Two kinds of democratic legitimacy for the EU? Input- and output-oriented legitimacy
as a case of conceptual misformation
Paper presented at the conference „Democracy as Idea and Practice‟,
Oslo 14-15 January 2010
Daniel Gaus
Senior Researcher
ARENA – Centre for European Studies
University of Oslo
Email: [email protected]
Draft paper. Please do not quote without permission.
Abstract
Sudies of EU‟s legitimacy frequently input- and output-oriented legitimacy as two different kinds of
democratic legitimacy. I argue that the distinction between input- and output-oriented legitimacy marks a
case of conceptual misformation. It does not represent two different justifications of political order as
democratically legitimate, but refers to two different aspects of one and the same concept of democratic
legitimacy. To substantiate that I proceed as follows: First, some troubles in the use of the distinction in EU
scholarly discourse are described. Second, it is argued that these troubles are not due to input-/output-oriented
legitimacy being essentially contested concepts, but a conceptual misformation (Sartori) missing two criteria
of concept formation. For one thing, the disctinction obfuscates the connotation of the general concept of
legitimacy as laid out in Eastons political systems theory. For another thing, a hermeneutical analysis of
Scharpf‟s explanation shall show that input- and output-oriented legitimacy are not mutually exclusive subconcepts of democratic legitimacy, but imply each other. I conclude that the conceptual distinction of an
input- and output-oriented form of democratic legitimacy does a disservice to the analysis of EU‟s legitimacy
and should be given up.
1
Introduction
Ever since the scholarly debate on the legitimacy of the European Union started in the period after the
Maastricht-Treaty, it has been dealing with the question of what is the adequate standard to judge EU‟s
legitimacy. Although ten years later, one might diagnosise with Beetham and Lord: „Among the most basic
points of disagreement about the EU‟s legitimacy is whether it should be understood according to the same
criteria as those applicable to political authority in the nation state, or quite differently.‟ (Beetham and Lord
1998: 2) Some scholars argue that the legitimacy of the EU cannot not be measured by criteria of democratic
legitimacy valid in the context of its democratic member states. According to their view, scholarly reflection
about EU‟s legitimacy needs to overcome a „touch of stateness‟ (Shaw and Wiener 1999: 2; Weiler 1999).
Since the EU is not a state but a polity sui generis, so their argument, the criteria for the assessment of EU‟s
legitimacy must be adapted. This assumption has been expressed most explicitly by Giandomenico Majone:
„[T]here is an urgent need to re-set the standards by which we assess the legitimacy of European integration
and of the institutions which guide the process‟ (Majone 1998: 6; see also Moravcsik 2002; Weiler 1999). In
this context, Fritz W. Scharpf (1999) proposed to differentiate between two concepts of beliefs about the
democratic legitimacy of a political order – input- and output-oriented legitimacy – and argues that the EU
can only reach output-oriented legitimacy for the time being. Schaprf‟s distinction has been frequently used
as a conceptual tool in empirical studies that seek to measure the legitimacy of (different aspects of)
European political practice.
This paper deals with the question if the conceptualisation of input- and output-oriented legitimacy as two
different kinds of beliefs about democratic legitimacy holds valid. I think there are good reasons to doubt
that. In the following I argue that the distinction between input- and output-oriented legitimacy is a case of
conceptual misformation (Sartori 1970). What input- and output-oriented legitimacy refer to is not two
different concepts, but two connected and inseperable aspects of the concept of democratic legitimacy. In
conclusion, I suggest to give up the distinction between input- and output-oriented democratic legitimacy
because it does a disservice to the analysis of EU‟s legitimacy.
I try to substantiate this conclusion by the following steps. At first I describe how the input- output distinction
has been introduced and is currently used in the scholarly discourse on EU‟s legitimacy (I.). One might argue
that disputes about the distinction of input- and output-oriented legitimacy are no surprise, as democratic
legitimacy is an essentially contested concept. Therefore I try to show that the problem cuts deeper and
suggest to view input- and output-oriented legitimacy as a misformation of the concept of democratic
legitimacy. On the one hand, a closer look at Eastons political systems theory shall reveal the distinction to
obfuscate the general concept of legitimacy (II.). On the other hand, I argue that the specifics of the concept
2
of the democratic legitimacy belief lies in a simultaneous reference to those aspects that are assumed as the
distinctive feature of input- and output-oriented legitimacy respectively. A brief analysis of Scharpf‟s
description of the two concepts shall demonstrate that both cannot be seen as mutually exclusive, as each
implicitly presumes the features ascribed as essential for the respective other (III.)
I. The use of input- and output-oriented legitimacy in EU-research
Let us first recall Scharpfs introduction of the input-output-distinction in 1970s, where he presented it as a
useful means to order contemporary normative democratic theories. He sees a specific dichotomy in how
those theories evaluate the legitimacy of political order, which he describes as „two faces of democratic selfdetermination.‟ (Scharpf 1999: 6) „[I]n the history of normative political theory it is possible to identify two
distinct but complementary perspectives – one, as it were, emphazising the first, the other one the second part
of the composite term [self-determination, D. G.].‟ (Scharpf 1999: 6) This dichotomy, Scharpf assumes, can
best be portrayed by adopting Eastons model of a political system:
„Starting from the model of a political system that takes in political inputs (especially articulated interests) from the
societal environment and transforms them into political outputs (especially binding decisions), normative theories of
democracy try to rationalise the political system primarily either from its inputs or from its outputs.‟ (Scharpf 1970:
21; my translation)
What is the difference between input- and output-oriented legitimacy arguments? Scharpf assigns each of
them to one aspect of Lincolns phrase of a government of the people, by the people, for the people. Inputoriented theories of democracy evaluate
„the political system not from the quality of its performance, but from the expressions of will and the articulated
interests entering the political process […]. They start from the question how to arrange the political system if
decisions should emanate as directly as possible from the equal participation of all.‟ (Scharpf 1970: 25; my
translation)
Accordingly, Scharpf assumes input-oriented legitimacy arguments to emphasise „“government by the
people”. Political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the „will of the people‟ – that is, if they
can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community.‟ (Scharpf 1999: 6) On the
other hand, output-oriented oriented theories of democracy „first normalise a desirable quality of political
output and then determine further requirements concerning the structures of the political system from this
point.‟ (Scharpf 1970: 21; my translation) Accordingly, output-oriented legitimacy arguments emphasise
„“government for the people”. Here, political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote
the common welfare of the constituency in question.‟ (Scharpf 1999: 6) There are three kinds of performance
to which output-oriented theories typically put down the democratic legitimacy of a political system:
prevention of tyranny, realisation of the common good and economic prosperity (Scharpf 1970: 21-25).
3
In the light of this description one could ask whether Scharpf really delineates two kinds of arguments about
the democratic legitimacy of a political system. Whereas the reference to equal participation apparently
makes the input-oriented argument one about the democratic quality of the political process, the same cannot
be said of output-oriented arguments. An absolutistic rule in early modern times that derived its dignity from
the divine order might nevertheless have successfully fulfilled the abovementioned performance criteria in
the eyes of the subjects.1 One might, however, reject this objection because it misreads Scharpfs argument.
Scharpf does not make assumptions about democratic legitimacy itself, but uses the input-output distinction
to describe ways in which arguments about democratic legitimacy have been made in normative democratic
theory. What is exactly is the difference? Some general distinctions about the term legitimacy might be
helpful to clarify that.
Some general remarks on the concept of a legitimate political order
In the discussion of legitimacy it is helpful to discern, for one thing, between the terms legitimacy and
legitimation and, for another thing, between an observers‟ and actors‟ usage of these terms. The first
distinction between legitimacy and legitimation leads back to Max Weber‟s basic sociological account of a
legitimate order. According to Weber, the meaning of social order (and thus also of political order) can
basically be specified as a relationship of actions oriented by certain maximes. For calling something a social
order, Weber argues, it does not matter why the actors orient their behaviour to the maximes in question. It
could be, for example, due to fear of sanctions in case of non-compliance. It could also be because the actors
consider behaviour according to the maximes as somehow normatively ideal. But, Weber argues, only in the
latter case of an order which „enjoys the prestige of being considered binding‟ (Weber 1978: 31) we speak of
a „legitimate order‟. In this reading, an order is legitimate when it is valid, that means, when according
behaviour is generally believed to be normatively right:
„Only then will the content of a social relationship be called an order if the conduct is, approximately or on the
average, oriented toward determinable “maxims”. Only then will an order be called “valid” if the orientation toward
these maxims occurs, among other reasons, also because it is in some appreciable way regarded by the actor as in
some way obligatory or exemplary for him.‟ (Weber 1978: 31)
Following Weber one might say that questions of legitimacy refer to a specific validity claim. Namely, the
claim that a certain set of social relations counts as justified in the light of certain normative principles
(maximes). Let us now assume a political order as a specific type of social order that represents the
organisation of „the authoritative allocation of values in a society‟ (Easton 1965: 50). Then the legitimacy of a
1
Greven makes this point about the concept of output-legitimacy (Greven 2000).
4
political order might basically be described as its „worthiness‟ to be accepted as a justified organisation of
value-allocation:
„Legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political order‟s claim to be recognized as right and just; a
legitimate order deserves recognition. Legitimacy means a political order‟s worthiness to be recognized. This
definition highlights the fact that legitimacy is a contestable validity claim; the stability of the order of domination
(also) depends on its (at least) de facto recognition.‟ (Habermas 1984: 178)
But it is obvious that neither arguments for or against the worthiness of a political order, nor standards of
their „goodness‟ fall from the sky. The legitimacy of a political order is of no quality that made it observable
like some objects in the material world. The (un-)worthiness of an organisation of value-allocation in a
society shows only indirectly in ways the members of the political system act and react. This brings up the
thorny issue which kind of social practices might tell us something about the state of political legitimacy. In
this regard Barker notes about democratic legitimacy that
„[i]t is easier to talk about crises and failures of democracies than of successes. The signs of the first are clear: civil
disorder, law breaking, non-payment of taxes, riot, and rebellion. Successfully operating democratic legitimation, by
contrast, might seem almost symptomless.‟ (Barker 2007: 30)
Barker highlights an interesting aspect here. It seems intuitively plausible to take wide-spread noncompliance as a clear indicator for a critical lack of legitimacy. An inverse conclusion, however, does not
have the same plausibility. Just because signs of failure are missing does not necessarily mean a political
system is legitimate. Even if people do not consider a system of rule as normatively right, they might
temporarily comply purely out of fear of sanctions or because they have no special reason to oppose. What
this suggests is that an analysis of the practices Barker mentiones seems to be insufficient to infer in matters
of legitimacy. Such an analysis would not allow for discriminating between the more general concept of
stability and the legitimacy of a political order, because it does not speak to the essential feature of the latter:
that legitimacy is a validity claim about a political order that might be contested and generally accepted or
rejected by the members of that order. Seen in this light, it is a certain kind of data that can be expected to
deliver information about the state of political legitimacy, namely, justificatory practices which might be
summarised as (de-)legitimations. Legitimations could be described as all those communications that (albeit
implicitly) state, deny or defend the worthiness of a political order (or parts of it) and refer to reasons about
why the respective claim should be accepted. To speak of a certain type of legitimacy, then, is to speak of a
certain type of explanation or reason on the basis of which members of a political order generally accept it as
justifiable. To put the first differentiation briefly, legitimacy primarily shows in form of successfully
operating legitimations.
5
A second differentiation concerns the ways in which the term legitimacy is used. On the one hand, the state of
legitimacy of a political order seems to be identifiable only via justificatory practices. On the other hand, in
such legitimation practices political actors usually make explicit use of the term legitimacy themselves:
„historically as well as analytically, the concept [legitimacy, D. G.] is used above all in situations in which the
legitimacy of an order is disputed, in which, as we say, legitimation problems arise. One side denies, the other
asserts legitimacy. […] Legitimations serve to make good this claim, that is, to show how and why existing (or
recommended) institutions are fit to employ political power in such a way that the values constitutive for the identity
of the society will be realized.‟ (Habermas 1984: 178-179, 183)
Thus, the use of the concept legitimacy in the context of a justificatory practice should be differentiated from
its use in describing these practices and the social relations they establish. In other words, there is a difference
between an observers‟ and an actors‟ usage of the term legitimacy (Barker 2007: 20-21) or, as some say,
between an empirical and a normative use (Peters 2005: 97-103). What is being observed and described in an
empirical use of legitimacy „will most immediately be the making of claims, or the attribution of meaning,
however expressed, by political actors‟ (Barker 2007: 20). But, a philosophically inspired reader might
object, is there a purely empirical use of the term legitimacy in the first place? Legimacy, it is often assumed,
is an „essentially contested concept‟2 and that means it is „appraisive in the sense that it signifies or accredits
some kind of valued achievement‟ (Gallie 1956: 171). According to this view, a speaker who uses the word
legitimacy always also performs an act of evaluation and, thus, makes a normative use of legitimacy.
Admittedly, it is often difficult to keep up a clear distinction between an empirical and a normative
perspective on legitimacy. Maybe this is due to a scholar being at the same time a member of a society and,
as such, potentially a political actor making legitimacy claims. However, just because it is sometimes hard to
draw exact boundaries between a scholarly and a political role does not mean that there is no difference
between an observers‟ and an actors‟ use and that every statement about legitimacy is a normative statement
commending something.
One might perhaps better appreciate that by recalling Searles (1962) argument about the difference between
the meaning of a word and the function of the speech act it is used in.3 Searle doubts that words can have a
„commending meaning‟, i. e., a meaning that makes their use appraisive per se. Although some words – like
„good‟ or, as I think, „legitimate‟ – can be described as terms of praise, not every speech act in which those
words are used in their literal meaning performs an act of praise (or even of appraisal). It is only in the
context of calling something good (or legitimate) that an act of praise is performed. On the other hand, „good‟
and „legitimate‟ can be seen as terms of praise, because if these words are used in the context of calling
2
See for example Hurrelmann, Schneider and Steffek (2007). For a good overview over the literature on the concept of an
essentially contested concept see Collier, Hidalgo and Maciuceanu (2006).
3
Searle uses the term „good‟ as an example, but I think the part of his argument that is of interest here covers the term „legitimate‟
as well.
6
something good (or legitimate), those speech acts always perform a favorable assessment. Thus, it is due to
the meaning of the word good (or legitimate) that makes saying “X is good (legitimate)” an act of
commending and not an act of dissuading. But it does not follow that saying, for example, „group Y views X
as good (legitimate)‟ performed an act of commending. Searle argues that the meaning of a word has to be
traced by the ways it is used. But to extrapolate a „commending meaning‟ from the ways in which the word
„good‟ (or „legitimate‟) is used is to mistake its meaning for its use in simple indicative sentences only:
„[T]he mistake is to suppose that an analysis of calling something good gives us an analysis of “good”. This is a
mistake because any analysis of “good” must allow for the fact that the word makes the same contribution to
different speech acts, not all of which will be instances of calling something good. “Good” means the same whether
I ask if something is good, hypothesize that it is good, or just assert that it is good. But only in the last does it (can it)
have what has been called its commendatory function.‟ (Searle 1962: 429)
Following Searle I suggest to keep up the distinction between a normative or actors‟ usage of legitimacy that
implies the speaker to perform an act of (de-)legitimation and an empirical or observers‟ usage that does not
entail such a commendatory function but aims at a description of legitimation practices and of a political
order based (also) on them.
These general reflections about the concept of legitimacy might be trivial. However, I think they are worth
recalling because the difference between legitimacy and legitimation as well as between a normative and an
empirical usage seems to be blurred sometimes in the EU literature. Let me try to illutrate this by the example
of the use of the input-output-distinction in the scholarly discourse on EU‟s legitimacy.
The use of the input-output distinction in EU scholarly discourse
I said before that in the light of Scharpf‟s description only input-oriented legitimacy arguments are apparently
about democratic legitimacy, but that this need not be an objection to his reasoning. We can now see more
clearly why this is so. To say that the input-output-distinction covers two types of legitimacy arguments
present in the historical discourse of normative democratic theory is a statement from an observers‟ point of
view. It claims to describe the use of legitimacy arguments by some democratic theorists who explained the
worthiness of a democratic order. This would, for example, still allow for the conclusion that the outputoriented type of legitimacy argument they used is in fact no argument about democratic legitimacy, because it
mistakes a certain performance quality to be specific to democratic orders. However, the way Scharpf refers
to the input-output-distinction later, in the discussion of EU‟s legitimacy (Scharpf 1999), does no longer
allow for such a conclusion. The reason for that is an exchange of the observers‟ for the actors‟ perspective
on legitimacy, which is also observable in some studies on EU‟s legitimacy that make use of the concepts of
input- and output-oriented legitimacy. Typically, this exchange shows the following pattern. Starting from the
(implicit) presumption that input- and output-oriented legitimacy describe two generally believed ideals of
7
the worthiness of a democratic order, studies turn to the shape of the institutional order of the EU to check
whether it fulfills the conditions implied in those ideals. But, as Quentin Skinner (1973) argues, such a move
finally means to call the political system in question to be (il-)legitimate and, thus, has a commendatory
function. Skinner explains that with „evaluative descriptions‟ that are employed in this type of argument.
Regarding empirical theories of democracy he argues, that every theory of democracy that first defines a
certain ideal of democracy and matches an existing political order against this ideal, does not describe but
evaluate:
„This follows from the (empirical) claim that the ideal embodies the conditions necessary and sufficient for being
able to say of a political system that it is genuinely a democracy, and from the (linguistic) fact that to make this
assertion about a political system is standardly to commend it.‟ (Skinner 1973: 299)
What Skinner describes here is in my view applicable to many EU-studies that use input- and output-oriented
legitimacy as conceptual devices for the operationalisation of the broader concept of democratic legitimacy. 4
At a first glance the input-output distinction seem to offer a useful tool to measure the state of EU‟s
legitimacy empirically. Actually, however, both concepts are mostly used as empirical premises about
operating legitimacy ideals embedded in a broader normative argument on EU‟s legitimacy from an actors‟
perspective.
This might be shown by example of Scharpf‟s reference to the distinction of input- and output-oriented
legitimacy in discussing EU‟s legitimacy:
„In democratic nation-states, however, input- and output-oriented legitimacy coexist side by side, reinforcing,
complementing, and supplementing each other – which is why the theoretical distinction introduced here can be
extracted from a close reading of normative treatises but is not usually explicated in the praxis of political discourse.
For the European Union that has the unfortunate consequence that the legitimacy of its institutional practices, when
discussed explicitly, is almost automatically judged, and found wanting, by reference to the conglomerate of inputand output-oriented criteria familiar from the national debates. […] This is doubly unfortunate since it prevents a
clear perception and plausible public presentation of both the basic legitimacy of European decision-making and its
necessary limitations. In my view, the confusion and frustration of present debates can only be overcome if the
distinction between input- and output-oriented democratic legitimacy is accepted, and if it is realized that the
European polity is fundamentally different from national democracies since it can, for the time being, only aspire to
the latter.‟ (Scharpf 1999: 12)
Although it remains implicit, the observers‟ use is exchanged for an actors‟ use. Scharpf now refers to the
input-output distinction in the context of calling the political practice of the EU to be worthy and
commending the (European) reader to accept the EU as (basically) legitimate. Accordingly, the claims
attached have changed. Firstly, input- and output-oriented legitimacy arguments are no longer taken to
categorise different legitimations presented by some democratic theorists, but to refer to different kinds of
4
Some claim to describe the state of legitimacy of the EU as a political system (for example Majone 2005; Moravcsik and
Sangiovanni 2002; Scharpf 1999), others focus on some of its institutionalised processes (for example Borrás et al. 2007; Menon
and Weatherhill 2002; Smismans 2004)
8
successfully operating legitimations in democratic nation-states. In other words, they now come along with
the empirical assumption to represent two different kinds of legitimacy ideals generally believed in by
citizens in the EU member states. Secondly, this description is employed as a premise in a commending act
which argues that a) because there are two logically independent and generally accepted ways to justify a
political order as democratically legitimate, and b) the EU matches the conditions of one of these two kinds
of legitimation, the output-oriented one, and c) the other kind, the input-oriented one, is beyond reach for the
time being, d) the EU should be accepted as (basically) democratically legitimate. I do not want to enter the
discussion whether or not we should accept the EU as legitimate. Maybe Scharpf is right in claiming that the
EU can be justified for some reason or another. My aim is only to draw attention to a certain kind of
confusion (of observers‟ and actors‟ use) that frequently accompanies the use of the concepts of input- and
output-oriented legitimacy in EU-studies.
There is a second kind of confusion and it is related to the first one. The application of the input-output
distinction often goes along with the (mostly implicit) assumption that the legitimacy of an order can be
described with reference to certain features of the institutionalised political process (namely at its input- or
output-side). However, given the above reflections about the nature of legitimacy and legitimation, the
primary object of an empirical analysis of legitimacy is not institutional features of a political process, but the
kind and impact of operating legitimations. Strictly speaking, it is the judgments political actors make with
regard to the political process and how these judgments or beliefs influence their behaviour5 that is the object
of analysis in empirical legitimacy studies. One might of course adduce good methodological reasons to
stress difficulties in analysing objects of such a kind. However, it still remains that in an empirical use
statements of the kind „the EU has x-legitimacy‟ have the meaning „the (political process of the) EU
generally counts as justified in group y (the EU citizens) due to reasons of type x‟. Accordingly, to account
for what counts as justified in group y it is not enough to focus on features of the institutionalised political
process.
However, this is what studies that seek to analyse the input- or output-oriented legitimacy of the EU mostly
do.6 Input- and output-oriented legitimacy is ascribed by analysing the quality of the EU decision-making
process (or parts of it). There is, however, a considerable variation in what features of the political process are
taken as indicators of input- and output-oriented legitimacy respectively. Some see output-legitimacy as
general effectiveness (Borrás and Conzelmann 2007) or as efficient problem-solving capacity (Bouwen 2002;
Mörth 2009) of the institutionalised decision-making process. Others assume output-legitimacy to exist when
5
For example, whether the political actors are motivated (also) by these judgments to comply with the rules of the political order or
not.
6
There is of course a variety of studies about EU‟s legitimacy that focus on peoples beliefs [references] or justificatory processes
[references]. But as far as I can see those studies do not test for a possible operating input- and output-oriented legitimacy belief.
9
„the Union delivers what people expect from it‟ (Lenaerts 2003). On the other hand, some see inputlegitimacy represented by institutionalised participation mechanisms for stakeholders when they demand
„wider forms of input legitimacy (beyond traditional forms of parliamentary control in the traditional
understanding of representative democracy)‟ (Borrás et al. 2007) for the EU. Whereas others refer to inputlegitimacy generally as the „probability that those being ruled have some say in the process of rule-making
itself‟ (Risse and Kleine 2007) or as the grade to which citizens‟ interests are represented by stakeholders in
the decision-making process (Verbruggen 2009).
In my view, the conceptualisation of democratic legitimacy by assuming input- and output-oriented
democratic legitimacy does a disservice to the empirical analysis of EU‟s legitimacy. Many authors have
criticised that a democratic political system cannot achieve output-oriented legitimacy without some form of
input-oriented legitimacy (Abromeit 2002: 15-19; Büchs 2008; Höreth 1999; Schäfer 2006; Wessels and Katz
1999). Bartolini (2005: 165-175) objects that, on a closer look, output-oriented legitimacy is beside the very
question of legitimacy. I think these authors have a point. However, I want to carry the objection further and
suggest to give up the distinction in the first place, because it is a case of conceptual misformation. As I try to
demonstrate in the following, it does not add to, but weakens the discriminating power with regard to the
information that is entailed in the concept of democratic legitimacy as a „data container‟ (Sartori 1970: 1039).
II. The distinction between input- and output-oriented legitimacy as conceptual misformation
In the following I try to show that the specification of democratic legitimacy by means of the input-output
distinction results in a conceptual misformation. I will mainly present two objections. In this part I argue that
the input-output distinction draws on Eastons model of a political system, but does not adequately take into
account the status of legitimacy in it. In the next part I argue, that input- and output-oriented legitimacy,
„when each is considered by itself‟ (Scharpf 1999: 6), are no free-standing concepts of democratic legitimacy,
but logically imply essential features of the respective other. I will start, however, with a brief remark on the
role of concepts in empirical research and what is meant by conceptual misformation in the first place.
What does conceptual misformation mean?
Giovanni Sartori develops the concept of a conceptual misformation in a basic reflection on the logical
structure and procedure of inquiry in political science. Generally, he describes a concept as a categorisation of
10
empirical information on the basis of certain distinguishing features.7 Concepts are not specific to scientific
inqury but play a fundamental role in human thinking in the sense that „human understanding – the way in
which our mind works - requires cut-off points which basically correspond (in spite of all subsequent
refinements) to the slices into which a natural or qualitative language happens to be divided‟ (Sartori 1970:
1038). Accordingly, Sartori argues that „concepts of any social science are not only the elements of a
theoretical system; they are equally, and just as much, data containers. Indeed data is information which is
distributed in, and processed by, “conceptual containers”.‟ (Sartori 1970: 1039)
Sartori draws two conclusions concerning inquiry in political science. Firstly, the quality of inquiry depends
on the quality of the concepts entailed. By quality of concepts he means their ability to unambiguously
categorise empirical information, or, to put it differently, their „fact-gathering validity‟ (Sartori 1970: 1039).
Secondly, the task of concept formation logically precedes not only the task of data interpretation but the very
collection of data. Sartori understands concept formation as a classificatory „unfolding technique‟, a
„taxonomical exercise [that] “unpacks” concepts, and plays a non-replaceable role in the process of thinking
in that it decomposes mental compounds into orderly and manageable sets of component units.‟ (Sartori
1970: 1038)
Conceptual misformation, then, might be understood as a failed decomposition of mental compounds. A
misformed concept does not allow to clearly distinguish, but tends to obfuscate the borders between the
logical units which compose the part of reality under scrutiny. Generally speaking, empirical concepts are
obtained by abstraction of observables. They can be imagined as located on a „ladder of abstraction‟ ranging
from empirical universals to contextual descriptions of a particular phenomenon. The members of such a
vertical conceptual structure – concepts from the abstract to the concrete – differ in their respective relation of
extension (denotation) and intension (connotation): „the denotation of a word is the totality of objects
indicated by that word; and the connotation is the totality of characteristics anything must possess to be in the
denotation of that word.‟ (Sartori 1970: 1041) In this light, the specification of a concept (climbing down the
ladder) requires the conceptual sub-classes to be „mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive‟ (Sartori 1970:
1039). Accordingly, a concept can be extended (climbing up) by reducing the number of distinctive
characteristics. „The larger the class, the lesser its differentiae; but those differentiae that remain, remain
precise.‟ (Sartori 1970: 1041) It is crucial to follow these rules in concept formation, Sartori argues, because
they decide over the discriminatory power of the concepts.
7
According to Sartori, not all concepts are empirical concepts. Some concepts are not abstracted from observables but „are
“theoretical terms” defined by their systematic meaning. For instance the meaning of isomorphism, homeostasis, feedback,
entrophy, etc., is basically defined by the part that each concept plays in the whole theory.‟ (Sartori 1970: 1040) In this sense,
conceptual misformation is no empirical, but a theoretical concept. In the following I use the term „concept‟ synomously with
empirical concept.
11
According to this view, conceptual misformation occurs when the rules of extending and specifying concepts
are broken and climbing up and down the ladder of abstraction goes along with „unnecessary losses in
precision and empirical testability‟ (Sartori 1970: 1041). In case of extension this leads to what Sartori calls
„conceptual stretching‟. The denotation of a concept is extended not by reducing but by obfuscating the
connotation. The result is not a more general concept, but mere generality:
„While a general concept can be said to represent a collection of specifics, a mere generality cannot be underpinned,
out of its indefiniteness, by specifics. And while a general concept is conducive to scientific “generalizations”, mere
generalities are conducive only to vagueness and conceptual obscurity‟ (Sartori 1970: 1041)
One might correspondingly think of different kinds of conceptual misformation in the specification a more
general concept.8 Either characteristics are added that are not covered by the more general concept that is to
be specified; or the more particular connotations fail to show the sub-concepts to be mutually exclusive; or,
finally, characteristics are added in a way that the respective sub-concepts together cover only some but not
all the phenomena referred to by the more general concept (not jointly exhaustive).
With these remarks on concept formation we can see more clearly what is implied in the claim that the
concepts of input- and output-oriented legitimacy represent two forms of democratic legitimacy. They are
assumed to specify the more general concept of democratic legitimacy or, to speak in Sartoris words, they are
a case of climbing down the ladder of abstraction. However, it is doubtful whether in specifying (democratic)
legitimacy by way of input- and output-oriented democratic legitimacy the rules of climbing down the ladder
are followed. In my view there are mainly two objections to that. For one thing, the attempt to add to the
connotation of democratic legitimacy with the input-output distinction misses the criterion of mutual
exclusiveness in that both sub-concepts logically presuppose the essential feature of the respective other. For
another thing, it leads in a wrong direction with regard to the nature of phenomena referred to by the data
container (democratic) legitimacy and obfuscates connotation instead of adding to it. I will first recall
Easton‟s systems theory of political life to elaborate on this latter point before I turn to the aspect of mutual
exclusiveness in the next part.
The role of legitimacy in Easton’s systems analysis of political life
As Scharpfs introduces input- and output-oriented legitimacy arguments with reference to David Eastons
systems analysis of political life (Easton 1965), it might be useful to have a closer look at Easton‟s theory and
the role legitimacy plays in it. First of all it is important to note, that Easton understands his theory as a
conceptual framework that describes political life in all kinds of political systems. He argues on the highest
level of abstraction, the level of a general theory, and seeks to trace
8
Although Sartori does not discuss them.
12
„the most general kind of matter that must be faced by all political systems regardless of time or place, from the
most democratic to the most dictatorial, from the most primitive to the most industrialized, from the most traditional
to the most modern.‟ (Easton 1965: 14)
He describes a political system as „those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a
society‟ (Easton 1965: 21). But, in accordance with the aim of a general theory, he does not analyse the
specific features of how a political process allocates values (which would obviously be different in
democratic and dictatorial systems). Instead, the focus is on the general function of the political system and
on those relations to its environment that are relevant for its persistence:
„All political systems as such are distinguished by the fact that if we are to be able to describe them as persisting, we
must attribute to them the successful fulfillment of two functions. They must be able to allocate values for a society;
they must also manage to induce most members to accept these allocations as binding, at least most of the time.‟
(Easton 1965: 22-24)
This view at politics explains the role of the categories of input and output in Easton‟s systems model. They
stand as „summary variables‟ for all those phenomena in the environment of a political system that are
communicated into or from the political process and have an impact on its persistence. Easton describes them
as an attempt to
„condense the major and significant environmental influences into a few indicators. Through the examination of
these we should be able to appraise and follow through the potential impact of environmental events on the system.
With this objective in mind, I have designated the effects that are transmitted across the boundary of a system
toward some other system as the outputs of the first system and hence, symmetrically, as the inputs of the second
system, the one they influence.‟ (Easton 1965: 26)
Using the input-output categories, the political system and its function can be reformulated as „a complex set
of processes through which certain kinds of inputs are converted into the type of outputs we may call
authoritative policies, decisions and implementing action‟ (Easton 1965: 17). The input category generally
refers to all those kinds of environmental disturbances that have an effect on the political system‟s ability to
fulfill its societal function. Easton assumes two types of such input. On the one hand, those inputs that the
political process transforms into outputs are demands. Easton defines a demand as „an expression of opinion
that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by
those responsible for doing so.‟ (Easton 1965: 38) The political system‟s persistences is dependend on its
ability to successfully transform demands into outputs and, thus, on the variety and volume of demands
communicated to it. On the other hand, however, there is a second type of input relevant for the political
systems persistence, which Easton calls support. It is Easton‟s description of the role of support, different
kinds of support and the ways for a political system to generate support that let it appear as a conceptual
misformation to speak of input- and output-oriented legitimacy from the viewpoint of Easton‟s theory.
Support is added as a second type of input besides demands because a critical lack of support „would prevent
the system from continuing to process demands through to binding outputs.‟ (Easton 1965: 189) At this point
13
it is crucial to note that there is a difference between output failure and a lack of support. If in the eyes of the
members a political system steadily fails to meet the specific demands communicated to it, this ongoing
output failure probably finally leads to a critical lack of support. But, conversely, support for a system is not
only dependend on output performance. Otherwise, Easton argues, it could not be explained how a political
system could persists, as the kind of dissatisfaction named „output failure‟ is an empirically universal
phenomenon:
„Some erosion of support is inevitable in all systems; cleavage among collectivities and accompanying output failure
could not be entirely avoided. In all systems, sharp conflict in competition for scarce social and economic values
represent[s] a normal aspect of political interaction. If we accept this assumption, we may infer that without some
provision to compensate for the dissatisfaction with outputs or to regulate the relationships among actually or
potentially conflicting groups, a system would be open to the constant and ultimate danger of disorder and chaos.‟
(Easton 1965: 247)
Easton assumes output performance to create a form of passing, specific support. But a political system‟s
stability depends, he assumes, on a second source of input of support that is not related to specific output
performance: diffuse or general support. He describes diffuse support as „a reservoir of favorable attitudes or
good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which
they see as damaging to their wants.‟ (Easton 1965: 273) There are three sources for general support: the
identification with a political community, the belief in the existence of a common interest and the belief in the
legitimacy of the authorities and the regime of a political system. Easton distincts those three sources of
diffuse support on the basis of the assumption that they have a respective independent effect regarding the
persistence of a system. Much had to be said about the ways in which they are interrelated. For the sake of the
argument, however, I focus on Eastons description of the caharacteristics of the belief in legitimacy as a
source of diffuse support.
Compared to the other two Easton highlights the belief in legitimacy as „probably the single most effective
device for regulating the flow of diffuse support‟ (Easton 1965: 278). By the same token he assumes a
widespread sense of legitimacy as necessary condition for any political system to be persistent:
„Under most conditions, it represents a requirement which, if it is not fulfilled, may find a system unable to marshal
enough support or general political good will for its persistence in any form. No other form of support can assure
such ready acceptance of the outputs, however much they may fly in the face of demands.‟ (Easton 1965: 310)
In his conceptualisation Easton differentiates two objects and three kinds of belief in legitimacy. On the one
hand, a sense of legitimacy can be directed toward the authorities, i. e. the incumbents, or the regime, i. e. the
system of norms and principles that defines roles and rules in the political process. On the other hand, it
might be instilled in three different ways.9 Firstly, there can be a personal basis of the legitimacy of
9
Although there are some parallels, Easton seperates his account of three sources of legitimacy beliefs from Weber‟account (see
Easton 1965: 301-304).
14
authorities. If the members see the incumbents „as personally, in their behavior and symbolism, worthy of
moral approval‟ (Easton 1965: 302-303) this usually casts a legitimating shadow over the regime‟s structure
and norms as well. Conversely, and secondly, there can be a structural basis of the legitimacy of the regime.
Here, Easton refers to a somewhat psychological effect of path-dependency, assuming that, over time, „there
is a strong tendency for the members to develop attachments to the structure and norms of the regime itself,
quite independently of the underlying moral principles to which they also subscribe‟ (Easton 1965: 300).
Already mentioned in this quote and most importantly, thirdly, are ideological sources of legitimacy of the
regime. That they play a fundamental role is mirrored in the fact that the very identification of a regime
already implies a certain set of values and principles on which the roles and norms of a political system are
based. According to Easton a regime
„embodies three different aspects: the roles through which power in a system is organized and distributed; the stable
expectations about or the norms for the use of this power; and the values and principles that form the broad limits of
outputs and infuse all areas of political interaction. The identification of a regime already presupposes the existence
of ideologies or belief systems in all political systems.‟ (Easton 1965: 289)
In accordance with these conceptual distinctions, Easton assumes two principally different ways for the
leadership of a political system to respond to stress of declining support.10 The first way is to generate
specific support via certain outputs. On the one hand, specific material rewards could be given by meeting the
demands of the (most important) groups of members. On the other hand, Easton assumes the use of coercion
as an output that, in form of negative rewards, generates specific support:
„The effect of coercion is to offer specific negative rewards or unfavorable sanctions for failure to comply. Members
may not be willing to offer their support voluntarily, but under the threat of force they may be led to engage in
activities, the objective consequences of which reflect at least a low level of support‟ (Easton 1965: 276)
But, as already mentioned, the kind of specific support generated by these outputs is a passing form of
support only. Thus, on a second way, a system usually seeks to generate diffuse support by instilling senses
of legitimacy, common interest and common identity.11 The persistence of a political system finally depends
on its capability to instill a reservoir of good will by symbolic means beyond its specific output performance.
Easton assumes diffuse support – in particular an ideologically based sense of the legitimacy of the regime
and its authorities – as the precondition of every political system‟s persistence. Otherwise, he argues, it would
be hardly understandable, why
„systems free from any visible threat of stress should find it continuously necessary to attend to the renewal of
sentiments of legitimacy. […] At the least, the behaviour of all systems suggests that there is the fear that without
10
Easton assumes a third possible response, namely change of regime structure (Easton 1965: 249-266). However, I think this point
is only of secondary relevance to the argument about input- and output oriented legitimacy.
11
One might argue that measures aiming at the stimulation of good will could also be seen as a form of output. And, indeed, Easton
admits they could be seen as a form of psychic or symbolic output of a system. But as such he does not include them into what he
treats under the category of output, namely, „authoritative policies, decisions and implementing action‟ (Easton 1965: 17).
15
constant efforts to inspire a conviction about the rightness of the regime and its authorities, members might quickly
lose the feeling that there is a special “oughtness” about the outputs. […] Every system seeks to strengthen ties of
legitimacy through the propagation of appropriate ideologies. Such symbolic responses are intensified through
concrete expression in rituals, ceremonies and physical representations of the regime.‟ (Easton 1965: 308)
In the light of these remarks on Easton‟s theory, we can now reconsider the concepts of input- and outputoriented democratic legitimacy. I think that, from the viewpoint of Easton‟s theory, a specification of the
belief in legitimacy into an input-oriented and an output-oriented type is misleading. Why?
In Easton‟s model of a political system, output and legitimacy refer to distinct aspects. Whereas output
signifies the specific performance of authorities in transforming ingoing demands into policies and decisions,
legitimacy refers to the members‟ belief about the rightness of the authorities to do so, even in case the output
does not answer their demands. Thus, it remains unclear in what sense a legitimacy belief could be specified
by describing it as output-oriented. I see two possible readings of what an output-oriented legitimacy belief
could mean in the context of Easton‟s theory. Firstly, it might say that output-oriented legitimations have the
function to secure the general acceptance of outputs. But according to Easton‟s theory, every sense of
legitimacy induces general support for all kinds of outputs by the authorities within the limits of respective
values and principles. In this reading a legitimacy belief would be output-oriented per se and nothing is added
the connotation of legitimacy. In a second reading, „output-oriented‟ might be taken at face value, referring to
the particular kind of support generated by the output performance of a political system. However, in this
reading the connotation of legitimacy would not be specified but obfuscated. Easton‟s distinction between a
passing form of specific support (generated via output) and a more enduring form of general support (based
on a sense of legitimacy, a common interest and a common identity) would be blurred. Similar problems
occur regarding the concept of an input-oriented legitimacy belief, since Easton takes input as a general
category that encompasses two types (demands and support), whereas he describes beliefs in legitimacy as a
sub-category of inputs (one of several sources of general support). Thus, with regard to Easton‟s conceptual
framework, the concepts of input- and output-oriented legitimacy do not specify, but, on the contrary, leave
legitimacy transformed from a general concept to „a mere generality [that] cannot be underpinned, out of its
indefiniteness, by specifics‟ (Sartori 1970: 1041)
III. Input- and output-oriented legitimacy as two kinds of democratic legitimacy?
In the previous part I tried to demonstrate that the assumption of an input- and output-oriented legitimacy
does not specify but obfuscate the connotation of legitimacy. However, it is noteworthy that – from the view
of Easton‟s theory – these connotation problems do not hit some specific type of legitimacy, but the general
concept of legitimacy. In Easton‟s theory the characteristics of specific types of political processes – different
ways of how demands are transformed into outputs – are deliberately disregarded. But specific features of the
16
political process seem to be exactly what is referred to by those ideological sources that ground democratic
legitimacy beliefs. In this part I try to substantiate the view that the concepts of input- and output-oriented
legitimacy should not be seen as mutually exclusive kinds of democratic legitimacy. For that, firstly, I briefly
elaborate on what makes the characteristic feature of a democratic legitimacy belief. I then turn to Scharpf‟s
description of the connotations of the concepts of input- and output-oriented legitimacy and try to show that
they do not refer to different kinds, but only different aspects of one and the same belief of democratic
legitimacy.
Features of the belief of democratic legitimacy
To get a picture of the characteristics of democratic legitimacy, it seems helpful to briefly recall what
legitimacy is about. As argued above, the nature of legitimacy can be described as the worthiness of a
political system and, accordingly, shows in successfully operating legitimations or, in other words, in
generally accepted justifications of a political order. Although I do not doubt that structural and personal
legitimacy to some degree matter, I think it is safe to say that the concept of democratic legitimacy represents
a legitimating ideology that justifies a regime. Thus, the question is what forms the common and specifying
denominator of operating justifications (or, respectively, beliefs) on the basis of which a democratic political
process is acceptable to its members?
Seen in this light, it might be promising to look at normative political theory for the task of defining the
connotation of democratic legitimacy. Normative political theory could be helpful because it seeks to
develop, amongst others, consistent moral justifications of democracy. However, beyond their role for
practical moral discourse, in our context such justifications might be co-opted for a different, a heuristic
purpose. They could be viewed as attempts to outline ideal-type justifications, which, following Weber, do
not serve as normative utopias, but as utopias that enable a more precise description of the part of social
reality under scrutiny (in our case: successfully operating legitimations). An ideal typical concept, Weber
argues, is an internally consistent system, that
„will help to develop our skill in imputation in research: it is no “hypothesis” but it offers guidance to the
construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to
such a description. […] In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically
anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the
extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality‟ (Weber 1949: 90)
I do not want to further elaborate on this methodological aspect. But, considering the difference between an
observers‟ and and actors‟ usage, it is important to note that I do not want to make a normative statement
when I now try to single out distinctive features of the belief of democratic legitimacy with the help of
arguments from normative political theory.
17
Normative political theory offers numerous ways of how to systematise different accounts of democracy‟s
value in the history of political ideas. In introducing the distinction between input- and output-oriented
democratic legitimacy, Scharpf refers to a prominent one: the juxtaposition of procedural accounts that
explain democracy‟s value by a procedure realising individual liberty and autonomy, on the one hand, versus
epistemic accounts that see democracy‟s value in fostering the rule of reason, on the other.12 However, I think
it it should be doubted that the belief in democratic legitimacy refers either to the procedural or the epistemic
qualities of a democratic process, but is characterised by a simultaneous reference to both. Let me try to
explain this.
A first objection concerns the assumption that democratic legitimacy can be traced back to the procedural
value of equal participation. As individual liberty and equality are fundamental values, this view assumes, the
central problem of political legitimacy is to justify the very existence of a coercive power imposing rules on
others. According to this view, the specific worthiness of a democracy is that it reconciles individual liberty
and equality with political rule through a process of collective decision-making that somehow binds rule to
the consensus of the ruled. A coercive power is justified, because it is authorised by the consensus of the
ruled. Scharpf refers to such an interpretation when he argues that the input-oriented democratic legitimacy
belief depends on the assumption that the decisions „emanate as directly as possible from the equal
participation of all‟ (Scharpf 1970: 25; my translation).
Against this view Allen Buchanan (2002) objects that consent theory misreads the very problem of political
legitimacy. If equality and individual liberty together make the fundamental moral principles, he argues, this
already implies that „we do not have a right not to be coerced to do what we have an obligation of justice to
do, at least if that obligation is implied by the principle that we are to treat all persons with equal concern and
respect‟ (Buchanan 2002: 703/704) One might put Buchanans argument differently. If a political order is
morally justified when it realises equal individual liberties for all members, then a coercive agency is not only
tolerable, but a moral necessity – as an instrument to preserve justice in every case where one member exerts
its individual freedom unduly at cost of another one‟s freedom. But this objection, on the other hand, does not
touch the fact, that in a political system the wielding of power by some leads to an inequality that poses a
problem from the view of the principle of equality. Buchanan‟s argument only objects the view, that the
justificatory power of a democratic process of equal participation lies in it solving this inequality problem by
somehow realising consensual decision-making. On the contrary, he argues, in a democracy, too, „politics
seems to be concerned, in some fundamental way, with how to get along when consent is lacking‟ (Buchanan
2002: 699/700).
12
For an example of structuring discourse about democracy along this line see (Buchstein and Jörke 2003) [more references]
18
What this argument suggests is, that it is implausible to trace back the belief of democratic legitimacy only to
the procedural qualities of equal participation – namely, to the assumption that equal participation guarantees
individual self-determination by allowing for equal individual exercise of political power. If that were the
only relevant aspect about equal participation, it would be equally acceptable, as David Estlund argues, to let
no one participate in political rule but to choose randomly between the alternatives in every political decision
(Estlund 2008: ch. 4). What this points to, in other words, is that there are epistemic expectations directed at
the decisions of a democratic political process besides the moral principles of individual liberty.
But, conversely, it neither seems plausible to explain democratic legitimacy on the basis of epistemic reasons
without recognising that equal participation plays a fundamental epistemic role in democratic decisionmaking. Following Jürgen Habermas, the standards of „correctness‟ for political decisions are not objectively
given, but principally dependend on how the problem to be solved is described in the first place. According to
that, political decision-making in a democracy is reflexive in the sense that what makes the quality of a
problem-solution is dependend on a foregoing common interpretation of a given problem, namely, in what
way a political problem refers to moral questions, ethical questions and/or pragmatic questions (Habermas
1996: 157-162). It might be due to this circumstance that a point made by Estlund in this context seems
intuitively plausible. In tracing back the meaning of democratic legitimacy to what he calls „epistemic
proceduralism‟, Estlund argues that the problem with accepting expert rule is not that it is implausible to
assume expertise in political matters. The problem is that there is no uncontroversial alternative to the
democratic process for deciding who counts as an expert in what political matter. In this sense, Estlund
argues, although in a democracy one might view single decisions as deficient in some regard, the democratic
process can still count as the „best epistemic strategy from among those that are defensible in terms that are
generally acceptable‟ (Estlund 2008: 42).
What these arguments suggest is that the normative meaning of equal participation in a democratic process
does not only refer to the moral principle of equal individual liberties, but – and in some sense: consequently
– to an epistemic dimension of (collective) self-determination as well. In this view, the belief of democratic
legitimacy refers to two different kinds of expectations directed likewise at the political process – moral
expectations that the democratic process helps realising political equality and self-determination (even if they
are restricted by the necessity of coercive rule) and epistemic expectations that the democratic process is a
device to create (normatively and pragmatically) adequate political decisions on a regular basis (even if in the
single case one personally doubts a decision to be the best).
I will now turn to Scharpf‟s description of the specific features of input- and output-oriented legitimacy. In
my view, there are some consistency problems present in his explanation that both concepts represent two
19
different types of democratic legitimacy, which correspond to the the account of democratic legitimacy
outlined above.
Scharpf’s description of input- and output-oriented democratic legitimacy
How does Scharpf explain the concepts of input- and output-oriented legitimacy respectively?13 Scharpf
explains the input-oriented legitimacy belief as based on a view of „normative individualism‟ (Scharpf 1999:
7). Accordingly, the input-oriented belief ties legitimacy to the ability of political system to derive decisions
as directly as possible from the individual preferences of the citizens. Legitimacy is said to stem from the
political order realising the „Roman law maxim volenti non fit iniura (i.e., if you have consented, you cannot
claim damages)‟ (Scharpf 2000: 103). But, Scharpf adds, whereas this normative justification of collective
rule was plausible in ancient democracies, in modern democracies consensual decisions are impossible
because of the plurality of interests and the distance between the affected and the representatives. Thus,
majority decisions are unavoidable for pragmatic reasons and become the central problem of an inputoriented justification. Scharpf argues, under modern conditions the mere principle of equal participation is not
sufficient to justify majority rule because of a simple reason: Seen from a voluntaristic point of view, what
could be the reason for a member of the minority to accept the majority decision even if this decision
obviously violates its interests? He concludes, the principle of equal participation must be accompanied by a
certain amount of trust to justify a duty to obey in case of majority rule:
„In the light of the danger that self-interested, or hostile, majorities could destroy the minority, plausible concepts of
input-oriented democratic legitimacy are logically required to stipulate specific preferences that make it possible to
think that “the people will do no wrong”. That is to say, the welfare of all must be an argument in the preference
function of each‟ (Scharpf 1999: 7/8).
But in this view it is hard to see how input-oriented democratic legitimacy could be explained consistently
with reference to the principles of a „normative individualism‟ only. What is introduced with the requirement
that all members mutually assume that „the welfare of all is an argument in the preference function of each‟ is
that individual preferences stand the test from a perspective of the political community. In other words, the
explanation of the input-oriented legitimacy draws on the presumption of an epistemic qualification, namely,
preferences laundered to be compatible with the public view („the welfare of all‟).
However, Scharpf does not ascribe this epistemic qualification to the democratic process. Instead, he goes on
to argue that the required mutual trust implies the existence of a „“thick” collective identity‟ as a precondition
of input-oriented democratic legitimacy:
13
A more detailed hermeneutical analysis of Scharpf‟s description of input- and output-oriented democratic legitimacy can be
found in (Gaus 2009: 245-263).
20
„When that belief in a “thick” collective identity can be taken for granted, majority rule may indeed loses its
threatening character, and it can also be relied upon to legitimize measures of interpersonal and interregional
redistribution that would not otherwise be acceptable.‟ (Scharpf 1999: 8/9)
At face falue this assumption seems to be uncontroversial. But note that the reason for why, according to
Scharpf, a „thick‟ collective identity is necessary, is the most existential threat of a majority that „could
destroy the minority‟. It goes without saying that the stability of cooperation in a political community
whatsoever can only be expected, if there is a mutual trust that every member is recognised as having a right
to peaceful co-existence and decisions do not pose an existential threat. However, it is difficult to see in what
sense such a kind of collective identity could be acceptable as a sufficient justification of majority decisions.
Instead, it might be more plausible to say that this kind of trust is a precondition for the readiness to
politically cooperate under certain conditions – and, thus, the reason for why the legitimacy question comes
up in the first place.
However, Scharpf agues that a „thick‟ collective identity not only bans existential fears, but furthermore
makes majority rule a reliable means „to legitimize measures of interpersonal and interregional redisdribution
that would not otherwise be acceptable‟. By this additional feature the „welfare of all‟ becomes a two-staged
assumption. And, as a consequence, one might infer on the assumed difference between a „thick‟ collective
identity mentioned at this point and a – logically implied, nut not mentioned – „thin‟ collective identity. A
„thin‟ collective identity, then, could be assumed to (only) induce mututal trust in a common interest in
peacefully regulated co-existence – banning „hostility‟.
What follows is that for the input-oriented legitimacy belief the reference to a „thick‟ collective identity
serves as an answer to the question of legitimacy: Given that I can trust the majority not to be hostile against
me, under what conditions can I accept its decisions as justified although they might run counter to my own
interest?
But it remains difficult to see in what sense the belief that „the welfare of all [is] an argument in the
preference function of each‟ could function as such a justification of majority decisions without further ado.
In my view, Scharpfs explanation could be understood in two ways: Either, firstly, the welfare of all is just
one among many interests members of the political community have. In this case, it could be part of the
preference function of each member, without being their highest interest. But then there would be no reason
for the minority to assume that decisions running counter to the welfare of all are the exception and not the
rule. Or, secondly, „the welfare of all‟ is mutually assumed to be the highest interest interest of everyone, a
trump on all other individual interests. This would make a democratic political process superfluous. Under
these conditions even a single person exceeding absolute rule would be regarded as (democratically)
legitimate, because the welfare of all would be the first interest of whoever decides.
21
In my view, these difficulties with Scharpf‟s description on the input-oriented legitimacy belief speak in favor
of two aspects outlined previously. On the one hand, they indicate that – as Easton proposes – a sense of
collective identity refers to a different aspect of general support than a sense of legitimacy. In the explanation
of input-oriented legitimacy, the assumption of a collective identity does not answer to the problem of
legitimising political rule. On the other hand, the analysis speaks in favor of the hypothesis that the belief of
democratic legitimacy also refers to a certain epistemic effect that is expected of the democratic decisionmaking process: that it helps to create decisions that are in line with what is required from a perspective of
„the welfare of all‟.
A similar (but reverse) reference to the allegedly distinctive feature of input-oriented legitimacy can be found
in Scharpf‟s description of the connotation of output-oriented democratic legitimacy. Scharpf notes that both
efficient problem-solving and the prevention of an abuse of power are the two main qualities which are
expected from the performance of political systems by output-oriented legitimacy beliefs. But if the epistemic
quality of an output is understood like this, it is logically dependent on what, in Scharpf‟s own terms, has to
be assigned to the input-side. The determination of what makes the efficiency of a political solution
presupposes that the affected somehow have reached an agreement about the description of the respective
problem as well as the aspired effect of a policy. Thus, a common interest as well as an effective problemsolution cannot plausibly be claimed to be met without the reference to the democratic qualities – most
important: equal participation – of a political will-formation process. The cognitive dimension of equal
participation likewise affects the second quality, the prevention of the abuse of power. In other words, outputoriented legitimation implicitly assumes an all-inclusive will-formation process as well as an epistemic effect
of the democratic process that integrates all political inputs according to generally acceptable criteria. This
kind of connectedness of the concepts of input- and output-oriented legitimacy becomes visible in Scharpf‟s
description of the two relevant qualities of output-legitimate decisions:
„output-oriented legitimacy depends on institutional norms and incentive mechanisms that must serve two
potentially conflicting purposes. They should hinder the abuse of public power and they should facilitate effective
problem-solving – which also implies that all interests should be considered in the definition of the public interest,
and that the costs and benefits of measures serving the public interest should be allocated according to plausible
norms of distributive justice.‟ (Scharpf 1999: 13)
Here, it is assumed that only the public interest avoids the abuse of power and secures efficient problemsolving. This public interest, as Scharpf‟s words suggest, is anything but self-evident. Rather it has to be
„defined‟ in an institutionalized political process. The definition of the public interest presupposes a process
in which „all interests should be considered‟. Thus, what is implied here is a public will-formation process in
22
which the members of the constituency have the equal possibility to participate and, as a consequence, that
their interests find their way into the process of decision-making – as the input of demands.
I stop the analysis of the connotation of the concepts of input- and output-oriented democratic legitimacy at
this point. My point is not that the aspects Scharpf discusses are beside the question of what makes the
general support of a democratic political order. On the contrary, I think, all of the abovementioned aspects are
relevant in that regard. My objection only concerns the claim that input- and output-oriented legitimacy
beliefs represent two different kinds of beliefs of democratic legitimacy. What the analysis shows is that this
attempt to specify the concept of democratic legitimacy misses the criterion that Sartori describes as mutual
exclusiveness: in explaining the connotation of input- and output-oriented democratic legitimacy Scharpf
implicitly presumes the alleged characteristic feature of the respective other. Thus, it does not seem plausible
to assume them as beliefs which could be „considered by itself‟ (Scharpf 1999: 6) and possibly account the
legitimacy belief that induces general support in democratic societies.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that Fritz W. Scharpf‟s proposal to conceptualise input- and output-oriented
legitimacy as two different kinds of democratic legitimacy does not hold valid. Instead of specifying the
concept of democratic legitimacy and describing two sub-types of the belief of democratic legitimacy, the
distinction between input- and output-oriented legitimacy is a conceptual misformation. It misses two of the
criteria Sartori describes as essential in the task of concept formation. For one thing, a closer look at Easton‟s
political systems theory revealed that the distinction does not specify, but obfuscate the connotation of the
general concept of legitimacy. For another thing, the distinction fails to show input- and output-oriented
legitimacy as mutually exclusive members of the same class (the democratic legitimacy belief). Drawing on
arguments from the literatur on political legitimacy I have argued that the specifics of the concept of the
democratic legitimacy belief is a likewise reference to those aspects that are assumed as the distinctive feature
of input- and output-oriented legitimacy respectively: the moral values of equal individual liberties, on the
one hand, and on the other hand an epistemic effect that helps to produce decisions that are in accord with the
public interest. Accordingly, a hermeneutical analysis of Scharpf‟s description has shown that in explaining
the specific connotation of input- and output-oriented legitimacy the features ascribed as essential for the
respective other type are implicitly presumed.
These circumstances could maybe held accountable for the fact that the use of these concepts in studies on
EU‟s legitimacy sometimes goes along with a confusion of an observers‟ and an actors‟ use of legitimacy as
well as the assumption that the object of an empirical analysis of legitimacy is (features of) the
institutionalised political process. But even if one does not want to draw this conclusion: In my view, the
23
presented analysis suggests that the distinction of input- and output-oriented democratic legitimacy should
not be seen as a useful conceptual tool, but as a conceptual misformation that does a disservice to the study of
EU‟s legitimacy.
24
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