Greater Kashmir
SRINAGAR | February 5, 2016, Friday
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IF INDIA GIVES NOTHING,
PAKISTAN WILL GIVE
NOTHING EITHER
I urge both countries to approach the coming talks not just
tactically but strategically
kASHMIR Ink
EXCLUSIVE
KHURSHID MAHMUD KASURI
I
have been asked by Kashmir Ink to write
about the Kashmir dispute and for my
views whether there was ‘a need to review
and rethink strategies’, as well as, to take a
critical look at the political movement of the
past quarter of a century, the existing challenges and the way forward.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST
QUARTER OF A CENTURY:
The past quarter century—the period under
discussion, starting from 1990 has seen the
radicalization of Kashmiri struggle for the
realization of their aspirations , as well as,
against militarization of the valley which
resulted in human rights violations. Concurrently, the leaders of Pakistan and India also
made efforts, off and on, to try and resolve the
issue of J&K.
The radicalization of the movement followed by the rigging in the elections in 1987
in which the Muslim United Front (MUF) candidate Muhammad Yusaf Shah who protested
against the rigging would later on become
Syed Salahuddin, chief of the militant outfit
Hizb-ul-Mujahdeen leading to some of his supporters like Muhammad Yasin Malik joining
the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation front
which has been formed in 1976 by Amanullah
Khan. The militancy in Kashmir took a step
further with the end of Soviet occupation in
Afghanistan and some of the Mujahideen after
Soviet exit from Afghanistan transferred their
attention to Kashmir. The killings in 1990 after
the appointment of Mr Jagmohan as Governor
saw a rise in suppression and consequently
also militancy. A large number of people died
in different incidents and this resulted in a
situation in which almost the entire population of the valley rose up and took to the
streets. The rising militancy and radicalization of Kashmir movement also led to the
exodus of Hindus in which almost the entire
Kashmiri Pundit community left the valley. It
was during that time, thousands of desperate
Kashmiri youth crossed over to Azad Jammu
and Kashmir to equip themselves for a violent struggle. With an estimated half a million
Indian security forces deployed in the Kashmir Valley since the 1990s violence and human
right violations became common place. This
led to tens of thousands of civilian casualties.
This led to a large number of people resorting to armed struggle against Indian occupation of Kashmir. Non-violent separatist
politics in Kashmir took a backseat until the
emergence of the Hurriyat Conference in 1993,
a Kashmiri separatist conglomerate of groups
comprising a large number of religious, political and other groups committed to striving
for independence of Kashmir through peaceful means. A year after the formation of the
Hurriyat Conference, the JKLF, announced
an end to its armed campaign and declared
to wage a non-violent struggle for Kashmir’s
independence.
Intifada: In June 2010 after the Indian Army
claimed to have killed three “Pakistani infiltrators” but it turned out to be a case of a fake
encounter in which three young villagers
were killed in a staged encounter. This had a
massive reaction and huge protests occurred
as a result of a call by Hurriyat Conference led
by Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Mirwaiz Umar
Farooq in the Indian Administered Kashmir.
They called for the complete demilitarization
of Jammu and Kashmir citing human rights
abuses by Indian security forces. The 2010
uprising by unarmed youth pelting stones at
Indian security forces exposed the rage of the
Kashmiri youth and foretold of an unsettled
future unless efforts were made to resolve
this long festering dispute of J&K between
the two countries. When we were in office, we
realised that regardless of technicalities and
legalities Kashmiris were an essential party to
the dispute and from a practical perspective
no solution would survive unless it met with
their aspirations; that is why I always wanted
to keep them in loop on the progress that was
being made regarding the framework. In my
book, I have described at length how despite
India’s objections to include them as a necessary party to the dispute, we did, as a compromise, convince the Indian government to at
least let the Kashmiris leaders travel between
Islamabad and New Delhi and Muzaffarabad
and Srinagar so that they could be kept in
the loop.
Apart from the development inside Kashmir, there were talks off and on between the
leaders of the two countries to try and find
a solution to the Kashmir dispute (as well
as Siachen, an offshoot of the Kashmir dispute) between Pakistan and India. Before
1990, efforts had been made between leaders
of the two countries including those by various Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Pandit
Nehru and more particularly between Pandit
Nehru and Ayub Khan. In 1987, efforts were
also made by General Zia ul Haq and Rajiv
Gandhi to reduce tension over Kashmir
through ‘cricket diplomacy’. Coming to the
quarter of a century under review, another
major effort (which initially held a lot of
promise—hence some details) was the meetings between Benazir Bhutto, the first female
Muslim Prime Minister in the world, the toast
of her times and the only celebrity the Clintons ever queued up to see, and India’s young
and handsome PM, Rajiv Gandhi. Both had
similar pedigree; Benazir was at Oxford and
Harvard, Rajiv at Cambridge. They got off
beautifully. There was a lot of promise in the
air and many felt the two would usher in a new
era of peace. Unfortunately, that was not to be.
Pakistan was flying high at that time, having
just seen the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan as a result of its efforts, supported by the
US, European allies, China and the Muslim
world. That it would have to pay a big price for
the policies crafted to tackle the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not the subject here.
Rajiv wished to go into the 1989 election with
the image of peacemaker-statesman and felt
peace with Pakistan could yield dividends.
Perhaps it could even make people forget
the Bofors scandal. He was also looking to
win Benazir’s support for ceasing Pakistani
support to the Khalistan movement. Benazir wanted India to withdraw from Siachen,
which it had stealthily occupied in violation of
the Shimla pact. Benazir claimed she had kept
her part of the bargain but Rajiv failed to deliver on his. According to her, Rajiv called her
while she was en route to a Commonwealth
meeting to tell her that he could not keep his
promise on Siachen but would do so after
polls. Some Indian analysts argue the promise wasn’t kept because Benazir didn’t have
her army’s support. But I strongly feel, based
on my experience as foreign minister, that if
India had withdrawn from Siachen, it would
have created the right atmosphere for solving other contentious disputes. I have given
all the details regarding this in my recently
published book. In February 1997, Pakistan’s
PM Nawaz Sharif, in a letter addressed to his
Indian counterpart I.K. Gujral, stressed that
without any progress on the Kashmir issue,
it would be difficult to initiate and achieve
meaningful cooperation between Pakistan
and India in various fields. This initiative led
to the commencement of Foreign Secretary
level talks. Significantly, it was the first time
since Simla Agreement of 1972 that India had
agreed to include Kashmir on the agenda of
talks. Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and
Vajpayee were also thinking of a negotiated
settlement on Kashmir and had even initiated
a backchannel for that purpose. Nawaz Sharif
has remained consistent in desire to solve the
dispute and since the new government led
by Mian Nawaz Sharif took over, conscious
efforts have been made to normalize relations
with India.
Now I come to the period about which I
can speak with some authority since as For-
While I welcome the resumption
of the dialogue between the two
countries, I urge both to approach
the coming talks not just tactically
but strategically. If India feels
that by just engaging Pakistan, it
may get over some of the existing
difficulties both inside Kashmir,
as well as, with the international
community it would be committing
a huge mistake. From my
experience I can predict that if
India gives nothing, Pakistan will
give nothing either and the current
dialogue process may be shortlived but if there is a genuine effort
and if India moves a yard, Pakistan
will move even more.
I would suggest to the two Prime
Ministers that they could appoint
anyone whether a politician,
a diplomat, a bureaucrat, a
businessman or a journalist; the
only condition was that such a
person must enjoy their complete
confidence with the ability to
speak to their principals at a
moment’s notice and without
anyone intervening in between.
eign Minister of Pakistan during 2002-2007 I
witnessed the most productive peace process
between the two countries since independence.
The years 1999-2002 saw high tension
between India and Pakistan—Kargil, the
inconclusive Agra summit, the Parliament
attack, then the largest mobilisation of troops
since World War II. Former President Pervez
Musharraf would say that Kargil highlighted
the need to resolve Kashmir but in my opinion, Pakistan paid a big diplomatic price and
faced international criticism. India’s invitation to Musharraf was a total reversal of its
stated stand since October ’99 not to deal with
a military regime in Pakistan. Many reasons
have been given for the Agra failure; Pakistanis and Indians, expectedly, have different versions. In my view, the fundamental
reason was the relative lack of any preparatory or staff work. It has always surprised me
how Musharraf, the architect of Kargil was
welcomed so warmly in India. All the major
channels in India gave top coverage to the
impending visit of President Musharraf. The
fact that President Musharraf was born in
Delhi was emphasized by the Indian media.
They discovered the ‘Nehar Wali Haveli’ the
ancestral home of President Musharraf which
was commented upon with great interest. The
media even produced an 80 or 90 years old
‘Aya’ (‘nanny’) from somewhere who seemed
to have excellent memory of the time she
spent with the child Musharraf. President
Musharraf visited the ‘Nehar Wali Haveli’
under the full media glare where he met the
old ‘Aya’ and showered her with many gifts.
This change and desire for peace in both the
countries occurred for many reasons which
I have detailed in my book. Inter-alia, Pakistan’s economy was doing exceptionally well
at that time, in one particular year it grew
at 8.6% second only to China’s 9.2%. Goldman Sachs had rated Pakistan among the
N-11 (next eleven emerging economies in the
world). The rising middle class in Pakistan
felt that peace with India would be helpful in
this respect. Similar factors were operating
with respect to India’s high growth economy
and the desire of Indian middle classes to normalise relations with Pakistan. It was in this
background that the friends of Pakistan and
India who had been trying to bring the two
countries closer that Prime Minister Vajpayee
on April 18, 2003, offered “a hand of friendship” to Pakistan. The US played a big role in
bringing the two countries together; Secretary
of State Colin Powell was in constant touch
with me at that time. We resumed the dialogue
with India, discussing all issues, after the joint
statement of January 6, 2004.
As a result, a lot of progress was made;
the commencement of the historic bus service across the LoC and between Srinagar
and Muzaffarabad in 2005 was a huge positive development and rightly compared to
the falling of Berlin Wall by many at that
time. A big achievement for Pakistan was
that despite opposition at certain levels, the
Indian government accepted its proposal of
permitting travel without passports and visas
to the people living on both sides of the LoC.
APHC leaders travelled to Pakistan without
passports, visas.
The morale of the Kashmiri leaders—Mirwaiz Umar Farooq,Yaseen Malik, Professor
Abdul Ghani Bhatt, Maulana Abbas Ansari,
Bilal Lone, Syed Shabbir Hussain Shah, Maj.
Gen. Sardar Muhammad Anwar, Sardar
Sikandar Hayat Khan and Barrister Sultan
Mahmood had begun to rise as the dialogue
between India and Pakistan began to gain
momentum and reports of progress on the
back channel started filtering through the
media. Unfortunately, however, I could not
convince the Indian government to let Syed Ali
Shah Geelani to travel to Pakistan. Not coincidentally, I could not convince him regarding
the Kashmir framework. Notwithstanding
all this, I believe that had our government’s
tenure not ended, and, given more time, we
might have succeeded in convincing him of
the immediate benefits of this framework for
the ordinary people of Jammu and Kashmir.
It is not without significance that even Kashmiri leaders like Mufti Mohammad Sayeed,
Mehbooba Mufti and Omar Abdullah who
took part in the elections said repeatedly that
the Kashmir dispute needed to be resolved
between India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris
and that the participation of the people during
the elections should not be taken as an acceptance of the status quo, the maintenance of
which, they said, was not a solution.
NEED TO REVIEW AND RETHINK
STRATEGIES?
Now I come to your question, whether there
is Need to Review and Rethink Strategies?
According to the leading analysts and thinktanks, the framework worked out during 20042007 would stand the test of time and at an
appropriate moment it would serve as a benchmark or a guideline when there are statesmen at helm in both the countries with the
required political will. Pugwash Conferences
on Science and World Affairs (an international
organization that brings together scholars and
public figures to work toward reducing the
danger of armed conflict and to seek solutions
to global security threats) in their reports on
Kashmir suggested that ‘People of Jammu and
Kashmir should be made part of any process
to resolve the Kashmir conflict and the four
point formula (It was 11/12 points described
below) that was under consideration during
2006-2007 should be revived as it can provide
an effective road map to peace in J&K.’ The
work on both sides was detailed and thorough;
in many cases, I even changed the punctuation. It was after approximately three years
of such painstaking work that we felt we were
nearing a stage where, after settling the few
remaining details, we would be in a position
to present the draft of an agreement to our
respective peoples and constitutional authorities for their approval. The major features of
the draft Kashmir agreement involved, inter
alia, gradual demilitarisation, self-governance
and a joint mechanism involving Kashmiris
from both sides as well as Pakistani and Indian
representatives in some form or another
(details regarding the nature of their participation was under discussion when the tenure
of our government ended). As far as we were
concerned, the purpose of the entire exercise
was to improve the comfort level of Kashmiris.
The joint mechanism envisaged cooperation
in various fields, including exploitation of
water resources and hydel power. In my book
I have given the details and contours of a possible agreement on Kashmir. Briefly these
involved, Demilitarization, The Challenge of
Non-state Actors: Centres to wean militants
away through DDR, Self-governance, international monitoring of elections in both parts of
J&K, Defining Units of Kashmir, Joint Mechanism, Common Policies Towards Development and Water Resources, Monitoring and
Review Process, LOC- ‘A Line on the Map’
and all of this, and more, to be climaxed by
the signing of a Treaty of Peace, Security and
Friendship like the Élysée Treaty between
Germany and France. Most importantly, there
was an unwritten agreement that neither side
would proclaim victory, once the details of the
framework had been announced.
The draft, it was felt by those in the loop
on both the Pakistani and Indian side, would
be acceptable to an overwhelming majority
of Kashmiris, Indians and Pakistanis. It is
impossible to find a solution that would be
equally acceptable to everyone. Admittedly,
it was a framework where some i’s needed
to be dotted and t’s to be crossed. Dr Henry
Kissinger, writing in March 2014 on how to
resolve the Ukraine crisis, says that in problems of this nature, “the test is not absolute
satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction”. I
am convinced what we had nearly achieved
was much better than this. The painstaking
labour and progress achieved then, I am sure,
will not go waste; the two sides will have to
begin from where we left rather than reinvent
the wheel when the time for earnest dialogue
and engagement is again propitious, with
statesmen at the helm in both countries.
EXISTING CHALLENGES AND WAY FORWARD:
The rise in influence of the RSS in Indian
Administered Kashmir could pose more problems leading to an even greater radicalization
and polarization of the people. We saw some
instances of this recently, particularly, over
the beef issue. I fear that unless concerted
efforts are made by the central leadership of
the BJP to control some of its extremist supporters in IAK, the situation would deteriorate further.
I had predicted in my book published
recently that Pakistan and India have no
option but to talk and that Prime Minister
Narendra Modi will eventually come back
to the table despite the hard rhetoric. I interacted with a large number of Indian politicians and media personalities during my
recent visit to India, according to whom the
“flip-flops” of the Modi government were an
illustration of the lack of clarity due to the
competing forces working around PM Modi.
Ground realities compelled him in the direction of a dialogue with Pakistan while his
attempts at appeasing his hardcore elements
took him in the opposite directions. While
I welcome the resumption of the dialogue
between the two countries, I urge both to
approach the coming talks not just tactically
but strategically. If India feels that by just
engaging Pakistan, it may get over some of
the existing difficulties both inside Kashmir,
as well as, with the international community
it would be committing a huge mistake. From
my experience I can predict that if India gives
nothing, Pakistan will give nothing either
and the current dialogue process may be
short-lived but if there is a genuine effort
and if India moves a yard, Pakistan will move
even more. Both will have to address each
other’s concerns seriously whether relating
to Kashmir, terrorism or any other issue. It
has become necessary for me to point this
out in view of the hardline posture adopted
by the current BJP government which in
turn has raised passions of some of its hard
line Hindutava supporters, Pakistan also has
very hardline elements who would not look
at coming peace talks positively. Both parties
need to understand they will have to show
leadership and expend political capital. If one
party gives nothing, it will receive nothing at
all in return. I have, however, seen that once
Pakistan and India start moving in a positive
direction, the improvement in their relationship can be quite speedy and very dramatic.
According to a recent news item in The
Express Tribune, Prime Ministers Nawaz
Sharif and Narendra Modi have decided to
use the ‘back channels’ for in-depth discussions on Kashmir through their respective
confidantes.’ Based on my experience, I
would suggest to the two Prime Ministers
that they could appoint anyone whether a
politician, a diplomat, a bureaucrat, a businessman or a journalist; the only condition
was that such a person must enjoy their complete confidence with the ability to speak to
their principals at a moment’s notice and
without anyone intervening in between.
(Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri is former Pakistan
Foreign Minister and author of ‘Neither a Hawk nor a
Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy’)
First published in the special new year issue of
GK Magazine Kashmir Ink
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