
from 1976, which summarises Northland history in a section entitled ‘Development of
Industry and Employment’:
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Northland was the main centre
of commerce in New Zealand. The initial attraction of the area lay in the
natural resources which could be readily exploited, and the abundance of
natural harbours attracted whalers who began trading for timber and
provisions. The potential of the Kauri forests as a supply of timber was soon
realized and ship building was developed as a complementary industry.
Mission stations began land settlement and were responsible for the early
attempts at pastoral production. Barter trade was established with Maori for
flax and kauri gum digging and was also responsible for attracting many men
to the area.
The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi marked the height of Northland’s
political importance but soon afterwards the colony’s administrative capital
was shifted to Auckland to be nearer to other main European settlements.
The region maintained its economic importance and growth [this statement is
not supported by the historical evidence] through continued exploitation of
resources, including gum, timber and coal (first mined in the 1860s). In later
years, as these resources began to decline, the region’s economic
development lagged behind that of most other parts of New Zealand.
The early importance of exploitative industries influenced the pattern of
Northland’s development well into the present century. The nature of these
industries and the prevalence of sea transport did little to encourage the
development of agriculture. Roading was only developed to the extent
necessary for logging, leaving the interior of the region inaccessible.
Another constraint to development of agriculture in the region was its low
fertility requiring application of artificial fertilizers. Much cleared land has
reverted to scrub because its low fertility made it uneconomic to farm without
large reserves of capital and skill. Also, land which had been logged or dug
over for gum was not in a condition that could be farmed easily and
consequently also reverted to scrub. Most of the most fertile land in Northland
lies on the low lying river flats requiring drainage and is subject to flooding.
Multiple ownership of Maori land and associated problems also hindered the
development of productive farmland.
As a result of these difficulties, agricultural development in Northland fell
behind that of other regions of New Zealand. In 1970 Northland had a total
area of occupied agricultural land of 2,310,500 acres. Of this, 33.5 percent
was unimproved and this represents the highest percentage of any of the
North Island statistical areas. In the 1920s, Government land development
schemes were introduced and the Department of Lands and Survey and
Maori and Island Affairs began to bring unproductive land into agricultural use
25
using the resources and the large-scale of activity necessary to overcome
difficulties which are beyond the means and capabilities of individual farmers
in Northland to deal with. These two departments are still active in the field
and there are large areas of land that may yet be developed.
Northland has a very high percentage of its labour force involved in primary
industry (26.6%) which is over double the national average. The slow
development of agriculture has been accompanied by slow development of
manufacturing industries and servicing industries. Because there has not
been a high level of investment in farming there has been little incentive for
the development of other industries.
Other factors responsible for the relatively low level of industrial development
have been poor communications and isolation of the area in its early history
and the relatively low population density. Northland has not been seen as
such a desirable site for industry as Auckland with its large consumer market
and servicing facilities. The major resource that Northland can offer
industrialists is its labour force, many of whom have had to move away from
the area. 19
These two excerpts are taken from later in the same publication:
Development based on local resources continues to be sufficient only to
maintain a modest rate of employment growth with a result that the natural
growth of the labour force has usually exceeded local demand for labour and
there has been considerable migration out of the region.
In the main resource-based industries (farming and fruit growing),
employment seems to have fluctuated around the same level for many years.
Other such industries (eg cement, fertilizer, ceramics and glass production)
have been growing but still provide only a very small proportion of Northland’s
employment. 20
The understanding above would appear to be the dominant view, apart from the
caveat noted in the citation, on Northland’s development as expressed within the
general historiography, reports and publications cited throughout this report. No one
for example has argued:
-
that although the North has been poor in the past, it has been for some time
well developed and prosperous
-
that on the whole the situation in Northland over time has been beneficial for
Maori
19
‘Employment Distribution and Potential in Northland’, (Research and Planning Division, Department of
Labour, 1976), pp 2-4
20
‘Employment Distribution and Potential in Northland’, ibid, p. 5
26
-
that the government had some initial responsibilities toward development in
Northland in terms of setting the general framework but was superseded in
the detail of development by private investment and local initiative, as was
and is normally the case in New Zealand
-
that the North is generally hopeless for economic development, has been
since the 1840s and is likely to remain a backwater offering little opportunity
except for a limited number of specialised economic activities, employing
small numbers of people
-
that the evolution of the economic situation in Northland was entirely
accidental and unforeseen, involving no planning or explicit intervention at any
stage, and today’s situation is an inevitable outcome of a laissez-faire
approach in which some regions will flourish and others will not
This is not to say that it might be possible to have more radical views on why
Northland developed in the way that it did but that such views, should they exist,
have yet to make any serious impact within the general historiography. This report
accepts the general description offered in the excerpt above is correct in broad
outline.
Rarely do the various historical discussions on Northland relied on within this report
seek to determine responsibility for why development took the direction it did. As the
excerpt above demonstrates, the standard approach is to assume a combination of
the accidental and inevitable as the primary causal factors of change, with human
effort mobilised to overcome obstacles. The various reports produced for this inquiry
do attempt to address the question of responsibility, in particular government
responsibility, as does this report. That additional perspective adds to the generally
accepted interpretative approach by attempting to refine the elements of causality
and so enabling a more informed view of why Te Raki regional development took the
form that it did. Again, however, the perspective adopted by those other reports done
for this inquiry is not radical in that none of them argue that the government is
entirely responsible for everything that drove regional economic development
whether good or bad, nor are any of them arguing that the government had no
responsibility for outcomes. What they argue is that the government had some
responsibility for outcomes which were negative for Maori, among other things.
27
What this means is that in the relevant literature identified and discussed throughout
this report there is little disagreement over the facts of Northland’s present economic
situation and what factors have contributed to it over time. There is likely to be some
disagreement over the degree of government responsibility for economic outcomes
in Northland, although most of the limited literature on Northland economic
development does not attempt to consider such a question, but rather reiterates what
is lacking for sustained economic development, and the need to address that lack in
some form. That the government had and has some responsibility for the overall
economic situation in Northland over time is not seriously contested by anybody, nor
is it contested in this report. The issue around responsibility is more about trying to
understand the nature and scope of government responsibility within economic
development, and the relationship between whatever responsibility it is believed the
government had towards Te Raki regional development and actual impacts and
outcomes for Te Raki Maori over time. This report considers aspects of the evolving
economic situation within the Te Raki region, the extent to which Maori were a part
of that development and could influence it, and the degree to which the government
could be said to have influenced the capability of Te Raki Maori to develop
economically.
Conclusion
As both the newly arrived and evolving state with its attendant local structures of
authority and the new expanding capitalist economy broke down traditional forms of
authority and order, especially among Maori, the state was increasingly empowered
and expected to bring order and authority to the new situation. The state’s powers
have been broad and wide ranging, especially from the end of the nineteenth century
as state authority became more effectively imbedded in New Zealand society.
Government participation in the New Zealand economy has involved the making and
enforcing of laws and regulations, for example through setting tax levels, regulating
the conduct of business, setting labour market law and regulations, border control
and monetary policy. The government has also spent, for consumption and
investment, on administration, health, education, housing, and infrastructure.
28
Spending has also occurred in support of industry in the form of grants and loans,
and transfer payments to households such as subsidies and welfare benefits.
The extent of this involvement has changed over time. The government plays a
significant role in promoting, directing and regulating the economic environment, but
can never entirely control it, as natural, political and economic constraints, which
may vary over time, limit government agency.
However, over and above structural and economic constraints, there are political
realities that impinge on state freedom of action, as noted by Mulgan:
Those who make the key decisions relating to business investment have the
power, collectively, to make or break a government. The government’s
popularity depends heavily on the performance of the national economy,
which in turn depends on the level of economic activity in the private sector. A
buoyant private sector requires that investors have confidence that they will
receive a good return on investments. The level of this confidence depends
on many factors, including the trends in the world economy which are beyond
the control of New Zealand and its government. But one critical factor is
whether business leaders and investors consider that the government is
taking the right decisions in terms of its management of the economy, for
instance in the levels of government expenditure and taxation. Any
government which wishes to maintain a prosperous economy must therefore
give especial weight to the likely reactions of business investors to its
decisions. 21
One ramification of this point is that input into government decision making is not
equally shared among different sectors of society since some, because of what they
do, have more opportunities to influence outcomes in their favour. If Maori in the Te
Raki inquiry region and elsewhere are not well represented among powerful groups,
then a significant capacity for influencing government policy is not available.
More broadly, state and economic imperatives challenged Maori autonomy and
economic self-sufficiency. The Te Raki inquiry region provides an opportunity to
investigate aspects of the economic history of one district to see how this challenge
impacted on Te Raki Maori over time.
21
Mulgan, ibid, p. 313
29
Chapter 3: Early Period to 1840: Land and People
This chapter provides a brief overview of the land and environment of the Te Raki
region, as well as a short economic summary of Maori and Pakeha engagement to
1840. The environment of the Te Raki region is a crucial component in
understanding its economic history. While substantially transformed by Pakeha
intervention, the environment proved to be less amenable than was initially hoped for
substantial economic gain and the capacity to sustain a major population. Other
regions proved more amenable to development with less costly investment and so
became more competitive. This more limited productive capacity of the environment
was less clear in the early days, and the evident early prosperity of Te Raki Maori,
and early Pakeha expansion, suggested that it was a region with real development
potential. Perhaps it was, but the course of subsequent economic development after
1840, emphasising particular pastoral and agricultural practices within a certain type
of property ownership and production model, has not facilitated Te Raki Maori to be
in the forefront of economic development in New Zealand. While the Te Raki
environment has a part to play in understanding what was possible over time, the
peoples and systems involved also have a crucial role in determining the nature of
economic development.
Relief
In outline the geography of Northland is different from the rest of New Zealand in that
there are no major mountain ranges or isolated peaks of any great height and no
part of the broad Northland region rises more than 850m above sea level. 22 With the
exception of the Wairoa River, rivers are generally short, slow flowing and silt laden,
with little hydro electric power potential. The typical inland landscape is one of low
rolling hill country, in many places interrupted and broken by rivers, inlets and
harbours. The coastline is physically distinctive in that it is very long in relation to the
total area of the peninsula, and very varied. No part of the region is more than 40
kilometres from the sea.
22
Information on relief, climate, and soils and vegetation is drawn from: National Resources Survey part iii,
Northland region, Town and Country Planning Branch, Ministry of Works, (Wellington, 1964), pp 1-2, and;
Northland Regional Development Resources Survey, Northland Regional Development Council, (Whangarei,
1978), chap 2
30
Long kilometres of windswept beaches on the west coast, which in some areas have
built up substantial sand dunes, are broken only by the extensive estuaries of
Kaipara and Hokianga. Although these estuaries were of great value in the
nineteenth century for access and communication, their shallow depth and the
formation of sand bars across their entrances has subsequently limited their
usefulness. On the east coast there are the deepwater harbours of Whangarei, Bay
of Islands and Whangaroa. Interspersed between the east coast harbours is a
sharply indented coastline along which sandy beaches alternate with rocky
promontories. Also mangrove swamps frequently occur in the tidal estuaries and
inlets, and shallower parts of the main harbours.
Climate
The proximity of the sea, combined with the sub-tropical latitude, results in a climate
characterised by warm, humid summers, relatively mild winters and plentiful rainfall.
The prevailing wind in most parts of the region blows from the west. In summer,
tropical cyclones give rise to north-easterly winds and occasional heavy falls of rain,
especially in exposed, eastern areas.
The mean annual rainfall ranges from about 1000-1300 mm in low-lying coastal
districts to over 2500 mm on some of the higher country. Approximately one-third of
the yearly total falls in June, July and August, and only one-fifth in the summer
months. The region is subject to high intensity rains and, as many of the rivers and
streams have flat gradients, flood rises can be spectacular and flood damage
serious. Although some parts of New Zealand have a higher February mean
temperature, no other region has higher July mean temperatures, which means
Northland has the highest mean temperature in New Zealand. Temperature
variations over the year are low. However, soils tend to dry out in summer, which
retards pasture growth, affecting one third of growing seasons over most of the
region. 23
23
National Resources Survey part iii, Northland region, Town and Country Planning Branch, Ministry of Works,
(Wellington, 1964), pp 43-44
31
Soils and Vegetation
In Northland, the low relief, the warm moist climate, the general absence of any
deposits from recent ash showers and the original vegetation have combined to give
soil-forming conditions that are intermediate between the remainder of the North
Island and the islands of the south-west Pacific. These conditions have produced
soils that are generally strongly leached, warm, heavy clays with thin topsoils and
low subsoil fertility. The main exceptions are soils derived from recent eruptions,
from recent stream and river deposits and those on unstable, steep slopes. The
composition of the remaining indigenous forest demonstrates important relationships
to the soil properties. Most of the region was covered with mixed subtropical rain
forest with considerable areas of manuka scrub on the coastal lowlands and dunes,
and mangroves as noted in the numerous tidal inlets along the coast. Generally, the
podocarps and conifers (especially kauri) were more evident on the hilltops, and the
broadleaf trees occupied the lower slopes and gullies. In relation to soil formation,
two broad divisions can be distinguished: the mull-forming broadleaf trees, which
include puriri, kohekohe, taraire, and tawa, and; the mor-forming podocarp and
conifer trees, which include totara, rimu, tanekaha, and kauri.
Under mull-producing trees the nutrients extracted from the soil are returned to the
soil through the rapid decomposition of dead leaves, twigs and bark, thus
maintaining a topsoil that is fertile and brown, with humus from the rapidly
decomposing litter blended with the mineral soil. Under mor-forming trees there is
usually a markedly acidic humus layer of unincorporated organic material, such as
leaves, twigs and bark, in various stages of decomposition, and sharply separated
from the mineral soil. Humic acids leached from this surface layer impoverish the
mineral soil below of plant nutrients more rapidly than under mull-forming trees. With
similar rainfall, there is an intensification of leaching under mor-forming species, and
a retardation of this tendency under the mull-forming trees.
Adding to this distinctive soil formation pattern is the influence of regional
topography. There are moderate areas of flat land in the inquiry region, especially
north and south of Whangarei but otherwise flat land tends to be confined to narrow
areas in the bottoms of river valleys. This is a contributory factor to the limited arable
farming in the region, apart from any questions of soil fertility and climate.
32
Considerable areas of steep land are found up to heights of 630 metres on the
dissected uplands of the bush-clad central ranges. Because of the difficulty of
access and topdressing, the maintenance of effective pastures on the soils in these
areas is not easy. The remainder of the region consists of moderately steep or rolling
country, and the soils owe their variation not so much to site but to climate and the
original vegetation cover. Map 2 gives an indication of land slope patterns.
Map 2: Distribution of Land Slope Classes in the North Island (Source: McLintock A.H. (ed), An
Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, vol 3, p. 280)
33
As most of the soils are leached to varying degrees, lime has been required through
most of the region, and with increased production heavy applications of lime in
conjunction with other fertilizers. Because of the need for large amounts of fertilizer,
the cost of improvement or initial development sometimes proved too high. The
result had been a continued reversion to scrub or fern on the less accessible areas
of the hill country, and a limitation of the amount of new development that could be
undertaken. Since soils are an important resource of any region that has agriculture
as the basis of its economy, knowledge of the challenges and limitations of the soils
of Northland for particular sorts of agricultural activity is vital to understanding the
shape of agricultural development there.
Northland soils can be divided into essentially three major soil types. 24 The first soil
type, northern yellow-brown earths, which formed under mixed forest, consists of
mostly heavy clays. The more fertile soils are moderately acid, ‘but support good
pastures when topdressed with lime and phosphate’. The rolling land, in 1966, ‘is
used for dairying and fat lambs, the hills for sheep and cattle grazing’. The less fertile
soils ‘support fair pastures when topdressed with lime and superphosphate’. The
terrain can be challenging as ‘on the easier land many dairy and fat-lamb farms are
situated, but pastures on the hill country are less easy to maintain.’ 25 The second
soil type comprises northern podzolised yellow-brown earths and podzols. These are
strongly acid and very low in plant nutrients. ‘Where formed under kauri forest they
are known as “gum-lands”’. 26 The third soil type is made up of red-brown loams and
brown granular loams and clays. These soils are used for ‘dairying, fat-lamb
production, and sheep grazing, and in places for market gardens and orchards’, and
are generally more fertile than the other two soil types, but respond even better when
‘topdressed with lime, phosphate and potash’. 27 Map 3 below shows the distribution
of these major soil types. A land use map is provided later in the report in chapter
seven, on p. 154, which in conjunction with Map 3 illustrates the relationship
between soil type and certain sorts of land use.
24
Information derived from McLintock A.H. (ed.), An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, vol 3, (Wellington,1966),
pp 287-289
25
McLintock, ibid, pp 287-289
26
McLintock, ibid, p. 289
27
McLintock, ibid, p. 289
34
Map 3: Distribution of Soils in the North Island (Source: McLintock, vol 3, p. 284)
In broad terms, the main vegetation cover today is set out in Map 4 below.
35
Map 4: Modern Main Vegetation Cover, (Source: Alexander, ibid, p.1055)
36
As noted by David Alexander, ‘…it is a fair statement to describe the environment of
the Northland study area in 1840 as being all forest, except for certain areas’. 28 The
areas identified by Alexander as deforested included, ‘…small clearances around
Hokianga and Whangaroa Harbours, an extensive unforested area around the Bay
of Islands and extending down the coast to Ngunguru, a thin strip fronting Whangarei
Harbour, Bream Bay and the Mangawhai/Pakiri coast, small clearances between
Mangawhai and Whangaparaoa, and extensive unforested areas south of
Whangaparaoa’. 29 Some soils, particularly those derived from volcanic rocks such as
on the Taiamai Plain, were naturally rich. These deforested areas were created and
sustained over time to 1840 by Maori to allow the cultivation of key crops.
The People and Economy
Briefly, the main groups in occupation in Northland in the nineteenth century leading
up to 1840 were Ngati Whatua, Ngati Paoa, Kawerau, Ngati Wai, Ngapuhi, Te
Rarawa and Ngati Kahu, with Ngati Whatua and Ngapuhi as the two largest groups.
These groups and their relationships with the land are discussed in detail in other
reports for this inquiry. 30 Relationships that developed between Pakeha and Maori
to 1840, including some economic discussion, are likewise covered in other
reports. 31 Some key economic features of the period which shaped subsequent
development can however be usefully highlighted.
First, prior to contact with Europeans, Te Raki Maori were engaged in a range of
economic activities. As Phillipson notes:
The pre-contact economy consisted of subsistence horticulture (mainly
kumara), fishing, hunting and gathering. In addition, there were exchanges of
services, in which certain crafts were the domain of specialists, such as
carving, tattooing and rongoa. Sometimes, such services were sought outside
the hapu, or offered to other groups. Food and resources, such as dried
seafood, and manufactures (cloaks and jewellery) would also be exchanged
between groups, particularly between inland and coastal groups. 32
28
Alexander, ibid, p. 38
Alexander, ibid, p. 38
30
In particular, Kawharu M., ‘Te Tiriti and its Northern Context in the Nineteenth Century’, (CFRT, 2006), (Wai
1040, #A20), and Henare M. et al, ‘Tribal Landscape Overview’, (CFRT,2009), (Wai 1040, #A37)
31
In particular, Phillipson G., ‘Bay of Islands Maori and the Crown 1793 – 1853’, (CFRT, 2005), (Wai 1040, #A1),
and O’Malley V. and Hutton J., ‘The Nature and Extent of Contact and Adaptation in Northland, c.1769-1840’,
(CFRT, 2007), (Wai 1040, #A11)
32
Phillipson, ibid, p. 62
29
37
With the arrival of Europeans, and the development of trade with them, Te Raki
Maori developed a new set of economic possibilities and opportunities. Engagement
with Europeans provided new food and beverages, including pork, potatoes, tea,
coffee and alcohol, new crops such as wheat, corn, cabbages, turnips, carrots,
onions, pumpkins, peas, grapes, strawberries, raspberries and other fruits and
vegetables, new domesticated animals such as chickens, sheep, pigs, cows and
horses, new tools especially iron-made ones, new building materials especially nails,
new weapons notably the musket, and new forms of clothing and textiles.
Pre-contact Maori society as noted by O’Malley and Hutton was ‘not generally
geared towards the production of surplus produce for barter with other groups’. 33
However, as those authors and others outline in various reports, production among
Maori especially in the Bay of Islands began to increase from 1815 onwards as
Maori sought to obtain what they could not produce by selling more of what they
could produce. Some of this trade, such as pork and potatoes, involved newly
introduced products, while in other cases such as with flax and timber, trade meant
the cultivation or procuring of an already existing but now valuable commodity for
sale. Muskets were a prized import item, and with more of them, Ngapuhi were able
to engage in extensive and successful warfare, which provided further slave labour
enhanced production. More Europeans came into the region, settlements grew, and
services of various kinds developed between Maori and Pakeha, as an emerging
and increasingly sophisticated market economy developed. Politically and socially,
there was instability and uncertainty at times, which forms part of the context for
political developments. Economically, Maori had demonstrated a resilient capacity to
adapt to new products and materials, to produce them for sale where they could, to
co-ordinate increased production to target the acquisition of key items, and to
engage with Europeans as economic equals within the opportunities opened up on
an international market. There seems little evidence that Maori were overwhelmed or
unable to adapt to the deep economic changes happening in terms of their ability to
manufacture, grow, trade, exploit or deal with outsiders although, as noted like all
societies confronted by the radical implications of capitalism, there was growing
social and political disturbance and re-alignment, in particular around differing
approaches to land use.
33
O’Malley and Hutton, ibid, p. 140
38
One key new feature for the various Te Raki Maori hapu however was a growing
dependence on trade and therefore the fortunes of the world beyond their control.
Table 1: Bay of Islands Ship Visits, 1800-1840
Source: Waitangi Tribunal, Muriwhenua Land Report Wai 45, (Waitangi Tribunal, 1997), p. 45
39
Prior to European contact, Te Raki Maori had been largely self-sufficient. By 1840,
self-sufficiency in terms of being able to produce for oneself almost all one’s needs
was over. Expectations had been created, which a growing economic base and
sustained contact with Europeans was a pre-requisite for maintaining. There was no
way back to the former life style nor did Maori seek to return. As they were now
linked to the wider world of trade with Europeans, their future prosperity depended
on how they were able to engage productively with the changing opportunities
provided. Map 5 below highlights aspects of the pre-1840 situation. From 1840, the
context for any economic opportunities that emerged was increasingly influenced by
the government, as that body sought to ground its authority within New Zealand. The
exercise of government authority, particularly in its legislative, regulatory and
financing functions concerning land, resources, trade, taxes, infrastructure and
incentives became a significant new factor in economic development within New
Zealand for everyone. This report focusses on various aspects of Te Raki Maori
economic development and capability from 1840 to 2000, in particular the role of the
government within that.
40
Map 5: Te Ao Hou, Maori, traders and missionaries in the north 1814-1840, (Source: McKinnon M., (ed),
The New Zealand Historical Atlas Ko Papatuanuku e Takoto Nei, (Auckland,1997), plate 28 (over two
pages)
41
42
Conclusion
Pre-contact with Europeans, the Northland region was substantially tree-covered,
especially with kauri, though less so in the Bay of Islands. As an apparently
temperate, fertile and flourishing land, it seemed to have offered a range of
sustainable economic activities for Maori. Initially, after contact to 1840, opportunities
for economic development opened up particularly around vegetable growing, timber
and food production. Maori were able to expand cultivation for trade, and attract
Europeans to the area. Economically, Maori within the region became richer and
more powerful, with particularly disruptive effects beyond the region through warfare.
Te Raki Maori had demonstrated a capacity to adapt to European economic
opportunities and to modify their own economic system accordingly.
By acquiring new items, practices, wants and needs, Maori had also acquired a new
dependence for which trade was essential to maintain their social and political
stability and authority. For this trade to proceed productively, commodities of some
sort were needed for trading, a market was needed to trade on, a capacity to
develop local economic opportunities was needed to adapt flexibly to changes in
demand and reinvest appropriately, and reliable, enforceable decision-making had to
be possible. Part of the rationale for government authority from 1840 was that a
stable political authority could provide the necessary framework for these factors to
work together coherently. Thus, from 1840, the Crown became a key instrument and
agent in the economic development story of Te Raki Maori, as decisions made by
the Crown impacted on the Te Raki physical, social, political and economic
environment. The Crown was then to operate within the possibilities opened up
within the Te Raki environment for commercial exploitation, the limitations that the
environment
set
for
specific
developments
and
the
developed
economic
expectations of Te Raki Maori.
43
Chapter 4: 1840-c.1875
Introduction
A very brief overview of aspects of New Zealand’s early economy history reveals the
swift transforming energy of Pakeha. 34 From 1840 British settlers began arriving in
large numbers, and the focus of their activity was farming. This was hindered at first
by limited access to land, which directly contributed to the wars of the 1860s with
Maori. The discovery of gold led to a significant Pakeha population increase and
economic expansion especially in the South Island. However, by 1870 the gold rush
was effectively over. Exports were dominated by wool, nearly all of which went to
Britain. Julius Vogel, finance minister in William Fox’s administration, borrowed
heavily from overseas to finance public works, including railways and roads. This
improved access to many areas, accelerating the growth of pastoral farming, and the
desire to acquire land by the significant number of immigrants attracted to New
Zealand.
Significant commercial development also occurred. By 1867, a New Zealand-wide
census of factories enumerated 406 establishments: gas works, collieries, sawmills,
biscuit factories, ship builders, grain mills, iron foundries, aerated water factories,
brick works and malt works. 35 Around this development, banks, insurance
companies, finance houses, and professional societies were established to construct
the fabric of commercial society. All this was occurring within the context of
extraordinary population growth. Between 1861 and 1871, New Zealand’s non-Maori
population leapt from 99,021 to 256,393. In the next decade, the population almost
doubled again to 489,933. 36 All these factors, that is population-driven demand,
urbanisation,
changes
in
technology,
increasing
land
use,
infrastructure
development, and expansion of local manufacturing, pushed the economy to develop
and coherently integrate these factors. This placed pressure on the state to manage
34
Information is drawn for this brief overview from Gardiner W.J., ‘A Colonial Economy’ and Graham J., ‘Settler
Society’, in Rice (ed.), ibid, chaps 3 and 5; Belich J., Making Peoples; A History of the New Zealanders; from
Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century, (Auckland,1996), pp 278-348; Monin P., ‘Maori
Economies and Colonial Capitalism’, in Byrnes (ed.), ibid, chap 6; Grey A., Aotearoa and New Zealand: A
historical geography, (Christchurch,1994), chaps 5 and 6: and King, ibid, pp 191-209
35
Hunter I., Age of Enterprise: Rediscovering the New Zealand Entrepreneur, 1880-1910, (Auckland,2007), p 33
36
Rice (ed), ibid, p. 116
44
the demands that such dynamism generated for the overall cohesion of New
Zealand.
Economic development to 1875 had transformed parts of New Zealand in different
ways. The South Island in particular had become a major focus of investment and
settler population growth, while significant areas of the North Island remained
relatively undeveloped or had been involved in war. Pakeha concerns and particular
economic opportunities that Pakeha could exploit, drawing in immigrants,
increasingly dictated the form, focus and exercise of political authority. Within this
rapidly changing, yet economically dependent entity that was emerging, the
concerns of Te Raki Maori were but one aspect of an increasingly complicated
mosaic of competing interests. This chapter discusses what was generally
economically feasible within the Te Raki region to approximately 1875, what
obstacles existed to retard development, Te Raki Maori concerns and wishes
regarding development and government engagement and effect on development.
Economic Opportunities and Challenges
The Te Raki economy did not flourish after 1840. A number of factors contributed to
this effect, including a reduction in the number of whaling ships as whale numbers
declined, and rising costs. Costs rose, or were sufficiently high to begin with, making
competition with other cheaper sources for resources more difficult. For example the
timber spar trade declined as the challenges of getting good quality spar out of the
region and the distance to take it to England began to affect competitiveness
compared to the more easily accessible and closer to market spar sources in Russia
and America. 37 Costs, including rising labour costs, affected the sawn timber export
trade. Initially, the prospects for a sawn timber trade had looked especially positive:
In some quarters it was thought that an extensive timber trade with Sydney
was possible. The Australian Colonies were said to be “almost destitute of
building timber, so that in Sydney, Hobart Town, Adelaide, Launceston and
the other Australian towns, there is a consistent demand for scanting-boards
and other sawn timber”. The wages of sawyers were high in Australia, thirty
37
Taylor, P.H., ‘The History of the Kauri Timber Industry’, MA thesis, (University of Auckland, 1950), pp 13-14
45
shillings per day being paid in Adelaide in 1840. It did indeed appear that New
Zealand would become “the timber-yard…of the Australian Colonies”. 38
However, the growing familiarity of Te Raki Maori with this trade and what could be
expected from it meant that profits in the trade could not be so dependent on low
wages. This point concerning knowledge of the value of commodities for trade and
what could be obtained had become a general feature of the economic relationship
between Te Raki Maori and the outside world, and underpinned their confidence to
continue in maintaining and expanding such a relationship. 39 The reality of capitalist
competition however, that it seeks lower costs in order to at least sustain and
preferably increase profits, meant that the risk of increased and more costly
expectations from Maori suppliers might cause the market to change and seek out
new and cheaper sources of supply appears to have begun by 1840. The initial
advantages over Australian suppliers that New Zealand offered went into decline:
But wages were also high in New Zealand, timber workers, both Maori and
Pakeha, making the most of the sudden increase in the demand for sawn
timber which followed the colonisation. Of the timber trade, Terry said: “The
days of figs, of tobacco, pipes, nails and fish-hooks are past;… the native now
knows the real value of his timber, pigs, maize and potatoes”. They now
demanded payment as individuals at the same rate as Europeans, and not
the small remuneration to the chief alone, as formerly. European sawyers,
who were once glad to work for six shillings per hundred feet, in September
1841, were receiving sixteen shillings. A carpenter was paid from sixteen to
twenty shillings per day. By comparison, […] labourers received only eight
shillings per day. 40
Further compounding the potential effect of this growing cost of labour on Te Raki
Maori economic competitiveness, the government in the early 1840s made three
further decisions which impacted on the already challenged Te Raki Maori economic
position, that is, the movement of the capital to Auckland, the charging of customs
revenues (and removal of Maori ability to charge) and decisions around Old Land
Claims. These decisions are discussed in detail in other reports for this inquiry, 41 but
some aspects can be highlighted here. Moving the capital to Auckland was noted by
Governor FitzRoy as a decision which Maori saw as especially significant
38
Taylor, ibid, pp 39-40
Phillipson, ibid, pp 310-311
40
Taylor, ibid, p. 40
41
See in particular Phillipson, ibid, chap 7, and Stirling B. and Towers R., ‘ “Not with the Sword but with the
Pen” : The Taking of the Northland Old Land Claims’, (CFRT, 2007), (Wai 1040, #A9), chap 5
39
46
economically in terms of its impact on increasing trade, while even maintaining trade
was seen as much more difficult due to government actions:
It should be carefully noted that the removal of the seat of government, in
1841, from the Bay of Islands to Waitemata or Auckland, caused very great
dissatisfaction to the natives of the northern districts, living near that Bay and
Hokianga. They soon discovered that the restraints and inconveniences of the
newly-constituted authority which they had consented to acknowledge,
however reluctant to obey, remained to interfere with them; while the
countervailing advantages of augmented traffic, and good markets, were not
only lost – gone to their greatest enemies – but that even the trade enjoyed
previously to 1840 was almost destroyed by the Custom House regulations,
and by the presence of government officers at Kororareka – (now called
Russell). 42
Yet as noted, on-going trade at the level of the 1830s was already under significant
pressure for reasons unrelated to government action. Ironically it can be argued that
the very success of early economic development in the Bay of Islands, and the
particular relationships established between Maori and Pakeha there as a result, was
a major factor in the decision to move the capital:
Hobson wanted somewhere the settlers did not already claim to own, so that
he could lay out a future city and sell its sections for the profit of the Crown,
and to subsidise the Government and settlement. The Bay of Islands simply
was not practical in this respect. 43
In this interpretation, the government moved the capital to gain the capacity to
function effectively with more assured streams of revenue under its control. The
effect of moving meant there was one less incentive for Pakeha to come to the Te
Raki region and, in combination with other perhaps less obvious factors inducing a
reduction in trade and profit, could easily be seen as a major visible factor in
explaining economic decline.
FitzRoy also came to believe that the imposition of custom duties on visiting ships
had played a key part in the decline of shipping to Te Raki ports. He was responsible
for lifting them, but was pressured to restore them in April 1845 after six months nonoperation, given their usefulness in providing government revenue. While difficult to
assess the effect of their abolition for six months, Phillipson does note that: ‘It would
42
43
Fitzroy R., Remarks on New Zealand, (London, 1846), p. 14
Phillipson, ibid, p. 309
47
be fair to say that the Bay of Islands was hit by a decline in the whaling trade which
would have happened regardless of the customs regulations’. 44
A further component impacting on the economic situation, interwoven within the
decline in economic competitiveness of Te Raki and changing markets, and the
practical decisions of the government regarding location and the revenue sources,
was the effect on Pakeha of declining trade in the region. The primary reason for
their presence, aside from the missionaries, was to partake in the profitable
opportunities that existed to trade and make money, and once these declined, then
relocation to more profitable sites became more attractive. The government, under
its Old Land Claims programme, allowed those people who were accepted as valid
purchasers of land to receive scrip rather than take up their land purchases. 45 The
government scrip certificates provided an opportunity to acquire equal amounts of
Crown-acquired land in another part of New Zealand that purchasers would
otherwise have been obliged to take up in Te Raki. Combined with the movement of
the capital to Auckland, this incentive to Pakeha further reduced the economic
advantages that the presence of Pakeha as middlemen, suppliers and purchasers,
had provided for Te Raki Maori.
Given the interrelationship between broader trade opportunities, the changing market
for particular sorts of products, variations in costs in different parts of the world, and
political developments influencing explicitly those aforementioned factors in varying
ways over time, there will always be some debate as to the exact weighting to be
given to the many components that would make up a comprehensive explanation for
the economic situation of Te Raki Maori in the 1840s. Some hint of this debate is
present at the time, with FitzRoy as noted being prepared to emphasise the
significance of moving the capital and the imposition of customs duties on economic
development, as did many Te Raki Maori, 46 while Selwyn as Phillipson notes ‘…was
surprised that that Maori should be “personally aggrieved” at what he saw as the
44
Phillipson, ibid, p. 313
Phillipson, ibid, p. 181
46
For example, Tamati Pukututu, a Kawakawa chief, who is noted as stating, ‘I felt very annoyed at his [the
Governor] leaving Russell, and at the departure of the strangers and soldiers who I had invited to live among
us’. Minutes of meeting between Governor Grey and chiefs at Kororareka, 28 November 1845, GBPP vol 5, p.
356
45
48
operation of the “political economy” (market forces)’. 47 What is clear is that from the
1840s Te Raki Maori faced challenges to their economic development and
prosperity. They tackled these challenges in various ways, with the government from
the 1840s playing an increasingly significant role in the capacity of Te Raki Maori to
engage with, respond to, and advance economic opportunities.
Economic opportunities remained limited for decades after the 1840s in the overall
Northland region. Alexander notes a role for gum-digging or perhaps more
accurately until the 1860s gum-collecting as it could be easily gathered. While some
revenue was obtainable, it appears not to have been significant or sustained. 48 The
timber trade remained much more constrained throughout the 1840s and 1850s,
especially after retrenchment in government expenditure in Britain which further
limited demand for spars from the Royal Navy. New Zealand could not trade
competitively:
In 1848 news reached Auckland that a cargo of spars shipped from Kaipara in
the Charles had been refused by the Admiralty, and sold by auction at thirty
shillings a load. The market remained unsatisfactory in the fifties. In 1853,
11,400 spars exported from Hokianga were sold for £142, while in 1856
twenty loads of spars bought only £60.
To private speculation, the enormous freight rates amounted to prohibition. In
1842 the rate per load of timber from New Zealand to England lay between
five and six pounds. 49
While some entrepreneurs were still able to trade, such as Hemi Tautari who
operated a series of coastal trading ships between the late 1840s and 1865
delivering produce from the Bay of Islands (including peaches, flour and bacon), 50
and some ‘native produce’ shipments of potatoes, maize, onions, wheat, pigs and
grass from Te Parawhau, Ngapuhi and Ngati Hine arrived in Auckland between
1852-1858, 51 the amount of produce overall coming out of the region had been
comprehensively overtaken by quantities coming from Hauraki and other areas
nearer to Auckland.
47
Phillipson, ibid, p. 311
Alexander, ibid, pp 58-59
49
Taylor, ibid, pp 38-39
50
‘Hemi Tautari’, in Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Vol 2. 1870-1900, (Wellington,1993), p. 507
51
Return of Native Produce Imported into the Ports of Auckland and Onehunga. Appendices to the Journals of
the House of Representatives (AJHR), 1865, E12
48
49
Given the generally unfavourable Te Raki economic environment from the 1840s
due to growing competition from other places, costs of production and emerging
centres of population beyond the Te Raki region, attempts by Te Raki Maori to
overcome these disadvantages, in particular to raise new capital, attract investment
and population back into the region, provide insights into their willingness and
capacity to promote economic growth and the obstacles they faced.
One remaining significant asset for Te Raki Maori was land, although this had been
already alienated to varying degrees by 1845.
Table 2: Land alienation prior to 1845
District
Bay of Islands
Whangaroa
Hokianga
Whangarei
Mahurangi
Total
Approximate total
area of the district
(acres)
420,053
212,484
283,450
684,884
522,277
2,123,148
Approximate % of district
alienated through pre-1845
transactions
25
16
24
3
12
14
Source: Crown Statement of Position and Concessions, 6 July 2012, p. 11 (Wai 1040, #1.3.2) 52
However, the government now intervened directly in land transactions, beyond
granting settlers the opportunity to exchange land for scrip as noted. The Crown had
prohibited private transactions but was generally not financially able to purchase land
itself, thus stalling the market. The Crown also recognised Old Land Claims as
absolute alienations, which disturbed the relationship between Pakeha and Maori in
regards to obligations and expectations especially where the Pakeha understanding
may not have previously prevailed (cf Map 13, page 176, for the extent of Old Land
Claims land). Furthermore, the Crown proposed that certain areas of land should be
granted to the land claimant while it retained the surplus. 53 Authority to decide how
land transactions might proceed had become more important in the changing and
more challenging economic environment. While the government showed some
flexibility, for example in waiving pre-emption for a time and customs duties, the
seriousness of the economic situation for Te Raki Maori was apparent.
52
53
It is not clear from the source how the percentage of land alienation pre-1845 was arrived at
Phillipson, ibid, p. 312
50
As the Chief Protector of Aborigines reported:
…they said they were now extremely poor; a few years ago they were able to
procure not only necessities, but luxuries; now they were reduced, as I might
see, to an old thread-worn blanket; and they had been given to understand
that this was in consequence of their having signed the Treaty of Waitangi.
They were now obliged to carry their surplus from one end of the river to
another, in order to get a fig of tobacco, and after spending a whole day, often
returned disappointed. They had been told that the reason the Europeans
could not now buy their produce was, that the demands of the Government for
money were so great, that they had none to buy their produce; they confessed
they felt these remarks, especially as they (from a conviction that their
approval of the late Governor, and signing the treaty would tend to prosperity)
had taken an active part in getting the treaty signed; and then to see him
removing from them to Auckland was too much for them, and not treating
them well… 54
The Northern War of 1845-46 was a symptom of the intersection between growing
Maori frustration at the deteriorating economic situation, and a range of divided
responses to that crisis. 55 These responses included trusting and working with the
Crown to a more direct challenge to the Crown’s actions that affected economic life.
The destruction of Kororareka was a further severe blow to the Te Raki economy,
both in terms of the value of goods lost and the eviction of valuable Pakeha settlers.
Kororareka never recovered, with total exports falling from £5678 in 1844 to £1981 in
1846, to £48 by 1851. 56 While the war directly contributed to economic deterioration,
it was not a major cause since deterioration had rather been a cause of the war, 57
and wars can in certain circumstances be recovered from with interrupted trade and
growth resuming. This recovery did not occur in the Te Raki region after 1846.
Donald McLean noted on a visit to the Bay of Islands in 1858 that: ‘…the poverty of
the Bay of Islands is very obvious. The people are poor, ill-fed, idle, and not
advanced in proportion to the advantages they have had’. 58 However, this is not to
suggest that Te Raki Maori made no serious attempts to encourage economic
growth, trade and prosperity. In 1847, Captain C.L. Nugent of the 58th Regiment and
the Native Secretary, Lieutenant Symonds were instructed to proceed to the Bay of
54
George Clarke to Colonial Secretary, 30 September 1844, GBPP, 1845 (369), vol. 4, p. 39
See Johnson, R., ‘The Northern War 1844-1865’, (CFRT, 2006), (Wai 1040, #A5) for a full discussion
56
Exports by Destination and Imports by Origin at Main Ports, 1841-1852 (Table 44), Statistics of New Zealand
for the Crown Colony Period
57
Phillipson, ibid, pp 310-312
58
McLean Donald, Journal (typescript), 22 December 1858, vol 4, MS-1287
55
51
Islands primarily to investigate allegations of murder among Maori but also to report
on all circumstances connected with the state of the northern Maori population. 59
Nugent noted that ‘…many of them [Te Raki Maori] would die sooner than resign…’
their rights to their land; also:
A large portion however of their land they would sell with avidity, with good
faith, and for almost nominal prices; as, far from being hostile to Europeans,
there seems to be a general wish for the establishment of townships in their
districts, as they are well aware of the advantages which arise from the
neighbourhood of a town, from the example they have of the tribe of Ng te
[Ngati] Whatua near Auckland. 60
Te Raki Maori he noted ‘…appear to feel the loss of those Europeans who have
gone, as they gave a good deal of employment, purchased their produce, and
supplied them with tobacco, blankets and clothing at more reasonable rates than
they are now able to obtain them’. 61 What observations such as these establish is
that Te Raki Maori, having enjoyed a degree of growing prosperity in connection with
Pakeha, wished to continue to promote that growth. This concern about how to
sustain and grow the wealth of their region is a constant refrain. 62
As noted, there were broader economic constraints around the emergence of other
competitive suppliers and easier access to markets for others that acted against
maintaining the same conditions of growth as had existed in the 1830s. Te Raki
Maori sought the engagement and assistance of the Crown in their struggle to
ensure a prosperous region, indeed signing the Treaty could be seen as part of a
strategy to sustain economic prosperity. 63 But some Maori became increasingly
concerned at Crown actions after 1841 which seemed to exacerbate the economic
issues, contributing to the outbreak of war. 64 In its aftermath, if Te Raki Maori
communities were to be able to bring forth initiatives to stimulate growth, they would
have needed certainty around land, in particular what land they could legally
consider their own and with which they could transact. As is discussed in various
reports for this inquiry, the Old Lands Claims and the surplus lands issue were not
59
O’Malley, ibid, pp 95-96
Nugent C.L. to Colonial Secretary, 2 January 1848, G13/1, Archives New Zealand
61
Nugent, ibid
62
For earlier examples see Phillipson, ibid, pp 310-314 and for later examples see Henare et al, ibid, pp 610611
63
Phillipson, ibid, p. 310
64
Phillipson, ibid, pp 310-314
60
52
decided on until the late 1850s, and this Crown controlled process of adjudication
directly impacted on the capacity of Te Raki Maori to engage with Pakeha
economically. 65 These decisions impeded Te Raki Maori ability to offer certainty
around transactions, to generate capital for themselves and to reestablish
communities of Pakeha in their region which they knew were crucial to ongoing
prosperity. The final loss of substantial land to the Crown was a further significant
blow to the asset base of Te Raki Maori.
To the extent that the comments of McLean noted above were accurate, the situation
can be attributed to a changing and less favourable trading environment compared
to the 1830s. 66 The Te Raki region encountered more competition from other parts of
New Zealand, and Maori engaged in conflict about how best to work with the Crown
in addressing the serious issues arising for regional stability. The Crown initially
could not offer clarity around land issues that took into account Te Raki Maori
concerns and expectations before finally making decisions over contentious land
issues that stripped substantial land from Maori. In attempting to improve their
economic situation from the 1840s, Te Raki Maori required certainty around their
authority over land, the types of transaction they could enter into, and the capacity to
then redeploy proceeds from such transactions into potentially profitable ventures.
This process was one they were quite familiar with in practice from the 1830s, but
which they were not able to effect from the 1840s onwards. While there is no
guarantee that, if Te Raki Maori had been able to transact with land authoritatively
that they considered theirs, there would have been a resurgence of prosperity, since
other restraining factors as mentioned still applied, nevertheless in an intensely
competitive economic environment, to be hampered further could only have been
onerous.
Attempts by Maori to establish a new township at Kerikeri were also stymied by the
government from 1847, in O’Malley’s view because ‘…government willingness to
assist in the economic revival of the north remained limited so long as the broader
political issues that had led to conflict in the 1840s remained largely unresolved’. 67
65
See in particular Stirling B. and Towers R., ibid, chap 5
Phillipson, ibid, pp 310-314
67
O’Malley, ibid, pp 107-108
66
53
Other requests for aid in establishing townships arose from the region and were
noted:
The Ngapuhi, who were the first among the tribes of New Zealand to invite the
English to settle among them, are now more anxious than ever that their part
of the country should be settled by a large European population. This tribe
feels confident that no harm will result to them from the introduction of more
Europeans; on the contrary, they consider that their poverty arises from
having no population to consume their surplus produce, - no means of getting
ploughs, carts, horses, harrows, and other implements to improve their waste
lands. Therefore, they say: - “Let us have more white people; we have been
so long accustomed to them, that we cannot live without them; let our
wastelands be purchased by the Government that we may see the country
around us improved by having good agricultural farms, with roads, bridges,
and other facilities, to enable us to travel with safety and comfort from place to
place. 68
The urgent need to develop their lands and regain a measure of prosperity led the
Te Raki Maori leadership to reengage with the government after 1858, as covered in
O’Malley’s report. 69 At a meeting at Kororareka on 7 January 1858, Governor Gore
Browne was made aware of a general commitment to establishing a new town, and
the extent to which Te Raki Maori were prepared to emphasise their loyalty to obtain
one:
Regret was expressed for the folly which had deprived the Ngapuhi of the
advantage of having a flourishing town in their midst; and His Excellency was
urged to promise that a new township should be formed in some eligible
situation. Allusion was made to the foolish project of setting up a Maori King, which none of the Ngapuhi Chiefs were disposed to favour but which, they
stated, had caused them to show all the tribes that the only sovereign the
Ngapuhi are willing to acknowledge is the Queen of England. 70
Although steps were taken to establish a town, it did not happen as envisaged. The
government needed to ensure that its authority was not only recognised but able to
be exercised, that sufficient land be available for settlers in this area and that the
costs of settlement be not just affordable but allow for development. 71 The
establishment of effective government authority was of critical concern, and justified
as necessary for mutual improvement:
…but I am nevertheless fully confident that if they are once made to feel that
the aim and object of the Government is to promote impartially the permanent
68
Te Karere Maori, 31 January 1857
O’Malley, ibid, chap 4
70
Te Karere Maori, February 1858
71
O’Malley, ibid, pp 128-131
69
54
advancement of both races of Her Majesty’s subjects, irrespective of any
temporary expedient for gaining some particular object, they will soon adapt
themselves with zeal and loyalty to such changes as their natural acuteness
of observation may prove to them as in reality conducive to such a
consummation. 72
While in economic terms, the government cannot guarantee consistent improvement
and development, its capacity to influence the necessary components for
development, in this case for example the establishment of a town, was readily
appreciated by Te Raki Maori, and gave significant initiative to the government in
drawing Te Raki Maori toward accepting government expectations.
In Parliament, Edward Stafford had drawn attention to the dire economic situation in
the Bay of Islands:
…it was actually in a state of retrogression, which was clearly proved by a
reference to tables of the exports and imports of the Bay of Islands within the
last four years. In 1853 the exports amounted to £511 15s., and in four years
the increase was less than £70; and in 1855 the total value of exports
amounted to £43. In fact, the district was absolutely dead, as to any power
within itself to increase in commercial or social importance and, with the
existence of such facts as those, surely it was time for the Government to take
some steps in the matter. 73
McLean saw the remedy for Northland stagnation as follows:
The North of New Zealand requires the infusion of a colonising spirit; the
purchase of land from the natives, and the earnest co-operation of the
Government, to give it a start. 74
Economic stagnation, Maori desire to restore prosperity, the need for the
government to engage constructively with Maori and potential settlers to promote
economic growth, and Maori recognition of the need for government involvement and
desire for it, were widely recognised as features of the regional situation. 75 Yet the
passing of the Bay of Islands Settlement Act in 1858 76 did not bring the hoped for
prosperity or the establishment of a township at Kerikeri. Issues around title security
and costs arose as important factors that were to have ongoing significance in
72
McLean to Gore Brown, 20 March 1857, Epitome, A.1, p. 58
11 June 1858, NZPD, 1856-1858, p. 522
74
McLean, Journal, 18 December 1858, vol 4, MS-1287, ATL
75
O’Malley, ibid, chap 4
76
This Act and its context are covered in O’Malley, ibid, pp 127-142
73
55
defining what the government was prepared to undertake in the region. As Colonial
Secretary Stafford noted, delays in the establishment of a Kerikeri township were
caused by three factors, which can be summarised as the non-settlement of old land
claims overlapping into the district earmarked for the settlement, delays in
extinguishing Maori customary title over better quality blocks to be included in the
scheme, and lack of funds to pay for surveying and compensating owners whose
lands were to be included in the settlement. 77 Ensuring development could take
place in such a way that the government, settlers and Maori could all profit would be
a challenge that in the end could not be negotiated successfully.
With war in the 1860s and massive South Island development and immigration
following the gold rushes, government priorities were not generally focussed on the
needs of Te Raki Maori and became even less so. While Grey’s ‘New Institutions’
were initially advanced as a further opportunity to enhance Te Raki Maori prosperity
and ensure loyalty, once the threat to the Crown brought on by war in the Waikato
was seen off, then the promotion of economic prosperity for the Te Raki region was
revealed as a much less important government priority. 78
Within the Te Raki region, some degree of uneven development did occur.
Armstrong and Subasic 79 note in the Mangonui/Whangaroa area that many Maori
relied on the gum trade, which although sometimes lucrative, was also subject to
large and frequent price fluctuations. When the price for gum was low, there was
little else available to supplement income. Lack of infrastructure and population
meant there was limited further incentive to sustain or develop comprehensive
alternative sources of income that would require disciplined planning, time,
investment and the acquisition and retention of appropriate skills. In Whangaroa,
Europeans appeared to dominate work connected with the timber trade and, by late
1867, there were about 200 settlers in the region. 80 In the Bay of Islands, Mahurangi
and Whangarei areas, a growing dependence on the gum trade typified economic
development, as Armstrong and Subasic demonstrate, with few alternatives. For
77
Evidence of Edward Stafford, 9 August 1865, Minutes of the Bay of Islands Select Committee, Le 1/1865/3,
National Archives
78
Grey’s ‘New Institutions’ and their effect in Northland is covered in O’Malley’s report, ibid, pp 159-178
79
Armstrong and Subasic, ibid, pp 616-619
80
Armstrong and Subasic, ibid, p. 619
56
Hokianga the timber trade was still an important source of income and employment,
although gum was always an incentive when prices were high. 81 What had emerged
generally throughout the region by the late 1860s was a growing dependence on the
gum trade as the single source of employment and income for the majority of Maori.
What seemed to be declining was the ability (and desire now that markets had dried
up or were not readily accessible) to grow in a systematic manner a range of crops
for food and processing, and to co-ordinate the trade resulting from these
productions to increase investment and expand further as necessary. While Te Raki
Maori communities continued to mobilise to ensure political objectives could be met,
the growing dependence on a single staple offering erratic but often good returns
and requiring limited communal co-ordination meant that the collective Maori
capacity to direct economic development for community ends was becoming more
challenging. If communal authority around land and collective authority to express
interests locally was not maintained, then the challenges facing Te Raki Maori
economic development became substantially compounded.
Political Authority
Concerning the exercise of political authority, the national government was not the
only working non-Maori authority in the Te Raki region. Pressure for local
development also arises from local authority pressures, and Te Raki Maori could be
expected by their numbers alone and collective organisations to have their local
concerns expressed forcefully. The political structure of local government had begun
to evolve along certain lines in the region with economic implications for Te Raki
Maori. Bruce Stirling has studied local government in the Te Raki region and his
report provides insights into the effects on economic capacity and development of
local government evolution. 82
As Stirling notes, when the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 came into effect in
New Zealand, the colony was divided up into six provinces, one of which was
Auckland province. 83 Each province had an elected Superintendent and Provincial
81
Armstrong and Subasic, ibid, pp 623-624
Stirling B., ‘Eating Away at the Land, Eating Away at the People: Local Government, Rates, and Maori in
Northland’, (CFRT, 2008), (Wai 1040, #A15)
83
Stirling, ibid, p. 65
82
57
Council. Provincial authority covered matters such as the construction of roads,
bridges and ferries, and responsibility for the provision of limited education and
health services. It also ‘allowed settlers a considerable degree of local control in the
districts they had settled’, 84 especially since the franchise was restricted to adult men
holding property of a certain value, which effectively excluded virtually all Maori as
holders of communal land not deemed to meet the property qualification. In practice,
Maori were excluded therefore from representative local and central government,
and while Maori remained the concern of the Crown (in particular of the Governor
and Cabinet) they were unable to bring their concerns forward within the normal
workings of the system, unlike settlers. No responsibility for any aspect of Maori
affairs passed to provincial governments, apart from a limited ability rarely used to
purchase Maori land directly. One result of the exclusion of Maori from local
government was ‘the development of the pervasive view that Maori were solely the
responsibility of central government, in the shape of the Native Department and its
successor, Maori Affairs’. 85 In practice, this political development could only have
detrimental effects on Maori capacity to mobilise economic resources and
infrastructure to their advantage.
Stirling highlights an immediate negative effect for Te Raki Maori of effective political
exclusion from the relevant decision-making processes:
However, it was the provincial government that had primary responsibility for
the development of local infrastructure and the provision of local services;
benefits Maori had been promised as forming a significant part of the ‘real
payment’ for the lands they had sold so cheaply to the Crown in the years
after 1840. The rising value of their remaining lands, the creation of a settler
market for their produce, the provision of health and educational services, and
improvements in roads, bridges, and wharves were promoted by governors
and land purchase officers alike as the true and lasting payment made for
their lands. Lands were sold at far below their real value in anticipation of just
such lasting collateral advantages. From 1853, these were largely dependent
on the provincial government, yet Maori were not represented at the provincial
level, and provincial councillors were unlikely to pay any heed to the needs of
those who were denied the right to vote for them. 86
84
Stirling, ibid, p. 65
Stirling, ibid, p. 68
86
Stirling, ibid, p. 68
85
58
The political impotence of Te Raki Maori within the local government/provincial
system despite their determination to try to overcome obstacles and work within that
structure where possible, as outlined by Stirling, 87 was compounded by the absence
in the Te Raki region overall of significant numbers of settlers. For infrastructure to
be built, settlers were needed to agitate within the representative political structures
available to them. Maori efforts to promote townships and encourage further
settlement were even more retarded by their own lack of political muscle within the
system that allocated infrastructural development funds, which meant that roads and
bridges that might have enticed settlers into the region were not built. The very
presence of Te Raki Maori in large numbers, with significant authority within their
own political structures, had become an obstacle to their own economic development
as control and decisions regarding crucial components of economic development did
not rest with Maori nor were particularly amenable to Maori concerns. Basically, Te
Raki Maori had provided the necessary land for development at cheap prices to
encourage settlement and clearly wanted settlement expanded. However, the
building of the necessary infrastructure to ensure that settlement was economically
feasible did not occur, weakening further Maori economic capacity with no return,
because the political system did not allow Te Raki Maori sufficient weight to target
the necessary development within their region to their benefit.
Te Raki Maori were increasingly caught in a vicious circle, meaning that
infrastructure was needed for development but only a good number of settlers could
bring the necessary political weight to bear to bring that development about, but
settlers in sufficient numbers would not come until infrastructure already existed to
encourage them in, which Maori could not provide given their impotence within
provincial government where decisions on infrastructure spending were made. The
absence of development funding and its significance was understood at the time:
The one great obstacle which stands in the way of settlement on the waste
lands of this province, more especially in the Northern districts, is the want of
accessibility to the land sold, unless along river banks… hundreds of
thousands of acres containing some of the finest lands in the province…
remain unoccupied and unimproved… Their original purchasers, who… might
have become useful and prosperous settlers, have many of them left the
87
Stirling, ibid, pp 64-97
59
country in disgust… [or have] made up their minds to let their country
properties by till time and the improvements of others and the filling up of the
country render them saleable at a high rate of profit. 88
In the circumstances of continuing economic stagnation, even settlers were being
driven away, reducing that indirect political influence to encourage development for
the region and for Maori.
Te Raki Maori were forced to appeal to central government to overcome the
deadlock, as the following example of a petition ’signed by almost all the principal
rangatira’ 89 appealing for the construction of a main trunk dray road north of
Auckland demonstrates, as reported by the Daily Southern Cross:
Should His Excellency… agree to the petition a great advance in the
civilization of the natives will follow, and as they have many bullock drays and
horses, which are used for removing kauri gum and other produce, their
condition would much improve. The present season being almost destitute of
their usual food, through the failure of the crops, appears a favourable
opportunity of thus rendering them a permanent benefit: An influx of settlers
would ensure them continuous employment, and much public benefit must be
the result of opening up a district unrivalled for its fine climate and natural
advantages. 90
The paper also noted later with regard to the same petition that it had been signed
by:
…nine-tenths of the native chiefs, for themselves and people, and they are
willing to give land or timber for constructing the road, without payment –
feeling satisfied that they will be receiving continual benefits by increased
facilities of communication. 91
It does not appear that this petition led to the road being constructed, but regardless
of outcome, it demonstrates how ineffective local government structures were for Te
Raki Maori to voice their concerns effectively.
Te Raki Maori appear to have been little affected initially by rating, following the
passing of the Municipal Corporations Act 1867. That Act established a uniform
88
New Zealand Herald, 1 August 1864
Stirling, ibid, p. 71
90
Daily Southern Cross, 21 May 1863
91
Daily Southern Cross, 3 June 1863
89
60
urban territorial authority structure for boroughs and provided for the creation of
boroughs on the petition of 50 or more people. Rates could be levied by the new
local bodies and rate payers were also electors. Few boroughs were established at
this point in the North Island so the effect of any rating through these institutions was
negligible initially. 92 General uncertainty about rating Maori land was intended to be
removed by the Highway Boards Empowering Act 1871 which would allow district
road boards to charge rates. In parliamentary debates on this bill, the Member for
Mangonui and the Bay of Islands, J. McLeod noted that Maori in his electorate paid
£40,000 to £50,000 annually in customs duties, but received little government
expenditure in return. He noted too that roading funds were invariably expended on
roads that benefitted Pakeha settlers in or near urban areas, and suggested that
Maori would be more amenable to rating if allowed to be members of road boards. 93
Wiremu Katene, the Member for Northern Maori from 1871 to 1876, made essentially
the same points, noting the customs revenue contribution made by the Maori in his
electorate, which should be retained in the region if public works funding was not
spent there, and emphasising further:
if the neglect hitherto manifested towards these districts is to continue, I am
not able to say what the consequences may be. The Ngapuhi…will not be
content to keep paying money while others derive all the benefits. Some of
the Maori districts have been well treated and cared for by the Government,
but the Ngapuhi, on the other hand, have protected the Europeans and also
the Government, and all we get in return is the imposition of taxes. 94
Generally, issues were raised about rates along the following lines in parliamentary
debate, including ‘the lack of influence Maori had over where roads should go; the
preponderance of roading projects in and near Pakeha urban areas; the fundamental
issue of taxation without representation; the concomitant need for Maori forms of
local government’. 95 What these debates confirm is that the forms of political
authority adopted by the government in the Te Raki region were not conducive to
effective economic development for Maori there, but rather weakened their capacity
to encourage development, and reduced their assets, especially land and their
collective ability to work together effectively, even further. In debates on the abolition
92
Stirling, ibid, p. 83
NZPD, 1871, vol 10, p. 365
94
NZPD, 1871, vol 10, p. 256
95
Stirling, ibid, p. 91
93
61
of the provinces, Katene’s successor as Member for Northern Maori H.K. Tawhiti
noted: ‘…some of the money that was appropriated by the Government for the
benefit of our part of the North Island has been thrown into the sea, or somewhere
else. I do not know where it has gone. I ascribe this wrong to the provinces.’ 96 The
extent to which the county system that replaced the provincial system was able to
address concerns and more adequately represent Maori is discussed more fully in
Stirling and is touched on in this report where relevant.
Conclusion
The major issue confronting Te Raki Maori from 1840 through to 1875 was how to
revive the economic prosperity of the immediate pre-1840 period, and therefore how
to sustain their communities which had begun to adapt to the presence of Pakeha
and the opportunities for profitable engagement and economic transformation. It is
likely that a major contributing factor to signing the Treaty for Te Raki chiefs was to
ensure that the possibility of economic benefits continued, in particular that the
economic dependency on trade that had transformed many Te Raki Maori
communities would be sustained while limiting the damage and uncertainty that
contact with Pakeha had also brought.
Very quickly after 1840, the economic fortunes of the Te Raki region became
unfavourable. A number of factors contributed to this situation, namely: the downturn
in international trade, affecting whaling and timber in particular; the movement of the
capital to Auckland, removing an incentive for Pakeha to base themselves in Te Raki
areas and moving central Pakeha decision-making processes out of the region thus
lessening Te Raki Maori ability to bring influence to bear locally; the taking up of
custom duties revenue by the Crown from Maori; war and the resulting destruction
and further disincentive of Pakeha to return; growth and competition from other
regions of New Zealand to supply local and international markets; and the initial
uncertainty about land titles, land use and ownership over large areas of land within
the region that was not clarified in many cases until the late 1850s or even later. This
latter aspect further retarded or discouraged Pakeha settlement, led finally to the
loss of much land to the Crown, and delayed the development of regional
96
NZPD, 10 August, 1876, vol 21, p. 238
62
infrastructure. Finally, where local government structures were established, Maori
were precluded from effective involvement because of the incoherence of the land
title system, a pattern that would have a long history in the region.
Maori leaders knew what was needed for the region to develop economically,
namely settlers, infrastructure, tradeable products and markets. They consistently
sought to encourage the growth and development of these factors from 1840
onwards. National and international trading opportunities declined and the Te Raki
region became less competitive however, which meant that sustaining a viable
economic future became more challenging. Some of the factors that would have
assisted Te Raki Maori to meet the economic challenges of this period were
controlled or directly influenced by government action. Although Te Raki Maori may
have expected that the government would be attentive to their concerns, the reality
for the government was that Northland was only one of many regions in New
Zealand after 1840. The government was an authority responsible for all of New
Zealand and which had to be responsive to other competing interest groups within
New Zealand, in particular Pakeha, who had more capacity to influence government
as the political structure evolved in a direction more completely under Pakeha
control. More directly, the government in its initial struggle to survive economically
became a competitor with Maori through the need to attain land cheaply for
settlement and in its need to find sources of revenue.
However, the insecurity and instability introduced by differing perspectives and
objectives around land title and land use, and the increasing ability of government to
impose its understanding, particularly impacted on the capacity of Te Raki Maori to
coherently respond to the challenges they faced.
Maori consistently requested
infrastructure and townships to encourage settlement, and were dependent on the
government to engage with them in securing these components. Much land was
promised and given to bring on development. This willingness of Te Raki Maori to
engage was not reciprocated in any comprehensive manner by the government,
serving to weaken the economic position of Maori over time, and leading to the
beginning of a dependence on extractive industries such as gum collecting within a
non-developing region.
63
In this period, the central issues of Te Raki economic development, which continue
to this day, first emerged, and Maori were aware of and brought to the government’s
attention what was needed and a willingness to contribute. Land ownership and title
issues needed to be settled in such a way that they did not detract from the capacity
of Maori to develop economically, infrastructure was needed, and government
engagement was needed to support and encourage investment and settlement. The
Te Raki region’s history from this point is largely about Te Raki Maori trying to obtain
these things with limited or no success, and their subsequent marginalisation within
an area that has been largely marginal to New Zealand’s economic development.
The government has always been aware of how it could assist in the development of
the Te Raki region, but this region, not only in this period but beyond, has never
been a high priority for development by government. Whether the region would have
had a more dynamic future if the government had been more responsive and
involved in Te Raki economic development over this time cannot be known, but the
nature and degree of its known involvement did not encourage growth in this region
for Maori.
64
Chapter 5: c.1875-c.1910
Introduction
By the end of the 1870s, New Zealand could no longer access credit as freely as
earlier in the decade due to a banking crisis in Britain, and interest payments had to
be made on the substantial amounts of money already borrowed. 97 The world
economy entered a period of economic slowdown, and prices for agricultural goods
in particular declined until the mid 1890s. The 1880s were a more difficult decade for
New Zealand but salvation appeared through the technological breakthrough of
refrigeration. This enabled a significant expansion of trade, but its full benefit did not
impact until the 1890s after further improvements in refrigeration technology and the
international improvement in prices. Meat, as well as wool, became an export
commodity. Dairy farming also began to grow, since butter and cheese could now be
exported. The move away from large sheep runs to smaller farms was helped by the
Liberal government of the 1890s with the compulsory acquisition of large holdings,
acquisition of Maori land, and the application of a graduated land tax. This was
driven by an explicit view of how New Zealand should be. ‘The great majority of
colonists including farmers, agricultural labourers, small-town dwellers, the union
movement, and even most big landowners and wealthy urban businessmen,
supported closer settlement because it would create jobs, enhance profits, and bring
economic and social gain to everyone.’ 98
Land under cultivation increased 400 percent between 1880 and 1910 to over 16
million acres, and farming became more widespread and diverse and shifted in both
products and location as the North Island entered into beef and dairy production. The
political parties of New Zealand had to respond to progressively more organised and
powerful owner operated farming interests, as well as express the general Pakeha
consensus that more intensive farming was desirable. Britain’s policy of free trade
and increasing population with more spending power, New Zealand farming’s
efficient production in a temperate climate, and government support and regulation
97
Information is drawn for this very brief overview from Gardner W.J., ‘A Colonial Economy’, and Brooking T.,
‘Economic Transformation’ in Rice (ed.), ibid, chaps 3 and 9; Belich, Making Peoples, ibid, pp 349-450; Easton,
In Stormy Seas, chap 2; McAloon J., ‘The New Zealand Economy, 1792-1914’ in Byrnes (ed.), ibid, chap 9; and
King, ibid, pp 224-238
98
Brooking, ibid, p. 81
65
of a vigorous farming economy helped to create a prosperous and confident Pakeha
community by the turn of the twentieth century. As Easton notes:
The new political economy was based on intensive pastoral farming.
Favourable climate, soils of moderate suitability, advances in technology, the
commercial efficiency of the family farm allied to supportive government
intervention resulted in the most efficient pastoral farming in the world, while
the British market willingly accepted the produce at fair prices. Around the
farming clustered industries which supported the farm, processed and
transported the produce, and provided the consumables of society. 99
Significant commercial development also occurred, as the increasing population
drove demand such that, ‘…the greater part of industrial activity was concerned with
the satisfaction of domestic needs, not only in clothing, footwear, confectionery, etc,
but agricultural implements, vehicles, harness, etc’. 100 By 1914, the government had
disposed of most of the land available and suitable for settlement. 101 The population
became more urbanised and more centred in the North Island. As urbanisation
increased, more sophisticated retail offerings emerged presenting a wider range of
consumer goods and specialty products, supported by well-organised wholesaling
and warehousing industry.
The industrial structure of the country deepened, aided by the increasing commodity
prices on the world market after 1895, and continuing urbanisation. New Zealand
industry became more concentrated and wider in its product offerings. ‘In 1890 there
had been 91 different classes of industry as measured by the census; by 1910 there
were 125 classes of industry. […] In 1881 only six industries had been represented
in each province – now there were sixteen different kinds of manufacture spread
throughout the country, aside from the strong regional clusters in such industries as
sawmilling in Wellington, cheese factories in Taranaki, tailoring in Auckland, wool
scouring in Canterbury, and hydraulic gold mining in Otago.’102 By 1914, New
Zealand was a net exporter across a diversified range of goods including butter,
wool, gold, sheep skins, meat and cheese, while goods such as the telephone, car,
telegraph, phonograph, radio and electric engine progressively transformed both the
methods of business and the nature of the consumer market.
99
Easton, ibid, p. 46
Lloyd Pritchard M., An Economic History of New Zealand to 1939, (Auckland,1970), p. 149
101
Ward A., An Unsettled History, (Wellington,1999), pp 158-159
102
Hunter, ibid, pp 71-72
100
66
While there was steady growth especially after the end of the long recession in the
mid 1890s and a degree of economic diversity within New Zealand, the actual
transformation occurred unevenly within the country. The Te Raki region was not to
experience much economic development, relying on essentially the moneys obtained
from gum digging, while urban development was negligible, alternative sources of
long term economic capability remained undeveloped and, reflecting and
compounding these factors, infrastructure, in particular roads and rail expansion,
was of a limited nature. Gum digging appeared also to defer a level of economic
plight that might otherwise have forced some degree of government intervention.
While economic opportunity existed at the national level, it had little local Te Raki
relevance, alongside which the particular extractive industry of gum digging masked
the need for some form of remedial action. In effect, gum digging allowed the Te
Raki region to go on regional economic development hold for about 40 years until,
with the demise of gum digging, the serious issues facing Te Raki regional
development became too apparent for governments to ignore.
Economic Opportunities and Challenges
Other economic opportunities apart from gum digging were identified within the Te
Raki region but were not taken up to any significant extent or, if developed, could not
be sustained. Particular non-agricultural development opportunities are examined
first in this section before turning to those in agriculture.
Coal was discovered in various places including Kawakawa in the 1860s. Investment
was required to start mining:
Dr James Hector, head of the newly formed Geological Survey, was called in,
and […] made extensive recommendations for developing the field, starting
from certain outcrops of coal in the Waiomio area. Auckland merchants acting
on his report, organised a company called the Bay of Islands Coal-Mining
Company, and in 1867 began laying out the Kawakawa coalmine. 103
Infrastructure was required to facilitate the movement of coal, leading to the
construction initially of a wooden horse-drawn tramway from the mine to Taumarere,
upgraded to an iron steam-engine by 1870 and extended to Opua in 1884.
103
Bullock K.I., Steam Through the Main Street (Railway Enthusiasts Society Inc, 1964), p. 4
67
Coalmining attracted further investment and settlers, and by 1881 Kawakawa was
the largest town north of Auckland. 104 However the coal seam began to peter out by
the 1890s and the mine finally closed in 1913, after some 870,000 tons had been
extracted. 105
Alexander notes that the mining was ‘a strictly European activity’, 106 and while it is
not known to what extent this was true of all aspects of mining, including the opening
by the company of its own steam-driven sawmill at Kawakawa in 1880, as far as
initial investment, development and profits are concerned, Maori did not appear to
have been involved. To that extent, this economic development indicated that
opportunities could be pursued within the Te Raki region without the need to engage
with local Maori once land and access had been assured. Also indicated was that
Maori here were not in a position to take the economic initiative and play a leading
role in mining development. To a limited degree, some economic development had
occurred if only for a short time, drawing in settlers and leading to the building of
infrastructure, as had been desired for decades by local Maori, but their own
capacity to engage with this opportunity appeared to be both constrained and
unwanted. An important reason for this limited capacity to engage is addressed later
in this chapter.
Coal was also discovered and mined from the mid 1860s on the Hikurangi block 15
kilometres north of Whangarei, which had already come into state ownership, and
also at Kamo which was worked from 1876. These coal discoveries led to the
building of a railway from Kamo in 1881 and from Hikurangi in 1984 to Whangarei. 107
Coal was also discovered at Kiripaka in 1886 and transported by tramway to the
Ngunguru estuary from 1892 until mining stopped in 1921. 108 As Alexander notes,
these enterprises appear to have been solely European affairs, with Maori only
occasionally involved via leasing, despite coal mining in the case of the Hikurangi
mine continuing production until coal began to be exhausted from the 1930s, with
104
Hedges J., ‘Demographic History of the Bay of Islands 1814-1899’, MA, (University of Auckland, 1987), p. 23
Ferrer H.T., The Geology of the Whangarei – Bay of Islands Subdivision, (NZ Geological Survey Bulletin No
27), pp 107-109
106
Alexander, ibid, p. 118
107
Alexander, ibid, pp 123-124
108
Alexander, ibid, p. 124
105
68
production stopping in 1950. 109 What these limited economic initiatives and
opportunities indicate is that Maori did not seem to be able to engage with
Europeans in an economic partnership, nor did Europeans need to engage with
Maori in their region in order to exploit resources, except where perhaps land access
had yet to be secured. Development, where it occurred as a result of economic
enterprise, happened despite Maori and demonstrated the practical inability of Maori
to influence the course of development to their advantage. Again, as noted, a major
factor driving this situation is explored further in this chapter.
Map 6 below indicates the location of various mineral deposits and geothermal sites
within the inquiry region.
109
Alexander, ibid, pp 124 and 234
69
Map 6: Mineral and Geothermal Exploitation, map taken from Alexander, ibid, p. 1056
70
Flax cutting and milling became a viable economic proposition again from the 1860s,
owing to a worldwide rise in prices. Two mills, in which flax could be dressed by
boiling, stamping and rolling, were set up in the Whangarei district in the 1870s, at
Whangarei and Ruatangata. 110 However, flax milling was not a dependable, reliable
source of income, and risky to invest in, given the instability of the market for flax:
By the very conditions of its existence, the industry was foredoomed to
fluctuate between dazzling prosperity and abject despondency. It was a
sporadic industry at best, highly sensitive to the conditions of the market. The
generality of flaxmillers, like the sawmillers, were practically nomads. They
pitched their improvised mill where the leaf was abundant, stripped the ground
clean, and moved to a new site if the price was still good, or closed down
altogether if it was bad… 111
The full extent of Maori participation in this industry is difficult to gauge but the nature
of it meant that it could not be a stable source of income but rather favoured those
with little attachment to the land except as a means of quick exploitation.
Regarding timber milling, Alexander provides an insightful summary of its impact on
Te Raki Maori as an economic activity. 112 Technological advances from the 1860s,
especially steam-driven vertical break-down saws and circular saws, allowed timber
milling to become economically competitive (cf Map 7, below, for an indication of the
timber and gum enterprises).
110
Pickmere N.P., Whangarei: The Founding Years, (Auckland,1986), p. 112
Scholefield G.H., New Zealand in Evolution, (London, 1909), pp 63-64
112
Alexander, ibid, pp 142-205
111
71
Map
7:
The
Kauri
Harvest,
(Source:
McKinnon,
ibid,
plate
48
(over
two
pages))
72
Mills could be small in number but process vast amounts of timber. The first mill on
Whangaroa Harbour opened in 1874, while the first mill on Hokianga Harbour, at
73
Kohukohu, started work in 1879. 113 However, the mills themselves appear to have
employed European artisans and millhands rather than Maori. S. Von Sturmer, the
resident magistrate in Hokianga, noted that the Kohukohu mill ‘…employs but few
natives, and then they only get bare wages’. 114 While the situation would have been
different out in the forests where Maori who still owned land could sell timber-cutting
rights, or could work in the forests to help transport the wood to the mills and, more
generally, share in the indirect benefits of local development, 115 the precise extent of
Maori engagement at the level of employment and income derived from timbercutting rights is not straightforward to ascertain.
In terms of taking a major role in directing the development of the industry, Maori
were much less well placed. Significant initial investment was required to start up in
the industry. As a result of entrepreneurial capitalism that thrived on the back of the
Thames gold mining boom:
Companies were formed that attracted capital, and were able to readily
borrow money from the banks. They were able to invest heavily in the timber
industry, purchasing timber cutting rights, or the freehold of the bush-covered
lands, and building large modern sawmills. 116
Maori were not in a position to compete at this level. Capitalism is unsettling in part
because it allows for the accumulation of great sums of money, which can be
targeted at newer money making opportunities by people who are empowered
through their wealth to buy into new regions and radically transform those regions,
without necessarily involving local people in the transformative industry except
perhaps at various levels of skilled or unskilled work. As Jack Lee notes:
However, in 1888 the Kauri Timber Company was formed in Melbourne with a
capital of £1,250,000, and profiting from the mid-Eighties depression and the
consequent low state of the timber industry in New Zealand, bought up
twenty-eight important mills and bushes in this country, together with
1,563,000,000 feet of standing timber and 303,000 acres of freehold and
leasehold timber land. All the mills were in full working order, with dams,
tramways, animals etc. So, in 1889, the Kohukohu mill passed to the Kauri
Timber Company, which ran it for twenty years. 117
113
Alexander, ibid, p. 143
Von Sturmer S. 14 March 1882, quoted in Lee J., An Unholy Trinity: Three Hokianga Characters, (Northland
Historical Publications Society Inc, 1997), p. 111
115
Alexander, ibid, p. 143
116
Alexander, ibid, p. 144
117
Lee J., Hokianga, (Auckland, 1987), p. 217
114
74
By the turn of the century, three further mills had been established in Hokianga, at
Koutu, Rawene and Waimamaku. Kohukohu provides an example of settler
dominated expansion following on from the establishment of timber felling:
At its most prosperous, the town had a population of about 600, reasonably
housed, with its Town Hall, Masonic Hall, school, churches, banks,
newspapers and brass band. Photographs of the 1880s and 90s show a
substantial town, comprising commercial buildings, some two-storeyed, and
stores, offices, two wharves and the sawmill. Served by a regular weekly
steamer service from Onehunga, it retained this form and its unrivalled
commercial eminence on the harbour until its decline was initiated by the
closing of the mill in 1909. 118
Some economic development and expansion could happen but Maori were part of it
primarily as labourers, whereas the evidence of successful Pakeha capability was
evident. However, within a capitalist economy, there is always a degree of
precariousness about the long term future and viability of emerging communities
based on limited economic activities, as the last part of the above quotation points
towards. The issue for all in the Te Raki region has been to find a sustainable,
dependable form of economic activity that generally encourages growth and
prosperity for the people living there. Leaving that issue to one side, the pattern
beginning to develop in the Te Raki region from 1870 was that whatever economic
opportunities that did develop were increasingly dominated by Pakeha.
The one asset Maori had which might have forced a more comprehensive
engagement between Maori and private competitors was land. However:
Once the large mills were established relying heavily on timber coming off
Crown-owned land, Maori lost their dominant position. In a short space of time
they became bypassed and, except where timber cutting rights on Maoriowned land were required, largely irrelevant to the industry. 119
Selling land cheaply to encourage development, 120 as well as loss of land to the
Crown and other purchasers, now meant that Te Raki Maori were in an increasingly
marginalised position and could effectively be ignored by those who wished to profit
from economic initiatives. While Maori labour was still useful indeed essential at
118
Lee, Hokianga, ibid, p. 249
Alexander, ibid, p. 144
120
O’Malley, ibid, pp 98, 107, 109, and 138, for some of the instances cited
119
75
times, settler capital and settlers were becoming more autonomous and less
dependent on it. Maori economic capability was weakened further even with land
they still retained, owing to the nature of the native land legislation through which
Maori land was processed, as is discussed further below. What Maori needed was a
secure title system that would have allowed them to collect rentals and royalties on
land clearly identifiable as their land, should they have wished to pursue that option,
or to be in position to enter into or expect to enter into joint ventures with other
commercial parties to extract maximum economic benefit from their resource in a
manner and time over which they had some decision-making input.
In practice, Maori economic opportunities were becoming more marginal to the main
lines of development. Yet money could still be made where Maori were needed. For
example, many Maori were noted initially as being involved in the Hokianga timber
trade. They felled the trees, squared the logs, and rafted them down the river for sale
to exporters. 121 However, ‘The immigration schemes of the early 1870s contributed a
European workforce who came to dominate the bush gangs, and effectively close off
the logging industry as a major source of employment for Maori.’ 122 The impact of
such non-Maori labour was likely to have varied from region to region but to the
extent that labour competition was a factor in the timber industry, employment
opportunities for Maori as labourers presumably became fewer. 123 Furthermore, the
value of timber-cutting leases, another potential source of revenue for Maori, was
more limited than it might have been through the low value the government put on
the value of timber. As Alexander notes, timber was generally viewed as something
to be removed to promote settlement, which meant that Crown forests were sold off
to the sawmilling companies at a very low price. Considerations Maori might have
had on the matter were irrelevant, within the cultural and economic expectations of
Pakeha regarding the place and value of trees. Company profits became conditional
on low prices for timber, allowing effective competition on the international market
and the repayment of the initial heavy capital investment. 124 It is not evident from
sources consulted for this report how much money was obtained for Maori from
timber-cutting leases, and obviously the amounts varied over time and among
121
Daily Southern Cross, May 3 1876
Alexander, ibid, p. 150
123
Alexander, ibid, p. 144
124
Alexander, ibid, p. 153
122
76
different groups and individuals, yet what they did obtain was limited by the dominant
priorities of other entities, such as the Crown and Pakeha private parties, who were
permitted to impose those priorities.
Given the steady marginalisation of Maori economic capability, the situation of Maori
might have become especially dire, especially given the degree of land alienation up
to 1865.
Table 3: Land alienation prior to 1865
District
Approximate
total area of
the district
(acres)
Approximate
% of district
purchased
by Crown
1840-1865
Approximate %
of district
alienated by
1865
420,053
Approximate %
of district
alienated
through pre1845
transactions
25
Bay of
Islands
Whangaroa
Hokianga
Whangarei
Mahurangi
Total
20
45
212,484
283,450
684,884
522,277
2,123,148
16
24
3
12
14
40
0
37
83
40
56
24
40
95
54
Source: Crown Statement of Position and Concessions, 6 July 2012, p. 11 (Wai 1040, #1.3.2) 125
However, gum digging became an essential component of Maori economic survival
from 1870 onwards until the exhaustion of that resource, and allowed some degree
of hope and sustenance in an otherwise increasingly constricted economic
environment. The extent to which Maori were forced to pursue gum digging also
indicated the limited opportunities available for Te Raki Maori to live sustainably, and
how much more narrow were Maori options to develop opportunities compared to the
hopes expressed earlier in the century.
Gum digging, unlike coal, timber and agricultural exploitation, required no significant
capital investment. In the absence of alternative reliable sources of employment and
income, and an increasingly limited capacity to develop any as Te Raki Maori
collective authority and control over land weakened, gum digging was a simple
survival strategy. However, the need to do gum digging for survival in turn
contributed to a further weakening of Maori collective capability to co-ordinate other
125
It is not clear from the source how the percentage of land alienation pre-1845 and between 1840 and 1865
was arrived at
77
basic economic activities. In Hokianga, according to von Sturmer, people were no
longer producing enough food and had to import it from other districts, as opposed to
the situation earlier in the century where substantial export of produce had taken
place. This situation was:
…owing partly to the increased indolence of the people, and partly to the fact
that a large number of them are engaged in the forests squaring and felling
timber and digging kauri gum, of which article there is a large export. 126
More seriously, the resident magistrate noted the high mortality rate among children,
and claimed that once populous smaller settlements were said to be deserted as
people were being forced to congregate into larger settlements. He commented: ‘I
feel sure it must be plain to all observers that the Native population is slowly but
surely passing away’. 127 However, he also believed that as involvement in the
extractive industries fell off, then Maori would be forced to lead ‘a more regular life’
and attend to their cultivations. 128 What this suggests is that a community that had
successfully fed and clothed itself for centuries was struggling to sustain itself at a
basic level. Yet as the same commentator was also able to point out, these particular
Hokianga groups were perfectly able to grasp what was needed economically for
them to survive, namely markets nearby in the absence of infrastructure, and
reiterating that in:
…former years when they sold large blocks of land to the Government it was
held out, as an inducement to sell, that Europeans would settle amongst
them: this they say, has not taken place, and they are now most anxious that
a portion of the purchased lands which of first class quality, though rather
broken, should be set aside for special settlement, and the promise made by
the agents of the Government who purchased the land fulfilled. 129
A similar situation of struggle was reported by the resident magistrate for the Bay of
Islands E.M. Williams, although his reports are somewhat unclear as to what was
really going on. While Maori were said to have received money from land sales, gum
digging and public works employment building a telegraph line, the fortunes of Maori
seemed to weave erratically from floods destroying crops bringing on food shortages
and sickness in 1876, to work on cultivations and a successful whale fishery in 1877,
126
Von Sturmer S. To the Native Secretary. May 12 1877. AJHR, G1 1877, p. 2
Von Sturmer S. To the Native Secretary. May 11 1878. AJHR, G1 1878, p. 2
128
Von Sturmer S. To the Native Secretary. May 13 1878. AJHR, G1 1878, p. 2
129
Von Sturmer S. To the Native Secretary. May 16 1879. AJHR, G1 1879, p. 2
127
78
but also increased sickness, requests for assistance, and ‘but little doubt that as a
race they are fast dwindling away’. 130 In 1878 came the dire conclusion:
The only hope for the Native race is their being induced to adopt European
habits and customs, to cultivate cleanliness, a better attention to clothing and
diet and providing for themselves and their children some comfortable shelter
from the elements than the miserable hovels which they now call houses and
in which but few exceptions [sic] they are content to huddle together in the
greatest state of discomfort. 131
If this was an accurate description then something had clearly happened within this
community to destroy its fundamental capacity to promote a decent standard of
living, and which leadership and economic activity, whether it be gum digging or
whatever, had been powerless to avert. Given these sorts of descriptions of Maori
communities, which continue for a number of years as evidenced by the resident
magistrate reports, it would seem remarkable that Te Raki Maori survived at all, and
clearly were not expected to at the time.
This theme of Maori reliance on the often good but erratic returns of gum digging, the
frequent failure to grow sufficient food for themselves let alone sell to others, general
unhealthiness, population decline, and more broadly a perceived inability to create
and secure a moderately stable economic foundation persists until the early
twentieth century when the one noteworthy change is population increase. 132 H.W.
Bishop, the resident magistrate at Mangonui with responsibility for Hokianga, and
later resident magistrate with responsibility for the whole of Northland commented in
1885:
Generally speaking the natives throughout my district are poor. They can
always earn sufficient and more than sufficient money, in one way or another,
to keep themselves, but they never seem to accumulate, and everything is
frittered away today, without regard to tomorrow. Kauri gum is still obtained in
large quantities, and the procuring of this product affords employment during
some portion of the year to members of every family in the district. Prices
have been ruling somewhat low, but the supply does not seem to have been
affected thereby, and large quantities of gum have been procured from the
various fields. Gum may truly be described as the great stand-by of Natives in
the North. They can never want while this is procurable, and a visit to the
130
Williams E.M., to the Native Secretary May 19, 1875. AJHR, G1 1875 p. 4; May 16, 1876. AJHR, G1 1876 p.
19; May 12, 1877. AJHR, G1 1877 p. 3
131
Williams E.M., to the Native Secretary June 19, 1878. AJHR, G2 1878 p. 2
132
Armstrong and Subasic, ibid, pp 1117-1137, pp 1219-1222, and pp 1249-1267
79
gumfields for a few weeks provides enough to live on for some time, without
the necessity of doing any work. Both physically and morally the effect is bad.
Physically, because often the whole population, men, women, and children,
turn out and live on the swampy ground, either in miserable whares or in
dilapidated tents, often wet through – always damp, and living on wretched
food, thus laying the sure foundation of subsequent disease. Morally, because
knowing that gum is so easily procurable, and pays so well, they neglect their
homes and the education of their children, and render themselves unfit for any
settled employment. The proof of this is to be seen in the various settlements,
and when gum gets really scarce, I fear that a bitter lesson will have to be
learnt. 133
Three years later, Bishop reiterated his views on the mixed blessings of gum digging:
The cultivation of the soil is still very much neglected, and few of the people
raise more crops than barely suffice for their own subsistence. There is great
inducement to neglect in this particular, in the fact that the Natives are able
with so little trouble to provide amply for all immediate requirements by the
proceeds of gum-digging. Every kainga in this district is within easy reaching
distance of a gumfield, and a few weeks’ work by a family during the fine
season suffices to provide funds for a long subsequent period of idleness. The
belief that kauri-gum is an unfailing source of revenue has a most
demoralising effect upon the Native mind. 134
In 1891, the pattern for Bishop was still the same, including the peculiar oscillation
he identified around apparent wealth which gum digging provides and yet the
persistent poverty which he could only explain as due to failure to save, laziness and
wastage:
Laziness and want of thrift are the curse of the Maori. They still only cultivate
barely sufficient land to provide food for their immediate wants, and, when any
extra effort is made, it is only in anticipation of some big political gathering in
the locality, when there is likely to be a large attendance of people and a
proportionate consumption of food. They lack the main incentive to downright
industry, i.e., poverty, for they can always command a fair amount of money
by spasmodic gum-digging. Kauri-gum affords an apparently inexhaustible
mine of wealth. Not only does almost the whole Native population of the north
rely upon it as a means of subsistence, but a very large percentage of the
Europeans also. At present there is little apparent decrease in its production.
It will be a bad day for the Natives when they can no longer rely upon this very
profitable industry. 135
133
Resident Magistrate Mangonui to Under Secretary Native Department, 30 April 1885. AJHR, 1885, G-2, pp
2-4
134
Resident Magistrate Mangonui to Under Secretary Native Department, 29 May 1888. AJHR, 1888, G-5, pp 12
135
Resident Magistrate Auckland to Under Secretary Native Department, 10 June 1891. AJHR, 1891, G-5, p. 1
80
What Bishop and others observed was a structural systematic inability of Maori to
co-ordinate their economic situation for long term gain and stability. This was despite
consistent attempts from 1840 onwards by Te Raki Maori to revive their economic
fortunes. The evidence of the magistrates suggests that engagement with the
political and economic processes of change since 1840 had not been especially
beneficial for Te Raki Maori generally, but rather had marginalised them
economically and decimated them socially.
Nor did Pakeha provide significantly successful alternative models of economic
development within the Te Raki region until the twentieth century, being equally
concentrated in gum digging. Indeed as with Maori, gum digging could retard other
forms of local development. As Marshall notes:
Gum both helped and hindered the development of North Auckland. Its
primary benefit was that it enabled the village settler to pay his way; while its
primary disadvantage was that sometimes the gum-fields attracted the settler
away from his section permanently, or the settler spend most of his time on
the gum-field, thus leaving little time or effort for the development of his
section. 136
Pakeha were able to engage in particular industries such as mining and timber, and
do so profitably, but not to such an extent that population grew markedly or that
many towns sprang up and steadily expanded or that infrastructure finally began to
open up the northern region.
Some limited agricultural development did begin to occur in the hinterland of
Whangarei, around Maungatapere, Waipu and Whangarei Heads, following
substantial Crown purchases in the area, the good quality of the soil and the
proximity to the Auckland market. However, this work was demanding:
Clearing the land was a slow and painful business, so that often only a part
was in anything approaching good order…. Both sheep and cattle were kept,
and some cropping was done; but the market was not extensive, for as yet the
export trade to England had not developed to any considerable extent….
A great part of the land south of Auckland was still in the hands of the Maoris,
so that the north had the market in that town to itself. Buyers visited the
settlements and the cattle when purchased were taken away in droves. At first
the sheep were taken to Auckland by sea, sometimes in the same cutters
136
Marshall B.W., ‘Kauri-Gum Digging 1885-1925, A Study of Sectional and Ethnic Tensions’, MA thesis,
(Auckland University, 1968), p. 6
81
which carried passengers; but, as the roads improved, they were usually
driven overland. With butter selling at fourpence a pound, dairy farming could
not pay, so the farmer devoted his attention to rearing the calves, which were
usually not weaned but allowed to run with the cows. 137
For settlement to occur more generally throughout the Te Raki region, forests had to
be cleared. This requirement was quite standard throughout much of New Zealand,
but Northland’s predominant Kauri, which drew soil nutrients into itself, could
deceptively suggest that the land might potentially be quite rich and productive once
cleared. The reality was that cleared soils often were not particularly rich, which
meant farm income especially on smaller holdings was not as high as initially hoped
for, and other opportunities such as gum digging and timber milling drew settlers to
more financially rewarding alternatives.
Gum digging attracted Pakeha, and caused the birth of towns: ‘...gum is the very
raison d’etre of Kaikohe’s existence, and it furnishes by its export a very good reason
for such existence’. 138 The precariousness of the gum trade was also noted: ‘The
spirits of our little population [at Kaikohe] rise and fall with the gum market, for the
whole of us (natives and whites) are dependent on the production of this valuable
commodity.’ 139 For settlers, it was claimed:
Gum has bought the land, built the house, reared the fences, stocked the
paddocks, and fashioned a bit of wild country, into … a settler’s well-arranged
comfortable homestead. 140
The international economic situation has some bearing on why certain local
opportunities were pursued and others neglected. Agriculture prices were depressed
worldwide from the late 1870s until around 1894, as has been noted in the
introduction. Working with gum provided a better return throughout the same period,
so within the Te Raki region there was a major economic incentive not to work the
land but to move into the more lucrative area of gum digging. 141 Agriculture became
more attractive again after 1894 when prices rose for produce, and technological
innovations with refrigerated transport, allowed the development of dairying and
137
Holmes C.O., ‘History of Whangarei from the Earliest Years up to 1876’, MA thesis, (University of New
Zealand, 1921), p. 87
138
New Zealand Herald, 20 July 1892, p. 6, quoted in Marshall, ibid, p. 20
139
New Zealand Herald, 24 September 1896, p. 6, quoted in Marshall, ibid, p. 1
140
New Zealand Herald, 26 June 1893, p. 3, quoted in Marshall, ibid, Chapter One introduction
141
Marshall, ibid, p. 16
82
meat for export. Gum prices fell from 1894 and, while recovering later, generally
remained static until 1906, before entering another period of price instability. 142 For
some decades, gum digging provided an income, and allowed the challenges of
developing a more stable and sustainable economic alternative to be avoided. If the
Te Raki region was to have an economically stable future, another more dependable
form of economic activity was needed apart from extractive industries.
Table 4: Kauri Gum Tonnage and Price (£) Statistics 1860-1960
Source: McLintock (ed.), ibid, Vol 2, p. 207
Money could also be made by way of licences to use gum lands and royalties on the
amount of gum collected. The considerable amount of land purchased by the
government, but not developed in any way, allowed for gum extraction with limited
official ability to insist on licence payment from private commercial parties. 143
142
Rive E.F., ‘The Kauri Gum Industry in Relation to the Development of North Auckland’, MA thesis,
(University of Auckland, 1949), pp 15-16.
143
Report of the Kauri-Gum Industry Inquiry Commission. AJHR, 1893, H-24, p. 3
83
Map 8: Maori Land Alienation in Northland from the 1860s to the 1880s (Source: McKinnon, ibid, plate
41)
Potential revenue was lost for Maori in that they no longer possessed land that in
some cases had been given to promote development, although for lands retained in
Maori ownership with gum deposits, a further source of revenue could be obtained
through licences and royalties. 144 However, the easy evasion of licence and royalty
payments on Crown land may well have impacted negatively on prices Maori might
have otherwise received for the use of their land. 145 A Royal Commission in 1898
was able to identify some payments received by Maori 146 but it is not possible to
gather a systematic overview of how much money was received by Maori owning
gum deposit lands.
Whatever money made by Maori on gum, whether by working it or through
ownership of gum bearing lands, was not reflected in a prosperous or even minimally
satisfactory style of life, as continued to be identified into the twentieth century:
I have had meetings with the great Ngapuhi tribes, and I have been assured
of a hearty cooperation in these matters [developing their lands] if the
144
Alexander, ibid, pp 130-131
Alexander, ibid, p. 130
146
Evidence of Francis Patrick Green to Royal Commission on Kauri Gum Industry. AJHR, 1898, H-12, p. 51
145
84
Government would only lend a helping hand, and I am sure that unless
something of this kind is done to stimulate the Natives to try other work than
gum-digging, the future of northern Maori is almost hopeless. 147
Armstrong and Subasic very usefully discuss the general economic situation of Te
Raki Maori in the first decade of the twentieth century, 148 noting how various official
reports of the time identified limited Maori employment opportunities within newly
opened European-owned timber and flax mills, some population increase and
greater land cultivation, but on the whole confirmed that reliance on gum digging was
the major component of economic activity for Maori.
As noted, if the Te Raki region was to have an economically viable future, as
opposed to being an underdeveloped resource extraction region reliant on transient
low skilled workers but which otherwise offered little incentive for the majority of its
inhabitants to live a less than precarious lifestyle, then something had to change.
The history of this region is primarily marked by the search for economic security
within the constraints of New Zealand economic and political development, the
hopes and expectations of local Maori, the decisions of governments over time, and
the assets and resources actually available within this region. Te Raki Maori for
much of the nineteenth century possessed two major assets that directly affected
economic capability, namely collective authority structures and land ownership. Both
these assets were to be radically transformed, and with that transformation, the
economic capability of Te Raki Maori was radically altered.
Land Tenure Revolution
What the preceding sections have begun to reveal is that before the 1870s it would
have been impossible to have written an economic history of the Te Raki region in
which Maori did not feature prominently whereas, from the 1870s, Maori become far
less important in understanding the economic issues and direction of the Te Raki
region, or whose interests were a determining factor in the type of economic
development that did occur. Because Te Raki Maori became economically
marginalised especially in terms of significant decision-making, this affected their
relationship with the government. From being a powerful factor in the region, Te Raki
147
148
Report of Dr Pomare, Health Officer to the Maoris. AJHR, 1903, H34 p. 67
Armstrong and Subasic, ibid, pp 1256-1274
85
Maori become peripheral to an economic system that, while allowing Maori a place
within it primarily as labourers, was increasingly driven by non-Maori concerns and
by economic opportunities that were open to those who could benefit from them,
whatever the impact of those concerns and opportunities on Te Raki Maori.
Whatever concerns the government might have had regarding the effects of
economic transformation on Te Raki Maori from the 1870s to 1910 (and beyond), the
ability of Te Raki Maori themselves to have input into decisions made, and influence
outcomes in their favour for economic development, had been substantially reduced.
By the early twentieth century, and beyond when dealing with Te Raki Maori, the
government responded, where it did respond, to a very different people
economically, within a very different economic context, to that of the pre-1870s
period.
As noted, while many reports track the details of Maori marginalisation over this
period, the overall effect of participation in the Native Land Court process in
particular, whether willing or not, was not one that served to advance the economic
security and development of Te Raki Maori.
And this was obvious at the time,
especially as a result of the findings of the Rees-Carroll Report of 1891. 149 This
report arose out of a commission of inquiry appointed to investigate Maori land laws.
The substantial problems clearly identified, arising from Native Land legislation, led
the Commissioners to advocate a return to tribal or corporate dealings in land. Rees
and Carroll noted that:
The unanimity of the Natives was not merely negative, and condemnatory of
the past and present – it was also displayed in their wishes for the future.
Everywhere they gave substantially the same evidence as to the desire of the
tribes regarding the future management of their land. Titles they believe can
be found and determined, boundaries can be settled, and lists of owners
prepared, by the Maoris themselves, leaving only a few disputed cases to be
determined by the Court. 150
Over and above any destabilising effects that a comprehensive integration into a
capitalist economy would have on any people, the Native Land Court legislation
served to proliferate ineffective individual land title and decimate authority structures
in a fundamentally uneconomic manner for Te Raki Maori. A particular legal
149
150
Rees-Carroll Commission Report, AJHR, 1891, Session II, G-1
Rees-Carroll Report, ibid, p. xix
86
construction of multiple land ownership, refracted practically through increasing
fragmentation, fractionation and succession, characterised the new regime,
generating a well understood range of issues. 151 Even more seriously, with the later
economic opportunities opened up for pastoral farming, and the generous
government assistance in support of pastoralism, the Maori land title regime
precluded Maori from engaging with the emerging opportunities at hand. No such
handicap impeded Pakeha.
The following excerpt from the time emphasised and reiterated yet again the
substantially negative effects of Native Land Court legislation that the Rees-Carroll
report had drawn attention to. Whether what happened for Te Raki Maori could have
been substantially different is another question, but what was in fact happening was
clearly identifiable as problematic. The language used in this excerpt is also
noteworthy for its tone of impassioned, repetitive condemnation, even if one were to
consider some of it hyperbole:
The tendency in the Act to individualise native tenure was too strong to admit
of any prudential check. The desire to purchase native estates overruled all
other considerations. The alienation of native land under this law took its very
worst form and its most disastrous tendency. It was obtained from a helpless
people. The crowds of owners in a memorial of ownership were like a flock of
sheep without a shepherd, a watch-dog, or a leader. Mostly ignorant
barbarians, they became suddenly possessed of a title to land which was a
marketable commodity. The right to occupy and cultivate possessed by their
fathers became in their hands an estate which could be sold. The strength
which lies in union was taken from them. The authority of their natural leaders
was destroyed. They were surrounded by temptations. Eager for money
wherewith to buy food, clothes, and rum, they welcomed the paid agents, who
plied them always with cash, and often with spirits. Such alienations were
generally against the public interest so far as regards settlement of the people
upon the land. In most of the leases and purchases effected, the land was
obtained in large areas by capitalists. The possession of wealth, or that credit
which obtained it from financial institutions, was absolutely necessary to
provide for native agents, interpreters, and lawyers, as well as to distribute
money broadcast among the native proprietary. Not only was this contrary to
public policy, it was often done in defiance of the law.
151
The Native Land Court and Native land legislation have been covered extensively by Waitangi Tribunal
inquiries particularly in the Gisborne Report, Turanga Tangata Turanga Whenua. The Report on the
Turanganui a Kiwa Claims, (Waitangi Tribunal, 2004) and The Hauraki Report (Waitangi Tribunal, 2006). Also
see Williams D., ‘Te Kooti Tango Whenua’ The Native Land Court 1864-1909, (Wellington,1999); and Boast R.,
Buying the Land Selling the Land, (Wellington,2008)
87
Of all the purchase money paid for the millions of acres sold by the Maoris not
one sixpence is left. Their remaining lands are rapidly passing away. A few
more years of the Native Land Court under the present system, and a few
amended laws for free trade in native lands, and the Maoris will be a landless
people.
But it was not only in the alienation of their land that the Maoris suffered. In its
occupation also they found themselves in a galling and anomalous position.
As every single person in a list of owners comprising perhaps over a hundred
names had as much right to occupy as anyone else, personal occupation for
improvement or tillage was encompassed with uncertainty. If a man sowed a
crop, others might allege an equal right to the produce. If a few fenced in a
paddock or small run for sheep or cattle, their co-owners were sure to turn
their stock or horses into the pasture. The apprehension of results which
paralyses industry cast its shadow over the whole Maori people. In the old
days the influence of the chiefs and the common customs of the tribe afforded
a sufficient guarantee to the thrifty and provident; but when our law enforced
upon them a new state of things, then the lazy, the careless, and prodigal not
only wasted their own substance, but fed upon the labours of their more
industrious kinsmen.
The pernicious consequences of native land legislation have not been
confined to the natives, nor to the Europeans more immediately concerned in
dealing with them for land. The disputes then arising have compelled the
attention of the public at large; they have filled the courts of the colony with
litigation, they have flooded Parliament with petitions, given rise to continual
debates of very great bitterness, engrossed the time of committees, and,
while entailing very heavy annual expenses upon the colony, have invariably
produced an uneasy public feeling. 152
A key factor identified by the Stout-Ngata Commission was firstly loss of land. In a
capitalist economy such land loss might in principle be mitigated if other sources of
revenue and investment were at hand to compensate for the economic loss of
opportunity. The effect of land loss on the scale that it occurred was not however a
purely economic affair. For Te Raki Maori, there was a major transition happening,
moving from a non-capitalist economy, to an economy beginning to engage with
capitalism and exploring within itself some of the challenges and consequences of
this engagement, to finally a more explicit Pakeha-controlled process of economic
engagement. Unlike the period from the 1840s through to the 1870s, this final
transition obliged a complete transformation of Maori societal and economic
structures by non-Maori processes. In that transition, Te Raki Maori had one major
commodifiable asset, namely land, through which they might retain influence. To
152
Excerpt from the Stout Ngata Commission Report 1907, AJHR, G-1c, p. 3
88
lose land especially productive land, the primary asset of Te Raki Maori, on a
significant scale, would almost certainly reduce their economic bargaining power in
the region. Only astute reinvestment of moneys obtained from sales or leasing, or
development within another area of the economy, could help to maintain the
strategic economic position of Maori within the region. Otherwise, the choice was to
sell their labour, and the return on this depended on need in the economy and the
skills Maori could offer.
Loss of good productive land, therefore, was a crucial element, but by itself was not
necessarily detrimental in the long term to the economic chances of Te Raki Maori if
workable alternatives existed which Te Raki Maori could take advantage of. When
combined with the social and cultural effects, as identified in the excerpt such as the
undermining of communal leadership structures, land loss impacts were magnified.
To focus purely on the quantity and quality of land without taking into account the
significance of land for a people in a pre-capitalist economy, or the importance of
retaining some institutional control in a period of capitalist transition, is simply to
apply categories incorrectly. Even if the land remaining in strictly capitalist economic
terms had been generous in both quality and quantity, Maori still operated with
significant disadvantages in relation to Pakeha because Te Raki Maori now faced a
deeply competitive Pakeha capitalist world with fewer assets and a more limited
capacity to mobilise collectively for economic benefit. As noted, the money and
opportunities afforded by gum collection and selling served to mitigate to some
extent the serious disadvantages that had accrued for Te Raki Maori, but also
exposed the obstacles to sustaining collective economic capabilities.
The potentially easy availability of money to individuals added further to the
disintegrative impact of change on Maori social and cultural cohesion. Money was
easy enough to obtain by both selling land and by selling gum, but the lack of
authoritative structures for financial re-investment and for attracting development
finance retarded Maori long-term economic development possibilities. At a time of
deepest vulnerability in the face of asset selling and erratic individual opportunity,
leadership was undermined and the chances of evolving a more responsive direction
in the face of change became even more problematic.
89
The example of Maori generally obtaining money from land selling, and in the Te
Raki region as well with gum digging, yet somehow still marked by economic
marginalisation, could not have enhanced Pakeha willingness to assist Maori in,
what was for Te Raki Maori, a period of particular economic turbulence:
Moreover, the squandering of easy money received from the sale of land
reacted to the detriment of the Maoris by hastening their physical and moral
deterioration and by lowering their reputation in the eyes of their Pakeha
neighbours. It was in this period that they came to be regarded as shiftless,
improvident, and incapable of sustained industry. 153
To stand some chance of significant participation within this fast-moving period of
social and economic revolution of capitalist development within New Zealand, Te
Raki Maori would have needed a co-ordinated control over the moneys obtained
from land sales and gum digging and a clear economic framework in which to
operate. They would have needed, at the very least, some kind of effective trust,
incorporation or komiti mechanism to be recognised by law. Even with these factors,
there would have been no guarantee of economic success, as that can never be
guaranteed, but to lack these factors could only have increased the disadvantages
Te Raki Maori faced in sustaining their interests. The reiteration of the Rees-Carroll
Commission report’s observation: ‘If a man sowed a crop, others might allege an
equal right to the produce’, highlighted an important point. The process of
individualisation, introduced after 1873, resulted in an individual title that could be
sold easily enough without reference to the remainder of the community, but was
virtually worthless for any other purpose. Actual individualisation on the ground
involved a costly, complicated and extremely rare process. This led Ward to observe:
‘In fact, it [individualisation] was a process by which each owner’s signature was
made a marketable commodity, but which rarely led to individual Maori owning a
small farm marked out on the ground’. 154 On the other hand, as Monin notes: ‘The
court’s failure to create a genuine tribal title made virtually impossible long-term land
development organised by and on behalf of the community.’ 155
153
Condliffe J.B., New Zealand in the Making, (Second revised edition, London,1959), p. 81
Ward A., An Unsettled History, (Wellington,1999), p. 168
155
Monin P., ‘Maori Economies and Colonial Capitalism’, in Byrnes (ed), ibid, p. 138
154
90
To develop economic capability, Maori communities needed secure and useable
entitlements, and a degree of empowerment sufficient to exercise them. But the
Maori land title system produced unworkable entitlements for Maori, as the StoutNgata Commission confirmed, especially around succession and fractionation.
Precisely because the titles were so unworkable meant that Maori could not pursue
coherent economic development. They were disempowered. Faulty entitlements and
disempowerment reduced economic capability.
In the long excerpt quoted, the Stout-Ngata Commission report further confirmed
how the uncertainty created by the Native Land Court legislation regarding
ownership of land improvements, and therefore any incentive to undertake them,
continued to undermine Maori competitiveness: ‘The apprehension of results which
paralyses industry cast its shadow over the whole Maori people’. In other words, the
economic operational framework around tenure, created by legislation, was deeply
flawed, placing a further obstacle in the way of coherent development, and
increasing Maori vulnerability to Pakeha commercial expansion which laboured
under no such impediments.
To have a co-ordinated control over moneys arrived at through land alienation and
through gum digging implies an authority capable of undertaking such responsibility.
The problem for Te Raki Maori was that their sources of authority were those
explicitly subverted by the government in pursuit of economic development:
The object of the Native Lands Act was two-fold: to bring the great bulk of
lands in the Northern Island which belonged to the Maoris… within the reach
of colonisation. The other great object was the detribalisation of the Maori – to
destroy if it were possible, the principle of communism which ran through the
whole of their institutions, upon which their social system was based, and
which stood as a barrier in the way of all attempts to amalgamate the Maori
race into our social and political system. It was hoped by the individualisation
of titles to land, giving them the same individual ownership, which we
ourselves possessed, they would lose their communistic character, and that
their social status would become assimilated to our own. 156
In fact, the Maori land tenure system did not provide individualisation of title, but
rather a hybrid that neither reflected prior Maori approaches to land nor provided
156
NZPD, (1871), p. 361
91
individual plots of land. The legal form of multiple land title was the problem, and not
just an economic one. The individualisation of people that it also fostered, individuals
detached from communal authority and empowered to alienate land interests, helped
to weaken or destroy Maori co-ordinating authority. In as far as any policy to weaken
Maori authority structures was successful, it had the effect of contributing towards
easier alienation of land and the entrenchment of Pakeha interests as Maori
collective authority to resist or construct alternatives weakened. 157 A further
consequence of undermining Maori authority structures was a weaker capacity for
Maori to collectively construct economically viable alternatives with the land and
resources remaining in their control. Where there was any intention to ensure that
Maori became assimilated into a Pakeha world, the economic consequences, in the
absence of specific recognition of Maori disadvantage and actions to address that
disadvantage, would always be generally unfavourable for Te Raki Maori. Precisely
what form any action to address disadvantage should take, particularly within a
social and economic environment that was reluctant to accord any significant
advantage to Maori especially where this would disadvantage other powerful Pakeha
interests, became a major source of debate throughout the twentieth century.
Armstrong and Subasic’s report provides a general discussion of the impact of the
Native Land Court, Maori land legislation, and land alienation on Te Raki Maori.
Their report also provides population figures over the period from the 1860s to the
early decades of the twentieth century, as well as land use and land alienation
figures. Their discussion reiterates a consistent theme in Waitangi Tribunal research
and in Waitangi Tribunal reports, 158 namely the extraordinarily destabilising and
weakening effect on Maori communities of the Native Land Court and legislation.
The impact of these external factors may not have always been completely negative
for Maori and may have occasionally been embraced and used by Maori themselves.
Nevertheless, for Te Raki Maori communities on the whole, the application of these
legal and political processes ensured that Maori economic capability within a
competitive regional environment made up of diverse interest groups was not
157
Of course, a major theme of Maori political activity in the period after 1870 was the endeavour to gain
Crown recognition of ongoing instruments of communal control such as runanga, komiti, incorporations and so
on. This report does not focus on this activity, but O’Malley V., ‘Runanga and Komiti: Maori Institutions of SelfGovernment in the Nineteenth Century’, PhD thesis, (Victoria University,2004) is a valuable source
158
See especially Waitangi Tribunal, The Hauraki Report, ibid, pp 657-900
92
enhanced. As is demonstrated in other reports for this inquiry, 159 and elsewhere,
local Te Raki Maori efforts to retain authority and to engage usefully with
governments and Pakeha could not be sustained in the face of determination to
ensure Maori abided by imposed land use norms.
In other areas of New Zealand, the Pakeha population quickly swamped that of
Maori, and may be considered a further important factor in the marginalisation of
Maori. However, what the Te Raki experience demonstrated was that Pakeha did not
need to come in significant numbers for Maori to be challenged and disempowered
in their locality. Pakeha systems of land tenure, when imposed, had more than
enough capacity to be destructively destabilising. As the Tribunal noted in its
Turanga Report:
Maori communities could not have withstood the introduction of an aggressive
land purchase market if armed only with the land tenure system provided
under the 1873 Act. In fact, no population could have. The whole idea of
individualised purchase, the complexity and contradiction of the legal regime
and the cost of the process and subsistence prices were, together, capable of
producing only landlessness and poverty. 160
It is impossible to know whether Te Raki Maori might have thrived economically had
they retained more control over the course of their own development, and managed
to engage with the government in terms closer to what they hoped, but the manner in
which Maori became enmeshed in intractable, legal and political processes over land
was a clear handicap to their economic capability.
In comparison, the advantages that Pakeha might possess as individuals were
enhanced by a workable title system, a growing government-backed assisting
regime to operate within those entitlements to pursue economic capability (discussed
in the next chapter), and a political environment at the local and national level in
which the ongoing preferences of Pakeha-dominated development could be given
voice. The Te Raki Maori experience was very different.
159
But especially the report of Armstrong and Subasic for this period
Waitangi Tribunal, Turanga Tangata Turanga Whenua. The Report on the Turanganui a Kiwa Claims, ibid, p.
521
160
93
In summary, the problems Maori faced were readily recognisable to the Stout-Ngata
Commission:
The necessity of assisting the Maori to settle his own lands was never
properly recognised… The spectacle is presented to us of a people starving in
the midst of plenty. If it is difficult for the European settler to acquire Maori
land… it is more difficult for the individual Maori to acquire his own land, be he
ever so ambitious and capable of using it. His energy is dissipated in the Land
Courts in a protracted struggle, first, to establish his own right to it, and
secondly, to detach himself from the numerous other owners to whom he is
genealogically bound in the title. And when he has succeeded he is
handicapped by want of capital, by lack of training – he is under the ban as
one of a spendthrift, easy-going, improvident people. 161
With communal forms of land ownership and management stymied, and individual
use of land handicapped, the circumstances for effective Maori economic
development in this region were not especially favourable, even if the region
otherwise had been one of considerable economic opportunity. When Te Raki Maori
communities had had effective economic capability, they had been able to pursue
economic development. The retardation of Maori efforts to advance economic
development, and the enhancement of Pakeha efforts to further economic
development, demonstrated the developmental asymmetry between the potential of
the two respective land title systems.
In 1908, data from the Stout-Ngata Commission indicates that Maori owned the
following amount of land in the inquiry region.
Table 5: Land in Te Raki Maori Ownership in 1908
District
Approx
total area
of the
district
(acres)
Approx % of
district
alienated
through pre1845
transactions
Approx % of
district
purchased
by Crown
1840-1865
Approx % of
district
alienated by
1865
Total amount of
land in Maori
ownership at
1908 using
Stout-Ngata/Te
Raki data
(acres)
228,735
34,957
221,855
58,207
14,886
543,754
Bay of Islands 420,053
25
20
45
Whangaroa
212,484
16
40
56
Hokianga
283,450
24
0
24
Whangarei
684,884
3
37
40
Mahurangi
522,277
12
83
95
Total
2,123,148
14
40
54
Source: Crown Statement of Position and Concessions, 6 July 2012, p. 11 (Wai 1040, #1.3.2) 162
161
Stout-Ngata Commission Report, AJHR, 1907, G-1c, p. 15
The Crown footnote for the 1908 figures is as follows: ‘The figures for Mahurangi and Hokianga only roughly
align with the Te Paparahi o Te Raki districts. The figure for Rodney has some overlap with Mahurangi and was
162
94
In discussing Whangaroa, the Commission noted the land remaining in Maori
ownership was ‘for the most part of low steep hills, with small valleys in between’. 163
After detailing the quality of land available for farming, the Commission concluded
‘This is really too small an area for the Maoris to be expected to make a living off the
land by ordinary farming’. 164 When comparing Pakeha and Maori, the Commission
concluded that Pakeha were rather better placed economically but that the area
posed challenges for both Pakeha and Maori:
There are 65,242 acres in the county owned by Europeans (inclusive of
Crown lands) and at the last census there were 801 Europeans in the county.
Assuming that they were all engaged in farming, this would give an area of 81
acres each, but a great number of Europeans are engaged in sawmilling,
bush-felling, storekeeping, shipbuilding &c. It will be seen from this statement
that the area used by the European farmers is far larger per head than the
area left to the Maoris per head for farming purposes, and if the Maoris had to
look to farming there is too small an area of their own land fit for pastoral
purposes. A considerable number of them, and, indeed, of Europeans, have
been maintained by digging for kauri-gum, but the gumfields are gradually
becoming exhausted, and the kauri forests in the county are nearly at an end.
There will be therefore a lack of employment both for Maoris and Europeans
unless the land now lying waste and uncultivated is turned to some profitable
use. 165
The other districts were less discussed. For the Bay of Islands the Commission
commented that land in Maori ownership ‘is of uneven quality’ with the best land
near Kaikohe ‘in the Motatau series of blocks, running in patches intermixed with
poor gum land’. 166 It also noted the presence of ‘worker-bees composed of owners
and others’ which, as Hearn discusses in more detail, provided some evidence of
collective Maori initiatives to develop land. 167 For Hokianga, the Commission noted
that ‘there is a nuclei of healthy Maori farming communities’ in parts of the district
used here. The Hokianga figures may need further refinement to more closely, align with the Te Raki Hokianga
district. These figures come from AJHR, 1908, G 1Q, p. 2 and AJHR, 1908, G 1J, pp. 1-6. Figures are approximate
only, not including roods and perches for ease of data handling.’ Clearly, some caution needs to be had with
these figures since, as a percentage of the 1908 acreage, Te Raki Maori appear to have retained 54.4% of their
land in the Bay of Islands, and 78.2% of their land in Hokianga for example, which cannot be right given the
1865 alienation figure in the table, as further land was alienated from Te Raki Maori in these regions between
1865 and 1908, cf map 8. It is not clear how this Crown source derives the alienation percentage over time
anyway.
163
AJHR 1908, G1J, p. 4
164
AJHR 1908, G1J, p. 5
165
AJHR 1908, G1J, p. 5
166
AJHR 1908, G1J, p. 3
167
Hearn, ibid, pp 90-91
95
and that ‘in the valleys very good agricultural land’, 168 which suggested some
potential. The situation in Whangarei district was less potentially favourable as ‘there
is a lack of system in the conduct of farming operations, due no doubt to
inexperience and want of proper instruction’. Overall, the evidence from this
Commission suggested a willingness of Te Raki Maori to engage in commercial
agriculture, and more generally to use their lands in an economically effective
manner where they could. However, Te Raki Maori faced a variety of challenges in
taking up commercial operations of whatever sort successfully, as the Commission
had also pointed out.
Yet Te Raki Maori did attempt to expand agricultural and pastoral production in the
early twentieth century, as the figures in the following three tables demonstrate:
Table 6: Showing for each County the Extent of Land in Cultivation and the Live-stock held by Maori,
according to Returns obtained at the Census of March, 1901
Counties
Whangaroa
Hokianga
Bay of
Islands
Whangarei
Rodney
Extent of Land in Cultivation by Individuals,
in acres
..
36½
100¼
Other
Crops
..
68
65¼
Sown
Grasses
..
539¼
1052½
Extent of Land in Common
Cultivation by Members of
Hapu, in acres
Potatoes Wheat
Other
crops
127
..
134
131
..
295
63½
..
193½
93
4½
86
4½
1488½
237
7½
1
Potatoes
Wheat
Maize
..
47
116¾
..
2
..
76
3
..
..
2
..
129¼
22
Live-stock held
Sheep
Cattle
Pigs
599
4885
5760
294
1812
2385
1423
2796
4979
1901
..
1229
36
974
88
Source: New Zealand Census 1901, Appendix B, page lviii
Table 7: Showing for each County the Extent of Land in Cultivation and the Live-stock held by Maori,
according to Returns obtained at the Census of April, 1906
Counties
Whangaroa
Hokianga
Bay of
Islands
Whangarei
Rodney
Individual Cultivation - Acres
90
224¾
109¾
Other
Crops
111½
396¾
151
Sown
Grasses
219½
3921
6372
In Common Cultivation Acres
Potatoes Wheat
Other
crops
5
..
1¾
4
..
24
9
..
5
133½
..
107½
2
5091
..
6
..
Potatoes
Wheat
Maize
98½
160¾
321
..
..
..
191
..
..
..
..
2000
..
Live-stock held
Sheep
Cattle
Pigs
553
212
3697
314
3186
3581
748
2231
2287
102
100
1433
147
769
46
Source: New Zealand Census 1906, Appendix B, page liii
168
AJHR 1908, G1J, pp 4-5
96
Table 8: Showing for each County the Extent of Land in Cultivation and the Live-stock held by Maori,
according to Returns obtained at the Census of April, 1911
Counties
Area of Land occupied by Individuals - acres
Potatoes Wheat
Maize
Other
Sown
Crops
Grass
es
Whangaroa
18
..
54
122½
644
Hokianga
181
..
437
391
12042
Bay of
Islands
Whangarei
250¾
..
241
400
37¾
..
75¾
152½
16223
½
7275
Rodney
1
..
4¼
19½
171
Number of Live-stock owned by individuals
Dairy
In
Horses
Sheep
Cattle,
Tuss
including Cows, in
milk or
ock
calves
to calve
or
othe
r
unim
prov
ed
558
654
545
484
210
6
420
2982
2501
4974
710
51½
365
3699
3707
4824
341
69½
522
889
175
1528
509
2
75
128
200
28
26
Pigs
765
1882
2699
314
39
Source: New Zealand Census 1911, Appendix A, page viii
It is impossible to know quite how accurate these Census figures above are. Also,
they provide an average number and acreage for each county, not therefore picking
up particular local variations within counties. For the period 1901 and 1906, a
distinction has been drawn between individual and collective patterns of use and
ownership, whereas for 1911 only the individual distinction remains. In 1901, areas
of common cultivation comprised a significant part of the overall total whereas in
1906 there was a dramatic reduction in the contribution of crops in common
cultivation, with the outstanding exception of 2000 acres of ‘other crops’ in
Whangarei. The 1911 census also provides further precision around land use and
live stock.
The cultivation and livestock census information reveal a number of patterns. Potato
cultivation dropped away between 1906 and 1911, with the limited exception of
Hokianga. Maize cultivation generally increased throughout the period, with the latter
limited exception of Whangarei. ‘Other crops’ cultivation was more erratic, increasing
in some areas over time and decreasing in other areas. ‘Sown grasses’ significantly
increased over time, with the exception of Rodney. Regarding livestock, pig numbers
generally declined over time or remained almost static, as did sheep numbers. Cattle
97
numbers significantly increased over time, and by 1911 dairy cows had become an
important component of the overall number.
What is broadly indicated is that Maori agricultural development was sensitive to the
wider economic possibilities within the region and expanded in accordance with the
growing opportunities afforded by cattle farming, and with dairying. If this potential
development trend was to continue, Te Raki Maori cattle and dairy farmers would
need to operate competitively, in particular, to access government and private
assistance as needed that was available to other competitors, and not be hindered in
their land ownership and land use in a manner not faced by their competitors.
Some areas of good quality land that might potentially be developed remained in
Maori ownership. More often, in part because of land lost to Te Raki Maori through
the operation of the land court system and earlier, the lands remaining to Maori by
the early decades of the twentieth century were generally of poorer, more marginal
quality which made living off them, let alone developing them, even more of a
challenge. Even with better quality soil, effective land use generally required
assistance, as was recognised later in the twentieth century:
Without adequate topdressing it is impossible to farm successfully most of
Northland’s soils. The soils are extremely varied, but the majority are heavy clays
with thin topsoils and relatively low subsoil fertility. Under the humid climate the soils
leach rapidly and thus most require heavy and regular applications of fertilizer to
maintain the fertility at a level sufficient to allow intensive grazing. 169
Hearn was able to conclude that there was a correlation between land ownership
patterns by the turn of the twentieth century and subsequent socio-economic
deprivation:
If the pattern of deprivation apparent in the Northland Inquiry Districts is compared
with maps depicting the ownership of land as it emerged during the period under
review, then a clear correlation is apparent, between the areas of Pakeha ownership
and least deprivation, and between the lands remaining in Maori ownership and the
areas of greatest deprivation. That correlation strongly suggests that the roots of the
present patterns of relative deprivation have their origins deep in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, that is, in the loss of potentially productive land and
associated resources. 170
169
170
National Resources Survey part III, Northland Region, ibid, p. 60
Hearn, ibid, p. 29
98
The following two maps, Maps 9 and 10 respectively, illustrate the correlation from
which Hearn has drawn his conclusion.
Map 9: The Status of lands in the Northland region 1905, (Source: Hearn, ibid, p.39)
99
Map 10: Northland socio-economic deprivation map, (Source: www.health.govt.nz/publication/dhb-mapsand-background-information-atlas-socioeconomic-deprivation-new-zealand-nzdep2006)
100
This correlation exists only in hindsight as it does not follow that Te Raki Maori
economic development, even if facing considerable challenges by the early twentieth
century, was somehow fated to be less successful than that of other competitors.
What was apparent by the early twentieth century was that where future economic
opportunities in the Te Raki region involved land exploitation for pastoral activities
then Pakeha were in an excellent position to take advantage of developing markets,
infrastructure, loans, fertilizers or whatever assistance or opportunity came their way,
given their prior possession of generally better quality land 171 and participation within
a workable land title system.
The land Maori retained was conversely likely to be more problematic to develop
even if specific forms of assistance were to become available. Te Raki Maori
possessed a foundation of varying amounts of land usually further from developed
infrastructure than Pakeha land, of sometimes good quality but more frequently poor
quality land, that they gave evidence of wanting to develop, yet which was
embedded within a problematic land title system. The amount of land lost and
retained from 1860 to 1910 is indicated in the maps below.
Map 11: Maori land alienation in Northland at 1860, 1890, and 1910 (Source: Ward A., National
Overview, Rangahaua Whanui series, national overview reports, 1997, 3 Vols, pp xviii, xix, and
xxi)
171
That better quality land had been obtained from Maori over time can be evidenced by comparing the slope
and soil class maps provided in chapter two, pp 33 and p. 35 with the land alienation maps in this chapter, p.
84 and in chapter seven, p. 176
101
The land tenure system as it had evolved was crucial to the type of development Te
Raki Maori might undertake. As R.G. Crocombe noted, ‘A subsistence economy
provides people with food and shelter. It cannot provide adequate schools, hospitals,
radio communications, motor transport, or the wide range variety of goods and
services which modern communities in most parts of the world now demand’. 172
Crocombe went on to note that:
A system designed to give maximum production and maximum standard of
living should combine the following features:
It should be clear who holds what rights in land.
Tenure should be secure.
Improvements must be protected.
There should be no unproductive rightholders.
Land should go to those able to farm it best.
And it should be adequately distributed among rural people.
The soil must be protected and used.
Holdings should be of suitable size, shape, and location.
Speculation should be discouraged. 173
The greater extent to which the Pakeha land tenure system was able to combine
these features cited above, compared to the land tenure system developed for
Maori, offers insights into why development paths had begun to differ by the end of
the nineteenth century and were to continue to do so between Te Raki communities
and Pakeha over the twentieth century. The challenge to find some viable means to
maintain and develop economic capability significantly determined Te Raki Maori
relationship and engagement with their remaining lands, and with the government,
for the rest of the century and beyond.
Conclusion
In general terms, Te Raki Maori faced formidable obstacles for co-ordinating and
taking advantage of economic development. The obstacles included: the imposition
by legislation of a more favourable land tenure regime for Pakeha than for Te Raki
Maori, completely replacing the attempts by Maori to engage with economic change
in their own terms; the attendant economic and social upheaval throughout Maori
172
Crocombe R.G., ‘Improving Land Tenure’, Technical Paper 159 (Revised edition), (South Pacific Commission,
Noumea,1975), p. 6
173
Crocombe, ibid, p. 6
102
society; the greater familiarity Pakeha had with the new economic order; the greater
commercial acumen, skills and networks Pakeha had in the new economic order; the
acquisition by the government and by Pakeha of significant amounts of better quality
land; and the completely dominant political order of nation state authority for whom
Maori were only one component among many competing interests. Under these
constraints, the economic options for Maori were not especially diverse.
Te Raki Maori had sought to retain greater control over their economic development
and to encourage development through engagement with the government to
promote infrastructure development and settlement. Unfortunately, Northland was
not a government priority, as other areas of New Zealand were more successful in
bringing political influence to bear for regional development, and once infrastructure
and economic opportunities were launched elsewhere, then in combination with
growing populations the capacity of those other areas to attract more investment
could only grow. Gum digging provided an immediate short term solution but created
in turn a dependency on a single resource within weakened collective structures for
Maori. Where selling their labour or developing other economic opportunities
became necessary for Te Raki Maori, Pakeha already held a significant skills and
asset advantage. Pakeha advantage was further strengthened by the local political
structures on offer over which Pakeha exercised increasing and eventually almost
complete control.
This is not to say that individual Maori and sometimes groups of Maori were not able
to be successful economically. Both Alexander’s report and that of Armstrong and
Subasic provide example of successful individual entrepreneurs and collective
economic endeavour, 174 as well as efforts to be successful that were stymied by lack
of capital and restrictive Maori land legislation. 175 Where Maori were able to operate
some form of competitive commercial venture, this tended to occur before the land
court began operating. What these examples of more limited engagement and
frequent failure demonstrate is that the overall pattern for Maori economic capability
174
Alexander, ibid, p. 60; and Armstrong and Subasic, p. 939, concerning the commercial activities of Hemi
Tautari, and p. 932 on a whaling fishery in the Bay of Islands
175
Armstrong and Subasic, ibid, pp 936-938 concerning efforts of Maihi Paraone Kawiti to organise a mill, and
pp 940-952 on the efforts of Heremia Te Wake and Te Hemara Tauhia to use their lands and resources to
engage with the colonial economy
103
was becoming increasingly one of withdrawal from commercial engagement, which
despite the persistent demand for infrastructure, settlers and support, suggests that
economic opportunities were narrowing for Maori with destructive effect. Given the
effect
of
unworkable
title
on
Maori
land
ownership,
and
the
resulting
disempowerment around effective land use decisions – affecting whether or not to
sell and lease, and at what time, or whether to loan against land for other ventures,
or whether to develop land, or whether to enter into partnerships with other sources
of skill and capital, or simply wait until a more favourable time presented itself
following infrastructure development for example – then it is not surprising that there
was a corresponding dampening of Maori entrepreneurial initiative.
More generally, the region had not found by the early twentieth century a stable form
of economic activity sufficiently attractive to draw in investment and people. Only a
small number of towns had developed, and there was no significant urban centre in
the region north of Auckland. Maori involvement in local government remained
minimal due to the political representation ramifications of the Maori land tenure
system, further removing Maori from opportunities to influence local economic
development. Infrastructure lagged behind the rest of the country. When various
possibilities were tried in the twentieth century especially pastoral farming, the
capability of Maori to engage with those activities meaningfully and productively
would further evidence the extent to which Te Raki Maori could play a vital role in the
economic development and direction of the region.
As King notes, the establishment of viable economic alternatives was crucial to
national survival, which did occur fortuitously:
It is difficult to see how New Zealand could have survived as a viable country
had it had to continue to rely solely on wool and grain and extractive
commodities for its national income.[…] The demand and price for gold and
kauri gum were unstable, and New Zealand’s reserves of the former were
limited and the market for the latter would disappear altogether as synthetics
became available […] Rather than the country’s being forced to wrestle with
these considerations, however, the coincidence of refrigeration technology
and a guaranteed market in Britain would soon deliver to New Zealanders one
of the highest standards of living in the world. 176
176
King, ibid, p. 238
104
This economic development was vigorously supported and developed by the
government nationally through engagement with settlers and their needs from the
1890s onwards. The extent of Maori ability to be a part of this development
depended on their capacity to transform their economic and social practices, which
in turn depended on whether the parts of New Zealand they were living in were
amenable to such change and whether the legal and political processes which
determined the nature of their economic engagement were supportive or not. King
also raises the question:
It was a fortunate outcome [New Zealand prosperity from the 1890s], though
one that would generate a new set of problems when questions eventually
had to be asked about whether the extent and scale of grass farming that
New Zealand had opted for was in fact sustainable in the light of the country’s
soils, climate and land instability. 177
This question particularly applies in the Te Raki region where the development of
grass farming was more challenging than in many other parts of New Zealand, but
nevertheless for better or worse, grass farming was taken up in the Te Raki region,
and its success was partly determined by the extent of government support for those
engaged in it. This region arrived later than other parts of the country to this
economic opportunity given the challenges of the land, the lack of infrastructure and
the alternative of timber milling and gum digging, but from the early twentieth
century, development of the land became the major economic activity for those living
in the Te Raki region who sought to create stable prosperous lives.
177
King, ibid, p. 239
105
Chapter 6: c.1910-c.1950
Introduction
Between the wars New Zealand experienced major economic fluctuations. 178 The
First World War saw a boom, fuelled by a growing demand for New Zealand’s
primary commodity exports, and a wartime ‘commandeer’ agreement by which
Britain undertook to purchase New Zealand products at agreed prices. The
disruption of shipping and a shortage of consumer imports encouraged the
expansion of domestic manufacturing. The price instability, which developed towards
the end of the First World War, was followed by a sharp recession in 1921-22.
Primary commodity prices declined markedly with the ending of wartime
commandeers in 1921 and 1922. Britain’s efforts to dispose of accumulated stocks
of wool, meat, and dairy produce, growing competition from both European and
South American producers, and unemployment and falling real incomes in the United
Kingdom served to dampen demand.
Initial post-war confidence in New Zealand’s economic prosperity, accompanied by
easy access to credit, had sustained a boom in imports and retail sales and,
especially in rural land values, steep rises fuelled in part by the government’s effort
to secure sufficient land to provide for those ex-servicemen who wished to take up
farms. Rural mortgage debt levels rose rapidly as farms were transferred and retransferred as speculative investments. Warnings that the prosperity was ‘fictitious’,
and that a serious commercial and financial crisis would follow the ending of the
commandeers went largely unheeded. 179 Export prices began to fall in May 1920.
Within a year post war confidence had largely evaporated, inflated land values
sustained by easy credit collapsed, and many of the 22,000 ex-servicemen settled
on farms by March 1924 sold their properties at greatly reduced prices or simply
abandoned them as loans were called in and advances restricted.
178
Information is drawn for this brief overview from Brooking, ‘Economic Transformation’ in Rice (ed.), ibid,
chap 9; Belich, Making Peoples, ibid, pp 148-156; Bertram G., ‘The New Zealand Economy, 1900-2000’, in
Byrnes G. (ed.), ibid, chap 22; Grey, ibid, chap 7: and King, ibid, chap 20
179
See Condliffe J.B. in Lyttelton Times, 9 August 1920
106
Predictions in 1921 that the economy would recover once Britain had disposed of
accumulated stocks seemed to be soundly based as export prices began to recover
during 1922. But export prices fell again between 1926 and 1933, farmers’ difficulties
being compounded by the growth in world primary commodity production and by the
efforts of New Zealand’s trading partners, notably the United Kingdom, to protect
their own primary products. Prices for primary products continued to fluctuate over
the 1920s, producing high levels of uncertainty and relatively high unemployment
levels. This was a testing time for New Zealand’s economic stability and viability.
Beginning from before the turn of the century to 1921, Pakeha New Zealand
generally enjoyed a long period of economic expansion, improved standard of living,
and national confidence. This was to be challenged from 1921 as the economic
situation became less favourable, and growth slowed. Also economically, socially,
politically and demographically, New Zealand from the early twentieth century had
taken on an overwhelmingly Pakeha hue. This was a predominantly Pakeha world,
from which Maori had been largely marginalised and made economically irrelevant
except as a rural proletariat.
For forty years – up to the 1930s – the main emphasis in New Zealand’s policies of
growth was given to the buying of land, settlement of small farmers, and providing for
their needs. Politics reflected the dominance of agriculture and particularly of the
North Island dairy farmer. The Liberal Government – a consensus of interests which
gave its main attention to land settlement – broke up after twenty years and gave
way to the explicitly farmers’ party, Reform. Rural public works, electricity supply,
further land settlement and provisions of mortgage finance after the First World War
in the 1920s, and improved marketing facilities through the producer boards, all
aimed to increase the efficiency of the farmer, to win his vote for the government,
and to commit the country more deeply to its highly specialised role.
In 1929, a major part of the world economy, in particular New Zealand’s chief trading
partner Britain, entered a period known now as the Depression. This brought on an
economic crisis for New Zealand, where the value of the country’s exports fell 40
percent in three years. In response, government expenditure was cut, and
unemployment rose to unprecedented levels. At the 1932 imperial conference in
107
Ottawa, Britain abandoned free trade, although New Zealand exports to Britain were
largely unaffected by this decision.
Export prices began to climb in 1934 as world demand recovered. The Labour
government, elected in 1935, increased government spending, initiating state house
building and public works programmes. Labour’s policies reflected the emerging
power of urban areas and a rising industrial and sophisticated service labour force.
New Zealand began a long economic expansion, which continued through the
Second World War, faltered slightly in the late 1940s, then resumed until struck by
new challenges in the late 1960s. Real GDP per capita rose at a higher rate than
previously. This was the age of the managed economy, or Keynesian economics,
with government spending being an important tool of economic policy. 180
During the war, farmers had the benefit of virtually guaranteed export prices, with
most of their produce being commandeered by the British government on arrival in
Britain. Post-war innovations in farming that either lifted production or increased
efficiency included aerial topdressing and herringbone milking sheds. Meanwhile,
New Zealand’s manufacturing grew. In 1938, the Labour government supplemented
the use of tariffs with import licensing. Importers could obtain licences to bring in
equipment or crude materials, but licences to bring in finished products were strictly
limited. Subsequent developments in manufacturing were not simply confined to
consumer industries, as developments occurred in sawmilling, pulp and paper
making, steel, oil refining, and aluminium smelting. Yet, by the 1960s, primary
products still accounted for most of the country’s exports.
These developments had implications for the social bases of the two main political
parties, National and Labour, from the late 1930s. As Easton notes: ‘…National the
party of the countryside and the farmer with support from urban commerce; Labour
the party of the city and the industrial worker, with a component of the poor rural
worker. But they did not differ greatly on the general direction the economy should
follow’. 181 Depending on where Maori generally sat economically, Maori would be
more likely to be drawn to one party rather than another, but no party would express
180
181
Easton, ibid, pp 46-48
Easton, ibid, pp 46-47
108
their economic interests exclusively, given the competing components. Support for a
common direction on economic policy by the two main political parties sprang from
the ‘two-legged’ interdependence of the economic structure. ‘The rural pastoral farm
leg earned foreign exchange for importing and debt servicing, while the urban
industrial leg used imports to produce goods and services for the domestic economy,
creating jobs for those whom the pastoral sector and its satellites could not employ
directly.’ 182 When this structure came under pressure, in particular from the 1960s
onwards, debates opened up as how best to adjust it or what more radical steps
might be needed to sustain prosperity and growth. For the period of this section of
the report, this model was completely dominant, and supporting it a primary
government concern.
Economic Opportunities and Challenges
As noted in the previous chapter, from the late nineteenth century onwards, the
opportunities arising from refrigerated transport and commitment to intensive
grassland farming began to shape the expectations of New Zealanders as to what
economic opportunities could be pursued profitably and to remake the landscape of
New Zealand accordingly. Government assistance was crucially intertwined with
these developments and remained so for the rest of the twentieth century. Belich
usefully draws the various strands together which demonstrate the vital role of the
state in shaping and supporting the key economic developments of New Zealand:
The state’s contribution is usually seen in terms of its direct input into the
reshuffling of landholdings into units compatible with protein production,
through the Lands for Settlement schemes in particular. These did subdivide
some large farms into protein-sized units, and the extensive purchase of
Maori land in the 1890s supplied more. But the Liberals’ intervention in the
supply of credit, notably through the Advances to Settlers programme, was
probably more important. This enabled aspirant small farmers to buy privately
subdivided large estates and to turn raw proto-farms into viable protein units.
State advances also pressured banks to lower the cost of credit and ease
access to it. 183
The state played an integral role in establishing, encouraging and sustaining
economic development. Belich goes on:
182
183
Easton, ibid, p. 47
Belich, Paradise Reforged, ibid, p. 59
109
State contributions extended well beyond credit, into the organisation, quality
control, marketing and research and development of the protein industry –
especially dairying. […] government had investigated dairying potential in
1883 and appointed dairy-farming inspectors in 1889. The Liberals
established the Department of Agriculture in 1892, and from that date involved
government in the grading and quality control of protein exports, including the
introduction of dairy-herd testing and meat inspection from 1898. Government
encouraged the use of lime as fertilizer by transporting it free by rail from
1898. Subsequent state-aided developments included research into the
improvement of grass types and stock breeds, and the use of superphosphate
fertilizer. 184
Through its support and encouragement of technological advances, its ability to
regulate commercial practices and standards more effectively and its direct financial
assistance, the state was integral to economic development and capability in New
Zealand. The benefits of this arrangement began to make themselves felt in the Te
Raki region from around 1910 in particular onwards as commercial farming began
expanding.
But one had to be in a position to take advantage of what was on offer: ‘…Maori
traditions of commercial dairying and effective farming dated back to the 1830s or
before. But, with the exception of Ngati Porou, they were initially unable to participate
in the new protein industry because government and banks would not lend to
them.’ 185 Yet government assistance within the Te Raki region for any sustainable
economic development was going to be crucial, given the particular challenges
there, as Alexander explains concerning the early to mid twentieth century period:
It was dairying that allowed agriculture in Northland to change from an
uneconomic industry and start growing. But even here, Northland was held
back by its history. To get the cream to the dairy factory, and from the factory
to the export wharf, requires roads or railways. However Northland’s roads
were appalling, and its railways had a long way to go to provide the level of
service that dairying needed.
For a start, there weren’t very many roads; because Northland had developed
as a series of isolated settlements served by sea transport, the road network
was very much organised around local needs. Even the local roads were
insufficient, because there had been no requirement for an elaborate network.
Furthermore the roads were in poor condition, because of the pummelling
they received from the gum and timber traffic, and because of the lack of
metalling. The County Councils were responsible for the roads, but had
minimal income for their upkeep, because so much of the economic activity of
184
185
Belich, ibid, p. 60
Belich, ibid, p. 60
110
the North (gumdigging, timber milling, Maori and Crown land) did not
contribute rates revenue.
Meanwhile, the railways were built by the Government where it could see that
strong traffic flows could be generated, and agriculture in Northland had not
provided that level of confidence before the days of dairying. 186
Basically, the Te Raki region was, by the early twentieth century, in a challenging
position to undertake extensive commercial development. Efforts to engage
economically subsequently would be conditional on the extent to which Te Raki
Maori could overcome, or have overcome, the barriers to assistance that the land
tenure reforms had put in place for Maori. While those barriers remained in place, in
particular the handicaps of fragmentation, fractionalisation, and succession, other
commercial operators, such as Pakeha settlers and farmers not so encumbered,
were in a position to seek government and private assistance more effectively and
so consolidate and expand their commercial enterprises within the region. From the
early decades of the twentieth century, Pakeha farmers in the region were able,
should they wish, to take up and apply the administrative, regulative and financial
advantages that governments had put in place from the late nineteenth century.
Unsurprisingly, the economic and social position for Te Raki Maori in general
remained one of marginalisation within the grasslands expansion. Explicit
government assistance was eventually extended to overcome the barriers Maori
faced for effective economic participation as well as in overcoming the existing
barriers to development within the region, in particular through land development
schemes from the 1930s. Yet Pakeha already had a significant headstart, investment
for alternative commercial activities beyond farming was difficult to encourage into
Northland, and the land use obstacles created by legislation were not easily
overcome. Maori tended therefore to stay longer in natural resource exploitation
industries such as gum digging, owing at least in part to the challenges of taking up
economic alternatives compared to their Pakeha competitors. The opening of
Moerewa freezing works in 1921 was able to draw on an under-employed Maori
workforce. However, as the Maori population increased, the general lack of
economic opportunities, and obstacles to participation, within the local economy for
186
Alexander, ibid, pp 197-198
111
Te Raki Maori forced increasing numbers of Maori to migrate in search of work
opportunities prior to the Second World War but particularly after 1945. 187
The Te Raki regional environment posed challenges for economic development, in
part because of prior exploitation:
Northland is in a cyclonic region. That explains our copious rainfall, and also
the basis for the claim that the district is uniquely favoured for agriculture,
particularly for dairying. Such a liberal supply of moisture spread as it is
throughout twelve months of the year, coupled with the warmth and mildness
of our climate, encourages a healthy and well-sustained growth, and makes
profitable tillage of the soil possible, even in areas which, elsewhere, would be
disregarded as useless.
This very development of what might be termed second class country, has
contributed to the difficulties which now confront us. Before the settlers’ axe
sought out the trees on the steepest hillsides, the standing bush held the
heavy and sudden rainfalls, and minimised flooding. The bushman was even
a worse offender in haphazard deafforestation, and in addition when floating
logs, left much of his timber in the beds of streams. The hardwood remains
there today, blocking the waterways, as drainage operations in the Riponui
district have recently proved; while willows also help to choke the outlets.
The pioneer and the miller were very essential factors in the early expansion
of the North, but unless these less pleasant heritages which they have left in
their train are remedied, the very development which they set in momentum
will not be brought to full fruition. 188
Added to the hazards and challenges of dealing with erosion and flooding was the
damage done to the landscape by gum digging, which further affected the capacity
of the region to sustain and promote development:
One last form of destructive exploitation is characteristic of the [late
nineteenth century] period. It produced man-made, disorderly landscapes,
especially in North Auckland. In search of kauri gum there, generations of
gum diggers have laid waste many thousands of acres of the most valuable
timber-producing forest in New Zealand. At the peak of production more than
7,000 diggers were employed on the North Auckland gumfields. Licences
gave them permission to maim a million and a half acres of land, mainly in
scrub but also under young kauri – taraire forest. The bush was cleared by
fire. The clay soils, and even the roads, were holed by digging, with the result
that the gum traffic is in many ways responsible for the tardy development of
this northerly district, with its genial climate. 189
187
Discussed in Walzl, ibid, pp 175-194 and pp 578-591
Northern Advocate, 16 January 1936
189
Cumberland K.B., Soil Erosion in New Zealand: A Geographic Reconnaissance, (Soil Conservation and Rivers
Control Council, Wellington, 1944), pp 162-163
188
112
Yet as has been noted, Maori had been become dependent on gum digging and
remained so into the early twentieth century, thus contributing by their very
dependency to the difficulties of regional development. Any sustainable economic
development had to move away from extractive industries, especially as those
industries went into decline, but they had left a legacy of damage and
underdevelopment in what was still regarded by many as a region with a definite
economically viable future.
When the opportunities for the expansion of agriculture, in particular dairy farming,
become more favourable following technological advances, government assistance
for farming and the decline of extractive industries, the Te Raki region now lagged
behind development in other parts of New Zealand:
The land is of good quality, and only needs cleaning up to make excellent
sheep and cattle country. If the visitor comes from a well-settled and well
farmed district, he will find everything strange in the North. He will probably
have forgotten that his own district was at one time in precisely the same
condition. [...] Very little of the land is in its highest state of productivity. Very
little of it is even fairly developed. If he judges the North, he must do so by the
quality of the soil, the climate, and the possibilities rather than by the
improvements. Indeed, there has not been a great deal of high-class farming
yet done in the North. 190
As Pakeha farmers set to work, they were in a better position to attract government
assistance in order to tackle the environmental obstacles to development. Pakeha
had surety of title and the legal right and possibility to raise finance, in other words
Pakeha had a clear, workable title system, which gave them secure entitlements
through which they were empowered to pursue economic development. The best
lands were already in their hands. Initially Pakeha struggled, as they were not
somehow innately aware of how best to work the land in the region:
Unfortunately in the past the areas taken up were in most cases too large.
The settlers had little or no capital, and in many cases their farming
experience was very meagre. Poor cultivation, poor strains of grasses and
clovers, late sowing, inadequate topdressing, and lack of cheap lime resulted
in poor, low producing pastures consisting mainly of browntop, danthonia and
lotus species, with little or no white clover. Permanent water is scarce over
large areas. The lack of water is a serious drawback to development. It is
impossible to sink satisfactory bores, and on most gumlands farm water has
190
Purdie E.C., North Auckland, 1913-1914, (Whangarei, 1914), p. 21
113
to be held by dams. This water is anything but good. If the dams are not
fenced off from stock, the water soon becomes in filthy condition….
Early development aimed at first raising the soil fertility by ploughing in green
crops, tile drainage, subsoiling and the use of burnt lime – this procedure was
very costly and did not give very satisfactory results…. While settlers were
working on these lines, no certified seed was available, freight charges on
fertilisers and lime were high, which resulted in poor grass seed mixtures
being used with little or no fertiliser applied to push the pasture on. With these
methods a poor weak pasture was established, which rapidly reverted to
danthonia and browntop, with teatree and rushes taking possession again. 191
Yet with proper knowledge and application of good techniques, farmers could hope
to bring the soil into a state for profitable production:
A marked change is now to be seen in the methods adopted through previous
experience – development of smaller areas is being undertaken, the
preparation and cultivation work is more thorough, certified strains of grasses
and clovers are being sown, adequate supplies of lime and phosphate are
being applied, and the results of this practice are apparent everywhere. With
the success which is now being obtained in developing gumland, it has been
clearly demonstrated that the secret of success is wrapped up in the
thoroughness of three main points.
The first important step is early ploughing, followed by a second ploughing
after the first ploughing has been subjected to plenty of cultivation…. The
second point is the necessity of sowing early with certified strains of grasses
and clovers, while the third point is the use of adequate supplies of lime and
phosphate…. If full attention is not paid to the above points, the resultant
pasture will be unsatisfactory. 192
A government-backed commitment to assist farmers to develop their lands profitably
assumed that such backing was feasible, not only in terms of land use enhancement
but that the farmers themselves were capable of learning and applying the
knowledge. Maori land, because of legal and administrative constraints associated
with its use, in other words because of an unclear, unworkable title system that gave
Maori insecure entitlements through which they were disempowered to pursue
economic development, became increasingly an obstacle to development. Yet it was
easier for some commentators to see the problem as residing in Maori rather than
the burdened and oppressive state of Maori land title, and so see the solution of land
alienation from Maori as the key to development:
191
Glanville E.B., ‘Grassing Gumlands of North Auckland’, (Papers Read at Seventh Annual Conference, New
Zealand Grassland Association, 1938)
192
Glanville ‘Grassing Gumlands of North Auckland’, ibid
114
The natives still hold large areas of fertile land in North Auckland, though their
holdings are gradually diminishing. It is estimated that in six or seven years
the native land difficulty in North Auckland will be a thing of the past, as by
that time natives will own only the land they are compelled to keep for their
own subsistence. During the last four years, since the introduction of the Act
of 1909, the amount of land that has passed from native to European
ownership has been enormous, amounting to fully thirty per cent of what the
natives held at that time. 193
These views were reiterated by a journalist accompanying a tour of parliamentarians
around Northland in 1917. The problem of land development and its solution were
obvious to this commentator, with ‘hundreds of thousands of acres of land, of
absolutely no present value to the Maoris, and of no prospective value except
through the State or Pakeha settlers’ expenditure...’, needing to be ‘...brought into
the market somehow...’, to be developed properly as farmland, since ‘the Maoris will
never make use of it’. 194
While the challenges to development were recognised arising from the prior course
of primarily extractive commercial activity, Maori and Maori land were now
considered a further obstacle to be overcome. Pakeha were never considered as a
burden to development but rather as essential. Their expectations and the land
tenure system under which they operated meshed with the legal and administrative
apparatus of the state in such a way that economic capability was enhanced for
them. On the other hand, Maori and Maori land had became a peculiar subset of
difficulty, to be overcome in part by removing land from Maori and put into a more
legally and administratively tractable form of title for Pakeha use or, as the century
advanced, by trying to reform the deeply unfavourable Maori land tenure system into
something Maori might be able to use rather than be burdened by. Commentators
quite rightly saw Maori as being unable to survive except at subsistence level, but
tended to attribute this situation to Maori themselves rather than to the state of their
primary asset land, and overlooking the consistent efforts of Maori to participate
meaningfully in regional development as their history had demonstrated they could.
193
Purdie, ibid, p. 23
North Auckland: A Land of Promise: The Parliamentary Tour, (Taranaki Herald and Budget, New Plymouth,
1917)
194
115
After a period of population decline in the nineteenth century, covered in other
reports for this inquiry, the Maori population began a slow increase from the turn of
the twentieth century but not evenly. 195 The population figures, as demonstrated in
table 9 below from the 1930s to the 1950s, also indicate that Pakeha numbers,
although larger in southern parts of the inquiry region such as Whangarei, were not
especially large, and Maori maintained a significant numerical presence.
195
See Hearn, ibid, pp 42-51; and Walzl, ibid, p. 37
116
Table 9: Te Paparahi o te Raki: Total Maori and Pakeha Population 1936-1956
County, Town,
District,
Borough
Maori/
Pakeha
Maori
Whangaroa
Pakeha
Total
Maori
Hokianga
Pakeha
Total
Maori
Bay Of Islands
Pakeha
Total
Maori
Whangarei
Pakeha
Total
Maori
Rodney
Pakeha
Total
Maori
Te Paparahi o te
Raki Total
Pakeha
Total
Maori
NZ TOTAL
Pakeha
Total
1936
Total
Population
1945
Total
Population
196
1951
Total
Population
1956
Total
Population
1342
1325
1194
1186
1191
1103
1252
1317
2533
2428
2446
2503
4928
4901
4824
4435
3708
2906
2936
2890
8636
7807
7760
7325
4504
5297
5930
6480
6079
6059
7467
8710
10583
11356
13397
15190
2121
2730
3270
3527
18159
19862
23853
27724
20280
22592
27123
31251
242
345
405
545
5391
5376
6060
6870
5633
5721
6465
7415
13137
14598
15623
16173
34528
35306
41568
47511
47665
49904
57191
63684
82326
98744
115676
137151
1491484
1603554
1823796
2036911
1573800
1702298
1939472
2174062
Changes in land tenure legislation and large scale land alienation from Maori were
not therefore driven to the same extent as in many other parts of New Zealand by
Pakeha settlers arriving in dominant numbers wishing to have the land freed up for
their benefit. When Pakeha did wish to settle and use the land for agriculture, land
itself and a favourable administrative and legal framework were already in place for
exploitation. Maori were also present in sufficient numbers and organisation to
protest at the loss of capacity to engage profitably within the regional economy, and
196
Reproduced from Walzl, ibid p. 589
117
as Maori numbers increased both in the Te Raki region and elsewhere, any
assumptions that subsistence would be satisfactory and sufficient for Maori, when
also confronted with the explicit desire of Maori themselves not to be relegated to a
marginalised subsistence, would become less tenable.
The potential value of the land for settlement and development, and some of the
impediments to settlement, including the uneven quality of land and accessibility,
were increasingly highlighted by commentary from the end of the nineteenth century
onwards:
The great drawback to settlement in most parts of the country north of
Auckland is the scattered nature of the really good settlement-lands.
Generally speaking the good land is in the valleys, and is of comparatively
small extent: 5,000 acres here, then a stretch of perhaps about ten miles of
poor pipe-clay gum-lands, next, 6,000 acres of fair settlement-lands, and
again a stretch of fifteen miles of pipeclay lands, and so on: thus necessitating
many miles of roads to connect the various settlements. 197
Despite land losses, Te Raki Maori were still in possession of land which was
perceived at the time as being, in parts of the region, of good quality. As the Settlers’
Handbook of New Zealand noted in 1902, Maori in the Bay of Islands county owned
152,000 acres of land, which around Kaikohe, ‘...is open and rich volcanic land, most
of it broken, but fit for settlement’. Maori in Hokianga county owned 104,650 acres,
noted as ‘almost all good land’, and in Whangarei county, Maori owned 28,850
acres, ‘part of it very rich’. 198 The problem with development was not seen as being
with the quality of the land but its legal and administrative inaccessibility:
In the great country north of Auckland there were tremendous areas of native
lands, rich, beautiful soil capable of growing anything. All these lands were
locked up indefinitely. At Kaikohe round about Lake Omapere, there was
some of the most superb land in New Zealand all shut up, and now useless.
In the Punakitere Block there were 78,200 acres of very rich land all suited to
very close settlement. On the borders of Hokianga, Bay of Islands,
Whangarei, and Hobson Counties immense areas of rich beautiful land were
locked up for the Maoris, and all through Hokianga settlement was blocked,
and the country kept back by the locking up of native lands. 199
197
AJHR 1898, C12, p. 4
The Settlers' Handbook of New Zealand. (Wellington,1902), p. 6
199
New Zealand Herald 4 September 1905.
198
118
Now that settlement and development was desired, the opportunities for economic
progress in the region were talked up, and Maori land was explicitly and repeatedly
identified as an obstacle to development. No Pakeha commentator suggested that
the manner in which Maori land was held offered an incentive to development for
Maori or could be considered as a direct rival to Pakeha development ambition.
Maori, via their ‘locked up’ lands, could not participate meaningfully in regional
development.
The opportunities for the development of commercial farming in the Te Raki region,
requiring skills and capital with which Pakeha were generally better endowed
compared to Te Raki Maori, led to an increase in Pakeha population as noted above.
In 1906, the Pakeha population had stood at 19,613 and had grown to 35,468 by
1945. 200 Hearn also sets out the Pakeha geographical distribution pattern, confirming
that the Pakeha were drawn to and developed further the better quality lands for
profitable farming:
European population remained sparse along the west coast, on the gumlands
south of Kaikohe, in the Waipoua Forest, the Tumatoe Range, and the hill
country to the south of Russell. The area of greatest European settlement still
lay around Whangarei where dairying had expanded on to the alluvial flats,
the areas of volcanic soils, and the lower hill country. Settlement had
continued to expand westwards towards Dargaville, especially towards
Maungatapere and Maungakaramea, and northwards following the extension
of rail and roadways and on to the land 'reclaimed' from the Hikurangi and
Ruatangata Swamps. Further north, the extension of the railway line to
Okaihau and thence to Kaikohe had encouraged the expansion of dairying,
notably around Kaikohe itself and between Okaihau and Kawakawa.
European population growth was slower in the Hokianga, although dairying
had developed in the Lower Waihou Valley. Consolidation of the pattern thus
established continued in the remainder of the period up to 1945, most
Europeans remaining concentrated around the coasts or on the inland areas
of fertile soil, along the river valleys or around such towns as Kaikohe,
Ohaeawai, and Waimate North. 201
Conversely, the opportunities for Maori to profitably develop their remaining lands
became steadily more challenging as their remaining lands were often generally of
poorer quality, though not entirely so, and not accessed as easily.
200
201
Hearn, ibid, graph 1.1, and also for 1936 onward to 1956 see table 9 in this report, p. 117
Hearn, ibid, p. 58
119
While much Maori land had been alienated prior to commercial farming expansion,
the perception that Maori still possessed some valuable land led to ongoing pressure
to alienate their remaining better quality land. Land prices had risen from the 1890s
following the rise in commodity prices, which made cheap land purchase difficult, yet
the expectations of growing numbers of Pakeha for land, as well as immigrants
whose numbers increased dramatically from the turn of the century to 1914, put
pressure on the government to provide land. While the government resumed land
purchasing in the Te Raki region before and after the First World War, as covered by
Hearn, criticism was still voiced at government inaction since it was alleged the price
of land was, ‘artificially high owing to the failure of government to meet the pressing
demand by opening the huge areas of Crown and Native Land still unoccupied’. It
was further alleged that ‘instead of unoccupied land being offered by government in
sufficient areas to satisfy the demand, ballot-rooms are packed to suffocation and
hungry land settlers are forced to bid against one another for land already in
profitable occupation’. 202 This line of complaint continues into the 1920s, especially
due to the pressure to find good land for discharged soldiers following the First World
War. 203
Once land was acquired and became potentially available for settlers, considerable
government assistance might then be accessed:
...successive governments devised a range of leasehold tenures intended to
allow settlers to devote their resources to development and later to acquire
the freehold; they provided 'cheap' and more extensive finance under the
Government Advances to Settlers Act 1894; they provided advice and support
through the Department of Agriculture (established in 1892); they made efforts
to maintain settlers in the occupancy of their holdings during periods of low
commodity prices and falling land prices through revaluations, rent reductions,
and controls on mortgage interest rates [in the 1920s and 1930s]; and
indirectly they assisted through the funding of public works through the Public
Works Department or through grants to local authorities. 204
202
New Zealand Herald, 22 May 1914
Hearn, ibid, pp 66-69, also Hearn, chap 6, discusses land acquisition by the Crown from Maori and the
amount of land involved for the period 1900-1945
204
Hearn, ibid, p. 65
203
120
With this degree of support and encouragement, dairy farming became a major
industry in the Te Raki region: 205
The growth of dairy processing in Northland followed a reasonably clear
pattern: as milk production exceeded domestic and barter needs small
processing plants were established; as milk production expanded upon the
application of grasslands technology (fertilisers, improved pastures, better
pasture management) and the use of higher productivity stock, and as roads
and bulk transport improved, small cooperatives merged to form larger
enterprises with larger processing plants. Producer cooperatives in particular
also supplied basic farming and farm household requirements, mechanical
and veterinary services, insurance, and finance to farmers; they acted as the
centres through which the Department of Agriculture distributed information
and advice; and from the late 1930s they initiated herd testing and bobby calf
pools. 206
The number of dairy cows in the region increased from 38,559 in 1910 to 94,295 in
1923. The main period of expansion occurred in the 1920s and 1930s. After a steady
increase in the 1920s, the number of dairy cows-in-milk and the total production of
butterfat rose sharply during the depression years. This increase reflected the large
number of sheep farmers who were forced to turn to dairying to bring in a regular
cash income, and of the policies of the Lands Department and the Department of
Native Affairs in settling farmers on small dairy units. As a result, the number of dairy
cows-in-milk in the region rose from 105,361 in 1929 to 191,684 in 1939. Sheep
farming developed rapidly in the 1920s as large areas of hill country were brought
under grass, before dropping sharply in the 1930s in unfavourable economic
conditions, and only began increasing again slowly after 1947. 207
What had emerged was a sophisticated commercial enterprise, with private and
government initiative intertwined productively, and through feedback loops of further
support via investment, credit, improving technology and institutional advice, the
dairy industry in particular was able to advance for the benefit of those who could
partake in this major exercise of economic enhancement. This pastoral commercial
enterprise did face risks as circumstances such as lower commodity prices during
the latter 1920s, and the Depression, could still retard development, yet its success
as a venture demonstrated what could be achieved and how it could be achieved.
205
See Hearn ibid, graphs, pp 1.7-1.10
Hearn, ibid, pp 77-78
207
Information drawn from National Resources Survey part III, Northland Region, ibid, pp 55-62
206
121
Pastoral farming, and the social and structural supports needed for it to function
profitably, was established as the major determinant of economic expansion and
opportunity in the Te Raki region.
The success of pastoral farming, particularly dairying, embedded the conditions of its
success into the Te Raki social and physical environment. Owner-operator farm
units, on secure land holdings of a certain size, near to suitable infrastructure and
supported in turn by local industries became the models of development. Only a
certain degree of employment could be sustained under such a model, which was
not labour intensive but rather was focussed on commercial efficiency involving
technological applications to reduce costs and enhance profit. The extent to which
Maori could profitably engage with the transformed Te Raki economy became
dependent on their capacity to conform their economic development to efficient
owner-operating farm units on the Pakeha model. To the extent that Maori land
holdings, Maori land tenure arrangements and Maori commercial knowledge and
practice, were not aligned with Pakeha expectations and the complex array of
support available within the transformed commercial environment, then Maori
economic practice became automatically problematic. The development framework
that had emerged was predicated on a different property regime, on different cultural
capital and on different norms for development. The successful development of
economic capability was now largely dependent on operating as if one were Pakeha,
operating in a Pakeha-facilitating world which reinforced the apparent obvious
superiority of Pakeha perceptions.
Some Maori did participate within the emerging economic opportunities provided by
dairying, as Hearn was able to identify. 208 Consistently from before 1840 Te Raki
Maori had sought to engage with economic opportunities, and to encourage the
conditions for economic growth, namely population and infrastructure, but while in
one sense the arrival of pastoral farming did at last create a viable economic basis
for development, the benefits of this enterprise were conditional on a radical
transformation of Maori society, partially brought about by the land tenure revolution.
Unfortunately the legal and administrative transformation in Maori land tenure did not
208
Hearn, ibid, pp 83-84
122
promote Maori participation within, or capacity to influence significantly, the types of
development on offer. Maori could participate but generally as handicapped, and
from a Pakeha perspective, as problematic and inefficient.
Maori land was economically crucial because it remained the primary asset of Te
Raki Maori. Either as a valuable commodity for sale or as a means to generate
income through its retention via leasing or development, the capability to use land
profitably necessitated a workable property regime, especially if there were other
competitors who sought to compete directly with Maori and who were not similarly
constrained. The property regime however was not favourable to Maori but on the
contrary was detrimental, which fostered the economic opportunities of others. Maori
economic capability was directly retarded by a government-created land title system,
which made key Maori entitlements unworkable and stymied effective decisionmaking. The government did make efforts, with Maori participation, to overcome
some of the impediments to Te Raki Maori using their land productively and
profitably, but with limited success overall.
Vesting, Consolidation and Land Development
Basically, three options were tried to allow Te Raki Maori to obtain some economic
value from their primary asset, namely land, for the first half of the twentieth century.
These options, arising from persistent Maori protest and eventually government
action, were vesting, consolidation and land development. It is immediately
noteworthy that the first two options were generated in response to the peculiar
problems of Maori land tenure that Pakeha do not have to contend with or consider
when dealing with land use and purchase for their lands. In a competitive economic
environment, to face legal or administrative hurdles that others do not face is to be
placed at a disadvantage. Success is not impossible for those within the constrained
tenure system, just more challenging. Hearn has provided a comprehensive
discussion of these options and only certain key aspects are highlighted for this
report.
123
Vesting
In 1900, the Government constituted six Maori land districts, each of which was to
have a council membership at least half Maori. 209 Councils were intended to ensure
that Maori retained sufficient land for future maintenance, to protect the interest of
owners whose land was leased to either the government or private individuals, and
to determine ownership of customary land. These arrangements were intended to
ensure that:
Maori were not rendered landless, to encourage and assist Maori to develop
their lands, to facilitate (through leasing rather than sale) the settlement and
utilisation of such lands as Maori did not require, and to give Maori a voice in
the administration of lands remaining in Maori ownership. 210
The Tokerau District Maori Land Council was constituted in December 1900, with
three elected Maori members, Iraia Kuao, Herepete Rapihana, and Wiremu
Rikihana, and three government appointees. 211 Maori generally proved reluctant to
vest their land since, as the Native Land Commission of 1907 observed, landowners
‘objected to being deprived of authority and management of their ancestral lands’. 212
Compulsory vesting was introduced by government in 1905, and councils were
replaced by boards, with fewer members who were entirely government appointees,
despite the opposition of Maori including Hone Heke Ngapua, the Northern Maori
MP. 213 Further changes in 1909 occurred by which time it had become clear, as
James Carroll, Minister of Native Affairs stated, that the primary purpose of boards
was ‘the alienation, administration and settlement of Native Lands’. 214 The
government vested up to 219,224 acres of land in the Tokerau District Maori Land
Board and of that total, 116,991 acres were located within the Te Raki inquiry
region. 215 The evidence Hearn assessed indicates that land was vested in such a
way as to preclude effective commercial use of it for Maori but rather promoted its
use for others:
209
See Loveridge D.M., Maori land councils and Maori land boards: a historical overview, 1900 to 1952,
(Wellington,1996), and Hearn, ibid, pp 174-360 for detailed discussion on Maori Councils, Boards and vesting
210
Hearn, ibid, p. 176
211
Hearn, ibid, p. 177
212
AJHR 1907, G1C, p. 7
213
NZPD 135, 1905, p. 703 and p. 846
214
NZPD 148, 1909, p. 1101
215
Hearn, ibid, p. 179
124
The board's sole concern was to secure control of the block [Motatau 2], and
especially the most fertile parts: by issuing leases, it rendered some of the
owners as tenants of land in which they held interests as owners, and secured
unto itself control of those lessees and the land they occupied. There is
sufficient in the observations of the board's president to suggest that it at least
held in contempt efforts by Maori to enter into commercial farming, that it held
scant regard for the effort and capital owners had invested, and that its
primary concern was to secure control in order to make the land available for
settlement. 216
Regarding land not as yet processed through the Native Land Court, Hone Heke
Ngapua claimed that:
Up in the North I checked the whole of our papatupu lands being surveyed
and put through the Native Land Court, for no other reason but because I and
the elders realised that as soon as any of the land was surveyed and put
through the Court it would be snapped up as soon as the Judge had signed
his name to the order creating the title. 217
In recognising however that these papatupu lands needed to be made available for
commercial use, the Native Land Commission of 1907 observed:
There is need of special effort on the part of the Native Department to clothe
this large area [118,000 according to the Commission’s estimates] with proper
titles, that settlement may be facilitated. There are also huge arrears of survey
work to be overtaken ...- surveys that are absolutely necessary before proper
titles can be issued to would-be settlers. 218
The Commission appeared to be attempting to steer a path between the demands
for land for settlement from Pakeha, and the need for Maori to retain sufficient land
for themselves to be able to benefit from continued use of their land for their present
needs and potential commercial opportunities, and was proclaimed as having
achieved that end in Parliament, as the Commission had:
... with great patience given the Native owners the fullest opportunity of being
heard and of expressing their objections or consent to those methods of
dealing with their lands which have been discussed or suggested by the
Commission. The happy result has been secured that a very large area of
land has been recommended by the Commission for European settlement,
while retaining for the Native owners such areas as are desirable for their use
and occupation. All this work has been done with the harmonious cooperation
of the Native owners themselves. 219
216
Hearn, ibid, p. 192
NZPD 140, 1907, p. 394
218
AJHR 1908, G1J, pp 7-8
219
NZPD 143, 1908, p. 3
217
125
Yet Hearn reveals a different story in practice. Vesting gave distinct advantages to
the government, at the expense of Maori, to facilitate the settlement demands of
Pakeha:
First, where it decided that it wished to acquire vested lands it [the Crown] had
only to deal with the board rather than with the owners either collectively or
individually: vesting allowed the Crown to effect acquisition speedily, to avoid
the protracted, costly, and uncertain process of acquiring individual interests.
In short, vesting allowed the Crown to step over some of the difficulties (as it
perceived them) associated with multiple ownership, the very difficulties which
it itself had helped to create, or, in other words, its solution to such difficulties
was to remove altogether those blocks required for settlement from the control
of their owners. Vesting effectively meant disempowerment.
Second, vesting allowed the Crown to select blocks so as to create what
might be termed settlement beach-heads from which settlers would
endeavour to acquire surrounding lands. Third, it could exercise a large
measure of control over the price, and indeed, there was a sense in which by
empowering itself to purchase land from a body which it had created, the
Crown was effectively both vendor and purchaser. Fourth, vesting enabled the
Crown to avoid having to compete with private purchasers. Fifth, it enabled
the Crown to control the flow of land on to the market, whether for sale of for
lease. Finally, vesting allowed the Crown to use the land as security for loans
raised from its own resources for the purposes of survey and the construction
of roads and bridges. 220
As Hearn sets out comprehensively in his report, Maori did not benefit from vesting
their lands because: they effectively lost more land through alienation; or because of
the loss of opportunity to acquire skills working the land due to the land being leased
to others; or through the limited financial advantages that leasing actually brought in;
as well as not only the loss of authority to influence decisions concerning economic
development within the region but even to sustain a viable way of living. This is not
to say that vesting their lands had brought no benefit to Maori only that it was a
limited benefit, and carried significant risks. The attraction of vesting lay essentially in
the absence of realistic alternative scenarios whereby Maori could retain what land
remained to them and use it in an economically beneficial manner. In a sense they
had to lose it (by leasing) to keep it. However, the problems of succession created
through the Native Land Court individualisation process meant that the limited
benefits that flowed back to Maori once all other costs were deducted were too
dispersed to provide any significant investment capital. 221
220
221
Hearn, ibid, p. 207
Hearn, ibid, further summarises the effects on Maori of vesting, pp 358-360
126
As Tom Brooking has argued, 222 while pressed by Pakeha to use their land or lose it,
Maori in practice found the challenges to using their land in a rational, economic
manner so great that losing it became a strong likelihood. Pakeha were never under
any such pressure to vest their lands because they never faced such a debilitating
land tenure regime as Maori and so never had to contemplate a drastic vesting
option in the hope of finding some profitable use for their land. Not only did the
option of vesting emerge as a response to a particular problem of land retention and
use for Maori, but in its application vesting further compounded the problems it was
potentially designed to overcome. The evidence of Hearn and others in their reports
strongly intimate that the reason why vesting did not work as a land development
and capability building strategy for Maori was that it was never intended to promote
those ends but rather to allow the government to address more easily the
development demands of Pakeha. Regardless of any specific intentions and benefits
that might have been argued for at the time for Maori following the vesting of their
lands, the reality was that it did not assist them to develop economic capability and
influence the direction of development in this region.
As Hearn notes:
...the area of land owned by Maori in the five counties of Whangaroa, Bay of
Islands, Hokianga, Whangarei, and Rodney fell from 560,101 acres in 1908 to
365,454 acres in 1928, a decline of 194,647 acres. The Maori population of
the five counties rose from 7,175 in 1906 to 10,217 in 1926, so that average
area per capita fell sharply from 78.1 acres to 35.8 acres. The land remaining
in Maori ownership included much that was steep, broken, and of marginal
productive value, so that the average area of productive land per capita was
even lower. 223
With less land, especially good quality land, and a growing population, another
alternative pursued to confront and overcome the land tenure difficulties Maori faced
was land consolidation.
222
Brooking T., ‘Use it or Lose it. Unravelling the Land Debate in Late Nineteenth-Century New Zealand’, NZJH,
vol 30, 2, (October ,1996), pp 141-162
223
Hearn, ibid, p. 463
127
Consolidation
Consolidation is discussed comprehensively by Hearn and by Stirling, and for the
purposes of this report their conclusions about the impact of consolidation are
broadly accepted. Consolidation would in theory entail a large-scale exchange of
individual Maori interests in numerous partitions or across several adjacent blocks.
Through such exchanges, individual owners, or small whanau groups, could amass
sufficient interests to merit the partitioning out of those interests as a properly
surveyed and individualised title, aiding the development of that land, and the
payment of rates on it. As Stirling develops in his report, consolidation not only
involved consolidating title so that development of land might be made commercially
attractive and feasible but it also meant that such consolidated land could be more
easily rated, with issues to do with recovering rates from Maori with dispersed land
holdings therefore overcome. As such, consolidation was seen as advantageous to
local bodies and their pressure formed part of the reason for government willingness
to consider this option. 224
Gordon Coates, Native Minister, set out the advantages he perceived would arise
with consolidation:
With regard to native lands owned in common in the North Auckland and King
Country districts, I was given to understand that at the conference of the
Under-Secretary of Native Affairs, the Native Trustee, the Maori Members of
Parliament, and the representatives of the local authorities, held after the
deputation had interviewed me, it was generally agreed that the final remedy
would be the consolidation of titles to native lands in those district. The
collection, consolidation, and placing of the scattered interests of a native in
blocks throughout a district into one compact block more easily financed and
worked would give such native a greater incentive to make use of such land
or to see that it was productive, and so enable him to meet his responsibilities
as a member of the community. 225
Ngata had also linked the rates issue to the need to assist Maori in the improvement
of their land. Ngata had claimed that that no government would put itself:
...on-side with regard to Native rating until it came down with a comprehensive
measure providing assistance to the fullest extent to the Maori for working
224
225
See the relevant discussion in Stirling, ibid, chap 4
Northern Advocate, 2 December 1927
128
their lands. Until it did that it would not be on side with the Native Race. It was
not fair to subordinate their lands to what was confiscation practically. What
the local bodies were urging was they should be put into a position where they
could enforce their judgments against titles. They were quite entitled by law,
but between the actual enforcement of a judgment and the passing away of
the land a good deal might be done by the Government to help and to place a
number of these Maori in a position to pay their rates. That was the weakness
of the present legislation.
[…] The Natives did not want to shirk all their responsibilities, but they wanted
some recognition of the peculiar handicaps under which owners of communal
lands were at the present time. They did not ask that these lands should be
exempt from taxation. They asked to be put in a position so that they might do
something to pay their rates. 226
The whole issue of rates payment and the extraordinary difficulties posed to Maori in
the region around their involvement in rates assessment, collection and capacity to
influence decisions around rating are covered by Hearn and especially Stirling in
their respective reports. The state of Maori land ownership had prevented Maori from
participating in their local communities as properly empowered ratepayers. Again,
when in competition for resources, infrastructure and investment opportunities that
Maori might have been arguing for as participants in local government, the reality of
handicapped land tenure arrangements had stymied their capacity to present their
concerns, leaving the local government field in the hands of Pakeha. In turn, through
the inability to collect rates comprehensively from Maori due to the state of Maori
landholdings and Maori unwillingness to pay, local Pakeha councillors could only
regard Maori as problematic and a burden on the broader community. Politically, at
the local level, broad Pakeha and Maori interests were at loggerheads. Efforts to
ameliorate or even resolve the particular obstacles to Te Raki Maori economic
development highlighted not only the extent to which Maori had lost economic
development potential and capability but also how alienated they were from the
exercise of local political authority within their own region.
Appreciating this
situation throws light on why Te Raki Maori communities struggled to overcome
extensive deprivation and marginalisation through these decades of the twentieth
century.
The particular issues facing Te Raki Maori were brought to the government’s
attention by Allen Bell, Bay of Islands MP in 1927:
226
Cited in Stirling, ibid, p. 291
129
For the past fifty years or more the principal occupation of the Native workers
has been in connection with the timber and kauri gum industries. In later years
this has been supplemented by work in connection with road and railway
construction. Timber and gum have about now petered out as far as the
Native worker is concerned, and in another five years, with the progress that
we are making at present, the backbone will be broken of our road and
railway construction works. What is going to happen to the Native? In my
opinion, unless we take steps to put him on the land, and assist him financially
in its development, he will be - to a large extent - a charge on the State and
local Charitable Aid Boards. This cannot be allowed to eventuate, for if not
legally, then we are morally constituted the guardians of the Native people.
I fully realise that the conditions under which the Natives are living are entirely
different in various parts of New Zealand. In some districts they are more
highly developed by education than in others; in some districts they have for
years been living on the rentals derived from Europeans, and these
considerations prevent the problem from being dealt with in a Dominion way.
In the district north of Auckland City the conditions aforementioned do not
obtain, but there we have I think about one-third of the Native population of
New Zealand, many of whom have interests in blocks of land that cannot be
subdivided and individualised, partly owing to the low value and the small
areas to which each individual is entitled, and the resultant prohibitive cost of
survey and other charges.
In the Northland we have as yet a few blocks of Crown land left, and might I
again suggest that the Maori interests in their various blocks be consolidated if necessary - by the exchange of these for areas of Crown land that could be
suitably subdivided, and on which the Native occupant could make a success
of farming – particularly dairying - and that steps be taken to finance the
Native settlers either through the State Advances Department or by lending
money to the Native Trust Board or Maori Land Board, the work to be carried
out under supervision by officers of the Agricultural Department.
It is in my opinion quite useless to try and force the Native to pay rates unless
we first place him in a position to do so. 227
The detail around how consolidation worked, or did not work, in practice is set out by
Hearn, Stirling and Walzl. 228 In terms of the amount of land involved, ‘the area
proposed for consolidation in Taitokerau comprised 522,287 acres embracing 6,583
blocks, which at the beginning of the schemes was owned by 42,266 owners. In
1952, just 81,135 acres had been consolidated...’. 229 In his summation on
consolidation, Hearn notes what he sees as, at least initially, a genuine government
attempt to make progress:
227
Allen Bell to Native Minister 4 October 1927, MA 1,20/1/14,Part 6. Bell also repeated his observations in
Parliament. See NZPD 216, 1927, pp 553-554
228
Hearn, ibid, pp 538-690; Stirling, ibid, chapter 4; and Walzl, ibid, pp 72-95
229
Harris A., ‘Maori Land Title Improvement Since 1945’, New Zealand Journal of History, 31, 1, 1997, p. 137
130
The consolidation programme envisaged and planned for the Northland
Inquiry Districts marked a real effort on the part of the Crown to try to resolve
the problems which the spatial and legal fragmentation of land ownership
posed for land development and the commercialisation of Maori farming.
Further, the Crown did make an effort to enlist the support and cooperation of
Maori, while Maori for their part made clear their desire to embrace the
opportunities which consolidation appeared to offer. 230
However, in practice as he describes the implementation of the scheme ran into a
range of obstacles, the most serious of which was:
...that, without some more fundamental reform of the law, consolidation would
be quickly undone by accelerating population growth and the continuation of
existing succession practices. The success of efforts to reform Maori land
titles depended in large measure on the accompanying reform of the law
relating to succession: the reluctance to grapple with the latter seriously
compromised the prospects of the former. 231
The original Native land laws and Maori land administration regime as implemented
in the nineteenth century still continued to exercise a powerful and baneful influence
on the successful application of Maori economic capability. The Hokianga County
Council made pertinent observations to the 1933 Committee on the Rating of Native
Land in this regard. In as far as Maori in the county had a ‘limited area of land
available per head’, this situation was due to the actions of the Native Land Court
and:
... if not directly by the Native Land Court, then with its permission, as the
majority of sales or leases are dealt with by the [Tokerau District Maori Land]
Board, and to have dealt extensively by sale or lease with a large percentage
of Native land without simultaneous activity in dealing with the remainder for
the Natives, is certainly a responsibility that must be accepted by the Crown,
or the State Department above mentioned, and as a Local Body we place this
responsibility more with the Crown than with the individual Native. The nett
[sic] result of this has been, when the Native[s] did realise something of the
wisedom [sic] of farming the land, a system of partitioning was indulged in
regarding the remaining portions of the better class land that resulted in the
whole area being carved up like a chess board, and a maze of survey lines
appeared, with a subsequent dead load of survey fees. This condition forced
the Native, in very many cases, to follow outside occupations, such as road,
bushwork and gum digging. 232
230
Hearn, ibid, p. 689
Hearn, ibid, p. 689
232
MA I 20/1/14 Part 2, p. 332
231
131
With contracting regional employment throughout the 1920s and more especially into
the 1930s, with accelerating population, a shrinking land base, and with Native title
succession practices ensuring legal and practical fragmentation of land and land
ownership limiting economic development, coherent let alone efficient economic
development for Te Raki Maori communities was becoming even more challenging.
By the 1920s at the latest this situation was well known to government. Government
action regarding Te Raki Maori development was organised around a series of
particular initiatives to overcome the logjam of blocked Maori economic capability
arising from the challenges of using their primary asset efficiently within a debilitating
legal and administrative land tenure structure. The inability of Maori to participate
meaningfully in the local economy had also become a major problem for local
Pakeha, leading to pressure from local bodies on the government to take action to
promote local development by enabling Maori to use their land, be in a position to
pay rates, and therefore be supportive of local development.
Land development
Land development was a further option the government pursued. By 1929, the
government could recognise that there was a problem with the integration of Maori
into the advantages and opportunities of general Pakeha-dominated economic
development, partly caused by previous government actions:
The settlement of Native land has for many years been a vexed question, and
many and varied have been the attempts to deal with it. The problem has
always been a major one, and the departmental report for the year ended 31st
March, 1911, drew attention to the effect the passing of the Native Land Act,
1909, as contributing to the elimination of the cry of ‘unoccupied Native land’.
This was accomplished, however, by the then policy of encouraging the
alienation of Native lands, both to the Crown (for European settlement) and to
private persons. The effect of this policy, whilst accelerating land-settlement
generally, was to deprive the Native race of its lands and to create a rentier
class of the non-sellers. 233
Maori were judged to be an economic problem where they had insufficient lands for
their needs. Where there might still be lands able to be used profitably by Maori, the
arguments put forward by Ngata offered a possible solution.
233
AJHR, 1929, G-9, ‘Native Department’, p. 2
132
Ngata summarised the problems faced by Maori nationally in developing their lands,
a summary that was applicable to the Te Raki region:
Until the second decade of the present century the attempts to assist Maoris
to farm their lands were sporadic and hesitating. Where the individual had
been fortunate enough to obtain a freehold title to valuable land he was
permitted to raise money upon mortgage, a very costly proceeding because of
the safeguards and restrictions imposed by the Legislature, which regarded
less the needs of the would-be Maori farmer than the supposed machinations
of the designing money-lender. The mortgage was suspected as another
device to wrest his land from Maori. After the advances-to-settlers legislation
came into operation its resources were theoretically available to Maori
landowners, but in practice, so great was the prejudice against the Native title,
very few were able to secure assistance from that source. Still there was a
hesitating recognition by the Legislature and financial institutions of individual
cases worthy of assistance. 234
Land development schemes are discussed comprehensively by Bassett and Kay in
their report for this inquiry. 235 From 1936 onwards, land development schemes
became, ‘…the major programme for improving the economic situation of Maori’. 236
However, it became rapidly apparent that development schemes would only very
partially deal with the issue of Maori employment and economic development. The
Young Maori Conference in May 1939 reported that land under development could
support at best only a quarter of Maori people. 237 The government was certainly
aware of this by 1948, when the Under Secretary of the Department of Maori Affairs,
G. P. Sheppard informed the Director of Employment that:
…while it would place a considerable number of Maoris on the land,
[development schemes] would only touch a fringe of the problem. There is
insufficient land in most areas, particularly in the North, to suggest that this
would be a complete solution. Moreover, the marginal lands could only be
economically developed by the use of machinery employing relatively few
people. 238
234
AJHR, 1931 G-10, p. iii
Bassett H. and Kay R., ‘Tai Tokerau Maori Land Development Schemes 1930-1990’, (CFRT,2006), (Wai 1040,
#A10)
236
Orange C., ‘A Kind of Equality: Labour and the Maori People 1935-1949’, MA thesis, (Auckland University,
1977), p. 69, and continues the discussion forward to p. 77
237
Report of the Young Maori Council held at Auckland University College May 22-26 1939, (Auckland, 1939), p.
12
238
National Archives L 1 30/1/28, part 4
235
133
As this latter point bears out, farming in New Zealand has been essentially capital
intensive, not employing large numbers of people directly. Whether breaking in land
or farming it subsequently, efficient commercial agriculture required a limited set of
skilled and unskilled labour to be productive. Even if Maori farming had been
remarkably successful after development scheme assistance, it could never have
satisfactorily addressed the employment needs of Te Raki Maori.
The major change that occurred over the lifetime of the development schemes was
the limiting of expectations. As part of Ngata’s vision, it was hoped these schemes
would become a major vehicle through which Maori economic development could
proceed, and cultural and social values be safeguarded. However, while
development schemes provided a vital source of employment during the depression,
they did not provide the platform for long-term development and prosperity that
Ngata had hoped. 239
Land schemes do offer however a series of mini case studies on government/Maori
relations, which demonstrated a tension between a government desire for the
schemes to be viable and concern for control to that end, and Maori concern that the
schemes make some form of adequate return under Maori direction, within a context
of practical managerial challenge and debt. As a means to address the underlying
economic challenges facing Te Raki Maori, land development schemes could only
play a limited role, as Bassett and Kay demonstrate in their report.
The impact of these schemes on the potential for Te Raki Maori economic
development continued for many decades. Approximately 437,635 acres of land in
Northland was included in the land development legislation, despite less than ten
percent expected to become dairy farms, but gazetting this land had the effect of
restricting land use and access by owners regardless of whether land development
actually occurred. 240 No such extensive restriction on land use and access
confronted Pakeha. In total, 36,939 acres of land in the Hokianga, Bay of Islands,
239
Macrae, ibid, pp 33-42 provides an excellent discussion of the assumptions and flaws in Ngata’s
development model
240
Bassett and Kay, ibid, p. 562
134
Whangaroa and Whangarei districts was developed within the development scheme
farm system. Bassett and Kay summarise the overall impact as follows:
While the schemes were eventually returned to owner control with
improvements having been made, the length of time which the Board of Maori
Affairs retained full control represents a significant lost opportunity for the
owners. Although most of the stations came back debt free, the existence of
the debt since the 1950s and 1960s had meant that the owners were denied
control, access and the use of their land for three or four decades. Most
schemes did not result in employment creation for local Maori, and despite
early promises, they did not create the anticipated number of farms which
would be available for Maori occupation. Furthermore, the ownership of the
scheme land was dramatically altered as hundreds of Northland Maori lost
their ownership of scheme land through the compulsory acquisition of
uneconomic interests, and through the Crown purchasing programme. In
addition to the general loss of rangatiratanga over the scheme land, almost
half the Maori land involved in the development scheme farms was purchased
by the Crown. 241
Another attempt to overcome the obstacles to effective land use created by the legal
and administrative Maori land regime had failed to deliver any substantial benefit;
indeed it had reduced the value of the Maori land asset even further by facilitating
further land alienation to the government. Diminishing options for local Maori
involvement in economic development on their land, or from developing economic
alternatives funded from investment capital arising from their land, or from engaging
with other private sources of skill and capital in some form of commercial relationship
meant that the region had become a less practicable place both to live in and to
generate investment in for Maori, especially if Maori farming generally in Northland
was unable to compete profitably and effectively alongside Pakeha land use and
development.
Maori
farming
however,
as
the
implementation
of
vesting,
consolidation and development schemes indicate, was not in good commercial
shape to function effectively.
Hearn discusses the state of Maori farming in chapter 10 of his report, and only
particular aspects are highlighted here. Te Raki Maori had consistently sought to
develop the potential of their lands, and this desire was reiterated in June 1929 when
‘leading men of the Ngapuhi tribe’ met at Puhimoanariki near Kaikohe, where they
proclaimed their opposition to further alienation of land and the need for land to be
241
Bassett and Kay, ibid, p. 577; and for land development schemes statistics, see p. 576
135
made productive. To do the latter required training and financial assistance, ‘To bring
that land into profit, to turn those Maoris now living in poverty into prosperous
farmers’. These ‘leading men’ had noticed the difference between Maori
development and Pakeha development in the district, and wished that such a
difference not continue especially given the impact on Maori, 'We want to bring our
people into line with our white compatriots, but we want also to remain Maori, since
as imitation Pakehas we will always be their inferiors. We will insist on our rights as a
people, but we want also to fulfil our duties. We want to save a large section of our
people from the pauperism that threatens them’. 242 They had identified the problem,
namely an inability to use their lands profitably and a resulting poverty, and proposed
a solution namely training and assistance, that respected them as people with rights
and duties, to enable them to live as Pakeha lived without actually having to
somehow become Pakeha.
Despite these observations, and the various actions of government departments to
assist Maori farming, Hearn concludes that:
...the development of Maori commercial farming in the Northland Inquiry
Districts was constrained by a lack of land, by a lack of land of sufficient
quality to sustain intensive use, and by institutional arrangements
underpinning Maori land ownership which failed to create the environment
necessary to encourage the investment of labour and capital. Consequently
Maori farming was characterised by a process of under-development in which
inadequate land and capital created a cycle in which low production levels
and low productivity resulted in poor financial returns and hence low
investment. The loss of land, the fragile nature of the institutional
arrangements underlying Maori land ownership, and the inability of Maori to
gain access to sources of developmental capital, combined with the decline of
timber milling, the contraction of kauri gum digging, and the continuing loss of
jobs in traditional sources of employment, combined to produce among Maori
what the Crown had long feared, that is, widespread dependency on the
state. 243
The land that remained in Maori hands was known to be of poor or marginal quality.
The Native Department in 1946 noted the unfavourable circumstances for the
profitable use of Maori land in Northland: ‘To a large extent, these lands are remote
from rail and highway communications. County roading is under-developed, and
likely to remain so owing to the marginal productive value of much of the Native
242
243
New Zealand Herald 26 June 1929
Hearn, ibid, pp 692-693
136
lands to be served, accentuated by the general problem of Maori rating’. Much Maori
land was ‘second class, near marginal or marginal land’ and the cost of bringing into
production ‘often equals and sometimes exceeds the land value, without allowing for
the cost of providing access’. 244 Rather than providing an asset that could boost
economic development, Maori-owned land had generally become either a costly,
unproductive burden or provided opportunities primarily for others via leasing. The
following table indicates that only a quarter of land still in Maori ownership in 1951
and not leased was considered fit for development.
Table 10: Disposition of lands owned by Maori, Whangaroa, Bay of Islands, Hokianga, Whangarei, and
Rodney Counties, 1951 (acres)
Whangaroa
Bay of Islands
Hokianga
Whangarei
Rodney
Totals
Total
(acres)
21000
142000
113000
50000
8200
334200
Leased
1200
13000
18000
7700
1000
40900
Under Dept
control
2800
24000
30000
10500
900
68200
Unsuitable for
development
8000
65000
40000
15000
4400
132400
Suitable for
development
9000
40000
25000
16800
1900
92700
Source: Archives New Zealand, Wellington, Ll 30/1/28 Part 5
The capability of Maori to develop their land had been further impaired over time by
the subdivision of land into blocks not easily useable for commercial development, a
point brought out by the Chairman of the National Efficiency Board in 1918:
The individualisation of blocks by partition amongst the many owners by a
Court, which has not seen the land or had a survey report of it, and without
being advised of any suitable roading scheme, must necessarily be work
which is often useless and impossible. We have been informed that in many
cases it would be impossible to layout a roading scheme which would give
reasonable access to the different partitions as cut out by the Court, to say
nothing of the expense which would be incurred in attempting to form any kind
of road. 245
Hearn discussed this issue of subdivision further in his report, and concludes by
noting the ‘high degree of uncertainty which Maori land owners endured and, more
244
Archives New Zealand, L1 30/1/28 Part 3
Chairman, National Efficiency Board to Acting Prime Minister 4 July 1918, in Archives New Zealand, NEB 1
1007
245
137
generally, the fragile character of the institutional arrangements which underlay
Maori land ownership’. 246
The issues confronting Maori who wished to develop their land up to 1929 were
largely covered in the following communication between the Under-Secretary of the
Native Department and the Minister:
In the different avenues open to the Maori it seems that the most suitable
industry for Natives is that connected with the utilisation of their land. Where
the opportunity has arisen and the circumstances have been favourable it has
been proved that they become efficient sheep and dairy farmers. They
possess land but unfortunately they have not the means to pursue pastoral or
dairying pursuits. The various lending Departments of the State are nominally
at their disposal but in reality they are not, since the conditions laid down for
advances make it quite impossible in the face of the heavy calls for
Europeans to give favourable consideration to the applications for advances
by Maoris. It is true that several statutory provisions have been made for the
purpose of enabling Maoris to participate on equal terms with Europeans but
in practice these have become a dead letter and it is quite safe to say that
with the exception of cases where European Trustees are concerned the
advances of loan monies by State Institutions to Maoris are negligible. The
Maori land boards which were set up as statutory agents for the Maoris
confined their efforts to the selling and leasing for Natives and receiving and
distributing the proceeds to the beneficiaries. Later it was found that quite a
considerable sum - nearly half a million pounds - of Maori trust monies that
were not immediately distributable had accumulated and had been deposited
for safe keeping and investment with the Public Trustee. With the object of
reserving such Maori-owned monies for Maori use the Native Trust Office was
set up and so far as practicable these monies were invested upon Maoriowned securities. As time went on the duties of the Maori land boards were
enlarged so as to enable them to make advances directly within their own
districts instead of the circumlocutory method of lodging funds with the Native
Trustee and afterwards returning it [the funds presumably] to the District as an
advance to an individual. In addition it is the duty of the Boards as Trustees to
get the best possible advantage for their clients and this could scarcely be
said to be done by lodging funds with a body which paid 4½% to let it out
again at 6% or more. It was further found that as consolidation proceedings
were undertaken and the titles of the Natives stabilised they were anxious to
make immediate use of their lands. This could best be done by the local Maori
Land Boards making the advances in the meantime until the Maori was
placed upon his feet when possibly his account could be taken over and be
better served by some Mercantile Firm the repayments being used by the
Boards for advances to other Maoris. 247
246
Hearn, ibid, pp 703-708, and p. 708
Under Secretary, Native Department to Native Minister 8 March 1929, in Archives New Zealand, MA I
1928/576
247
138
The challenges and disadvantages Maori faced in acquiring development finance
were known by government but the issue was how to free up finance given the
previous and existing restrictions arising from the land tenure system. The turn to
consolidation and development schemes was in part driven by the inability of Maori
to access finance without a substantial reform of the Maori land tenure system,
especially the succession laws, which was not under consideration.
While measuring the efficiency of Maori farming, and in particular to draw accurate
comparisons between Pakeha and Maori farming is challenging, Hearn has
attempted to conduct such an exercise in his report by comparing a number of
sources. 248 In particular, one study Hearn used, that of R.M. Frazer in a summary of
a survey of Maori land and Maori population done in 1958, noted that ‘Maori has not
enough land for the rural population to be supported in a manner even approximating
that of the rural Pakeha’, that the average Northland Pakeha dairy farm was 221
acres and the average Maori dairy farm was 145 acres, and that large numbers of
Maori farmers were producing insufficient butterfat to provide a living and very small
numbers were producing sufficient for a ‘comfortable living’, whereas the reverse
was true for Pakeha. 249
Hearn concludes that there are a number of factors which explained the poor
performance of Maori farming. In particular, his focus on the different and debilitating
Maori land regime as central to understanding why Maori economic development
took the path that it did pinpoints the central variable:
To insufficiency of land and insufficiency of capital must be added the
continuing legal and geographical fragmentation of land ownership and,
especially, the fragile character of the institutional arrangements on which
Maori land ownership was based. The Crown had long recognised that
investment of labour and capital, and thus economic growth, required clearly
defined, robust, and enduring private property rights. So much had been
made clear in the range of land tenures which it introduced, especially from
1881 onwards, to encourage settlers to select and develop land; its reluctance
to abrogate, limit, or restrict the operation of private property rights; and in its
willingness to allow lessees to acquire the freehold of the properties they had
248
Hearn, ibid, pp 745-753
Frazer R.M., 'Maori land and Maori population in the Far North,' New Zealand geographer XIV, I, April 1958,
pp 24, 26 and 27
249
139
originally leased from the Crown. Such recognition did not extend to Maori.
Until the end of the 1920s the Crown remained firmly focussed on the
acquisition of land from Maori and its transfer into the hands of settlers. In the
midst of increasing Maori population growth and a contracting area of land in
Maori ownership, the shift in policy associated with Ngata's consolidation and
land development programme came too late.
Rather than assisting the development of small-scale Maori commercial
farming, it exposed the consequences of land purchasing over a protracted
period, the unwillingness to assist Maori to develop such resources as
remained to them, and an inability or unwillingness to confront the causes of
land ownership fragmentation. 250
Despite government recognition of the challenges facing Te Raki Maori farming, and
assistance granted to develop land, the evidence points to a structural and
embedded distortion in Maori capability to develop their lands which compounded for
each generation, meaning that the negative socio-economic effects arising from that
distortion became even more pronounced.
Hearn discusses briefly Te Raki Maori involvement in other areas of the commercial
economy but notes: ‘The scale and character of Maori participation in the regional
economy are difficult to characterise and estimate’. 251 The 1926 census for the first
time attempted to record the occupations of Maori, but only for provincial districts.
Table 11: Main occupations, Maori males, Auckland Provincial District, 1926
Occupations
Primary
Farmers
Farmer or farm labourers (not otherwise defined)
Dairy farmers, milkers, share milkers
Farm labourers (1)
Kumara and potato growers and diggers
Fencers
Bushmen, scrub and firewood cutters, labourers
engaged in afforestation
Kauri gum diggers and bleeders
Industrial
Saw-mill hands
Roadmen
Drainers
Ill-defined
Labourers
Kai mihi
(1) Includes
Share of total
10.0
5.9
4.4
12.0
4.2
2.1
4.7
3.6
1.4
2.6
1.5
26.5
3.1
n=11721
farm labourers, ploughmen, shearers, drovers, station hands
Source: Census of New Zealand 1926
250
251
Hearn, ibid, p. 755
Hearn, ibid, p. 79
140
As Hearn notes, these figures suggest, ‘the continuation of subsistence cultivation
and a workforce the employment of which was highly dependent on the performance
of the region’s resource-based industries of forestry and kauri gum, on land
development, and on labouring’. 252 Generally, the available evidence indicates that
Te Raki Maori were not able easily to participate in the mainstream commercial
economy within off-farm enterprises, such as small business, services and the
professions. Evidence assessed for this report does not point towards Te Raki Maori
somehow being opposed to entering these areas of the economy. Rather, given the
lack of requisite skills generally compared to the substantially larger potential
competition from Pakeha, the more rurally based location of Te Raki Maori, the
domination of the urban environment by Pakeha, the less diverse commercial
development within the region and the difficulty of raising or borrowing the necessary
finance as noted arising from the nature of the land tenure system, then the
constrained involvement of Te Raki Maori within the local economy is less surprising
and more comprehensible.
This broad pattern of predominantly primary sector employment and employment
within lower paid and less qualified sectors of the economy largely continues for Te
Raki Maori within the Te Raki region to the present day. Walzl in particular analyses
the employment patterns and education figures for Te Raki Maori in his report, 253
which confirms the significance of and need for profitable engagement within the
pastoral economy for Te Raki Maori not only up to 1950 but beyond, given both the
more limited commercial opportunities within the region and the more marginalised
and constrained economic place of Te Raki Maori within the broader commercial
economy. Yet the land tenure system did not combine for Maori the features that
Crocombe had identified as necessary for maximum production and maximum
standard of living, 254 which precluded for Te Raki Maori a comparable profitable
engagement within the Te Raki pastoral economy to that available for more favoured
Pakeha.
252
Hearn, ibid, p. 81
Walzl, ibid, p. 174, pp 636-651, pp 654-662, pp 1124-1132, and pp 1492-1505
254
Crocombe, ibid, p. 6, and already cited in this report on p. 102
253
141
Conclusion
Economically, between 1910 and 1950 New Zealand continued to develop pastoral
farming as the key commercial venture for ongoing growth. While there were
occasional challenges to the profits able to be generated due to low commodity
prices through most of the 1920s and into the depression of the 1930s, a guaranteed
British market and the combination of private initiative and government support
ensured a generally competitive and profitable outcome. In the Te Raki region, with
the decline of the extractive industries and limited alternatives on offer, pastoral
farming, in particular sheep and later dairy farming, became the economic backbone
of regional development. The region faced specific challenges due to infrastructure
neglect and low population, but commercial agriculture did develop significantly over
the period.
In particular, the geographical areas that were developed were primarily flatter,
better quality lands, near transport lines and centres of population, and largely in the
hands of Pakeha. The land acquisitions carried out by the government in the
nineteenth century and continued into the twentieth century had opened up land for
Pakeha use, leaving generally lesser quality land in Maori hands. More importantly,
as a result of land tenure reform, Maori were constrained from using their land
productively, leaving their lands vulnerable to the designs of those who believed
Maori should be relieved of more land for the benefit of those who could profitably
use it. Maori, and Maori land while it remained in Maori hands, were seen by many
commentators of the time as a problem for local development, as not only did Maori
not develop their lands but potential rates that might have been paid on properly
developed land were not available. Maori had been reduced to being an impediment
to local economic growth. But Maori had not created the legal and administrative
regime under which they were obliged to live, had drawn attention to the constraints
they operated under, had sought assistance to overcome those constraints, and
more generally had always assumed they had a legitimate and vital role to play in
regional development. 255
255
The role of Maori in pressuring governments over time to address issues around the use of Maori land are
evidenced and discussed in considerable depth by Hearn, ibid, and Bassett and Kay, ibid, throughout their
respective reports
142
The growing number of Te Raki Maori, their persistent protest, and the inability of
both local Pakeha and government to at least ignore Maori concerns led to a greater
willingness to consider options to promote more effective Maori engagement.
Vesting, consolidating and land development were the major proposed vehicles of
economic renewal for Maori. Each option was a recognition that the legislative and
administrative state of Maori land was the chief impediment to Maori economic
development. However, by the 1950s, despite vesting, consolidation, land
development, various forms of state assistance and the efforts of Maori themselves
independently and through engagement with these types of support, Te Raki Maori
economic capability remained retarded.
In assessing this situation confronting Maori economic development, a clear picture
emerges of the relationship between the areas over which the government had
responsibility over time, in particular the establishment and maintenance of the
property regime, and the effect of that official oversight for Maori. Pakeha lived under
a different property regime, one that provided significant advantages and assistance
to them. The direction of change that the government undertook to encourage Maori
economic development, primarily vesting, consolidation and land development,
which assumed that a property regime more like that of Pakeha or more eligible for
assistance along Pakeha lines was the ideal, was a further proof of the damage
done and being done to Maori economic development within the existing structures
of Maori land tenure.
Te Raki Maori farming, and indeed general Maori agricultural commercial activity,
faced serious obstacles to profitable or even sustainable returns. The region
provided no genuine alternatives to Maori economic development apart from
commercial land use. Even if Maori land use options had been less constrained by
legislative and administrative formalities, and had even become profitable, there was
still a further and growing challenge of finding sufficient employment for the growing
population as farming and generally commercial land use activities were not labour
intensive.
143
Pakeha were more likely to move in or out of the region as necessary given a
probable looser cultural attachment. While the term Maori for this report essentially
means those Maori comprising the communities of the Te Raki inquiry region, the
term Pakeha is much more capacious, including not only Pakeha who live or who
have lived in the region but the many thousands who could potentially do so. Being
able to make a decent living in the region for good numbers of people may be more
a problem for Maori because they are more culturally attached to a region that
increasingly cannot, for either Pakeha or Maori, supply decent substantial
employment. Because economic capability had become largely confined to owning
commercial agricultural units, then those who have these enterprises and who can
run them profitably will have their economic capability enhanced. The constraints
Maori faced generally for effective involvement in those money making enterprises,
which were also the main sources of employment and economic stimulus, precluded
a capacity to accumulate capital for investment in whatever form or wherever Maori
might have sought to develop. Limited economic development for Te Raki Maori
meant that, when they migrated, they were more likely to leave as poor and underskilled compared to Pakeha who might also be migrating in search of work.
Finally, the growing establishment of Pakeha controlled city, borough, local, and
regional councils, as well as a plethora of boards of differing sorts, gave Pakeha
access to avenues where further needs could be debated such as roads and
infrastructure, and pressure brought to achieve these needs in particular areas.
Local Pakeha might not always gain what they wanted when they wanted it but at
least they were arguing in the right forums. While the development priorities of
Pakeha, such as improved infrastructure, might benefit Maori communities also, the
primary concern for those petitioning for these ends was that Pakeha economic and
commercial opportunities be enhanced. Marginalised from effective participation in
local economic and political life, Maori could easily be seen through their
nonpayment of rates and their lower standard of living to be a particular sort of local
burden for Pakeha to bear. Ironically, the growing Pakeha perception that Te Raki
Maori were a burden and not contributing sufficiently to regional development added
to the pressure on government to be responsive to suggestions on how to address
the serious issues facing Maori. Petitioning the government directly was a less
effective way to advance Maori needs, yet the alien nature of Pakeha forms of local
144
representation from which Maori had been practically excluded meant that a whole
channel of influence was unavailable to Maori even if, legally speaking, there was no
formal barrier to Maori representation on the various political instruments operating
at local level.
The restriction of Maori economic capability through the Maori land tenure system
had ramified further into limiting local political involvement, effectively meaning a
system of representation dominated by Pakeha who were conversely able to use
their political influence as a means to express and enhance their economic
capability. Stirling’s report should be read in part as an investigation into the effects
of repressed Maori economic development as manifest in the local government
sphere, and Maori efforts to overcome the resulting barriers. 256
For Te Raki Maori to deal with the government directly was increasingly
anachronistic in a system where central government was at the apex of a complex
political and social system of influence, a last resort rather than the first port of call.
Knowledge of the intricacies and participation in this Pakeha-dominated system was
essential if influence could be brought to bear for Maori interests. The immensely
difficult struggle to penetrate this system in order to represent Maori concerns
effectively meant that economic vulnerability was compounded further by a
significant degree of political impotence. The persistence and courage of Maori
communities throughout this period is even more remarkable therefore given the
odds against them.
256
A political engagement report has been commissioned for the Te Raki inquiry and is likely to flesh out
further important aspects of Maori political engagement at the local and national level
145
Chapter 7: c.1950-c.2000
Introduction
The New Zealand national economic model identified in the previous chapter, quoted
and summarised thus: ‘The rural pastoral farm leg earned foreign exchange for
importing and debt servicing, while the urban industrial leg used imports to produce
goods and services for the domestic economy, creating jobs for those whom the
pastoral sector and its satellites could not employ directly.’, 257 remained dominant
through the 1950s but came under sustained pressure from the 1960s onwards. 258
In December 1966, wool prices collapsed and the Wool Commission ended up
buying over a third of the season’s clip to ensure a payout for farmers. Wool prices
began a steady decline as competition from synthetic fibres advanced. In 1973
Britain joined the EEC, and New Zealand’s meat and dairy exports to European
countries became subject to quota limits. The days of an almost guaranteed market
were over, and New Zealand was forced to search both for new overseas markets
and to diversify its exports to exploit new markets, something it achieved with
remarkable success. 259 Other external shocks included the oil price hikes of 1973
and 1978, the 1987 sharemarket crash, the sharp global recession of the early
1990s and the Asian crisis of 1998, all of which highlighted still further New
Zealand’s vulnerability within a sometimes unstable and highly competitive world
economy.
The combination of these external shocks, the loss of market security with Britain
and the need to adjust for changed international markets, contributed to New
Zealand moving from being one of the richest countries in the OECD in the 1960s to
one of the poorest in the 1990s. This was due largely to the structure of the New
Zealand economy within a world of changing expectations. Since the 1960s leading
to 2000, the world has seen a strong growth in exports of manufactures, and slower
growth in exports of primary products, an economic direction that has affected New
257
Easton, ibid, p. 47
Information is drawn for this brief overview from Hawke G., ‘Economic Trends and Economic Policy, 19381992’ in Rice (ed.), ibid, chap 16; Belich, Making Peoples, ibid, pp 297-321; Bertram G., ‘The New Zealand
Economy, 1900-2000’, in Byrnes (ed.), ibid, chap 22; and King, ibid, pp 413-448
259
Easton, ibid, p. 48
258
146
Zealand’s growth. While growth in New Zealand’s manufactured exports has been
similar to growth in the world’s manufactured exports, the small size of New Zealand
manufacturing limits advantages to be gained. Even with effects of globalisation,
which include the increased mobility of capital, large manufacturers are less likely to
establish new plants in a small economy located far from most of the world’s major
markets.
New Zealand is forced to focus on that area where it holds comparative advantage,
namely the production of primary products, but this reliance poses some problems
for economic growth and profitability. Despite New Zealand’s best efforts to market
primary products, most developed countries protect their own agricultural sectors,
usually in the context of policies that aim to produce security of supply in food, and
because of successful lobbying by local agricultural producers. Further, a feature of
economic development has been that, as incomes rise, the demand for food stuffs
increases but limits are reached sooner than in the case of manufactured goods
where demand is less inhibited. As long as growth in global demand for agricultural
products remains lower than demand for manufactured goods then countries that
rely on primary product exports such as New Zealand will experience slower growth.
Should this trend change, then one would expect to see New Zealand’s primary
sector expand accordingly.
There have been no obvious solutions to New Zealand’s economic problems,
although governments since the 1960s have tried some drastic approaches. These
have ranged from Robert Muldoon’s ‘Think Big’ and tight regulation, to Roger
Douglas’s deregulation and privatisation. Unfortunately, New Zealand’s problem is
largely related to its economic structure, and this structure is likely to change only
slowly. The broad context for the Te Raki inquiry region therefore is that New
Zealand moved from crisis in the early 1930s, to a long period of government
managed growth on the back of secure markets and good prices for primary
products, to a period finally of economic uncertainty, experimentation with new
options and reduced or uneven prosperity.
147
Economic Opportunities and Challenges
By 1950, some of the major differences between Pakeha and Te Raki Maori can be
outlined.
1. Pakeha in the Te Raki region worked within Pakeha institutions of local
government and business that they had created themselves, and with which they
were intimately familiar. Few such structures of equivalent familiarity or value
existed for Te Raki Maori. Maori capacity to engage with local government had
been severely compromised because of the Maori land title system, precluding
effective economic development and an empowered opportunity to participate in
local political decision-making.
2. Historically, Pakeha living in the region have never had to undergo the massive
process of land conversion entailed by the Native (later, after 1947, Maori) land
court or adapt to completely different and alien social, cultural and economic
processes, under the aegis of a central authority comprising many competing
interests beyond Maori, the Crown. A particular set of legal and administrative
regimes that arose out of this experience did not apply to Pakeha as a
consequence,
and
which
had
compromised
Maori
efforts
to
advance
economically.
3. Mainly as a consequence of point 2, a perception had arisen among Pakeha that
Te Raki Maori and their land management practices were a burden to local
development.
4. Pakeha were generally a more urbanised people and were likely to be familiar
therefore with at least some of the complexities of the urban world, whereas Te
Raki Maori were a predominantly rurally based people, for whom urbanisation
would be another massive economic and social upheaval.
5. Te Raki Maori now had a smaller asset base, no accumulated capital, poor
access to finance, had no real solutions to title difficulties, all of which factors
were likely to act as significant barriers to entrepreneurial initiative.
148
6. Consistently poorer health, education, housing and rates of employment among
Te Raki Maori. 260
7. Finally, and in many ways as a consequence of the above points, Pakeha ways
and values were the norm against which other standards or systems were
judged. Economic development along particular Pakeha monitored lines
established
the
standard
for
economic
development.
Maori
economic
development and its effectiveness were judged as successful when compatible
with those standards and inefficient when not. Distinctive Maori factors were likely
to be seen as problematic, since they had no place in the ‘normal’ understanding
of economic development.
Where economic advantages could accrue as a result of these differences, then
differences between Pakeha and Maori would be expressed through different
economic outcomes. Where Maori and Pakeha differed in economic outcomes, the
government might be inclined to approach them differently on a whole range of
issues and needs, apart from whether it was trying to reduce economic disparity.
Where the government tried to reduce economic disparity, it might not be able to
overcome all obstacles to economic equivalence between social groups owing to the
recalcitrance of at least some of the factors mentioned in the above list. Economic
disparity might even be a price for distinctiveness, for example choosing to live in the
Te Raki inquiry region when better economic opportunities existed elsewhere.
Pakeha generally had culturally and socially less difficulty in relocating than perhaps
local Maori did. If so, when considered purely on economic terms, this was an
economic advantage for Pakeha. Whatever developments occurred in the district
after 1950, most of these differentiating points would continue to influence and
determine different economic outcomes between Te Raki Maori and Pakeha.
Given these differences, some of which the government directly produced and
controlled through processes such as the Native Land Court and Maori land
administration regimes, the understanding the government had of Maori, including
their economic situation, becomes an important component in understanding Maori
economic development. Of course, a particular government understanding may not
260
Walzl, ibid, provides substantial evidence and support for this situation throughout his report, continuing
on from the evidence supplied by Hearn, ibid, and Armstrong and Subasic, ibid for their respective periods
149
determine an economic outcome, as other factors are involved in influencing
outcomes, as mentioned. Furthermore, even if the government understands
something to be the case concerning a particular interest group in society, or is
informed that a particular group believes something about itself, such knowledge
does not always lead to outcomes desired by the group. For example, the
government in the early twentieth century was aware that certain occupations were
unhappy about their wages and working conditions. This knowledge still meant that
trade unions and eventually a labour party had to develop to represent those
interests more effectively against other interests in a political and economic system
less open to change in this area. The government is an agent of change, but it is
also an instrument of change, open to manipulation by interest groups able to wield
the instrument legitimately in their favour.
More concretely for this report, the governments of New Zealand were aware of the
challenging aspects of the economic situation for Maori up to the 1950s. This was
quite apart from Maori attempts, including persistent attempts from Te Raki Maori, to
engage with the government directly over issues of concern. 261 There were regular
reports by officials recorded in the AJHRs. Regular commissions of inquiry
investigated aspects of Maori life and the impact of Pakeha society, including
government legislation and policy on that life. These included the Rees-Carroll
Commission, the Stout-Ngata Commission, major Native Land legislation reform in
1891, 1909, 1931, and 1953, as well as a host of minor amendments over time.
There was also a specific section of government concerned with Native affairs, which
in some shape or form has been a consistent element in New Zealand
government. 262 Censuses and statistics supplied further information, but this only
became more detailed and comprehensive in the twentieth century.
For the Te Raki region for the period 1950 to 2000, Tony Walzl in his report has
provided a rich array of statistics and analysis on socio-economic factors around
Maori economic development. 263 Some salient points are discussed here. What is
noteworthy is that within some significant changes, in particular the growing Maori
261
Both Walzl, ibid, and Hearn, ibid, provide considerable evidence and discussion of Maori mobilisation
Fleras A., ‘Towards ‘Tu Tangata’: Historical Developments and Current Trends in Maori Policy and
Administration’, Political Science, 37(1), July 1985, pp 18-39
263
Walzl, ibid
262
150
population initially and urbanisation, the underlying issues remain largely
unchanged. 264 Despite efforts to develop other aspects of the local economy, the
most important industry is still commercial farming, much of the area is still
challenging to develop, Maori still struggle to draw sustained economic benefit from
the region in part due to the persistence of Maori land tenure difficulties even with
efforts to overcome these difficulties, and Maori remain social and economically
marginalised within their own region. As noted for previous time periods, the Maori
land tenure system put in place in the nineteenth century, which worked well in
aiding the alienation of significant amounts of land from Maori, has proved
remarkably resistant to efforts to reform it to work effectively for the economic
interests of Maori. Trying to develop or take advantage of economic opportunities
while working within the constraints of the Maori land tenure system proved as
challenging for governments to overcome as it had consistently been for Maori to
work within.
Land development became more of a government priority after the Second World
War. Technological advances and the greater availability and affordability of
agricultural
machinery
brought
about
a
boom
in
agricultural
productivity.
Furthermore, aerial topdressing opened up the more inaccessible hill country areas
where soil was usually poorer, allowing greater production through more intensive
farming. Within New Zealand, stock numbers grew dramatically to the 1960s, and
wool and sheep meat production doubled, with up to 60% of this increase estimated
to have come from the farming of hill country. 265 Within this context:
The economic role of Maori land changed dramatically after the Second World
War, with social security, the urbanisation of a rapidly increasing Maori
population and increasing full employment. The land was not required to
sustain Maori communities. Government placed an emphasis on urban
employment and social security as the sources of economic well-being for
most Maori families. Ironically, this placed more economic pressure on the
land. The government saw its responsibility as bringing land into production,
not simply for the benefits of Maori communities, but as part of a national
imperative to gain the most from the agricultural resources for the country, in
an age of booming prices and free access to British markets. Unproductive
Maori land was an evil to be eradicated by all means possible. Reforming the
264
265
Walzl provides comprehensive data on population growth and change in his report
Belich, Paradise Reforged, ibid, p. 249
151
title system, by assimilating it into the European title system as much as
possible, became the prime objective. 266
With the passing of the Maori Affairs Act 1953, government objectives around land
titles work were stated as being; ‘... to assure for Maori settlers a good title to their
farms, to assist them to develop the land, to teach them modern methods, and to
establish farming as a way of life that can be regarded as economically and socially
rewarding’. 267 Practically speaking, the development of farming to the 1950s in the
Te Raki region had created a number of difficulties which would challenge these
objectives.
By the early 1960s, with 70 percent of farm units in Northland devoted primarily to
dairying, farm properties ranged in size from the small, marginal, low-producing
holding to the large fully-economic unit. 268 When the regional average for the
production of butterfat both per cow and per acre is compared to other main North
Island dairying areas, it is generally lower, which points towards lower levels of
efficiency of farming in Northland, particularly dairying:
An important factor in explaining this is that in certain areas subdivision has
proceeded to a stage where the size of unit is now too small to support an
economic farm. Large areas of Northland with unsuitable soils and topography
are used for dairying because this gives the best return from holdings which
are either too small to be economic pastoral units of any type or, while
capable of supporting economic dairy farms, are too small for sheep farms.
The small uneconomic farm has led to the retention of much land under
dairying that would be better suited to sheep farming, and also to the lowering
of production levels on good dairying land. 269
The Northland survey report is blunt on the quality of Maori farming: ‘Although Maori
farms vary greatly in size and efficiency, a large proportion, particularly in the remote
and old established settlements, are of a very small size, poorly run, and with very
low production levels’. Even though the attempt by government to establish dairy
farming in the 1930s was well-meaning, to allow some economic opportunity, it
created further problems:
At the time of development during the depression years of the thirties, when
there was a great demand for new farms and it was necessary to settle as
266
Belgrave, M, et al.‘Crown Policy with Respect to Maori Land 1953-1999’, (CFRT,2004), p. 8
AJHR, 1954, G.9, p. 5
268
Discussion drawn from National Resources Survey, Part III, Northland Region, ibid, pp 60-61
269
National Resources Survey, ibid, p. 61
267
152
many farmers as possible on a limited area of land, dairy farming was the
most suitable. Today [in 1964] these farms, capable of producing only 810,000Ib of butterfat (and usually producing far less), cannot give an
adequate standard of living, particularly where a debt of any consequence still
exists. Thus many Maori farmers are still only semi-sufficient, part-time
farmers, running small, low-producing herds on land often unsuited to
dairying, and they must still supplement their income with other work. 270
Thus, while the region continued to pose some challenges for successful dairy
farming, Maori dairy farming struggled even more so in comparison with Pakeha
farming, and provided a reduced individual, let alone collective, capacity to build up
investment potential and improve the farm unit asset. Since this sort of commercial
activity had become the primary means in the Te Raki region to advance
economically using one’s land and skills in combination, then the state of Maori
farming to this point was clear evidence that regional development had not been
favourable to the economic progress of Maori. Map 12 below shows the predominant
land use patterns that had emerged by the mid 1960s.
270
National Resources Survey, ibid, p. 70
153
Map 12: Main Classes of Land Utilisation in the North Island (Source McLintock, ibid, p. 286)
In a thesis by R.M. Frazer, entitled ‘Maori land in the Four Northernmost Counties of
New Zealand’, some of the issues and resulting distinctiveness of Maori farming and
social life are pointed out. 271 Walzl has discussed this thesis and drawn out key
points which clearly highlight the distinctive and generally unfavourable situation of
271
Frazer R.M., ‘Maori Land in the Four Northernmost Counties of New Zealand’, MA thesis, (Auckland
University, 1956)
154
Maori in Mangonui, Hokianga, Bay of Islands and Whangaroa. In particular that:
...43% of the Pakeha population lived in boroughs and townships or in service
centres within predominantly farming areas. The remaining 57% were spread
fairly evenly over developed farmlands, with higher concentrations in areas
where the land was more productive, such as Kerikeri. In comparison 83% of
Maori lived outside boroughs and townships but were not located in
predominantly farming areas. Instead, this Maori population was clustered on
Maori land located in often isolated places such as Te Hapua, Mitimiti or
Mangamuka. 272
Two distinctive landscapes had also emerged, with towns being primarily European
settlements with evidence of progress in the form of new businesses and buildings:
‘This is the growing and prosperous North, the land where a belated prosperity is at
last flowering.’ The growth in these towns was directly linked to the rapid post-War
expansion in agriculture that was occurring within the four districts of Mangonui,
Hokianga, Bay of Islands and Whangaroa. The towns were suppliers of services,
goods and facilities for the surrounding farmlands and as such they were
‘functionally linked to their hinterlands.’ As Frazer noted, the towns had all been
established by Pakeha who were involved in supplying commodities to farms,
processing products from farms or transporting them to other places. The towns ‘are
a typically European response to European commercial development of this or any
other New Zealand area.’ 273 Although there was some citrus fruit farming around
Kerikeri dominated by Pakeha, the most significant farming, namely Pakeha dairying
farming, appeared in pockets where there were rolling hills or valley bottoms with
rich soils which often required drainage. Alongside this Pakeha landscape was a
Maori landscape, summarised by Walzl:
On this land, there was a higher density of population than for Pakeha
reflected in holdings that were obviously smaller. This factor, and the
appearance of the way the land was being used, suggested to Frazer that
those living on the land were dependent upon other sources of income off the
land. Frazer observed that Maori land was primarily occupied as settlements
although there was variation between these with some having as little as a
dozen residences, clustered into a small defined areas (such as a small valley
or bay), whilst others might have more than 400 residents with occupancies
distributed over a landscape of pastures. Where the land was being used for
farming, dairying predominated.
272
273
Walzl, ibid, pp 560-573
Frazer, ibid, pp 8-9
155
Similar to the Pakeha landscape, the dairying was located in pockets and
centred on an area of flat land with some hill land for grazing. Discernible
differences for Frazer included: evidently smaller farming enterprises, both in
terms of farm area and herd size; fewer fences; less evidence of buildings
(and therefore capital investment); and evidence of persistence of attempts to
use hill land for dairying (rather than dry stock), with the result of greater signs
of reverting pasture and increasing scrub. 274
In comparing these landscapes, Frazer commented: ‘The resulting landscapes are
distinctive; the Pakeha one of progress and expansion, the Maori one of
complacency and inertia.’ 275 These distinctions, although generally informative, do
not appear to involve any consideration of mixed Pakeha and Maori families, their
possible contribution and effects on communities, and whether any such families
facilitated economic development and through what means within Te Raki Maori
communities. Claimant views on such families would be interesting to explore with
them.
In an article derived from his thesis, Frazer commented further on some of the
reasons why he believed this landscape pattern had evolved, in particular the
characteristic features of Maori land use:
Many persons claim that the reason is to be found in the failure of the Maori to
use his land properly, and point to the neglected condition of large areas of
undeveloped and unoccupied Maori land as the main feature retarding local
progress. Complaints are heard that the poor condition of the roads is due to
non-payment of Maori rates and that the Pakeha taxpayers’ money is being
used to develop land at high cost which immediately reverts to scrub and
waste when the Maori regains control. The Maori repudiates many of these
charges, claiming that the Pakeha gained control of almost all the good land,
and that the remaining undeveloped Maori lands are almost worthless.
Furthermore the Maori are more numerous than the Pakeha in most rural
areas, and yet the former have much less land. Farms are too small to
support families, and young people, who can find work, are forced to migrate
to the towns where living conditions are often poor. 276
In
these
circumstances,
while
noting
improvements
following
government
assistance, Frazer could also see serious problems remaining:
274
Walzl, ibid, pp 562-563
Frazer, ibid, p. 18
276
Frazer R.M., ‘Maori Land and Maori Population in the Far North’, ibid, pp 35-36
275
156
Mostly this [improvement] takes the form of land development, which has
been seen, is only a partial answer to the problem of individual and
community outlook. It provides for those who, in present circumstances, wish
to become farmers on their own account; but, for the majority who do not so
wish, there is no alternative but to live in poverty or move to where work is
offering. 277
Multiple ownership within the existing land tenure structure was singled out by The
New Zealand Herald in 1960, following a week-long investigation into the
abandonment of Maori land, as the reason why Maori had left thousands of acres of
their land, and why farming represented a challenge for those who wanted to farm:
County officers and dairy company representatives say that Maori have
walked off farms because their co-owners have demanded a share of the
profits although, in some cases, they do not even live in Northland.
They say the department has done its best to secure, for approved Maoris,
economic properties to which title may be gained. The department is
powerless to help many other Maoris because they have no security of tenure
to the land they work and the department cannot lend them money for that
reason. 278
In trying to understand the drift of Maori farmers from the land, a departmental official
J.A. McKain noted in 1960 that, for those Maori farmers who had stopped production
and who were no longer supplying cream, their land was still being used in some
form but:
It is perfectly evident that the majority of the cases referred to are uneconomic
farms. In fact a good proportion of the properties referred to are so small that
could hardly be called farms. There is no doubt that a number of these went
into dairy production in the days of the depression and during the intervening
25-30 years have served their purpose.
Undoubtedly the standard of living of the Maori people has increased
tremendously over the last 25 years. Whereas then a 12 to 20 cow proposition
was considered satisfactory it is, under present-day conditions, no good.
Maoris have come to learn that they cannot hope to get the standard of living
they wish from a small uneconomic property. 279
277
Frazer, ‘Maori Land and Maori Population in the Far North’, ibid, p. 37
The New Zealand Herald, 9 May 1960, ‘Main Problem Multiple Ownership: Idle Maori Farms in Northland’
279
McKain J.A., Drift of the Maori Farmers from the Land, June 1960, AAMK 869 48/2/1
278
157
Views on the matter of the difficulties of Maori farming were expressed by E.C. Bott,
Chairperson of the Hokianga County Council as recorded in the Auckland Star in
1960. Basically in his view Maori farming struggled because of the:
(1) Inability of Maoris to raise finance to enable them to develop their farms.
(2) Insecurity of title through a multiplicity of ownership.
(3) Failure of the Maori Land Court to deal effectively with Maori land
problems under existing legislation.
(4) Problems in some instances of uneconomic units.
(5) Repayment of capital mortgages is so severe that many farmers have very
little left to provide for wives and families.
(6) Lack of access roads. 280
Walzl covers in detail the wide range of commonly held views about the issues
facing productive Maori farming. 281 Bassett and Key discuss the findings of a
Committee of Investigation held in 1960 on Maori farming in Northland, which
identified Maori farms as being too small to be economic and having too many
owners as the main problems. 282 Regardless of what strategies were adopted to
assist Maori farming, the numbers who could be employed within it, especially given
its troubled state, were insufficient to account for the growing Maori population
needing work.
Since Maori were not integrated into employment within farming or the service
industries of the towns within their immediate locality, where employment
opportunities would have been limited anyway due to the small population size of
these towns, the only other work alternatives were larger scale industries requiring
many unskilled workers, public works schemes or migration. Involvement in the
mainstream commercial economy within off-farm enterprises, such as small
business, services and the professions remained generally more limited for Maori, as
noted in the previous chapter. As Walzl cites concerning Maori employment in 1965:
In rural areas 50% of Maori males worked in extractive industries including
farming, forestry, hunting, fishing, mining and quarrying. A further 20% worked
in manufacturing (this included freezing works), 17% in construction and 8%
280
Auckland Star, 9 June 1960, ‘Maori Owners Seek Individual Land Titles’, AAMK 869 48/2/1
Walzl, ibid, pp 897-968
282
Bassett and Key, ibid, pp 145-149
281
158
in transport. In the urban areas, 40% were in manufacturing, 20% in
construction and 20% in transport.
• For Maori women, 50% were employed in service industries in rural areas,
20% in extractive industries and 15% in manufacturing. In the urban areas this
changed to 40% in services, 40% in manufacturing and only 1% in extractive
industries. 283
Walzl’s analysis of employment patterns demonstrates that the Te Raki region
offered decreasing opportunities for work within the rural environment for a growing
Maori population and provided more limited options within a much smaller urban
environment than other regions of New Zealand. 284
As regards industrial development, there has been up to the present very little in the
Te Raki region, with only one freezing works at Moerewa, the Marsden Point
refinery, a major dairy processing plant just outside Whangarei and another in
Maungaturoto down from six plants in the 1960s, and one fertilizer works. 285 The
inability to attract investment into the region post-war had retarded the development
of a fishing industry. While in 1961 there were 134 vessels licensed for commercial
fishing, ‘no more than a quarter landed fish to a value exceeding £500 for the year.
This indicates that most of the 160 fishermen, of whom the majority are Maori or
Dalmatian, have alternative employment to supplement their incomes’. The real
issue was ‘that unless Northland can supply markets further afield or develop a fishprocessing industry of importance there seems little likelihood of expansion either in
the size of the present fleet or the number of men engaged’. 286
This situation had changed to some extent by the 1990s:
The region’s coastal waters support a substantial commercial fishery, based
on finned fish such as snapper, flounder and mullet. There are also crayfish,
scallop, cockle, pipi and tuatua fisheries. Marine farming, a profitable resource
from earliest years, by 1999 produced nearly half the country’s exports of
Pacific oysters, and three-quarters of its mussel spat. 287
283
Walzl, ibid, p. 658, citing a study ‘Our Maori Population and Labour Force’ July 1965
Walzl, ibid, p 174, pp 636 -662, pp 1124-1132, and pp 1492-1505 for an analysis of Maori and Te Raki Maori
employment figures and occupations over time, in relation to the general and local economy
285
Alexander, ibid, p. 306
286
Northland regional survey, ibid, p. 121
287
www.teara.govt.nz/en/northland-region/10 (accessed 5 August 2012)
284
159
The extent of Maori involvement in these enterprises, whether as owners, managers
or workers, might be usefully explored with claimants to identify patterns.
An
emerging pattern seems to be that for those Maori staying in the region who can find
work, the need is to find multiple sources of work since one occupation may not be
sufficient to survive on adequately.
In the 1960s, some significant non-agricultural development began to occur for the
first time in the district, in and around Whangarei. The table below shows
employment growth rates in surveyed industries within the Northland region including
Hobson and Mangonui. The growth of most industries was affected by the expansion
and contraction of the construction industry in the mid-1960s. Projects such as the
construction of the Marsden Point oil refinery and coal-fired power station, and a
cement works, resulted in an increase of 1300 employees in the construction
industry workforce between 1962 and 1967. Between April 1967 and April 1968,
though, there was a reduction in the workforce equal to about half of the increase
that had occurred during the previous five years and, although there was some
growth from 1969, employment in that industry remained lower than it had been in
1966 and 1967. From 1970 to 1974, growth rates in most industries on average
seemed to have returned to levels similar to those prevailing before 1962, but the
downturn in 1968 had a more dramatic effect within Northland in terms of numbers
losing employment.
Table 12 – Surveyed Employment Annual Growth Rates by Industry Group 1956-1974
Industry
1956-62
1962-67
1967-68
1968-74
Manufacturing
2.64%
6.15%
- 2.58%
2.65%
Building
and - 0.21`%
Construction
12.95%
- 28.28%
3.98%
Transport and 1.85%
Communication
3.30%
- 4.86%
1.64%
Community and 2.57%
Personal
Services
4.91%
- 2.71%
0.10%
160
Wholesale and 3.09%
Retail Trade
5.53%
- 3.70%
1.94%
Finance
1.82%
Insurance and
Real Estate
8.77%
0.00%
0.37%
Electricity, Gas 2.84%
and Water
9.00%
7.13%
- 1.73%
Forestry,
Logging,
Mining,
Quarrying
-2.63%
4.72%
-4.18%
4.16%
2.20%
4.97%
-6.30%
2.29%
New 2.64%
3.51%
-1.85%
2.68%
and
Total Northland
Total
Zealand
Source: Employment Distribution and Potential in Northland, (Department of Labour 1976), p. 7
Manufacturing industries in Northland in 1974 employed 15.0 percent of the labour
force whereas nationally the proportion was 25.1 percent and only 9.4 percent were
employed in non-seasonal manufacturing compared with 19.3 percent for New
Zealand as a whole. Women’s employment tended to be concentrated in service
industries to a greater extent than nationally because of the lack of light
manufacturing. Only 8.3 percent of the female labour force was employed in
manufacturing compared with 22.2 percent for New Zealand as a whole. Of the 750
employed in this sector, 340 were in clothing factories: 288
Seasonal manufacturing accounts for over one-third of manufacturing
employment in Northland, compared with one-sixth nationally. Of the 1750
workers in this group, about 1200 are employed in the meat freezing industry
at Moerewa, 530 in various dairy factories and 22 in seafood processing.
Despite the prevalence of seasonal employment, the overall seasonal surge
in employment has been small compared with that in other predominantly
agricultural regions. This is because of a longer killing season in the Northland
freezing works and their wider range of processing activities. 289
288
Figures derived from Employment Distribution and Potential in Northland, (Department of Labour, 1976), p.
12
289
Employment Distribution and Potential in Northland, ibid, p. 12
161
The growth and expansion of industries and employment prospects around them
was not sustained, and by 1974, Northland’s brief economic surge, centred on
construction in Whangarei, was largely over. In 1996, Northland was still the least
urbanised area of New Zealand with only 51.9 percent of the population living in
urban areas, compared with the national figure of 85.6 percent. 290 Whangarei, as the
table below indicates, contributed a substantial portion of the urbanised total.
Table 13: Whangarei Population Growth in relation to selected North Island cities
1911
1936
1961
1996
Population
Population
Population
Population
(excluding Maori)
Whangarei
2,664
9,868
21,790
45,891
Wanganui
14,702
25,750
35,694
41,097
Hamilton
3,542
20,096
50,505
158,046
New Plymouth 5,238
18,597
32,387
48,870
Tauranga
1,346
5,808
24,659
82,287
Hastings
6,286
17,920
32,490
58,494
Rotorua
2,390
8,899
25,068
54,297
Palmerston
10,991
24,372
43,185
73,860
North
Source: New Zealand Official Year Book 2000, p. 95
In comparison to these other population centres, Whangarei either developed late, or
grew more slowly, or after a period of growth then slowed. Hamilton, Tauranga and
Rotorua were able to expand significantly, being in reasonably close proximity to
each other and to Auckland. The more diverse economic activities and opportunities,
the greater numbers of people and the positive feedback into better infrastructure
and further opportunities for commercial development that other regions of the North
Island were able to concentrate productively, could not be easily replicated within
Northland, as evidenced by its slower rate of urban growth and larger rural
population. Walzl shows that, by the early twenty-first century, Te Raki Maori were
still largely employed, where they could find employment, within lower skilled, lower
290
Prepared by Statistics New Zealand, Regional and International Statistics Division and published by the
Publishing and Community Information Division of Statistics New Zealand, November, 1999, ‘A Regional
Profile: Northland’, p. 15
162
paid occupations within Te Raki, more so than for non-Te Raki Maori and non-Maori
generally who benefitted from a greater diversity of opportunities and occupations
within New Zealand. 291
Throughout this period, the government was kept informed, indeed sought to keep
itself informed, of Maori concerns, including the concerns of Te Raki Maori, through
commissions and reports to do with land, the activities of the Maori Land Court
(reviewed in 1980), legislative changes around Maori Land administration such as
occurred in various acts and amendments in 1953, 1967, 1974 and 1993,
parliamentary questions, and census and statistical information. There was also the
Department of Maori Affairs, which developed into the Ministry of Maori Affairs or Te
Puni Kokiri. Land marches, protests and the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal
all add to a list of channels through which the government was kept informed of
Maori concerns. One might think that the government was perhaps better informed
on the range of issues to do with Maori including Te Raki Maori, and the competing
arguments as to how best approach and address Maori issues than on many other
social or economic issues. Again, of course, knowledge of issues does not
necessarily translate into policies entirely agreeable to those trying to effect change.
The Hunn report provides an insight into the situation of Maori in general up to 1960,
and where the report believes government action should be concentrated. 292 The
following long excerpt from the report captures many aspects of its overall
conclusions and the author’s beliefs about the urgency with which the government
should respond:
226. Full integration of the Maori people into the main stream of New Zealand
life is coming to be recognised as just about the most important objective
ahead of the country today. The point was brought out strongly in the editorial
column of the New Zealand Herald on 23 May 1960, as under:
Maoris in a Changing Role
The painless absorption of the fast-growing Maori population into the
economic and social structure of the European is the great problem
facing both races in New Zealand today… As his numbers increase,
the Maori in his search for opportunity is turning from his traditional
rural way of life and moving to the city. In 1945, 19.5 per cent of the
291
292
Walzl, ibid, pp 1492-1505
Hunn J.K., ‘Report on the Department of Maori Affairs, with statistical supplement’, AJHR, 1961, G. 10
163
Maori population lived in the towns; in 1956 this percentage had
increased to 27.75, and it is still rising. Preparation for the migration
has been limited and every day its need becomes more apparent. The
Maori must be educated for his new role in the city, not only in his
personal behaviour but also vocationally … Although various
Government agencies built nearly 4,000 homes for Maori families
between 1951 and 1956, the construction programme has barely kept
pace with the population increase. Poor housing leads to poor health,
poor family life, poor education, and poor moral health.
A similar sentiment was expressed, as follows, in a recent letter to the
Department (of Maori Affairs) by Professor W.G. Minn, Head of the School of
Social Science at the Victoria University of Wellington: ‘I regard the problems
of Maori Welfare to be next in importance to New Zealand’s economic
planning’.
227. Both these authorities were thinking of welfare in its widest sense, and
that is the end to which the efforts of the whole Department (of Maori Affairs),
not just one Division (Maori Welfare) are bent. 293
Unlike the last great transition in Maori economic life when land was processed
through the Native Land Court, and the attendant social, political and cultural
changes that partially ensued as a result, urbanisation was not only recognised as
rendering Maori vulnerable, but inspired a serious discussion and commitment to
assist Maori in this period of vulnerability. The Hunn report came up with various
options, which entered into broader political debate, but there was no doubt of the
government’s awareness of the adverse effects of socio-economic dislocation that
were occurring among Maori, and the seriousness with which it was urged to take
action.
While the Hunn report did not apply specifically to the Te Raki inquiry region, there
was nothing significantly different about the economic situation of Te Raki Maori that
would lead to the report’s general observations not being applicable to Maori within
this district. Other differences from earlier in the century were that Maori no longer
possessed a significant economic asset such as land that others sought, that their
‘problem’ was also a Pakeha problem in that Maori were coming to live and work
among Pakeha, that there was now (in 1960) a government department with some
long-term knowledge and experience of Maori economic challenges, and that Maori
themselves were more experienced in dealing with government departments. While
this conjunction of elements aided in a government recognition of problems that
293
‘Hunn Report’, pp 78-79
164
Maori faced and indicated a willingness to take action, the question as to how best to
tackle these disadvantages, to what precise end, and the extent of Maori input and
control of whatever solutions were proposed, could still be a source of discussion
and debate. While it is true that the government both recognised that there was a
problem with the socio-economic position of Maori, and tried to do something about
that position, the fact is that substantial damage had already been done that was not
easily rectified.
The government did continue to try from the 1950s onwards to find some way to
boost economic development in the Te Raki region. For Maori, development
schemes were continued although with mixed results as noted above and discussed
in depth by Bassett and Kay. With the apparent failure of consolidation and vesting,
a new approach to overcoming the obstacles represented to Maori economic
development by the land tenure system was tried; conversion.
As Walzl succinctly summarises:
The conversion programme established under the Maori Affairs Act 1953 was
an attempt to reduce the numbers of owners on individual titles by prohibiting
the further partition of uneconomic interests. Uneconomic interests were those
worth less than £25. A Conversion Fund was established from which payment
could be made to owners who sold their uneconomic shares. The fund
consisted of £50,000. Uneconomic shares could be compulsorily vested in the
Maori Trustee on the recommendation of the Maori Land Court. Conversion
would generally occur at the point of succession. In addition, Section
152(3)(c) of the Maori Affairs Act 1953 provided that interests acquired could
be sold to the Crown for the purposes of ‘any scheme for the development of
Maori land’. The intention of this section was that the Crown would acquire
interests in land development schemes, as this had the potential to simplify
the process of settling the schemes. If an entire scheme could be purchased
this would enable the Crown to eventually on-sell to those Maori farmers who
were settled on the scheme units without the need for consulting owners. 294
As Bassett and Kay set out, the purchase of uneconomic interests by the
government in the Tai Tokerau district was focussed on development scheme lands.
Up until 31 March 1958, within the Tai Tokerau district, conversion purchases were
made in 371 blocks with a total of 4,868 interests. A total of 2,818 interests were
onsold. There were 9,100 acres in the Conversion Fund and a total of £40,560 had
294
Walzl, ibid, p. 544
165
been paid. When compared to other regions throughout the country, the number of
interests purchased in the Tai Tokerau district was greater than the total number
purchased in the other five regions combined (3,093). The amount of land held under
conversion in Tai Tokerau was more than five times greater than the amount of land
held in all other districts. 295 The government’s rationale behind the purchase of the
development scheme district shares was to on-sell to the Maori farmers who were
settled on the scheme units. However, the reality was, that for many schemes
settlement was delayed over many years or even decades, and consequently the
government came to own a considerable and valuable interest in a number of
schemes. 296
In practice, this approach, while attempting to reduce the numbers of owners within
land blocks to create more economic units or build up more economic land block
units, meant that owners also lost land, and the rights and privileges that went with
land ownership. Nevertheless, given that various commentators, reports, and
investigations especially from the 1960s had identified multiple owned land as the
main problem for development, leading to uneconomic farms, the government
pressed ahead vigorously with this approach. Since land ownership was not simply
about owning an economically successful piece of land but had social and cultural
implications, this land conversion option, especially as extended by legislation
throughout the 1960s, led to significant national Maori protest, which finally in 1974
resulted in legislation significantly constraining the conversion of Maori land.
Further detail about conversion and how it was applied throughout the Te Raki
region along with the continuing drive to develop land and to prevent land reversion
is supplied in depth in Walzl and in Bassett and Kay. Broadly speaking, the
government had become committed to title improvement as the key approach to
bringing Maori land into full economic production, which was axiomatically
considered to be the primary purpose of land ownership. As Harris notes:
In the government’s view, communal ownership of Maori land worked against
the goal of bringing all Maori land into full production. It hindered the cultural
295
296
Bassett and Kay, ibid, p. 90
Bassett and Kay, ibid, p. 146
166
adjustment of Maori people to mainstream society, and indulged sentimental
attachments to valueless interests. Sole ownership or controlled ownership,
however, encouraged Maori farmers to maximize production on land they
could call their own, and about which they could make decisions without being
fettered by obligations to whanau and tribe. 297
As Harris also discusses, there was another option available to enable Maori to
potentially use their land in a productive manner, namely by incorporation and, after
changes introduced in the Maori Affairs Act 1953, also by trust. Incorporations and
trusts allow multiply owned land to be administered as if owned by one corporate
body or trust, although the legislative and administrative constraints under which
they have operated in practice over time since their establishment, in 1894 for
incorporations and from 1953 for trusts, have limited their potential and popularity
among Maori until recent times. 298
These entities have become steadily more important as vehicles for land use in the
Te Raki region. In 1989, the Maori Affairs Department was abolished and the control
of the land development schemes was transferred to the Iwi Transition Agency. The
restructuring of the Maori Affairs Department which involved the end of its role in
land development and farming eventually led to a change of policy. It was decided
that the government would cease all control of development schemes by 1991.
Negotiations with Maori owners continued over the late 1980’s, and in most cases
the government finally agreed to write off all or nearly all of the debt involved with the
development schemes prior to their return to the owners. 299 The remaining land in
Tai Tokerau schemes was mostly returned in the form of farm stations which had
proved to be unprofitable when run by the Board of Maori Affairs. Four properties,
Motatau/Pokapu, Ngaiotonga, Okaroro, and Omapere-Rangihamama, were returned
to the control of Maori incorporations, and Waima, Awarua, Oromahoe, Te Horo and
Waiomio were resumed by Section 438 Trusts. 300
Walzl summarises the recent situation regarding incorporations and trusts:
297
Harris, ibid, p. 151
See Bayley N., Boulton L. and Heinz A., ‘Maori Land Trusts and Incorporations in the Twentieth Century in
the Central North Island Inquiry District, Summary’, (Waitangi Tribunal, 13 June 2005)
299
Bassett and Kay, ibid, p. 583
300
Bassett and Kay, ibid, p. 588
298
167
In Tai Tokerau most land management takes place under trusts.
Nevertheless, Tai Tokerau has 15 incorporations (i.e. 9.4% of all
incorporations) making it the fourth and therefore middle Land Court district as
far as numbers of incorporations are concerned. These incorporations
account for 33,801 Ha which is 38.7% of the area of Tai Tokerau’s managed
lands and again is fourth highest amongst all districts. The small number of
incorporations, however, means that comparisons between districts or across
land area categories are not really feasible.
Tai Tokerau has 517 trusts managing 53,454 hectares. When the number of
trusts in different land size categories is taken into account, Tai Tokerau is
shown to be below the national average in 8 of 12 land area categories,
although the difference often is not large. Compared with other districts, Tai
Tokerau appears to have a somewhat lower percentage of land than other
districts in the 0-0.4 Ha, 101-300 ha and 301-500 Ha categories. In addition,
Tai Tokerau had no trusts above 10,000 Ha. On the other hand, Tai Tokerau
has the highest percentage of trusts in the 11-30 Ha and 501-1500 Ha
categories. 301
The extent to which these entities have actually been successful for Maori and why
certain particular trust size preferences seem to have emerged, is something
claimants, particularly those directly involved in management as well as owners,
should be able to shed more light on. While incorporations and trusts may have
begun to provide more economic development opportunities, they are likely to
generate some tension among Maori owners: ‘The legal mechanism of trusts and
incorporations enables the issue of multiply-owned and fragmented title to be
separated from the issue of managing the land. This does not necessarily mean that
the cultural values and concerns of the Maori owners have automatically been
reconciled with economic imperatives.’ 302 Precisely how economic development is to
take place with Maori land, given the fragmented nature of much Maori land title and
the sometimes competing interests of Maori landowners, is not straightforward, but
at least there is now a genuine prospect of economic development for multiple
owned land which is not automatically impeded by the effects of succession.
What is consistent throughout the period is the type of obstacle identified as standing
in the way of Te Raki regional development generally, and Maori development in
particular. For example, in 1966, five broad issues affecting Northland regional
development were identified by a government department as:
301
302
Walzl, ibid, p. 1461
Bayley et al, ibid, p. 22
168
1. Farm production, which could be quickly and greatly increased, is being
held back by problems of land ownership; size of holdings; capital
insufficiency; poor roads; some water shortage; and too often insufficient
organised effort to overcome the existing problems, difficult though they may
be.
2. Afforestation and fishing, both of which industries have great potential, are
making to the region's economy only a small fraction of the contribution of
which they are capable. Both these activities are proceeding too
conservatively.
3. Both secondary and country roads reflect the under-developed condition of
the primary industries and obstruct the development of the tourist industry
which could otherwise be spectacular.
4. The progressiveness of most local bodies is hindered by the lack both of
adequate finance and full appreciation of the potential benefits of cooperation
and amalgamation.
5. The lack of potential for manufacturing development. 303
None of these issues were new, especially the concerns about infrastructure, the
lack of developments beyond pastoral farming, the problematic state of land title and
property size, lack of regional co-ordination among authorities and insufficiency of
capital.
In proceeding from the 1960s to the 1980s, largely the same difficulties facing Maori
economic development were still present. In 1984, the Tai Tokerau District Maori
Council set up a research team to report on the possibilities for developing Maori
land with the help of unemployed Te Raki Maori. The team reported the main issues
confronting people trying to develop their land included: multiple titles; inability to
trace owners; restrictions on land use; lack of business knowledge; lack of
experience with new land techniques; problems in gaining government approval for
projects because of the number of agencies which have to be consulted; lack of
roading and services; and absence of skilled leaders and labour for potential
projects. 304
Moving to the early twenty-first century, most of the obstacles to development
remain, despite some new ventures, as discussed in Walzl. 305 During 2001, Tai
303
‘Economic Survey of Northland’, (Department of Industries and Commerce, August 1966), p. 39
Kia Mataara Research Team, 1984, Land and People: Report of Kia Mataara Research Team to the
Taitokerau District Maori Council.
305
Walzl, ibid, pp 1466-1475
304
169
Tokerau Management Consultants prepared a report on Tai Tokerau Maori
economic development, 306 which also included Kaipara and Muriwhenua as well as
the Te Raki inquiry region. In examining issues related to land utilisation, they found
that a number of external factors relating to Maori and land use impacted on
development such as Treaty land claims, local council processes and relationships,
and access to finance for development.
Maori land development initiatives in the Tai Tokerau region were relatively small in
terms of commercial activity, with the Maori commercial asset base largely
concentrated in primary production sectors, such as farming and forestry, and
fisheries. Barriers to land use were linked to regional infrastructure and transport:
‘The majority of Maori land blocks are within the rural environment and in coastal
surroundings, with relatively poor road structures.’ 307 The consultants’ report noted
that Maori lived predominantly in the west and remote rural areas of Tai Tokerau
where there were obvious disadvantages such as access to some blocks being only
through use of lower quality unsealed roads. 308 Poor infrastructure regarding access
to water and electricity services for many Maori blocks was also an issue.
The consultants’ report pointed out that ‘multiple owned lands do not provide the
ability for owners to trade with their asset base that has investment potential and
economic value’. 309 This issue has bedevilled Te Raki Maori economic capability
since the nineteenth century, and despite the possibilities potentially offered by the
operation of incorporations and trusts, it still remains a canker on Maori land
development.
With local government, it was highlighted that the now long established structures of
government-instituted local authorities were still not attuned to the commercial and
strategic interests of Maori, at least as places where they could participate in
influential decision-making:
306
Tai Tokerau Management Consultants, August, 2001, Tai Tokerau Maori economic development report:
prepared for Te Puni Kōkiri. - http://www.tpk.govt.nz/publications/docs/TT_MEcoDev_Rept.pdf
307
Tai Tokerau Management Consultants, ibid, p. 16
308
Tai Tokerau Management Consultants, ibid, p. 17
309
Tai Tokerau Management Consultants, ibid, p. 17
170
…Throughout the interviews, many were of the view that relationships
between local government and Iwi must be strengthened as land comes back
into Maori ownership and strategic plans are implemented for Maori
development. There is a willingness and determination from Maori to have a
key role in the decision making process of district and regional strategic
planning. However, in order to undertake this, there also needs to be a
system in place that will enable this relationship to be manifested. 310
The consultants’ report also discussed forestry. As context to forestry development,
after the extractive native timber industry went into decline in the earlier twentieth
century, Maori derived little benefit from timber cutting leases, as Walzl notes: 311
Within Tai Tokerau, timber cutting leases do not feature significantly as a form
of development. Few leases at all occur before 1952 and the Tai Tokerau
leases account for less than 8% of the national number and less than 3% of
the acreage. This result is not surprising as the timber trade in Northland had
primarily occurred in the 19th and early 20th Century. By the 1940’s and
1950’s, the focus had shifted to the indigenous forests of the Central North
Island. 312
However, from the 1960s there was a dramatic expansion in exotic forestry.
Nuttall, 313 in discussing exotic forestry commercial opportunities for Maori in
Northland, noted as context the well-established obstacles to effective participation:
Maori land in Northland today is largely a legacy of blocks in the lessdesirable land: most of the prime land has been alienated. Much of the
remaining land which has been developed is in small marginal farms, and has
been fragmented by inheritance. Maori land development in Northland has
been limited in extent and success by problems of finance, land tenure,
legislation and availability of advisory services. The problems which must be
overcome by those wishing to retain and develop the land are very great: the
land is generally poor in soil type and fertility; management may be complex
and require very large financial commitments; finance must be raised;
conflicts between shareholders need to be mediated and technical expertise
obtained. 314
Written in 1981, and despite over 50 years of attempts to overcome these problems
well recognised by 1929, the core difficulties confronting Maori economic capability
310
Tai Tokerau Management Consultants, ibid, p. 19
Walzl, ibid, pp 548-559
312
Walzl, ibid, p. 555
313
Nuttall R., ‘The Impact of Exotic Forestry on Maori Land in Northland: A Point of View’, New Zealand Journal
of Forestry, 1981, Vol 26, pp 112-117
314
Nuttall, ibid, p. 112
311
171
remained irrepressibly evident to commentators. Nuttall observed that the leasing of
land for forestry development ‘has been perceived as a means of solving these
problems while providing financial returns, increasing local employment, rejuvenating
the declining rural community, and enabling ownership if not control to be
retained’. 315 By May 1979, some 19,530 hectares of the total area of Maori land in
Northland was tied up in eight long-term forestry leases, although much of this land
fell outside the Te Raki inquiry region, in Muriwhenua and Kaipara. 316 Nuttall did
sound some warnings, noting that the royalty basis of leasing was specifically
designed to ensure ‘that the lion’s share of any economic improvement shall pass to
the lessee (the grower being the real risk-bearer) not to the passive land owner’, and
that:
The profitability of pulpwood production appears to lie in processing and
exporting and not in the production of the pulpwood itself. If the lease
agreements provide only for royalty on stumpage, the owners of the land on
which the timber is grown will not share the benefits which accrue to the
exporting companies. 317
Claimants, including any signees of forestry leases, may be able to shed more light
on the nature of leasing agreements, especially as to what they cover given the
above comment. Returning to the consultants’ report, it noted that there were
approximately 26,600 hectares of pinus radiata on Maori owned land in Tai Tokerau.
The majority of these lands were noted as tied up in long-term leases, the larger
ones being the government (7,389Ha), Carter Holt (7,307Ha), Juken Nissho
(5,696Ha) and Taitokerau Forests (4,637Ha). In similar vein to Nuttall’s observations
in 1981, the consultants’ report considered that Maori investments in forest
ownership, forest management and new planting could potentially make significant
contributions to Maori economic and social development. 318
However, and again along the same lines as Nuttall, a further report completed in
2001 identified some key issues in relation to Maori forestry in Tai Tokerau:
Maori are mainly the landlords rather than the owners of most of the forests.
Therefore, in most cases they do not share in the profits. Forestry is a long
315
Nuttall, ibid, p. 112
Nuttall, ibid, p. 113
317
Nuttall, ibid, pp 114-115
318
Tai Tokerau Management Consultants, ibid, p. 22
316
172
term investment and does not generate income in the short term unless
agreeable financial arrangements can be established between the landowner
and financier. Forestry only generates employment during establishment,
silviculture and harvesting. Thus, there is a 15 year period with minimum
labour requirements. Other issues to consider include the opportunity in the
future for the role of a unified Tai Tokerau Maori Forest organisation, the
merits of training and employment opportunities in all aspects of the forest
industry, the merits of added value industries, and the possibility of carbon
credits and their impact upon the forest industry. 319
The extent to which the expansion of exotic forestry really has been or will be of
significant and lasting benefit to Maori is not clear, but for this industry to provide
significant economic development opportunities for Maori it would help to have more
wide ranging involvement for suitably empowered and experienced Maori entities
throughout the industry, particularly in the decision-making processes. Pakeha
engagement proceeds along these more comprehensive lines rather than in more
limited spheres of commercial initiative, such as leasing, which have tended to
characterise Te Raki Maori engagement.
Horticulture as a potential commercial venture was noted in the consultants’ report,
and this industry, and related activities such as manuka honey ventures, worm
farming and hemp growing, were considered to be of increasing importance in the
use of Maori land. 320 However, constraints included the small scale of operations,
lack of capital for establishment, a shortage of machinery, and a lack of information
on optimal land use at the micro-level, which mean at this point that horticulture is
not yet a significant source of economic development for Maori communities. 321 One
crop which is likely to be making some form of economic contribution to the region is
marijuana, as ‘Northland is the cannabis capital of the country, with a third of the
marijuana plants seized and destroyed by police in six-month long, nationwide
operations targeting drug growers and dealers grown in the region’. 322 The extent of
Maori involvement and the commercial advantages for Maori in marijuana cultivation,
319
APR Consultants for Northland Regional Economic Development Strategy Steering Group, December, 2001,
Strategy for the Sustainable Economic Development of Northland,
http://www.enterprisenorthland.co.nz/downloads/northland_strat.pdf
320
Tai Tokerau Management Consultants, ibid, p. 24
321
APR Consultants, ibid
322
Northern Advocate, ‘Jailed dope grower vows to sell again’, August 6 2012
173
over and above the social costs and illegality, has not been a subject for research for
this report.
A 2001 Treasury paper commented on the non-performance of Maori land as an
economic asset:
Similarly the on-going levels of deprivation in rural communities may be linked
to the non-performance of Maori land as an asset. The relatively small area of
Maori land, its poor quality and the multiple ownership institutional framework
for Maori land tenure are factors that contribute to continually low levels of
economic performance.
Within this bleak picture there are regional variations (over 70% of Maori
freehold land in the East Cape, and Northland is in the three poorest land use
capability classes). The diffusion of ownership rights constrains the ability of
owners to act concertedly (there are estimated to be 1.9 million individual
ownership interests for the 1.5 million hectares of Maori land, and the number
of ownership interests is estimated to increase by 185,000 per annum). Over
64% of all Maori land blocks (comprising about 20% of total area of Maori
land) have no formalised administrative structures. 323
The land tenure system even as modified over time was still a problem:
Among Maori land practitioners there is a growing view that the tenure
system, despite a major overhaul resulting in the Maori Land Act 1993, has
not yet achieved a balance between protecting land from further alienation
and enabling it to be used as a productive commodity. 324
While Walzl discusses some of the ongoing contributions and debates occurring
among regional development experts, government departments and local Maori over
the next stages of economic development, it is clear from the evidence assessed
that economic development in the region has been problematic for some time,
especially for Maori and in the use of Maori land. The Te Ture Whenua Maori Act
1993 appears to have gone some way to assisting Maori in dealing with their land,
but as Walzl notes there still remain challenges:
During 1993 the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act was passed with the dual goals
of land retention and development in relation to Maori land. Whilst the Act was
largely successful in relation to land retention over the subsequent years, the
effects of this Act on land development has been the subject of considerable
discussion. Attempts by Maori and iwi groups in the area of land utilisation
have continued to encounter a number of obstacles both on a national basis
and in the specific context of the Te Paparahi o te Raki inquiry district. 325
323
Claridge M., Geography and the Inclusive Economy: A Regional Perspective, (The Treasury,2001), Annex 4.
Claridge M., ibid
325
Walzl, ibid, p. 1444
324
174
Within the inquiry region, Te Raki Maori hold varying amounts of land within districts,
and this landholding pattern is likely to exercise an influence on the nature and pace
of future Te Raki Maori regional economic development overall.
Table 14: Land in Te Raki Maori Ownership in 2012 326
District
Total approximate area of
district (acres)
Bay of Islands
Whangaroa
Hokianga
Whangarei
Mahurangi and Gulf Islands
Total
420,054
212,485
283,449
684,883
522,277
2,123,148
Approximate amount of
land in Maori ownership
today (%) 327
16
8
23
4
1
10
Source: Crown Statement of Position and Concessions, 6 July 2012, pp 10-11 (Wai 1040, #1.3.2)
Map 13, below, indicates the major historical block divisions around transactions and
titling that now mark this land. When compared with the soil and slope class maps in
chapter three, and the land use map from earlier in this chapter, it is clear that the
lands still owned by Te Raki Maori have been and remain challenging to develop
commercially.
326
As a general footnote to this table, the Crown notes ‘The map and data showing land loss identifies all land
held in Maori freehold title within the Tribunal’s five regions regardless of which iwi might have interests in
that land. The Tribunal's Hokianga region includes land on both the north and south of the harbour. For the
purposes of reaching the figure of 23%, that did not include the area covered by the Hokianga harbour itself’.
327
The Crown footnoted as follows ‘This is an estimate calculated by adding up the acreage for all blocks
identified in the CFRT block list created for the Te Paparahi o Te Raki inquiry. The Crown commissioned SKM to
locate some additional blocks in parts of the district that had not been identified previously. These blocks have
been added to the overall calculation. As those who have worked on the mapping are aware, not all land
blocks in Te Paparahi o Te Raki have been accounted for as it is difficult to locate records for all areas’.
175
Map 13: Northland Maori Blocks Overview Map, (Source: Crown Law, 2012), (Wai 1040, #1.3.1(a))
In the major successful economic initiatives of the twentieth century for the region,
that is predominately pastoral farming but with exotic forestry also of growing
significance, Pakeha have generally been better placed to take advantage of the
profitable exploitation of these opportunities. What has not occurred for either
Pakeha or Maori in the region is a diversity of profitable commercial enterprises, the
absence of which has led to migration and urbanisation to other parts of the country
and elsewhere as the region cannot employ within the limited economic activities
available the numbers of people who seek work.
For those who remain in the region, unemployment has been a major and persistent
problem over time, especially since the 1970s. Walzl has discussed the
unemployment issue in detail, and is able to draw on wide ranging evidence to
demonstrate consistently higher, sometimes significantly higher, levels of Te Raki
176
Maori unemployment. 328 While many Maori from the region migrated to find work,
their general dependence on employment within the unskilled labour market made
job security precarious.
The particularly turbulent period after 1985 following major restructuring of the New
Zealand economy highlighted the damage that can be done economically to the
prospects of Te Raki Maori when growth slows and employment contracts,
particularly in the unskilled area. Not only did a limited job market in the region
decline even further but employment opportunities were reduced nationwide. Also,
as government social and economic priorities changed, this impacted on the nature
of its participation in the economy, and the extent to which the government was
actively able to assist vulnerable groups through the provision of employment:
In the forestry, mining, communications, and transport sectors there has been
a high level of government involvement/ownership, through the New Zealand
Forest Service, State Coal, the communications arm of the New Zealand Post
Office, New Zealand Railways, and the Electricity Division of the Ministry of
Energy. The commercial functions of these organisations were often in conflict
with the social objective, which was to create employment, particularly in the
regions. Many of the jobs were also low skill/low technology positions, and
thus provided opportunities for Maori with few skills. A need to reduce
government spending, plus a recognition of the need to make the business
operations more internationally competitive, saw the formation of the Forestry
Corporation, Coalcorp, Telecom, the Railways Corporation and Electricorp,
with a corresponding shedding of labour. 329
While governments cannot guarantee the best economic conditions for all peoples,
nevertheless the historical circumstances of Te Raki Maori meant that generally they
remained particularly vulnerable to instability or downturns in the economy, as well
as government policies to pull back from active participation as an employer in the
economy.
Regrettably, the broad and particular changes introduced within the New Zealand
economy by the government in the 1980s and 1990s did not seem to have
sufficiently considered the likely impact on Te Raki Maori communities, or if they did,
insufficient safeguards were put in place to lead Maori in this region through a
328
Walzl, ibid, see especially pp 1421-1431
Callister P., ‘Implications for Maori Development: Economic and Sectoral Trends to 1997’, (New Zealand
Planning Council, Wellington, 1989), p. 6
329
177
difficult transition. 330 This could not have been through lack of information as census
figures detailed clearly the rise in unemployment, apart from the direct protest of
Maori themselves. The government made choices from the 1980s within the
international and national constraints it believed itself to be under, and these choices
were not especially helpful to a significant number of Te Raki Maori.
The problems with regional economic development, particularly the issues that face
Te Raki Maori, were reiterated yet again as late as 2012 at an economic summit held
in Waitangi on 6 June, by the Finance Minister, Bill English in drawing attention to
under-utilised Maori land:
There’s more here than probably anywhere else in the country, and it’s all to
do with the way the law affects that land. There have been attempts in the
past to deal with it and they’ve been unsuccessful, but we might have another
crack at that. The problem is how to get decisions without creating more
grievances by over-riding property rights. We just need to be a bit more
innovative. 331
While clearly a work in progress, the facts of limited economic opportunity, as well as
serious challenges to addressing outstanding constraints and advancing Maori
economic capability, remain firmly on the agenda as requiring urgent attention for all
concerned with the future and welfare of Maori in this region.
Note on Migration
Walzl has dealt with migration and urbanisation comprehensively in his report, in
particular through the provision of statistics and discussion of the social and cultural
aspects of such dislocation over time. It needs to be emphasised that migration, as
noted in the second chapter of this report, is a standard feature of societies
undergoing capitalistic transformation. Pakeha coming to New Zealand were but a
small part of a huge wave of migration out of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries in the face of economic, social, cultural, technological and political changes
that reduced the economic capability of millions of Europeans – migrants left to find
better work opportunities than existed in Europe, and create or be part of political
structures that they could influence in their favour. On arriving in New Zealand,
330
Walzl, ibid, pp 1421-1431 and pp 1492-1500 for the significantly higher and growing unemployment rate
among Te Raki Maori from the mid 1980s into the 1990s compared to national unemployment rate figures
331
Comments as recorded in Northern Advocate, 11 June 2012
178
Pakeha over time have internally migrated within New Zealand depending on where
economic opportunities appear to be most promising, and the economic possibilities
that can flow from migration have also been attractive to Maori. 332 As such, a degree
of internal and external migration is a routine feature of New Zealand society not an
anomaly.
Urbanisation is a subset of migration, describing the movement of peoples from rural
environments to urban environments. Again, it has been a standard feature of
capitalist societies, and indeed virtually all societies since the nineteenth century.
Urbanisation generally occurs in relation to the technological developments that
capitalism fosters, leading to concentrations of peoples and skills to take advantage
of economies of scale around communication, transport, labour, resources,
commercial infrastructure, and the productive interconnections of all these factors
which, in co-ordination, accelerate growth and productivity. Cities become nodal
points of economic energy and transformation. Rural areas cannot sustain
comparable levels of economic activity and employment, hence the steady
movement from the countryside to cities that has characterised the social geography
of the planet for over two centuries. Even countries that experimented with noncapitalist strategies, such as communism, experienced sharp urban growth as they
sought to compete with the industrial and commercial power of capitalist societies.
Urbanisation has therefore not unexpectedly been a characteristic of New Zealand
society. As agriculture in particular developed, its productivity and growth depended
in part on its successful commercialisation, and the supporting urban infrastructures
that developed around it. In the nineteenth century, Auckland emerged early as a
strong centre of commercial development, but for a time cities in the South Island
also grew vigorously on the back of gold and agricultural exploitation. As economic
opportunities were opened up on North Island land by the breaking in of new land
obtained from Maori, technological advances around refrigeration, a Pakeha332
Sources for the following brief discussion of broad aspects of migration and urbanisation are Dunstall G.,
‘The Social Pattern’, in Rice (ed), ibid, chap 17; Johnston R.J., Urbanisation in New Zealand, (Auckland,1973);
Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, ibid; Phillips J., and Hearn T., Settlers: New Zealand Immigrants from
England Ireland and Scotland 1800-1945, (Auckand,2008); Simpson T., The Immigrants, (Auckland,1997);
Watters R.F, (ed), Land and Society in New Zealand Essays in Historical Geography, (Auckland 1965)
179
favouring legal and administrative environment encouraging the use of government
and private support for commercial development, so too did urban development take
off in the North Island and cities grew.
Given this phenomenon of urban growth, the state has little role or responsibility in
deciding whether urbanisation should proceed or not. If the economy is growing in a
standard capitalist environment, urbanisation will be occurring. Where it occurs
cannot always be known in advance, though in hindsight it is usually clear why some
locations seem to grow at the possible expense of others. Settlements are often
initially chosen due to some favourable natural feature such as a deep water
harbour, a sheltered bay, near productive land, and/or to confirm a local alliance, or
for a ready capacity for defence. Once started, a settlement may grow or it may not
depending on a range of circumstances over time, including competition from other
settlements, the major economic development path followed which may in time
privilege some locations more than others, the proximity to resources, and then,
once launched, the capacity to draw and channel people, skills and enterprises into
an ongoing economically productive relationship. Within New Zealand, Auckland
remains the outstanding example of this developmental process.
Regional development must involve cities as the nodal points of intensified economic
activity, and the region must in turn be able to sustain a range of commercial activity
and growth for which the city or cities becomes the expression. Some parts of New
Zealand have been less successful in achieving consistent economic development
and growth over time, including the Te Raki region. A major factor retarding
economic growth in Te Raki has been the lack of economic diversity. Pastoral
farming developed, after the decline of extractive industries, as the key commercial
enterprise, but the region posed serious environmental challenges and costs to the
expansion of that activity, which allowed other regions to develop more
competitively. Other economic opportunities such as forestry, tourism, fishing or
horticulture have not as yet provided a complementary capacity to develop swiftly.
The retardation of economic expansion delayed the development of infrastructure,
which acted as a disincentive and constraint for subsequent commercial ventures,
especially in relation to locations better placed. While the problems of under
development in the Te Raki region, particularly around unemployment, poorer health,
180
education, and social marginalisation, have been discussed in numerous reports and
inquiries over time, and the need for economic development articulated through a
plethora of forums, conferences, reports, and investigations (which Walzl explores
and discusses in depth), the reality is that regional development in this area has not
yet overcome its many obstacles to growth especially employment growth, and
remains less competitive compared to other regions of New Zealand. Yet the region
is developing its primary industries such as agriculture, seafood and aquaculture,
and forestry and horticulture, which demonstrate genuine economic growth potential.
The higher than average unemployment rate of the region and the loss of people
through migration has been a cost to the region and a drag on economic
development. As Frazer noted in 1958:
Outward migration of a section of the population, principally the young and
unmarried people, is removing the most energetic section in most Maori
communities, and is causing the total population increase to be small for the
areas as a whole. In some counties the decline is evident despite the large
families and high birthrate. The resultant unbalanced population structure may
be both a cause and an effect of the relatively undeveloped nature of the
Maori lands and the distinctive appearance which they present. 333
Urbanisation has always involved severe disruption of social and cultural patterns of
life. No society has undergone an urbanising experience without some degree of
trauma, and the risks and challenges of survival and flourishing in urban
environments have often been onerous, and still are, for millions around the world.
As Walzl demonstrates, Maori were not an exception, and urbanisation affected Te
Raki Maori communities profoundly. 334 No government anywhere has been able to
direct a well-managed, progressive and minimally disruptive urbanisation, as the
process is not one directly under the control of governments, but some states have
been better placed than others to deal with the resulting upheaval. While not
minimising the challenges facing Te Raki Maori in migrating and urbanising, and
their courage in facing them, it was a fortuitous situation that the major surge of
Maori people leaving for cities occurred in the 1950s and 1960s in New Zealand
when there was generally a good range of paying jobs in skilled and unskilled work
333
334
Frazer, ‘Maori Land and Maori Population in the Far North’, ibid, pp 75-6
See in particular Walzl, ibid, pp 871-896 and pp 1492-1596
181
available. 335 While the government struggled to provide the necessary social
infrastructure and support for the needs of thousands in growing cities particularly
Auckland, it was spared the instability that might have resulted from multitudes of
urban unemployed. Urbanisation in short opened up economic opportunities for Te
Raki Maori not available in their own region, as well as challenging Te Raki Maori to
engage with and find a place within a new social and cultural environment.
The fortuitous fact of economic growth and stability for a good period of time postwar, from which all New Zealanders benefited, was not obviously something
specifically designed for Te Raki Maori. 336 Yet it did offer some hope of economic
advancement from the previous state of subsistence living, and many local Maori
took advantage of this. It also demonstrated what conditions were necessary if Maori
communities were to advance economically in general terms, as opposed to what
certain individuals or groups might attain. A general economic situation of growth,
stability, individual, legal and property security, job availability and social support
definitely helps, while not of course addressing all the broader cultural and social
needs and aspirations of Te Raki Maori.
Job availability, and the opportunity to save money and purchase more of what one
required, gave some Maori a degree of experience in what economic development
might mean. However, the necessity of taking unskilled positions in urban settings
where greater economic needs had to be satisfied through paid labour, meant that
these Maori were particularly vulnerable to any downturn in the unskilled labour
market. Walzl provides detailed statistics and extensive commentary on urbanisation
and its impact on Te Raki Maori communities throughout his report. 337 Urbanisation
also confirmed that whatever the place of their remaining land might be in the
general picture of Te Raki economic life, working on the land would never be an
adequate or even feasible working career for the majority of Maori from this region.
When employment opportunities declined from the mid 1970s, migration became a
less attractive option financially, and led in turn to increased unemployment in the Te
335
Bertram G., ‘The New Zealand Economy, 1900-2000’, in Byrnes (ed), ibid, pp 560-561
For a good general survey see Hawke G., ‘Economic Trends and Economic Policy, 1938-1992’, in Rice (ed),
ibid, chap 16
337
See in particular Walzl, ibid, pp 871-896 and pp 1492-1596
336
182
Raki region as the safety value of migration drew off fewer people. Finding ways to
both grow the New Zealand economy and provide adequate work for its population
remains a major political challenge, for which there are not as yet any easy answers.
It is not possible in this report to identify or quantify the extent that remittances sent
back to the Te Raki region from local Maori working in other parts of New Zealand
may have stimulated the local Te Raki Maori economy, but such a relationship,
should it have existed, would still be one of precarious dependence. As energetic
members of the community leave, taking their skills and experience to other areas,
and acquiring further expertise while there, the effect on local Maori economic
initiatives is likely to have been negative. The poorer regional economy of the region
meant that Te Raki Maori who stayed would struggle anyway in the competition for
resources or to develop economically feasible ventures. The extent to which Maori
commercial ventures have been successful in recent years, and what has been
needed to promote that success including perhaps links with former residents of the
district who have been economically successful elsewhere, might be usefully
explored with claimants.
Conclusion
In the decades from the 1950s, pastoral farming in particular dairy farming, grew
steadily in the Te Raki region. It was a Pakeha dominated commercial activity,
although Maori were extensively engaged in it also. Pakeha however had obtained
the best land, had readier access to supporting infrastructure including towns, and
farmed larger units. Farming the land was an economic capability enhancing venture
for Pakeha, and working in tandem with local and national government support to
break in new land, apply fertilizer, and raise loans fostered the expansion of Pakeha
economic dominance. However, the region did not much diversify in its economic
development, which meant that towns remained small, and except in parts of the
region around Whangarei, infrastructure especially roads was late in coming
compared to other regions of the country. When a degree of diversification began
from the 1980s, the region still faced practical obstacles around infrastructure and
limited urban development beyond Whangarei that inhibited competitive growth.
183
Maori had faced development obstacles, particularly as noted in previous chapters
around the use of their lands in an economically competitive manner. Consolidation
and land development schemes had been promoted by governments and to some
extent taken up by Maori as means to overcome the land use obstacles, but with
limited success. Land conversion was tried more aggressively from the 1960s
onwards but also with less commercial benefit than hoped and provoking much
greater resistance from Maori. The reality was that the unfavourable land tenure
regime under which Maori land was held was still by the twenty-first century a
significant impediment to the development of Maori economic capacity. Numerous
commentators and experts, including government officials, reported throughout the
period on the problematic state of Maori land title, and linked this issue explicitly with
the poor state of Maori land use. Given successful land use was the key to economic
capability in this region, any obstacle faced by Maori that competitors did not face
could only affect their overall economic position negatively. Even if Maori
communities had wanted to invest in other areas of economic activity, the
problematic state of Maori land title made raising capital and loans more challenging.
Not that economic success would have been guaranteed for Te Raki Maori had their
land title situation been greatly improved. Pakeha already had substantial
advantages due to their ownership of better quality, better located, and better
developed land, as well as the skills and experience derived from many years of
successful land use and management within a more favourable land tenure regime
and their own controlled local government environment. But the effect of not being
able to use their land effectively increased the chances of Te Raki Maori community
marginalisation, making them generally poorer, with less opportunity to bring about
better health and education, and isolating them from decision-making processes
affecting their communities.
While Pakeha, unsurprisingly therefore, did better economically generally speaking
than Te Raki Maori, the region continued to lag behind other more prosperous, more
populated and more economically dynamic parts of New Zealand. Given Maori
numbers in the region, to inhibit or not effectively encourage Maori economic
development could only impact negatively on total regional development, as local
bodies had recognised in their struggle to raise finance from rates-compromised
184
Maori land. Furthermore, for neither Pakeha nor Maori in the region were there good
prospects for sustained employment for the population in this region. Migrating
Pakeha were in a stronger position to take better paid, more highly skilled jobs in
urban areas due in part to the advantages gained through education that their
economic position had allowed them greater opportunities to advance within. 338 The
economic constraints on Maori development meant that when growing numbers
migrated they were drawn into the lower skilled sections of the workforce.
Commercial agriculture is still a major economic activity within the region, which
although not labour intensive, occurs alongside a population nearly half rurally
based. Other economic opportunities have begun to develop, including horticulture,
fishing, forestry and tourism, but successful, commercially beneficial engagement for
Maori in these ventures is more likely if Maori participate as properly empowered
commercial entities, rather than primarily as casual or seasonal unskilled labour. As
the character of successful Pakeha economic initiatives demonstrates, it would help
Te Raki Maori economic development if suitably robust commercial entities with
sufficient economic muscle arose for Maori communities to raise capital, or enter into
partnerships with other private or state initiatives, or expect to be consulted and
involved in regional development as powerful and influential stakeholders. Once the
forceful economic presence of Maori were re-established within the region as a part
of overall economic development, rather than as a burden and obstacle to
development, then more effective political engagement at a local level would be
more likely to follow as Maori-derived proposals for change and development began
to have implications for the overall shape and direction of the region.
In the meantime, high unemployment and migration which have characterised Maori
community experience for the last number of decades are likely to continue. Trusts
and incorporations offer some opportunities for a more empowered Maori economic
engagement, but there is no guarantee that the economic opportunities developed
will greatly impact on reducing the jobless in the region. There are therefore major
challenges ahead for this region for all concerned, but a Maori economic capability
338
See Walzl, ibid, pp 1075-1141 for education and employment comparisons
185
freed from legal and administrative constraints still stifling Maori development would
likely enhance the possibilities of overall economic success.
The government, as the authority regulating land tenure law and administration, has
not only played an influential role in the capacity of Maori communities to participate
in their region economically, but through its perceptions of Maori potential and
particular decisions around unlocking that potential, has directly contributed to the
overall state of Maori socio-economic and political performance in this region.
Regional development is not an exact science and it is not easy for politicians to
predict and implement policies that lead to an overall progressive development for all
regions in New Zealand. Nevertheless, the legacy of development in New Zealand
not always being to the benefit of Te Raki Maori would perhaps be less likely to
continue if at least two issues identified by Bill English, Minister of Finance, as
having the potential to transform the regional economy, namely the settling of treaty
claims and the issue of underutilised Maori land 339 were adequately addressed.
339
Northern Advocate, 11 June 2012, ‘Focus is on claims and Maori land’
186
Chapter 8: Conclusion
The interpretative framework adopted for this report as the best means to approach
economic issues, outlined in chapter 2, used economic capability as a key analytical
tool. Economic capability is founded on entitlements and empowerment, and how
those two components are integrated within the political economy of the nation state.
Entitlements consist in the bundle of rights that an entity (an individual, family or
some other collectivity) has; empowerment concerns the ability to make use of those
rights; and political economy provides the context in which the entitlements and the
power to use them are set. To function adequately, an entity needs formally
recognised entitlements. To use entitlements an entity must be legally recognised
and empowered. Finally an entity must be able to participate in political processes
that may change entitlements or empowerment, that is, in the political economy.
Ability to develop economic capability means that these aspects are aligned in a
workable way. If these aspects are not aligned in a workable way, then economic
capability is retarded. This report has focussed on economic capability as the key
variable in coming to grips with the complexities of economic development and how
to address the question of responsibilities for outcomes.
The government plays a crucial role over time in setting and safeguarding
entitlements, deciding who is empowered and how empowerment operates, and sets
constraints on involvement in processes to modify entitlements and empowerment.
The local region provided the context in which the playing out of the government’s
involvement with local Maori economic capacity was explored. The opportunities that
were developed and the economic capability of Maori to engage with those
opportunities changed over time. The reasons for economic failure and success
spring from multiple sources, but the capability to engage economically with some
hope of success works within evolving government-controlled parameters of
possibility that have an important bearing on overall outcomes.
As part of the broader context for this report, the industrial revolution originated in
Britain which had a limited range of natural resources, at a time when synthetic
187
materials were not yet known. In these circumstances economic expansion was
transmitted to less developed areas by a steep and steady increase in Britain’s
demand for primary commodities which those areas were well suited to produce.
Local factors of production overseas, whose growth may in part have been induced
by trade, were thus largely absorbed by the expansion of profitable primary
production for export. On top of this, the industrial centre’s increasing demand for
raw materials and foodstuffs created incentives for capital and labour to move from
the centre to the outlying areas, accelerating the process of growth transmission
from the former to the latter.
New Zealand was one of a number of countries that benefited from this
arrangement. Capital poured in to open up the sheep country of the South Island,
and later the dairying land of the North Island; loans were issued to develop ports
and to build railways; migrants came in their thousands to open up the land –
peacefully and by force – and to settle it, mine the gold and to work in the towns; and
at the same time Britain’s market was opened up to the goods produced by New
Zealanders. Within this arrangement which lasted until the 1970s, New Zealand
became and remains a generally prosperous country.
But New Zealand became a satellite – admittedly a generally affluent one – of the
powerful industrial metropolis, utterly dependent on Britain’s market, and, to a lesser
extent on Britain’s loans and investment and its supply of migrants. Britain could
always have turned to a range of alternative suppliers of primary produce had New
Zealand failed, as its network of trade and investment was, in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, truly international. But New Zealand’s choice was strictly limited.
There was after the 1880s no major alternative market on which New Zealand could
sell its products. New Zealand’s whole economy, commercial legislation, political and
cultural attitudes were those of a colony providing for the needs of a mother country.
The economic effects of this colonial dependence have been explored by C.G.F.
Simkin and W.B. Sutch, and more broadly by Belich. 340
340
Simkin, C.G.F., The Instability of a Dependent Economy: Economic Fluctuations in New Zealand 1840-1914,
(Oxford,1951); Sutch, W.B., Colony or Nation? Economic Crises in New Zealand from the 1860s to the 1960s,
(Sydney,1966), and Belich J., Making Peoples and Paradise Reforged, ibid.
188
The opening up of the North Island for small-scale dairy farming throughout the
1890s and up to the First World War committed the country to an acute degree of
specialisation and reliance on the home market of Britain. Refrigeration provided the
basis for the dramatic expansion of the new colonial economy phase based on grass
and put an end to the possibility that New Zealand might become, as Vogel had
hoped, a new ‘Britain of the South Pacific’ with a balanced agro-industrial economy.
To most observers of and commentators on these decades, New Zealand’s choice
was virtually inevitable. With the technology available and the metropolitan market
open, the colony had only one decision to make, and that was to concentrate solely
on this new field that had fortuitously opened up.
Given this formative context, effective land tenure and land use would be critical to
economic capability and development. However, these economic and political
developments and the knowledge we have of them are known in hindsight. In 1840,
the future of New Zealand, and the place of Maori communities within it was not so
predictable. New Zealand in 1840 was a different place from the commercially
sophisticated, prosperous, satellite farm of Britain that it was to spend a substantial
part of its subsequent history becoming.
As explored in chapter 3, Te Raki Maori communities had already been exposed to
the transformative effects of economic engagement with Pakeha by 1840. The
effects had been challenging, leading to war and social upheaval. But there had also
been successful commercial enterprises launched, a greater variety of goods and
services had become available to Maori than hitherto, and Te Raki Maori social
structures had demonstrated resilience in dealing with the disruptive challenges
arising from the impacts of cultural, social and political change while retaining
authority and a capacity to direct economic development productively. Many Maori
communities had become intertwined with the needs and economic ambitions of
Pakeha, but the reports for this inquiry covering this period of Maori/Pakeha
engagement recognise that Maori had clear entitlements, and were empowered to
use them within Maori social structures that regulated their use in a coherent
manner. Regulating Pakeha was another challenge, and as their numbers grew and
as now key components of Maori economic capability, they too required structures
that recognised their entitlements and provided empowerment. Maori capability was
189
demonstrated further with the signing of the Treaty, which economically speaking
provided a legal framework for Maori and Pakeha to function within and kept Pakeha
connected to the economic fortunes of Maori.
This report has commented on the environment of the region, noting its initial heavy
afforestation, the capacity of some parts of the district to produce good crops, but
also the significant challenges arising for commercial land use on a large scale given
the generally poor quality of much of the soil once forests were stripped. In the early
years, these environmental obstacles to development were less apparent, and
indeed only became serious difficulties once New Zealand’s developmental path was
set towards commercial agriculture.
With the signing of the Treaty, the Crown became a presence within New Zealand
and an influential component within the decision-making processes of Te Raki Maori
communities. These communities were now tied through the dependencies created
by economic development to Pakeha settlers, Pakeha commercial ventures and
decisions made that affected where Pakeha might operate.
However, the Crown had its own priorities, both for its own survival as a system of
authority and secondly as an authority structure responsive to persuasive interests
operating within and through it. Once established, the Crown had responsibilities
wider than the concerns of Te Raki Maori. That Te Raki Maori communities could not
expect to have first call on Crown priorities was evidenced by the movement of the
capital to Auckland, the Crown’s collection of customs revenue and the protracted
manner in which for Maori the urgent matter of Old Land Claims was dealt with.
Maori frustration with the Crown, combined with an economic downturn in the Te
Raki region prompted by less favourable markets for local produce and the
beginning of competition from other parts of New Zealand, contributed to the
outbreak of war which further negatively affected economic development. Whatever
advantages Maori communities had sought by engaging with the Crown, the Crown
was itself an entity whose legitimacy was in part derived from and maintained over
time by its capacity to represent and facilitate the interests of powerful sectional
groups, within whom, after 1840, Te Raki Maori became a decreasingly influential
presence.
190
Te Raki Maori communities recognised what was necessary for economic
development and sought the relevant assistance. Unlike most other Maori
communities in New Zealand they had already participated in and experienced the
benefits of, and become dependent on, commercial ventures within the national and
international market place. Despite the economic downturn for their region, and the
unhelpful decisions of the Crown around its relocation, revenue extraction, war, and
land use determinations, Te Raki Maori sought from the Crown assistance with
infrastructure development, encouragement of Pakeha settlers to the region
including the building of townships, and a willingness to develop land cheaply sold
for that purpose so as to reduce costs. Alternative Crown priorities and the inability of
Te Raki Maori communities to persuade the Crown otherwise meant that the
economic capability of Te Raki Maori communities was reduced as Te Raki Maori
alienated land with little by way of potentially useful support for commercial
development provided through the 1850s and 1860s.
At least until the 1860s, Te Raki Maori communities still retained their entitlements,
especially their land entitlements though significantly reduced, although the extent to
which such entitlements were properly recognised by the Crown in relation to Old
Land Claims is still an issue for claimants. Nevertheless, although the general
economic and political situation was not favourable for Te Raki Maori over the 1850s
and 1860s, Te Raki Maori tried various commercial ventures as identified by various
commentators. These ventures were possible because of the capacity of Maori to
use their entitlements with authority, although economic success could not be
guaranteed.
A fundamental change to Maori community economic capability occurred with the
establishment of the 1865 Native Land Court, its operations and the attendant Maori
land legislation and administration that followed. A new system of land tenure was
introduced, which radically transformed the manner in which Maori communities
could hold or have land entitlements recognised, how they might use them, and how
they might influence decisions on how their land entitlements should be used. The
issue is not the introduction of an individualising land tenure system per se. It is not
impossible that had Maori retained more control over how their land entitlement
191
system would work that they might have opted for a more individualising land title
and use structure. As noted in chapter 2, virtually all societies in the face of the
transformative power of capitalism have modified land holding regimes for more
individual land holding patterns, with sometimes severe social and political disruption
in the process as some interests are empowered through the process and others
disempowered. Maori may well have done the same, with the attendant disruptions.
Nor is the economic issue necessarily whether or not the Crown imposed the land
tenure regime. Even if imposed, a more individuated title system might have allowed
Maori to take up a range of economic options more competitively, increasing the
resilience of Maori communities generally, but with again some certain degree of
social upheaval in its train.
The core issue is that the new land tenure regime worked in practice at the expense
of Te Raki Maori communities for the benefit of the Crown and Pakeha. Maori land
title and land use entitlements were compromised, they had little power to change
the system in their favour, and the overall system in which their entitlements and
empowered existed, was itself more amenable to the interests of others, Pakeha,
whose primary concern was to alienate land from Maori. Maori communities
throughout New Zealand, once the full impact of the alien and alienating Maori land
laws began to have its debilitating effect on Maori social, cultural, economic and
political structures, began a consistent stream of protest to governments over time.
Substantial land had already been alienated from Te Raki Maori before the operation
of the land court, and more was processed and taken under its authority. Combined
with this structurally induced impediment of land loss and constrained use for
economic development, the region in general remained too costly and unattractive to
develop in competition with other regions of New Zealand better favoured and more
successful at
bringing political influence
to
bear.
Infrastructure
remained
undeveloped, towns small, and economic diversity limited.
From the 1870s, extractive industries in particular gum-digging became the
economic mainstay of the Northland region, until going into decline in the early
twentieth century. Although many Maori communities were able to make money from
gum-digging, commentators and government officials noted the growing poverty and
192
disinclination of Maori communities to engage in systematic agricultural pursuits or to
develop ventures of a more commercial kind rather than for self sufficiency. Some
commercial efforts were noted, but inevitably lack of credit or ability to attract
investment precluded success. These communities had traditions of successful
commercial ventures, indeed had been modified over time even before 1840
precisely because of their willingness to engage in commercial enterprises. By the
1870s onwards, the ability to engage and the desire to engage were clearly on the
wane for Maori. The land tenure regime and its burdensome and stifling effect on
Maori economic initiative appears the major culprit.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the limitations on successful Maori use of their
land were recognised by government to the extent that vesting was put forward as a
means to use land that otherwise could not be used profitably. This vesting option
was itself a tacit admission that the land regime was economically constraining for
Maori as Pakeha did not require such a process for their land nor were they
promoting for themselves such an option.
With the expansion of pastoral farming, especially dairy farming from the 1890s
onwards in New Zealand, with the decline of the extractive industries, and the
growing Maori population in the early twentieth century, the Te Raki region entered a
new phase of development. The advantages accruing to Pakeha from the land
tenure system had fostered for Pakeha the purchase of the better quality lands in the
district, as well as opening Pakeha-owned lands up for credit assistance, loans and
for the advantages of late arriving infrastructure developments around Pakehadominated towns and flatter areas. Pakeha-dominated pastoral development
became the key economic development factor for the region over the twentieth
century. Yet the disadvantages of later development compared to other regions of
New Zealand, and the lack of sustained diversity in economic development, meant
that the Te Raki region remained largely rural and with few alternatives beyond the
limited employment opportunities offered by commercial agriculture.
The growing number of Te Raki Maori and Maori throughout New Zealand meant
that it was harder for governments to ignore the realities of general Maori
marginalisation and impoverishment. If Maori were to regain and develop an
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economic capability, impediments around their major economic asset land had to be
dealt with. In trying to deal with the impediments to effective land use, which for
example might have allowed for Maori developing land themselves or using it as a
means to acquire capital for other ventures, the government struggled to make the
nineteenth century land Maori tenure system work for Maori. That system had been
focussed primarily on alienating land from Maori not in assisting Maori to develop
their lands. Unsurprisingly, with the new focus on economic development of Maoriheld land, it became clear that the land tenure system as it operated was
unfavourable for that purpose. The options tried through the twentieth century by the
government to assist land development for Maori, such as consolidation, conversion
and land development schemes, provide evidence not only of a government
willingness to encourage Maori economic development but also of how burdensome
the land tenure system had been, was and continues to be for Maori economic
development.
Vesting was tried by government, with some support from Te Raki Maori, in order to
gain some benefit from land that owners could not develop. Consolidation was tried
from the 1920s to the 1950s as a means to bring title holding together to encourage
more effective land use. Land development schemes were tried from the 1930s until
the 1980s as a means of overcoming the challenges of bringing the land up to a
useable state without burdening the owners with that expense. Conversion was tried
from the 1950s until the 1980s as a means of bringing together uneconomic plots of
land together for potential use as more economic farm units. None of these options
dealt with the curse of succession for Maori arising from Maori land legislation, and
in practice provided limited relief in support of Maori economic expansion.
Pastoral farming remained a key economic determinant of regional development
from the 1960s onwards, and despite some growth in Whangarei in the 1960s on the
back of construction projects, the region is still substantially rural, with limited urban
areas of any size beyond Whangarei. Not only has Maori pastoral farming struggled
in relation to Pakeha pastoral farming due in part to the relatively privileged position
of Pakeha in the land tenure system, but many of the farms developed for Maori or
that Maori were assisted with in the 1930s proved to be too small commercially by
the 1950s, leading to neglected farms, loss of income and out-migration.
194
The challenges for regional development generally have been further exacerbated
over time through the lack of rates revenue that could be collected from Maori, owing
to the land-holding patterns of Maori land. Contributing to government pressure to
address issues with Maori economic development came the pleas from local
government bodies, as they struggled to raise revenue from the substantial Maori
population still living in the Te Raki region. Maori empowerment had been further
weakened within the region as their ability to participate within local government
structures and influence development decisions in their favour had been reduced
through their inability to be effective rate-payers.
Not that economic success would have been guaranteed for Te Raki Maori had
these issues been somehow overcome or substantially mitigated. Within the general
economy, Pakeha tended to enjoy substantial advantages such as more experience
in multiple enterprises, commercial networks, political knowledge and structural
power, familiarity with the complexities of modern economy, finance, commerce,
banking, insurance, and technical expertise as well as greater numbers, wealth, and
dominance in government. Pakeha were obviously not so heavily advantaged as to
combine all these features, but a certain number did benefit from at least some of
these advantages sufficient to ensure they were well placed to provide strong
competitive pressure within any emerging economic opportunities.
For Maori, given the obstacles to exercising economic and political power on a par
with Pakeha in the region, given their increase in numbers, given the limited
employment opportunities within the still emerging commercial ventures of fishing,
tourism, horticulture and forestry, the major economic choice made has been
migration and urbanisation. The general development and advance of the New
Zealand economy from the 1950s to the 1970s could not overcome deficiencies
within the local regional economy, and there was insufficient economic activity to
provide work and opportunities for Te Raki Maori, bringing substantial relocation to
urban areas sometimes within but more often beyond the district. While these
opportunities were at the lower end of the technical and skilled workforce, jobs were
generally available at least somewhere until the 1970s, and an active government
policy of regional assistance by way of employment in government-owned
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enterprises where such existed in the Te Raki region further assisted Maori there.
Changes in government economic priorities in the 1980s exposed again the
vulnerability of the regional economy with its limited employment options and
preponderance of unskilled labour, bringing on high unemployment especially for
Maori.
For those Te Raki Maori trying to develop economic capability within the region,
there is no shortage of discussion by experts, private and public, about the
challenges and needs of regional development. One set of institutional vehicles
which appear to go some way to navigating through the minefield of Maori land
tenure legislation and administration are trusts and incorporations. These entities,
while not unproblematic, do offer a means to make co-ordinated, legally binding,
authoritative decisions, to raise capital and enter into partnerships with other
corporate or government bodies. They offer a degree of effective entitlement and
empowerment and as such offer an opportunity to advance Maori economic
capability.
At a local level, good health, good education, good employment prospects, input into
the local political and commercial structures, appropriate government assistance and
protection given recognised vulnerability, and a collective capacity to make
investment decisions in their own interests, are crucial if Maori were to overcome
their initial disadvantages in the face of a vibrant and government-privileged Pakeha
commercial enterprise. The reports of Walzl and Hearn in particular provide a wealth
of detail and statistical information as well as useful commentary on the socioeconomic realities of life for Te Raki Maori communities. To the extent that the Maori
economic situation has improved over time, or provides examples of improvement,
this is due to deficiencies in those crucial social and economic factors being at least
partially addressed in the course of the twentieth century. A continuing poorer socioeconomic position indicates that challenging issues remain for Te Raki Maori
generally.
There is much that this report does not cover that is likely to be relevant to Te Raki
economic development. Te Raki Maori have been intimately involved with Pakeha
since before 1840, mixing genes and ideas liberally over time. How such mixing
196
impacted on particular Te Raki whanau and hapu, perhaps advancing opportunities
through useful kinship networks or through particular sets of commercially
practicable skills, is likely to nuance the more broadly interpretative focus adapted for
this report which sees Te Raki Maori generally as more often disadvantaged than not
within the emerging land tenure system and its broader economic repercussions.
Maori involvement with Pakeha through sport and war may have opened up
particular economic opportunities through respect and friendships begun in those
arenas. Maori political mobilisation, focussed in part through religious movements
such as Ratana, may have provided a cohesion and purpose that not only was
crucial to articulating and vitalising Te Raki Maori political visions but which may
have also assisted in galvanising people to work the land despite the challenges, of
mediating a vision of a better productive future, and of sustaining an
expectation/belief that Te Raki Maori must have a viable economic future worthy of
respect. Such possible politically and religiously infused perspectives, as well as
other possible personal and professional attachments to Pakeha, have not been
picked up in this report but are likely to be of some value in understanding further
aspects of Te Raki Maori economic development.
Nor has this report engaged in a comprehensive and detailed economic analysis of
Te Raki over time. It has, in line with the commission questions set, provided a
focussed and evidenced discussion and interpretation of key factors that impacted
on Te Raki Maori economic development, and the role of the government within
those key factors.
Commission Questions
The commission questions, as set out below again, are answered in brief. This report
provides more complete answers and should be used in conjunction with the short
answers provided here.
a. What economic opportunities existed for Te Paparahi o Te Raki Maori
communities between 1840 and 2000? In particular, what Crown actions
promoted such opportunities? How did economic outcomes differ for
non-Maori in Northland, and why?
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A number of economic opportunities have been available in the Te Raki
region. These have primarily included forestry both indigenous and exotic,
mineral extraction especially coal, gum-digging, fishing, commercial farming
ventures in particular dairy farming in the twentieth century, horticulture and
tourism. Up to 1840, the Crown had virtually no role in developing either
entities that took advantage of those opportunities, such as Maori
communities, or the economic opportunities themselves that developed
around flax, timber and commercial vegetable growing. From the 1840s,
economic opportunities declined but the major entities which sought to
advance economic development remained Maori communities. Gum-digging
became the predominant economic activity until the early twentieth century.
To engage in this activity required only a group of people working together
with no capital outlay, and a market. Coal mining had also begun and for this
a commercial entity with capital behind it was required. The Crown aided that
development to the extent that it provided a secure political, legal and
administrative environment. Pastoral farming became the major economic
activity of the twentieth century. Farm units with secure land tenure for which
government and private financial assistance was available became the
institutional commercial means to exploit that opportunity. The government
provided loans, research advice, cheap land, land development assistance for
example subsidised fertilizers, and sought to retain or expand markets for
produce. The commercial entities that evolved to take advantage of the
economic opportunities have generally sought to function with skills and
capital that they can deploy within the legal and administrative regime of the
nation state, taking advantage of government and private assistance where
available, and seeking to promote their interests and development. Economic
outcomes differed for non-Maori because they were able to engage within a
workable land tenure system which enabled easier access to private and
government financial assistance. On the whole, Crown actions did not
promote the economic opportunities that became available over time within
the region for Te Raki Maori, but rather put in place a land tenure regime that
handicapped Maori economic development, allowing non-Maori operating
within a secure, workable land tenure regime to develop economic
198
opportunities to their advantage alongside the considerable government
support that was available to those favourably positioned to access it.
b. What was the degree of Maori participation and capability at all levels of
the Northland regional economy, and the impact of Maori migration
within and outside of the Northland region? In what ways did Maori
participation and migration differ from non-Maori patterns in Northland,
and why?
From the earliest days before 1840 it was precisely the desire of Te Raki
Maori communities to participate in and influence economic opportunities
around shipping in those early years, in commercial vegetable growing and
the timber trade that enabled them to grasp the economic importance of
Pakeha. Maori communities sought to engage with the Crown from 1840 to
encourage a degree of Pakeha settlement to advance their own economic
development. Over time, Maori communities have struggled to retain their coordinating authority to develop and participate in economic development. This
constraint has affected the ability of Maori communities to take a leading role
in development, allowing Pakeha not so constrained to dominate as owners
and managers within emerging economic opportunities. Te Raki Maori have,
more and more over time, largely participated in economic opportunities as
manual labour, either within the district when work was available, or worked
outside the district should they find work there. Migration out of the region has
been a response to lack of economic opportunity for Maori within the region.
Maori migration and urbanisation began within a context of Maori being
initially more rurally based than non-Maori in Te Raki, thus the transition
would have been more challenging. Secondly, Maori had already undergone a
long period of social, economic and political marginalisation within the region
that had no equivalent among non-Maori. The urban transition could only
have been more disruptive as a consequence, and Maori began with fewer
advantages generally within urban environments compared to Pakeha.
Finally, while jobs existed for those migrating, the immediate economic effect
was positive, but with downturns in the economy and the reduction of the
government’s role in direct employment provision, Maori were more
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vulnerable than non-Maori to unemployment because of their location within
lower skilled occupations. As economic opportunities reduced for Te Raki
Maori beyond their region, unemployment numbers increased within the Te
Raki region as the economic attraction of migration waned. Non-Maori have
generally enjoyed better economic prospects within the region, and a better
socio-economic position in terms of health and education reinforced by
dominance in local government. Where non-Maori have been obliged to
migrate, those initial advantages provided a greater scope for better paid,
more secure employment compared to Maori, within a continuing Pakehadominated national context.
c. Did the Crown seek to inform itself of Maori economic status between
1840 and 2000, in particular of adverse aspects?
Yes. In general, the Crown was aware of the economic status of Te Raki
Maori communities, but the depth of its knowledge developed as more precise
information gathering tools were devised, and as Te Raki Maori were more
clearly
differentiated
within
census
questions.
Integration
of
Maori
communities into the general economy allowed more precise categorisation of
Te Raki Maori by state authorities.
The Crown sought to inform itself of
adverse effects, in particular through commissions such as the Stout-Ngata
commission, and extensive reports such as the Hunn report. The existence
after 1947 of the Department of Maori Affairs, the operation of the Maori Land
Court, and the work of Maori MPs entailed in part that information concerning
adverse aspects of Maori economic status would be transmitted to the Crown.
Until the 1930s, Te Raki Maori communities appear to have played little part
in government economic policy formation with regard to the Te Raki regional
economy and land-use, but information was gathered about them. In part
because of information gathered about Te Raki Maori communities, policy
formation changed to promote land development schemes, and later for
vested lands to be returned to Maori control. The urbanisation of Maori in
general, and knowledge of this, contributed to government attempts to keep
employment opportunities open in urban areas as a state employer. As
government priorities changed for management of the economy in the 1980s,
200
consideration by government of Maori community interests with regard to the
local economy and land-use was insufficiently focussed to prevent a dramatic
increase in Maori unemployment in the region.
d. Did the Crown act to remedy any of the adverse aspects of Te Raki
Maori economic status between 1840 and 2000? What was the Crown’s
capability to take remedial action? What form did any such policies and
actions take?
Te Raki Maori had benefitted from economic development in the 1830s
through their capacity to identify and produce crops and generate income in
order to trade for those commodities they wished to acquire. To benefit from
economic opportunities, Maori communities needed to have entitlements for
example over land, needed to be empowered to use those entitlements
productively and needed to be able to bring influence to bear effectively within
the political context that protected their entitlements. Maori communities had
these capabilities at least to some effective extent to the 1860s despite losing
significant amounts of land, until they came under threat with the Native Land
Court, Native Land legislation and administration. Because Maori capability
was seriously weakened through the government’s introduction of a Maori
land tenure regime, Maori have not been able to benefit from participation in
economic activities in the district to the same extent as Pakeha who do not
confront the same constraints.
Within the general economy, Pakeha tended to enjoy substantial advantages
such as experience in finance, commerce, banking, insurance, as well as their
numbers, generally greater wealth, and dominance in government. Not all
Pakeha were so advantaged obviously in comparison to Maori but a sufficient
number were to some extent at any one time to provide a strong competitive
advantage. These obstacles arising from the numeric, institutional, financial
and skills advantages that Pakeha possessed did not so much prevent Maori
communities from participating in economic development as provide a
challenge to Maori success. Some of them could be overcome or limited as
Maori became knowledgeable and could compete with Pakeha as skills were
201
acquired and relevant support could be accessed. These obstacles became
more serious to the extent that Pakeha had advantages within the existing
system that privileged them at the expense of Maori.
The government directed the process that ensured the land of Te Raki Maori
was integrated into a secure, workable property regime. It was at this point
that the Crown had maximum capability to ensure that the land tenure system
put in place for Maori did not impede their economic development. The
manner in which this process was conducted severely challenged the
coherence and economic competitiveness of Te Raki Maori communities.
Land had been commodified, empowering individuals to sell, within an
economy that was actively focussed on transforming land into farms and
sought land to do this. The effective absence of legalised, properly
empowered, co-ordinating Maori authoritative entities meant that Te Raki
Maori were not well placed to take advantage of potential economic
opportunities, for example reinvestment of sales proceeds for collective
purposes, or a collective focus on the development of farming skills. Maori
were also precluded from effective involvement in local government, as
obstacles to land use and the attendant inability to participate as empowered
ratepayers blocked opportunities to advance or protect their interests within
that forum. The land tenure system compromised Maori economic
development and opportunity in favour of the Crown and Pakeha. From the
early twentieth century, the government took steps to mitigate obstacles to
Maori economic participation and engagement, but the land tenure system
which had facilitated land alienation from Maori was not easily made workable
to encourage Maori land and general economic development. Crown
capability to take remedial action has been constrained by the type of action it
believes is appropriate to pursue to address the issues arising around its own
Maori land tenure creation. Initial willingness by some Te Raki Maori, with
government encouragement, to vest lands for leasing, and later compulsory
vesting, did not bring in much income due to operational costs of the scheme,
and the lack of significant return on farming for multiple owners of land.
Consolidation and land development assisted to a limited extent in securing
some degree of economic growth for Maori but were inadequate in
202
overcoming the systemic issues of development for Maori arising from the
constraints and handicap of the Maori land regime. Effective participation
within local government remains an issue. Trusts and incorporations provide a
somewhat more effective means to overcome the obstacles facing Maori coordinated, collective and empowered collective development, but the extent of
their success might be usefully explored with claimants.
e. What international and national economic factors affected the Crown’s
economic actions towards Te Raki Maori?
The nature of the New Zealand economy is that it must be responsive to
international and national factors, and this reality impacted on the Northland
region. Internationally, New Zealand, as a primary product producer and
exporter, has to compete for market access. For much of New Zealand’s
economic history, this has been largely guaranteed through Britain, but since
the 1970s the New Zealand economy has been forced to diversify.
International price
slumps for agricultural produce, depression,
and
restructuring since the 1980s have had effects on economic development
within the Te Raki region, and while the government has attempted to mitigate
these to some extent, the regional economy itself poses more expensive
challenges to government for development than other regions in New
Zealand.
f. How did Crown economic policies and actions differ between Maori and
non-Maori in Northland between 1840 and 2000?
As this report demonstrates, the question is not so much about Crown
economic policies and actions differing between Maori and non-Maori but
more the legal and administrative regime the Crown put in place to promote
economic development. A substantial part of economic development occurs
through the actions of private, non-governmental actors, including Maori
communities. As context, the Crown provides political and legal security, and
engages within national and international political decision-making affecting
the market place to assist New Zealand’s economic development. Economic
203
development can take many paths, depending on individual circumstances,
environmental and resource possibilities, collective effort and organisation,
capacity to influence or make decisions, access to financial and other types of
assistance, and profitable, trading markets. The Crown has generally sought
to create and sustain an economic environment where these factors are
integrated together productively. The crucial difference between Maori and
non-Maori in the Te Raki region is that the property regime introduced for
Maori meant that they were marginalised from effective engagement with
emerging economic opportunities over time. Legal and administrative
differences between Maori communities and other sectors of the economy
obliged differing policy formation and other government responses, alongside
the essentially rural nature of Maori communities until the 1950s, and their
concentration in the lower skilled sections of the regional economy and
beyond. The recognition that Maori communities were not integrated
effectively into the economy as comprehensively and productively as other
sectors was a major factor in government attempts to encourage integration.
A major explanation for different economic outcomes between Maori and nonMaori in the Te Raki region remains the handicap for Maori of the land tenure
regime under which they operate. Maori capability to take full advantage of
the economic environment the government seeks to create for economic
growth would seem to necessitate that any structural, government-controlled
impediments for Maori economic participation be addressed. The long-term
damage already done to Maori economic development is unlikely to be easily
overcome.
Final summary
Two major forces came to bear on the government in the nineteenth century and still
do, namely the economic dynamism of capitalism and Pakeha social dynamism. The
challenge for the Crown was to integrate the two forces productively. The Crown
brought to this challenge its own imperatives of bureaucratic and administrative
efficiency, which increased its own manipulative power over diverse individual, social
and economic phenomena within New Zealand society, and opened up opportunities
for social and economic formations best adapted to operate within a Crown204
transformed environment. Within that challenge, Maori were a further component
arising from their cultural and social difference, and obligations the government
recognised towards Maori as possessors of certain rights, expressed in part, but not
entirely through the Treaty of Waitangi. Maori were also the possessors of one major
economic development asset desired by Pakeha, that is, land. General economic
development, the expectations of growing and powerful Pakeha populations, and the
Crown’s own requirements for organisational efficiency within these constraints,
meant a growing tension between addressing these needs coherently and advancing
the interests of Maori. The contested view of Maori land and its place in general
economic development served as the general battleground of these broadly
competing interests. Crown action came to focus on Maori land, but by implication
included Maori political, social and cultural cohesion. The general import of this
report is that, over and above the detail of practical, political discussion taking place
between Maori and Crown officials in the Northland region, there were overarching
economic, social and administrative forces in significant tension with the economic
interests of Maori.
Within these broad parameters of economic development, Pakeha social expectation
and Government efficiency, the place of Maori economic development, especially as
to how it might involve land, was a further competitive constraint on Crown action.
One can suggest what the Crown should have done, or what the Crown might have
been urged to do, and quite correctly point out Crown knowledge at the time of the
damage and disadvantage that would accrue to Maori if certain courses were
adopted. Nevertheless the constraints of legitimacy, deriving in part from the
requirement to facilitate significant Pakeha interests and promote a prosperous
economic climate, made an emphasis on effective Maori economic development
problematic for governments, especially from the 1890s to the 1920s. There is a real
question as to whether there was a genuine option in the early decades of the
twentieth century of accommodating, within the economic, social and political
constraints of the time, both significant Pakeha economic development and
significant Maori economic development in the Te Raki region. The requirements for
Pakeha and Maori economic development competed, and Pakeha nationally were in
a stronger position to mobilise the Crown in support of Pakeha interests, and the
Crown was more responsive to Pakeha interests.
205
Furthermore, the comprehensive conversion of Maori land into a form of individual
title through the Native Land Court process, regardless of any advantages that might
accrue for Maori, could only have been a fundamental challenge to Maori cultural,
social and economic life. Rather than assisting Te Raki Maori to engage more
effectively within the emerging economy, the operation of the Native Land Court and
Maori land legislation put in place serious impediments to Te Raki Maori economic
capability. Given the momentous implications for Maori communities of this legal and
administrative process, a serious question arises as to its appropriateness for Te
Raki Maori at least in the form it was implemented.
Title conversion by the Native Land Court rendered Te Raki Maori communities more
economically, socially, politically and culturally vulnerable. In a real sense, a whole
way of life was coming to an end, and a new life, within the new legal, administrative
and fiscal constraints of individual title, was yet to be born. The government was fully
aware of this at the time. Yet the title system put in place did not provide an effective
range of opportunities within the general land system, but delivered an unworkable,
complex, cumbersome regime, which worked to strangle Maori economic
development and deliver Maori land to others for their economic development. The
subsequent economic position of Te Raki Maori, after their land had been processed
through the Native Land Court, offered little opportunity for economic development
within the existing regime. This was despite a clear willingness of Te Raki Maori
communities from early contact to 1865 to engage with the Pakeha economy in the
expectation that some economic development would occur.
Whatever protections the government might have believed it had provided at the
time, especially from the 1890s onwards, the broad economic position that resulted
for Maori in the region does not indicate that these protections were particularly
effective. Once work in gum digging and forestry ended, subsistence farming,
augmented by casual, seasonal labour, was a rational economic response to the
limited economic opportunities available. But there was nothing strictly inevitable
about that outcome, especially as Maori had not specifically sought subsistence
living as an outcome, nor did their economic position from the 1840s suggest that
their future necessarily lay in that economic direction. While Maori operated under
206
significant disadvantages compared to Pakeha, some of these disadvantages, such
as Maori land legislation and administration and the consequent impediments to
accessing finance and maintaining commercially viable land acreages, were
government generated. This aspect of Maori vulnerability flowed directly from
government actions, and the government’s subsequent reluctance to take substantial
remedial action until later in the twentieth century, served to weaken Maori economic
robustness even further. Had Te Raki Maori communities been offered genuine
assistance in these areas of vulnerability and more authority on how to use that
assistance, their capacity to respond to other challenges and disadvantages they
faced in the region would have been greater.
In particular, if they had had a
workable land tenure system, their economic capability would have at least been on
a par with Pakeha to that extent.
There is no guarantee of course that had the Government been more alert and
protective of Maori economic interests and development, the course of that
development would have been more favourable. Pakeha in competition with local
Maori still held significant advantages. At the very least, Maori communities might
perhaps have expected the government to mitigate any disadvantages Maori
suffered that were directly in the government’s control to change. To handicap Te
Raki Maori further within an intensely competitive environment may suggest that
other competitors had a more privileged access to government decision making.
However, such considerations could offer no consolation to local Maori as their land
was either lost, or locked up in economically unrewarding leases, or bogged down in
a legal and administrative quagmire.
Given the clear desire of Te Raki Maori to engage with the new economy, the clear
recognition at the time that the Native Land Court process worked to the
disadvantage of Maori economic development, and the clear willingness of Te Raki
Maori communities to explore economic options despite legal and administrative
constraints, the question must arise as to why the Maori land legislation process was
not modified to accommodate the concerns of local Maori. It would seem that while
the Native Land Court process helped to integrate Maori land within the Pakeha legal
and administrative regime to aid commercial development, it did so in such a way
that allowed the major Maori economic asset to be effectively stripped from their
207
control and use. The explanation for this result lay in the powerful, interlinked, and
competing requirements of Pakeha social, political and economic development,
which effectively used Crown authority, despite debates, legal arguments, local and
national Maori opposition and occasionally alternative policies, to encourage Pakeha
development at the expense of Te Raki Maori economic development.
Te Raki Maori needed some form of legally recognised, properly empowered,
communal entity to decide questions around land alienation and use. Such entities
had existed for Maori, indeed such authority structures are standard features of
coherent societies. In practice, the competing demands of emerging Pakeha society
clashed with the economic and social structures of Maori society, and in the resulting
struggle, the government actively impeded the collective capability of Maori to
participate in and manage economic development. The Maori land tenure system put
in place from 1865 onwards by the Crown directly undermined Maori economic
capability to the benefit of the Crown and of Pakeha. Maori economic development in
Northland became an immensely more frustrating and difficult venture to pursue
coherently as entitlements were legally tangled, their use compromised and political
pressure to change this state of affairs largely parried within a system more
favourable to hostile interests. Effective local government participation was blocked
for Maori, leaving them vulnerable to the competing priorities of increasingly hostile
authorities for whom Maori inability to pay rates gave evidence perversely of Maori
economic incompetence. Only when Te Raki Maori communities had been
prevented from using their economic asset productively, freeing Pakeha to make use
of it where they could, did local Maori finally become worthy of serious government
economic concern as citizens not only persisting, but increasing in number, and
clearly economically disadvantaged.
From the 1920s onwards when Te Raki Maori had become a clear social problem,
the government was involved in an exercise of damage limitation, and economic and
social repair as regards local Maori economic development, within an emerging
context of urbanisation. The government readily recognised there was a problem
with Maori development, and took action both with land development, and later with
assistance within the urban environment. Actions taken by governments in the 1980s
and 1990s indicated that Te Raki Maori were still vulnerable, because of their socio208
economic position, when competing economic and significant Pakeha social
interests combined to direct government policy.
The general economic pattern is that, up to the 1870s Te Raki Maori were still a
significant economic force despite the limited opportunities for sustained economic
development, due primarily to their communal control of land. When that communal
control and use of land was lost in particular following the implementation of the
Maori land tenure regime, the capacity of Te Raki Maori communities to mobilise for
their economic interests, in the face of competing Pakeha interests and the priorities
of the government, was weakened. The economic outcome for Te Raki Maori to
1950 and beyond is evidence that any process of integration into the Pakeha
controlled economy, or any capacity to develop alongside the Pakeha-dominated
economy, had not been successful for Maori. The land title system was a major
impediment to coherent economic planning by Maori in whatever form they may
have sought to develop. Urbanisation brought a new set of economic challenges for
Te Raki Maori communities, but the legacy of their weakened socio-economic
position was reflected in their urban economic situation of mainly unskilled labour.
It is not possible to quantify on some form of responsibility calculus the exact extent
of government responsibility for this consistently poorer economic outcome for Te
Raki Maori over time. That governments were constrained in what they could deliver
for Maori in that region is clear, but they also had some responsibility for the poorer
economic outcome where governments either put in place or failed to remove legal
and administrative impediments to local Maori economic capability and performance.
Maori economic capability was directly weakened by the Maori land legislation and
administration, and is still hampered by it today, despite sincere if sometimes
contentious efforts by the Crown over time with varying degrees of Maori support to
alleviate the problems arising from its own creation.
In 1840, the dominant commercial entities were generally controlled by Maori
communities in the Te Raki region, with Pakeha as marginal but necessary. For the
region to flourish economically, many within Maori communities recognised that
engagement with Pakeha was crucial to secure ongoing growth and prosperity.
Nowadays, the dominant commercial entities in the Te Raki region are generally
209
controlled by Pakeha, with Maori as marginalised but necessary. Likewise, for the
region to flourish some way has to be found to facilitate the growth and interests of
both groups without being at the expense of the other. This is a serious regional
challenge, given the damage already done to Maori economic development, and the
general ongoing issues of regional underdevelopment in Te Raki.
210
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Appendix: The Commission and Extensions
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Extension Direction 1
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Extension Direction 2
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