Criterion
April/June 2010
Volume 5, Number 2
Pakistan and Nature of the State:
Revisionism, Jihad and Governance
Khaled Ahmed
3
A.G. Noorani
22
Religion and State in Pakistan
Iqbal Ahmad Khan
42
Nuclear Politics and South Asia
S. Iftikhar Murshed
60
Taimur Khilji
87
Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech
Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns
of Growth in Asia
Essays
Pakistan’s Economy on the Razor’s Edge:
Reform Imperatives
Zubair Iqbal 137
Mountain & Glacier Response to Climate Change
Impact of Transnational Media on
Broadcastng in Pakistan
The Future of Small Scale Enterprises
Aisha Khan 150
Hamid Raza Khan 163
Shahid Kardar 179
PAKISTAN AND NATURE OF THE
STATE: REVISIONISM, JIHAD AND
GOVERNANCE
Khaled Ahmed*
Abstract
(Threat perceptions are produced by the mind. National strategies are
produced by imagination on the basis of nationalism and geopolitical
compulsions. Threats have to be imagined so that armies can be trained
and weapons acquired accordingly. Some states have fixed enemies. All
dangers are to be interpreted on the yardstick of this fixed enmity. Other
nations are flexible and keep changing their perceptions of threat. It can
be Russia today and China tomorrow. External threats can be “created”
to distract from internal threats. Pakistan’s permanent danger is supposed
to be from India. As a challenger state it is supposed to endanger India
to a point where it relents on Kashmir. But the strategy of endangering
India has its reverse side, that of an anticipation of counter-threat. From
early days, Pakistan endangered India in its tribal northwest. India
endangered Pakistan in its tribal Balochistan. Starting 1990, Pakistan
enhanced its capacity to endanger. After that Pakistan and India went
into a whirlwind of action and reaction. Today it is difficult for most
Pakistanis indoctrinated by the media to see who endangers first and
who is merely “reactive.” Author.)
The course of democracy has never run smooth in Pakistan.
Every time the state is ruled by a dictator, the urge for democratic
governance increases. Yet, each democratic interregnum has unfolded
amid controversy and wrangling till it is no longer tolerable for the
*
Khaled Ahmed is Director, South Asia Free Media Association, Lahore.
Khaled Ahmed
state. Ironically, looking back, scholars find only the periods of nondemocratic rule more economically successful. The normal state of
the state in Pakistan appears therefore to be non-democratic. While the
variations in the mode of governance introduced by dictators to achieve
acceptance and legitimacy have been studied, there is still space for
studying the changing nature of the state itself.1
After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan faced many problems
associated with newly independent states in history. Two of them, lack of
funds and opposition from India, later became a part of its nationalism,
again in line with nationalisms in history: the consciousness of a “painful
birth.” The most significant factor in this consciousness was the war with
India over Kashmir. It determined the nature of Pakistani nationalism at
an early stage. The unspoken “mission statement” of Pakistan became
based on “revisionism” positing “injustice” of the annexation of Kashmir
by India and promising its reclamation through a “just war.”
Like other states, nationalism determined the nature of the
“revisionist” state in Pakistan. All the classical features associated with
nationalism were there: India was designated as the “enemy state”
whose survival meant end of the survival of Pakistan because India
was not reconciled to the existence of Pakistan; the use of the “external
enemy” as the cementing factor inside a multi-ethnic Pakistan.2 From
the expenditures made on defence in the first 25 years, one can say that
this revisionist doctrine embedded inside Pakistani nationalism invested
the Pakistan army with special importance. Over time, this developed
into an institutional supremacy that periodically becomes contentious.
Pakistani revisionism placed a tough task on the army and shaped
its outlook for years to come. It was required to challenge a state many
times larger than Pakistan, a state it could not win a war against or annex
as a trophy of war. Since these factors of “fundamental inequality”
normally determine the strategy of an army, strategy was discarded by
the Pakistan army to enable it to challenge the Indian army tactically. In
consequence, the Pakistan army became a “tactical” organisation whose
officers had more panache than intellect, in line with the Islamic concept
of jihad that relied on faith rather than on the calculus of relative military
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Pakistan and Nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance
power. It fought “niche” or “set-piece” wars with India on the basis of
Pakistan’s revisionist nationalism with results that could be interpreted
vaguely as victories.
The Cold War era helped Pakistan to continue adherence to its
nationalism which also meant yielding paramountcy to the army. The
army “took over” every time it needed to remind the civilian leaders that
they had reneged on nationalism. Every time it took over it also touched
base with its own “tactical” nature and provoked war with India. The
fall of East Pakistan should have shaken Pakistan out of the groove of
its revisionist thinking, but it encouraged revanchism instead. Under
civilian rule the army was once again strengthened by this instinct for
revenge. The nationalist myth of binding the nation on the basis of the
“external enemy” began to fall apart. Communities inside Pakistan that
had suffered because of Pakistan’s excessive attention to the “Indian
threat” began to challenge the civilian rule.
Another aspect of Pakistani nationalism was its ideology, based
on Islam but in no small measure propelled by a desire to differentiate
Pakistan from India and prevent its “relapse” into India. Islamic
governance, based on the doctrine of non-separation of state and church,
became an early intellectual challenge but could not be resolved through
creative re-interpretation. The army, already in the habit of using tribal
lashkars or non-state actors in national wars with India, consolidated
Pakistan’s nationalism by adding to it the element of religion. It became
the guardian of frontiers as well as ideology. This was completely in
tune with the Pakistan’s post-1947 Muslim ethos. After the 1971 war
in East Pakistan, the Pakistan army seriously inducted the concept of
the non-state actors into its tactical philosophy of “death by a thousand
cuts” on the presumption that India was already in the process of falling
apart.3
Jihad and creation of ‘ungoverned spaces’
The induction of jihad into national war had its consequences for the
sovereignty of the state and its “monopoly of violence.” The formation
of jihadi militias and their location within civil society after their military
CRITERION – April/June 2010
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Khaled Ahmed
training tended to create multiple centres of power in Pakistan. Because
of this new phenomenon, the first fissures of loyalty within the Pakistan
army made their appearance. For the first time, during the war in
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, a kind of “reverse-indoctrination”
in favour of the mujahideen became observable inside the army: the
“handlers” became won over to the cause of jihad in supersession of
the authority of the state. What comes first: Islam or the state? By the
1990s, public discussions showed that that more and more Pakistanis
were inclined to say that they were Muslims first and Pakistanis later.4
In the 2000s, because of the proliferation of madrassas as nurseries of
jihad and as intellectual guides for the common man, the TV channels
began to reflect this subordination of the state as an accepted value in
Pakistan.
Pakistan always had “ungoverned spaces” on its territory. This is
where the non-state actors came from in the 1947, 1965 and 1999 wars
against India. It is moot whether the retention of these territories was
propelled by the “civilian” desire to preserve the traditional way of life
of the tribes or the “military” need to obtain non-state actors. However
after the Afghan war, in which Pakistan participated covertly together
with the United States and its other allies, expanded these ungoverned
spaces and brought them into the settled areas. The madrassas network,
aided by the mujahideen militias, partook of the sovereignty of the
state, benefited from the additional centres of power they increasingly
represented. Allegiance of the army officer became divided and he began
to show more loyalty to the Islamic warrior he was handling than to the
Pakistan army.5
The rise of the “ungoverned spaces” as bastions of jihadi power
after 2001 began another process: the tribalisation of Pakistan’s settled
areas and the retreat of state governance from the provinces. This
new trend in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and
Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) was carried on the
Islamic demand for sharia that challenged the Constitution of Pakistan
and its implementation of sharia through the Federal Shariat Court. The
jihadi sharia was based on the enforcement of “marufaat” – not in the
Constitution - as well as the punishment of “munkiraat” – contained
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Pakistan and Nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance
in the Constitution. By 2005, all the clergy in Pakistan, including the
non-jihadi section, believed in the enforcement of “marufaat” and thus
indirectly rejected the Constitution. Tribalisation of Pakistan was now
quite visible as suicide-bombing shifted to the cities. The NWFP did
not only lose the Malakand region of PATA, it lost most of the cities
outside Peshawar to the Taliban, including important military and air
force bases in Kohat and Bannu.6
There are two trends that set Pakistan apart from the Third World
norm as a state with problems specific to itself: its permissive stance
towards the expansion of “ungoverned spaces” and its acquisition of
nuclear weapons. Both incidentally favoured the environment of jihad
at the expense of the sovereignty of the state since jihad was fought
by non-state actors. The acquisition of nuclear weapons was actually
more suited to Pakistan as a revisionist state vis-à-vis India than to
India which had renounced revisionism vis-à-vis China. (Why India did
not choose to challenge China, many times more powerful than itself,
makes for a separate study reflecting non-dominance of the Indian army
in the state because of the nature of Indian nationalism.) The “niche”
war doctrine of Pakistan army could now be carried out under a nuclear
umbrella. After failing to tackle aggression after bilateral nuclearisation,
India has now decided to confront Pakistan with Pakistan’s own concept
of “limited war.”7
Sacrifice of governance for national security
While external sovereignty of the state is a myth, no state can exist
without internal sovereignty. Before the 20th century international order
became consolidated, the only measure of a state’s existence was its writ:
its ability of governance over territory it claimed, including taxation
and law and order. The adoption of jihad by the state was directly
instrumental in the gradual deprivation of the writ of the state. It began
in Balochistan and the Tribal Areas and crept into the cities in the shape
of “no-go” areas. Balochistan suffered as a province owing to many
factors but not least because Pakistan’s security concerns were focused
more on the eastern border; and its only concern for Balochistan was
expressed through the presence there of the Pakistan army and Frontier
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Khaled Ahmed
Constabulary (FC). The political consensus in Balochistan today is
against the presence of the police, against the presence of the army
and the FC, clearly a signalling for a status far beyond the confines of
federalism. And when India decided in favour of “limited war” with
Pakistan it opted for activism in Balochistan.
Governance depends on the writ of the state which precedes
governance. Governance in regions without writ of the state or writ
shared with non-state actors will be flawed. In the Tribal Areas and in
Malakand for at least two years, the local infrastructure was not in the
control of the state, there was no law and order and people could survive
only by renouncing their loyalty to the state of Pakistan. In Balochistan,
the infrastructure is under challenge and assets of the federal state are
unprotected despite the presence there of the army and its paramilitary
adjuncts. The police is either non-existent outside Quetta and some other
cities or under challenge from the system of levies the Baloch leaders
favour. Private armies are the norm and the only order that works is
the law of deterrence and intimidation. If you add up Balochistan, the
Tribal Areas of FATA and PATA plus most cities of the NWFP, the no-go
areas of Sindh and the city of Karachi, and an increasing thinning of the
state in South Punjab, you come up with nearly 60 percent of Pakistan
without proper governance, or areas where governance is not possible
because of the weakness of the writ of the state.
Governance, at the primitive level, means law and order. After
that comes the ability to collect taxes, especially direct taxes linked to
people’s incomes; tax collection is also an indicator of the “outreach” of
the state. Both factors of governance have been lacking in Pakistan for
over a quarter of a century. The Third World state is generally deficient
in tax-collection and, to some extent, its ability to achieve effective
executive and judicial outreach. But Pakistan has certain characteristics
that it doesn’t share with the Third World states; it shares them rather
with the failed or failing states like Somalia, Chad and Afghanistan.
The first is absence of law and order in large rural and urban areas; the
second is the prostration of the judiciary and the executive in the face of
intimidation from the terrorists and jihadi organisations. The third factor
that is unique to Pakistan is that foreign terrorists and Pakistani non8
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Pakistan and Nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance
state actors are able to carry out terrorist acts outside Pakistan, as far
afield as Europe and the United States. This opens Pakistan to invasion
from the aggrieved states under international law.
Pakistan is now subject to insurgencies aimed at changing the map
of the state from the inside. There are non-state actors, meant originally
to strike outside Pakistan, who are now striking inside Pakistan on behalf
of the very foreign states once targeted by Pakistan through them. There
are non-state actors who are labelled foreigners but are a part of the
Islamist-terrorist global movement fighting the West in general and the
United States in particular. They are supposed to be located in some
parts of Pakistan where the state doesn’t have its writ; they are also said
to be located in other parts of Pakistan where they are protected by the
intelligence agencies of Pakistan. This development is complicated by
Pakistan’s policy of dividing the Taliban into two categories, the good
and the bad Taliban, ironically the bad ones being Pakistani Taliban. The
dominant sentiment in Pakistan is anti-American which means it finds
itself handicapped in inhibiting militant elements opposed to the United
States.
Anti-Americanism has brought disadvantages in its wake. The US
policy in the region is in lockstep with the thinking of the other regional
and non-regional states threatened by terrorism. Adopting an antiAmerican posture is advantageous in Pakistan for politicians as well as
institutions looking after or enhancing their turfs. While it is empowering
to be anti-American in Pakistan, it comes at the price of isolation at
the international level. Given the pattern of economic dependence,
Pakistan can ill-afford this isolation. Attention is deflected from this
realistic scenario through appeal, once again, to national security - to
“threat from India” - which traditionally trumps threat from economic
malfunction. In the absence of a Cold War environment, the reliance on
“threat from India” is a dangerous introversion since no one among the
allies of Pakistan, including the United States, believes it.
Does appeal to “threat from India” create the sort of national
solidarity it did in the past?8 From evidence on the ground, it doesn’t, but
it does unite all the centres of power against the incumbent government.
CRITERION – April/June 2010
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Khaled Ahmed
The provinces, demanding autonomy after half a century of uneven
economic growth, apparently feel no need to curb their criticism of the
federation and the federal executive in the national security interest.
However, the “centres of power”, appearing on the scene during the
struggle to remove General Musharraf in 2007, use the traditional
anti-Indian rhetoric with the new anti-American rhetoric to attack and
destabilise the federal government. Pakistani nationalism has run its
course and insurrections in Balochistan and other regions do not respond
to it, affirming the failure of “nationhood” in Pakistan over time because
of the imposition of the national security state from above. The media at
times joins the establishment in Islamabad in insisting that Pakistan be
considered a national security state in order to maintain the posture of
hostility towards India.9
Pakistan’s Six Pillars of the State
All states have three mutually balancing “centres of power” or
pillars of the state: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. As
the nationalist and ideological pressures mounted in Pakistan, a fourth
informal pillar was added: the army. Over time, this evolved into what is
called the establishment, supplemented by other permanent institutions
of the state: the military-bureaucratic pressure group. The shibboleth
of “security” brought the intelligence agencies of the state to the top
of the establishment hierarchy. Today ISI plays the role of the strategic
mind of the establishment, while an increasingly active MI confirms the
dominance of the army in the establishment. Two more centres of power
have been added to the pillars-of-the-state theory: the media and the
jihadi organisations. Out of the “six pillars” in 2009, five were intensely
anti-American and anti-Indian in varying degrees. The executive, seen
as pro-American and pro-India, was seriously undermined by this
imbalance in the checks-and-balance mechanism of the state and by calls
for “mid-term” elections in the media, which accuses the opposition in
the legislature of being too soft on a renegade government.
Today, the “existential” pillars of the state are: 1) Legislature, 2)
Executive, 3) Judiciary, 4) Army plus Establishment, 5) the Media and 6)
Jihadi Organisations. The rise of the media as arbiter and manufacturer
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Pakistan and Nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance
of pressure through “public opinion” is dated to the years in power of
General Musharraf who allowed a proliferation of TV channels and,
through them, dominance of the Urdu-medium opinion expressed by rightleaning ideological columns. The first instalment of TV anchors came
from the top-rung Urdu columnists; later, as the channels proliferated,
second- and third-grade columnists too found their place among the
“mind-benders” of the nation. The rise of the Jihadi Organisations was
made possible gradually over the years because of the use made of them
in the covert and low-intensity wars staged by the Pakistan army in
Afghanistan and Kashmir. The rise of the jihadi militias as “centres of
power” arose over the years because of the protection they were given by
the state in their intercourse with civil society. The judiciary too became
subordinated to them in the countryside where seminaries attached to
the jihadis could force the lower judiciary to deliver verdicts of their
liking. One can say that even the higher judiciary did succumb in many
cases to their intimidation.10
The campaign to oust Musharraf brought together three entities:
the media, the agitating lawyers and the judiciary. There was support
from civil society to this movement as the campaign symbolised
rejection of military rule and elevation of a judiciary that broke the past
tradition of judges submitting to military takeovers. The other support
for this movement was not universally recognised, the one coming
from the jihadi organisations. The jihadi organisations were offended
by Musharraf’s switching-off of the Kashmir jihad and his clampdown
on the Al Qaeda elements with which the jihadis were aligned. The
religious parties, as Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA) had felt betrayed
by him equally after they agreed to be a part of the Muslim League
Quaid (PMLQ) alliance by not relinquishing charge of his dual armychief-and-President office. The MMA parties were aligned in differing
measures with the jihadi organisations and the Taliban and backed the
movement for the restoration of the judges fired by Musharraf after his
showdown with the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Iftikhar
Muhammad Chaudhry.
After the 2008 general election the PPP government in Islamabad
took its time restoring the judges fired by Musharraf and violated the
CRITERION – April/June 2010
11
Khaled Ahmed
agreement it had signed in this regard with the largest political party in
the parliamentary opposition, and the ruling party in Punjab, Muslim
League Nawaz (PMLN). As the PMLN distanced itself from its
traditional rival the PPP and the lawyers stepped up their campaign for
the restoration of the judges – this time against the PPP government –
the media and the judiciary formed a bond of solidarity. During the 2007
Lal Masjid siege in Islamabad, opposition to Musharraf compelled the
TV channels to take a pro-cleric stance, which affected the attitude of
the Supreme Court about the Lal Masjid clerics for the same reason. It
was in this way that the judiciary, the media, the lawyers and the PMLN
were seen as “friendly” by the Taliban, the jihadi militias and Al Qaeda.
It should be noted that Al Qaeda had taken a stand at the highest level of
its leadership on the side of the defiant clerics of Lal Masjid.
The PPP government, in light of the pledge made in the Charter
of Democracy (2006) began to make moves to “normalise” relations
with New Delhi, beginning with the Trade Policy of 2008 which the
“establishment” did not like judging from the articles thereafter placed
in the press. The Trade Policy, apart from increasing the tradable items
to 2000, envisaged the setting up of an Indian factory near Lahore for
the manufacture of CNG-equipped buses. In November 2008, after
the Mumbai attacks by Pakistani non-state actors, the government first
offered to send the ISI chief to India for consultations, then tried to
subordinate the ISI to the Interior Ministry, both actions falling foul of
the establishment. Earlier, President Zardari had announced that he was
ready to forswear the doctrine of nuclear first strike against India because
he was not scared of India. All these purported “policy changes” were
opposed by an angry media remarkable in its uniformity of views.11
As observed above, the effect of jihadi organisations on the judiciary,
especially in the districts, has been a familiar consequence of the state’s
waging of covert war. Journalism too has been under the pressure of
intimidatory tactics in the districts where the jihadi militias locate
themselves. The English-language press misses out on the districts
news because of a lack of reporters with ability to write in English. This
“blackout” on the dominance of the jihadis in the countryside is also
owed to additional two factors: 1) that the Urdu newspapers do not pay
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Pakistan and Nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance
salaries to their district correspondents, forcing them to rely on handouts
they receive from people whose news they get printed in the newspapers;
and 2) that the intimidated district correspondents work literally as the
“press branch” of the jihadi militias, printing only news that showed the
jihadis in a favourable light while attacking their victims, non-Muslims
and Shias, as the offending parties.
This has undermined the “independence” of the media the same
way as it undermined the “independence” of the lower judiciary in
the districts. If the TV channels assert their independence daily by
attacking the PPP alliance in government, their “independence” to do
so will be legitimised only if they are able to comment freely on the
activities of the jihadi organisations as well. Most newspapers continue
to write “militants” instead of “terrorists” and abstain from referring to
the terrorist organisations by name, only applying the term “a banned
organisation” when reporting an act of extreme violence by one of
them. In a paper read at a seminar of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies
(PIPS) on 18 November 2009 some observations were made about the
partisanship or lack of independence of the media in Pakistan:
“Many media experts would tell you that the newspapers and
TV channels in Pakistan do not perceive the Taliban as a threat to the
country or its people despite butchering thousands of men, women and
children and flouting in the most blatant manner the rights and protection
guaranteed by the constitution. Only a few months ago – before the
launch of the military operation in Swat – countless newspaper reports
and TV talk shows were opposing military action or justifying the illegal
and unconstitutional demands of the Taliban when they had effectively
ended the writ of the state in Malakand division and were quite literally
slaughtering security forces personnel, public representatives and
common citizens. At that time, there were many voices in the media
either calling for reaching an understanding, or an agreement with the
Taliban and ceding more territory to them, or generally writing and
airing favourable reports, either out of fear or on the establishment’s
behest. It is painfully obvious why elements in the establishment would
still be interested in a favourable press for the Taliban and other militant
extremists.”12
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Khaled Ahmed
The same paper speaks of the trouble one Lahore-based daily had
with the warlord of Khyber Agency, Mangal Bagh, on calling him “a
thief” in its second editorial after noting his ransom-taking activities
in the agency and in Peshawar. The terrorist warlord picked up the
newspaper’s reporter from Peshawar and made him grovel at his feet for
hours, asking him to reveal the name of the editorial-writer. The paper
finally gave in, apologised to him and placed an embargo on any news
thought to be negative about Mangal Bagh and his men. The editors of
a Lahore English-language weekly had to abjectly apologise to a jihadi
organisation based in Lahore for writing a critical “inside” account of
the militia. The apology was “arranged” by the Punjab administration on
the condition that similar material never be published again. A similar
incident took place in Lahore after an English-language newspaper
published a cartoon that gave offence to the wife of the Lal Masjid
cleric, Abdul Aziz. The paper came under threat from the jihadis ready
to die for Lal Masjid.
The PIPS paper goes on to put on record another incident which is
thought to be typical of the press in Pakistan: “A leading English language
daily newspaper referred to the Taliban as militants in its coverage. Then
one day someone asked the editor’s wife if her husband’s newspaper did
not consider Taliban terrorists and if it did then why would it not say so
in its reports. The following day that newspaper started referring to the
Taliban as terrorists. The same week, the newspapers’ reporters from
Malakand and the NWFP pleaded with the main office in Lahore that
the Taliban had threatened to kill them if the paper referred to them
as terrorists once more. The next day Taliban had got back the tag of
militants.”
More blatantly: “In October 2009, a Taliban group sent two letters
to the Lahore Press Club – one on October 12 and the other on October
14 – warning that if the media ‘does not stop portraying us as terrorists
... we will blow up offices of journalists and media organisations.’ The
list of threats and warnings individually sent to journalists and media
organisations is a long one.” One typical example was the threat to
author and columnist Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa carried in the publication
Al Qalam belonging to Jaish-e-Muhammad, rebuking her on writing
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Pakistan and Nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance
about the power of Maulana Masood Azhar in Bahawalpur. Dr Siddiqa
understood the editorial comment as a threat and was greatly concerned
about her safety as were her friends, especially as her book Military Inc
was considered highly critical of the Pakistan army. It is a pointer to the
continuing co-existence of the state with jihadi organisations that firing
of automatic weapons in November 2009 on the house of columnist
Kamran Shafi in Wah was confused between terrorists who rang him
after the incident and the state itself.
The creation of uniformity of opinion in the media has directly
undermined the authenticity of public opinion in Pakistan.13 The
interaction between the moulder of public opinion and public opinion
itself has given rise to the censoring of the variant point of view on the
TV channels. Columnist Saleem Safi wrote in Jang (6 Dec 2009) that in a
TV discussion he held the position that President Karzai would continue
to be president of Afghanistan because the Americans had no alternative
to him despite tentative reference to Ashraf Ghani and Agha Sherzai.
He added that sadly Pakistan and the Taliban too had no alternative to
Karzai but had thoughtlessly unleashed propaganda against him. Only
when non-Pashtun Abdullah Abdullah came up against Karzai in the
elections was it realised in Islamabad that Karzai was still the best option
for Pakistan. The TV anchor so disliked his opinion that he cut it out of
the show during editing.
When public opinion is not formed in conditions of freedom
guaranteed by the writ of the state, it loses its validity and may be
extremely dangerous to the survival of the state. It begins to resemble
the public opinion produced in fascist and totalitarian states through a
coercive state propaganda machinery. In Pakistan, this lack of freedom
emanates from the weak writ of the state and the ganging up of the
five pillars of state power against the executive, have brought about a
dangerous trend towards populism. This has introduced distortion in the
objective and expert handing of the affairs of the state, producing the
judicial trend of “interference” in areas requiring expertise rather than
reference to public opinion. Populism has been defined as a negative
trend in democratic societies being run on scientific lines by politicians
elected by the people. Its most harmful traits include stereotyping
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Khaled Ahmed
of communities and states and the propagation of these stereotypes
through dogmatic assertion. In the case of Pakistan, public opinion thus
formed has damaged the economy and curtailed the flexibility of stance
in the domain of foreign policy; or it has habituated the people to see
the suppleness of foreign policy options as a kind of capitulation and
betrayal of national honour (ghairat).14
Conclusion: Getting out of India-based threat perception
Pakistan has “discovered” the political and economic disadvantage
of relying on the threat perception established by nationalism. Both
the mainstream national parties, after being alternately overthrown
from power following their attempts to “normalise” with India,
pledged themselves to change the country’s India policy in the Charter
of Democracy in 2006. After coming to power in 2008, the PPP
government, backed by its traditionally pro-India ally parties, the ANP
and the MQM, tried to fulfil the pledge made in the Charter. Apart from
his efforts described above, President Zardari became the spearhead
of some concrete measures in the direction of normalisation. These
efforts were in line with such earlier efforts to create security through
“interdependence” with India as the project of Iran-Pakistan-Indian gas
pipeline.
There was international pressure on Pakistan during the Musharraf
era to move towards economic interdependence with India to end the
decades of conflict the two countries had engaged in. The World Bank
offered liberal credits if any plans were made to build trade routes
through Pakistan to enhance its strategic importance as a “trade corridor.”
Musharraf was thinking in paradigmatic terms about converting Pakistan
into a trading hub for the regions lying around it. Since he had begun to
build the Gwadar Port – not first conceived by him, let us admit – the
network of roads and railway tracks branching from the port seemed
to leave India out. But later he began to speak in more general terms
and was once privately in favour of conceding the Indian request that a
corridor be given it for trading with Central Asia. The idea of the Indian
corridor got sidelined because the general deferred to the “defence”
angle and abstained from de-linking it from Kashmir after having
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strangely established the precedent of de-linking the IPI from Kashmir.
As a general he probably knew that he was standing on the edge of an
identity-change of the state of Pakistan. Perhaps he realised the limits of
how far he could go as a military leader in changing the country from a
warrior state to a trading nation.
President Zardari was less half-minded in extending this policy and
moving more quickly towards a policy of economic interdependence
with India. The SAARC summit had issued a declaration in April 2007
on the desire of the member states to develop “connectivity” including
roads that would link the South Asian region for trade and travel. In
May 2009, when he was in Washington and met his Afghan counterpart,
President Karzai, he signed an MOU with him which was significant
in its strategic outreach. Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed “to begin
talks on a transit trade agreement which will ultimately allow India to
use the Wahga-Khyber route for trade with Kabul.” The memorandum
committed the two countries “to achieving a trade transit agreement by
the end of the year.” US Secretary of State Ms Hillary Clinton, hosting
the round, said: “This is a historic event. This agreement has been under
discussion for 43 years without resolution.”
Although India was not mentioned as a beneficiary in the
memorandum, its ghost was very much present on the occasion. Ms
Clinton spelled out all the implications – a set of Western beliefs in
trade as antidote to war which is not greatly appreciated in Pakistan
– of what the opening up of Indo-Afghan trade through Pakistan will
imply: “Nothing opens up an area to economic development better than
a good road with good transit rules and an ability to transport goods and
people effectively.” The DG ISI of Pakistan was among the delegation
led by President Zardari which saw the memorandum being signed by
the foreign ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Later, the Foreign
Office in Islamabad was compelled to play down the MOU in words
that implied non-commitment. Pakistan in 2009 was busy diverting the
threat perception from internal elements to India.
Threat perceptions are produced by the mind. National strategies are
produced by imagination on the basis of nationalism and geopolitical
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17
Khaled Ahmed
compulsions. Threats have to be imagined so that armies can be trained
and weapons acquired accordingly. Some states have fixed enemies. All
dangers are to be interpreted on the yardstick of this fixed enmity. Other
nations are flexible and keep changing their perceptions of threat. It can
be Russia today and China tomorrow. External threats can be “created”
to distract from internal threats. Pakistan’s permanent danger is supposed
to be from India. As a challenger state it is supposed to endanger India
to a point where it relents on Kashmir. But the strategy of endangering
India has its reverse side, that of an anticipation of counter-threat. From
early days, Pakistan endangered India in its tribal northwest. India
endangered Pakistan in its tribal Balochistan. Starting 1990, Pakistan
enhanced its capacity to endanger. After that Pakistan and India went
into a whirlwind of action and reaction. Today it is difficult for most
Pakistanis indoctrinated by the media to see who endangers first and
who is merely “reactive.”
After the November 2008 attack in Mumbai by Pakistani non-state
actors, India has emerged as a source of renewed threat in Pakistan.
Nationalism has made a reactive comeback “to stand up to India’s
accusations.” On the other hand, India has changed its “dialogue
policy” and has increased its presence in Afghanistan as a policy of
counter-threat with the clear approval of the US and its allies. Despite
evidence to the contrary after the capture of many terrorists, most
attacks including suicide-attacks in Pakistan are officially blamed on
India. On the December 7 attack on Moon Market in Iqbal Town Lahore,
the Punjab Law Minister said that the attack had come from India and
Israel working together. The Punjab governor was less sure about it and
linked it to the Taliban reaction to Pakistan army’s successful operation
in South Waziristan. The NWFP senior minister Bashir Ahmad Bilour
refused to blame India for a blast that occurred in Peshawar the same
day. On the other hand, Interior Minister Rehman Malik stuck to his
position that India “and others” – meaning the US – were involved in
terrorism inside Pakistan. Some TV channels expressed anger at those
who refused to blame India.
Public opinion, created through a unidirectional media, has come
to the conclusion that confrontation with India has become inevitable.
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Pakistan and Nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance
International opinion however is insistent that the epochal Indo-Pak
conflict can only be resolved through economic inter-dependence.
Economists located inside Pakistan seem to agree with the nationalist
sentiment in favour of confrontation, but Washington-based Shahid Javed
Burki, former finance minister of Pakistan and former vice-president of
the World Bank, thinks it more urgent than ever that Pakistan should
opt for an economic partnership with India as a means of resolving its
disputes with it. After observing that Pakistan is not likely to solve its
resource problem any time soon - like increasing either its domestic
savings rate to invest more in the economy or its tax-to-GDP ratio for
the government to turn its attention to provide services to the poor - he
proposes:
“One way of opening it is to work closely with India on the
economic front and get foreign investment to come from that route.
With better relations with Pakistan, Indian companies may be willing to
invest in Pakistan. I believe during the Musharraf period Tata Computer
Services had shown some interest in investing in Pakistan, making use
of the cheaper skilled labour available here compared to the demands
of workers in India. The Reliance Group also wanted to develop oil
storage facilities in the Jhelum area making use of the exhausted salt
mines. This would have reduced the amount of freight and storage India
was paying on the Middle Eastern oil. But Pakistan did not permit these
investments for political reasons. A democratic government may be able
to take a different policy stance. Another way Pakistan could benefit
from the revival of interest in India on the part of foreign investors is
to establish strong links with some of the industrial sectors in India.
Automobile industry is one such candidate. Recent industry data
showed sales of trucks and buses in India rose 52 per cent in October,
the fourth consecutive monthly rise and the strongest expansion since
April 2007.”15
The civilian meaning of “geopolitical importance” of Pakistan is
its median position as a trade corridor; the military meaning of the term
is Pakistan’s ability as a median state to obstruct trade in order to exert
pressure for a better bargaining position on Kashmir. In the middle of
Pakistan’s war against internal terrorism the state has once again chosen
CRITERION – April/June 2010
19
Khaled Ahmed
to insist on the solution of the dispute of Kashmir.16
(The author read this paper at the Irtiqa Institute of Social Studies as the
Hamza Alavi lecture for 2009)
References:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
20
Raymond Hinnesbusch in his paper Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization: Theory
and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique in Democratisation in the Muslim World:
Edited by Frederic Volpi & Francesco Cavatorta; Routledge 2007; p.12: “authoritarian
regimes can adapt to new conditions; specifically, their political liberalisation or
pluralisation is, for structural reasons, more likely to be a substitute for democratisation
than a stage on the way to it”. Shades of this would be observable in the Muslim world as
well as in the non-Muslim world but one has to agree that Muslims are more vulnerable
to this substitution.
Dr Ishrat Hussain, Public policy and Social Sciences, in Critical Perspectives on Social
Sciences in Pakistan; Edited by Pervaiz Tahir, Tahir Kamran & Rizwan Omer Gondal; GC
University Lahore 2008; p.72: “Since its inception, Pakistan has faced the monumental
task to spell out an identity different from the Indian identity. Born from the division of
the old civilization of India, Pakistan has struggled for constructing its own culture, a
culture which would not only be different from the Indian Culture but one that the whole
world would acknowledge”.
Public statements by ex-army chiefs like Aslam Beg and ex-ISI chiefs like Hamid Gul
keep referring to scores of insurgencies inside India which will one day unhinge India.
Hafiz Said of Jamaatud Dawa repeated this in his article in daily Jinnah in the 6 December
2009 issue. Pakistan simply has to deliver a cut here and there to get India to implode.
Army General Kayani repeated that on visiting the dead of Rawalpindi’s Parade Lane
mosque in December 2009, saying that the army would die for Islam and Pakistan, and
confirming that the priority of faith before the state was accepted.
Herald, April 2009: Major General (Retd) Faisal Alvi revealed that he had written a
letter to the army chief saying that serving generals had joined up with the Taliban. Alvi
was later killed by Major (Retd) Ashiq who worked for another retired army officer –
denied by the Pakistan army – Ilyas Kashmiri now located with the Taliban in North
Waziristan.
Khaled Ahmed, The Friday Times, 21 September 2007, Islam and its function of
retribalisation: “After Islamisation, and the part played in it by Saudi Arabia through
the manipulation of the Council of Islamic Ideology, the rest of Pakistan too began its
backward journey to tribalism. Jirgas and panchayats began to raise their ugly head as
parallel systems of justice with the ideal of revenge-seeking at the centre of their codes
of conduct. The modern state began to be pulled down gradually as the Islamic state
came into its own. The Pakistani society, honour-based because of the persistence of its
collective tribal memory and low ‘secular’ literacy, began to say goodbye to the municipal
law already dysfunctional because of lack of reforms in the institutions that ran it. The
madrassa saw itself as the presiding authority over this retribalisation and instrumentalise
the concept of jihad to give itself the power of the executive.
Daily Times, 25 November 2009: “Indian Army chief General Deepak Kapoor’s address
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Pakistan and Nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
during a defence seminar indicated that the possibility of a limited nuclear war was “very
much a reality in South Asia”.
Christoph Jaffrelot, A History of Pakistan and its Origins, Anthem Press, 2004; p.37:
“The limits of national integration explain the campaigns against ‘others’, regularly
brought into play by Pakistani leaders in order to weld the unity of the country once more.
These campaigns are launched against ‘bad Muslims such as the Ahmadi or against the
Hindus or the Christians. The orchestration of this antagonism is all of a piece with the
perpetuation of the conflict over t over Kashmir. Pakistan, therefore, might well be a case
of nationalism without a nation”.
Chief Editor Jinnah (8 Nov 2009) wrote that PPP spokesperson Fauzia Wahab told the
press that Pakistan was not a security state but an economy-based state. He took strong
exception to this and observed that Ms Wahab should not have said this in the open.
Because not terming Pakistan a security state could harm the PPP government. He stated
that if Ms Wahab had said it in rage (tap gai) she should learn to control herself. He
thought an economy-based Pakistani state would have to normalise relations with India
and that was not acceptable.
Justice (Retd) Bhatti of Lahore High Court who allowed bail to Christian Salamat Masih
accused of blasphemy was killed after retirement in his chamber. In the case of sectarian
killer Riaz Basra of Lashkar Jhangvi a number of judges retired during the hearing of
the murder of Iranian consul Sadeq Ganji but did not pronounce judgement. Shia-killers
Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq are about to be released from Multan and Lahore courts
in 2009 because the witnesses in the trial have either been killed or have resiled.
Literature on nuclear war does not recognise the credibility of the doctrine of “second
strike” and therefore renouncing the doctrine of “first strike” is rendered meaningless.
Najam U Din, Mainstream media’s response to radical extremism, paper read on 18 Nov
2009 at Holiday Inn Lahore, during PIPS seminar.
Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan conspiracy theories stifle debate, BBC website 27 Nov 2009:
“Switch on any of the dozens of satellite news channels now available in Pakistan. You will
be bombarded with talk show hosts who are mostly obsessed with demonising the elected
government, trying to convince viewers of global conspiracies against Pakistan led by
India and the United States or insisting that the recent campaign of suicide bomb blasts
around the country is being orchestrated by foreigners rather than local militants”.
Lyrical columnist Irfan Siddiqi wrote in Jang (17 Oct 2009) that the bride of ghairat
(honour) has left the house of Pakistan. And carrying the kashkol (begging bowl) and
wandering in the streets of the world is the fate of the nation. We are empty in the pocket
of our robes (tahi-daman) and cannot live within our means; but then why is the spark of
ghairat rising from our ashes?
Dawn, 30 Nov, 2009, Working with India.
Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Vanguard, 2005), p.51. Cohen thinks the ‘Kashmir
Curse’ of Pakistan has “seriously damaged Pakistan’s prospects as a state…a cost that
several generations of Pakistani leaders have been willing to pay”.
CRITERION – April/June 2010
21
JINNAH’S 11 AUGUST, 1947 SPEECH
A. G. Noorani*
Abstract
(Muhammad Ali Jinnah meant every word of what he said on 11
August 1947. He was opposed to an Islamic State as understood by its
protagonists in Pakistan like Abul Ala Maududi relying on Abul Hasan
al-Marwardi and others but of which Jinnah was innocent – he did not
demand because he wanted to establish an Islamic State. Like others he
was concerned at the play of majority rule in a country with communal
divisions. The Congress rejected power-sharing in 1937-39 and drove
him to ask for partition. It was a political not a religious demand.
Author)
Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s Presidential address on
11 August 1947, to the inaugural session of Pakistan’s Constituent
Assembly, was one of the most consequential pronouncements in
the history of South Asia. Even sixty years later and despite archival
disclosures, debate persists on its true import and significance. Very
understandably, because it touches the very fundamentals of the state,
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In contrast to the Constitution of 1956,
the Constitution of 1973 prescribes in its various oaths of office a pledge
to “strive to preserve the Islamic Ideology which is the basis for the
creation of Pakistan.” (Third Schedule; vide the Second Schedule to the
Constitution of 1956).
There was no ambiguity whatever in the formulations Jinnah used:
“You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing
to do with the business of the State … you will find that in course of
time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be
*
A.G. Noorani is an eminent Indian scholar, legal expert and columnist.
Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech
Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith
of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”
(Jamiluddin Ahmad (ed.)., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah; Vols. I
and II; Sh. Muhammad Ashraf; Lahore; Vol. II, pp. 403-4).
This marked the abandonment of the two-nation theory, explicitly.
For Jinnah referred in the same speech to “a nation of 400 millions souls in
subjection” to the British rule. His much acclaimed biography by Stanley
Wolpert, far from providing any cogent explanation for this volte face,
expresses bewilderment. “What was he talking about? Had he simply
forgotten where he was? Had the cyclone of events so disoriented him
that he was arguing the opposition’s brief? Was he pleading for a united
India – on the eve of Pakistan – before those hundreds of thousands of
terrified innocents were slaughtered ….?” (Jinnah of Pakistan; Oxford
University Press; p. 304). This tells us more about Wolpert than Jinnah.
What lends ambiguity to the text is the context. Since 1939, even
before he demanded Pakistan, Jinnah had put forth the two nation
theory. From 1940 onwards the demand was sought to be justified on the
basis of the theory. The “Muslim nation” had fought for and achieved
statehood in Pakistan. Inevitably it would be a Muslim state. But he had
not hesitated in his programme of mass mobilization, to press Islam into
service. References to the Quran were freely made. The followers – at
least a good many of them – could hardly be blamed for imagining that
Pakistan would indeed be an Islamic state. It is unthinkable that Jinnah
also shared this ideal. The speech sowed the seeds of a contest between
the modernists and the Islamists, which has continued to rock Pakistan
to this day. It did not declare closure. For even after the speech, Jinnah
– now Governor-General and head of state – continued to invoke Islam
and the Quran.
Not surprisingly the speech came as a shock to his followers.
The chronicler of Pakistan’s Press, Zamir Niazi, one of the most
honest journalists, has recorded the reaction in his book The Press in
Chains (Royal Book Company, Karachi; pp. 36-37). His account is
based on authentic contemporary sources. Hamid Jalal revealed that
the Establishment sent a press advisory to black out the speech. Altaf
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23
A.G. Noorani
Husain, editor of Dawn, foiled the move by threatening to “go to the
Quaid himself.” Zamir Siddiqui corroborated Hamid Jalal’s account.
The prime culprit was Majid Malik the Principal PRO. The fact that he
spoke to Chaudhry Mohammed Ali, Secretary-General of the Cabinet,
before withdrawing the advisory casts the latter in a dubious role. Zamir
Niazi records also attempts in later years to censor the speech (p. 38).
The speech passed muster in the historical records. It did not shape
policy. There is an aspect, however, which is commonly overlooked by
those who cite Jinnah’s references to Islam and the Quran to imply that
he did not quite mean what he had said. Jinnah knew the personal law
of Muslims. Very few, in his times, knew of “the Islamic State”. It was
some time after the establishment of Pakistan that the concept began to
be defined, with varying degrees of vagueness. Jinnah never did, never
could have subscribed to the concept as propounded. It is dishonest to
extrapolate his strong occasional remarks to the formulation of advocates
of an Islamic State. (Vide the writer’s essay The Islamic State; A Mirage;
Criterion; July-September 2009; pp. 28-55).
We have two authentic accounts of his rejection of the concept
totally. One is by the Raja of Mahmudabad, who was close to him. He
wrote “My advocacy of an Islamic State brought me into conflict with
Jinnah. He thoroughly disapproved of my ideas and dissuaded me from
expressing them publicly from the League’s platform lest the people
might be led to believe that Jinnah shared my view and that he was
asking me to convey such ideas to the public.” (C.H. Philips and Mary
Doreen Wainwright (Eds.) The Partition of India; George Allen and
Unwin Ltd.; Some Memories p. 388).
Sir Prakasa, India’s first High Commissioner to Pakistan, took up
the issue with Jinnah in September 1947 on the basis of a speech he had
never made. Sir Prakasa urged Jinnah that no “stress should be laid on
Pakistan being an Islamic State. … he said he had never used the word
‘Islamic.’ He added ‘You are a responsible man, and you should tell me
where I have done so.’ ” Sir Prakasa cited “in your broadcast from Lahore
on 31 August you had yourself spoken of Pakistan as an Islamic State.”
Jinnah was quite sure that he had not done so, and asked me to let him
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Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech
have the original version, if I could. At this he suddenly got up. I could
see he was visibly livid with rage. I was summarily dismissed.” (Sir
Prakasa; Pakistan: Birth and Early Days; Meenakshi Prakashan; p. 57).
Jinnah was perfectly justified. The memoirs cite no detail significantly.
None of the compilations of the Governor-General’s speeches contain
the broadcast. What is fully established is that Jinnah regarded advocacy
of an Islamic State as a reproach since he rejected the idea completely.
He did broadcast from Pakistan Radio, Lahore. It was on 30 October
1947. He spoke of Pakistan as a “Muslim State” (ibid; p. 427).
However this fact does not answer a reproach based on the
incontrovertible record of his speeches in which he did speak of Islam and
the Quran. A noted scholar Farzana Shaikh grapples with this problem
in her able work, Making Sense of Pakistan (Foundation Books, New
Delhi, Hurst & Company, London; 2009).
Her views deserve to be quoted in extenso. “Uncertainty about
national identity and the lack of consensus over Islam greatly affected the
country’s constitutional and political development; they also impinged
on the construction of a coherent economic and social vision. Jinnah
was famously ambivalent about his understanding of the relationship
between Islam and politics. While he had done more than most to tighten
the bond between religion and nationalism, thus laying the foundations
of Pakistan, he was by all accounts a reluctant convert to his own idea.
Moreover Jinnah, like the political and military leaders who succeeded
him, was unable to resist the temptation of mobilizing the language
of Islam to generate power – power that lay for the most part beyond
the reach of mass democratic politics, about which Jinnah was also
ambivalent.”
She proceeds to add “Jinnah, no romantic, soon realized that while
the principles of Islam might represent a panacea for the resolution of
the Muslim national question, they were unlikely to help address the
real shortcomings of Muslim society. These shortcomings were brutally
exposed at Partition, when Muslims (like others) demonstrated that the
primeval impulses of their religion remained dangerously in place. By
August 1947 Jinnah was forced to recognize that, whatever the national
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25
A.G. Noorani
claims on behalf of Islam, he could not tame the Islamic tiger. In his
famous inaugural speech to the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly,
he appeared to acknowledge the damaging effects flowing from the use
of religious rhetoric to justify his demand for Pakistan.” ….
“Jinnah’s own prevarication did little to clear the confusion. In a
speech to the Sind Bar Association in Karachi on 25 January 1948, he
even seemed ready to abandon his earlier stance, which had called for
religion to be kept out of politics, and denouncing as ‘mischief’ attempts
to ignore ‘Shari’at Law’ as the basis of Pakistan’s constitution. While
few would deny that these inconsistencies were to be expected from
Jinnah, who by that time was consumed by fatal ill-health, they set an
unfortunate precedent for his successors. Many have since used the
ambiguity cultivated by Jinnah to negotiate their own positions and, in
doing so, have continued the legacy of a movement that under Jinnah
himself came to represent all things to all men.
“The Objectives Resolution passed in March 1949, which has served
as a preamble for all three of Pakistan’s constitutions (1956, 1962 and
1973), was symptomatic of this ambiguity. Though regarded as the
country’s ‘constitutional Grundnorm,’ its endorsement was marred by
a discord that demonstrated the fragility of the consensus underpinning
the new state.” (pp.82-83).
As will be pointed out later, her reading of Jinnah’s speech is
inaccurate. But it speaks volumes for the speech that despite the
Objectives Resolution, the Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973 and
four military coups, its central theme is still recalled as a beacon light.
In January 2001 President Pervez Musharraf announced a ban on all
militant groups, including sectarian outfits, signaling thereby a break in
relations between the army and its militant protégés in Afghanistan and
Kashmir. His decision came in the wake of a daring attack by militants on
the Indian Parliament in December 2001, which had brought Pakistan to
the brink of a dangerous military confrontation with India. In his speech
justifying the ban, Musharraf recalled Jinnah’s vision of ‘the ideology
of Pakistan,’ which he claimed stood in contrast to the ‘theocratic state’
advocated by Islamist parties and their militant allies. Their attempts
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Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech
to establish a ‘state within a state,’ he declared, would be defeated by
his military regime, which had come to recognize that “today Pakistan
is not facing any threat from outside … the real threats are posed from
within.’”
Since ambiguity arises from Jinnah’s other speeches, before and after
the partition, the best way to unravel the mystery, such as it is, is first,
to determine Jinnah’s “Public Philosophy,” to use Walter Lippmann’s
expression, trace the slide towards the two-nation theory and the
invocation of the faith, and lastly, analyze the terms of the speech in the
light of the speaker’s pronouncements before and after he spoke as he
did.
Speaking in the Central Legislative Assembly on 7 February 1935
on the Communal Award, Jinnah said: “I entirely reciprocate every
sentiment which the Honourable the Leader of the Opposition expressed,
and I agree with him that religion should not be allowed to come into
politics, that race should not be allowed to come into politics. Language
does not matter so much. I agree with him, if taken singly one by one.
Religion is merely a matter between man and God. I agree with him there
entirely, but I ask him to consider this, - Is this a question of religion
purely? Is this a question of language purely? No, Sir, this is a question
of minorities and it is a political issue.” (Ahmad; Vol. 1; p. 5).
He repeated these views even after the Lahore Resolution on
Pakistan (1940) when he addressed students of the Ismaili College in
Bombay on 1 February 1943. He said “Which government, claiming to
be a civilized government can demolish a mosque, or which government
is going to interfere with religion which is strictly a matter between God
and man? The question is that the Musalmans are a nation, distinct from
the Hindus.” (ibid; p. 469).
His presidential address to the Delhi session of the All India Muslim
League on 21 April 1943 was a documented indictment of Gandhi’s
injection of religion into politics. (ibid. pp. 481-482).
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27
A.G. Noorani
Earlier at the Aligharh Muslim University Union on 5 February 1938,
Jinnah took pride in the fact that “What the League has done is to set you
free from the reactionary elements of Muslims …. it has certainly freed
you from that undesirable element of Maulvis and Maulanas” (ibid. p.
43). The record is consistent and clear and the speech of 11 August 1947
fully accorded with the outlook these remarks expressed.
This brings us to a sorry omission in the entire discussion on that
speech. It was delivered on the establishment of Pakistan. Surely in order
to ascertain “the ideology of Pakistan” it is far more relevant to consider
Jinnah’s speech delivered at the first espousal of Pakistan, at the Lahore
Session of the League on 23 March 1940. It had not the faintest hint of
an Islamic State. It offered arguments in support of a political solution.
In a broadcast on All India Radio on Eid Day 15 November 1939 he
said pointedly “we shall be guided by our rational interpretation of the
Quran.”
The address at the Lahore session fell in to two parts. One concerned
recent politics, the other, the demand for Pakistan. The two-nation
theory cemented both (ibid.; p. 156 and 162). Islam came last in the
peroration which exhorted “come forward as servants of Islam.” But
neither the Lahore Resolution nor the League President asserted that
India’s partition was being demanded in order to establish an Islamic or,
for that matter, a Muslim State. “The ideology of Pakistan” is a belated,
artificial and an utterly bogus construct.
However, it must be emphasized that it was not a secular state but a
majoritarian State that Jinnah began demanding with strident consistency.
It was far removed from Jawaharlal Nehru’s concept of secularism. Few
of his senior colleagues shared it. (S. Gopal; Nehru; Oxford University
Press; Vol. II; p.15).
There was a false construct which Jinnah began tirelessly to
propound – the homelands of Muslims lay in the areas in which they
formed a majority. This is based on a historical falsehood. Islam came
first to Malabar not to the north. To this day the namaz is said in an
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Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech
ancient mosque in Cannonore in the manner it was in the days of Prophet
Mohammad (PBUH). It is absurd to aver that the seats of Muslim culture
in U.P., Hyderabad, and Bengal are not the Muslims homelands.
This theory had a pernicious corollary – the rest of India comprised
the Hindus’ homelands. Sample this amplification of the Lahore
resolution. “The question for the Muslim minorities in Hindu India is
whether the entire Muslim India of 90,000,000 should be subjected
to a Hindu majority raj or whether at least 60,000,000 of Musalmans
residing in the areas where they form a majority should have their own
homeland and thereby have an opportunity to develop their spiritual,
cultural, economic and political life in accordance with their own genius
and shape their own future destiny, at the same time allowing Hindus
and others to do likewise. Similar will be the position of the Hindus and
other minorities in the Muslim homelands.” (ibid.; p. 166). Specifically
“What the Muslim League wanted was that the Muslims should have
opportunity to have their own governments in the two zones which they
considered as their homelands and develop their own culture. He wished
Godspeed to the Hindus to have their own governments in the other
parts and develop according to their own genius.” (ibid. p. 220).
The two States would be given over to the two communities. But
note this formulation on 2 January 1941. “The question is not merely
cultural but of political, economic and social problems which can only
be solved according to our genius in our homelands, provided that they
are independent states and in no way under the control of any centre for
all India. Safeguards, constitutional or otherwise, will be of no use. So
long as there is communal Hindu majority at the centre, safeguard will
remain on paper. Therefore I think of nothing better or more suitable
having regard to the conditions and realities than separation of Muslims
in my proposed homelands.”
A statement issued in May 1941 came close to the “faith” but it was
obviously rhetorical. “Therefore, the Muslims asked that where they
were in a majority they should be allowed to have their own way of life,
and that where Hindus were in a majority they should continue to have
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29
A.G. Noorani
their way of life, each nation according to its own philosophy, faith and
culture.” (ibid., p. 292).
It was bad enough propounding a proposal which did not, could not
possibly, resolve the communal problem. It was far worse to embellish
it with a theory which legitimized majoritarian States in both parts – a
Muslims State and Hindu State. It is most unfair to deny Nehru the
credit for rejecting this theory and opting instead for a secular state,
however imperfect it may be in actual practice. The minorities have a
yardstick by which to hold the State to account.
It was of course, not an Islamic State that Jinnah had in mind. The
ideas he floated gave succour to those who did. Jinnah did not realize
this. He resented charges that he wanted a religious state in a speech at
Aligarh on 2 November 1941. K. M. Munshi was reported to have said,
“The State under the Pakistan scheme would not be a civil government
responsible to a composite legislature consisting of all communities,
but a religious State pledged to rule according to the teachings of that
religion thus by implication excluding all others not following that
religion from a share in the government. One crore and thirteen lakhs of
Sikhs and Hindus would constitute a minority under the protection of
the religious State of the Muslims. These Hindus and Sikhs would be on
sufferance in the Punjab and would be foreigners in Hindustan.” Jinnah
replied “Is it not an incitement to the Sikhs and excluding them from
all power, is entirely untrue. He seems to suggest that non-Muslims in
Pakistan will be treated as untouchables. Let me tell Mr. Munshi that
untouchability is only known to his religion and his philosophy and not
ours. Islam stands for justice, equality, fair play, toleration and even
generosity to non-Muslims who may be under our protection. They are
like brothers to us and would be the citizens of the State.” (ibid.; June
1941; pp 313-314).
Jinnah’s honesty is not questioned. His clarity of thought, consistency
and lack of sense of responsibility is. He had not thought through the
implications and consequences of his ideas.
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Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech
He regarded the minorities virtually as citizens of the “other” State.
“You will protect and safeguard our minorities in your zones and we will
protect and guard your minorities in ours” (ibid., p. 441; 2 November
1942).
It was Muslim exclusivism in excelsis. If a plebiscite on Pakistan
was to be taken in the Muslim majority provinces, the Hindus and Sikhs
were not to vote. His demand repeated all too often was “give effect to
the verdict of a Muslim plebiscite and carry out the Pakistan scheme”
(ibid.; p. 448). How could the disfranchised minorities have an equal
position in a state formed thus?
A careful student of Jinnah’ policies will notice a significant shift in
emphasis every time he spoke in the NWFP. A message to the NWFP
Students Federation, on 4 April 1943, read thus: “You have asked me
to give you a message. What message can I give you? We have got
the greatest message in the Quran for our guidance and enlightenment”
(ibid., p. 472).
By then the maulanas at whose political marginalization he had
rejoiced were being invited to join and did join the League in droves.
The infiltration increased as elections began to loom large. Jinnah was
too wide alert not to sense the danger which “ideological confusion”
posed in such a situation. He declared emphatically at the League’s
Session in Delhi on 24 April 1943: “The Constitution of Pakistan can
only be framed by the Millat and the people. Prepare yourselves and
see that you frame a constitution which is to your heart’s desire. There
is a lot of misunderstanding. A lot of mischief is created. Is it going to
be an Islamic government? Is it not begging the question? Is it not a
question of passing a vote of censure on yourself? The constitution and
the government will be what the people will decide. The only question
is that of minorities.
“The minorities are entitled to get a definite assurance and ask:
‘Where do we stand in the Pakistan that you visualize?’ That is an issue
of giving a definite and clear assurance to the minorities. We have done
it. We have passed a resolution that the minorities must be protected
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A.G. Noorani
and safeguarded to the fullest extent and as I said before any civilized
government will do it and ought to do it. So far as we are concerned our
own history, our Prophet have given the clearest proof that non-Muslims
have been treated not only justly and fairly but generously.” (ibid., pp
507-8).
At no time did Jinnah utter the words “Islam in danger” which his
detractors attribute to him; never citing the source. “It is for you all to put
your heads together, your Council of the All-India Muslim League, and
undertake proper and systematic planning, I can only repeat once again,
for educational uplift, social uplift, economic uplift, political uplift and
cultural uplift of the nation.” –protection of Islam was not mentioned.
(ibid., p. 513).
But faith kept cropping up. “What was it that kept the Muslims
united as one man, and what was the bedrock and sheet-anchor of the
community,” asked Mr. Jinnah. “Islam,” he said, and added; “It is the
Great Book, Quran, that is the sheet-anchor of Muslim India. I am sure
that as we go on and on there will be more and more of oneness – one
God, one Book, one Prophet, and one Nation.” (ibid., p. 575).
With the character of the State was bound up its duty to persons of
the same religious affiliation in the other part of the split country. “How
could Pakistan help the Musalmans of C.P., U.P., Madras, Bombay and
elsewhere? What could be the objective of the Musalmans of these
provinces? Safeguards could be the only thing. But what would be the
use of these safeguards if there was no authoritative sanction to ensure
their fulfillment. If they achieved for provinces where Muslims were in
a majority the cherished goal of Pakistan, it would mean independence
for seven crores of their brothers and enforcement of safeguards in the
Muslim minority provinces, and this would guarantee a just and fair
treatment to all minorities.” (Ahmad, Vol.; 2; pp. 19-20, on 13 March
1944).
The linkage between the State and its wards outside was clearly
stated. “The crux of the issue is, are you prepared to trust your minorities
with us and are we prepared to trust our minorities with you and accept
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Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech
the position that where you are dominant it shall be your dominant
government and it shall our dominant government where we are in a
majority?” (ibid., p. 166).
The nature of the help was not left vague, either. He had no wish to
quarrel, Jinnah said but if “our minorities are ill-treated Pakistan cannot
remain a passive spectator. If Britain in Gladstone’s time could intervene
in Armenia in the name of protection of minorities, why should it not be
right for us to do so in the case of our minorities in Hindustan – if they
are oppressed?” This was stated as late as on 11 April 1946 at the League
Legislators’ convention. Gladstone intervened militarily on behalf of the
world’s strongest imperial power. Moreover, was Jinnah not conferring,
implicitly, a similar right to the stronger neighbour? (ibid.; p. 286).
The record must be viewed as a whole and objectively. The debate
has been reduced to an exchange of polemics on both sides. Which is
why Jinnah’s statements are recalled here at some, perhaps tiresome,
length in a quest for understanding; not in an effort at proving a preconceived thesis. One thing is clear. Even when recalling the Quran and
its injunctions he never extended them to the structure of the State.
Sample this. “Everyone, except those who are ignorant, knows
that the Quran is the general code of the Muslims. A religious, social,
civil, commercial, military, judicial, criminal, penal code; it regulates
everything from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life; from
the salvation of the soul to the to the health of the body; from the rights of
all to those of each individual; from morality to crime, from punishment
here to that in the life to come, and our Prophet has enjoined on us that
every Musalman should possess a copy of the Quran and be his own
priest. Therefore Islam is not merely confined to the spiritual tenets and
doctrines or rituals and ceremonies. It is a complete code regulating
the whole Muslim society, every department of life, collective and
individually.” This comprehensive formulation made on Eid Day 1945
omitted the State. (ibid., p. 209).
The Associated Press of America was told on 1 November 1945
that “This would be a Muslim State. As far as the Musalmans are
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A.G. Noorani
concerned there would be no social barriers of any kind against the
Hindus or anyone else. The Musalmans are a people who believe in
and act on the basic principle of equality of manhood and fraternity.
… Hindu minorities in Pakistan can rest assured that their rights will
be protected. No civilized Government can be run successfully without
giving minorities a complete sense of security and confidence. They
must be made to feel that they have a hand in Government and to do this
they must have adequate representation in it. Pakistan will give this.”
(ibid.; p. 232). This was a pledge in the most explicit terms that the
minorities would have a share in power, “a hand in Government”, as
distinct from what he called “paper safeguards.” (ibid., p. 232).
Pakistan would be “a Muslim State in which the minorities would
enjoy equal rights. The duality is glaring.
Peshawar always inspired him to go the extra length to keep the flock
together. Students of the Islamia College were assured during his tour of
the Province in November 1945 that “the League stood for carving out
States in India where Muslims are in a numerical majority to rule them
under Islamic law.” (ibid., p. 233).
We do history no service in glossing over the flaws in the thinking.
Jinnah’s pronouncements on Islam and the minorities were riddled
with contradictions. On the occasion of his 70th birthday the Memon
Merchants Chamber hosted a tea party in Bombay. It was a good
occasion for reassuring Muslims in non-Muslims majority provinces.
He seized on a statement by Ravi Shankar Shukla, former Premier of
the Central Provinces and one of the more rabid Hindu communalists
in the Congress, that Muslims in such provinces would be treated as
foreigners. “It was amazing to find that Congress leaders were indulging
in such reckless and irresponsible threats” (ibid., p. 269).
A little over three months later, in an interview to the BBC at
New Delhi on 3 April 1946 – when partition had emerged as a distinct
possibility – Jinnah himself offered three options to the Muslims
minorities and did so in terms which the BJP and RSS could playfully
quote in support of their credo though it is diametrically opposite to
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Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech
Jinnah’s liberal credo. He said “These areas, like Madras for instance
will have a Hindu government and the Muslim minorities will have
three courses open to them: they may accept citizenship in the State in
which they are. They can remain there as foreigners; or they can come
to Pakistan. I will welcome them.” (ibid.; p. 282).
A year later he stressed that all the minorities would be equal and
loyal citizens of the State to which they belong. This was not a new
formulation. The fundamentals of the 11 August 1947 speech were
always present; not least at the Legislator’s Convention on 11 April 1946.
“What are we fighting for? What are we aiming at? It is not theocracy,
not for a theocratic state. Religion is there and religion is dear to us. All
the worldly goods are nothing to us when we talk of religion; but there
are other things which are very vital; our social life, our economic life,
and without political power, how can you defend your faith and your
economic life?” (ibid.; p. 284).
This brings us to the speech. Jinnah’s biographer Hector Bolitho
asserts that “he worked, for many hours, on the Presidential Address”
which was undoubtedly “the greatest speech of his life.” (Jinnah Creater
of Pakistan; Oxford University Press, Karachi; pp. 175-6).
A textual analysis suggests that it was delivered extempore. It was
rambling in parts. The man spoke from his heart. Notice the topics he
addressed first. They were “law and order;” “bribery and corruption;”
“black-marketing;” and “nepotism and jobbery” - in this order. He next
turned to the partition of India and of the Punjab and Bengal. “I know
there are people who do not quite agree with” it. He understood the
feelings of the minorities, but “a division had to take place.” A united
India could not have worked, adding “may be that view is correct; may
be it is not; that remains to be seen”. It was “impossible to avoid” the
situation of minorities in both states. “Now what shall we do?”
The famous, indeed immortal words, are an answer to that question.
Their core is reproduced here. “If you will work in co-operation,
forgetting the past, burying the hatchet you are bound to succeed. If you
change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no
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A.G. Noorani
matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had
with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first,
second and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges and
obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.
“I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that
spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and
minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community
– because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias,
Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmans, Vashnavas,
Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on – will vanish. Indeed if
you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to
attain the freedom and independence and but for this we would have
been free peoples long long ago. No power can hold another nation,
and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection; nobody could
have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have
continued its hold on you for any length of time but for this. …”
Inter-Muslim differences were put on a par with Hindu-Muslim
differences and the fact of “a nation of 400 million souls was accepted.”
He added “Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free;
you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques
or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may
belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the
business of the State. …”
“Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you
will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and
Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because
that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as
citizens of the State.” (ibid.; pp. 403-4).
The theme was repeated with increasing emphasis in passage after
passage and it is one which is in accord with the theme for which the
vintage Jinnah was known. Later on in October 1947 he advised Muslims
in India “to give unflinching loyalty to the state in which they happen to
be.” (ibid., p. 420).
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Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech
One is at a loss to understand why the 11 August 1947 speech is
regarded almost as a unique pronouncement. Compare the words he
uttered then with what he used at his last press conference in New Delhi
on 14 July 1947:
“Q.
Could you as Governor-General make a brief statement on the
minorities problem?
A. At present I am only Governor-General-designate. We will assume
for a moment that on August 15, I shall be really the GovernorGeneral of Pakistan. On that assumption, let me tell you that I shall
not depart from what I said repeatedly with regard to the minorities.
Every time I spoke about the minorities I meant what I said and
what I said I meant.
‘Minorities to whichever community they may belong, will be
safeguarded. Their religion or faith or belief will be secure. There
will be no interference of any kind with their freedom of worship.
They will have their protection with regard to their religion, faith,
their life, their culture. They will be, in all respects, the citizens of
Pakistan without any distinction of caste or creed.
“They will have their rights and privileges and no doubt, along with
it goes the obligation of citizenship. Therefore, the minorities have
their responsibilities also and they will play their part in the affairs
of this State. As long as the minorities are loyal to the State and owe
true allegiance and as long as I have any power, they need have no
apprehension of any kind.
Q. You said that minorities in Pakistan, if they are loyal, will be dealt
with generously and justly, may we take it this applies to Muslims
in Hindustan as well?
A. It applies to any minority anywhere in the world. You cannot have
a minority which is disloyal and plays the role of sabotaging the
State. That minority, of course, becomes intolerable in any State.
I advise Hindus and Muslims and every citizen to be loyal to his
State.
CRITERION – April/June 2010
37
A.G. Noorani
Q. Will Pakistan be a secular or theocratic state?
A. You are asking me a question that is absurd. I do not know what a
theocratic state means.
A correspondent suggested that a theocratic state meant a state where
only people of a particular religion, for example, Muslims, could be
full citizens and non-Muslims would not be full citizens.
A. Then it seems to me that what I have already said is like throwing
water on a duck’s back. When you talk of democracy, I am afraid
you have not studied Islam. We learned democracy thirteen centuries
ago. “
(Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947 – 1948; Oxford University Press
Karachi; pp. 13 and 15).
In his interview to Reuters on 25 October 1947 Jinnah recalled
his famous speech. “Minorities belonging to different faiths living
in Pakistan or Hindustan do not cease to be citizens of the respective
States by virtue of their belonging to a particular faith, religion or race.
I have repeatedly made it clear, especially in my opening speech to the
Constituent Assembly, that the minorities in Pakistan would be treated
as our citizens and will enjoy all the rights and privileges that any other
community gets. Pakistan shall pursue that policy and do all it can to
create a sense of security and confidence in the non-Muslim minorities
in Pakistan.
“Every citizen is expected to be loyal to the State and to owe true
allegiance to it. The arm of law should be strong enough to deal with
any person or section or body of people that is disloyal to the State. We
do not, however, prescribe any school boy tests of their loyalty. We shall
not say to any Hindu citizen of Pakistan ‘if there was war, would you
shoot a Hindu.’” (ibid., p. 61).
Hindus in East Pakistan were assured on 22 March 1948 that the
Central and Provincial Government “were now their own Governments.”
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CRITERION – Volume 5 No.2
Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech
(ibid.; p. 153).
In a broadcast to the United States in February 1948, he said “In
any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State – to be ruled by
priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims – Hindus,
Christians, and Parsis – but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy
the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their
rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.” (ibid.; p. 125). He repeatedly
characterized Pakistan as a Muslim state; except on one occasion, at
Peshawar, predictably. It was at the Edwards College on 18 April 1948
when he described Pakistan as land “under a rule, which is Islamic,
Muslim rule, as a sovereign independent State” (ibid., p. 201).
Jinnah could not have failed to learn the reaction the August speech
had produced. The speech which Farzana Sheikh considers as a virtual
retraction of the August speech must be read in context. He was trying to
assuage fears but without committing himself to accepting the demands.
He was speaking on the occasion of the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) birthday
at the Bar Association in Karachi. According to the report published
in Dawn on 26 January 1948, “Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
Governor-General of Pakistan, speaking at a reception given to him on
the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) birthday, by the Bar Association, Karachi,
said ‘Why this feeling of nervousness that the future constitution of
Pakistan is going to be in conflict with Shariat Laws?’ The Quaid-iAzam said ‘Islamic principles today are as applicable to life as they
were 1,300 years ago.’
“The Governor-General of Pakistan said that he would like to tell
those who are ‘[some are] misled by propaganda’ that not only the
Muslims but also the non-Muslims have nothing to fear.
‘Islam and its idealism have taught democracy. Islam has taught
equality, justice and fair play to everybody. What reason is there for
anyone to fear democracy, equality, freedom on the highest standard of
integrity and on the basis of fair play and justice for everybody.’ (ibid.;
p. 97).
CRITERION – April/June 2010
39
A.G. Noorani
In this the Quaid-i-Azam adopted the very technique which was
later deployed by Charles de Gaulle on 4 June 1958. He had just come
to power and desperately needed time, de Gaulle assured the rebellious
colors in Algeria “Je vous ai compris … “ (I have understood you).
A few days later he spoke of “algerie francaise” (French Algeria). De
Gaulle alone could have granted independence to Algeria and that too at
the risk of his life. In both cases those in the know knew what the leader
was aiming it.
But, ambiguity always exacts a toll especially if used in defining
the nation’s identity. “If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall
prepare himself to the battle?” (I Corinthian xiv, 8). India is still paying
the price for defining itself in the very first Article of the Constitution
as “India, that is Bharat. ..” and capping this with a “Directive Principle
of State Policy” for banning the slaughter of cows. The likes of Abul
Ala Maududi were opposed to the demand for Pakistan. They seized
on some stray utterances of the Quaid to argue that he too wanted an
Islamic State.
The Pir of Manki Sharif urged Jinnah on 19 July 1947, to establish a
separate portfolio “for affairs concerned with Shariat.” (Z.H. Zaidi (ed.)
Jinnah Papers, First Series Vol. III; p. 512). The Governor of NWFP
Rob Lockhart reported to the Governor-General Lord Mountbatten on 9
August 1947, “dissensions amongst the local League leaders.” He added
that “some are annoyed because Jinnah said he could not establish
Shariat law” (ibid.; Vol. IV, p. 462).
Jinnah’s rhetoric exacted a toll. Significantly not one political party,
not even the Muslim League, over which he had presided for over a
decade, championed Jinnah’s credo. Nor did Z. A. Bhutto, by no means
a religious person. That was left to a band of intellectuals. Sibte Hasan
wrote in Dawn of 28 March 1976 “The Struggle for Secularim is an
integral part of the struggle against feudalism.” In 1986 appeared his
book The Battle of Ideas in Pakistan (Pakistan Publishing House,
Karachi).
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CRITERION – Volume 5 No.2
Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech
Hasan Zaheer was no Communist. He lamented “had it not been for
its involvement in the (Rawalpindi) Conspiracy, the Communist Party
might have become a significant element in the mainstream politics
in both wings in Pakistan.” (The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi
Conspiracy Case 1951; Oxford University Press, Karachi, p. 208).
The lament was made in the specific context of “the feudal and tribal
social structure of West Pakistan.” In India, likewise, anti-Communists
like this writer noted the Communist Parties’ fight against anti-secular
forces. This the legacy which Jinnah’s ambiguous rhetoric left.
The record, like any other, must be viewed as a whole without
allowing one’s views to emphasize one or the other statement or factor
or circumstance unduly. Seven propositions emerge incontestably. First,
Muhammad Ali Jinnah meant every word of what he said on 11 August
1947; Secondly, he was opposed to an Islamic State as understood by its
protagonists in Pakistan like Abul Ala Maududi relying on Abul Hasan
al-Mawardi and others but of which Jinnah was innocent; Thirdly, he
did not demand Pakistan because he wanted to establish an Islamic
State. Like others he was concerned at the play of majority rule in a
country with communal divisions. The Congress rejected power-sharing
in 1937-39 and drove him to ask for partition. It was a political not
a religious demand; but, fourthly, his espousal of the pernicious twonation theory – which he threw out of the window on 11 August 1947
– inescapably brought in Islam as part of the identity of Muslims as
he defined it; fifthly, some of Jinnah’s statements in his campaign of
political mobilization were just that and no more; sixthly, while Jinnah
indubitably described Pakistan as a Muslim State, equally indubitably
he insisted on equal rights for all citizens, regardless of their religion.
The two-nation theory could be discarded. Pakistan’s identity which
it had forged was fixed with a Muslim character; and lastly, even this
would disappear with the passage of time as he said all too clearly on
11 August 1947. Therein lies the enduring, undying legacy of Quaid-eAzam Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s famous speech which the Islamists wish
had never been delivered. The speech will remain to inspire all who
fight for Jinnah’s Pakistan.
CRITERION – April/June 2010
41
RELIGION AND STATE IN PAKISTAN
Iqbal Ahmad Khan*
Abstract
(The Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah gave clear and
unambiguous guidelines to the constitution makers of the new state
of Pakistan. His historic address of 11 August 1947 embodied the
raison d’être of Pakistan. “You may belong to any religion or caste
or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State,” he told
the members of the Constituent Assembly. With his passing away and
the emergence of parochial and incompetent governments, there set
in a gradual dilution of the Quaid’s message. The most lethal attack
came with the attempt by the military dictator General Ziaul Haq
to set up a theocratic state in Pakistan. Presently, we are facing the
blowback from his misguided and duplicitous policies. The general
sought inspiration from a religion-based political party which had the
dubious distinction of opposing both the founder of the country and
the Pakistan freedom movement.
It is the unenviable task of the incumbent democratic government
to cleanse the body-politic of the policies and practices pursued by the
dictator. If this is not done Pakistan will continue to harvest the bitter
fruit of intolerance, bigotry and religious persecution. Despite its history
of faith-based persecution and wars of religion, such oppression and
violence has been absent from the west in recent centuries and lessons
can be drawn from this experience. Author.)
Religion-related violence in Pakistan has become a familiar and
painful part of the contemporary socio-political scene. It has pitted the
*
Iqbal Ahmad Khan is a former ambassador of Pakistan. Email ghazalakhan27@hotmail.
com
Religion and State in Pakistan
citizens of the country against each other; it has given birth to hatepreachers who exploit the powerful medium of a free media to spew
poison against opponents; it has led to the emergence of militant sectarian
outfits armed and trained in the targeting and physical elimination of their
so-called adversaries; it has regrettably demonstrated the inefficacy of
state institutions entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the lives
and properties of citizens; even worse, it has given rise to widespread
allegations from a range of credible sources about the complicity of
certain state institutions with militant outfits; it has badly stained the
international image of the country with predictable consequences; it has
made women, who account for more than half of the total population of
the country, retreat further into seclusion because of fear and confusion;
it has instilled fear and insecurity among the minorities, and; it has
seriously undermined economic and social development and prompted
emigration of professionals and the flight of capital. The following
events which occurred in the past few months illustrate poignantly the
brutalization of Pakistan society.
The end of February 2010 saw the celebrations on the occasion of
the birthday of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) marred by the tragic deaths of
several Muslims at the hands of a rival sect. A large number of people
were also injured and considerable damage was done to public and private
property by an enraged and unruly mob. The police attempted to restore
a semblance of order, but it too fell victim to mob violence. The bloody
incidents took place on 28 February in the districts of Dera Ismail Khan
and Faisalabad. Troops had to be deployed in D. I. Khan and Section 144
imposed in Faisalabad. According to a newspaper report a procession
commemorating the anniversary of the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) birthday
was fired upon in D. I. Khan as it passed by a seminary. Soon thereafter
a charged mob retaliated by launching an attack on the seminary.1All
this fratricidal violence occurred on one of the most auspicious days in
the Muslim calendar.
On the same day and on the same occasion Faisalabad too witnessed
armed clashes between two sects, one of which was celebrating the
birthday of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the other allegedly fired upon
the procession and that too from the precincts of a mosque. The clashes
CRITERION – April/June 2010
43
Iqbal Ahmad Khan
were followed by accusations and counter-accusations while arson and
vandalism caused extensive damage to public and private property.
An editorial carried by a Lahore-based English newspaper
revealed that the clashes took place essentially between the Barelvis
and Deobandis. The Barelvis “more rooted in the culture of the subcontinent and deeply influenced by Sufism have always promoted the
more human side of religion by spearheading celebrations of the birth of
the Holy Prophet (PBUH)….This has irked the conservative schools of
Sunni Islam, notably the Deobandis, who had been campaigning before
the occasion that celebrating the birth of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) was
a heresy because neither he nor his companions celebrated the event.
The eruption of violence on such an insignificant issue between two
Sunni denominations is an indication of deep insecurities and a wish to
impose one’s interpretation of religion on all others.”2
A few weeks earlier on yet another religious occasion - the martyrdom
of Hazrat Imam Hussain - a several thousand-strong procession of
mourners in Karachi were subjected to a heart wrenching bombing
in which dozens perished and hundreds received injuries. Property
including landmark buildings worth billions of rupees were looted and
burnt. The misery encompassed hundreds more who overnight lost all
their worldly possessions or their near and dear ones or both. The scale
of human suffering which this one act of sectarian terror inflicted on a
peaceful religious procession of devoted and reverential men, women
and children was unimaginable and simply unbelievable.
The state could neither protect the celebrators of the birthday of
the Holy Prophet (PBUH) nor those who had come out to mourn on
the anniversary of the tragic slaying of his grandson, Imam Hussain.
It was widely reported that the security agencies had received
credible intelligence that rival groups would try to violently disrupt
the commemorations. To date it is unknown what progress the police
have made in apprehending the perpetrators of the heinous crimes.
The inability of law enforcers to deliver is hardly surprising given the
magnitude of the terrorist challenge that has been mounted against the
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Religion and State in Pakistan
state and the limited resources at their disposal. These crimes ironically
have been committed in the name of a religion which considers the
killing of one innocent person, Muslim or non-Muslim, as tantamount
to the murder of humanity.
The insecurity and helplessness that the ordinary Pakistani faces
at the hands of these fanatics cover all sections of society, Shias and
Sunnis, Muslims and non-Muslims, rich and poor, men and women.
Only a few months before the Ashura massacre, innocent and harmless
Christians were targeted in the town of Gojra. It was alleged that the
Holy Quran had been defiled. That was enough to provoke a Muslim
mob to kill Christians and torch their houses and churches. In a rehearsal
of similar incidents in the past, gangs of marauders packing weapons
and incendiary material arrived in the village to literally add fuel to the
fire. The Punjab Law Minister declared that preliminary investigations
had revealed no evidence of the Quran having been defiled. The Federal
Minorities Minister’s orders to the police to ensure peace and security
to the Christian population were reportedly ignored. The Minister
claimed that here too the banned militant organization the Sipah-eSihaba was involved.3 The same murderous outfit is also believed to
have been responsible for the carnage in Shantinagar in 2005. In that
tragic incident a mob of 3000 aided by the police played havoc with the
lives and property of the poor unarmed, defenseless Christian minority
community.
A common factor which emerges in all the bloodletting, whether
its victims were the commemorators of the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH)
birthday, the Shia mourners or the minority Christian community is the
reported involvement of Sipah-e-Sahaba (SS). The SS was born in Jhang
in 1984, a product of General Ziaul Haq’s program of Islamisation.
It was a Sunni militant organization which not only spewed venom
against Shias but was responsible for the targeted killings of hundreds
of Shias. Emboldened by the State’s indifference or perhaps even
indirect support, the SS assassinated the Iranian Consul in Lahore. It
also initiated a campaign of providing recruits from its madrassas to the
Afghan jihad.4
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Iqbal Ahmad Khan
The very same organization, which was allegedly behind the killings
of the hapless Christians in Gojra and Shantinagar and which had been
banned by the government, was openly besought by the ruling party
in the Punjab in an election in Jhang in March 2010 to a provincial
assembly seat. In a letter addressed to the Punjab Chief Minister, the
Governor of the province claimed that the government of Punjab had
released two convicted terrorists of the Sipah-e-Sahaba ahead of the
by-election in Jhang to get their support. The Governor urged the Chief
Minister to take action against the provincial Law Minister under the
Anti-Terrorism Act. The Minister it was alleged was accompanied by
known terrorists of the Sipah-e-Sahaba at public meetings addressed by
the Minister.5
Such violent encounters among Muslims, while tragic and painful,
do not appear all that absurd to those versed in the interpretation of Islam
by various ulema, who boast of large followings. Aitzaz Ahsan, a jurist
and a scholar, in an address on “A case for Secularism. Were Iqbal and
Jinnah secularists?” referred to the observations made by Justices Munir
and Kayani of the Punjab High Court which form a part of the report
of the Court of Enquiry appointed by the government to determine the
causes of unrest in the early 1950s during what was called the antiAhmediyya movement. After eliciting the views of various ulema the
Justices observed:
“Keeping in view the several definitions (of Islam) given by the
ulema, need we make any comment except that no two learned divines
are agreed on this fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as
each learned divine has done and that definition differs from that
given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And
if we adopt the definition given by any one of the ulema, we remain
Muslims according to the view of the alim, but kafirs (non-believers)
according to the definition of everyone else…….The net result of all
this is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith
nor Barelvis are Muslims and any change from one view to the other
must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death if the
government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the
other party to be kafirs.”6
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Religion-based persecution and violence was virtually unknown in
Pakistan during the period spanning its birth and till the 70s. The advent
of General Ziaul Haq and his compulsion to gain legitimacy, both within
the country and abroad, set in motion a process whose bitter fruit the
nation is reaping today. It represented the most drastic and the most
disastrous departure from the ideals and principles of the Quaid-e-Azam
Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Unlike Ayub Khan, General Zia had deposed
a legitimately elected civilian government which constituted an act of
treason under Article 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Moreover, unlike the
weak and incompetent government Ayub Khan overthrew, that headed
by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was arguably one of the most
popular in the history of Pakistan. Thirdly, the army under General
Ziaul Haq did not enjoy the same prestige that it did when Ayub Khan
was its commander-in-chief. In the past nearly two decades it had been
politicized, accused of corruption and held responsible for the shame and
humiliation of the 1971 defeat at the hands of India and the subsequent
disintegration of the country. General Ziaul Haq was a usurper. The
action that he took on 5 July 1977 was purely and simply a power grab.
The usurper general was able to extract some measure of legitimacy
from an obliging Supreme Court, but this too was conditional. The
Supreme Court accepted the legitimacy the 1977 coup on the grounds
of the ‘doctrine of necessity’ but while doing so clearly stated that it had
validated the coup “not only for the reason that he (CMLA) stepped in
to save the country at a time of a grave national crisis….but also because
of the solemn pledge ….that the period of constitutional deviation shall
be of as short a duration as possible and that during this period all his
energies shall be directed towards creating conditions conducive to the
holding of free and fair elections leading to the restoration of democratic
rule in accordance to the dictates of the constitution.”7
The Supreme Court’s verdict notwithstanding, as the months
went by the military regime found itself increasingly isolated, both
domestically and internationally. Internally, General Zia decided to
acquire the required legitimacy by attempting to transform the Quaide-Azam’s Pakistan into a theocratic state by unilaterally initiating a
process known as Islamisation. The period between 1977 and 1984
was traumatic. During this phase, Pakistan’s political system began to
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47
Iqbal Ahmad Khan
exhibit characteristics commonly associated with totalitarian regimes.
In February 1979 General Zia announced the Hadood Ordinance which
contained severe punishments for theft, adultery and drinking, such as
amputation of hands, stoning and flogging. In a unique decision, the
Shariat Court declared that stoning for adultery was against Islam. As
a result the Shariat Courts were barred from reviewing martial law
ordinances. Through a series of ordinances in 1980, 1982 and 1986 the
Pakistan Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code were amended
to declare anything implying disrespect to the Holy Prophet (PBUH),
members of his family, his companions, Islamic symbols and the Quran
a cognizable offence, punishable with death, imprisonment or fine
depending on the nature of the violation. It is relevant to point out that
barring flogging, the other two penalties were never carried out primarily
on account of the strong domestic and international criticism directed
against these laws.
The targets of the most severe criticism were provisions directly
affecting women in cases of adultery. Indeed, it became extremely
difficult to distinguish rape from adultery. The father of an 18 year
old blind girl Safia Bibi registered a case of rape leading to pregnancy
against her employers, father and son. Both father and son were finally
acquitted while the girl was sentenced to 15 lashes in public, 3 years
imprisonment and fine. In view of an enraged public, the Federal Shariah
Court rescinded the judgment. A Law of Evidence was promulgated
which in certain cases equated the evidence of two females with that
of one male. The Law of Qisas (Retribution) and Diyat (Blood Money)
provided half payment for a murdered woman as against full payment
for a murdered man.
As a general policy, the government exercised its patronage in favor
of the explicitly conservative elements. Among other things, the new
approach led to the task of rewriting the history of Pakistan, in order
to highlight the vanguard role of Islamic ideology and ulema in the
struggle for independence. General Zia’s inspiration and concept of an
Islamic state came from Maulana Maudoodi the head of the Jamaat-eIslami whose Islamic state involved an all powerful, monolithic, public
institution upholding a coherent religious ideology. Maudoodi’s state
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Religion and State in Pakistan
envisioned that the full weight of state power would ensure that all
segments of society reflected the character of an Islamic polity.8
Omar Noman analyzing General Zia’s Islamization process claims
that it represented a distinct shift in the ideological paradigm within
which the state operated. It marked a departure from the conception of
society held by the Muslim elite, which led the Pakistan Movement. Their
perception of society symbolized a different form of Islamic response to
the modern age. They were the intellectual descendents of Sir Syed and
Allama Iqbal, both of whom evolved a flexible interpretation of Islam,
which made it compatible with 19th century Western liberalism. This was
done by separating the principles from the letter of the law, disengaging
the spirit of religion from the social context of 7th century Arabia. This
view of religion necessitated the rejection of specific punishments and
measures contained in the Quran and the Hadith on the grounds that
they were meant to be applied only to the particular social formation in
which the prophet and his immediate descendents lived. This approach
was one in which the delineation of what is good and desirable is made,
and such positive attributes are shown to be compatible with the spirit
of religion properly understood. This is in direct contradiction with the
fundamentalism preached by the Zia regime.9
Unfortunately for the general his Islamization program could not
confer legitimacy to his rule. He then had to resort to further political
maneuvering to achieve his goal. Assistance for the general came from
a totally unexpected quarter – the Soviet Union. On 27 December 1979
the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. This set in motion a series
of events whose repercussions we continue to feel to this day. The
embattled General Ziaul Haq accepted the US and Saudi proposal for
the use of Pakistan territory to train, arm and launch Afghan freedom
fighters into Afghanistan in a jihad to force the Soviets to withdraw. The
goal was achieved 10 years later. In these 10 years, Pakistan received
over 3 million Afghan refugees and guns, drugs and violence spread
like cancer within Pakistan society. The CIA reportedly recruited some
25,000 Arabs to join the Jihad or holy war against the Soviet Union.
There were hundreds of others who, fired by the passion to rid a Muslim
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49
Iqbal Ahmad Khan
country of infidels, volunteered their services and provided financial
assistance. Among them Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda outfit.
When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in February
1989, Pakistan was confronted not only with 3.5 million Afghan
refugees, thousands of non-Afghan Mujahideen who refused to return to
their countries of origin, but also with a civil war in Afghanistan among
the Mujahideen factions which had ousted the Soviet Union. To make
matters worse for Pakistan, the US which was the principal beneficiary
of the war packed up and left. It simultaneously imposed economic and
military sanctions on Pakistan on account of its nuclear program. These
multiple problems Pakistan had to manage at a time when internally it
was undergoing a transition from an 11 year old military dictatorship to
a democratic order.
Pakistan at this stage could have totally extricated itself from
the Afghan imbroglio and concentrated its energy and resources on
internal consolidation and growth. Unfortunately, a nascent democratic
government had to on matters of national security give in to the military
who adopted the policy of acquiring ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan
and of ‘coercive diplomacy’ in Kashmir. The former led to the creation
of the Taliban and the latter to Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Lashkar-eTayyaba. These groups have now combined with Al Qaeda to terrorize
Pakistan.
It was this extremely sensitive and potentially divisive relationship
between religion and the state which was uppermost in the mind of
Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as he prepared to confront
multiple challenges facing the new state of Pakistan. The Quaid had the
utmost respect for the rule of law, justice, fair play and equity. He was
liberal, modern and democratic. His belief, that the formal mixing of
religion and politics, would necessarily lead to intolerance, in-fighting,
and disunity surfaces time and again in his political career. It is evident
as early as 1929 during the debate in the Legislative Assembly on the
Child Marriages Restraint Bill which was introduced in 1927. The bill
had evoked widespread anger among the fundamentalists, who sent
thousands of petitions to the Assembly alleging that the bill violated
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Religion and State in Pakistan
rights of the Muslims and demanded that it be withdrawn. This massive
opposition from the fundamentalist lobby did not cow down Jinnah. In
his remarks, while accepting the right of the fundamentalist lobby to
voice their anti-bill sentiments, Jinnah asserted that he could not allow
such opposition to drag them down and be an impediment to the march
of progress. “In the name of humanity, I ask you. And if we are going
to allow ourselves to be influenced by the public opinion that can be
created in the name of religion, when we know that religion has nothing
whatsoever to do with the matter I think we must have the courage to
say: No, we are not going to be frightened by that.” Several years later
on 7 February 1935 Mr. Jinnah observed in the Legislative Assembly
that “Religion should not be allowed to come into politics…..Religion
is merely a matter between man and God.”10
Admittedly, there were certain contradictions between the twonation theory and the demand for a state where religion and politics
would be in separate compartments. On the eve of the passage of the
Lahore Resolution Mr. Jinnah in his presidential address spelt out the
two-nation theory. He said that Islam and Hinduism were not religions
in the strict sense of the word, but distinct and different social orders.
The Muslims and the Hindus did not inter-marry, they did not inter-dine;
they derived their inspirations from different sources of history; the hero
of one is the foe of the other and their victories and defeats overlap;
indeed they belonged to two different civilizations based mainly on
conflicting ideas and conceptions.
While the emphasis on theological divergence in Jinnah’s address
was unmistakable, the Lahore Resolution passed the next day had only
a marginal reference to religion. It was this resolution that became the
manifesto of the All India Muslim League and it was on this basis that
an overwhelming majority of the Muslims opted for a separate state for
the Muslims of India.
Similarly, when in April 1943 Dr. Kazi at the Muslim League’s Delhi
session called for the constitution of the proposed state of Pakistan to
be based on the Quran and the Sunnah and the principles of government
established during the reign of the first four Caliphs, Jinnah insisted that
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Iqbal Ahmad Khan
the resolution be withdrawn.(Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan.) In the
same fashion Allama Iqbal, the poet-philosopher who played an important
role in the freedom movement and in raising political consciousness
among Muslims took pains at the 1930 Allahabad meeting of the All
India Muslim League to reassure Hindus and Sikhs that there would not
be religious law in the autonomous regions where there was Muslim
rule.
Pakistan was the culmination of Jinnah’s decades long struggle. It
was the fruition of a movement whose direct aim was the establishment
of sovereign power for the Muslims of South Asia within a defined
territory. This and not a theocratic state had the support of the people who
believed that their political and socio-economic interests would be best
safeguarded in an independent Muslim state. Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad
Ali Jinnah’s address on 11 August 1947 to the Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan on his election as its president embodied a definition of the
struggle that led to the establishment of Pakistan and the foundation
on which the edifice of the state was to be raised. The address was by
the creator of Pakistan to those entrusted by the people to formulate the
fundamental law governing the new state and delivered on the eve of
the formal establishment of the state. It was perhaps the most important
speech of his political career. Given the enormous significance of the
address, it would be appropriate to reproduce the words that the Quaid
used and which pointed in one and only one direction, namely, that
religion is essentially a personal matter and that is how it should be in
the new state. The Quaid said:
“If you change your past and work together in a spirit that
everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no
matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what
is his color, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of
this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will
be no end to the progress you will make……In course of time
all these angularities of the majority and minority communities,
the Hindu community and the Muslim community- because even
as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis
and so on among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas,
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Religion and State in Pakistan
Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis and so on-will vanish…..This
has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain the
freedom and independence….Therefore, we must learn a lesson
from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you
are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship
in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste
or creed-that has nothing to do with the business of the State. As
you know, history shows that in England conditions, some time
ago, were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The
Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other……
The people of England in course of time had to face the realities
of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and
burdens placed upon them by the government of their country
and they went through that fire step by step. Today, you might say
with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist;
what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of
Great Britain and they are all members of the Nation….. Now I
think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will
find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and
Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense,
because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the
political sense as citizens of the State.”11
The above is an extensive quote from the Quaid’s address. It
is necessitated by the fact that it contains in clear and unambiguous
language guidelines for members of the Constituent Assembly entrusted
with the onerous responsibility of drafting the fundamental law of the
country. He draws attention to the ethnic and religious diversity existing
in the new state. He recalls the conflict between the Protestants and
Catholics and admires the measures taken by the State to ensure that
both communities live side by side in peace and harmony. He cites this
as the ideal that needs to be kept in mind and if this indeed is the case
then in ‘course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims
would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is
the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens
of the State.’
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Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Similar interpretation of the Quaid’s speech and thinking is given
by leading scholars and jurists. Aitzaz Ahsan in the above-mentioned
address at the Institute of Peace in Islamabad in his typically learned and
logical fashion makes a convincing case for the separation of religion
and the state. In the process he quotes the observations of Justices Munir
and Kayani contained in the report of the Court of Enquiry appointed
by the government to determine the causes of the unrest in 1953 during
the anti-Ahmediyya movement. The Justices characterize the Quaid’s
11 August address as a landmark event which was intended to define the
ideal towards which the new state was to devote all its energies. “There
are repeated references in this speech to the bitterness of the past and an
appeal to forget and change the past and to bury the hatchet. The future
subject of the state is to be a citizen with equal rights, privileges and
obligations, irrespective of color, caste, creed or community. The word
‘nation’ is used more than once and religion is stated to have nothing to
do with the business of the state and to be merely a matter of personal
faith for the individual.”12 These are the observations of two learned
judges of the Punjab High Court and they leave no doubt as to the role
of religion in the new state.
The Quaid’s speech has also been commented upon by Hamid Khan, a
Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and a former president
of the Supreme Court Bar Association. In his book “Constitutional and
Political History of Pakistan” Hamid Khan observes that it is evident
that “Jinnah’s prescription for the Constitution of Pakistan included
guarantees that: one, all citizens of Pakistan would be equal regardless
of their belief, caste or creed; two, that all citizens would be guaranteed
freedom to practice whatever religion they believed in; three, that all
religious, sectarian, ethnic, linguistic, and other similar distinctions
would cease to matter in political sense, and the Constitution would
ensure that the nation should progress regardless of such distinctions;
and, four, that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state and religion
would be a citizen’s private and personal matter.”13
Dr Mubarak Ali, a respected historian and former Chairman of the
History Department, Karachi University believed that Jinnah was a
perfect secularist as far as his private life was concerned, yet he believed
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Religion and State in Pakistan
in using religion for public consumption to achieve his political ends.
The propelling slogan during the struggle for Pakistan was to establish
a distinct identity of Muslims as a nation. And Jinnah used Islam as a
motivating force to rally the Muslims to the cause of Pakistan politically.
But the state he aimed to create was to be secular, not a theocracy.
And the method to achieve the goal was not a religious movement but
political agitation.
At this stage it would be appropriate to take a glance at the rise
of secularism in Europe, particularly since the Quaid-e-Azam made
a special reference in his 11th August speech to the animosity and
persecution that once existed between Protestants and Catholics. It is
noteworthy that religion-generated violence is virtually unheard of in
the overwhelmingly Christian countries of Western Europe and the
United States. This was not the case a few centuries ago. In the 15th
century the vast mass of Europeans were Christians and those who lived
in Central and Western Europe owed complete allegiance to the Catholic
Church. They believed that a common faith and a common moral code
was part and parcel of a safe, secure and stable society. Every child
born to Christian parents was born into the Church. The Church had
recognized official standing and the state made sure that its citizens
respected the authority of the Church. The Church, it was believed, was
founded by Jesus Christ to teach and disseminate his message to enable
its members to properly order their lives in this world and to prepare for
the hereafter. Those guilty of showing disobedience or challenging the
Church’s divine authority, were likely to be punished by the state.
As the 16th century dawned an increasing religious consciousness
made many Christians aggressively and many eloquently and wittily
question the corruption, immorality and worldliness rampant both
in Rome, where the Pope resided as well as among clergymen in
general. The invention of the printing press enabled this criticism
to be disseminated among the masses by a host of pamphleteers.
There were, on the one hand, many within the Catholic Church who
demanded religious reform, which could best be achieved by means of
a reformation within the Catholic Church, that is, without disturbing the
unity of the Church. A large number of critics of the Church also felt,
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Iqbal Ahmad Khan
in common with the reformists that all good Christians should be able
to find under divine guidance the same truths in the same Bible. Martin
Luther was convinced that his reading and interpretation of the Bible
reflected true and pious Christianity, as did John Calvin with respect
to his interpretation or Henry VIII of England who regarded himself as
infallible and like Luther and Calvin put to death many in the name of
religion who differed from them in their reading of the religious texts.
The split between the Catholics and the Protestants transformed
Europe into a bloody battlefield the likes of which Europe had seldom
experienced. “Catholic leaders felt that they were defending traditional
Christian civilization against anarchical forces of rebellion and greed.
Protestant leaders felt quite as sincerely that they were restoring the
pure Gospel and safeguarding it against despotism, superstition and
corruption. To the former, Luther and Calvin and all the so-called
“reformers” were possessed of devils; to the latter, the Pope was the
beast, the “anti-Christ.”14As the battles surged through Europe every
Christian, Catholic or Protestant fanatically believed in his own version
of Christianity and was prepared to kill to have his ideas accepted.
The religious upheaval did indeed consume thousands of men,
women and children who became victims of bigotry and fanaticism.
In the long run, however, the unprecedented intolerance and bloodshed
served to create a situation which contributed significantly to religious
tolerance. The belief that political unity depended on religious unity
gave way to the realistic assessment that dictated tolerance of religious
differences. It was felt that diversity in religion was not necessarily
destructive of national unity, that a state or a national monarchy might
be strengthened, rather than weakened, by extending its protection to
religious minorities. Secondly, sincere Christians, especially if they
were of a minority group in a given country, were anxious to secure
toleration for themselves and could be counted upon to back the efforts
of conciliatory statesmen. In Protestant countries the Catholic minority
espoused the principle of religious liberty, while in Catholic countries
Protestants were natural advocates of freedom.
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Religion and State in Pakistan
The most important lesson derived from the religious upheaval
of the 16th century by the statesmen and political thinkers outweighed
all the other benefits. It gave a strong impetus to a process, called
secularization, which involved the gradual transfer of direction and
control of numerous activities to state authority. Previously, these
activities involving education and taxes, in certain cases were under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Church. Religion increasingly became a
personal affair and a wide array of social, economic and educational
matters passed under the jurisdiction of the temporal power.
In the United States too, a society which grew as immigrants from all
corners of the world professing different religions and cultures swelled
the US population, religious conflict or even religious intolerance is
practically unknown. The roots of religious tolerance go back to the
same constitutional amendment which guaranteed freedom of speech.
This First Amendment to the Constitution contains the equally basic
guarantee of freedom of religion. It states that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” Two provisions concerning religion are contained
in these famous words of the First Amendment. The first, the “nonestablishment” clause forbids the government to support any particular
religious establishment. The second, the “free exercise” clause, bars the
government from interfering with the freedom of Americans to worship
as they wish.
The separation of the Church from the State was reinforced by
President Thomas Jefferson in 1802 in a letter to a group known as the
Danbury Baptists. President Jefferson wrote:
“Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith
or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions
only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of
the whole American people which declared that their legislature should
“make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between
Church & State” 15
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Iqbal Ahmad Khan
This was further reinforced by President James Madison, when in a
letter to Edward Livingston he expanded, “We are teaching the world the
great truth that Governments do better without Kings and Nobles than
with them. The merit will be doubled by the other lesson that Religion
flourishes in greater purity, without than with the aid of Government.”
The 16th century religious wars tore apart the fabric of European
society. European leaders were quick to learn lessons so that the postWestphalian political order set in motion the process of separating
religion and the state. From then on religion became essentially a personal
affair and the state protected every individual’s fundamental rights,
irrespective of the religion he professed. The system ended religious
persecution and religious conflict in Europe. The founding fathers in the
United States were quick to grasp the significance of this development
for their country and ensured that their constitution placed religion and
the temporal responsibilities of the state in different compartments.
The mixing of religion and politics has harmed our national unity,
undermined peace and stability, stymied our economic development and
tarnished our image abroad. It now poses a serious challenge to our
national security. It has become a serious impediment to the emergence
of Pakistan as a modern state. It is ironic that the most vociferous
protagonists of a theocratic state have been a hated military dictator
and a political party which was opposed to the Quaid and the Pakistan
movement and whose performance in the elections has been at best
rather mediocre. Now that we have a representative government it is
in its interest, in the interest of democracy and that of the future of
Pakistan to reverse the creeping religious extremism in the country.
The Constitution too needs to be amended to align it with the ideas and
beliefs of the founder of the country.
References:
1
2
3
4
5
58
Dawn, 1 March 2010.
Daily Times, 2 March 2010.
Daily Times, 2 August 2010.
Jalal, Ayeshah; Partisans of Allah.
The News,6 March 2010.
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Religion and State in Pakistan
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Quoted by Aitzaz Ahsan in his lecture on “A Case for Secularism: Were Iqbal and
Jinnah Secularists?” delivered at the Institute of Peace, Islamabad, 1994.
Judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan headed by Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq and
delivered on 10 November 1977.
Noman, Oman; Pakistan – Political and Economic History since 1947.
Ibid.
Jinnah’s address to the Central Legislative Assembly, 7 February 1935.
Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches and Statements.
Quoted by Aitzaz Ahsan in his lecture on “A Case for Secularism: Were Iqbal and
Jinnah Secularists?
Khan, Hamid: Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan.
Hayes, Carlton J.H.; Modern Europe to 1870.
15 Thomas Jefferson, “Jefferson’s Letter to Danbury Baptists.”
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59
NUCLEAR POLITICS AND SOUTH
ASIA
S. Iftikhar Murshed*
Abstract
(Chance or accidental discoveries may have played a part in the
development of nuclear weapons yet, had they not occurred, the
Manhattan Project would still have been initiated, albeit, at a later
date. The inevitable would merely have been postponed. The psychology
of strength is consistently evident in the politics of nuclear weapons.
The initial years of nuclear weapons technology clearly demonstrated
that monopoly of a weapon of mass destruction leads to assertiveness
in foreign policy. Its possession by more than one power results in a
balance of terror which was the signature tune of the Cold War era. The
experience of South Asia has been no different. An invisible Berlin Wall
of unresolved disputes, particularly Kashmir, obstructs the establishment
of good-neighbourly and cooperative relations between Pakistan and
India. The tensions that have marked the equation between the two
countries for the last six decades have resulted both in conventional as
well as sub-conventional wars. After the nuclearization of South Asia in
1998, the continuation of aggressive postures by either country can have
disastrous consequences. For this precise reason, there is an urgent need
for a strategic restraint regime involving the three interlocking elements
of conflict resolution, nuclear and ballistic restraint and conventional
balance. Author)
*
S. Iftikhar Murshed is the publisher of Criterion. Email: [email protected]
Nuclear Politics and South Asia
The Initial Phase in West
The possession of nuclear weapons has influenced the manner in
which countries interact with each other. This is as true of contemporary
South Asia as it was of the bipolar world during the Cold War era.
These weapons of mass destruction were introduced by the West and
it was there that the nuclear factor became a major determinant of
foreign policy. The experience of South Asia has been no different after
Pakistan demonstrated its nuclear capability at the end of May 1998 in
response to the Indian nuclear tests earlier that month. The contours of
nuclear diplomacy emerged in the US-led West at the end of the Second
World War and since then the possession of nuclear weapons has not
only determined the pattern of interstate negotiations but has also been
instrumental in establishing a tenuous global and regional equilibrium
based on the fear of total annihilation.
It is said, perhaps wrongly, that the world stumbled across the
nuclear bomb by chance. According to physicist Hans Bethe it was only
very “slowly and painfully, through a comedy of errors, (that) the fission
of uranium was discovered.” Research scholars support this view and
explain that chance was instrumental in Enrico Fermi’s discovery in 1934
that the atom’s nucleus is capable of capturing slow neutrons. Fermi’s
“seemingly accidental findings” were predicated upon developments
that began with “Albert Einstein’s famous 1905 papers and continued
with subsequent reports and inventions by scientists such as Leo Szilard
(in connection with the cyclotron) and James Chadwick (in connection
with the existence of the neutron).”1
These “accidents,” which may have been merely incidental to
ongoing research and development, accelerated the advent of the
nuclear age with the testing of the world’s first device by the US on
16 July 1945 in the desert north of Alamogordo, New Mexico. On 6
August of that year the US dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and
three days later on Nagasaki thereby ending the Second World War. This
unleashed a chain of events that was to have permanent and profound
political consequences. After the Soviet Union tested its nuclear device
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four years later, the Cold War began and mutually assured destruction
became the dominant theme of the era
The initial US monopoly of the bomb resulted in political decisions
which, under other circumstances, would have been inconceivable.
Foremost among these was Washington’s decision to rearm and rebuild
its erstwhile enemy, Germany. At Yalta, Roosevelt had unambiguously
affirmed that American public opinion would never allow the reemergence of Germany as a security threat and, furthermore, US troops
would have to be brought home from Europe in view of the isolationist
pressures that were gathering momentum in Congress. A broad agreement
on controlling Germany was sought with the Soviet Union, the other
major military power. Roosevelt also favoured the early dismantling of
the German military-industrial complex which would result in the twin
objectives of ensuring against German resurgence and provide short
term reparations to the war-ravaged Soviet economy.
The Yalta agreement envisaged: (a) big power control of Germany;
(b) payment of approximately US $ 20 billion (half of which was to
go to the Soviet Union) by Germany as reparations; and, (c) a vague
declaration on the status of Eastern Europe. After Alamogordo, US
policy changed radically. The idea of the neutralization of Germany was
abandoned. Washington acted unilaterally to reconstruct the western
portion of the country and, later, to integrate it into a West European
military alliance. Similarly, the understanding on German reparations
was also discarded while little respect was shown for Soviet security
concerns in East Europe.
The nuclear monopoly that the United States had acquired induced,
in the words of President Harry Truman, “an entirely new feeling of
confidence.” Shortly after Hiroshima, the Secretary of War, Henry
Stimson, noted in his diary that Secretary of State James Byrnes “was
very much against any attempt to cooperate with Russia. His mind is full
of problems with the coming meeting of foreign ministers and he looks
to having the presence of the bomb in his pocket, so to speak, as a great
weapon to get through the thing.” It is significant that the nuclear tests
in June 1946 at the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific, code-named “Operation
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Crossroads,” took place when Byrnes was meeting Vyacheslav Molotov,
the foreign minister of the Soviet Union. By 1948, the US had fifty
weapons in its nuclear arsenal.
US policy, particularly on the German question, became more
assertive and unilateral with the increase in its nuclear stockpile. It was
obvious that this would be unacceptable to the Soviets. On 29 August
1949, the USSR conducted its first nuclear test in Kazakhstan. The other
powers were not to be left behind. Britain went nuclear in 1952 and
France conducted its first test in 1960 in Algeria while China exploded
a nuclear device on 16 August 1964 at its Lop Nor site.
Five declared nuclear weapons states had thus come into existence
and the possibility of the complete destruction of the world became a
persistent nightmare. The Cuban missile crisis of 1961 provided startling
evidence that the danger was real. The following year saw nuclear
testing at its peak with the United States and the Soviet Union carrying
out more than 170 explosions between themselves.
More than two thousand nuclear tests were conducted in the period
1945-1996 as per the following computation:
US
USSR
France
UK
China
India
Atmospheric:
215
219
50
21
23
0
Underground:
815
496
159
24
22
1
Total:
1030
715
209
45
45
1
It is significant that after the peak year for nuclear testing the Partial
Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was signed. Under this accord, the United States,
the Soviet Union and Britain agreed to stop all nuclear explosions in the
atmosphere, underwater and, with an eye to the future, in outer space.
From that time nuclear tests went underground though France and China
continued testing in the atmosphere till 1974 and 1980 respectively.
It took thirty-three years and an end to the Cold War for the world to
move on from the Partial Test Ban Treaty to the imperfect Comprehensive
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Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996. The few and far between steps towards
nuclear disarmament in this period include:
(a) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was opened
for signature on 1 July 1968 in London, Moscow and Washington
forbids the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five declared
nuclear powers. India, which exploded its device in 1974, was not
considered a nuclear power under the NPT. All countries except
Pakistan, India and Israel became signatories.
(b) On 3 July 1974 the US and the USSR signed the Threshold Test
Ban Treaty limiting underground tests to 150 kilo tons which is
equivalent to 150,000 tons of high explosives.
(c) On 31 July 1991 the two superpowers signed START 1 which
reduced their nuclear arsenals by about one-fifth to between eight
and nine thousand weapons.
(d) START II which was signed by the United States and Russia on 3
January 1993 aimed at reducing long-range nuclear arsenals to a
maximum of 3,500 warheads each.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Prior to the vote in favour of the CTBT by 158 members of the
UN General Assembly on 10 September 1996, France conducted its last
nuclear test in the South Pacific in 1995 whereas China exploded its
final underground device at Lop Nor, in the remote north-western desert
region of Xingjiang on 29 July 1996.
India, along with Bhutan and
Libya voted against the CTBT while Syria, Lebanon, Cuba, Mauritania
and Tanzania abstained.
The CTBT was signed by the five declared nuclear powers on 25
September 1996. On this occasion, President Clinton said that he had
signed the Treaty with the same pen that had been used by President
John F. Kennedy for concluding the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963.
The purpose was probably to emphasize the importance of the CTBT
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but it also served as an unintended reminder that it took more than three
uneasy decades for the world to move from a partial to a comprehensive
test ban treaty despite its imperfections. However, on 13 October 1999,
the US Senate rejected ratification of the CTBT. Subsequently, during
his election campaign in 2008, President Barack Obama declared: “As
president, I will reach out to the Senate to secure the ratification of the
CTBT at the earliest practical date.”2 This was reiterated more forcefully
when Obama visited Prague on 5 April 2009 during which he also
committed the United States to “take concrete steps towards a world
without nuclear weapons.” However, the US-India nuclear cooperation
agreement which was signed by Condoleeza Rice and Pranab Mukerjee
on 10 October 2008 not only implicitly recognizes India as a nuclear
weapons state but has also administered a crippling blow to the prospects
of strategic restraint regime in South Asia. Furthermore, this was
preceded by a similar deal between Paris and New Delhi the previous
month. “A world without nuclear weapons” as envisaged by President
Obama is, therefore, unlikely.
The CTBT, contrary to what the initials imply, is not a comprehensive
treaty - the “Basic Obligation” as defined in Article I of the treaty is
restricted to prohibiting nuclear test explosions but not all tests related
to nuclear weapons. This left the door open for nuclear weapon states
to conduct sub-critical tests to ensure the safety and reliability of their
arsenals and to continue research and development for the qualitative
improvement of the devices already in their possession. At the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Conference on Disarmament where the text of the
treaty was painstakingly deliberated upon for more than two years,
Pakistan proposed amendments that would have proscribed qualitative
improvements of nuclear weapons in accordance with the negotiating
mandate of the Committee. However, this was rejected by the nuclear
weapons states.
The provisions of the treaty fell short of the expectations of the
international community inasmuch as there was an absence of any
commitment, either in the operative or the preambular portion of the
text, to nuclear disarmament and to the elimination of all nuclear
weapons within a time frame. Through the CTBT negotiations India
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played a waiting game. The hope, quite clearly, was that some other
country would block the proposed treaty. It was only in 1996, when it
became apparent that the CTBT would be concluded, that India tabled
its demand for a “time-bound” programme for nuclear disarmament to
justify its rejection of the treaty. No such precondition was stipulated
when India co-sponsored the US resolution at the UN General Assembly
in 1993 proposing the CTBT negotiations nor did it raise this issue at the
Ad Hoc Committee meetings between 1994 and 1995.
During the negotiations, Pakistan, along with several other
countries, had repeatedly affirmed that the verification of the CTBT
must be accomplished primarily by the International Monitoring System
(IMS) and that on-site inspections (OSIs) must be a rare and exceptional
occurrence. In this context it was also accepted that IMS information
would have primacy over data obtained from National Technical Means
in view of the unequal capabilities of states in this respect. Sufficient
safeguards were built into the Treaty against intrusive or abusive on-site
inspections, including the requirement of approval for an OSI by 30
of the 51 members of the Executive Council as well as the right of the
inspected state to deny access to certain sensitive facilities and buildings
etc. The decision-making formula in the Executive Council which was
changed from a simple majority to 30 votes ensured that the process
would not be dominated and determined by the major powers.
Although the CTBT has not entered into force, a monitoring
mechanism is in place. This outfit employs seismology, hydro-acoustics,
infrasound and radionuclide methods to monitor the underground, the
waters and the atmosphere whenever there is any sign of a nuclear
explosion. Despite the reservations of countries such as Pakistan, onsite inspections will be provided for after the treaty comes into force.
Currently the monitoring network consists of 337 facilities located
worldwide. By September 2009, 250 of such facilities had been certified.
The information collected by these stations is processed and analysed
at the international data centre of the Vienna-based Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty Organization and then sent to countries that have signed the
Treaty.3
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The “Entry into Force” provisions under Article XIV require the
treaty to be signed and ratified by the 44 “Annex 2 states” i.e., states that
had participated in the CTBT negotiations between 1994 and 1996 and
possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at that time.4 This
was to include the five nuclear powers and the three threshold states,
i.e., Pakistan, India and Israel. It was Pakistan that had insisted on the
inclusion of this clause on the ground that the treaty’s effectiveness
depended on its simultaneous acceptance by the nuclear capable states.
This was staunchly resisted by India at the time of the negotiations. As
of November 2009, 151 states ratified the CTBT while an additional
31 countries, including nine of the Annex 2 states, have signed the
treaty but are yet to ratify it. 5 India, Pakistan and North Korea are not
signatories.
Chance or accidental discoveries may have played a part in
the development of nuclear weapons yet, had they not occurred, the
Manhattan Project would still have been initiated, albeit, at a later date.
The inevitable would merely have been postponed.
The psychology of strength is consistently evident in the politics
of nuclear weapons. The initial years of nuclear weapons technology
clearly demonstrated that monopoly of a weapon of mass destruction
leads to assertiveness in foreign policy. Its possession by more than one
power results in a balance of terror which was the signature tune of the
Cold War era.
The Nuclear Issue and South Asia
There has never been any ambiguity in India’s objectives of
developing a nuclear weapons capability. When the Indian Atomic
Energy Commission was established in 1948, Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru expressed the view that “every country would have to develop
and use the latest scientific device for its protection.” This was echoed
by Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha (1909-1966), the father of India’s nuclear
industry, when he said that it was imperative for his country to pursue
a “dual capacity” research and development programme. Subsequent
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events would show that these initial pronouncements were based on a
well considered political decision to acquire nuclear weapons.
Pakistan’s stance on nuclear weapons, unlike that of India, has not
been consistent. From 1947 to 1970 it had fought two wars with its
more powerful neighbour and these resulted in stalemates. This gave
Pakistan the confidence that despite India’s military prowess, it would
be able to acquit itself well in the event of a future conflict. In that
period, Pakistan did not seriously entertain any ambition of acquiring
nuclear weapons and the few non-proliferation initiatives that it took
were sincere. However this was to change after its conclusive defeat
in the 1971 war with India which resulted in the dismemberment of
the country and the creation of Bangladesh. It was then that Pakistan
realized that it had no other option but to pursue a nuclear weapons
programme as only the possession of such a device would neutralize
India’s conventional military superiority.
From 1971 till 28 May 1998 when Pakistan demonstrated its
weapons capability, in response to India’s nuclear tests earlier that
month, it sought to capture the high moral ground, while pursuing a
clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, by proffering
several regional non-proliferation proposals which it knew New Delhi
would reject. India’s approach was far less subtle and was predicated on
the unattainable demand of total global nuclear disarmament. It made
the usual noises about its commitment to the elimination of weapons of
mass destruction but did little to hide its nuclear ambitions.
All this was known to the international community which did not
seriously discourage India from pursuing its research and development
efforts to acquire a nuclear arsenal. For instance, no safeguards were
required for the research reactor CIRRUS that was supplied by Canada.
In addition, Canada also assisted India with a heavy water plant, a
nuclear fuel complex and two large reactors in Rajasthan. For its part,
the United States provided 21 tons of heavy water without safeguards,
two light water reactors were financed through US AID and thirteen
hundred scientists were trained by the Americans. Washington also
helped India to build a reprocessing facility in Trombay and provided
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training to 24 specialists for this purpose. Expertise and technological
know-how for the extraction of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel were
provided by France.
On 7 September 1972, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave verbal
authorization to the scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Centre to assemble
the nuclear device they had designed for testing.6 Throughout its
development phase the device was usually referred to as the Smiling
Buddha and it was tested at Pokhran on 18 May 1974 coinciding with the
Buddha Jayanti festival in India marking the birth of Gautama Buddha.7
This was the first confirmed nuclear test by a country outside the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council.
India described the detonation of its nuclear device as a “peaceful
explosion.”The reaction of the international community, even by the
most fervent proponents of non-proliferation, was astonishingly muted
and the French Atomic Energy Agency actually sent its felicitations.
No sanctions were imposed and no preconditions linking aid to nuclear
restraint were put forward. On the contrary, a month after the Pokhran
test, India was rewarded by the Western donors’ consortium with a 200
million-dollar increase in development assistance.
In contrast, it was Islamabad that was singled out for punitive
measures. In 1972, an IAEA study had recommended that Pakistan
should meet its energy shortfall through nuclear power. Twenty reactors
and a complete fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing, were
envisaged. That year Canada supplied the KANNUP reactor to Pakistan
under safeguards. However, after the Indian nuclear test, the Canadians
halted fuel supplies for KANUPP, retracted from their commitment to
provide a fuel fabrication plant and then unilaterally ended all nuclear
cooperation with Pakistan. Subsequently, France also reneged on a 1979
agreement with Pakistan for the sale of a reprocessing plant under IAEA
safeguards.
The US Congress enacted stringent non-proliferation laws in this
period which impacted mainly on Pakistan as it pursued its clandestine
nuclear weapons development programme. The Symington Amendment
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
of 1976 which was modified by the Glen Amendment the following year
made it mandatory for the US administration to terminate economic
and military assistance to any country which acquired or provided
enrichment facilities, materials or technology after 1976 without fullscope safeguards. Thus, India, which had already obtained all the
technology it required for pursuing a nuclear weapons programme was
automatically exempted from the sanctions prescribed under this law.
The country-specific Pressler Amendment was adopted in 1987
under which American assistance and military sales to Pakistan were
prohibited unless the US president certified annually that Pakistan did
not possess a nuclear device.
Analysts in Pakistan believe that the international community was
strangely wayward in its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. They
are of the view that a distinct historical pattern is apparent suggesting a
conscious decision to provide material and technical assistance for India’s
nuclear programme. Similarly, at the multilateral plain, there was an
eagerness to accommodate India’s views on non-proliferation. Though
Pakistan supported Ireland’s 1957 proposal for a Non-Proliferation
Treaty, it was India, not Pakistan, which was represented in the eighteennation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. It was here that India put
its full weight behind the Soviet demand to legitimize peaceful nuclear
explosions. This was accepted by the NPT’s sponsors and, subsequently,
provided India with a tailor-made excuse for its 1974 nuclear test.
At the time of the establishment of the IAEA, Pakistan proposed
that all civil nuclear activities should be under international inspection.
In 1965 it wrote to the co-chairmen of the Geneva conference on
disarmament documenting Indian preparations for a nuclear explosion.
This warning fell on deaf ears. The representatives of the United States
and the Soviet Union did not even accept Pakistan’s note. Similarly,
Canada ignored the information provided by Pakistan in 1967 detailing
Indian efforts aimed at carrying out a nuclear test by diverting plutonium
from the CIRRUS reactor. Subsequently, a step-by-step narration
was given by the Pakistan delegation to the UN General Assembly.
However, the world chose to ignore these warnings either because of
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genuine scepticism or because of a deliberate, well-thought-out policy
of encouraging India in its nuclear ambitions.
Despite its reservations, Pakistan voted for the adoption of the NPT
in 1968 at the UN General Assembly. It made clear its willingness to
accede to the Treaty on condition that the nuclear-weapons-states provide
adequate security guarantees to the non-nuclear states and persuade
the threshold nuclear powers, including India, to accept the Treaty. In
pursuance of this objective, Pakistan convened the Non-Nuclear Weapon
States Conference at Geneva in 1968. The meeting was derailed by the
US and the USSR.
When the KANNUP reactor was being inaugurated in 1972, Prime
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto proposed the creation of a nuclear weapon
free zone in South Asia. The proposal, which it was obvious would be
unacceptable to New Delhi, was revived after the Indian nuclear explosion
in 1974 and was repeatedly adopted by the UN General Assembly.
A number of other proposals, aimed at achieving an equitable nonproliferation regime in South Asia, also emanated from Islamabad. These
included: (a) a joint Pakistan-India declaration renouncing the acquisition
or manufacture of nuclear weapons (1978); (b) mutual Pakistan-India
inspection of each other’s nuclear facilities (1979); (c) simultaneous
Pakistan-India adherence to the NPT (1979); (d) acceptance by the two
countries of full-scope IAEA safeguards; (e) a bilateral or regional test
ban treaty (1987); and (f) the creation of a zero missile zone in South
Asia (1994). These initiatives, which Pakistan knew would be rejected
by India, provided it a smokescreen to pursue its own nuclear weapons
development programme.
These proposals did not elicit the least support from the major
powers probably because of their suspicions about Islamabad’s nuclear
ambitions. It was only after 1988, when it became apparent that Pakistan
had acquired a nuclear capability, that Washington endorsed a regional
approach towards non-proliferation in South Asia. Even then sanctions
under the Pressler Amendment were imposed on Pakistan in 1990
but this did not deter Islamabad from persevering with its pursuit of
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nuclear weapons while New Delhi continued with its own nuclear and
missile development programmes. The objective of promoting nonproliferation in South Asia was thus defeated. US Defence Secretary
William Perry conceded that Pressler was a “blunt instrument” and an
impediment to Pakistan-US relations and, in the final analysis, to nonproliferation prospects in South Asia. It was revised, to an extent, by the
Brown Amendment which removed form the Pressler law non-military
assistance, restored the provision of International Military Education
Training (IMET) and allowed a one-time waiver of the Pressler
Amendment for the release of embargoed military equipment worth
approximately US $ 368 million. This however did not apply to the
28 F-16s purchased by Pakistan but, in all fairness, President Clinton
promised to take measures for the refund of the money to Islamabad.
The Brown Amendment was signed into law by the US president in
January 1996.
The realization that Pakistan had attained nuclear capability resulted
in its being taken more seriously. Despite the sanctions under the Pressler
law, there was a progressive de-escalation of the nuclear-related demands
on Pakistan. For instance:(a) In 1991-93, the US asked for a “roll back”
of Pakistan’s nuclear programme; (b) in 1993-95, it gave this up and
instead proposed a unilateral “verified freeze” in exchange for delivery
of Pakistan’s embargoed military equipment; (c) in 1995, the US gave
up the “freeze” proposal and, instead, pressed Pakistan to accept the
early conclusion of the a multilateral Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty.
Subsequently there was a shift from discriminatory bilateral pressures
to the adoption of multilateral and non-discriminatory measures; and (d)
in 1996 the Brown Amendment was finally adopted.
India and Pakistan were equally duplicitous in their nuclear
weapons research and development programmes. The former, despite
the Pokhran test of 1974, unconvincingly called for comprehensive
nuclear disarmament while further developing its weapons programme;
the latter repeatedly proposed a number of measures built around the
unattainable goal of a nuclear-free South Asia while stealthily pursuing
its quest for the bomb. Despite their declaratory policies, neither New
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proliferation. India’s nuclear programme was not merely for reasons of
security but was also motivated by its yearning to acquire the status of
a major power. After its bitter experience in 1971, Pakistan’s nuclear
ambitions were security-driven and were spurred by the conventional
military imbalance in South Asia that was weighted heavily in favour of
India. Though Islamabad had acquired a nuclear weapons capability by
the end of the 1980s, like Israel, it pursued a policy of ambiguity leaving
it for the international community to guess whether or not it had the
bomb. This was to change after May 1998.
India shocked the world by conducting nuclear tests on 11 and 13
May 1998 but even then it did not abandon its declaratory stance of
abhorring weapons of mass destruction. It unconvincingly reiterated
that it remained committed to nuclear disarmament and maintained that
it had been compelled to carry out the tests because of threats to its
security. Despite this, it did not conceal its desire for recognition as a
nuclear power. Thus in his address to the Lok Sabha on 27 May 1998
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated:
“... In 1947, when India emerged as a free country to take its
rightful place in the comity of nations, the nuclear age had
already dawned. Our leaders then took the crucial decision to
opt for self-reliance, and freedom of thought and action. We
rejected the Cold War paradigm and chose the more difficult
path of non-alignment. Our leaders also realized that a nuclearweapon-free-world would enhance not only India’s security but
also the security of all nations. That is why disarmament was and
continues to be a major plank in our foreign policy.
“During the 50’s India took the lead in calling for an end to all
nuclear weapon testing. Addressing the Lok Sabha on 2 April,
1954, Pt. Jawaharlal, to whose memory we pay homage today,
stated ‘nuclear, chemical and biological energy and power should
not be used to forge weapons of mass destruction’. He called for
negotiations for prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons
and in the interim, a standstill agreement to halt nuclear testing.
This call was not heeded.
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
“In 1965, along with a small group of non-aligned countries,
India put forward the idea of an international non-proliferation
agreement under which the nuclear-weapon States would agree
to give up their arsenals provided other countries refrained from
developing or acquiring such weapons. This balance of rights and
obligations was not accepted. In the 60’s our security concerns
deepened. The country sought security guarantees but the
countries we turned to were unable to extend to us the expected
assurances. As a result, we made it clear that we would not be
able to sign the NPT.
“The Lok Sabha debated the issue on 5 April, 1968. Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi assured the House that ‘we shall be
guided entirely by our self-enlightenment and the considerations
of national security’. This was a turning point and this House
strengthened the decision of the then Government by reflecting a
national consensus.
“Our decision not to sign the NPT was in keeping with our basic
objectives. In 1974, we demonstrated our nuclear capability.
Successive Governments thereafter have taken all necessary
steps in keeping with that resolve and national will, to safeguard
India’s nuclear option. This was the primary reason behind the
1996 decision for not signing the CTBT, a decision that also
enjoyed consensus of this House…
“India is now a nuclear-weapon State. This is a reality that
cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it
a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by
our scientists and engineers. It is India’s due, the right of onesixth of human-kind. Our strengthened capability adds to our
sense of responsibility. We do not intend to use these weapons
for aggression or for mounting threats against any country; these
are weapons of self-defence, to ensure that India is not subjected
to nuclear threats or coercion. We do not intend to engage in an
arms race.
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“Our nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness.
We have not violated any international agreement either in 1974
or now, in 1998. The restraint exercised for 24 years, after having
demonstrated our capability in 1974, is in itself a unique example.
Restraint, however, has to arise from strength. It cannot be based
upon indecision or doubt. The series of tests recently undertaken
by India have led to the removal of doubts. The action involved
was balanced in that it was the minimum necessary to maintain
what is an irreducible component of our national security
calculus...’” 8
Vajpayee’s solemn pledge before the lower house of the Indian
parliament that India would not use its nuclear weapons for aggression
“or for mounting threats against any country” could not have been
intended to be taken seriously. Newspapers after the tests at Pokhran
carried banner headlines highlighting the provocative statements and
threats made by the Indian leadership against Pakistan. Islamabad was
told that the strategic balance had changed and that India would teach
Pakistan a lesson. On the night between 27 and 28 May, there were
credible intelligence reports that India had planned pre-emptive strikes
against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities and this left Islamabad with no
option but to demonstrate its nuclear capability on 28 and 30 May after
which the threats from New Delhi came to an abrupt end.
Consequent to the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the Conference
on Disarmament convened its first ever special session on 2 June 1998.
The Pakistan representative identified avoidance of conflict and the
easing of current tensions, South Asian nuclear stabilization, rectifying
the conventional military imbalance between India and Pakistan; and a
just settlement of the Kashmir dispute as the four aspects of the South
Asian crisis that needed to be addressed by the international community.9
All this, of course, fell on deaf ears and Pakistan-India tensions have
continued to bedevil the South Asian security environment. As in the
West during the Cold War era, the nuclear factor was to dominate issues
of peace and security in South Asia. After May 1998, the nuclear postures
adopted respectively by Pakistan and India became the main determinant
of the manner in which the several militarized crises between the two
countries would unfold.
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
The Nuclear Postures of Pakistan and India
In March 2009, Gen. Shankar Roychowdhry, a former Indian
Army Chief of Staff, conceded that Islamabad’s threat of nuclear use
had deterred India from undertaking conventional military strikes
against Pakistan.10 According to Vipin Narang, a Ph.D. candidate in the
Department of Government at Harvard University and a research fellow
at Harvard’s Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, India’s
nuclear weapons failed to deter Pakistan’s sub-conventional attacks in
Mumbai and Delhi as well as its “conventional aggression” in the Kargil
conflict in 1999.11
Narang identifies three regional nuclear postures, namely, (i)
catalytic; (ii) assured retaliation, and; (iii) asymmetric escalation. India
has adhered to an assured retaliation posture whereas Pakistan moved
from a catalytic posture in the early years of its nuclear weapons program
to asymmetric escalation after the May 1998 nuclear tests by the two
countries.
Analyses of the militarized crises between Pakistan and India since
1986 demonstrate that the asymmetric escalation posture which is built
around the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional
attack has been “deterrent optimal” for Pakistan and has dissuaded India
from crossing the international border on a number of occasions. In fact
because of the widening conventional military imbalance in favour of
India, Pakistan currently has no other option but to adopt a credible first
use posture.
CATALYTIC POSTURE
A catalytic posture is based on an ambiguous nuclear capability
and is directed at “catalyzing” third party intervention in the form of
diplomatic or military assistance in the event of a possible attack by
neighbouring countries. If such assistance is not forthcoming then the
state employing a catalytic posture threatens to discard the ambiguity
surrounding its nuclear capability and unsheathe its weapons thereby
escalating the conflict.12
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Nuclear Politics and South Asia
Thus the distinguishing feature of this posture is that it is not directed
at the adversary but at a third party in order to trigger its intervention.
As an example, Narang cites the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Israel
put into effect its catalytic nuclear posture. Three days into the war at a
time when Egyptian and Syrian forces threatened Israel’s survival, the
latter carried out operational checks of its delivery vehicles discernible
only to US intelligence to signal that it was seriously contemplating
using its nuclear weapons. The purpose was to prompt the urgent supply
by the US of conventional state-of-the-art weapons to Israel to deal with
the threat and also to pressure the Soviet Union to restrain Egypt and
Syria.13 What is important in this illustration, if accurate, is that Israel
directed its signal not at Egypt or Syria but at the United States. It is also
instructive that Israel’s nuclear capability did not deter the Egyptian and
Syrian attack and its rapid intensification. The catalytic posture was also
employed by South Africa in the 1980s.14
ASSURED RETALIATION POSTURE
The assured retaliation posture is founded on a second strike
capability and is aimed at deterring nuclear attack or even the threat of
such attack. It entails moving up the spectrum of nuclear capabilities as
well as deployment procedures. Central to this posture is the development
of a survivable second strike capability that can hit the adversary’s
strategic facilities. India and China have adopted the assured retaliation
posture.
ASYMMETRIC ESCALATION POSTURE
The focus of the asymmetric escalation posture is the certainty of
rapid (and asymmetric) first use of nuclear weapons against conventional
military attacks in order to deter the adversary from such aggression.
This obviously entails making nuclear weapons operational and usable
at short notice. The credibility of such a posture, built as it is around
the first use of nuclear weapons, necessitates transparent capabilities,
deployment patterns and conditions of use.
This posture is adopted by countries that encounter serious security
threats from proximate adversaries that possess superior nuclear and
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
conventional capabilities. Under such circumstances, the first use of
nuclear weapons becomes the only option available. In his well-researched
article titled “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and
South Asian Stability,” Narang gives the example of Cold War Europe
where NATO and French forces were pitted against a conventionally
superior and nuclear-armed Soviet Union. They accordingly adopted an
asymmetric escalation posture that threatened the first use of nuclear
weapons against Soviet military incursions into Western Europe.15
Though the intensity of the asymmetric escalation posture can
vary from massive retaliation to flexible response, its core ingredient
is a credible threat of first use of nuclear weapons against conventional
aggression in order to deter such an eventuality.
The South Asian Experience
When India first tested a nuclear device in 1974, it had a rudimentary
aircraft-deliverable strike capability. It was under Rajiv Gandhi in
the 1980s that it made significant advances on weapons designs and
developed nuclear-capable missile systems after which it adopted an
assured retaliation posture.
Analysts believe that the “core aim of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program is to prevent a repetition of 1971…to deter an Indian attack that
might reduce Pakistan’s size even further, or perhaps even put the country
out of existence entirely.”16 After the debacle of 1971 Pakistan is said to
have embarked on a nuclear weapons development program. By the end
of 1987, the US assessment was that “Pakistan had produced enough
fissionable weapons-grade uranium for four to six bombs.”17 Thus by
the mid to the late 1980s both Pakistan and India were de facto nuclear
weapons states although Islamabad had yet to carry out any tests. This
marked the commencement of the South Asian nuclear period and, since
then, all three nuclear postures have been adopted in the region. While
India has been consistent with its assured retaliation posture, Pakistan
switched from a catalytic posture to asymmetric escalation after May
1998 when it discarded its policy of ambiguity and demonstrated its
nuclear capability in response to the Indian tests. This entailed the full
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Nuclear Politics and South Asia
integration of its nuclear weapons into its military forces to credibly and
directly deter Indian conventional attacks.
In January 2002, the director general of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans
Division, Lt. Gen (r) Khalid Kidwai, is reported to have stated that
the country’s “nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. In case that
deterrence fails, they will be used if: (a) India attacks Pakistan and
conquers a large part of its territory; (b) India destroys a large part of either
its land or air forces; (c) India proceeds to the economic strangulation
of Pakistan; or (d) India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or
creates large scale internal subversion in Pakistan.”18
The asymmetric escalation posture has been effective in deterring
Indian attacks against Pakistan in: (a) the Kargil war; (b) Operation
Parakram which was launched after the 13 December 2001 attack on
the Indian parliament, and; (c) the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
During the Kargil war, according to Lt. Gen. (r) V.K.Sood and
Pravin Sawhney, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was “known to
have seriously considered a Pakistani nuclear strike had India escalated
the war.”19 India’s Chief of Army Staff at that time, Gen. Ved Malik,
also admitted that Pakistan’s nuclear posture compelled New Delhi to
“rule out full-scale conventional war.”20 In “Four Crises and a Peace
Process: American Engagement in South Asia,” P.R. Chari, Pervez
Iqbal Cheema and Stephen Cohen agree that the BJP government
was firm about “not enlarging the theatre of operations beyond the
Kargil sector or attacking Pakistani forces, staging posts, and lines of
communications across the LoC, despite the fact that this defied military
logic and entailed acceptance of heavier casualties. India’s air force had
strict orders to avoid attacking targets in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
This restraint was in marked contrast to India’s response in the 1965 and
1971 conflicts, when nuclear weapons had not entered the equation and
it had not displayed any inhibitions in invading Pakistan.”21
Operation Parakram, which was launched on 18 December 2001,
involved some 800,000 troops and is said to have been the largest
Indian mobilization since 1971. Infantry and mountain divisions
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
were positioned along the LoC while India’s three strike corps were
moved from Malthura, Ambala and Bhopal22 and deployed along the
Thar Desert in Rajasthan in order to launch a massive attack against
Pakistan. This took several weeks and gave Islamabad the time to also
mobilize its forces. Subsequently tensions abated somewhat only to
flare up again after a mujahideen attack in May 2002 at Kaluchak in
Jammu. India, which had not withdrawn its strike corps from the border,
seemed resolved, yet again, to move deep into Sind in line with the socalled Sundarji doctrine espoused by New Delhi from 1981 to 2004.23
This doctrine, named after Gen. Krishnaswamy Sundarrajan, was based
on administering Pakistan a devastating blow in response to attacks by
Pakistan-based jihadi groups.24 Islamabad responded by threatening to
use its nuclear weapons and Lt. Gen. Javed Ashraf Qazi, the director
general of the Inter-Services Intelligence, declared “If Pakistan is being
destroyed through conventional means, we will destroy them by using the
nuclear option.”25 Subsequently the Parakram Operation was terminated
and the strike corps were withdrawn from the border. The opinion of
Indian analysts was that this operation “ended as an ignominious retreat
after having failed to secure even its minimum objectives.”26 Lt. Gen.
Sood conceded that had India “crossed the international border and
severed Punjab and Sind with its conventional forces…Pakistan would
use nuclear weapons in that scenario.”27
After the Mumbai attacks in November 2008, the war hysteria
among segments of Indian society became progressively ascendant and
this triggered similar saber-rattling in Pakistan. However, the leadership
in both countries were able to defuse, albeit gradually, the inflamed
public outcry. The Congress-led government in India was convinced that
a conventional military attack against Pakistan was not an option as that
could have escalated the conflict to the nuclear level and this was also
admitted by the former Chief of Army Staff, Gen Shankar Roychowdhry:
“Pakistan’s nuclear weapons deterred India from attacking that country
after the Mumbai strikes…(and) it was due to Pakistan’s possession
of nuclear weapons that India stopped short of a military retaliation
following the attack on Parliament in 2001.”28
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Analysts believe these three crises illustrate that the asymmetric
escalation posture adopted by Islamabad since 1998 has been effective
in deterring India from launching conventional military strikes against
Pakistan. On 22 November 2008, President Asif Ali Zardari took the
world and, more so Pakistan, by storm when, during a videoconference
organized by The Hindustan Times, he told his Indian audience that
Pakistan would “certainly not” be the first to use nuclear weapons.
He then quoted his late wife, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
as saying that “there was a bit of Indian in every Pakistani and a bit
of Pakistani in every Indian,” and added “I don’t feel threatened by
India and India shouldn’t feel threatened by us.”29 The initial reaction
of Indian strategic analysts was to cautiously welcome the president’s
remarks. For instance, one such scholar, C. Uday Bhaskar, was
remarkably accurate in his assessment that: “It is quite a breakthrough,
but we have to wait till tomorrow to see how the General Headquarters
in Rawalpindi responds to Mr. Zardari’s political initiative.”30 Nothing
was to change as far as Pakistan’s nuclear posture was concerned and
President Zardari’s comments generated the perception that he could
not be taken seriously. However, on 25 December 2008 i.e., more than a
month after the videoconference, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Choudhry
Ahmad Mukhtar told reporters in Gujrat that the president had meant
every word of what he had said and no one could make Zardari change
his mind.31
Four days after President Zardari’s categorical pronouncements
on the no first-use of nuclear weapons, the Mumbai attacks took place
and the Congress leadership, as noted earlier, ruled out a conventional
military attack against Pakistan for fear that a conflict could spiral to the
nuclear level because of Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation posture. Since
Mumbai, Pakistan-India relations have been marked by tensions. This
was more than evident during the first post-Mumbai top level contact
between the two countries when President Zardari and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh met at the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization Summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on 16 June 2009. In his
opening remarks, Manmohan Singh declared before the media that his
mandate was confined only to discussing what Pakistan had done to
stop terrorist attacks against India emanating from its soil.32Later the
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S. Iftikhar Murshed
Indian Prime Minister told reporters he had not realized that the media
was still present in the room and that he had not meant to hurt President
Zardari.
Four weeks later, when the prime ministers of the two countries met
at the fringes of the NAM Summit in Sharm El Sheikh on 17 July 2009
they agreed “that dialogue is the only way forward. Action on terrorism
should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should
not be bracketed.” 33This demonstrated statesmanship and courage on the
part of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh but unfortunately it triggered
a severe backlash from nationalists amid accusations of weak-kneed
capitulation to Pakistan. The Indian prime minister was vehemently
criticized in parliament and New Delhi reverted to its position that a
resumption of dialogue between the two countries was contingent to
Pakistan bringing the alleged perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to
justice. The 25 February 2010 talks in New Delhi between the foreign
secretaries of the two countries achieved little as India insisted on a onepoint terrorism-related agenda while Pakistan wanted a comprehensive
discussion of all outstanding issues. The two delegations therefore talked
at rather than with each other.
In the absence of a regular structured dialogue between the two
countries and the consequent building of mutual trust and confidence,
another terrorist incident in India could instigate a conventional strike
against Pakistan. Such an eventuality is a possibility and cannot be
brushed under the rug because of the dangers inherent in India’s current
military doctrine.
After the Operation Parakram fiasco of 2002, the Sundarji doctrine
was discarded and in April 2004 the Indian army announced the Pakistanspecific Cold Start doctrine. This envisages quick mobilization, rapid
strikes against Pakistan, and shallow incursions “50-80 kilometers deep
that could be used in post-conflict negotiations to extract concessions
from Islamabad”34 (as opposed to the Sundarji doctrine of cutting
Pakistan in half). What has not been factored in the Cold Start concept is
that, Islamabad would be left with no option, because of the conventional
imbalance, other than to respond with a nuclear first-strike.
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Walter C. Ladwig III, a doctoral candidate at the Oxford University’s
Merton College, writes: “The Cold Start doctrine requires reorganizing
the Indian army’s offensive power away from the three strike corps of
the Sundarji doctrine into eight smaller division-sized integrated battle
groups that combine mechanized infantry, artillery and armor…The
eight battle groups would be prepared to launch multiple strikes into
Pakistan along different axes of advance.”35Since the announcement of
the Cold Start doctrine in 2004, five exercises of varying sizes have been
held to test the concept. These are: (i) Divya Astra (Divine Weapon)
in March 2004; (ii) Vajra Shakti (Thunder Power) in May 2005; (iii)
Desert Strike, the largest since the 1985 Brass Tacks exercise, was held
six months after Vajra Shakti; (iv) Sanghe Shakti (Joint Power) in May
2006 was the largest Cold Start exercise. Ominously instead of the usual
“red” and “blue” land, the two sides were posited as Pakistan and India,
and; (v) Ashwamdeh (Horse Sacrifice referring to an ancient ritual of
Hindu kings to assert their superiority over neighbouring kingdoms) in
April-May 2007. 36
Cold Start has been described as a “limited war doctrine” and the
absurdity of this claim becomes immediately obvious because of the
certainty of a nuclear first strike by Pakistan should Indian forces cross
the international border and occupy even a small part of its territory.
Furthermore, the presumption that hostilities will end after Indian
conventional forces have made shallow incursions into Pakistan is
wishful thinking. In this event the conflict will not end and the areas
occupied by Indian troops will not be available to New Delhi as a
bargaining chip to negotiate with Islamabad. Military doctrines based
on invasion and occupation of territory that make have been feasible
before the nuclearization of South Asia are now anachronisms and no
longer relevant. War, no matter how brief, is not an option available
to either Pakistan or India because of the probability of such conflicts
escalating to the nuclear level.
The disastrous consequences of a Pakistan-India conflict seem to
have been lost on hardliners in both countries and, in particular, the
Indian military leadership. General Deepak Kapoor, who retired as
the army chief on 31 March 2010, “identified five thrust areas for the
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Indian military build-up: the ability to fight a two-front war against
Pakistan and China; optimize capacity to counter asymmetric and subconventional threats; enhance capabilities for strategic reach and outof-area operations from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits; acquire
strategic (intercontinental) and space-based capabilities and ballistic
missile defences, and ensure a technical edge over adversaries (that is,
Pakistan and China)…But the greatest danger for Pakistan emanates
from the concept of the so-called ‘Cold Start’ strategy, propounded
by General Kapoor, to mobilize and strike fast (within 96 hours) at
Pakistan ‘under a WMD overhang.’”37More than 70 percent of India’s
military capabilities are deployed against Pakistan. Kapoor’s statement
was discussed at a meeting in Islamabad on 13 January 2010 of the
National Command Authority which “took serious note of recent Indian
statements about its capability to conduct conventional military strikes
under a nuclear umbrella” and these were described as being “oblivious to
the dangerous implications of adventurism in a nuclearized context.”38
An invisible Berlin Wall of unresolved disputes, particularly
Kashmir, obstructs the establishment of good-neighbourly and
cooperative relations between Pakistan and India. The tensions that
have marked the equation between the two countries in the last six
decades have resulted in conventional as well as sub-conventional wars.
After the nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, the continuation of
aggressive postures by either country can have disastrous consequences.
For this precise reason, there is an urgent need for “a strategic restraint
regime involving the three interlocking elements of conflict resolution,
nuclear and ballistic restraint and conventional balance.”39 The wisdom
of keeping the recently resumed Pakistan-India talks on track is selfevident.
References:
1
2
3
84
“The Centrality of the Bomb;” Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird; Foreign Policy, Spring
1994.
“Nuclear Testing is an Acceptable Risk for Arms Control;” Scientific American March
2009.
http://www.ctbto.org/press-releases/2009/us-nuclear-security-administratordagostinovists-the-ctbto/
CRITERION – Volume 5 No.2
Nuclear Politics and South Asia
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
“CTBTO Preparatory Commission.” CTBTO Press Centre.
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
(2010). “Status of Signature and Ratification.” Accessed on 21 February 2010.
Wikipedia, “Smiling Buddha.”
Ibid.
Quoted by Ambassador Savitri Kunadi at the Special Session of the Conference on
Disarmament on 2 June 1998 for discussion the South Asian nuclear crisis.
Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram at the Conference on Disarmament on 2 June
1998.
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Deterred India,” Hindu, 10 March 2009.
“Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” Vipin
Narang.
This term was used to describe South Africa’s nuclear posture. See Terrence McNamee,
“The Afrikaner Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation and Rollback in South Africa,” in Avner
Cohen and McNamee, Why do States Want Nuclear Weapons? The Cases of Israel and
South Africa. (Oslo: Norwegian Institue of Defence Studies, 2005, p.14)
Avner Cohen, “The Last Nuclear Moment,” The New York Times, 3 October 2003;
Hermann Eilts quoted by Janice G. Stein, “The Failure of Deterrence and Intelligence,”
transcript of round table discussion, reprinted in Richar B. Parker, ed. The October
War: A Retrospect, Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 2001, p.121, and Avner
Cohen, “Nuclear Arms in Crisis under Secrecy: Israel and the Lessons of the 1967 and
1973 Wars,” in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds. Planning the
Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000, p.118.
Peter Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” International Security,
Vol. 26, No. 2, Fall 2001, pp.45-86.
See, for example, David S. Yost, “France’s Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe.”
Part I “Capabilities and Doctrine,” Adelphi Papers, No. 194, London, International
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984/1985.
Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the
Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2005, p.123.
Hendrick Smith, “A Bomb Ticks in Pakistan,” New York Times Magazine, 6 March
1988.
Quoted in Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear
Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: A Concise Report of a visit by Landau Network
Centro Volto,” 14 January 2002 http://www.pugwash.org/September 11/pakistan-nuclear.
htm.
V.K.Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: An Unfinished War, Delhi, Sage,
2003, pp. 70-71.
Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in Nuclear South Asia,” p.79, and Kapur, “India and
Pakistan’s Unstable Peace,” p.147.
P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process:
American Engagement in South Asia; Washington D.C. Brookings Institution Press,
2007, 137.
“A Cold Start for Hot Wars,” Walter C. Ladwig III, International Security, Vol. 32, No.33,
Winter 2007/2008 pp. 158-190
Pakistani Air Comdr. Tariq M. Ashraf termed the conventional military strategy pursued
by India from 1981 to 2004, the Sundarji doctrine (after Gen. Krishnaswamy Sundarrajan
CRITERION – April/June 2010
85
S. Iftikhar Murshed
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
86
in “Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces,” Military Review, Vol. 84 No.
6, November-December 2004, p.54. Gen Sundarrajan’s overhaul of the Indian Army’s
conventional doctrine in the 1980s is mentioned in Amit Gupta, “Determining India’s
Force Structure and Military Doctrine: I Want My MiG,” Asian Survey, Vol. 35 No. 5,
May 1995, pp.449-450.
Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars.”
“Pak Will Not Hesitate to Use Nuke against India,” Press Trust of India, 22 May 2002.
Praveen Swami, “Beating the Retreat,” Frontline, Vol. 19 No. 22, 26 October 2002.
Quoted in S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and
Conflict in South Asia, Stanford Calif. Stanford University Press, 2007, p.138.
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Deterred India,” Hindu, 10 March 2009.
Dawn, Karachi, 23 November 2008, report from New Delhi by Jawed Naqvi.
Ibid.
Zee TV, news file 26 December 2008.
The Hindu, report by Nirupama Subramanian from Islamabad, 19 June 2009.
Joint Statement on the conclusion of the meeting the meeting between the prime ministers
of Pakistan and India at Sharm El Sheikh on 17 July 2009.
Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars (The Indian Army’s New Limited War
Doctrine),” International Security, Vol. 32 No. 3, Winter 2007/08, pp.158-190.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Muneer Akram, “Meeting India’s military challenge,” The News, Lahore, 28 January
2010.
Quoted by Muneer Akarm in “Meeting India’s military challenge.”
Shamshad Ahmad, “This melon is not yet ripe,” The News, Lahore, 27 January 2010.
CRITERION – Volume 5 No.2
ASIA RISING? INEQUALITY AND
PATTERNS OF GROWTH IN ASIA:
TOWARDS A REGIONAL POLICY
FRAMEWORK
Taimur Khilji
Abstract
(Persistent inequality, in addition to being ethically wrong, is politically
risky and is likely to arrest development gains. In a continent that is now
largely democratic, issues of equity will shape the future of governments.
Rising levels of inequality across Asia underscore the regional dimension
of the problem. Although currently lacking, a coherent regional response
to address this issue is desperately needed for Asian countries to make
a smooth development transition. If the transition from developing to
developed is to be achieved by the least developed countries in Asia
while keeping inequality in check, then the transition from rural to
urban needs to be managed carefully. The policy focus needs to shift
from pursuing merely growth to developing a more inclusive form of
growth. This requires that the distribution of, as well as the contribution
to growth be critically questioned. Author).
Context
Rising levels of income inequality in Asia is becoming a central
public policy problem. Over the past two decades the level of income
inequality, as measured by the Gini index has steadily increased in
a number of Asian economies (Milanovic 2009). Across countries,
inequality has also increased as measured by differences in per capita
Taimur Khilji
income over time. The emerging, and now more developed economies
of Asia have grown at a much faster rate than the fourteen Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) in Asia. While the policy focus has been
on sustaining economic growth, reducing inequality has largely been
off the development agenda (Mishra 2009; Jolly 2009). Asia is often
projected as a fast growing region with China and India leading the way
(Winters and Yusuf 2007).
There is good reason to see Asia through the lens of growing
prosperity. The rapid economic successes of several East Asian countries,
including South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand,
were aptly deemed miracles (Stiglitz 1996). The region’s fastest
growing economies have reaped the benefits of globalization and made
commendable strides in reducing poverty (Habito 2009). Through the
1990s and into this century, East Asian economies have come together to
form complex trade networks within the region based on intra-regional
trade in electronic parts and components, where the production process
has been fragmented according to dynamic comparative advantage to
provide almost 30 percent of world’s merchandize exports (ADB 2006;
WTO 2008). China and India, the two most populous countries in the
world, continue to be the fastest growing within the region. From such
a vantage point, Asia provides an exceptional example of economic
achievement.
In sharp contrast, Asia comprises the largest number of poor on a
single continent; the number is close to a billion (World Bank 2009). In
2008, the number of hungry was 500 million (FAO 2008). The fourteen
LDCs of Asia have an average per capita income of just over $500
(UNDP 2005). A number of countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Philippines and Indonesia, are faced with conflict while others, such
as Sri Lanka, Nepal and Timor Leste, are just beginning to recover
from it. The recent rise of domestic food prices has disproportionately
affected the poor, especially where the poor are net consumers (Ivanic
and Martin 2008). In Pakistan, for example the number of food
insecure people increased from 60 million to 77 million in 2007/2008.
Most recently, the global financial crisis has not only affected those
employed in the financial sector, but also those in the manufacturing
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CRITERION – Volume 5 No.2
Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia
and services industries (Chhibber et al. 2009). Current social protection
and social security measures that help buffer the vulnerable population
during times of crises have proved inadequate as they do not extend to
those working in the in the informal sector (Baulch et al. 2008).
On the one hand, Asia has made unprecedented economic progress,
but on the other it is still grappling with basic development issues. While
growth has been consistent and strong, there are still large pockets of
poverty. India, for example has the largest number of billionaires in
Asia (Petras 2008), and is also home to over 450 million persons living
below the $1.25 poverty line (World Bank 2008). Both extremes must
be considered to capture the dynamic nature of income inequality. The
gap between the more developed and less developed economies has
widened as has the gap between prosperous and less prosperous regions
within countries. Also, the top 20 percent of the income distribution has
steadily increased its share in total income, while the bottom 20 percent’s
share has decreased (ADB 2007). Furthermore, for most countries in
the region the Gini index values are not only high but have increased
over time. It is also worth noting that inequality is not just limited to
income, but is also prevalent in access to essential social services such
as education and health (ADB 2007).
Current development literature has either taken up inequality
within specific countries in Asia (such as China, India, and a
number of East Asian economies) or explored it at a global level.
Although a comprehensive study of inequality in Asia was recently
published by the Asian Development Bank (2007), the report focuses
mainly on trends and patterns and fails to develop a regional policy
framework to address this critical issue. This paper attempts to provide
a comprehensive overview of inequality in Asia, and also to develop a
regional policy framework.
This paper treats inequality separately from poverty. Inequality and
poverty have historically been grouped together in development literature,
which has led to the development of a common set of policies for countries.
Addressing economic inequality demands a structural change in policy
thinking and design—from devising ways to reduce absolute income
CRITERION – April/June 2010
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Taimur Khilji
poverty to addressing relative income level. This represents a shift from
viewing inequality as part and parcel of a static income problem to treating
it as a dynamic and relative issue. Poverty, and by association inequality,
has traditionally been viewed in absolute and isolationist terms, where
the focus has been limited to reducing the number of poor. The broader
concept of inequality, however, requires exploration of the difference
in levels (of income, of provision to public goods, of opportunity, etc.)
between individuals and groups in society. It requires looking at society
at large and identifying the sources of disparate outcomes, which tend to
be social, geographical, political and economic in nature.
Is income inequality bad?
Economists have historically cast the inequality debate in terms of
efficiency vs. equity, where inequality is to be tolerated and indeed accepted
as a trade-off to efficiency and economic growth. Posner (2007) has argued
that “income inequality is not bad in general when it does not involve
any reduction in the incomes of a substantial fraction of the population.”
His rationale is quite simple: in the event that incomes of the bottom
quintile increase by two percent while incomes of those in the top quintile
increase by ten percent, everyone is better off even though inequality has
increased. Posner (2007) believes that as long as incomes increase across
all groups, it is not significant whether one group’s average income is
increasing at a faster rate. In a similar vein, inequality is viewed as irrelevant
by some, and what seems to matter is absolute increase in income and
not relative increase (Krueger 2002; Feldstein 1999). However, there is
agreement amongst economists that extreme inequality is bad, as Posner
concedes that extreme inequality “can be politically destabilizing.”
Psychological studies show that relative incomes do matter and that
people care about where they stand in the social hierarchy (Graham and
Felton 2005, Frank 2005). According to Milanovic, “national inequality
[is] an issue—simply because people compare their own standard of living
and make judgments whether these income differences [are] deserved
or not.” Using time series data on views about income inequality and
social policy preferences in the 1980s and 1990s, Kenworthy and Macall
found that “Americans do tend to object to inequality and to believe
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Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia
government should act to redress it.” Kuznets, who famously argued
that income inequality is a common feature of a developing economy,
also noted, “it is only through contact that recognition and tension are
created, one could argue that the reduction of physical misery associated
with low income and consumption levels[…]permit[s] an increase
rather than a diminution of political tensions [because] the political
misery of the poor, the tension created by the observation of the much
greater wealth of other communities[…]may have only increased.”
The difference in relative incomes has led development economists
and political scientists to explore the link between income inequality
and conflict (Cramer 2003; Piazza 2006; Stewart 2002). A study of 85
developing countries between 1973 and 1977 found inequality to be
a significant predictor of political violence (Muller and Weede 1990).
Income and wealth differentials based on ethnicity, religion, and other
groupings have been the cause of social violence. In Sri Lanka, for
example, income, wealth and employment differentials between the
minority ethnic Tamils and the majority Sinhala population has been the
sources of a 25-year-long conflict (Gunewardena 2009). In Malaysia,
despite considerable improvements, the incomes of the Chinese Malays
are almost twice as much as those of the Bumiputeras (Stewart 2005).
In India, the stark difference in incomes based on caste and religion has
led to communal violence (Kundu 2009).
In the neoclassical economics framework, inequality is bad if it is
perceived as detrimental to economic progress. Thus conceived, the
value (bad or good) of inequality is largely determined by whether it
impedes conditions for sustaining growth. While extreme inequality is
considered bad for economic growth, there is no consensus as to what
constitutes this extreme. This is partly due the elusive nature of inequality
manifests: development experience of how income inequality plays out
and its impact on economic progress has been mixed (Mishra 2009).
A high degree of inequality in country X may not immediately result
in adverse social and economic outcomes, whereas a relatively lower
degree of inequality in country Y may quickly escalate conflict, which
in turn would hamper growth. In Nepal, for example, despite increases
in GDP, increases in income inequality over a relatively short period
(5-7 years) became a rallying point for the Maoist opposition party,
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Taimur Khilji
and had in effect, helped fuel the insurgency (Murshed and Gates 2003;
Khatiwada 2006). China, on the other hand has grown at an average of
more than eight percent in the past two decades, despite a sharp rise in
inequality over the same period. Lately, vast differences in average
incomes between rural and urban areas, and across provinces in China,
is becoming apparent, and there is growing realization that future growth
will be compromised due to the widening income disparities (UNDP
2005). In consequence, increasing inequality in China is now viewed
by the national government as a limiting factor to growth. Reducing
inequality is thus seen instrumental (and as a means) to sustaining
growth.
In philosophical literature the concept of equality/inequality is
couched in ethical terms. Issues of equity, including a more equal
distribution of income, are associated with ideals such as justice and
fairness (Aristotle 1912 (1282); Berlin 1956; Rawls 1971). Social
scientists and policymakers often forge a link between income inequality
and unjust social and political practices. Inequality therefore emerges as
a manifestation of unjust practices and bias policies (Rawls 1971, 1977;
Reddy and Pogge 2002; Singer 2002). As such, reducing inequality is
seen as an end in itself and an inherently worthwhile pursuit; its value is
not derived based on whether it drives or limits growth.
In sum, extreme inequality is bad, both from an ethical and an
economic point of view. Inequality in Asia has risen to unprecedented
levels, posing a threat to economic growth. This presents a timely
opportunity for ethical and economic thinking to come together to
address the issue through public policy.
1. Research Questions
What are the recent trends in growth, as measured by GDP and
GDP per capita, for countries in Asia? What are the trends in inequality,
both across and within countries, for the major economies? How have
the different sectors of the economy grown over time? What is the status
of regional inequality within countries? How can governments, multilateral organizations, and regional bodies work together to develop a
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Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia
framework for reducing inequality at the regional level? What short
and long-run policy options do governments have at their disposal to
achieve a more equitable income distribution and a balanced growth
trajectory?
2. Hypotheses
Based on increasing levels of inequality across and within countries,
this paper attempts to present the broad outlines of a regional policy
framework for reducing inequality in Asia. Any serious attempt to reduce
inequality will require decoupling policies and programmes geared at
reducing the number of poor from those aimed at reducing inequality.
While poverty has significantly reduced in Asia in terms of persons
living below a-dollar-day, inequality remains not only persistent but has
dramatically increased in the region, especially since the 1990s (ADB
2007; World Bank 2009). Given the secular rise in inequality, we must
take a fresh look at inequality and consider it separately from poverty,
both in theory and in practice.
This paper will focus on the following hypotheses.
Growth in Asia has been driven by the expansion of manufacturing
and services, at the expense of the rural sector. As most of the poor
reside in and are employed in this sector, they are excluded from the
growth engines of the economy. Growth of the economy is increasingly
shouldered by a limited segment of society, specifically those employed
in the manufacturing and services. Reductions in inequality would
require broadening the economic base to include a greater proportion
of the working population as well as measures that make growth a more
inclusive enterprise where, over time, low income earners account for a
greater share in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Direct investments that
help build the potential of semi-and unskilled workers to be productive
members of society are urgently needed. Finally, education provides
the main means for building human capital and realizing productive
potential.
The conventional approach to reducing inequality through increased
and targeted government spending and so-called ‘redistribution,’ although
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Taimur Khilji
useful in curbing poverty, is not a sustainable solution for decreasing
inequality. While direct income transfers and social protection measures
are necessary, especially in helping to lift persons out of poverty, they
do not directly build the capacities and the productive assets of the poor.
The fiscal expansionary policies (such as those instituted by a number
of emerging economies in the aftermath of the recent global financial
crisis) focused on providing employment, building infrastructure,
and extending basic social services to the low income segment of the
population, need to be complemented by deeper structural policy reform
that develops human capital and works with the values of societies to
reorient the current pattern of growth. Income inequality is a regional
issue as it continues to affect the majority of countries in Asia. The
paper will, therefore, develop the broad outlines of a regional policy
framework to address inequality.
3. Methodology
In the analysis section of the paper, the focus is on capturing
the pattern of inequality both across and within countries. Given
that rising inequality is not limited to a few economies in the region,
but rather is prevalent in a several Asian economies, a regional
lens is applied in capturing and addressing the rise in inequality.
Both inequality across countries (as measured by respective country
GDP per capitas over time) and within country inequality (as measured
by respective Gini coefficient/Gini index values) are considered in the
analysis. China and India, due to their population size, high growth
rates, and increasing levels of inequality, are analyzed in greater depth
than other countries. Due to lack of data gathering and standardization,
the paper limits the country-level analyses to China, India, Philippines,
Bangladesh and Vietnam.
The growth-inequality link is explored through a sectoral analysis of
growth. A disaggregation of growth by sector (i.e. services, manufacturing
and agriculture) is used to identify sectors that drive growth. Employment
data for select countries in the region, disaggregated by sector, is used to
look at the distribution of the labor force across sectors.
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Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia
Based on the above analyses, the policy section attempts to develop
a regional policy framework to address inequality.
4. Analysis
Inequality between Countries
Data on Asia over the past three decades supports three broad trends.
First, the majority of countries in Asia have reduced poverty in terms
of persons living under the internationally defined dollar-a-day poverty
threshold (Dollar 2004; World Bank 2008). East Asian countries, and
more recently China, have been the major players in this respect (World
Bank 1993; Dollar 2007). Second, the region as whole has achieved a
high level of sustained economic growth. Asia has grown faster than
any other region over the past 20 years (World Bank 2008). Finally,
income disparities between countries in the region have widened and
the distribution of income within countries has become more uneven
(ADB 2007). While the first two trends are positive, the third—rising
inequality across and within countries—poses a risk to future growth
(Humphrey 2007). To better understand the potential causes of increasing
inequality requires 1) a close look at the nature of the growth process
that has accompanied the divergence in incomes and 2) an analysis of
the structural shifts that have aided and abetted economic growth.
Figure 1 reflects the GDP per capita values of countries in Asia and
the Pacific since 1985 and into the 2000s. The comparison, based on PPP
adjusted GDP per capita also helps to assess whether Asian economies
are displaying what economists commonly refer to as σ convergence,
the claim that the dispersion in incomes across countries should decrease
over time.
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Taimur Khilji
Real GDP per capita time trend (All of Asia)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
Figure 1: Growth Trajectory of Countries in Asia and Pacific, PPP
US$, 1985-2000s
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
year
Time trend in chained PPP adjusted GDP per capita over the time period
of 1985-2003 for all Asian countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
China, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
India, Iran, Cambodia, Kiribati, ROK, Laos, Sri Lanka, Macao, Maldives,
Mongolia, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Palau, Papua New
Guinea, North Korea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga,
Taiwan (China), Vietnam, Vanuatu, and Samoa.
Each line in Figure 1 corresponds to a particular country’s Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) adjusted GDP per capita value in US dollars over
a period of approximately 20 years. The dispersion in 1985 GDP per
capita values across countries is much less than in the 2000s, indicating
a divergence over time in GDP per capita across countries. While the
average per capita income of a number of countries grew at a similar rate,
several economies appear to have undergone a growth spurt, in effect
branching off on higher growth paths. As a consequence, disparities
in average per capita GDP have increased between faster growing
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Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia
economies (including China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South
Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam) and relatively
slower growing economies (including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos,
Nepal and Pakistan). Countries such as Mongolia and North Korea have
experienced little or no growth over the period. Although China had per
capita incomes as low as those of North Korea and Mongolia in the mid1980s, spectacular growth in the 1990s and 2000s has propelled China
away from these two poorer economies. Ultimately, these growth trends
have led to clear winners and losers, reflected as increasing divergence
in economic fortunes.
Applying a similar exercise to other sub-regions, including East
Asia, South East Asia, and South Asia, also shows a pattern of divergence
in GDP per capita over time (Figures A1-A3 in Annex 1). The Pacific
Island Countries (PICs) are an exception, as they do not conform to
this general trend of divergence, but they do not show convergence
either (Figure A4 in Annex 1). What is noteworthy is that none of the
PICs showed strong or sustained growth, and therefore no particular
economies took off while leaving others behind. Instead, these countries
seemed to share similar economic experiences and therefore while they
have not exhibited the divergence seen in other regions.
Testing for β Convergence
According
to
Barro
and
Sala-i-Martin
(1991),
β
convergence occurs when initially poorer countries catch
up to initially richer countries by growing at a higher rate.
This exercise is not meant as a formal test of the theory behind β
convergence, especially as it is unlikely that an economy like South Korea
has the same steady state growth rates as an economy like Cambodia. It
is instead employed merely to show that Asian economies have lacked a
tendency to converge in terms of PPP adjusted per capita GDP.
Figure 2 plots the average annual growth rate in PPP adjusted GDP
per capita between 1985 and 2003 on the y axis and the log of initial level
of PPP adjusted GDP per capita in 1985 on the x axis (following Barro
and Sala-i-Martin 1991). The red line also shows the linear relationship
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97
Taimur Khilji
between the two variables from a linear regression of the log of the initial
level GDP per capita (1985 value) on the growth rate of GDP per capita
(over the period 1985-2003). For β convergence to occur, there should
be a negative relationship between the two variables. Clearly, there
is no evidence in favor of β convergence. If anything, Figure 2 shows
that there is divergence. The coefficient from the linear regression is
positive. The initially richer countries appear to grow faster than the
initially poorer countries, resulting in a widening gap in GDP per capita
over time between the two sets of economies. Along with the previous
analysis of simple GDP per capita trajectories of economies, this result
paints a picture of rising inequality across the Asian region.
.2
Figure 2: Testing for β convergence in all of Asia for the time period
of 1985-2003
.15
Testing for
Beta Convergence (all of Asia)
CHN
.1
KOR
TWN
MDV
.05
BTN
0
KHM
IND
THA
MYS
IDN
LKA
SGP
MAC
HKG
BGD
NPL
LAO
KIR
PAK
-.05
PRK
MNG
SLB
PNG
PHL
TON
WSM
FSM FJI IRN
VUT
PLW
AFG
6
7
8
9
10
log_rgdpch1985
grgdpch_1985_2003
Linear prediction
There is a noticeable difference in the growth trajectory between
high/middle income countries on the one hand and the low income and
the least developed countries on the other. Figure 3 groups countries
according to their respective income levels; by indexing the Gross
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Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia
National Income (GNI), the difference in growth over time becomes
apparent. While the GNI of currently high/middle economies in the
region grew 7.5 times over 1980-2005, the GNI of LDCs grew at less
than half this rate. The low income countries grew slightly faster than
the LDCs, but markedly slower than high income countries.
Figure 3: Rate of GNI growth, 1980-2005 (1980=100)
Source: World Development Indicators 2007, The World Bank
Assessing inequality across countries requires careful examination
of specific policies that have led to a lag in economic growth for some
and have sparked tremendous growth for others. However, as inequality
between countries has been measured by average per capita income, it
tells us very little about within country inequality. A relatively slower
growing economy such as Mongolia may have a more even distribution
of income across its population compared to its faster growing neighbor
China where the income distribution is heavily skewed in favor of the
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Taimur Khilji
upper deciles. Should Mongolia grow faster to catch up with other
countries at the expense of greater inequality within its borders? Or
should it grow at a slower rate, but maintain a more constant level of
equality? Such questions are commonly posed and highlight the apparent
trade-off between equity and growth. It is assumed that there exists an
inverse relationship between growth and equality (Stigltiz 1996). This
paper will argue that it is indeed possible to have faster growth with
equity leading to less disparate growth between and within countries.
Inequality Within Countries
Income inequality within countries has also increased. Figure 4
depicts the percentage change as well as the final value of the Gini index
for a select group of countries. All countries excepting Thailand record
increases in income inequality. While Thailand reduced its Gini index
value by slightly over four percent over the past fifteen years, it still
has relatively high levels of inequality with a final Gini index value
of 42. Economies showing high rates of Gini index increase include
both relatively developed economies (i.e. Hong Kong, South Korea,
Philippines and Singapore) and developing economies (China, Nepal,
and Sri Lanka).
Contrary to Kuznet’s famous hypothesis (1955), increases in
inequality are not limited to periods of development, but also occur after
passing milestones of development. Kuznet’s predicted that inequality
should increase during periods of development, and ought to taper
off and begin to decrease once a country achieves a certain level of
development. Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan for instance,
should thus show a declining trend in Gini index values. This, however,
is not the case, as increasing inequality seems to affect both developed
and developing economies (Figure 4).
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Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia
Figure 4: Levels and Changes in Gini Index, 1990s-2000s (percentage
Gini points)
17.5 %
China (46.9)
Sri Lanka (40.2)
Nepal (47.3)
China, urban (33.3)
Hong Kong SAR (51.4)
China, rural (36.3)
Philippines (46.1)
Singapore (48.1)
Korea (33.1)
Lao PDR (34.7)
Bangladesh (31.8)
Malaysia (49.2)
Taiwan POC (33.9)
New Zealand (33.7)
Japan (31.4)
Thailand (42.0)
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Source: IMF 2006, data from World Bank PovcalNet, WIDER World Income
Inequality Database 2008, OECD 2005
The Gini index has increased in several countries not covered in
Figure 4; in India (from 32.2 in 1986 to 36.8 in 2004), in Indonesia
(from 32.4 in 1984 to 36.3 in 2005), and in Vietnam (from 32.8 in 1993
to 37 in 2004). In the case of Pakistan it declined slightly (from 32.44 in
1985 to 30.6 in 2002). By and large, for most countries Asia, inequality
has increased within countries, with relatively shaper increase in this
divergence over the past decade and a half.
What has driven this increase in inequality within countries?
Finding an answer to this question requires a careful analysis of the
nature of growth; specifically, a sectoral analysis will allow us to assess
how the three main sectors of the economy—services, manufacturing/
industry, and agriculture have grown relative to each other. In addition
to examining disparities across sectors, regional differences in income
within countries will also be described. Certain geographical locations
(urban and coastal regions for instance), have experienced greater
economic activity and economic growth, while other locations (rural
and inland regions) have achieved lower levels (ADB 2007).
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Taimur Khilji
Sectoral Analysis of Growth
What is immediately noticeable and supported by sectoral growth
data (Table 1) is that GDP growth has been largely driven by industry,
manufacturing and the services sectors. The high growth rates that East
Asia and South Asia have been able to sustain are derived from the growth
of these sectors. While East Asia’s GDP has grown at an average of over
eight percent per annum since 1990, its industry, manufacturing and
services sectors have grown significantly faster. South Asia is similar in
this respect. On the other hand, in both of the sub-regions the agricultural
sector has grown at a much slower rate than the other three sectors and
overall GDP growth. In effect, agricultural growth, by being markedly
slow relative to other sectors, has tempered overall GDP growth.1 There
is evidence suggesting that sectoral composition of growth impacts
inequality independently of the rate of growth (Ravallion and Chen
2007). The slow growth of agriculture has contributed to increasing
inequality in spite of the high average growth rate for economies as a
whole.
Table 1: Sectoral Growth for Countries in Asia 1990-2005
Countries
GDP
Agriculture
1990- 2000- 19902000
05
2000
E a s t A s i a 8.5
8.4
3.4
and Pacific
Cambodia 7.1
8.9
3.9
China
10.6 9.6
4.1
Indonesia 4.2
4.7
2
K o r e a , 5.8
4.6
1.6
Rep
Lao PDR 6.5
6.2
4.8
Malaysia
7
4.8
0.3
Mongolia 2.7
5.8
3.7
P h i l i p - 3.3
4.7
1.7
pines
Thailand
4.2
5.4
1
Vietnam
7.9
7.5
4.3
South Asia 5.6
6.5
3.1
102
Industry
Manufacturing
Services
2000- 1990- 2000- 1990- 2000- 1990- 200005
2000
05
2000
05
2000
05
3.7
11
9.4
10.8 9.8
8.1
8.7
5.7
3.9
3.4
-0.1
14.3
13.7
5.2
6
14.2
10.9
3.9
6.3
18.6
12.7
6.7
7.3
14.1
11.1
5.2
7
7.1
10.2
4
5.6
8.2
10
6.2
3.7
2.8
3.4
0.1
3.9
11.1
8.6
2.3
3.5
12.1
4.6
7.5
3.3
11.7
9.5
9.7
3
10.4
5.2
5.5
4.3
6.6
7.3
0.2
4
6.7
5.3
7.8
6
1.9
3.8
2.4
5.7
11.9
6.1
6.9
10.2
7.2
6.9
11.2
6.6
7.2
11.5
7
3.7
7.5
7.1
4.5
6.9
7.8
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Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia
Bangladesh
India
Iran
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
4.8
5.4
2.9
2.5
7.3
7.3
7.2
6.7
4.5
5.6
6
3.1
4.9
3.8
5.3
7
5.8
2.8
4.8
4.2
3
3.2
2.4
4.4
1.8
2.5
5.5
3.2
2.3
0.7
6.3
2.6
7.2
4.1
6.9
7.5
7
1.1
6.5
3.3
7
5.1
8.9
3.8
8.1
6.9
10.2
-0.6
9.1
2.9
8
3.8
6.4
4.4
5.7
8.5
5.1
2.8
5.4
5.8
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 2008
While manufacturing, industry and services are currently driving
Asian growth, this was not historically the case. Over time, the value
added as a share of GDP for industry, manufacturing and services has
steadily increased for both East Asia and South Asia, while the relative
contribution of agriculture towards GDP has declined (Table 2). The
decline in agriculture’s value added has been significant: for East Asia
its share in GDP shrunk three times, from 34.6 percent in 1970 to just
11.9 percent of GDP in 2008. In South Asia’s case the decline was more
than 20 percentage points, from 41.5 percent to 18.6 percent over the
same period. Although the shift from being predominately agrarian to
manufacturing and services oriented is in line with typical development
trajectory, but has taken place over a relatively short period of time in Asia.2
The abrupt structural change, with a focus on the secondary and tertiary
sectors has paid dividend in way of unprecedented growth. However, a
significant proportion of the population has neither contributed to, nor
has benefited from the increased growth.
Table 2: Value-added by Sector, 2008 (percentage of GDP)
Agriculture
East Asia and 1970
the Pacific
34.6
South Asia
41.5
1990
2008
25.0
11.9
29.1
18.6
Industry/Manufacturing
1970
1980 2008 1970
36.0
21.0
39.8
26.1
47.5
28.6
Services
1980
2008
29.3
35.2
40.6
37.1
44.7
53.4
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 2009
Each sector’s contribution to GDP over time underscores that many
Asian economies are no longer agriculture-based. While the agriculture
sector has grown at the slowest rate and has contributed the least towards
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Taimur Khilji
GDP amongst the main sectors, it employs the majority of the labor force
(Table 3). In South Asia, agriculture still accounts for almost half of
total employment, whereas in East Asia over 40 percent of the employed
are in agriculture. The emerging dynamic is clear: agriculture has come
to contribute least to the GDP, employs considerably more persons than
industry and services, and, thus, also pays relatively lower wages on
average. On the other hand, industry and services contribute significantly
more to the GDP than agriculture, employ significantly fewer persons,
and consequently pay relatively higher wages on average. This dynamic
over time has led to a widening disparity in average incomes between
those employed in agriculture and those employed in more productive
sectors (ADB 2007).
Table 3: Employment by Sector, 2008 (percentage)
Agriculture
41.1
Industry/Manufacturing
East Asia and
the Pacific
South Asia
47.7
Source: ILO Kilm 6th Edition 2009
Services
21.7
36.4
22.2
30.1
While there has been high and sustained economic growth, it has not
led to significant increases in employment. There has been a general lack
of absorption of labor by the more productive sectors, which is reflected
by the low employment elasticity of growth (Pasha and Palanivel
2004).3This phenomenon of high economic growth in conjunction with
low employment growth has been termed “jobless growth.”4 In fact, the
level of unemployment has increased over the past ten years in South
Asia and Southeast Asia and the Pacific (Figure 4).5 In East Asia, the
unemployment rate showed a slight decline from around 4.6 percent to
4.2 percent between 1998 and 2008 despite record levels of economic
growth during the period.
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Figure 5: Unemployment Rate 1998, 2008 (percentage)
Source: ILO Kilm statistical database 2009
The Geography of Growth
Increased industrial dynamism, over a sustained period, has not
been without consequence. Growth has not only been labor saving,
but has also had a geographical bias. Certain regions with better access
to international trade through historical ties to world trade, better
infrastructure, reduced transport costs, better management by the state,
or regions specifically targeted for foreign investment by government
policy, have benefited more from economic industrialization and
liberalization than other regions. For example, the coastal regions in
China are now many times more well off than the inland regions, the
central area of Thailand including Bangkok is much wealthier than
the north eastern and southern states of the country, and states like
Maharashtra and Karnataka in India are much more economically and
technically advanced than states like Bihar and Orissa.
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The experiences of several high population countries in Asia show
income differentials between geographical regions to be large and on
the rise. China and India, due to their enormous populations, account
for the majority of the poor in Asia; in both countries the issue of rising
regional inequality has come to the fore, and has been well documented.6
Even though the Chinese central government has recognized the urgent
need to reduce these regional disparities through large government
campaigns such as the Great Western Development project (Goodman
2004), regional inequality persists. The Human Development Index,
a well-being index composed of GDP, life expectancy and gross
enrollment ratio, showed urban areas to be much better off than rural
areas (UNDP 2005). Urban areas recorded an HDI of 0.816 (comparable
to Turkey, Russia, and Brazil), while rural areas recorded an HDI of
0.685 (comparable to Namibia, Tajikistan, and Bhutan).
Figure 6 shows the different rates of GDP per capita increase over
time across five provinces of China. As a member of the burgeoning
coastal regions, Shanghai is noticeably ahead of the other provinces
for which data is available. Another coastal province, Zhejiang, is also
growing faster than other provinces. Shandong province, a remnant of
the heavily industrial state owned enterprise dominated region of the
pre-reform era, has seen less growth and started at a lower level than the
two coastal regions. Nonetheless, it is still ahead of the inland province
of Hunan and the western province of Xinjiang. As suggested by Figure
6, the inland and western provinces have yet to really share the massive
wealth gains of the other regions.
Factors that have contributed to such large gaps between provinces
have been preferential policies that have shifted productive resources
towards manufacturing, creating Special Economic Zones to encourage
foreign investment, restrictions on labor and capital mobility, and urban
biased policies (Yang 2002; Ravillion and Chen 2007). In addition,
regional differences have come to exist in other aspects of society
including access to health, education, and government fiscal expenditure
(UNDP China Human Development Report 2005). These disparities are
believed to have reinforced income inequality across regions.
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GDP per capita Time Trend for Selected Provinces
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
Figure 6: GDP per capita (in Chinese Yaun) growth in Chinese
Provinces
1994
1996
1998
year
SHANGHAI gdp_per_capita
XINJIANG gdp_per_capita
SHANDONG gdp_per_capita
2000
2002
HUNAN gdp_per_capita
ZHEJIANG gdp_per_capita
Like China’s, India’s urban areas have experienced a
disproportionately large share of the country’s growth, leading to rising
income inequality. In 1986, India had a Gini index of 32.2. By 2004,
the value of the index had increased fourteen percent to 36.8. The rural
Gini has hovered around 29 and the urban Gini has fluctuated around 36
in recent years. This lack of drastic movement of the rural and urban
Gini cannot account for the increase in the overall Gini. It seems that the
increase in the overall index is due to the increasing disparity between
the rural and urban areas.
India’s regional inequalities have been driven mostly by inequalities
in the agriculture and service sectors (Das and Barua 1996). For
example, not all states benefited equally from the sharp productivity
gains of the Green Revolution. Also, only a few states have significantly
changed the structure of their economy and driven India’s rise to global
leadership in the information technology industry. Consequently, one
observes trends such as the one depicted in Figure 7 (below), where
states such as Karnataka and Maharashtra lead other states such as Bihar
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Taimur Khilji
and UP. However, urban centers such as Delhi are even wealthier than
the relatively wealthy states of Karnataka and Maharashtra. Inequality
across states has been further exacerbated by reductions in fiscal
spending, skewed sectoral and geographical distribution of domestic and
foreign direct investment (FDI), and the impact of trade liberalization
on employment intensive sectors (Pal and Ghosh 2007).
GDP per capita Time Trend for Selected States
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
Figure 7: GDP per capita (in Rupee) across select Indian States
2001-2006
2001
2002
2003
year
KARNATAKA gdp_per_capita
BIHAR gdp_per_capita
DELHI gdp_per_capita
2004
2005
2006
UTTARPRADESH gdp_per_capita
MAHARASHTRA gdp_per_capita
In Philippines the National Capital Region (NCR) that encompasses
Manila accounts for more than one third of the national economy and has
a GDP per capita three times the national average. In contrast, the region
of Mindanao has GDP per capita that was less than one quarter of the
national average. Since 2000, the incidence of poverty has been lowest
in NCR with eleven percent of the population below the poverty line,
whereas the poverty incidence has been consistently over 50 percent in
the Mindanao and Visayas regions (ADB 2005).
The Philippines have relatively more complete and consistent data
for the time period of 2001-2006. As shown in Figure 8, the metropolitan
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Manila area has much higher per capita GDP compared to the other
regions. It is the region that seems to have experienced the most growth
in GDP over the early half of the 2000s.
GDP per capita Time Trend for Selected States
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
Figure 8: GDP per capita (in Philippine Peso) across regions in
Philippines, 2001-20067
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
year
METROMANILA gdp_per_capita
CORDILLERA gdp_per_capita
MUSLIMMINDANAO gdp_per_capita ZAMBOANGAPENINSULA gdp_per_capita
BICOL gdp_per_capita
Bangladesh is no exception to the general trend of regional
disparity across Asian economies. Dhaka exceeds the other regions of
Bangladesh significantly in terms of GDP per capita, as shown in Figure
9. Chittagong and Khulna form the mid-level regions in terms of wealth
and Barisal, Rajshahi, and Sylhet trail far behind.
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25000
Figure 9: GDP per capita (in Taka) across regions in Bangladesh,
1996-20008
10000
15000
20000
GDP per capita Time Trend for the Regions of Bangladesh
1996
1997
1998
year
BARISAL gdp_per_capita
DHAKA gdp_per_capita
RAJSHAHI gdp_per_capita
1999
2000
CHITTAGONG gdp_per_capita
KHULNA gdp_per_capita
SYLHET gdp_per_capita
Given the scarcity of regional data, average agricultural wages
across districts has been used as a proxy for income (Mahmoud et
al. 2008). While average wages had increased across all districts,
inequality also increased over the period 1993-2004 as wages in some
districts (Chittagong) grew much faster than in other regions (Rangpur).
Maholoud et al. (2008) cite regional distribution of public spending
skewed in favor of richer districts as one of the main sources perpetuating
inequality over time.
With the Doi Moi economic reforms in Vietnam, particular
regions of the country have been heavily promoted at the expense of
others. While there was a general decline in inequality within rural
and urban areas, the national rise in inequality is attributed to a rise in
inequality between rural and urban areas (Glewwe et al. 2000; VASS
2007). Notable reforms took place with regard to land and agriculture
(dismantling of agricultural communes), private sector (promoting
business), public sector (closing down of state-owned enterprises),
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trade (liberalization through reductions in import tariffs and duties), and
investment (promoting domestic and foreign investment) (McCaig et
al. 2009). With real per capita expenditures growing at 133, 117, and
111 percent between 1993 and 2004 for South East, North East, and Red
River Delta respectively, inequality between regions grew (McCraig et
al. 2009). Since the South East and Red River Delta, containing Ho Chi
Minh City and Hanoi, were already the two richest regions in 1993,
their faster growth has widened the relative gap between the richest and
poorest regions. These fast growing regions (around Ho Chi Minh City,
Hanoi, and Haiphong) have led growth and have left the mountainous
areas of the North, the North-central, and parts of the central highlands
mired in relative poverty (Glewwe et al. 2000; McCaig et al. 2009).
Factors contributing to inequality are education disparities, ethnicity,
uneven access to infrastructure, and low employment status of head of
household (Van de Walle and Gunewardena 2001, Molini and Wan
2008). Importantly, education has been singled out as a key determinant,
as it was consistently found to be higher amongst urban households and
positively correlated with higher income (Nguyen et al. 2006).
5. Developing a Regional Policy Framework for Addressing
Inequality
Inequality emerges as a regional issue, prevalent in the majority of
countries in Asia. It also coincides with the economic rise of Asia and
has manifested itself most visibly in the faster growing economies of the
region. Thus far, a regional level response has not been articulated to deal
with rising inequality. Regional institutions such as ASEAN and SAARC
have focused on regional integration and cooperation, culminating
in trade and investment agreements (ASEAN 2007, SAARC 2009).
However, the charters of these multi-national organizations, like that of
the United Nations, are grounded in peace building and not necessarily
in economic development. While the United Nations, the World Bank,
and the Asian Development Bank have continued to highlight social
and development concerns, none have developed a specific regional
framework that squarely addresses rising inequality. 9
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Regional bodies and global multi-lateral institutions must work
together to develop a framework similar to the Millennium Development
Goals and the Climate Change agenda that addresses inequality. The
approach should:
1) set specific country and regional level targets and metrics that can
be monitored;
2) identify dominant values that promote equality;
3) share and build on experiences of successful interventions; and
4) develop action oriented policies and programmes that attempt to
achieve growth with equity.
The Millennium Development Goals that emerged out of the
Millennium Declaration,10 where 189 member states pledged to eradicate
poverty by 2015, was an initial step in creating the conditions necessary
for global and regional cooperation on social issues. Although the
goals in full are unlikely to be achieved by 2015, they are quantitative
and time bound, with a roadmap/development framework that can be
adapted to suit the specific context of a country.11 Similarly, regional
level agreement on reducing inequality, conceptualized in the form
quantitative, measurable and time-bound targets, would be a necessary
first step in realizing the regional dimension of inequality.
The Gini index or the Gini coefficent is the commonly used measure
for income inequality. At the national level, consumption/expenditure
data are often used as proxies to measure wellbeing and inequality
between regions and provinces (Slesnick 1994; Gradín et al. 1998;
Anwar 2006). Ideally, household surveys such as the Living Standard
Measurement Surveys12 used by the World Bank should be used to
maintain consistency and accuracy of data across countries and within
countries. Eventually, by building their statistical capacity, each country
should be able to report disaggregated levels of inequality—between
and within states/provinces, between rural and urban areas, and across
the male and female population.
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Often, income inequality is accompanied by other types of inequalities,
for instance, a low income person is likely to suffer from inequalities in
basic rights, education, health, social standing, etc. (Stewart and Langer
2007). Tracking the wider associations of inequality such as access to
health and sanitation, education, transportation (infrastructure), and
social capital should be included as part of a broad set of indicators. This
exercise should help identify the complementarities income inequality
may have with other forms of inequality.
For a sustainable solution to the issue of inequality, we need
to carefully analyze the prevalent value system of a society, and see
whether it encourages a sense of equality between individuals. We
need to identify and work with values that lead to greater equality.
While promoting values such as individual achievement, the merits
of cooperation must also be emphasized. Introducing changes to the
national education curriculum can be a starting point, where collective
effort is rewarded. On the playing field, fairness, team effort, talent and
skill, should take precedence over winning. In the workplace, social
responsibility and sharing of profits should underpin business strategy.
In places of worship, similarities between religions should also be
highlighted, encouraging acceptance and tolerance of other religions. By
working within the value system of a society, behavioral shifts can alter
our standard notions of success such that individual success can come to
be more closely associated with public benefit rather than personal gain
(Barr and Gilg 2006; Cárdenas 2009).
This may seem like a utopian vision. However, current public
policy on climate change and the environment is already making
headway in creating conditions for a more equal society. The emphasis
on environmental sustainability is encouraging societies to rethink
individual consumption patterns (Jorgenson 2003; Mont and Plepysa
2007). It is questioning the notion of mass production of food items,
and advocating a more local, community driven approach to farming
(Rosset 2000; Hole et al. 2004). It is instilling the value of sharing
through carpooling, public transportation and the use of renewable
sources of energy (Kockelman 2008). It is checking wasteful behavior
by making recycling an everyday activity. Finally, it is promoting
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cooperation at the highest political level by bringing world leaders
together to act collectively to set norms and standards.13 Many of
these behavioral shifts and their likely impact on what constituents the
Zeitgeist go unnoticed. However, our inability to measure such change
does not render it inconsequential. As cooperation, sharing, a collective
sense of responsibility, and prudence become dominant values, gross
differences in income are less likely to be tolerated. Such a normative
stance can be developed and articulated at the regional level through
partnerships between governments, international NGOs, and multilateral and regional bodies.
The main lesson emerging from the success of the Asian miracle
economies was that they achieved “rapid and equitable growth.”14 The
early development experiences (1960s -1980s) of Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong were marked by little or
no positive change in the Gini coefficient while sustaining high levels
of per capita growth (World Bank 1993). According to the World Bank
report, the key ingredients that led to balanced growth were 1) sound
macro-economic policy, 2) gradual liberalization and export-led growth,
and 3) and investments in human and physical capital. Moreover, despite
the diminishing role of agriculture, the sector grew at a formidable rate
with high levels of productivity.
The main engines of growth were “private domestic investment and
rapidly growing human capital,” and the education policies instituted by
these countries “focused on primary and secondary schools [generating]
rapid increases in labor force skills.” 15 Rural incomes, especially of
those employed in agriculture, were not taxed excessively. Another
commonly cited aspect of success was government intervention, which
“was conducive to technology transfer.”16 With regard to maintaining
equality, or rather preventing inequality from worsening, South
Korea, Japan and Taiwan carried out land reforms which led to greater
productivity and savings for farmers, thereby increasing domestic
demand. Redistribution of income contributed to overall political
stability, and relatively stable housing prices eased the burden on the
poor (Stiglitz 1996). Finally, Stiglitz believes that Thailand’s program
to provide credit to the rural sector “seemed not only to have promoted
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equality but also to have yielded reasonably high economic returns.”17
In recent years, Thailand also dramatically reduced its military budget,
from 20.6 percent of GDP in 1985 to 8.6 percent of GDP in 2001; at
the same time, the Thai government increased spending on human
development (Numnak 2006).
Although useful, the experiences of growth with equity may not be
easily replicable. What may have worked in Taiwan in the 1970s may
not work in India in the 2010s. As such, the sharing of experiences stands
rather as a testament, contrary to popular belief, that growth and equity
can complement one another. Conventional theory, including Kuznet’s
hypothesis, has long supported the idea that inequality is necessary for
growth and that the initial growth trajectory produces inequality.
The next and final step toward a regional stance on addressing
inequality is for countries in the region to develop their own policies
and programmes to achieve more equitable and inclusive development.
The analysis section identified two common and interrelated concerns.
First, the sectoral analysis of growth revealed that the agricultural sector
lagged behind industry and manufacturing. Second, there is a growing
rural-urban development gap, one manifestation of which has been a
growing disparity in incomes between those employed in a rural setting
and those working in the more lucrative and productive urban sectors.
The two concerns are interconnected as agriculture is the mainstay of the
rural economy. According to the World Bank (2008) poverty is a rural
phenomenon: “75 percent of the developing world’s poor live in rural
areas.”18 Moreover, “between 80 to 90 percent of the poor are rural in all
the major countries of the [Asia and the Pacific].”19 The working poor
of Asia are very much part of the agricultural economy, one that has
been in steady decline over the past two to three decades (IFAD 2002).
Faced with these alarming facts, a regional strategy to make growth
more equitable would require a focus on rural areas in general, and on
the agricultural sector in particular. As such, policies should consider
the following:
Growth should take place in sectors in which the poor work: the
majority of the poor in most Asian countries are engaged in rural
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economic activities and need support in raising living standards
through public investments in rural infrastructure and services.
In particular, the focus must be on raising productivity of small
farms and on promoting off-farm employment opportunities in
rural areas (Pasha and Palanivel 2003).
Growth should occur in backward and marginalized areas where
the poor live: poverty rates are generally much higher in backward
areas, sometimes over twice the national average (World Bank
2008). Therefore, the development strategy has to focus on uplift
of backward areas and removal of the basic obstacles to growth.
Growth should derive from the factors of production that the
poor possess and enhance their capabilities: labor demand
created during the process of growth should be concentrated
on creating employment opportunities for unskilled and semiskilled workers. Sectors characterized by high levels of laborintensity should be encouraged by preferential allocations of
credit and tax treatment. In addition, the ability of the poor to
avail the emerging opportunities should be enhanced by greater
investment in human development, especially in basic education
and health services.
Growth must keep prices of goods and services consumed by the
poor, like food, relatively low: high rates of growth may fail to
achieve significant poverty alleviation if simultaneously the rate
of inflation, especially in food prices, also rises (Palanivel 2008).
Not only is there a need for supporting domestic food production
but also for improving marketing arrangements of such items
(Timmer 1991).
Thus, an inclusive and equitable growth strategy in the shorter to
medium term horizon has to focus on sectors, areas, factors of production
and items of consumption, which play a critical role in increasing the
productivity and incomes of the rural population.
As the growth of economies is clearly driven by manufacturing,
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industry and services, skill development will play a key role in raising
incomes, productivity and the capabilities of the working population
at large in the longer run education (Te Velde and Xenogiani 2007;
Kirkegaard 2007). Currently, the proportion of the population driving
Asian growth is marginal compared to the region’s total population;
over 50 percent of the labor force is employed in agriculture suggesting
a narrow base responsible for growth. Investment targeted towards
high growth sectors reveals a skill-bias in favor of high-skilled workers,
leaving out the majority of the population in Asia, especially the rural
unskilled workers (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). Different levels of
education have been known to manifest themselves as differences
in skill level among workers, and as a consequence account for the
disparity in wages (Juhn, Murphy & Pierce 1993). Reaping the benefits
of globalization, and simultaneously enlarging the economic base so that
a greater proportion of the population contributes to long-term growth,
requires a focus on education and skills development. Currently, most
governments, particularly in South Asia, spend less than three percent of
their GDP on education, and in some cases it is as low as two percent of
GDP. Clearly, an increase in public expenditure on education is desirable,
especially targeted towards the poor.
6. Conclusion
Persistent inequality, in addition to being ethically wrong, is
politically risky and is likely to arrest development gains. In a continent
that is now largely democratic, issues of equity will shape the future
of governments. Rising levels of inequality across Asia underscore
the regional dimension of the problem. Although currently lacking, a
coherent regional response to address this issue is desperately needed
for Asian countries to make a smooth development transition.
If the transition from developing to developed is to be achieved by
the least developed countries in Asia while keeping inequality in check,
then the transition from rural to urban needs to be managed carefully. The
policy focus needs to shift from pursuing merely growth to developing a
more inclusive form of growth. This requires that the distribution of, as
well as the contribution to growth be critically questioned.
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While the role of agriculture is likely to diminish in the future, it
still employs a significant proportion of the working population. By
building the potential and capabilities of individuals, especially of
those employed in agriculture, the economic base can be broadened.
This would allow for a greater proportion of society to increase their
respective contribution toward growth and development. Under such
an outcome, the benefits of growth are also likely to be shared more
widely.
Finally, if disparities are to persist in the short term, then we should
ultimately be driven by the Rawlsian maxim, where inequalities are
permitted only if they are to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged
members of society.
(The author is solely responsible for the views expressed in this paper,
and the opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the
views of the United Nations Development Programme. The author is
also indebted to Dr. Hafiz Pasha for his guidence).
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Annex I:
Figures of Real per capita GDP Time Trends for Sub-regions in Asia
Real GDP per capita time trend (East Asia)
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
Figure A1: Time trend in chained PPP adjusted GDP per capita over the
time period of 1985-2003 for East Asian countries: China, South Korea,
North Korea, and Mongolia
1985
1990
1995
year
CHN rgdpch
MNG rgdpch
128
2000
KOR rgdpch
PRK rgdpch
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Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia
Real GDP per capita time trend (Southeast Asia)
0
10000
20000
30000
Figure A2: Time trend in chained PPP adjusted GDP per capita over
the time period of 1985-2003 for Southeast Asian countries: Indonesia,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Laos.
1985
1990
1995
year
IDN rgdpch
VNM rgdpch
MYS rgdpch
KHM rgdpch
2000
2005
PHL rgdpch
THA rgdpch
LAO rgdpch
SGP rgdpch
Figure A3: Time trend in chained PPP adjusted GDP per capita over the
time period of 1985-2003 for South Asian countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Nepal, Maldives, India, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan.
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Real GDP per capita time trend (South Asia)
0
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Taimur Khilji
1985
1990
1995
year
PAK rgdpch
BGD rgdpch
NPL rgdpch
MDV rgdpch
2000
2005
IND rgdpch
LKA rgdpch
BTN rgdpch
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Figure A4: Time trend in chained PPP adjusted GDP per capita over
the time period of 1985-2003 for Oceania: Papua New Guinea, Kiribati,
Tonga, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu,
Palau, and Samoa.
1985
Real GDP per capita time trend (Oceania)
1990
1995
year
PNG rgdpch
KIR rgdpch
PLW rgdpch
SLB rgdpch
VUT rgdpch
130
2000
FJI rgdpch
FSM rgdpch
WSM rgdpch
TON rgdpch
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Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia
Annex II: Notes on Data
The data used for the majority of the following analysis is the Gini
coefficient/index database compiled by Branko Milanovic. It can be downloaded
from http://econ.worldbank.org/projects/inequality and also used his book,
Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005. This database is the most encompassing
database of world Gini coefficients/index values currently available. Created
in 2004, it compiles and adapts three existing datasets: the Deininger-Squire
dataset that covers the years 1990-1996, the UNU Wider dataset that covers
the period 1950-1998, and the World Income Distribution dataset that covers
the period 1985-2000. For the Milanovic database, Milanovic only included
Gini coefficients of the previous datasets that were compiled from nationally
representative household-based surveys.20 And in an attempt to supplement the
Milanovic database, the 2008/2009 CIA World Factbook and IMF Statistics
were also used. However, note that these later figures may not have undergone
the same rigorous filtering process as the Milanovic figures.
Additionally, the Gini coefficients for the rural and urban economies
of particular countries were extracted from the UNU-WIDER WIID2
database. Since Milanovic only extracted Gini coefficients from nationally
representative surveys, he left out many useful Gini coefficients that were
computed from either rural or urban representative household-based or
individual-based surveys. Consequently, returning to the original WIID2
database allowed rural and urban trends to be analyzed. However, because
the WIID2 database compiled data from a variety of sources, care was taken to
only pick the Gini coefficients from the most credible sources. There was also
a deliberate attempt to sacrifice number of data points in favor of consistency.
For example, China offered numerous sources for rural and urban data.
Nonetheless, only one source, Chotikapanich et al 2006, was used because it
contained the relatively highest quality data and a relatively broad coverage of
years. Using Gini coefficients from different sources sometimes significantly
changes the patterns.
For Countries
Data limitations led to an analysis on a handful of countries in Asia:
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Taimur Khilji
China, India, Bangladesh, Philippines, and Vietnam. Even then, the data
quality varies by country. For China, the 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2003
Statistical Yearbooks published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China
were used to calculate the province level GDP per capita figures. All figures
are in Yuan and are in current market prices. Since province level GDP per
capita figures are not reported by the Statistical Yearbooks, they are crudely
calculated by dividing the province level GDP figures by the province level
populations.
For India, the data are taken from the Directorate of Economics & Statistics
of respective State Governments, the Central Statistical Organisation, and the
2001 Census of India. The state level GDP per capita figures are denominated
in current price Rupees. Also, the data for 2006 is based off a population
projection conducted by the Census. Since state level GDP per capita figures
are not available, they are calculated crudely by dividing the state level GDP
figures by the state level populations.
The Indonesian data are from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS-Statistics
Indonesia). The GDP per capita figures are denominated in Rupiah and are in
constant 2000 prices. Again, since province level GDP per capita figures are
not reported, they are calculated crudely by dividing the province level GDP
figures by the province level populations.
The data for the Philippines was extracted from the National Statistical
Coordination Board and are denominated in pesos at 1985 constant prices.
Here, region level GDP per capita figures are reported and are therefore used
in the analysis.
The data for Vietnam are collected from the General Statistics Office,
Viet Nam Economy in the Years of Reform, Statistical Publishing House,
Hanoi and are data from 2002. The Vietnam figures are actually the gross
regional product per capita as a ratio of the national average. Other sources
have also been used and have been cited accordingly.
Finally, the Bangladesh data are from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
and some are extracted from the March 2008 “A Strategy for Poverty Reduction
in the lagging Regions of Bangladesh,” published by the General Economics
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Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia
Division. The data here are GDP per capita at current market prices and are
denominated in Taka.
References:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
The extent to which growth has been affected depends on the agricultural sector’s
relative weight in country/regional GDP.
In the case of much of Western Europe and United States the process of
development was spread over a much longer period of time.
Employment elasticity of growth is the incremental increase in employment
due to a one percent increase in GDP. Pasha and Palanivel (2004) calculated
the employment elasticities of growth over time and across sectors for several
Asian economies. Their results show that manufacturing and services sectors,
especially since 1990, have shown a declining employment elasticity of growth.
UNDP-ILO Press Release, ROAP/07/04, February 20, 2007, p1. Available at
http://www.undprcc.lk/Publications/MDGI/ILO_UNDP_Asian_econ_report_
PR_format.pdf
The 2008 unemployment level reflect pre-crisis (global financial crisis) levels.
For China see Wei 1999, Sachs at el 1996, Kanbur and Xiaobo 2001, Yang 2002,
UNDP 2005). For India see Datt and Ravallion 1990, Das and Barua 1996,
Deaton and Dreze 2002, Chamarbagwala 2006)
GDP per capita time trends for the Metropolitan Manila area, Cordillera, Muslim
Mindanao, the Zamboanga Peninsula, and Bicol.
Note that only two data points have been taken (1996 and 2000). More recent
figures were not available.
Currently the advocacy focus of these three organizations has been at the regional
level, with an emphasis on climate change (in the longer term) and the social and
economic impact of the financial crisis (in the short-term).
Available at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.html
Additional goals have been added by some countries: Mongolia added Human
Rights and Democratic Governance as its 9th goal, whereas Afghanistan added
Human Security as its 9th goal. In addition, countries such as Thailand that have
fared well have set new—MDG plus--targets for themselves.
For more information on Living Standard Measurement Surveys is available at
http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/
The Kyoto Protocol and the Global Climate Conference held in Copenhagen are
examples.
The World Bank .(1993). The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public
Policy, World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford University Press, pp v
The World Bank. (1993). The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public
CRITERION – April/June 2010
133
Taimur Khilji
Policy, World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford University Press. pp 5.
16 Stiglitz, J. (1996) Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle, The World Bank
Research Observer, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 151.
17 Ibid., pp. 168.
18 World Bank. (2008). World Development Report 2008. pp 45.
19 IFAD. (2003). Assessment of Rural Poverty: Asia and the Pacific, pp 3.
20 Note: For some countries, the Gini coefficient was only available for a very
limited set of years. Consequently, a detailed analysis of the trend in income
inequality in those countries cannot be conducted. In addition, some countries
were left out of the following analysis all together due to lack of data.
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Essays
PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY ON
THE RAZOR’S EDGE: REFORM
IMPERATIVES
Zubair Iqbal*
Overview
The deterioration of the Pakistan economy over the past 2-3 years can
be attributed mainly to the continuation of inappropriate macroeconomic
policies since, at least, 2005/06. The sudden and debilitating weakening
of the international economic and financial environment added to the
turmoil. While the major economic challenges - sharply declining
growth, rising unemployment, increasing poverty, high inflation, and
widening external imbalances - are easy to grasp and policy options to
address them are also not difficult to articulate, there is a singular lack
of will to implement the needed reforms in a timely fashion.
The strategy pursued in the first six years of the decade, which
focused on accumulating external reserves as protection against
external terms of trade shocks without strengthening domestic policies,
predictably proved to be ineffective. In addition, political inaptitude,
lack of national consensus on economic objectives, and a continued
misreading of the depth of the challenges faced by the economy - in the
face of a worsening security situation and global financial meltdown have compounded the crisis. Although, recently there has been some
recognition of the underlying problems, the authorities are apparently
either unable or unwilling to take the bull by the horns. These have
deepened the vicious cycle in which inaction and a declining ability to
act have militated against corrective action.
*
Zubair Iqbal is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute, Washington DC.
Essay
Pakistan’s economy is presently on the razor’s edge. If remedial
measures are not taken expeditiously, it could permanently derail from
its potential growth path estimated at about 6-7 percent per annum. The
obvious fallout would be incremental unemployment pressures which,
in turn, will spur political instability. The recent tentative steps to move
away from the precipice need to be built upon so that the vicious circle
can be converted into a virtuous cycle.
The Dye is Cast
It has become commonplace to attribute the current economic malaise
to the “wrong” growth strategy or strategies pursued during the past
60 years. Such reiterations are not only meaningless but also unhelpful
for understanding the current policy imperatives. Undoubtedly, there
has been a weakening of institutions but that cannot be proffered as
an excuse for inappropriate policies. Pakistan’s economy has typically
gone through “booms and busts” as policies have not been changed
expeditiously to respond to changing conditions. In most cases, booms
have been associated with increases in foreign funding followed by
busts when such inflows ceased or debt service payments rose. Foreign
inflows have had an unintended consequence in as much as they have
reduced domestic effort to mobilize savings and effect liberal policy
reforms, thus leaving the country without adequate resources when the
crutch provided by such funding was withdrawn.1 The current crisis is
a link in the same chain - albeit, more serious because of the deeper
international economic downturn.
It should be recognized that, during the 1990s, some reforms were
undertaken in response to the shrinking access to global savings (both
from official and private sources). Although many of these reforms were
haphazard, the economy experienced some important structural changes.
Steps had been taken to conform prices of publically supplied goods and
services - including the exchange and interest rates - to market conditions
as well as reforms in the financial sector, and privatization. Steps had
also been taken to get budget outlays under control by reducing some
subsidies and improve tax administration.
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Essay
During 2002/03-2006/07, as the external resource pressures eased
(through debt relief, increased foreign aid, and resumption of external
private capital inflows), these reforms were instrumental in allowing
the expansionary policies of the previous government to generate a
temporary surge in growth. At the same time, the improved external
environment and domestic political stability facilitated effective private
sector investment decisions which contributed to an improvement in
factor productivity.2
However, higher spending in the face of limited production capacity
and primary focus on credit-financed consumption and imports, led to
the re-emergence of macroeconomic imbalances. The external current
account deficit started to widen as export growth slowed and dependence
on uncertain external private capital inflows grew. Concurrently, private
sector investment stagnated while public sector investment was not
adequately focused on addressing the looming shortages of infrastructure
(particularly, energy and water) and improving competitiveness. Fiscal
deficits started to widen and - combined with an overly expansionary
monetary policy - inflation started to increase briskly, which also
appears to have worsened income distribution and reversed progress
in reducing poverty. Given the focus on consumption and import-led
growth, the economy had not been deepened enough through investment
in productive capacity to withstand emerging external and internal
shocks.
By the end of 2006, there was firm evidence that continuation of
the ongoing policies would be counterproductive. The external current
account and the fiscal deficits had reached 5 percent of GDP, respectively.
The authorities initially misread the emerging imbalances which
were masked by the continued brisk growth and no timely corrective
action was taken. And then the crisis of judicial independence erupted,
which with elections looming, drastically reduced room for politically
unpopular steps, including mobilization of revenues and rationalization
of expenditures. The private sector lobbied for increased subsidies and
maintaining expansionary policies characterized by increasingly negative
real interest rates and an appreciating rupee. As export competitiveness
declined, official subsidies to the manufacturing sector were increased
CRITERION – April/June 2010
139
Essay
rather than adjusting the exchange rate, further worsening the fiscal
position without benefiting exports. In the event, national savings fell
further and the corresponding external current account deficit rose,
putting pressure on foreign exchange reserves and the exchange rate.
There was little cushion left to “finance” the way out of the looming
crisis.
The deteriorating economic situation was dramatically worsened by
the sharp increase in world oil and food prices in 2007/08, the worldwide
financial crisis, and the consequent global economic contraction. The
authorities’ decision not to immediately pass on the higher prices and
recourse to printing money to pay for the burgeoning government
expenditure - a politically expedient ploy - meant a further reduction in
external reserves and escalation of domestic inflation. Exports slumped
while the import bill rose sharply, and capital inflows fell on account of
global economic slowdown and political uncertainty in the country.3
It should be emphasized that the impending economic crisis would
have happened even if oil prices had not gone up; it simply brought
the underlying un-sustainability of policies to the fore sooner and more
dramatically. The deepening domestic and external imbalances would
have sapped external reserves and, under unchanged policies, would
have forced an intensification of controls, capital outflow, and drop in
growth.
Not surprisingly, growth fell in 2007/08 to about 4 percent from an
average of over 6 percent during the previous four years. The budget
deficit shot up to over 7 percent of GDP as revenues declined by more
than one percent of GDP and expenditures rose by about 3 percent of
GDP. With a sharp increase in money supply as the deficit was financed
mainly by borrowing from the State Bank of Pakistan, inflation more
than doubled to about 22 percent (end-of-year basis). Reflecting, in
part, the dissavings at the government level (rising fiscal deficit),
overall national savings fell to an all-time low of less than 14 percent
of GDP. Although investment fell slightly, the saving-investment gap
rose sharply to an unsustainable level of over 8 percent of GDP with a
corresponding increase in external current account deficit. In the process,
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Essay
gross foreign exchange reserves fell to the equivalent of less than three
months of imports - a dangerous level, indeed, for Pakistan’s economy
in the deteriorating global environment.
Problems were compounded by a total disregard of economic crisis
by the new government in the initial period; valuable time, during
which the crisis could have been staved off, was lost.4On the other
hand, Pakistan’s competitors took early corrective policy steps and
established a solid basis to bounce back once the current global downturn
is reversed. The volatile political and security situation continued to
undermine economic confidence and militated against early corrective
policy response.
Moment of Truth, 2008
By mid-2008, Pakistan was confronted with a moment of truth. Its
approach to the so-called “friends” for emergency assistance had failed.
It had to seek IMF resources to support its economic program for staving
off further deterioration, stabilize the economic situation, and to lay the
foundations for sustainable recovery. The belated promises of assistance
by “friends” under the Tokyo Agreement remain to be honored.
Although the program underlying the arrangement with the IMF is
quite mild given Pakistan’s economic situation, its implementation so far
has been mixed. The original program, supported by an arrangement with
the IMF for $7.6 billion for about two years - subsequently augmented
to $11.3 billion - called for reducing the fiscal deficit to 4.2 percent
in 2008/09 and 3.3 percent in 2009/10 while allowing for increased
spending on the social safety net. It envisaged important reforms in tax
policy administration, and cutbacks in subsidies, while monetary policy
was to be tightened to fight inflation and protect external reserves.
Increased donor support, a reduction in financial account pressures, and
continuing IMF assistance were expected to allow a significant increase
in international reserves to a more comfortable level.
With security pressures, unexplainable delays in the implementation
of fiscal reforms - especially for raising tax/GDP ratio - and delays in
CRITERION – April/June 2010
141
Essay
disbursements by the so-called “friends” under the Tokyo Agreement,
the fiscal deficit target had to be revised upwards: even the most recent
targeted deficit of 5.2 percent for 2009/10 may not be met. This is not
to detract from a callous failure of the so-called “friends” to meet their
obligations which had been considered critical for meeting pressing
social and development needs, avoiding excessive recourse to domestic
financing, and thus meeting the fiscal targets.
The present economic position is somber and highly vulnerable to
internal and external shocks. Reflecting energy shortages, inefficiencies
in large scale manufacturing, poor export performance, and credit
restraints, the real GDP growth is estimated to have fallen to about
2 percent in 2008/09 and is not projected to exceed 3 percent during
2009/10. While national savings have shown little increase during
the two years, 2008/09-2009/10, investment has fallen, underpinning
the low growth of GDP. Only a part of the fiscal deterioration can be
explained by unbudgeted outlays on internally displaced persons or
security. Revenue collection has declined further to an all-time low
of 14.3 percent as tax evasion has continued to grow. With monetary
expansion contained, inflation has fallen but remains unacceptably
high at 13 percent with serious implications for the standard of living,
poverty, and income distribution. Core inflation remains unacceptably
high at about 16 percent.
The external position of the economy improved somewhat on
account of a sharp drop in imports (by 10 percent) on account of lower
oil prices and continued increase in workers’ remittances. Exports, on
the other hand, declined by 6 percent in 2008/09 and are expected to
fall further by over 2 percent in 2009/10 as traditional exports, such as
textiles, plummeted reflecting declining competitiveness and a stagnant
world economy. Moreover, because of political uncertainty, lack of
market confidence in the sustainability of official adjustment policies,
and security concerns, net capital inflows fell by about $3 billion (by
40 percent) in 2008/09. While gross external reserves have been built
up through IMF financing, net reserves remain low. The exchange rate
weakened further in line with the market conditions as the State Bank of
Pakistan showed “flexibility” about its level. Furthermore, the financial
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Essay
sector showed signs of increasing stress as the share of nonperforming
loans increased under the weakening economic conditions.
The near and medium-term outlook, under the current policy stance,
remains difficult and vulnerable to a number of external shocks such as
oil price increases, potential political instability, and the regional security
situation. In addition, vulnerabilities remain strong on account of the
continued revenue shortfalls, an increase in nonperforming loans, energy
subsidies, and large dependence on commodity imports. Weaknesses in
the infrastructural capacity will also continue to constrain growth.
Even if energy shortages were to be adequately addressed and the
fiscal position is less onerous than in the recent past, growth will recover
only modestly in the medium term because of the negative effects of
global economic stagnation, little pick up in domestic investment, and
continued insecurity. Also, the external position will see only a gradual
improvement. Moreover, even if adequate restraint is maintained against
bank financing of the budget, global oil prices do not increase significantly,
electricity tariff rates are increased gradually, and monetary policy is
not eased prematurely, inflation may not see a significant decline until
after 2009/10 (Table 1).
Table1. Pakistan—Basic Economic Indicators, 2004/05-2011/2012
2004/05- 2007
2006/07 /08
2008 2009 2010 2011
/09
/10e /11p /2012p
GDP growth (%)
7.1
4.1
2.0
3.0
4.0
4.5
Inflation (%)
7.8
12.0
20.8
11.0
7.0
6.0
Budget deficit/GDP(%)
-3.6
-7.3
-5.0
-5.2
-4.1
-3.2
Tax revenue/GDP (%)
10.5
10.6
10.2
10.7
11.4
12.2
Savings/GDP (%)
17.9
13.5
14.1
14.2
16.3
17.0
Ext. current account deficit/GDP (%)
-3.4
-8.4
-5.6
-4.2
-4.6
-4.5
Government debt/GDP
57.0
58.4
(%)
Sources; Government of Pakistan, and IMF.
55.6
56.4
55.8
54.7
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Any meaningful improvement over this somber medium term
outlook will, critically depend upon the maintenance of a tighter fiscal
position, strengthened competitiveness, and improved governance so as
to reduce the vulnerabilities listed above. In the short run, generation of
employment opportunities is critical for the success of the medium term
strategy. In this context, elimination of energy shortages will provide the
much needed spur to the use of installed capacity, facilitating growth,
improving employment opportunities, and creating room for higher
revenues, thus easing the path of adjustment over the medium term.
Fiscal reform will, above all, call for an acceleration of tax reform
effort so as to generate a significant increase in revenue in 2009/10
and sustained into the medium term. At present, given the political
uncertainties, it is unclear whether the authorities will be able/willing to
implement difficult, but necessary, reforms in the tax system, reductions
in direct and indirect subsidies, and the needed control on provincial
outlays. It also presupposes that any shortfalls in donor disbursements
under the Tokyo Agreement will not be made up through domestic
financing. In this context, it is unclear as to whether any further reduction
in interest rates would be opportune. In the event of an expansionary
fiscal stance supported by an easy monetary policy, the authorities will
have to accept a further weakening of the rupee, with attendant domestic
inflation.
Medium-term growth will remain hostage to low domestic savings
and investment. Reaching the growth rate of 6 percent a year level average rate of growth registered during 2002/03-2007/08 - even by
2014/15 would, given the outlook for external financing, call for domestic
savings to increase to at least 21 percent of GDP in 2014/15 from 14
percent presently. Even if the above is realized, given the expected
population growth, income per capita would increase only marginally
over the next 5 years and poverty would remain high.
Given the head start that other countries in the region and other
competitors have over Pakistan, the scenario above will put Pakistan
behind them by about a decade! The political ramifications of such a
development are not hard to grasp. Hence the need to do more than that
envisaged above.
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Reform or Low Growth Trap
Pakistan is presently encountering a dual problem: (1) macroeconomic
imbalances and inflationary pressures arising out of a dysfunctional fiscal
system supported by a compliant monetary policy stance; and (2) low
domestic savings which, given the present outlook for capital inflows,
are inadequate to sustain a level of investment needed to achieve a higher
growth rate over the long run that will be necessary to reduce poverty
without inflation and with debt sustainability. It is worth noting that
average savings in countries in the same income category as Pakistan
are significantly higher than in Pakistan; for example, India’s savings
rate is about 30 percent as compared with 14 percent in Pakistan in
2008/09! Over the past year, the apparent shortage of energy has also
added to the gravity of the two fundamental problems identified above.
These are inter-related problems and have to be dealt with under a
comprehensive reform program. The primary factors underlying these
challenges are: low level of revenue mobilization and out of control
expenditures, policies discouraging improvement in productivity in both
agriculture and manufacturing; and large implicit and explicit subsidies
(estimated as equal to about 4 percent of GDP). These subsidies, which
are needed to sustain certain inefficient private manufacturing activities,
increase budget deficit, reduce savings, allow the maintenance of prices
such as exchange and interest rates out of line with market conditions,
and promote speculative activities. Moreover, inappropriate sectorspecific policies have continued to misallocate resources.
Finally, the deteriorating official capacity to formulate and
implement effective policies - poor governance - has become a major
impediment. Above all, there is no convergence between the interests
of the ruling elites and the masses - this lack of national consensus has
resulted in a policy gridlock. Inaction has continued to build upon itself,
fueling corruption, thus progressively reducing the effectiveness of
policy responses.
A new strategy is needed to not only shift the focus of growth, but
also alter the mode of implementing policies. The policy stance should
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be shifted to rebalance growth from the past heavy dependence on
consumption and imports to higher investment and exports. This will call
for not only fundamentally correcting the macroeconomic imbalances,
but also significantly increasing savings in a sustained fashion, reducing
dependence on uncertain foreign aid, and redirecting foreign direct and
domestic investment to export-oriented activities. It is to be hoped that
foreign capital inflows would eventually resume as the economy returns
to a sustainable path. While a significant reduction in insecurity will be a
pre-condition for the success of the proposed policy reform, a sustained
implementation of policy reforms to cement market confidence will be
central. Full implementation of the current adjustment program which is
supported by the IMF should help get over the short-term macroeconomic
crisis and help lay foundations for the needed paradigm change in the
philosophy underlying Pakistan’s development strategy.
Without fundamental reforms of the fiscal sector aimed at raising
domestic revenues and increasing room for outlays to improve the
abysmally poor infrastructure—energy, education, health, water
resources, agriculture, and transportation-- any sustained improvement
in growth outlook is unrealistic. Any attempts to increase domestic
spending through bank financing will reignite inflation, destabilize
exchange rate, encourage uncertainty, and promote capital flight, thus
worsening the already fragile situation. The recent easing of monetary
policy should therefore be revisited to ensure that it would not compound
the effects of the current expansionary fiscal policy. Finally, a sharp
increase in reliance on external capital to compensate for lower domestic
savings will not only increase the cost of financing, but also weaken debt
sustainability, thus hurting the longer term outlook for growth.
It is critical that early steps are taken to reform the tax system. In
particular, the planned VAT tax should be implemented in 2009/10 while
tax administration is improved to at least reduce tax evasion which, at
present, is an endemic problem. New avenues for additional taxation
and a more equitable sharing of burden should be seriously considered;
agricultural income, real estate, and capital gains are readily available
avenues. It is critical that steps be taken to ensure that the elites - which
have been notorious and brazen in not paying taxes - step forward and
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settle their liabilities. If necessary, major tax evaders should be given
exemplary punishment. Such an action could break the gridlock that
has paralyzed effective policy actions so far. Official external financing
could also be made conditional on steps to improve revenue mobilization
over a defined 2-3 year period. It is worth noting that at about 10 percent
of GDP, tax revenue in Pakistan is one of the lowest in the world and
well below the average level for economies in the same income per
capita range as Pakistan.
Delays in implementing the critical energy sector reforms will
not only keep actual growth well below the potential growth rate in
the short run, but also drain the budget through subsidies, and hurt the
medium term growth prospects. It is necessary to determine whether
it is a problem of low tariffs or of electricity theft—the latter could
not be solved through increases in tariffs.5Closely associated with the
energy issue, and of fundamental long term importance, is the issue
of emerging water shortages which would have debilitating effect on
agriculture. Major investments are needed to drastically improve water
supply and irrigation so that agricultural growth could underpin long
term growth and food security without which political stability could
not be ensured.
While the near-term savings-investment decisions can be influenced
by changes in the budget and monetary policy, the longer term savingsinvestment patterns are primarily structured by the relative openness of
the economy, policy biases for allocation of resources, and the ability
of the financial sector to attract, mobilize, and allocate savings - both
domestic and foreign. In Pakistan, non-performing loans have started to
increase significantly on account of excessive and speculative lending in
the recent past, and the sharp economic slowdown. Moreover, the large
interest rate spreads have encouraged capital flight and disintermediation.
Bank regulation and supervision need to be strengthened. Increased
competition in the financial sector would help resource mobilization and
allocation.
Some of the critical prices, such as the exchange rate and the interest
rate structure, have been distorted to support private sector activity which,
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in turn, have raised subsidies and perpetuated inefficiency in resource
use. This is an opportune time to correct such prices, particularly the
exchange rate. It is critical that Pakistan’s export competitiveness is
restored so that it is ready to compete when the world market emerges
from the current contraction. While the rupee has depreciated in nominal
terms over the past year, it is unclear whether the level is consistent
with the expected external current account deficit. Given the lags in
response to the exchange rate correction, an early action would be highly
desirable. Such an action will provide the much-needed space and time
for the authorities to put in place structural reforms that will be needed
to sustain the required export-orientation of the economy.
Governance and Challenge of Implementation
None of the proposed reforms will make any headway without a
dramatic and sustained improvement in governance - not simply in
terms of formulation of policies and strengthening of institutions to
implement them. There is incontrovertible evidence that difference
in governance explains the differences in growth paths of developing
countries. This is an area where Pakistan has experienced widening gap
with its competitors in the region and at large.6
At the core, there is a need to develop national consensus on the
economic challenges faced by the country and proposed solutions, and
for all actors - political parties, military, civil society, elites, and the
masses - to buy into it. At present, such a consensus does not exist. The
ruling elites do not seem to fully grasp the enormity of the crisis and are
therefore more interested in seeking external financing to “finance” the
way out of the problem - as in the past-rather than face it heads on.
At this juncture, the donor community can play a critical role to
forge the needed consensus. It is critical that donor financing must be
conditional in order to ensure that Pakistan takes painful, but necessary,
steps that are needed for it to durably ensure growth and thus eliminate
the need for global handouts every so many years. One way would be for
such assistance to be tied to reform programs agreed with multilateral
lending agencies. In particular, consideration should be given to linking
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disbursements with irreversible domestic actions to raise revenues and
domestic savings rate over a defined period so that domestic savings
rise enough in a durable fashion to permanently obviate the need for
foreign aid. The importance of policy reforms and commitment to their
implementation is thus self-evident.
(The views expressed in this article are solely of the author and in no
way reflect views or opinions of the Middle East Institute)
References:
1
2
3
4
5
6
See Moyo, Dambiso; “Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a
Better War for Africa;” Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009. Prof. Bhagwati noted
that in the absence of conditions for proper use, aid is more likely to harm than
help growth by discouraging or postponing necessary policy reforms.
For detail see IMF Country Report on Pakistan, N0. 08/21, January 2008. See
also IMF, Pakistan-Public Information Notice, 17 December 2007.
Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2007-08, June 2008. For a good analysis of the
emerging crisis see IMF, Pakistan – Request for Stand-by Arrangement, 20
November 2008.
An important example of the lackluster approach to the mounting economic
problems is that, in the first six months of the new government, finance ministers
were changed three times and secretaries of finance twice which did not provide
continuity of policy implementation and mixed signals to the market, leading to
significant capital outflows.
The emerging consensus for energy reforms calls for an early settlement of the
circular debt followed by repairs of installed capacity to increase production of
electricity. Estimates show that the latter can be achieved in a few months and
would cost only a fraction of the planned outlays on rental units.
For more details on the role of governance in growth see: Mark Gradstein,
“Governance and Growth,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 73, Issue 2,
April 2004, pp. 505-518; and Mushtaq H. Khan, “Governance, Economic Growth,
and Development since 1960s,” background paper for the World Economic and
Social Survey, 2006.
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149
MOUNTAIN & GLACIER RESPONSE
TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Aisha Khan*
The ecological trend of greatest concern in Pakistan today is the
continuing loss, fragmentation and degradation of its natural and
modified habitats.
The country, situated as it is in Southern Asia, borders the Arabian
Sea and is flanked by India in the east, Iran and Afghanistan in the west
and China in the north. Much of its geography is shaped by the collision
of the Asian and Indian plates which dominate the contours of its relief
in the north and, together with the plateaus, make up three-fifths of its
total area. This tectonic fault-line runs almost parallel to the Indus River
which derives its waters from these mountains and glaciers and, along
with its tributaries, represents one of the world’s single largest water
management systems spanning an area of 317,000 square kilometers.
The biophysical environment
The impact of the mountains and glaciers in a country like Pakistan
is therefore of enormous significance and becomes the cause and effect
of the biophysical environment. The latter is the symbiosis between
the physical environment and the biological life-forms within the
environment and includes all varieties that comprise the earth’s biosphere.
The biophysical environment can be divided into two categories: the
natural environment and the built environment with some overlap
between the two. The built environment has become an increasingly
*
Aisha Khan is the CEO of the Mountain and Glacier Protection Organization
(MGPO).
Essay
significant part of the earth’s environment. The part of the earth in which
all life occurs is called the biosphere and falls within the scope of the
biophysical environment. A biophysical environment is the complex
of biotic, climatic and edophic factors that act upon an organism and
determine its form and survival and morphs itself in the process.
Ecosystems are also a defined part of the biosphere. Within an
ecosystem there are a number of habitats in which organisms exist. At
its most natural state an environment would lack any effect of human
activity but the scale of this activity is such that there is no area on earth
that is not influenced in some way by humans. At the other end of the
scale is the built environment and in some cases the biotic component
is virtually absent in it. The biophysical environment can vary in scale
from microscopic to global. They can also be subdivided in accordance
with their characteristics. The interactions within the biophysical
environment and its impact on natural environment, built environment
and social environment are the studies undertaken by environmental
scientists to collect empirical evidence and provide green guidance to
people in order to help them make informed choices about their future
and quality of life.
The countries that contain eco-fragile areas within their geographical
boundaries bear the additional responsibility of minimizing or eliminating
the effect of human activity on the biophysical environment. The issues
of concern usually relate to the natural environment with the more
important ones being climate change, species extinction and old forest
growth loss.
Mountains as water towers
Mountains comprise 25 percent of the earth’s surface. Together
with their peripheral areas, they constitute 26 percent of the habitat for
the global population and occur in 75 percent of the world’s countries.
They are a source of fresh water for almost half of humanity. More
than half of the world’s fresh water originates in the mountains and all
its major rivers are fed from mountain sources. The earth’s snow and
ice-covered mountains constitute the water towers of vital supply for
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hundreds of millions of people. In many places each annual melt of
snow and ice, recharges the river basins and reservoirs of the earth. But
world water use per person has also doubled in the past century and the
surge in demand for the commodity is likely to become an increasingly
contentious issue in the coming years.
Mountain ecosystems are among the world’s most vulnerable biogeographical domain. From the Andes to the Himalayas they are very
distinct from lowlands and encompass heterogeneous habitat under
threat from deforestation, destruction, loss of biodiversity, poorly
conceived infrastructure, unregulated tourism and a host of other
activities incompatible with mountain environment and beyond the
carrying capacity of its land and resources.
Mountains have therefore acquired unique global significance as
biodiversity “hot spots” and “water reservoirs.”
The importance of the world’s mountain regions was internationally
recognized at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Mountains are
characterized by a high degree of biological and cultural diversity.
High latitude and mountain environments are very complex due to
the interaction of tectonic, geomorphic, ecological and climate agents
and are known for their sensitivity to habitat and climate change. In
addition to the continental ice masses, several geographic regions have
been identified as critical regions and include Alaska, Patagonia, the
Himalayas and the Karakoram.
Glaciers and water supply
Glaciers are frozen rivers of ice and affect the environment by
moving across land and making valleys. They also provide critical clues
about global warming. Glaciers are sensitive to temperature fluctuations
accompanying climate change and can help provide scientists with
answers to questions like the rate of atmospheric warming between the
Ice Ages and the impact of human activity on global warming. Glacial
ice ranges in age from several hundred to several hundreds of thousands
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of years. The ice cores drilled and extracted from the glacier contain
information regarding past climate. Scientists analyze components of
cores trapped in bubbles which reveal past atmospheric composition,
temperature variations and types of vegetation from thousands of years
ago in tiny bubbles. This information not only helps to reconstruct the
past eras but can be used to predict change in the future. Since the early
twentieth century, with few exceptions, glaciers around the world have
been retreating at unprecedented rates. Some ice caps, glaciers and even
an ice shelf have disappeared altogether in this century and many more are
retreating so rapidly that they may vanish within decades. The production
of electricity, along with the use of coal and petroleum in industry affects
our environment in ways we did not previously understand. In the last
200 years human activity has increased the amount of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere. Glacial loss
poses a risk to specific regions, habitats and species. Glaciers grow and
shrink in length, width and depth in response to climate fluctuations and,
because they are sensitive to temperature and precipitation changes, the
rate of their growth and decline can serve as an indicator of regional and
global climate change. Glacier changes can affect agriculture, drinking
water supplies, hydro electric power, transportation, tourism, coastlines
and ecological habitats.
The mountains & glaciers of Pakistan
A mountain range is a group or chain of mountains that are close
together. Mountain ranges are usually separated from each other by
passes and rivers. The Himalayas are the world’s highest mountain
range with 30 peaks over 7315 meters while the Andes Mountains are
the longest continental range stretching 7200 Km from north to south
along the west coast of South America.
Pakistan is home to many mountains above 7000 meters. Five of
the world’s fourteen peaks above 8000 meters are located in the country.
The three main ranges are the Karakoram, the Himalayas and the Hindu
Kush. Most of the high peaks are in the Karakoram Range of which K2
(8611 meters) is the second highest in the world. The highest peak of the
Himalayan range in Pakistan is Nanga Parbat (8125 meters).The other
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8000m-plus peaks include Gasherbrum1 (8068m), Broadpeak (8047m)
and Gasherbrum2 (8035m). Located in the region of Gilgit Baltistan,
the Karakoram Range spans the Pakistan-China border and is situated
east of the Hindu Kush, south of the Pamirs, west of Tibet and north of
the western Himalayas. It stretches roughly 480 km from east to west
and 210 km from north to south. In a central 160 km area the Karakoram
has 60 peaks above 7600 meters and 4 peaks above 8000 meters. This
agglomeration of towering peaks and the lure of its idyllic landscape
have fascinated and captured the imagination of people worldwide for
a variety of reasons. The magnetic attraction of the region for scientists
and mountaineers alike is self-evident.
The Karakoram Range represents a significant region which,
together with the mountains of High Asia and the immense Tibetan
Plateau, constitutes a major topographic part of planetary climate control
and serves as catchments of snow and ice as well as watershed for the
surrounding dry lowlands. This critical region is thought to contribute
16 percent of the water transferred to the world’s oceans. Fresh water
in the form of ice constitutes about 80 percent of the water that is not
in oceans which is far greater than any other stored source and also
about 2 percent of the total water on the planet. In recent years there has
been considerable debate over climate forcing and landscape responses
as complex geodynamics regulate feedback mechanisms that couple
climatic, tectonic and surface processes. Concerns over green house
gas forcing and warmer temperatures have prompted research into
understanding climate forcing and associated earth system response.
The largest glaciers outside the sub-polar region are located in the
Karakoram Range. The total length of the glaciated area is approximately
6160 square kilometers which means that almost 37 percent of the
Karakoram Range is covered with glaciers as against 17 percent in the
Himalayas. The Siachin Glacier is the longest (70km) and largest midlatitude glacier in the world, with high nourishment zones above 5000
meters altitude. Political problems aside, the Siachen Glacier and the
other nearby ice masses such as the Baltoro Glacier (62km) to Mount K2
(second highest on the planet) span a range of elevations and geographic
positions that offer unique opportunities for a broad range of scientific
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research, alpinism and adventure tourism. Some of the other glaciers
in the region include Biafo (68km) Hispar (53km) and Batura (58km).
Detailed scientific studies are required to fully understand the manifold
problems associated with such things like climate change that can have
local and perhaps global consequences associated with the world’s
highest peaks. There is also some indication that the massive mid-latitude
glaciers may be responsible for the major up-roofing of the Karakoram
massif and the focused isostatic adjustment (P.Koons, persona comm.,
1998) that is responsible for the uplift of so many 8000m-plus peaks in
the region, more than anywhere else in the world. Glaciers are sensitive
to climate change and recent reports indicate changes in the Himalayas
and other parts of High Asia; mostly of glaciers retreating fast. The
impact of this on water availability and other associated hazards is of
concern at the local, national and transnational scales.
Scientific Research
Hazards in the cryosphere represent a continuous and growing
threat to human lives and infrastructure, especially in high mountain
regions. Glacial lake outbursts, floods, surges, debris flow, landslides
and avalanches are all cryosphere-related disasters in the mountains that
can kill hundreds of people at once and cause damage worth millions.
Changes in glacier and permafrost equilibrium are shifting hazard zones
beyond historical experience or knowledge. The increase in world
population is pushing human settlements and activities into endangered
zones. Empirical knowledge alone does not avert disaster and therefore
needs to be replaced by scientific understanding of the processes that
cause and affect changes that impact on the shrinking resource of the
planet. Climate change could bring hydrological chaos, even with an
average temperature rise of only a few degrees Celsius over the coming
century, which is expected to bring more rain, less snow and more and
earlier melting. This may halve snow pack volumes and increase flood
and landslide hazards. Drastic change in hydrology over a period of
time has a cumulative adverse effect that may become irreversible.
The global hydrological cycle of the earth is therefore absolutely
critical for sustaining the biosphere. Rational water management can
only be founded upon a thorough understanding of water availability
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and movement which requires that its components are quantitatively
measured and accounted for in hydrologic or mass balance. The most
significant elements of the hydrologic cycle are:
The volumes of solid, liquid and gas within subsystems.
Residence time during which a unit remains within a subsystem
reservoir.
Paths of motion from one system to another.
These scientific conclusions are the result of 35 years of research
studies by Professor John F Shroder, Jr. on the mountains and glaciers
of Pakistan.
The high altitude, geodynamic systems of the Karakoram and
Himalayan ranges are thought to be the direct result of climate forcing,
although the climate forcing versus tectonic causation of the highest
peaks is still being debated (e.g., Raymo et al.,1988; Raymo and
Ruddimann,1992; Zeitler et al., 2001 a & b). Fundamental to this is
the understanding between climate versus tectonic forcing and glacial
response (Dyurgerov and Meier, 2000). In the absence of detailed
information about glacier distribution and ice volumes, mass balance
gradients, regional mass balance trends and landscape factors that
control ablation it is difficult to assess the scope of hazard-potential
in this region and its implications. The rapidly changing glaciological,
geomorphologic and hydrological conditions of the region present a
different kind of looming crisis in terms of decreasing water supply,
increased hazard potential and further geopolitical destabilization.
However there is a growing recognition that glacial conditions in the
region are very diverse, and so are their responses to climate change.
Scientific progress in understanding the western Himalayas has been
slow due to the complex and difficult topography, paucity of field
measurements, limitations associated with information, military
restrictions and other difficulties. Scientific problems include limited
information on:
1. Enumeration and distribution of glaciers.
2. Glacier mass balance gradients and regional trends.
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3. Estimates of the contribution of glacial melt water to observed
rise in sea level.
4. Natural hazards and the imminent threat of land sliding, ice and
moraine dams and catastrophic outburst caused by rapid glacier
fluctuations.
Concerns over green house gas forcing and warmer temperatures
have caused initiation of research into understanding climate forcing
and associated earth system responses. The decade ending in 2009 was
the warmest on record according to new surface temperature figures
released by the National Aeronautical and Space Administration. The
agency also found that 2009 was the second warmest year since 1880,
when modern temperature measurement began. The warmest year was
2005. The other hottest recorded years have all occurred since 1998
(NASA).
There are many different implications in different societal contexts
and in relation to rapid socio-economic changes, water resource projects
and security crises but the main impact of climate change will be on
water supplies. Desertification, flash floods, melting glaciers, heat
waves, cyclones or water borne diseases such as cholera are among the
impacts of global warming and inextricably tied to water.
World-wide field investigations and remote sensing indicate that
many glaciers are retreating and down wasting. This has also been
observed in the western Himalaya and Hindu Kush (Shroder and
Bishop, 2005 a,b) even though most of the glaciers in the Himalayas
have accumulated zones at altitudes from 6000-8000 meters that are
permanently frozen and would be less affected by global warming.
From a scientific perspective, climate forcing has had a significant
impact on this region in a relatively short period of time (Shroder and
Bishop, 2000; Bishop et al., 2002). Research however has yet to determine
whether atmospheric warming will produce negative or positive regional
mass balance trend. The local and mesoscale topographic variations
also modify the regional climatic patterns and tectonic forcing which in
turn govern climate and glacier dynamics (Hubbard, 1997; Shroder and
Bishop, 2000).
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From the resource perspective, ice masses in the Hindu Kush and the
Himalayas constitute the potential melt water resource from the mountain
“water towers” of South Asia and the total volume and condition of these
long and short term storages will be critical to the management and
prediction of future water resource availability. Irrigation, agriculture,
tourism, hydroelectricity, drinking water, catastrophic floods and
cross-border conflicts can all be significantly affected by the changing
conditions of the Asian ice masses. Already the drought in the western
most areas, particularly the Hindu Kush of Afghanistan, is dramatically
reducing the many small glaciers that still provide or once provided the
melt water supplies.
Glaciations and de-glaciations in the region, especially the disruption
of melt water resources through damming and diversions, as well as
instabilities produced by mountain-wall undercutting and removal of
ice and rock support buttresses generate numerous hazards that can have
catastrophic effects (Hewitt, 1989a; Richardson and Reynolds, 2000;
Costa and Schuster, 1988). This fact has significant implications for
hazard production that need to be given serious consideration before
undertaking any developmental projects in the area that can become
trigger factors for man-induced disasters.
Although the reality of climate change is not questioned but some
recent scientific observations in particular to unresolved problems of
understanding high altitude glaciers and their relation to climate change
needs to be further explored. Globally most glaciers are reported to be
diminishing and reports of “disappearing glaciers” have also come from
many parts of high Asia. However this is not the case in the Karakoram
Himalaya where many have started thickening and advancing. While
there was roughly 10 percent reduction of the Karakoram ice cover
in the first 60 years of the 20 century, no significant reduction has
occurred in recent decades. While a threat from “disappearing glaciers”
is cause for concern, the growing glaciers are not necessarily benign.
The worst consequence in recent history came with enlarged ice cover
of the Little Ice Age: a period of several centuries, ending just over
100 years ago, when glaciers grew throughout the northern hemisphere.
The considerable reduction of the glaciers between 1910 and the 1960s
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was in effect removing ice stored in the Little Ice Age. The evidence of
advances in the Karakoram not only indicates a different response to
changing climate; it also raises the prospect of the hazards of advancing
ice not seen since the Little Ice Age. Enhanced melt water production
may contribute to the well known profusion of glacier surge activity in
the region and associated en-glacial and pro-glacial floods for which
there is no mitigation of risk reduction strategy in place to develop
people’s capacities to cope with and adapt to environmental change.
The complex geo-dynamics of the region combined with the
unpredictable impact of climate change makes collaborative research in
the following areas both important and necessary:
1. Seismic Hazard Research
Sharing standardized seismic data between all countries in
the region.
Collaborative effort between engineers and seismologists
where impoundment construction is being considered in close
proximity to active fault-lines specially to avoid risk of dam
failure with reservoirs.
Shallow subsurface studies of earthquake fault areas.
A study of alluvial fans and seismic hazards associated with
landslides and other disturbances in their vicinity.
2. Monsoonal Variations with Climate Change and Microclimatic
Impacts:
Interdisciplinary analysis of monsoonal variation.
Palaeoclimatic studies using sediments from glacial lakes and
other normal lakes to understand the behaviour of monsoons
in the region.
Watershed modeling of Western Himalayan river systems
between hydrologists, climatologists and restoration ecologists
to assess anthropogenic disturbances to riparian areas.
3. Glacial Behaviour:
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Study of past and current glacial behaviour and its impact on
downstream ecosystems and communities.
Primary research to understand the cyclic versus anthropogenic
impacts of glacial changes in the Himalayas.
Data collection of Glacial Lake Outbursts and regional
coordination to develop risk management strategies.
The impact of mountaineering and armed conflict on glaciers
in the Western Himalayas.
Environmental Economics
In developing countries rapid population growth is often combined
with rapid environmental degradation and a diminishing resource base
sets the stage for environmentally induced conflicts. There is already
evidence of environment and demographic stresses creating societal strife
both at the national and international levels. Although environmental
scarcity is not the sole cause of conflict but environmental degradation
and environmental scarcity feed into each other and together unleash
the market forces that pit vested interest groups against each other for
the capture of the critical resources at the cost of marginalization of
poor groups, rising economic hardships and social instability. This in
turn creates and fuels ethnic, communal and class-based rivalries which
increases and promotes group identity and deprivation conflicts as
groups resort to violence to address their grievances.
The Millennium Eco System Assessment, the work of 1300 scientists
and experts from 95 countries in which UNEP played a pivotal role,
gives some of the first firm figures on the environment’s economic value.
Damage to natural capital does not only undermine our life-support
systems but erodes the economic basis for future generations. The
goods and services provided by nature are worth millions and restoring
damaged ecosystems is both costly and time consuming. The burning
of 10 million hectares of forest in Indonesia in the late 1990s cost an
estimated $ 9 billion as a result of factors such as increased healthcare
and tourism losses. The value of timber and fuel wood from a forest
is worth less than a third when compared with the value of services
such as watershed protection, recreation and the absorption of pollutants
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like green house gases. Environmental economics will therefore play a
critical role in the coming years as the world wrestles with increased
populations, indiscriminate use of natural resources, disproportionate
consumption patterns, inequitable distribution of wealth and shrinking
base of vital natural assets.
According to the United Nations University (UNU) experts, 50
million people will be environmental refugees within the next five
years. The UNU says that the number of people forced to move by
environmental related conditions already approximates the number of
officially recognized “persons of concern” recently calculated at 19.2
million. The UNU also cites research by the International Federation
of Red Cross that shows that more people are now displaced by the
environment than by war.
Conclusion
Mountains are beautiful and provide a transcendental experience
by elevating the mind to a higher level of consciousness but mountains
also serve another purpose which is not sufficiently understood by
the majority who regard mountains as a destination for recreation or
a challenge to summit a peak. Mountains support and sustain life and
their glaciers and landforms hold clues to past and future problems and
possibilities.
The mountain regions of Gilgit Baltistan in Pakistan are core
strategic assets that need to be preserved and protected not only for
our own land and people but also for regional geopolitical stability. In
concrete terms their sustainable management means enabling mountain
communities to earn a livelihood, providing protection against natural
hazards, conservation of natural resources and supporting developments
that take into account the special features of mountain regions and ensure
that both mountain and lowland populations become equal partners of a
fundamental social contract.
The Millennium Development Goals signed by 191 nations provides
a roadmap for the future global progress with benchmarks and timelines.
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It identifies 8 goals as paramount for human development. Each goal
holds its own merit but goal 7, which calls for Ensuring Environmental
Sustainability, has an overarching importance and determines the
relevance of all the other goals. If the human race is threatened with
extinction then the other goals will automatically become redundant.
Mountains can give life and mountains can destroy life. We in Pakistan
need to understand our mountains, respect their power, fear their fury
and learn to live in harmony with nature. In the concept of deep ecology
the living and the non-living parts of the earth interact and constantly
modify each other. The answer lies in seeking balance between individual,
regional, national and international efforts to work for a common goal
with shared objectives. Saving the planet is not one person’s, one
community’s or one nation’s responsibility. The responsibility for the
protection of the environment lies with all sections of the national and
international communities. There is enough evidence to indicate that
degradation of the environment in one part of the world will affect the
lives of many others in distant lands. Global warming too is no longer an
abstract theory but a reality with scientific data to support its findings.
Mountains and mountain ecosystems are part of our life and future.
Mountains mean water and water means life. The need to understand
mountains and glaciers is a vital prerequisite to preserve these water
towers for the future survival of the human race.
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IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA
ON BROADCASTNG IN PAKISTAN
Hamid Raza Khan*
Introduction
The advent of globalization and the proliferation of modern
communication technologies have led to the emergence of a new media
order which has dramatically reshaped national boundaries. This has,
in turn, made it difficult for countries to restrict worldwide cultural
flows and control forces of global communications. Giving way to this
trend are the national media systems which are increasingly becoming
transnational in character as they negotiate cross-border movements
of ideas, goods, capital and people. The impact of transnational media
differs from one region to another depending upon the dynamics of
regional politics and inter-state relations (Page, D. and Crawley, W.
2005). However, some of the common features in the development of
transnational and regional media are visible in the way a number of
them have expanded themselves to acquire a global reach. One of the
countries to have witnessed an impressive growth of the transnational
media in recent years is Pakistan which has emerged as another success
story in this area. In effect, the transnational media spearheaded by
dozens of private TV channels has revolutionized the broadcast sector,
making it a new decisive factor in determining the course of major social
and political developments as they unfold in Pakistan which, in terms of
population, is the sixth largest country in the world.
*
Hamid Raza Khan is a civil servant currently heading the public relations
department of a large public sector organization.
Essay
Contextualizing broadcasting in Pakistan
At the time of its independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited a small
broadcast media comprising five radio stations. Against the background
of the tragic events which preceded the partition of the South Asian
subcontinent and the emergence of Pakistan in the name of Islam, it was
left to the newly established Pakistan Broadcasting Service to forge a
strong sense of national unity and Islamic identity among the masses who
were largely dispersed in the rural areas with limited access to schooling,
electricity and other amenities. The radio was, in time, joined in this
mission by Pakistan Television (PTV) founded in 1964 with financial
and technical assistance from Japan. The first television station was set
up in Lahore. The idea was to tap the talent the city offered being a hub
of art and culture. As PTV’s programmes progressively became popular
for being “spontaneous, literary and experimental,” the government
bought majority shares in the corporation, bringing it effectively under
its control (Pasha, Shireen 2000). In the preceding years, TV and radio
provided the public a certain degree of awareness and entertainment
through music and plays. PTV plays were not only popular within the
country but also captured a huge viewership in India (Pawar, Yogesh
1999). However, the downside was its obsession with the twin task
of promoting Islamic identity and ensuring the “legitimization” of the
incumbent regime. This seriously hampered the progressive evolution
of creative ideas indispensible for innovative programming. Official
control became increasingly stringent and any criticism of the country’s
domestic and foreign policies entailed serious consequences for the
producers. Consequently, PTV’s flagship news bulletin, ‘Khabarnama,’
aired at 9:00pm became a tool of official propaganda and was jokingly
characterized as ‘9 pm with one pm’ for its almost incessant coverage of
the prime minister and his ministers (Barraclough, Steven 2001). This
incrementally spawned a culture of self-censorship and gave birth to
“a new cadre of people, within and outside the electronic media, who
unabashedly sided with this opportunity reducing the media to a genre
of mediocrity, hypocrisy and degeneration” (Pasha, Shireen 2000).
The coercive regime of restrictions which the PTV encountered
became particularly pronounced in the 1980s when, during General
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Zia-ul-Haq’s military dictatorship, Islamization of PTV resumed in
earnest. Even radio felt the weight of this policy when “absurd attempts
to mutilate music” were made by officials as they sought “to ‘Islamise’
the names of classical music ragas” (Mooraj, Anwer 2007). For PTV,
some of the early targets of Zia’s policy were women presenters who
were directed to cover themselves with an all-encompassing dupatta
(scarf). If they refused, they were summarily dismissed. It was however
the burgeoning film industry that felt General Zia’s draconian measures
more when he ordered a clampdown on the so-called vulgarity exhibited
in the Urdu and Punjabi movies. The consequences were so pervasive
that over the next 10 years more than 1000 cinema houses were closed
and the owners forced to “do everything from advertising soap to running
a circus to make money” (Kennedy, Miranda 2004).
Liberalising the airwaves
For more than four decades, Pakistan’s 152 million citizens have had
to bear with official news offerings reflective of one-sided propaganda
and a blinkered view of major political events. But the winds of change
started blowing in the 1990s when India liberalized its media sector
which recorded an exponential growth from one state-owned television
channel in 1991 to 70 in 1998 (Thusso, Daya Kishan 1999). Given their
availability on the dish antenna and cable, the Indian channels penetrated
Pakistani society through their superior, more open and glamorous
programming. For some years, Pakistani rulers looked askance at this
development and toyed with the idea of reforming Pakistan Television
by encouraging private productions though avoiding permissive
programming. These faltering measures, however, failed to stop the
cultural juggernaut of Indian channels from making further inroads into
Pakistani society (Barraclough, Steven 2001). The turning point came
during the Kargil war when the Indian channels successfully “squeezed
out the Pakistani point of view” (Page, D. and Crawley, W. 2005). The
PTV response was pathetically inadequate both in terms of content as
well as quality with its “wooden-faced newscasters” woefully failing
to make any impact on Pakistan’s own public who turned to Indian
channels to get the latest on the Kargil conflict.
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The ascendant influence of Indian channels on Pakistani society
became a cause of considerable concern for the government of Pervez
Musharraf who decided in 2002 to create a “media deterrent” to New
Delhi’s propaganda onslaught. The government thinking was led by
Javed Jabbar, the information minister at the time, who saw “a huge
asymmetry” Pakistan faced in comparison to the Indian media. While
pointing out “an insidious aspect to the way in which, between the song
and dance, Indian media seek to undermine the rationale that validates
and motivates Pakistaniat,” he stressed the need “to develop the media
equivalent of nuclear weapons so as to equalize and neutralize the Indian
superiority in conventional numbers and the attempts to corrode our
persona” (Jabbar, Javed 2003).
It was therefore less for “altruistic” reasons and more for countering
the “pervasiveness” of Indian TV channels that the military government
of General Pervez Musharraf decided to open up the broadcast sector to
private ownership in 2002. But the move came as a blessing in disguise
for the Pakistani public who hungered for a real, reliable and relevant
source of independent information. In the intervening two years, the
Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) issued about
100 FM radio and 25 satellite TV licences, transforming the country’s
media scene drastically. Since then, the number of private channels to
have entered the market in Pakistan has increased steadily and by the
end of 2009, the country boasted of 77 private satellite channels and 129
FM radio stations – an increase attributable to a considerable relaxation
in cross media ownership restrictions and enhanced national advertising
budget owing to the advent of many FMCGs (fast moving consumer
goods) on the national horizon (PEMRA Annual Report, 2009).
Impact on state broadcasting
The impact of the transnational channels on the broadcast sector in
Pakistan has been phenomenal. For one, it has helped end the monopoly
of state broadcasters who are now suddenly up against a slew of
formidable rivals challenging the long-held dominance of PTV among
the viewers. Feeling the weight of the competition, the PTV introduced
in the 1990s a more liberal approach in the news and current affairs
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programmes as reflected in ‘Open Forum’ and ‘Meezan’ (Scales) – two
popular talk shows of the time. On the entertainment side, programmes
such as Spotlight (beauty tips), PTV Gold and Her Taan Hay Deepak
(film music), Lok Rang and Sohni Dharti (folk music) were a welcome
departure from the “oppressive” Zia era (Barraclough, Steven 2001).
However, the arrival on the scene of local private channels
dramatically changed the nature and scope of competition for PTV
which found its new rivals far more competitive than the Indian channels
in terms of resources and the reach they had to report the local events.
While ARY and Indus gave PTV a run for its money, the real competition
came from Geo TV, launched by Jang Group, which quickly staffed
itself with some of the most well-known journalists already working
with the Group’s Daily Jang and The News, two newspapers in Urdu
and English with the largest countrywide circulation. In response PTV
scrambled to put in place an assortment of new programmes, hired
professionals from the market and went for all possible professional and
technological innovations. A clear change was perceptible in the PTV
plays which lent themselves to changes “in attire and idiom of characters
corresponding to modernization of certain sections of the population”
(Wasim, Mohammad 2006). There was also “a visible movement from
unilinear to multi-linear themes of plays, reflecting a greater awareness
about complex issues of public and private life than before” (ibid). Plays
were also aired on themes that were previously considered sensitive and
taboo including violence against women, family planning and AIDS.
In recent years, plays like ‘Umrao Jan Ada’ which depicts the life of a
18th century sex worker and ‘Shaid Kay Bahaar Aye’ which details the
struggle of a lawyer who is raped but fights her circumstances and finally
emerges successfully from her ordeal, mark a clear shift in the official
policy on entertainment (Kiran N. Ahmed, Uzma T. Haroon, 2003).
However, the openness displayed in entertainment programmes is
at complete variance with the stricter government control on the news
and views which continue to reflect the state’s point of view. This was
glaringly apparent in an incident narrated by noted Pakistani broadcaster,
Beena Sarwar, who wrote that soon after the 9/11 tragedy a short news
film showing a protest against General Musharraf and US President Bush
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was telecast apparently inadvertently by PTV’s Tando Allahyar relay
centre in Sindh. This prompted stern action by the PTV management
who suspended the entire technical staff at the station “for violating the
policy against covering anti-government unrest” (Sarwar, Beena 2002).
After the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, there was a discernible
shift in PTV’s policy towards the religious right and views critical
of extremism were aired. While some analysts welcomed this stance
against religious bigotry, others felt that it was motivated by no higher
purpose than to justify the government’s change in policy towards the
Taliban regime in Kabul (Sarwar, Beena 2002).
The launch of a current affairs and news channel in October 2000
was also an attempt by PTV to deal with the competition from private
channels. Two noticeable current affairs programmes were Question
Time, based on recording of the question hour in the parliament, and
Open Forum which brought ministers and officials face to face with the
public on civic and political issues.
One of the popular current affairs programmes was ‘News Night’
aired daily soon after the main 9:00pm Khabarnama (news bulletin).
Hosted by Syed Talat Hussain, considered one of the top journalists of
Pakistan, the programme attracted a sizeable viewership because of its
variety of political views, the quality of debate and the perspectives that
emerged during the live discussions. A real treat for the informationhungry PTV viewers came on the occasion of the SAARC (South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Information Ministers’
Conference in Islamabad in March 2002 when ‘News Night’ aired live
interviews with the visiting ministers, including India’s Sushma Swaraj.
The interview was a massive hit and received press reviews both in
Pakistan and India because of the particularly tense relations prevailing
between the two countries at the time.
In recent years, PTV has tried to rejuvenate itself by improving its
professional and technical resources as well as extending its outreach.
Apart from PTV One, various new channels such as PTV National, AJK
TV, PTV Bolan, PTV World and PTV Global have been launched. In
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August 2007, PTV One and PTV World were renamed as PTV Home
and PTV News respectively. There is also a comparative improvement
in the news and entertainment content. The duration of hourly news
bulletins has increased and PTV has also begun to provide live coverage
of selected events. Its marathon transmissions during the devastating
earthquake that left over 70,000 people dead in Pakistan’s northern
region were appreciated considerably. PTV also won appreciation for
a programme hosted by popular compere Tausiq Haider who visited
hospitals, clinics and relief camps set up in Islamabad and Rawalpindi
for the quake victims and interviewed the patients separated from their
families after being airlifted for medical treatment. The programme
continued for several weeks and helped reunite many families.
Besides strengthening the profile of its news telecasts, PTV has also
launched several current affairs programmes like News Morning (Urdu)
and News Plus (Urdu) broadcast in the morning and News Night (Urdu),
Aitraz (Urdu) and Salim Safi Kay Sath aired in the evening. World View
is another talk show which caters to the English-speaking viewers.
However, PTV’s most popular current affairs programme in recent years
has been Sach Tu Yeh Hay which is aired every Saturday, followed by
a repeat telecast the following day. Its panelists, often six, are drawn in
equal number from the government and opposition political parties and
they discuss threadbare key national issues often in two episodes, each
of 50 minutes duration.
On the whole, PTV has adopted a far more open and liberal approach
following the phenomenal expansion of transnational media but this
is, to an extent, offset by the continuous government control which
undermines its credibility and impedes creativity in its entertainment
and general presentations.
Impact on news and entertainment
The impact of transnational media is clearly evident in the way news
and entertainment segments of TV programming have been transformed
in recent years in Pakistan. Far from the days when one-sided official
propaganda churned out by PTV was imposed on viewers, private
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channels have made considerable advances in terms of engaging the
public and educating them through well-informed analyses of social and
political issues and this has been instrumental in influencing popular
opinion (Wasim, Mohammad 2006).
In recent years, some of the major national events which were closely
monitored and reported by the private channels include the general
elections of 2002 and 2008 as well as the earthquake tragedy that visited
the northern areas of Pakistan in October 2005. It was the enormity of the
tragedy that prompted massive electronic media coverage for weeks on
end and this evoked a spontaneous and generous response from the local
and international community. Yet another occasion when the country’s
private television channels stood out for their fearless news reporting
came during the judicial crisis in 2007 after President Musharraf sacked
Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry. The situation deteriorated
sharply after the president imposed emergency and deposed half of
the country’s higher judiciary. This blatant violation of the constitution
ignited popular outrage and the country hurtled towards turmoil. The
ensuing mass movement spearheaded by the lawyers and supported to
the hilt by the intelligentsia assumed the proportions of a political tidal
wave. This contrasted starkly with events in India in 1975 when civil
society “caved in” during the emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi.
(Nayar, Kuldip 2007).
The private television channels joined the fray and refused to
be cowed down by the government which wanted them to moderate
their extensive coverage of the anti-Musharraf protests. The media
was determined to protect their hard-won freedom. The turning point
came when the private channels provided a blow by blow coverage of
the riots in Karachi in May 2007 when armed government supporters
killed dozens of their rivals (Walsh, Declan 2007). This was a complete
departure from the past, especially the 1980s when Karachi was aflame
with ethnic violence and bomb explosions wreaked havoc in the markets
and populous civic centers which the controlled electronic media was
unable to report.
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Indeed, one of the reasons for the steep fall in popularity of the
Musharraf government was the worsening security situation that was
effectively projected by the private channels through their live or ontape reporting of bombs blasts and other terrorist incidents. For instance
the country watched in sheer horror the live reporting of the bomb
explosion killing over 140 people during the massive PPP rally organized
in Karachi to welcome its chairperson, former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto, on her return from exile on 18 October 2007. A little more than
two months later, the entire country was again stunned when television
cameras captured images of the suicide bombing that targeted and
killed Benazir Bhutto as she waved to crowds while driving home from
a public rally in Rawalpindi’s Liaquat Garden on 27 December 2007.
The private channels have also changed the concept of political
reporting and with it the country’s politics and the conduct of politicians.
This is clearly visible in the political talk shows which “feature a diversity
of views that would please Ofcom” (Waraich, Omar 2007). People love
to watch politicians as they ramble and squirm in the face of teasing
questions by hosts keen to scrutinize their personal and professional
conduct on matters of public concern. The private channels “freely
criticize the government for going against the spirit of the constitution,
violating democratic traditions and being unaccountable to the public
at large for inflation, unemployment, poverty, deterioration of the law
and order situation and highhandedness against opposition” (Wasim,
Mohammad 2006). Indeed, the popularity of political talk shows such
as Capital Talk, Jawab Dayh (Accountable), Mairay Mutabiq (For Me)
and Aaj Kamran Khan Kay Sath (Today with Kamran Khan) of Geo
News; Live with Talat Hussain and Bolta Pakistan (Pakistan Speaks) of
Aaj TV; Off the Record, Second Opinion and Q&A with PJ Mir of ARY;
Doosra Pehlu (Other Aspect) of CNBC Pakistan; and Kal Tak (Until
Tomorrow) and Centre Stage of Express News is such that even after a
repeat telecast by their respective channels, many of these programmes
land up at popular websites such as YouTube, blip.tv, pkpolitics.com,
awaz.tv, politicsarea.com for the viewers to see them all over again.
Religion has always been at the centre of social and cultural life for a
majority of the Pakistanis. Religious programmes therefore get a sizeable
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chunk of daily TV programming. While PTV’s religious programmes
had a simple format, now such programmes by private channels have
moved away from the stereotype. For instance, GEO’s Alim Online has
a suave young host with a closely cropped fashionable beard who has
a laptop and a telephone in front of him. The programme is unique in
the sense that it brings together scholars from the Shia and Sunni sects
which have often been embroiled in sectarian violence against each other.
The outreach of the private channels is vast and broad-based thereby
enabling hitherto marginalized communities to voice their grievances
and to bring these within the ambit of public consciousness and become
a part of the broad national discourse. Furthermore, religious festivals
and community functions of minorities are reported widely while special
programmes are run to mark other events such as Valentine’s Day and
New Year celebrations.
While the liberal programming has broadened the minds of the
people, it has also made them aware of issues which were previously
swept under the rug. The rampant domestic violence against women and
their exchange as goods of trades to settle disputes in certain tribal areas
have been highlighted consistently by the private channels. “And social
mores have relaxed to the point where fashion shows and a transvestite
talk show host, Begum Nawazish Ali, are proving more popular than
the new breed of Muslim televangelists” (Waraich, Omar 2007). Private
channels regularly feature edgy comedies such as Geo’s Hum Sub Umeed
Say Hain, Dunya’s Hasb-e-Haal and Aag Channel’s 4 Man Show which
often satirize politicians and celebrities from film and sports alike.
Geo TV broke taboos when it launched its popular weekly show
‘Marriage Online’ which is frequented by the youth who describe
themselves and ask prospective suitors to contact their parents. Geo also
caused a public outcry in 2004 when it broadcast a report on Rawalpindi’s
Internet cafes serving as hubs for pornography and meeting spots for
young lovers. A year later, the channel again created a stir when it
aired a discussion on the ultra-sensitive topic of incest on its Agony
Aunt programme, Uljhan Suljhan. During the show, host Hina Khwaja
Biyat read out a victim’s letter in which she wrote how her brother had
sexually abused her for six years. Among the panelists was a doctor
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who identified the mutual dependency situation as incest and strongly
recommended the use of contraception to prevent further complications.
It was a daring talk on issues considered highly provocative in the deeply
conservative Pakistani society and the channel had to pay for it when a
group of armed men claiming affiliation with a religious organization
attacked Geo’s Karachi building, beat up security guards and ransacked
the first two floors.
In recent years, this freedom has been used to delve deep into the
labyrinths of politics with channels going into an overdrive to unmask
incidents of corruption, malpractice and maladministration. From
a legislator cheating in an examination hall or shopping on a stolen
credit card to police officials publicly lashing persons under detention
are some of the spectacles that are coming as a routine daily diet on
television news. Indeed, the media has become an effective watchdog,
holding the government and opposition leaders to constant scrutiny
and exposing corruption and highlighting social ills and human rights
violations (Lodhi, Maleeha, 2010). The media has also transformed
and enlarged the public space and enhanced citizens’ engagement with
issues which are now debated on the television screen, not the floor of
parliament (ibid).
Occasionally, this unchecked freedom has also been used by new
channels to step into legal controversies. In 2006, Geo ran a series of
debates titled Zara Sochiey (Think for a moment) to highlight “lacunae”
in the controversial Hudood laws dealing with cases of rape and
adultery. Consequently, the government amended the law to make it
more balanced. Although, the liberal view presented by new channels is
often frowned upon by ultra-conservative Islamic groups, there is also
a sense of satisfaction at the way new programmes have replaced the
international media, like BBC, CNN, Fox (CBS News, 2004). The new
channels argue that while they have a responsibility to fight conservatism,
they will continue to “to nudge it towards the middle, bringing it out of
these dark dungeons of PTV programs but protect it from ‘Sex and the
City’” (ibid).
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While new channels continue to cleave to the notion of bold and
liberal programming, the impact of such programmes on the society
is already visible. Pakistan-born British novelist Mohsin Hamid who
travelled to Pakistan in 2007 to watch his would-be wife performing
the lead role in a show called Jutt and Bond, an Urdu sitcom about a
Punjabi folk hero and a British secret agent, recounts “the incredible
new world of media that had sprung up in Pakistan, a world of music
videos, fashion programmes, independent news networks, cross-dressing
talk-show hosts, religious debates, stock-market analysis, and dramas
and comedies like Jutt and Bond” (Hamid, Mohsin 2007). “Views both
critical and supportive of the government are voiced with breathtaking
frankness in an atmosphere remarkably lacking in censorship. Public
space, the common area for culture and expression that had been so
circumscribed in my childhood, has now been vastly expanded. The
Vagina Monologues was recently performed on stage in Pakistan to
standing ovations” (ibid).
The contribution of private channels towards promotion of popular
music genres is also significant. The phenomenon set in the late eighties
by the likes of pop stars Nazia and Zohaib and later picked up by Vital
Signs and Junoon has been taken to a new high by dedicated 24-hour
music channels led by MTV Pakistan, The Music, Indus Music and Aag
Channel. Massive corporate sponsorships and availability of more air
space for pop acts have resulted in hundreds of amateurs and underground
bands trying to burst on the music scene (The News 2007). Pakistani
singers Atif Aslam, Shafqat Amanat Ali, Jawad Ahmed, Rahat Ali Khan
and Ali Zafar routinely perform in India. Popular songs by some of
them have also been included in Hindi movies. The story of Amanat
Ali, a 19-year-old lad from Faisalabad, ending up as second runner up
after polling 43.8 million votes in a global music contest organized by
Zee Music in 2007, reflects on the music mania private channels have
created in Pakistan. Besides music channels, entertainment channels
featuring infotainment, drama serials and sit-coms have also encouraged
frequent injections of music videos and soundtracks being composed by
established musicians.
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The proliferation of television channels has also opened up new vistas
for the corporate world which has catapulted the advertising industry to
new heights at the back of a competitive economic environment and
strong consumer spending. Pakistan’s robust telecom industry boasting
over 80 million subscribers at the start of 2008, the banking sector which
has maintained one of the best growth rates in the region, and a resurgent
construction business spearheaded by companies like Emaar and AlBuraj Group have all combined to transform the country’s advertising
industry which now boasts of Rs 17 billion annual revenues (Yasir,
Muhammad 2007). And the prime beneficiaries of this boom remain
private television channels whose revenues have skyrocketed. While
new channels join the foray increasing the on-air ad space, ad rates on
the satellite channels have continued to climb. During the early days of
its launch, Geo TV sold ad time for between 5,000 to 10,000 rupees per
minute with ARY and Indus also enjoying similar rates (Qizilbash, Talib,
2007). “Now, Geo’s prime time tariff rates (undiscounted) are quoted
at 75,000 rupees. Among the other top channels, ARY One World and
Indus Vision command 60,000 rupees, while Hum TV and Aaj TV ask
for 45,000 and 37,500 rupees respectively for a 60-second prime time
spot” (ibid).
The Pakistani TV going transnational has also reached the expat
community all over the world, bringing them closer to events at home.
Channels such as Geo, ARY and Aaj enjoy a massive viewership among
the Pakistani expatriate community. The number of telephone calls made
to television talk shows and news magazines by Pakistanis living abroad
is a measure of their engagement with politics back home.
The impact of transnational media on broadcasting is also reflected
in an overall transformation of professional skills and work ethics. The
quality of news and investigative reporting is consistently improving.
The demand for quality has also contributed to better wages for the
journalists. With the expansion of the broadcast sector, the intake of
fresh blood into the industry has also increased manifold. At the time
Jang Group launched Geo TV, it added 2,000 employees to the existing
3,000 workforce and some 500 journalists were trained for six months
through international media consultants. This was in addition to a
CRITERION – April/June 2010
175
Essay
network of reporters developed across Pakistan and in 10 major cities
throughout the world. The new channels have also contributed to an
all-time high intake of students in mass communication departments
of Pakistani universities. The standard of journalism has also improved
considerably. Subjects such as TV production, investigative and online
journalism are quite popular now.
Conclusion
This essay has encapsulated the impact of transnational media on
the broadcasting sector in Pakistan with references to the changes the
sector has undergone in recent years. From the way it has shaped itself,
this broadcasting revolution has been thrilling and “a reality television
in the truest sense of the word” (Qizilbash, Talib, 2007). While the
future television landscape in Pakistan is likely to change with the focus
shifting to very few hybrid channels and many more regional and news
channels, the nature of infotainment and its presentation has undergone
an irreversible change. The beneficiaries of this revolution are the viewers
who now have a “smorgasbord” of TV viewing options. Indeed, from
Quran TV which has championed religious programming, to Fashion
TV Pakistan which gets away with partial nudity in the middle of the
day, to Muzik which showcases Pakistani pop arts, to Pakistan’s first
English language Dawn News, there is little the burgeoning new industry
is not auditioning (Mufti, Shahan, 2007). The phenomenal growth the
broadcast industry has registered in Pakistan has already spawned a
healthy competition which is likely to result in more viewing options for
the public, more revenue and jobs for the national economy and more
opportunities to make money for the entrepreneurs and prospective
investors.
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Essay
2. CBS News, 2004. TV loosens up in Pakistan. CBS News, 28 July. Transcript
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178
CRITERION – Volume 5 No.2
THE FUTURE OF SMALL SCALE
ENTERPRISES
Shahid Kardar*
Until recently underdeveloped infrastructure like road networks,
transportation, etc., had created sheltered local markets for small
enterprises. The only competition they encountered was amongst each
other from the overcrowding in such a market. Then there were government
policies that created the perverse incentives to remain small and operate in
an isolated manner. However, even in Pakistan the business environment
and the ways of doing business have changed radically. Competition
has heightened because of the government’s strategy to create a more
competitive environment through deregulation and liberalization of
the investment regime, significant dilution of sector-specific protection
from competition and globalization, increasing integration of world
economies, the formation of the WTO forcing member countries to scale
down trade restrictions and rapid technological developments that have
sharply reduced costs of transportation and communications, facilitating
the free movement of goods, services, capital and knowledge.
We are therefore seeing large formal sector entities and imported
finished products steadily taking over some of the market share held
earlier by small and medium sized enterprises, resulting in the reduced
growth in their numbers, if not the closure of large numbers of small/
cottage-sized manufacturing, in recent years.
In Pakistan SMEs face economic, technological, marketing and
financial constraints. Reliable and efficient infrastructure like power,
water, transport and communications are pre-requisites for efficient
performance and competitive capability. The problems on account of
*
Shahid Kardar is a former Finance Minister of the Punjab Government.
Essay
infrastructural deficiencies are more acute in the case of SMEs since
they are located in an unplanned, uncontrolled and dispersed manner.
In particular, poor availability of reliable supply of electricity in the last
two years has hit small scale industry disproportionately, since a large
part of it neither has the financial wherewithal to acquire and operate
generators and still remain competitive, despite the high incidence of
GST and income tax evasion in this sector. The cumulative impact of
these developments has been the drastic transformation of the economic
environment in which small and medium sized enterprises function,
leaving them with only the option to compete or perish.
In these changed circumstances and improved road and communication
networks large manufacturing companies have managed to extend their
operations into rural areas, thereby opening up markets that, as argued
above, were sheltered because of product and geographical segmentation
of the market. These larger enterprises have also managed to enhance
their market share with the closing down of a sizeable section of small
scale industry as a consequence of crippling load shedding. Given the
impact of globalization, better road networks providing access to large
scale industry, lack of energy/power and the sharp deceleration in the rate
of growth of large manufacturing enterprises to whom small industrial
units either sell, or buy from, it is simply bizarre that government growth
statistics claim that the small scale manufacturing sector grew by almost
30 percent in nominal rupee terms in 2008/09!
Having discussed how the business environment has altered for
the small scale industrial sector the rest of this article will focus on
the challenges that they face from globalization. The challenges from
globalization have been overwhelming, requiring forced adaptations
in management techniques, automation and technology. Companies
are switching from large fixed investments to computer controlled,
flexible specialization, and changing their structures to enable quicker
responses. In a highly competitive global market experiencing rapid
changes in product mix, design and technology, fixed investments have
not only become less attractive and more expensive but now also play
a reduced role. Along with lower fixed costs of search for markets and
customers and of advertising, the factors identified above have reduced
180
CRITERION – Volume 5 No.2
Essay
the importance of economies of scale, increasing the scope and potential
to exploit opportunities for product differentiation. The role of the
standardized mass market is diminishing and that of exclusive niche
markets for differentiated products growing.
The new communications technology has also brought new areas,
like services (computer software, consultancy), into the framework of
external trade. Earlier services were not tradable across time and space.
Now they can be exported via the internet and even stored electronically
and used a long time after they have been produced. Now that services
are tradable they can be included as a component in the comparative
advantage of developing countries, export of labour-intensive services
(programming, data entry, call centers, etc.). Computers can be used
to automate low productivity tasks previously performed by office
secretaries. The tradability of services across space and the shrinking
importance of economies of scale are combining to provide developing
countries the opportunity to sell their labour-intensive services and
manufactures.
At same time, the increasing internationalization of production,
distribution and marketing is enabling the creation of global commodity
chains (i.e. business networks of various sized units) from the stage of
supply of raw materials to the production, marketing and retail of any
product. These commodity chains are either producer-driven or buyerdrive.
There are producer-driven commodity chains for capital and
technology-intensive products like automobiles and electronics. The
manufacturers of such products are the major driving force. Buyerdriven commodity chains are relevant for products that are design and
marketing intensive but relatively labour intensive in their manufacturing
stage, e.g., textile garments and leather products. In such cases retailers
and brand merchandisers control the chains. The existence of such global
commodity chains leaves industrial enterprises no choice but to become
part of the chain, simply to access markets. Pakistani manufacturers,
even those small sized, know they cannot operate in isolation any more.
However, to become a part of these production and trade networks
CRITERION – April/June 2010
181
Essay
individual enterprises have to meet standards of price, quality and
delivery schedules.
All this requires upgrading of technology and development in
organizational structures and information systems as increasing
presence of multinationals opens up opportunities for subcontracting
and outsourcing. The Chinese development experience demonstrates
how each enterprise can grow at a faster pace by focusing on its core
competency while subcontracting other work, instead of following the
Pakistani model of doing everything in-house through vertical integration
of production structures within an organization. Poor contract adherence
norms in our social system and a weak and tedious judicial system for
enforcing contracts are the key obstacles to the development of more
productive efficient industrial and commercial structures based on core
competencies.
Admittedly, issues like environmental and labour standards under
the WTO are adding to the pressure to develop technology, raising
the cost of production. Therefore, the need for strategic alliances with
others in the global commodity chains to gain access to technologies
and markets. This will require a change in attitudes of government
functionaries, involving an environment of trust in SMESs, while
improving their access to decent quality infrastructure (road networks,
railways, ports and utilities - like electricity, gas, water and drainage)
and facilitating the development of global associations - the latter being
their primary role in accelerating the process of growth of the sectors of
industry and services.
182
CRITERION – Volume 5 No.2
Back Issues Available
Price per issue is Rs. 200/- (Inclusive of postage)
Payments can be made by cross cheque payable to Criterion and
sent to House 16, Street 15, F-6/3, Islamabad
Volume 1 Number 1
October-December 2006
The Contemporary Challenge to Global Peace and Security – S. Iftikhar Murshed
Bilateral Negotiations on Kashmir: Unlearnt Lesson – A.G. Noorani
Interview with Qazi Hussain Ahmad – Navid Zafar
Islamic Polity and the Constitutional Process in Pakistan – Walid Iqbal
Post-9/11 Foreign Policy of Pakistan – Shamshad Ahmad
Pitfalls and Economic Prospects of Pakistan – Dr. A.R. Kemal
Education in Pakistan: Some Reflections – Dr. Manzoor Ahmad
Volume 2 Number 1
January-March 2007
My Vision for Pakistan – Shaukat Aziz
Problems and Prospects of Peace and Development in the SAARC Region: A Perspective from Bangladesh – Mohammad Mohsin
Baluchistan: Pakistan’s Existential Dilemma – Tanvir Ahmad Khan
Search for a Viable Solution to the Jammu and Kashmir Problem – Anwar Kemal
On Economics and Civil War & Terrorism – Syed Mansoob Murshed
Emerging Monopolies in the Pakistani Media – Muzaffar Abbas
Iran’s Nuclear Programme – Challenge and Response – Javid Hussain
Volume 2 Number 2
April-June 2007
Causes of the Rebellion in Waziristan – Khalid Aziz
Globalization: Its Lures and Discontents in the Muslim World – S.M. Naseem
Madrassas: The Potential for Violence in Pakistan – Dr. Tariq Rahman
The Death of Zia-ul-haq – Khalid Ahmed
Pakistan and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women – Sabrina Khan
Current Afghan Ground Realities – Rustam Shah Mohmand
Role of Media in National Development in the 21st Century – Javed Jabbar
The Kashmir Dispute: A Kashmiri Viewpoint – Abdul Hameed Karimi
Volume 2 Number 3
July-September 2007
Using Trade as a Driver of Political Stability: Prospects in Indo-Pak Context –
Moeed Yusuf
Pakistan: On or Off? Examining the Future of US-Pakistan Relations in the War on
Terror and Beyond – Farhana Ali
The Parliamentary System in South Asia – A.G. Noorani
Fundamentalism, Extremism and Islam – Dr. Anis Ahmad
OIC – Retrospect a Prospects – Tayyab Sddiqui
The Shia of Iraq and the South Asian Connection – Khaled Ahmed
Turning on the Faucets of Thought – Anjum Niaz
Volume 2 Number 4
October-December 2007
Political Uncertainty and Extremist Violence – Editorial
The Politics of Economic Policy Reforms – Ishrat Hussain
Kashmir Dispute: Is there a Viable Solution? – Zamir Akram
The Roots of Sectarianism in Pakistan – Khaled Ahmed
Need for a Pak-Afghan Treaty on Management of Joint Water – Khalid Aziz
Defining Moments: The Political Implication of State Policy – Shahwar Junaid
Iran, the United Stated and Regional Stability – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Some Reflections on Islam and Governance – Dr. Manzoor Ahmad
Volume 3 Number 1
January-March 2008
The Broken Pledge – Editorial
Pakistan Peoples Party and the War on Terror – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Pakistan – US Relations and the War on Terror – Zamir Akram
Balti Tandoori and Chicken Tikka Masala: Culture as National Power –
Toheed Ahmad
Militancy in the Pashtun Belt; Perspective of a Peace Jirga – Khalid Aziz
Meeting Pakistan’s Energy Needs – Mukhtar Ahmad
Should Islam Modernize Itself? – Dr. Khalid Zaheer
Stock Market Performance in Pakistan: A Scrutiny – Inayat A. Mangla
Musharraf’s Kashmir Policy: An Appraisal – Tayyab Siddiqui
Combating Terrorism through Film – Mushfiq Murshed
Volume 3 Number2
April-June 2008
New Government, Old Problems – Editorial
Governance Reforms in Pakistan – Ishrat Hussain
A Liberal Islam in South Asia – A.G. Norani
Muslim Radicalism, Western Concerns – Tanvir Ahmad Khan
The Bomber Under the Burqa – Farhana Ali
The Law of Aerial Bombardment and Civil Casualties: Kosovo and Afghanistan –
Prof. Hayatullah Khan
Security Alliances and Security Concerns: Pakistan and NATO – Shahwar Junaid
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Legacy and the Rebuilding of Pakistan – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Of Tongues and Languages: The Tao of Translation – Toheed Ahmad
Dimensions and Consequences of NATO Expansion to Eurasia: Reviewing Iran’s
Security Environment – Arif Kemal
Volume 3 Number 3
July-September 2008
Impeachment of President – Editorial
Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday – Criterion Team
Jinnah’s Worldview/Outlook on World Affairs – A.G. Noorani
The MQM and Identity Politics in Pakistan – Niloufer Siddiqui
Transformation of Al Qaeda – Khaled Ahmed
Patterns of Regional Cooperation: Options for Pakistan – Shahwar Junaid
Nations of Saints and Scholars: a Portrait of Ireland – Toheed Ahmad
The Status of Women in Pakistan: A Ray of Hope – Talat Farooq
FATA at the Crossroads – Ayaz Wazir
Volume 3 Number 4
October-December 2008
Suicide Terrorism at the Islamabad Marriott – Editorial
How to Develop the Afghan-Pakistan Tribal Belts – Shahid Javed Burki
Jinnah & Muslims of India – A.G. Noorani
The Haroon Report - A.G. Noorani
Notes on Pakistan’s Trade and Industry Policy – Faizullah Khilji
Some Thoughts on Democracy – Kazi Anwarul Masud
Pakistan Muslim League: a Reality Check – Talat Farooq
Pakistan: Religion, Terrorism and Democracy – K.S. Dhillon
Volume 4 Number 1
January-March 2009
The Mumbai Attack – Editorial
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – Syed Rifaat Hussain
Jinnah & the Nizam of Hyderabad-A Tragic Liaison – A.G. Noorani
A Critical View of the Political Developments in Pakistan – Kazi Anwarul Masud
War and State Expansion: A Theoretical Framework – Talat Farooq
Drugs, Counter Narcotics & State Building in Afghanistan – Nazia Hussain
Economic Governance in Pakistan – Ishrat Husain
The Muslim World in a Bind-Whither the Ummah? – Khalid Saleem
Volume 4 Number 2
April-June 2009
Terrorism and Political Turmoil– Editorial
Jihad vs. Terrorism – A.G. Noorani
The USSR’s Last Gamble – The Why and Wherefore – Khalid Saleem
Islam and Western Modernism: Is There a Way Forward? – Talat Farooq
Mumbai Attacks and the North Arabian Sea – Muhammad Azam Khan
Education: the Perennial Questions – Mahvesh Khan
Navid Zafar – S. Iftikhar Murshed
India – Emerging Global Power – Tayyab Siddiqui
Minorities and Human Rights – Raja Tridiv Roy
Volume 4 Number 3
July-September 2009
Pakistan and the Challenge of Extremism - Editorial
Supreme Court of Pakistan: The Case of Missing Persons – Dr. Tariq Hassan.
The Islamic State: A Mirage – A.G. Noorani
Islam and Apostasy – S. Iftikhar Murshed
Analysis and responses to the Global Food Crisis – Veena Jha
Pakistan’s Economic Problems: Some Non-Conventional Therapies –
Anwar Kemal
The Inequitable Tax Structure – Shamim Ahmad
The Transition to Democracy – Cyril Almeida
A Deconstruction of Some Myths about the Pakhtun - Farhat Taj
A Blueprint for Victory - Lt. Gen. (r)Javed Alam Khan
Afghanistan: The Case for a UN Peace Keeping Force – Saeed Khalid
Defeating Terror: Lessons from Recent History – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Volume 4 Number 4
Octobre-December 2009
Terrorism and the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan – Editorial
Notes on the Financial Crisis, Global – Faizullah Khilji
Imbalances, Recovery and the East Asian Response: What We Know and What We
Do Not Know The SINO-PAK Boundary Agreement – A.G. Noorani
The Afghan Turmoil From 1747 to 2001 – S. Iftikhar Murshed
Internal Security Challenges for Pakistan – Shahwar Junaid
Promoting Political Parties and an Independent Legislature in Afghanistan –
Niloufer Siddiqui
Institutional Role Behind Civil-Military Equation – Muhammad Ismail Khan
A Strategy to Fight Militancy? – Cyril Almeida
Between Dreams and Realities – Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Cooperative Mechanism to Save Kashmir Environment and Water Wars –
Iftikhar Gilani
The Price of ‘Sea Blindness’ – Muhammad Azam Khan
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