Democracy and Consolidation: How Consolidated is India’s Democracy? 1
India is one of the oldest Third World democracies. Bar two years of
authoritarian rule in the mid-1970s, it has periodically held elections at
the centre and in the federal units. Besides, in terms of statistics it is the
largest functioning democracy. But can India serve as a model for other
emerging democracies? What
could we learn from India’s
experimentation of half-a-century of rule of law, free speech, universal
adult franchise, affirmative action, civilian supremacy over military and
other such democratic values? Indian democracy, in recent years, has
become a prisoner of caste and religion. Also it is encountering a
multipronged attack by the citizenry that is ignored by the economic
liberalisation process. Similarly, there is mounting opposition against the
state by various ethno-religious communities seeking autonomy and
independence. Thus the general notion that democracy is almost
triumphant throughout India, and that India should serve as an example to
other Third World polities witnessing the painful process of democratic
transition needs reassessment.
The aim of this paper is two fold: to define what consolidation in
democracy implies and its application in the Indian context. The paper is
divided into six sections: the first section provides a definitional
interpretation of the term consolidation. The second section highlights the
two main theories of democracy most closely associated with India. In the
third section the efficacy of the policy of reservation is analysed; while in
the fourth the theme of liberalisation and its impact on the masses is
explored. The fifth section examines the separatist and secessionist tides
and assess their overall impact. Section seven investigates into the civilmilitary relations to evaluate the oft-quoted remark that ‘military in India
is most apolitical in nature’. The concluding section makes some
preliminary inferences on the level of democratic consolidation in India.
Consolidation defined
Consolidation is an indispensable method to assess the level of democracy in a particular
society to most theorists of democracy. In the context of the Third World democracies
this mode is considered indispensable as it provides vital insights into the actual working
of democracy. Consolidation also implies democratic reconstruction that begins only
when democratic institutions are set up.2 Consolidation, therefore, can be defined as the
instititutionalisation and socialisation of certain democratic values and imperatives and
their subsequent legitimisation. The institutional dimension of consolidation is perhaps
best interpreted by Samuel Huntington. In his view, consolidation is “the process by
which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability. Thus the level of
institutionalisation of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity,
autonomy, and coherence of its organisations and procedures.”3 On the socialisation
aspect it refers to the implementation, cultivation and promotion of the democratic
political culture free of prejudice. Briefly then, consolidation allows us to perceive the
overall success, failure endurance, and stability in a democratic polity.
Two theories of democracy
There are two dominant theoretical frameworks that that one is most likely to apply while
assessing the level of democracy in a society or polity. These are minimalist and
maximalist positions. The minimalist position emphasises regular elections, multiparty
political system, governmental succession by constitutional and electoral procedures, the
affirmation of rule of law and so on. Though these conditions are vital and indispensable
in any democracy, the maximalists’ take a much more broader view of democracy than
this. In the maximalist framework the nature of social justice, human rights, broadened
popular participation, redistribute socio-economic reforms, promotion and protection of
minority rights, civil-military relations are also crucial conditions that need to be applied
to any polity to assess the level of democratic consolidation there.
While the minimalist position refers to democracy the maximalist position implies
democratisation. Therefore, if democracy suggests an ideal end state, it is imperative that
the concerned society or polity has undergone the democratisation process. In other
words, the end of democratisation would logically imply the unveiling or the emergence
of democracy. 4 The maximalist position then, is a part of the fulfillment of minimalist
agenda. Thus consolidation of democracy is subject to the fulfillment of all the avowed
goals enshrined in these two frameworks.
Most Western democracies are considered to have fulfilled all the conditions
highlighted both by the minimalists and maximalists. Interestingly, the Third World
polities are now being assessed in the same framework. There is hardly any breach in the
Indian democratic practice if one holds on to the conventional minimalist definition of
democracy such as rule of law, constitutional supremacy, multiparty political system etc.
It almost certainly fulfills all the criterias that are dear to minimalists’. However, India’s
record of democracy can be quite unsettling if one applies the maximalist argument
which sets out a socio-economic framework to measure democratic consolidation. On
balance, the four main essentials of minimalist and maximalist definitions of democracy,
then, are rule of law, multiparty political system, supremacy of civilian rule and its
regular succession, and most important of all redistributive socio-economic justice. I shall
broadly discuss their implications in the case of India.
Politics of reservation and democratic consolidation
From a maximalist stand point, affirmative actions are one way of redressing inequality in
the society. So far as democracy is concerned such provisions not only allows the
minorities a stake in the mainstream political culture but forecloses the ‘dictatorship of
the majority’, through consensual politics. The maximalist theory further posits that
reservation of seats at every level of public participation in politics is politically
necessary and just. Indeed, many Third World democracies have embraced such
provisions in recent times considering it bien trouvé. The founding fathers of the Indian
constitution were pioneers in this matter, however.
When Indians inherited their state from Britain, in 1947, it was in a messy
situation. The onus on the founding fathers, therefore, was to devise a system which will
generate confidence among the country’s diverse and conflicting communities. They
conceived the policy of reservation and enshrined it in the constitution to allow certain
communities to come up faster until the principle of equality is assured. Yet one also
needs to bear in mind that while securing these provisions they did not permit its
perpetual perpetuity. They thought it wise and pertinent to win over the trust and goodwill
of the depressed communities and minorities, by reassuring them that, although the
constitution would one day like to shed these provisions the communities concerned can
continue with these guarantees until they are a part of the mainstream culture. Fifty years
on, as more and groups demand reservation the original ideal of affirmative action
appears to have lost course.
The efficacy of reservation of seats from the lowest political institution the Gram
Panchayt to the highest body, the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the parliament can be
questioned.5 Ironically, what was once prescribed as a medicine has become a dietary
habit. Reservation of seats at al levels of government including that of the elected offices
has become a norm in contemporary India. A brief assessment of India’s record of
affirmative action reveals that it is deeply flawed. First, it has prevented the emergence of
a shared citizenship. Second, reservation has fragmented the society into neatly isolated
communities while reinforcing their inherited prejudices. Third, it has curbed the chances
of shared collective life and ruled out an interactive democratic community and has
communalised politics. To put it slightly differently, the provision of reservation of seats
in Indian politics for depressed groups has frozen the communities, rigidified their
internal structures, and arrested the growth of common bonds and a shared political life.
Fourth, reservation has intensified caste and communal politics. For instance, in those
constituencies where the seats are permanently held by a particular community those
outside it feel alienated and often resort to violence. The eastern province of Bihar is a
glaring example of this. The gangland wars there between the upper and lower caste
groups is an outcome of the policy of reservations.
Furthermore, reservation has also affected the nature of party politics. True,
multiparty system ensures healthy extension of democracy and allows variety. However,
an overwhelming growth of parties that too based on narrow, parochial, regional, caste
and communal identities is surely not an advantage. Between 1990-1998 India has had
five different governments at the centre. Clearly, on an average each government enjoyed
one and half years of rule instead of the prescribed five years. The government of V.P.
Singh toppled on the issue of reservation for other backward castes or OBC’s.
Contradictory as it may appear, critics argue that the Congress Party succeeded in staying
in power by implementing the policies of reservation for which V.P. Singh lost his
position. In some instances, MP’s belonging to reserved categories and caste based parties
have determined the very survival of a government by supporting or withholding their
support in India’s precarious multiparty system.6
At regional level, in provinces like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the successful
continuation of a party-in-power has come to depend solely on the politics of caste and
reservation. This has not only affected the process of governance but led to overall chaos
and violence. Uttar Pradesh is a case in point. Every time the party representing the
depressed caste comes to power it overtly makes policies against the upper caste
community. The process is repeated, conversely, of course, when the party sharing the
upper caste aspirations forms the government. In Bihar, the politics of caste and
reservation until recently allowed its casteist Chief Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav to run
the province like his personal fiefdom. While manipulating the depressed castes Mr
Yadav not only stifled the voice of healthy effective opposition but blatantly ignored all
democratic norms. The upper castes in this smudgy politics have taken resort to
terrorising their hapless lower caste electorate. To vent their anger, they have in fact
repeatedly massacred their lower caste counterparts.7
Currently Indian parliament is debating reservation of another kind. This time it is
for women who constitute about 46 per cent of India’s populace and are largely backward
compared to their counterparts elsewhere in the world. In spite of their backwardness, at
present, women hold 8 percent of seats in the lower house of parliament and a similar
share in state assemblies.8 The move is to reserve a third of the seats in the national
parliament and state assemblies for women. In theory, such provision would not only
improve the general condition of women but also enrich democratic ideals of equality of
sexes by helping women to come forward. This practice has worked in the Nordic
countries where a combination of political will, party quotas to ensure gender
representation and a general acknowledgment of women as a salient political factor has
brought about equal representation of sexes in participatory democratic process.9 In
practical terms, however, in ‘quota-happy India’, women’s reservation may not result in
attaining the desired result, is the opinion of many theorists and even feminists. In a
society where women are traditionally bound to the household it will be a daunting task
for them to build a political base of their own. Since they will be contesting from a
reserved seat they will actually depend on others to create this base and unwittingly
become hostages of these workers, party bosses, and to the latter’s larger agenda and
interests. In India, where family ties are very strong, the chances of women in the
category of daughters, wives and even mistresses serving as proxies to their male relatives
would be very high.10
In a large and developing country like India, election is a very costly and time
consuming affair. It not only involves the actual spending of money from the state coffer
to conduct the process but resources lost in terms of working hours. Usually elections to
the lower house of parliament is a three-day-affair in India and it takes another two weeks
before the results are announced. Similarly, the provincial election involves at least one
day for polling and a week to announce the results. Indians are gregarious by nature and
every election provides an opportunity to temporarily escape the pressures of everyday
existence. The date from the announcement of the election till its completion with the
declaration of the results the entire period is observed in a charged atmosphere often
having its toll in public sector where precious working hours are idled away. Though
there is no precise data available, as yet , on election and its impact on Indian economy, it
is a common knowledge that the economy suffers every time Indians go to polls. In
addition, frequency of election apart from draining the economy is also failing to produce
stable, reflective and effective government.11 The increasing use of politics of reservation
instead of providing any solutions is most likely to compound the problem.
Elites, Under Class and Governance
Structural adjustments and neo-liberal economic reforms are regarded vital for many
Third World economies and also considered crucial for the healthy extension of
democracy. Indeed, a commonly-held neo-conservatives position is that democracy is
inseparable from capitalist market forces. Furthermore neo-conservatives and the new
orthodoxy assume that “there are no inherent tensions, conflicts, or difficult trade-offs
over time between the various goals of development - such as growth, democracy,
stability equity and autonomy.”12 It is true, that restrictions and rulings imposed by
multinational corporations and other global financial institutions has forced the elite to
respect the political ideals of democracy in many countries. That these external checks
and balances play a vital role in consolidating democratic institutions is beyond dispute.
But does this consolidation lead to larger socio-economic redistributive justice in the
maximalist framework of analysis? One of the standard long-term contention is that such
economic reform creates a rich elite and the benefits of such reforms does not necessarily
permeate to all levels of the society. Also, economic restructuring has meant a
fundamental transformation in the role of the state. In its 1997 report, Amnesty
International argued that in the structural adjustment process “the right of people are
frequently given less weight in public policy than the interests of the capital”. According
to a leading critic, “in the Third World capitalist countries democracy is confined to the
middle classes and organised sectors of the urban society.”13Though not entirely
convincing there is some element of truth in this argument.
In the case of India, however, one is not entirely sure whether the country with its
largest middle-class in the world and even a much higher depressed underclass14and a
burgeoning market economy can rightly be called a Third World capitalist democracy.
Moreover, institutionalisation of democracy in India does not require intervention by the
external financial institutions. Still, it is a worthwhile exercise to study the impact of
liberalisation and the attendant economic benefits and the level of its percolation to
different stratum in the Indian society. “A 1997 Gallup poll suggested that two out of
three Indians believe their standard of living has fallen or stagnated after five years of
economic reform.”15 Those affected have responded to it in several different ways. In the
Southern state of Andhra Pradesh more than one hundred farmers have committed
suicide, owing to effects of liberalisations. A similar number of farmers, artisans, forest
dwellers have been killed by police while protesting against the economic policies of the
state.
Interestingly, in spite of its alleged role in increasing the gap between the rich and
the poor, liberalisation nonetheless has unwittingly boosted popular participation in
democracy. Ignored by the system and untouched by the developmental mechanism rural
Indians are now increasingly turning to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) for the
promotion and preservation of their very livelihood. Of the 70 per cent of India’s
population who are farmers most belong to several different grassroots organisations. The
NGOs, in turn, have been instrumental in organising these groups and communities. As a
result, there is now a grassroots movement throughout India against all forms of stateoriented developmental projects that bypass the interest of the depressed and the deprived
or tries to trespass into their traditional resource base such as forests, rivers, mountains
and so on. This new initiation of the economically backward communities and farmers
into participatory democratic process has severely restricted the power of the state. A
case in point is Government of India’s postponement of Patent Amendment Act from
being passed into law following massive country-wide agitation. Moreover, rural Indians,
in recent years, have formed successful parallel institutions like collective seed banks,
village level financial institutions, village courts etc. that limits the role of the state. The
avowed goal, it would appear, is to establish Gandhian development based on selfreliance and village-level democracy.
If genuine democratisation entails a shift in the state power i.e. within national
units, groups, communities and individuals, there has been considerable devolution in the
authority of the India state following liberalisation. Elites who have historically
represented the Indian state and engaged in its preservation continue to be important. Yet,
unlike other Third World societies their absolute control of the state is in decline in
India.. The protest movements, in this analysis, can be defined as popular forces who
have come to demand that the national state must serve ‘as a focus for their own
identities, and as a source of basic material needs’.16 On balance, one can argue that
liberalisation has led to two opposite developments in India. From a maximalist point it
has failed to ensure socio-economic redistributive justice. However, so far as popular
participation in the democratic decision making is concerned there is a steep rise.
But are these developments compatible with ‘good governance’ - another factor
closely related to democratic consolidation. In current usage ‘good governance’ means a
democratic capitalist regime, presided over by a minimal state which is also part of the
wider governance of the New World Order.17 Most political parties in India, except the
left ones, have responded well to the liberal economic reforms, albeit with some
reservations. Thus these governments fulfill the ‘obligations of a capitalist regime’.
Second, external flow of capital has restricted the role of the state. Third, and finally the
state, its institutions and the individuals are now a part of the New World Order. This
form of ‘governance’ is a narrow and self-serving agenda imposed on many Third World
states by the international financial institutions, multinationals and other capitalist
regimes. While such prescriptions serves the elites in the society and the outside investors
well, it sits ill at ease with the economically depressed and other backward communities
who depend on traditional resources-base. Naturally the long-term effects of such
democratisation process is proving to be disastrous. In the 1980s reviewing the state of
India’s uneven socio-economic growth a leading expert had suggested pro-lower class
institutionalised reforms within the state structures to eradicate poverty and inequality.18
Call it welfare or socialist measures such recommendations, it appears have very little
scope in an era of the globalisation of Indian economy.
Democracy, Hegemony, Separatism and Secessionism19
Divisions in terms of ethnicity, religion, language etc., are major impediments to the
attainment of stable democracy. Challenges imposed by these divisions are particularly
severe in many Third World countries. Apart from striking at the roots of the state these
cleavages undermine the overall progressive political culture by promoting narrow
parochial identities. Furthermore, in a variety of ways, “direct and indirect, ethnic,
linguistic, and religious conflicts can be conducive to authoritarianism, and in at least
equally various ways, democracy can facilitate either majority rule and the exclusion of
minorities or minority rule and the exclusion of majorities.”20 The more deeply a
democratic regime is mired by secessionism the more autocratic it is likely to become
towards the latter.
Though democracy in India is more institutionalised than most other Third world
countries, it faces the same dilemmas and challenges in the realm of governance as the
latter. After a period of long three decades of relative calm there has emerged a growing
opposition against the state. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s the Punjab served as
a hot-bed of Sikh separatism. Similarly, at present, the central government is in the
middle of a full-blown secessionist war in the province of Kashmir and there is a massive
opposition against the state machinery in the north-east mainly in Assam. Though the
coverage of these secessionist movements is wide-spread how the Indian state has kept
these separatist tendencies at bay within the democratic framework has not received much
attention. A section of the academic community, albeit a minority, posits that the main
form of management of the ethnic, religious and other culturally distinct communities and
their incorporation into the national mainstream was possible in the past not because of
ideals of democracy but owing to the Indian state’s ‘hegemonic control’.21 While there is
some truth in this argument, it is, too simplistic a conclusion that avoids taking into
consideration the national security issues and the overall rise in ‘clamour for identity’
across much of the world.
Institutional decay and manipulation of democratic ideals can also disorient
distinct communities and add fuel to secessionism. The insurgency war in Kashmir can be
seen in this light. Since Kashmir occupied an especially sensitive geopolitical area and
consisted of an overwhelmingly distinct religious community compared to the rest of the
country the management of the state was a delicate affair. For a while the Indian state
mediated democracy in Kashmir and hoped to restore it fully through an evolutionary
process. However, pressures imposed by Pakistan and real and imagined fears of Kashmir
breaking away from India, forced New Delhi to adopt policies that gave low priority to
democratic transparency. 22 Ironically, in their effort to promote democracy the central
government bureaucrats’ and various regimes regularly tampered with elections results
and rigged votes in the province. The opposition to such practices was initially confined
to protests and greater autonomy but was soon transformed into militancy and
secessionism.23
Ethnic conflict feeds authoritarian tendencies in democracies. Typically
characteristic of any other state, depending on the severity of the crises and to maintain
national integration and national security New Delhi has resorted to various authoritarian
options including direct rule and the deployment of para-military and military personnel
to curb anti-state activities. That these interventions are a blow to democracy, is without
dispute. Fortunately, unlike many Third World countries, the Indian state remains equally
committed to the restoration of the institution of democracy, even sometimes bestowing
favouritism if that helps generate popular confidence. Following the Rajiv-Longowal
agreement of July 1985, the Congress Party by abstaining from the provincial elections
‘in effect, permitted the Akali party to win the election with ease’.24 It is currently
following a similar policy in the troubled-province of Kashmir by encouraging exmilitants to participate in the democratic process provided the latter forfeit violence.
Consolidation and dissemination of democratic ideals can alternatively be
tampered by majority-minority scuffle. The exclusion of minorities by the majorities as a
rule leads to separatist and secessionist tendencies. In a reversal order, if the minorities
‘shut out’ the majority it can also affect the nature and employment of state power and
ultimately determine the course of democracy. In the Punjab and Kashmir the Sikhs and
Muslims respectively targeted Hindus who were in a minority in these two provinces. The
Hindu minority almost completely migrated out of Kashmir at the height of Islamic
fundamentalist terrorism and a campaign of ethnic cleansing between 1990-91.25 In the
north-eastern state of Assam those belonging to non-Assamese origin have often been
singled out by the majority and encountered displacement and death. If a regime is
committed to pluralist principles it is expected that it follows it throughout the country.
A large-scale violation of minority rights, property and their forced eviction through
several terror-mechanism virtually made it impossible for the central government not to
intervene in the provincial politics and put restrictions on the democratic rights of its
institutions.
As the situation deteriorated, the central government authorised military
machinery came down heavily in these troubled regions. On several occasions these
interventions have been severe and led to gross human rights violations. While such
moves demand condemnation in the strongest possible terms, that the state has acted in
these situations in accordance with the preservation of ‘national priorities’ cannot be
ignored. Moreover, in the framework of humanitarian intervention whether a particular
state has the right to intervene in those parts of its territory engulfed in sectarian and
secessionist violence needs reassessment. In fact, one of the ironies of democratic
development is that, as the future is being planned, the past intrudes with increasing
severity.26 Interestingly, New Delhi does not consider insurgency to be national liberation
struggles, but rather treats them as attempts to destabilise India’s democracy and unity.27
Perhaps we can absolve the Indian state of accusations of authoritarianism and violation
of the principles of democracy in the Punjab, Kashmir, Assam and the north-east, if we
take into account its overall commitment to democracy, nation-wide.
Civil-Military Relations: Consolidation of Civilian Authority?
Though armed forces are a part of the state they are, in fact, in subordination to the
constitution which is civilian in nature. This is perhaps the basis of civil-military relations
in all democracies, and where such boundaries are disdained or ignored democracy
suffers a setback. On an average, nine out of ten Third World states, at one point of their
career, fell in the hands of authoritarian rulers or their political process was manipulated
by the military. A variety of reasons have been put forward to explain and reverse this
trend.28 However, the most important, factor that needs mentioning is the nature of the
political culture. Most African states’ that emerged after centuries of colonisation lacked
a matured democratic political culture. They were also at disadvantage so far as
institutions of democracy were concerned. A lengthy transition to independence, it is
argued, during which a strong structure can develop is conducive to sustainable
democracy.29 Most African states bypassed this transitional process. Since democracy in
such societies were ‘planted’ soldiers continue to succeed in their intervention in the
politics as fewer and fewer people have the will to defend the already defunct or nonexistent democratic structure.30 By contrast the political society of India, which has
sustained its democratic institutions was in the making for nearly a century prior to the
country’s independence.31 This served as an ideal backdrop against which Indian
democracy flourished.32
Yet, given the country’s massive military machinery and the seer number of
conflicts that the state has to mediate and manage one would expect some sort of military
intervention in Indian politics. In fact, on two occasions in the post-independence Indian
history the military could have intervened but did not. The first incidence was the SinoIndian war of 1962 and the second one was the 1975 National Emergency rule by Indira
Gandhi. More recently, in 1984, after the Operation Blue Star incident a section of the
military personnel from two different Sikh Regiments rose in mutiny with the explicit
though unplanned aim of overthrowing the national government.33 Military
insubordination to civilian supremacy was expressed once more by the Chief of Navy in
1998. In an unprecedented move, however, the president of the republic sacked Admiral
Vishnu Bhagawat on 30 December 1998. The government maintained that the decision
was taken “consciously and deliberately, in the face of action which threatened the
established structures of democracy, the traditional neutrality and objectivity of India’s
armed forces as well as national security”.34No doubt civilian sovereignty over military is
one of the benchmarks of the consolidation of democracy.
Traditionally, the role of military has been to maintain national security.
Additionally, many states use the service of their military in times national disasters such
as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, fires and so on, and in restoring law and order. To put
simply, they are used to help tide the situation over lean time. However, to confine the
role of the armed forces only to the above mentioned purposes would be incorrect.
Increasingly the use of armed forces to contain internal dissension in several democracies
that lack a homogenous national identity is in the rise. Are the principles of democracy
compromised in such cases then? And how far is it correct to use the military to restore
and implement democratic institutions and values in a divided society such as India?
India’s military machinery that was once apolitical has been periodically brought
into the state’s political arena to curb the growing levels of violence that are mostly
offshoots of the nation’s politics.35 Ironic as it may seem, in a reverse order, the civilian
regimes have come to use the military to maintain their authority in parts of India.
Consolidation of democracy one would like to think is best carried out by civilian
procedures. In provinces like Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and Assam the Indian state has
used its military to curb disruptive forces and check anti-nationalist tendencies. From a
state-centered perspective such interventions have helped restore democracy. Here Punjab
is cited as a case in point.36 Still, the statist argument that a civilian regime has every
authority to use its force against a section of its mutinous populace or a troubled seditious
region if it helps restore constitutional government and foster mainstream nationalism37
does not sit well in the larger democratic framework. Moreover, the longevity of
democratic consolidation through military intervention is also questioned. Through
various military maneuvers followed by civilian negotiations New Delhi brokered peace
in the troubled north-east in the 1980s.38 After a brief period of democracy the region has
now returned to status quo ante. Chances of similar developments in Punjab and
Kashmir, therefore cannot be ignored.
Some inferences
Democratic consolidation is an evolutionary process. Unlike liberal western democracies
where consolidation is likely to stay once the targeted goal is achieved, it is subject to
constant change in the Third World. Pressures imposed by external economic institutions,
internal ethnic, linguistic, and religious divide and the politics of affirmative action can
destabilise institutions of democracy and hinder democratic consolidation.
If ‘democracy is an act of faith’39 in the sense that each individual, group,
community and society have the right to represent their views there is certainly a
sustained mass progression in that direction in India. At the same time, however, it
negates democratic consensus. The argument that the Indian state is the embodiment of
‘institutional consensus’ among the social and cultural pluralities40 therefore needs
reassessment. Our application of two theoretical positions to gauge consolidation
suggests that while some of the basic ideals of democracy have been met many have
been trampled in the process. Given its enormous size, population and accompanying
problems such failings might appear natural. Nonetheless, by and large the Indian state
offers its citizens an open and competitive political culture. However, one is not entirely
sure whether to call Indian political participation as democratic consolidation or chaos.
Notes
1
Paper prepared for the ECPR Joints Sessions of Workshops, Democracy in the Third World: What
Should be Done? 26-31 March 1999, Mannheim, Germany. Amalendu Misra, Department of Politics and
Asian Studies, University of Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, United Kingdom. E-mail: [email protected]
2
Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990, p. 139.
3
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968,
p. 12.
4
Shahid Qadir, Christopher Claphamand Barry Gills, ‘Sustainable democracy: formalism vs. substance’,
Third World Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 3, 1993, p. 417.
5
More than one fifth of a total 547 seats in the lower house of the Indian parliament is reserved for
members of scheduled castes and tribes.
6
For a discussion on politics of reservation, constitutional amendment and the role of political parties and
individuals, see Thomas Paulose and Gurpret Kaur (ed.) Parties, Politics and Parliamentary Democracy,
(mainly Ch. 1), New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1996.
7
The upper caste private militia The Ranbir Sena, accused of massacring several lower caste Biharis in
the district of Jehanabad, on a number of occasions has maintained that it was forced to resort to such
extreme measures as the law and order situation under the government of Laloo Yadav espousing only the
lower caste causes was inadequate the life and property of the upper caste.
8
9
‘India a blow for women’, The Economist, 19 December 1998, p. 95.
Anne Phillips, Democracy and Difference, Oxford: Polity Press, 1993, p. 115.
10
Perhaps the most glaring example can be found in Bihar. When Chief Minister Laloo Yadav was
implicated in corruption charges he quickly passed over the mantle to his illiterate wife Rabadi Devi.
Rabadi Devi’s farcical rule lasted for about one year until she was ousted by the Governor under the
provisions of President’s rule.
11
Atul Kohli, India Defies the Odds: Enduring Another Election’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 9, no. 3,
July 1998, p. 7.
12
Adrian Leftwich, ‘Governance, democracy and development in the Third World’, Third World
Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 3, 1993, p. 605.
13
Samir Amin, ‘Democracy in the Third World’, in D. L. Sheth and Ashish Nandy (eds.), The Multiverse
of Democracy, New Delhi: Sage, 1996, p. 78
14
In spite of rapid and massive modernisation and a growing middle class, almost 60 per cent of the total
populace i.e. 600 million people are desperately poor and live in backward areas.
15
Kathraine Inez Ainger, ‘In India, peasants are burning crops, mocking their leaders - and dying. Here’s
why...’, The Guardian, 27 January 1999.
16
Shahid Qadir, Christopher Clapham and Barry Gills, ‘Sustainable democracy: federalism vs substance’
Third World Quarterly, p. 417.
17
Adrian Leftwich, ‘Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World’, p. 611
18
Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987, p. 228.
19
One needs to make a clear analytical distinction between separatism and secessionism. While separatism
refers to demand for greater autonomy within the state, secessionism might contain the tendency to ‘break
away decisively from the existing dominant political authority’. And the Indian state is embroiled in curbing
both separatist and secessionist movements.
20
Donald H. Horowitz, ‘The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: Democracy in Divided Societies’, Journal of
Democracy, vol. 4, no. 4, October 1993, p. 20.
21
For a good discussion on ‘hegemonic control’ in the case of Punjab and the argument which
nonetheless can be applied to other regions such as Kashmir and the north-east, see Gurharpal Singh, ‘Reexamining the Punjab Problem’, in Gurharpal Singh and Ian Talbott (eds.), Punjabi Identity: Continuity and
Change, New Delhi: Manohar, 1996, pp. 115-38.
22
For a good discussion on this aspect, see Sten Widmalm, ‘The rise and fall of democracy in Jammu and
Kashmir’, Asian Survey, vol. xxxvii, no. 11, November 1997, pp. 1005-1030.
23
For a stimulating interpretation of protest movements in the Punjab and Kashmir and its subsequent
transformation into full-scale secessionist war, see, Maya Chadha, Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in
India (especially Ch. 6, pp. 122-44), New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
24
Maya Chadha, Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in India, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997,
pp. 136-37.
25
T.N. Madan, ‘Coping with ethnicity in South Asia: Bangladesh, Punjab and Kashmir compared’, Ethnic
and Racial Studies, vol. 21, no. 5, September 1998, p. 985.
26
Donald Horowitz, p. 23.
27
Sagarika Dutt, ‘Identities and the Indian State’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 3, 1998, p. 427.
28
For a good discussion, see S. R. David, Defending Third World Regimes from Coups de’État, Lanham:
University Press of America, 1985.
29
Robert Pinkey, Democracy in the Third World, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993, p. 97
30
Robert Pinkney, p. 66.
31
A. H. Somjee, The Democratic Process in a Developing Society, London: Macmillan, 1979, p. 11.
32
A contemporary study details seventeen other related factors which have contributed to India never
having experienced a military coup. See, Apurba Kundu, Militarism in India, London: I. B. Tauris, 1998, p.
6.
33
For a detailed account of Operation Blue Star and the events that followed, see Mark Tully and Satish
Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi’s Last Battle, Calcutta: Rupa, 1985.
34
Prabhu Chawla and Manoj Joshi, ‘Sunk’, India Today, 11 January 1999, p. 19.
35
Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 4.
36
After years of terrorism, the civilians of Punjab indeed welcome the intervention by the army and their
presence sanctioned by New Delhi under the code name “Operation Woodrose”.
37
For a related discussion on this point, see Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (especially the section titled
‘Our Patriotism -their Nationalism’), London: Sage, 1995, pp. 55-9.
38
For an exhaustive discussion, see Bhagwan D. Dua, ‘Federal Leadership and Secessionist Movements on
the Periphery’, in Ramashray Roy and Richard Sisson (eds.), Diversity and Dominance in Indian Politics,
vol. II, Division, Deprivation and the Congress, New Delhi: Sage, 1990, pp. 189-218.
39
40
Ashis Nandy, ‘The Political Culture of the Indian State’, Daedalus, vol. 118, no. 4, 1989, p. 23.
Rajni Kothari, Politics in India, Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970.