Defeating ISIS and Their Complex Way of War
By Aaron Bazin
Journal Article | Sep 15 2014 - 7:06am
Defeating ISIS and Their Complex Way of War
Aaron Bazin
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has succeeded in gaining an incredible amount of ground at a
pace that caught the world off guard. Even though they face opponents with overmatch in technology and
firepower, ISIS has proven more than capable. One way to understand ISIS is to seek to understand it as a
complex adaptive system. Arguably, ISIS’s lack of central control, rapid tempo, and unpredictable
behavior suggest that it is a complex adaptive system, and a dangerous one at that. The question this
article will address is if ISIS displays the characteristics of a complex adaptive system, how should the
international community address this threat?
Is ISIS a Complex Adaptive System?
In the 1950s through the 1980s, a “new” science emerged, one that sought to gain a deeper understanding
of complex adaptive systems. Upon investigation, complexity scholars observed diverse and seemingly
unrelated phenomena (such as ant colonies, weather systems, and the human brain) displayed behavior
that adhered to certain rules. These observations have affected many fields of study and changed the way
scholars seek understanding of the world. [1]
A complex adaptive system has no central control mechanism pulling the strings, and a person cannot
hope to understand it as simply a sum of its parts. A complex adaptive system has components (called
actors) that are independent but connected with each other and to the external environment. These actors
co-evolve and small changes that can have big effects over time (often called the butterfly effect). [2]
Out of all of this interaction, order and patterns emerge, patterns that no person could have predicted by
looking at any one component. These systems learn and grow when they are away from equilibrium; when
a system stagnates, it dies. A paradox exists where surface simplicity indicates deep complexity, and
surface complexity really indicates deep simplicity. One cannot predict the behavior of these systems
from past behavior nor can one see causality and dependency in retrospect. [3]
ISIS certainly seems to display most of the attributes of complex adaptive system. It does not have
unifying central control and is a mix of small groups and sub-groups of actors unified by a common
purpose. These groups act independently, and in a highly unpredictable, self-organizing way. Its lack of
formal organization has not hampered its effectiveness and ability to defeat better-organized forces with
superior equipment and training. Even though they come from all over the globe to fight, the strength of
their common will creates a bond that holds them together against a common enemy (even though they
fight each other at times). Either by default or deliberately, it appears that ISIS has behaves as a complex
adaptive system at war. [4]
General Winfield Scotts’ Anaconda Approach to the Confederacy [5]
An “Anaconda” Strategy for ISIS?
If ISIS fights as a complex adaptive system, then the international community could apply knowledge of
complex adaptive systems theory to defeat them. Twice in its history, the United States has employed an
“Anaconda” Strategy. General Winfield Scott developed an “Anaconda” strategy to isolate and strangle
the Confederate States (photo above). More recently, General David Petraeus employed an “Anaconda
Strategy versus Al-Qaeda Iraq” to isolate the adversary both physically and conceptually (photo below).
The international community should consider application of the “anaconda” metaphor to this new
context. One such approach could approach on three fronts: (1) establish boundaries to isolate and
contain; (2) intervene on multiple fronts early and often; and, (3) conduct near simultaneous elimination of
the connectors.
General Petraeus’ Anaconda Approach to the al-Qaeda Iraq
Establish Boundaries to Isolate and Contain
All complex adaptive systems have boundaries that one can understand even if the system itself seems to
defy explanation. Without growth, complex adaptive systems move toward entropy, and eventually death.
Through isolation and containment, at the boundaries begin form around the problem. Much like in the
treatment of cancer, once identified, the first goal is to prevent the tumor from growing.
The international community can contain and isolate at tactical, operational and strategic level, the ISIS
through forging new diplomatic partnerships and the deployment of military forces to backstop further
growth. These forces would prevent anything from coming in or going out physically and possibly
psychologically as well. Using this technique, the key is to fight ISIS where they are not, to make ISIS
military expansion as difficult as possible.
Although the U.S. should support and enable this effort, nations in the region must support a containment
strategy or the effort will eventually fail. The international community should engage Iraq, Turkey,
Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, U.A.E, Turkey, Afghanistan, the Kurds, and other
regional stakeholders. The international community should also seek the political buy-in of Syria and
Iran, even if they have to go through third parties to do so.
Intervene on Multiple Fronts Early and Often
Concurrent with the isolation, the international community should conduct direct intervention where
possible. Complex adaptive systems are very sensitive to initial conditions and, as such, the international
community should consider intervention early and often. This intervention need not be solely military in
nature, and should include all available instruments of national power (diplomacy, information, military,
economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) balanced appropriately.
As time progresses, the international community should apply direct continuous concentric pressure on all
possible fronts to create a constricting effect. With fewer and fewer options available, the world would
force ISIS to act in a way that is even more isolated. This would serve to control ISIS’s tempo, eventually
allow the international community to gain the initiative.
Conduct Near-Simultaneous Elimination of the Connectors
Complex adaptive systems are self-organizing. As the system organizes, a hierarchy is established and
leaders come to the forefront. It seems counter-intuitive, but letting this happen helps stabilize the system.
Much like in criminal organizations, overtime, three tiers of ISIS will eventually emerge: leaders,
connectors, and workers. Capturing or killing the leadership throws the system back into disorganization,
which actually causes the system to emerge stronger. Eliminating all of the workers is also difficult as it
takes a largest amount of resources and time.
The key here is to allow the system to stabilize and then eliminate the mid-tier connectors in a near
simultaneous fashion. Law enforcement commonly does this in racketeering and drug cases with a near
simultaneous ‘round-up’ of all members of a criminal organization. This weakens the system, and
prevents it from operating effectively. Leaders find themselves unable to lead anything and workers find
themselves without resources or guidance. Unable to find a position of power, the international
community would find ISIS leadership more amenable to accept their will and comply with international
norms. Once weakened, the international community must help provide a viable governance alternative
and help build its legitimacy. The international community must have the follow-through to address the
critical question of what’s next.
Conclusion
Much like any strategic approach, an anaconda-type approach has its faults. It takes time, effort, a plan,
and the willingness of the international community to accept a large degree of risk. In contrast, other
approaches that solely target leadership, (e.g., ‘mow the grass’, ‘cut the head off the snake’, etc.) only
make the problem more complex and allow the adversary to rise from the ashes stronger and more
determined than before. Simply, ISIS is a wicked and complex problem and the international community
would be wise to address it as such.
End Notes
1. Chan., S. (2001). Complex Adaptive Systems. Retrieved from
http://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/Complex%20Adaptive%20Systems.pdf; Kaensky, D.
(n.d.). Managing the Complicated vs. the Complex, Retrieved from
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/article/managing-complicated-vs-complex; Miller, J.,
Page, S. (2009). Complex adaptive systems: An introduction to computational models of social life:
an introduction to computational models of social life. Princeton University Press.
1. Ibid.
1. Ibid.
1. Laub, Z. and Masters, J. (2014). Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Council on Foreign Relations.
Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-syria/p14811
1. Library of Congress Civil War map collection: Scott's great snake. Entered according to Act of
Congress in the year 1861 by J.B. Elliott of Cincinnati. Picture retrieved from Wikimedia commons.
Retrieved from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Anaconda_Plan.jpg
1. Civil War Academy. (n.d.) Anaconda Plan. Retrieved from
http://www.civilwaracademy.com/anaconda-plan.html; Greenway, H.D. (2009). General
Petraeus’ ‘Anaconda plan,’ Boston Globe. Retrieved from
http://www.civilwaracademy.com/anaconda-plan.html
1. USF-I Concept Slide 2007 from personal files 2008, also available on
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/inteldump/anaconda.jpg
About the Author
Aaron Bazin
Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Bazin is a Functional Area 59 officer and currently works
at Joint and Army Concepts Directorate at the Army Capabilities and Integration
Center at Fort Eustis, Va. Previously, he served as U.S. Central Command as lead
planner for the 2010 Iraq Transition Plan and other planning efforts. His operational
deployments include Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan.
Available online at : http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/defeating-isis-and-their-complex-way-ofwar
Links:
{1} http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/aaron-bazin
{2} http://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/Complex%20Adaptive%20Systems.pdf
{3} http://www.businessofgovernment.org/article/managing-complicated-vs-complex
{4} http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-syria/p14811
{5} http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Anaconda_Plan.jpg
{6} http://www.civilwaracademy.com/anaconda-plan.html
{7} http://blog.washingtonpost.com/inteldump/anaconda.jpg
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