T H E O F F I C E R C O R P S IN NEW S P A I N :
THE M A R T I A L C A R E E R , 1 7 5 9 - 1 82 1
By C h r i s t o n
I.
Archer
Murió Flon, gañe el doblon
Doblo a puesta, a que perece Calleja
Allende volverá, y a Venegas prenderá.
¿ Y los Europeos que hay ?
Pagarán la prisón de Iturrigaray1.
Few young Mexicans of the good social classes considered the
prospects of obtaining a commission to serve the army of New
Spain. Indeed, until the Seven Years' War, Mexico possessed little
in the way of a professional military for the career oriented and
the provincial militias were recruited on an ad hoc basis for the
duration of hostilities. Attempts to march hastily gathered units
to the defense of Veracruz resulted in resistance by officers who
suddenly were too old, disabled, ill, or beset by their family and
business obligations. Their erstwhile soldiers deserted upon learning about mobilizations and because they knew about high
mortality rates on the coast caused by yellow fever, malaria, and
other endemic and epidemic diseases. Peninsular officers expressed revulsion at the confusing racial composition of the Mexican population which was reflected in the provincial officer
corps. The idea of Indians, lobos, coyotes and as many castas
as one could describe serving together under officers of dubious racial origins drove some Spanish commanders close to
apoplexy. This was not at all improved when almost all of the
Mexican officers and soldiers no matter what their color insisted
that they were Spaniards or white. Although regular army
majors, subalterns, and NCOs were assigned to the militia regiments instruct the part-time soldiers and to inculcate some
1) Anonymous broadside, Mexico, 1810, Archivo General de la Nación,
México (cited herinafter as AGN), Operaciones de GueiTa (OG), vol. 446. Translation: Flon died, I won the doubloon / I will double the stakes, I bet
you / that Calleja dies. / Allende will return, and take Venegas / And what
of all the Europeans who are left? / They will pay for imprisoning Iturrigaray.
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martial values, most senior commanders agreed that reforms were
almost impossible. Totally exasperated by the chaos he found in
1768, Inspector General of Infantry Marques de Torre wrote:
" . . . all majors, officers, sergeants, and corporals assigned to the
imaginary provincial regiments eat their salaries without any service or occupation" 2 .
Beginning in 1764 with the mission of Lieutenant General
Juan de Villalba, the imperial regime had posted a fairly significant cadre of peninsular officers in Mexico to discipline approximately six infantry regiments, several units of cavalry and dragoons, and a number of frontier and coastal formations. These
were to be headed arid inspired by one or two peninsular Spanish
regiments stationed for short terms in the colony to provide an
example of military virtues for the Mexicans. Although the exact
size and composition of the Mexican army became a matter for
acrimonious debate and constant adjustments, certain basic factors became evident. First, the segment of the Mexican population available to offer candidates for regular and militia commissions acceptable to peninsular commanders was comparatively
small. Men considered suitable for army commissions were occupied totally with mining, agriculture, commerce, or the professions3 . Second, European Spanish officers avoided postings in
New Spain where promotions came slowly if ever and there were
few opportunities to return to the peninsula4. Third, because
colonial service was a dead end to career advancement, the imperial high command used Mexico as a dumping ground for incompetent, troublesome, and lazy officers with records blemished
by drinking, gambling, and sexual immorality.
2 ) Antonio Joaquin de Llano y Villaurrutía to Viceroy Antonio Maria
Bucareli, February 1, 1775, AGN, Indiferente de Guerra (IG), vol. 202-B;
and Dictamen del Marqués de la Torre, Inspector General de Infantería en
punto de milicias del reino de Nueva España . . . , October 24, 1768, AGN:
IG, vol. 36-B.
3 ) Félix María Calleja to José Miguel de Azanza, October 8, 1798, AGN;
IG, vol. 157-B.
4 ) Conde de Revillagigedo to Antonio Vald<fs, no. 528, April 30, 1790,
Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla (AGI), Sección 5, Méjico (Mexico), leg.
1538; and Revillagigedo to Conde de Campo de Alange, no. 177, Archivo
General de Simancas, Simancas (AGS), Guerra Moderna (GM), leg. 6966.
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Naturally there were exceptions to the generally poor quality
officers to be found in New Spain. If a subaltern or captain
arrived in the retinue of an inspector general or a viceroy-elect,
he could gain sufficient recognition and advancement to launch a
successful military career. It was essential for officers to maintain
close connections with a senior patron either in Mexico City or
even better in the imperial military hierarchy in Madrid through
family connections or established ties with a political patron. The
careers of officers such as Félix Calleja, José de la Cruz, and
Torcuato Trujillo — to mention three officers who will appear in
this paper — illustrate how talent blended with connections to
advance careers and to prevent personality flaws and mistakes
from becoming costly disasters. Calleja arrived in Mexico as a
regular army captain in 1789 with Viceroy Conde de Revillagigedo. Through careful grooming of his career, hard work, and
considerable military aptitude, he managed to impress a succession of viceregal patrons, to marry a criolla heiress, to lead the
royalist armies to victory in the Hidalgo and Morelos Revolts,
and finally to assume the viceregency himself. In an army where
talents were scarce, intelligent officers such as Calleja could break
out of the general pattern to advance quite quickly through the
ranks to colonel, brigadier, or even field marshal. On the other
hand, Joaquín Gutiérrez de los Ríos, a relative of the imperial minister of War, Marqués del Campo de Alange and married
to a daughter of the fabulously wealthy Fagoaga family of New
Spain, needed little talent to advance his military career. He was
named colonel of the Provincial Regiment of Puebla and retired
at 60 years of age in 1810 as a full brigadier 5 .
Unfortunately, for every successful officer there were hundreds who passed their careers in what they termed "involuntary
servitude" stationed with some obscure militia unit where they
were forgotten for decades. Many of the lieutenants and sublieutenants who arrived in Mexico in 1764 with Juan de Villalba and
5) Marqués de Branciforte to Campo de Alange, no. 109 reservada, November 3, 1 7 9 4 , AGI, Mexico, leg. 1438; and Audiencia of Mexico to Minister of War Francisco Eguia, no. 5 3 , June 26, 1810, AGN, Correspondencia
de los Virreyes (CV), series 1, vol. 2 4 6 .
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Christon I. Archer
who were assigned to serve in provincial militia units were still to
be found in the same posts thirty years later 6 . In 1795, Lieutenant Félix Nuez, a regular officer attached to the Fourth Militia
Division of the Pacific Coast since 1764, received a transfer to
hold the same rank in the newly formed Regimiento de Dragones
Provinciales de la Reina at San Miguel. His wife wrote to the
viceroy stating that Nuez was dangerously ill from a liver infection and diarrhea, had not been paid for months and had no
money to pay for the move, and he had a family of eight dependents to support 7 . While other officers may not have suffered all
of the disabilities of Lieutenant Nuez, they gradually lost interest
in the army, married and produced large families, developed business connections with their communities, and purchased land
that consumed their full attention 8 .
By the end of the 1780s, the imperial government terminated
its policy of stationing peninsular regiments in New Spain. Severe
erosion of these units due to desertion and disease and the international situation forced an end to what had been a wasteful
program. Although a few good officers would continue to be
transferred to Mexico with the succession of viceroys, the Mexican army became an entity frozen in terms of personnel until the
Hidalgo Revolt. Officers aged in service and lacking adequate
retirement and pension plans they refused to step down in favor
of captains and junior subalterns. Despite severe physical incapacities, ancient officers clung to their commands rather than
accepting poverty in high-priced Mexico 9 . Many officers had
married without obtaining full permission of army authorities in
Madrid — a process which took years and included extensive
investigations of genealogy and family finances — and thus were
Manuel Antonio Flórez to Valdés, no. 94, January 25, 1788, AGI,
Mexico, leg. 1515.
7
) María Gertrudis to Branciforte, 1795, AGN, Sección de Historia, vol.
489.
8) Pascual de Cisneros to Bucareli, July 13, 1778, AGN: IG, vol. 361-A.
This document outlines the total uselessness of the officers assigned to the
Lanceros de Veracruz.
®) Pedro de Gorostiza to Rcvillagigedo, January 25, 1790, AGN; IG,
vol. 66-B.
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not eligible for pensions to wives and dependent children 1 0 . Colonel Agustín Beven, age 74 years, could not mount a horse and
his physician declared that he was in no condition to travel.
Beven informed the viceroy in 1794 that he could not be expected to serve with his troops except in good climates. Since the
major danger came from Veracruz and the tropical lowlands
where invasion forces might land, Beven was admitting his uselessness t o the army 1 1 . In 1808, Colonel Ignacio Maneiro, 68
years of age, was so ill and physically crippled that he had to
witness a viceregal review of his regiment wrapped up in a cape
enclosed in a coach 1 2 .
In regiments such as the regular Dragones de México and España, the aging of senior commanders eroded the ability of the
units to maintain acceptable levels of discipline and control.
Younger officers lost their sense of subordination and dedicated
their time to gambling, drinking, and other amusements. Their
cost of living transcended their salary expectations forcing many
to borrow heavily from battalion and company funds 1 3 . Searches
of these units for captains apropos for promotion produced lists
of malicious malcontents, incorrigible idlers, the chronically ill,
and those who had gone stale years before awaiting advancement 1 4 .
The obvious answer to the problem of aging and the shortage
of officer candidates was to recruit more criollos to replace the
fading peninsulares.
Here, however, the old
criollo-gachupín
10
) Reglamento del Monte Pío de Viudas, Huérfanos, y Madres de Oficiales Militares, 1761, and Real Declaración de 17 de junio de 1773 . ..,
AGN: IG, vol. 23-A.
11
) Agustín Beven to Branciforte, October 26, 1794, AGN: IG, vol.
282-A.
> 2 ) Conde de la Cadena to José de Iturrigaray, February 13, 1808, AGN:
IG, vol. 356-A.
13
) Revillagigedo to Campo de Alange, no. 9 8 9 reservada, August 31,
1793, AGN: CV, series 2, vol. 26.
14
) Revista de Inspección, Regimiento de Dragones de México, October, 1790, AGN: Historia, vol. 155; and Revillagigedo to Campo de Alange,
no. 1126, February 28, 1794; AGS: GM, leg. 6 9 6 7 ; and Branciforte to
Campo de Alange, no. 153 reservada, January 15, 1795, AGI, Mexico, leg.
1438.
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Chris ton I. Archer
rivalry intruded with both sides exacerbating ancient grievances
and new difficulties. Some officers alienated other privileged corporations and the royal jurisdiction by pressing too hard for
expansion of the fuero militar. Many peninsular officers harbored
anti-Mexican biases which were not diluted even after years of
residence in New Spain. Viceroy Revillagigedo (1789—1794) frequently discussed "natural lassitude", "indolence", and other impediments of native Mexicans of all classes 15 . It was not surprising that provincial officers responded to gachupín haughtiness.
At the town of San Miguel in 1804, soon to be a hotbed of
insurgency, the peninsular major, Vicente Barros Alemparte, sent
to administer the Dragones Provinciales de la Reina was abused
and resisted by the part-time criollo officers 16 . Barros Alemparte
aggravated existing feelings by preventing the regimental musicians from playing at weddings and dances, and by his own campaign to marry an aunt of his wealthy regimental colonel Narcisco de la Canal. Because the major of a provincial militia regiment
was the most senior regular army officer in the unit, he held very
important financial, administrative, and training duties as well as
representing the senior command in the provinces. If the colonel
and other officers who were largely criollo in origin became entangled in disputes with the major, the regiment was reduced to
chaos.
By the mid-1790s, the lingering mistrust of criollo officers by
Europeans had to be forgotten. The total involvement of the
Spanish Empire in the international struggles commencing with
the outbreak of the French Revolution meant that very few
peninsular officers would be available. Viceroy Marqués de
Branciforte (1794—1798) tapped the criollo passion for social
position and recognition by permitting the wealthy classes to
donate large sums of money to the army in exchange for provincial militia commissions and some honorary privileges. Dispatching
a number of army commissioners to the major cities of New
l î ) Revillagigedo to Valdés, no. 50, July 12, 1790, AGN: CV, series 2,
vol. 30; and Revillagigedo to Valdés, November 12, 1789, AGI, Mexico, leg.
1531.
16
) Vicente Barros Alemparte to Ignacio García Revollo, August, 1804,
AGN: IG, vol. 3 2-A.
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Spain, Branciforte created an effective alliance with the criollo
elites that produced sufficient officers to command the expanded
militia army 1 7 . While some regional elites were not inspired to
compete for military privileges and an attractive uniform, bidding wars made regimental and battalion commands exceptionally
costly to the donors and raised the prices of captaincies and
lieutenancies 18 .
As might be expected, officers who had bought commissions
for social purposes did not bargain for years of active duty in
cantonments, service in the fetid climate of Veracruz, or any of
the other dangers normally attached to army life. While most
wealthy hacendados, miners, and merchants accepted their first
period of active service at Orizaba, Cordoba, and Jalapa from
1796 to 1798, they resisted subsequent efforts to attach their
companies to regular army regiments garrisoned at Veracruz. The
part-time officers disappeared on extended business trips leaving
others to be mobilized who supported seven or eight children 19 .
Needless to say, the renewed war with Britain in 1804 found the
provincial officers much less enthusiastic about the army. Viceroy
José de Iturrigaray (1803—1808) encountered numerous petitions from militia officers who argued that old age, pressure of
business, illness, and other factors prevented them from joining
the cantonments 2 0 . By 1807 and 1808, the senior militia officers
who represented the landowning, stockraising, and mining elites,
were fearful about the state of their abandoned businesses; many
developed severe rheumatic pains and other political illnesses
designed to get them home. The Conde de Casa Rui, commander
of the Regimiento Provincial de Valladolid, calculated that his
17) See Branciforte to The Comisionados para el establecimiento de milicias, December 24, 1794, AGN: IG, vol. 270-A; and Christon I. A r c h e r ,
The Army in Bourbon Mexico, 1 7 6 0 - 1 8 1 0 (Albuquerque, 1977), 157.
18
) Colonel Josef Antonio Rengel to Branciforte, February 25, 1795,
AGN: IG, vol. 156-B. Some officer candidates of the new Batallón de Guanajuato stated that they had not been consulted, others lacked the wealth
to hold a commission, and one claimed that he was illiterate.
i») Juan Fernández Millar to Azanza, January 24, 1799, AGN: IG, vol.
143-A.
20
) Iturrigaray to Caballero, no. 934, November 26, 1805, AGN: CV,
series 1, vol. 225. This document listed 7 captains and 13 lieutenants who
claimed exemptions from service.
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Christon I, Archer
enormous mining and hacienda interests suffered incalculable
damages after he had spent three years on active duty. He requested and received permission to return home in order to
check up on his administrators and to settle family affairs. At
first Viceroy Iturrigaray was willing to concede retirements to
many officers, but the fact that no replacements came forward
caused him to slow the process and to suggest the promotion of
regular army sergeants to serve as subaltern officers 21 .
Following the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the overthrow
of Viceroy Iturrigaray in September, 1808, the vestigial Spanish
government of the Junta Suprema decreed the immediate dispersal of the Mexican cantoments. With New Spain in political turmoil and the metropolis all but occupied by the French, existing
weaknesses in the military system of New Spain became accentuated. Both regular and provincial militia units were broken up
into small police garrisons in the cities or disbanded to their
homes. There, disenchanted militia officers determined to escape
any renewed mobilizations. The overthrow of Iturrigaray by a
group of gachupín conspirators in Mexico City had the impact of
smashing the existing system of military patronage which
emanated from the viceregal palace. Iturrigaray's army commanders — including Félix Calleja and other senior officers of the regular army and ten provincial militia brigades — adopted a policy
of political neutrality in an atmosphere that seemed dangerous to
careers. Brigade commanders and regimental colonels relaxed
controls over their far-flung units; in the process they helped to
set the scene in which some regiments such as the Dragones de la
Reina and the Regimiento de Infantería de Celaya fell into the
hands of Miguel Hidalgo's insurgents22. To confuse matters even
2
!) Iturrigaray to Caballero, no. 1322, July 16, 1807, AGN: CV, series 1,
vol. 234; Iturrigaray to Caballero, no. 1354, August 27, 1807, AGN: CV,
series 1, vol. 234; and Iturrigaray to Antonio Olaguer Felin, no. 1592, April
30, 1808, AGN: CV, series 1, vol. 237; and Conde de Casa Rui to Iturrigaray, August 25, 1808, AGN: IG, vol. 301-B.
22
) Lucas Alamán identifed the dissolution of the army as an important cause of Hidalgo's early successes. He blamed Pedro Garibay who
succeeded Iturrigaray for having dissolved the Jalapa cantonment, but in
fact the orders came from the provisional regime in Spain. See Lucas A 1 á m a n , Historia de Méjico, I (México, 1968), 248.
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more for army officers, family connections and patronage ties
with the metropolis were no longer of any use. Indeed, many of
the most powerful army chiefs and politiceli leaders of Spain had
been discredited in the failure of the army against the French or
had joined forces with the invaders.
It was in this chaotic situation that the Mexican army had to
respond to the insurrection of Miguel Hidalgo. Clearly, none of
the military commanders of 1810 were ready for large-scale
domestic violence. Some senior officers feared a French or British
landing on the Gulf Coast, but most were keeping the lowest
possible profile while they awaited the arrivili of Viceroy Francisco Javier de Venegas. Throughout New Spain, officers were confused and unprepared for the challenges which lay on the horizon. Moreover, the factors of old age, shortage of trained officers, disorganization, and the crioUo-gachupín division between
regulars and provincial militia officers would slow the military
response to the insurgency. Even in 1811, the field marshals and
brigadiers available to the royalist army were of advanced age,
poor health, or in political offices that kept them far from the
battlefield. Indeed, of the commanders listed in Table 1, only
Félix Calleja and J o s é de la Cruz played major roles in the counterinsurgency. Fortunately, Venegas brought with him several
senior officers of whom Colonel of Militias J o s é Jalón, Commandante de Dragones de Granada Torquato Truxillo, Brigadier
Cruz, and naval Capitán de Fragata Rosendo Porlier were thrown
directly into combat against the insurgents. Cruz received command of the Army of the Right and orders to reopen the roads
from Mexico City to Querétaro before joining forces with Calleja's
Army of the Center. Jalón became commander of the provincial
Columna de Granaderos, an elite militia force drawn from the
existing infantry regiments. Trujillo led the royalist defense forces in the Battle of Las Cruces before taking control of the strategic province of Valladolid.
The arrival of these peninsular officers heralded an influx of
senior commanders and Spanish expeditionary regiments that
were to direct much of the decade of counterinsurgency warfare.
Because Spain of 1811 offered few opportunities for officers to
pursue their careers as military commanders until the French
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Christon I. Archer
Table 1: Senior Commanders of the Army of New Spain in 1811
NAME
FIELD MARSHALS:
1 Garcia Dávila
2 Judas Tadeo de Tornos
3 Félix Calleja
BRIGADIERS:
1 Bernardo Bonavía
2 Conde de Alcarez
3 Miguel Costansó
4 Alejo García Conde
5 Dieao García Panes
6 José de la Cruz
7 José Dávila
AGE
71
54
65
60
71
80
DUTIES
administrator
administrator
active commander of the
Army of the Center
administrator
very ill
engineer
administrator
very ill
active commander of the
Army of Reserve
army administrator
Source: AGI, Mexico, leg. 1321, and other sources.
Table 2: Senior Peninsular Officers Transferred to Active Duties in New
Spain, 1 8 1 0 - 1 8 1 2
F ield Marshal Conde de Castro Terreno — arrived from Cádiz January 29,1812,
without specific posting.
Brigadier Manuel de Torres Valdivia — arrived from Cádiz January 30, 1812,
accompanied by his wife and one child.
Brigadier J u a n José Olazabal — Ayudante General del Estado Mayor del
Ejército, dispatched to New Spain, November, 1811, with the Regimiento
de Infantería Americano.
Brigadier José Moreno Daoiz — transferred by the Regency government,
November, 1811.
Brigadier Andrés Boggiero — transferred to Mexico by the Regency government to recover his health, March, 1812.
Brigadier José Osorio de los Ríos — transferred to the Estado Mayor of the
Plaza de México, J u n e , 1812.
Brigadier Melchor Alvarez — transferred with the Regimiento de Infantería
de Savoya to New Spain, August, 1812.
Brigadier Rafael Bracho — commander of the Regimiento de Infantería de
Zamora, arrived in Mexico, August, 1812.
Sources: AGI, Mexico, leg. 2420; and AGN, OG, vol. 878, 879, and 880.
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were driven away from Cádiz, the colony offered an alternate
theatre of where careers could be salvaged and new laurels won.
Prominent and well connected officers who under normal circumstances would not have considered service in New Spain were
more than pleased for an opportunity to escape Cádiz for an
overseas assignment 23 . Table 2 outlines some of the senior commanders who took up important military and political-administrative posts in New Spain.
If the French invasion wrecked the old system of army patronage emanating from Madrid, the war in New Spain created a
new and exciting alternative for many officers. Félix Calleja, José
de la Cruz, and other senior brigade, detachment, and garrison
commanders assumed powers far beyond anything exercised by
army officers prior to the conflict. While Viceroy Venegas remained a powerful officer patron in Mexico City, years of broken
communications and much greater flexibility for the field commanders altered the balance in their direction. Some officers who
had been passed over because of old faults or simply due to their
lack of access to a good patron discovered that combat accelerated their advancement. José Antonio Andrade, a career regular
officer born in 1763 at Veracruz, spent a rather uninspired career
for 30 years in the regular Regimiento de Dragones de España.
He labored — possibly against his criollo origins — to attain promotions and transfers, but as late as 1800 he was rejected for the
post of major in a militia regiment and described as a gambler unfit for advancement. Although Andrade had reached the rank of
lieutenant colonel by 1810, it was as commander of the backwater militia Escuadrón de Tulancingo. With the Hidalgo Revolt,
however, he emerged quickly as a tough counterinsurgency field
officer whose flying divisions smashed rebel formations to the
north of Mexico City. He lost his possessions twice during 1812
in the ill-fated defense of Orizaba against the Morelos forces, but
his reputation did not diminish. By 1816, Andrade commanded
the Regimiento de Dragones de Nueva Galicia; he was wounded
23
) Memo of the Regency Government at Cádiz, 1811, AGI, Mexico,
leg. 1321. The Inspector of Infantry at Cádiz had a list of officers who had
requested assignment in New Spain.
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Christon I. Archer
twice as he played a major role in the final assaults against
the forces of Francisco Xavier Mina. In 1821, he pronounced
with Pedro Celestino Negrete to join with the separatist conspiracy of Agustín Iturbide 2 4 .
The shortage of officers and changing situation in the pen insula allowed room for continued promotions of criollo officers
like Andrade. Although Spain was occupied by France arid a
theatre of war until 1814, the restoration of Fernando VII signaled the renewal of patronage ties emanating from the senior command of the Spanish army. Officers who had opted for Mexican
service in 1810 or 1811 found that they were isolated from the
centers of patronage and promotion competition by 1814 to
1816. Moreover, the colonial war showed every sign of remaining
a brutal and nasty counterinsurgency affair that seldom produced
military heroes and o f t e n damaged aspiring reputations. After
several years' service at Puebla against the Morelos forces, Brigadier José Moreno Daoiz, younger brother of Lieutenant General
Tomás Moreno Daoiz who had remained in Spain, invoked his
access to political patronage to return to the peninsula. Claiming
aggravated ills suffered during his tour of duty in New Spain, he
had the lieutenant general approach the Minister of War, the
Marqués de Campo Sagrada, to make the petition. Brigadier Moreno Daoiz received the permission he desired, despite having to
pay his own passage back to the mother country 2 5 . In another
case, Captain Antonio Mahy invoked family ties and connections
to get himself out of the Mexican army into a more lucrative position in the customs service. Mahy, a captain of dragoons, claimed powerful support from his brothers who were senior officers
in Spain and ties of friendship in the imperial cabinet stemming
from his deceased father Lieutenant General Nicolás Mahy. The
continuing patronage advantages of peninsular officers over criollos was demonstrated by the fact that both the Secretaries of
î4
) Azanza to Comet, no. 643, January 30, 1800, AGI, Mexico, leg.
1455; and Petition of Andrade, December 1818, AGI, Mexico, leg. 2420.
2S
) Marqués de Campo Sagrado to the Secretario de Hacienda, Palacio,
September 10, 1816, AGI, Mexico, leg. 2420.
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War a n d T r e a s u r y t o o k t i m e t o c o r r e s p o n d a b o u t M a h y ' s petition26.
Table 3 : Officer Candidates for Promotion to Captain of the 7th Company
in the Batallón Auxiliar de Santo Domingo of New Spain, 1813.
NAME
STATUS
The 4 most senior Lieutenants:
1 Manuel Enderica
Very ill and incapable of handling his present
responsibilities.
Jailed for slander against the former battalion
2 Antonio Noailles
commander.
Incapable of managing money because of
3 Juan Landero
heavy debts and addiction to gambling.
Possessed of sufficient martial talents, but
4 Miguel Buenabad
incapable as an administrator and known for
indecorous behavior and familiarity with
soldiers.
The 4 most senior Sublieutenants:
Well known for poor behavior.
1 Cayetano Muñoz
Known for indecorous customs, little appli2 Pedro Lemus
cation to duty, misuse of battalion funds,
and slander against senior officers.
Under charges for having sold muskets and
3 J o s é del Paso
other battalion property.
Had never taken up his post since his forma4 Manuel de Movillón
tion of the unit in 1810.
Source: Antonio de Mora, Accidental Comandante del Batallón Auxiliar de
Santo Domingo to J o s é Dávila, June 10, 1813, AGN: OG, vol. 246.
D e s p i t e the i n f l u x o f peninsular
o f f i c e r s a n d the m u c h g r e a t e r
potential for p r o m o t i o n within the Mexican a r m y , the old probl e m of l o c a t i n g s u i t a b l e c a n d i d a t e s f o r c o m m i s s i o n s r e m a i n e d t o
m a k e life d i f f i c u l t f o r c o m m a n d e r s . A s T a b l e 3 i n d i c a t e s , t h e
regular B a t a l l ó n A u x i l i a r d e S a n t o D o m i n g o l a c k e d a n y lieutenants and sublieutenants a p r o p o s for p r o m o t i o n to c o m p a n y
level. I n d e e d , t h e s e n i o r s u b a l t e r n s a p p e a r e d t o p o s s e s s all o f t h e
failings of the o r d i n a r y s o l d i e r s . While this b a t t a l i o n m a y b e said
t o r e p r e s e n t an e x t r e m e c a s e b e c a u s e it was s o m e t h i n g o f a de2 6 ) Nicolás Mahy to Manual López Araujo, Secretario de Estado y del
Despacho Universal de la Real Hacienda, Valladolid, Spain, September
4, 1816, AGI, Mexico, leg. 1322.
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pository for undesirable soldiers from the Mexican army, it was
more in need of dedicated officers than most other units. Reporting on the status of the Army of Reserve from Guadalajara
in 1815, J o s é de la Cruz informed that in the battalion of the provincial Regimiento de Puebla, there was no commander and all of
the captains and lieutenants were sick or feigning illnesses. The
colonel of the Regimiento de Infantería de Toluca had been
relieved of his duties for malversation of funds and illness, there
was no major, and four companies lacked captains. The Battalón
de Guadalajara had only one captain and both its colonel and
major were on duty far from the city as detachment commanders. Other units within Cruz's army suffered similar shortages
of officers 2 7 .
From the beginning of the insurgency, it became obvious that
the army could not depend upon the gachupín minority to present officer candidates. Most peninsular Spaniards — civilians as
well as army officers — could not adjust to the challenges that lay
before them. Félix Calleja complained bitterly that local governors and administrators refused to see the larger picture of general revolt and controlled whatever troops and supplies that fell
into their hands. Calleja attacked the gachupines for their "lack
of patriotism and criminal indifference" in avoiding military service unless they were offered the most senior commissions and
the best postings 2 8 . Placing his thoughts in the frankest terms
possible, he warned Viceroy Venegas that Spain would have to
accept reforms if Mexico was to be preserved and the "egotistical
and greedy Europeans {gachupines)"
could not continue to depend upon an army of "buenos criollos" for their salvation 2 9 .
Calleja was depressed to see Europeans abandoning New Spain in
an exodus that prejudiced royalist morale and drained the
province of desperately needed liquid specie. On October 26,
1813, Calleja published an order regarding general army enlistment in which he prohibited the use of royal licenses for the
) José de la Cruz to Calleja, February 3,1815, AGN: OG, vol. 161.
) Calleja to Francisco Javier de Venegas, January 28,1811, AGN: OG,
vol. 171.
2 9 ) Calleja to Venegas, January 29,1811, AGN: OG, vol. 171; and Calleja to Venegas, August 12, 1811, AGN: OG, vol. 190.
ì7
2β
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holders to return to Spain. As might be expected, Spaniards condemned the move as both arbitrary and despotic; they argued
that it was the right of any subject to move freely within the
30
empire .
Although Calleja made every effort to honor criollo officers,
the deep resentments surfaced whenever a gachupín officer acted
in a haughty and superior manner. Officers from Spain made frequent and unfortunate reference to the "infamous race" of Mexicans and mocked the gossip, denunciations, accusations, and
minor plots that were a part of provincial life well before the
rebellion. Brigadier Cruz made few friends among Mexican ranchers when he described local horses as "miserable rats" that did
not allow an officer to show any kind of military presence 31 .
Lucas Aláman noted that there were complaints in Mexico City
following the Battle of Las Cruces when gachupín officer casualties were buried with more fanfare and ceremony than criollos.
After the funeral of peninsular Captain Antonio Bringas, an
anonymous broadside complained 32 :
¿Bringas era gachupín?
Su entierro fué un S. Quintin.
¿N. era americano?
Su entierro fué liso y Uano.
Many officers of both criollo and peninsular origins reserved
their harshest criticisms for their comrades at arms. Field commanders such as Cruz condemned the attitudes of some officers who
seemed dedicated to avoiding any part of the conflict. Cruz damned the behavior of senior commanders such as Nemesio Salcedo,
Bernardo Bonavía, and Diego Garcia Conde whose fortunes
following the outbreak of the insurgency were quite different
than those of Calleja and Cruz. According to Cruz, Salcedo had
remained in the north well away from the hostilities; Bonavía
stayed "in his rabbit warren of Durango"; and García Conde
30
) Memos of the Consejo de Indias, April 6, 1815, and May 25, 1816,
AGI, Mexico, leg. 1146.
31) Cruz to Calleja, December 2, 1810; AGN: OG, vol. 206.
32
) Lucas A 1 a m á η , Historia de Méjico, I, 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 .
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dashed off like a "bolt of lightning to care for his intendancy at
Arizpe". Somewhat sardonically, Cruz pointed out to Calleja 33 :
"These officers will have much greater luck than us and their
reputations will be without blemish, or fear of loss, while here we
are exposed to accidents that can choke us and may send us to
the other world without us eating or drinking." Torcuato Trujillo, commander of the Division of Valladolid during 1811 and one
of Venegas's key men came under intense pressure demanding his
censure by other officers when he made public statements that
the senior royalist commanders "operate in infamy and cowardice having sought in the war only to maintain their personal
security" 34 . An impetuous soldier at the best of times, Trujillo
was relieved of his Michoacan command and detained in Mexico
City. Calleja described him as "a madman with a sword," but his
close ties with Venegas were sufficiently strong that he was able
to depart New Spain with his mentor in 1813 and to retire in
Granada as a full brigadier 35 .
Despite the various conflicts within the officer corps, the rebellion did develop esprit de corps, expand the political power of
army commanders, and enhance the power of the military in
relation to other institutions. The viceroys, intendants, and city
cabildos lost many traditional controls over the army to be replaced by regional military chiefs. The fact that the insurgency
was a multi-faceted guerrilla war caused a general breakdown in
communications and a gradual relaxation of powers from the
central regime in Mexico City to the district and provincial commanders 36 . Beginning in 1812, for the first time in Mexican history, army officers mobilized themselves to intervene in political
affairs. This occurred when officers of the Army of the Center
believed that their chief Félix Calleja was being subjected to
unjust criticism by politicians in the capital. In petitions to Venegas, Calleja's senior commanders and captains warned of "enor33) Cru« to Calleja, April 1 8 , 1 8 1 1 , AGN: OG, vol. 145.
3 ¿ h Bernardo Villamil to Calleja, August 3 0 , 1 8 1 1 , AGN: OG, vol. 181.
35) Lucas A 1 a m á η, Historia de Méjico, II, 57; and III, 241.
î 6 ) See Christon I. A r c h e r , "The Royalist Army in New Spain: CivilMilitary Relationships, 1 8 1 0 - 1 8 2 1 , " Journal of Latin American Studies,
Cambridge, 1 3 , 1 (May 1981), 5 7 - 8 2 .
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mous evils" if their general was forced to resign 37 . While Calleja
did not appear to be in any real danger, the willingness of his
officers to act upon his behalf demonstrated just how much
change had taken place in Mexico in the two years since the
outbreak of the revolution.
There can be no doubt that decentralization and isolation
caused by the insurgency permitted some army officers to make
fortunes. Brigade commanders responsible for dealing with captured booty, livestock, and property often directed much of the
proceeds into their own purses. Reports of confiscations and
recovered goods that should have been filed with the provincial
intendants and treasury officials were never written. Brigadier
Melchor Alvarez was charged with malversation of funds from
the Oxaca treasury and other financial abuses. Notwithstanding
Alvarez's defense, "I have no science in matters to do with the
treasury," the case against him was exceptionally strong. It was
clear that army regulations on confiscation of real estate, distribution of recovered property, and on many other fiscal matters
had been sadly neglected 38 . Viceroy Juan Ruiz de Apodaca recalled Alvarez to the capital to answer charges, but he was returned to Oaxaca when it was found that there were no other officers
suitable to govern the province and to head its army divisions.
The royalist victory over the interventionist forces of Francisco Xavier Mina in 1817 combined with Viceroy Apodaca's policy
of granting generous pardons to any insurgents who would put
down their arms, weakened the revolutionary cause. Although
many historians have overemphasized this view based upon
Apodaca's propaganda, the guerrilla struggle was far from over. It
was true that large conventional insurgent armies were a thing of
the past, but from the mountainous areas of Guanajuato, Zaca37
) Officers of the Estado Mayor of the Ejército del Centro de Operaciones to Venegas, January 30, 1812; and Captains of the Ejército de Operaciones, signed by nineteen captains to Venegas, February 1, 1812; AGN:
OG, vol. 165.
38
) Melchor Alvarez to Calleja, December 7, 1814, February 25, 1815,
and June 16, 1815, and Instrucción que ha de sugetarse todo comandante
de tropas que marcha en persecución de enemigos ó con cualquier otra
comisión del Servicio Militar, Conde de Castro-Terreño, April 24, 1812,
AGN: OG, vol. 1.
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tecas, and other provinces, and in the enormous region south and
west of Lake Chapala, the revolution continued. After the defeat
òf Mina, however, Apodaca dispersed the army of operations garrisoning the Spanish expeditionary regiments and Mexican forces
throughout New Spain. From the peninsular expeditionary army,
he sent the Regimiento de Zamora to Durango, the Regimiento
de Navarra to Zacatecas, the 1st battalion of the Regimiento de
Zaragoza under Lieutenant Colonel San Julián to San Luis Potosí, and the second battalion to Querétaro. Few plans could have
caused more damage and undermined royalist authority more
completely. When trouble broke out again in 1821, the best units
were spread out over the face of the country where they could be
seduced, isolated, or defeated piecemeal by Agustín Iturbide.
Almost as important, the garrisoning of the European units in
provincial towns created frictions about billeting troops and
renewed the criollo-gachupín conflicts. At Zacatecas, Brigadier
José Gayangos ordered residents to open their homes to officers
from the Spanish units, exempting only widows who supported
unmarried daughters 39 . By 1820 with the arrival of news of the
revolution in Spain, Gayangos reported meetings of the Zacatecas
populace outside the city at night. Soldiers of the Batallón Mixto, known locally as the Pelones or Dull Ones, used the pretext
of the return of the Spanish 1812 Constitution to create turmoil.
José de la Cruz dispatched additional forces to Zacatecas from
the Spanish Batallón de Navarra (renamed Barcelona in 1820) at
Aguascalientes. The friction ended temporarily but Cruz learned
of clubs, juntas, and conversations in Zacatecas and in other
cities such as Valladolid that favored the concept of Mexican
independence 40 . Cruz warned Viceroy Apodaca to avoid subdivision of the army and to reassemble an operational force. With
great foresight, he feared another 1810 uprising in which the
royalist military would not have sufficient force assembled to
respond immediately to danger.
In Spain, the Riego Rebellion and restoration of the Constitu39) José Gayangos to Cruz, February 1 5 , 1 8 1 8 , AGN: OG, vol. 153.
) Cruz to Juan Ruiz de Apodaca (Conde de Venadito), September 15,
1820, and October 4, 1820, AGN: OG, vol. 157.
40
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tion created a state of chaos comparable to the 1808 to 1810
period that had caused impotence in Mexico. Urgent requests by
Viveroy Apodaca in 1818 requesting 3,000 Spanish officers and
troops to fill vacancies in the expeditionary units occasioned by
retirements, deaths, and desertions, were not acted upon by the
imperial army until late in 1819. But before these troops embarked for Mexico from the Depòsito de Ultramar near Cádiz, they
were drawn into the Riego Rebellion and did not sail 41 . The
Spanish units in Mexico were left without reinforcements.
Again following the situation in Zacatecas, by the beginning of
1821 soldiers of the Batallón de Barcelona were fighting with
their counterparts in the Batallón Mixto. In one incident, two
soldiers were arrested by the guardia de prevención after they
were found fighting with knives and bayonets. Shortly after a
patrol from the Batallón Mixto under Sublieutenant José María
Santillón happened on the scene. Using the most foul language he
could think of, Santillón encouraged his men to open fire on the
peninsular troops stating that gachupines should not get away
with wounding one of their comrades. Some fifty to sixty léperos (rabble) who were present began to throw stones. With
these provocations, the Spanish troops fixed bayonets and opened fire. In the ensuing melee of musket fire and rock throwing,
the rabble mob grew in size and retreated to the slopes of the
mountain La Bufa behind the city. After the intervention of their
officers, soldiers of both battalions returned to their barracks.
Although this incident was relatively unimportant on its own,
similar events took place in many cities and towns of New
Spain 42 .
By February, 1821, Brigadier Agustín Iturbide had declared
his Plan de Iguala, joined forces with the Guerrero rebels at Tlacotepec, and robbed the Manila convoy on the road to Acapulco.
News spread of senior army commanders forsaking their allegiance and in many cases their Spanish heritage to proclaim their
support of Iturbide. Cruz's protégé and friend Brigadier Pedro
4
!) José de Ymar to the Secretano de Hacienda de Indias, Palacio, October 5, 1819, AGI, Mexico, leg. 2420.
42
) José Ruiz to Cruz, Zacatecas, February 18, 1821, AGN: QGrrvoL·
148.
•.caca
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Celestino Negrete joined the rebellion followed by officers such
as José Antonio Andrade, Anastasio Bustamante, the garrison of
Guanajuato, and other forces. In Guadalajara, Cruz reported on
March 31, 1821, that only 257 of 2,225 officers and soldiers in
his force were actually available for duty 4 3 . While the rebellion
sputtered momentarily it soon renewed its progress to involve
some of the most senior officers in the army. At San Luis de la
Paz, the 2nd battalion of the Regimiento de Zaragoza threw
down their arms to join Iturbide. They were joined by two companies of the Regimiento de Zamora led by Brigadier Rafael
Bracho and his second officer Lieutenant Colonel San Julián.
Most officers and soldiers embraced the rebel cause and the others
dispersed harmlessly into enemy country. The 1st battalion of
the Regimiento de Zamora capitulated at Querétaro with Brigadier Domingo Loaces and Brigadier Melchor Alvarez 44 . Loaces
made a show of resistance before losing two men and deciding to
surrender. At Puebla, Brigadier Ciriaco de Llano with the Regimiento de Extremadura gave up after an hour of fighting and the
loss of four men. By this point, the odds were stacked against
those forces that were willing to fight. Colonel Francisco Ebia of
the Regimiento de Castilla defeated a dissident force at Tepeaca,
but at Córdoba more than 3,000 rebels smashed his regiment.
Ebia died in the hopeless defense of a cannon 4 5 .
Confronted with the question, why did senior officers desert
Spain, one need not find answers in discussions of liberalism, conservatism, or the merits of the Spanish Constitution. For many
army officers, years of residence in Mexico, marriages and family
commitments in the province, and business interests had altered
their loyalties from Spain to Mexico. Many others were simply
caught up in the tide of rebellion and enjoyed little alternative
other than to join the movement. Their careers were ruined by
43
) State of the Nueva Galicia garrison, March 31,1821, AGN: OG, vol.
148; and Brian R. H a m η e t t, "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de
independencia, 1810-1821," Historia Mexicana XXVIII, 534 -535.
44
) Ayudante Mayor Domingo Travieso to Tomás Barrera, Cádiz, December 10, 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 1569.
45
) Aryso Garrido to Tomas Barrera, December 10, 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 1569.
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association with the loss of New Spain and probably they saw
little reason to face investigations and possible courtsmartial in
Spain. Clearly, many officers supported Iturbide because they
believed that his program would allow them to continue enjoying
the prosperity they had attained. Negrete, for example, lost no
time in taking full advantage of his new powers at Guadalajara to
charge two peninsular merchants 3,000 pesos and 1,000 pesos
for passports to leave Mexico 46 . Business was probably better
than it had been when he was a loyal commander of royalist
forces! Relatively few officers expressed the compelling ties of
loyalty of José de la Cruz who regarded his reputation and honor
"more than life itself" 47 . There were even fewer officers like
Ebia who were willing to sacrifice their lives for Spain. In what
was close to a comic opera finale — although lacking all humor —
the remaining Mexico City garrison deposed Viceroy Apodaca
and replaced him with Inspector of Artillery Francisco Novella 48 .
By this point, however, most senior officers had defected, the
garrison was unpaid, and the few remaining ragged soldiers were
blocked from any escape.
The Mexican army of 1821 was drastically different than the
subservient colonial force that had begun the war in 1810. Officers who had depended upon their links with viceroys in Mexico
City and the imperial command and patronage system of the
peninsula, now enjoyed considerable regional autonomy. The
long war decentralized power and made patronage rest upon the
military-political commanders of the Mexican provinces. Having
grown accustomed to powers abandoned to them by the wartime
situation, both pensinsular and criollo commanders wanted to
hold their gains. They had moved far beyond the normal role of
soldiers and developed a much greater stake in the economy and
society of Mexico. The criollo officers had both their country
4 6 ) Travieso to Barrera, December 10, 1821, AGI, Indiferente General,
leg. 1 5 6 9 .
Cruz to Venadito (Apodaca), May 1, 1821, AGN: OG, vol. 1 4 8 .
4 8 ) See Timothy E.
A n n a , "Francisco Novella and the Last Stand of
the Royal Army of New Spain," HAHR 5 1 : 1 (February, 1971), 9 2 - 1 1 1 ;
and Margaret L. W o o d w a r d , "The Spanish Army and the Loss of
America, 1 8 1 0 - 1 8 2 4 , " HAHR 4 8 : 4 (November, 1 9 6 8 ) , 6 0 1 ^ 6 0 2 .
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and the advantages they gained from the lengthy insurgency.
European officers had to mexicanize themselves by joining the
independence party if they wished to hold on to their positions
and property. Iturbide offered them the possibility of keeping
everything in exchange for their conversion from Spaniards to
Mexicans. In 1821, they could not see that the victorious criollos
would turn upon them once independence had been achieved.
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