A edition
Battle of Tsushima was Real Network Centric Warfare
Rear ADM (Ret.) Kazuo ITOH
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Introduction
NCW Concept
Outline of the Battle of Tsushima
Information and Communications Network during the Battle of Tsushima
Telegraphs in Russia and Great Doubling of the Baltic Fleet
The Outcome of the War, from the Viewpoint of NCW Factors
Conclusion
Introduction
The 21st century is the age of information. War in the information age is said to be
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) rather than Platform Centric Warfare (PCW). The word
“NCW” first appeared in public in the thesis written by then Vice Admiral Cebrowski.1 He
talked about the Japanese Imperial Navy, which won the Battle of Tsushima in the
Russo-Japanese War, first proving on an actual battle site the effectiveness of NCW, and the
establishment of information and communications network, and the proper implementation of
wireless telegraphs, was contributing factors to the Navy’s victory.2
In this paper, I am going to explore how the information and communications network was
established, how wireless telegraphs were operated, and how network actually contributed to
the triumph, during which NCW was truly displayed. These were the crown of the sweat and
blood efforts by our patriotically-minded forerunners and predecessors, as well as the result of
the brilliant team work between sectors of the military, the government and individuals.
1 NCW Concept
(1) Background
The Gulf War, which the Iraq started in 1991, ended surprisingly without much difficulty
with the defeat of Iraq. The decisive difference between the coalition forces and the Iraqi
forces was derived from the gap in the capabilities of information gathering and technology.
The traditional style of a war, in which the number of platforms and the quality of weapons
has a great influence over the way of fighting, was not applied in the Gulf War.
Later, the United States recognized that war nature was shifting from PCW to another
style suitable for the information age, after evaluating and reviewing the value of information
and technology through the experiences of the Kosovo conflict, the Afghanistan War and the
last Iraq War. Thus, the backbone of the arrival of the concept of NCW had already been
introduced in the 21st century.
(2) What is NCW?
Now, the achievement of superiority in NCW had become a fundamental policy for military
development in the United States. The definition of the NCW can be described as set forth
below.
“NCW derives its power from strong networking of a well-informed but geographically
dispersed force. The enabling elements are a high-performance information grid, access to all
appropriate information sources, weapons reach and maneuver with precision and speed of
response, value-adding command-and-control (C2) processes and integrated sensor grids
closely coupled in time to shooters and C2 processes.”3
(3) NCW and the Three Victorious Necessities
Cebrowski opined that the following three elements are especially important to win a war
in the information age. Each of these fighting elements in a war will become greater in value
when concentrated on a network grid.4
・ Information Superiority
・ Speed of Command
・ Self-synchronization
2 Outline of the Battle of Tsushima
The Russo-Japanese War was kicked off with the Japanese Imperial Navy’s attack on
Russia’s Lushun on February 8, 1904. The Japanese Imperial Army landed on the Korean
Peninsula and marched to Manchuria by campaigning and confronting the Russian Army.
The logistic line of Japanese Imperial Army was stretched out due to marching into the
hinterland of Manchuria. It was the best for the Japan to terminate the war under favorable
condition during Japanese dominance on the field.
The only remaining concern for the Imperial Navy was a battle with the Russian Baltic
Fleet led by Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky. The biggest concern was the location of the battle.
The question was which Strait, amongst the Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits, the Baltic
Fleet would take to reach the destination of Vladivostok. Japan was nearly sure about the
route which the Baltic Fleet would take, having received various information, but it was still
unknown which Strait would be taken by the Russian fleet.
On a gray morning on May 27, 1905, Auxiliary Cruiser “Shinano-Maru” found the Baltic
Fleet going north in the west sea of Kyushu and reported it to the Japanese Combined Fleet.
Receiving this report, Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Togo immediately ordered sorties to the
Combined Fleet forces which were already waiting in Jinhae Bay in Korea. The Japanese
naval forces intercepted the Baltic Fleet in the northeast water of Tsushima and achieved a
complete totally destroyed the Russian Fleet. Upon this decisive victory and the conciliation
of the U.S. President, Theodore Roosevelt, a treaty of peace was concluded between Russia
and Japan in September 1905.
The above was a brief outline of the Russo-Japanese War. From the viewpoint of the NCW,
one can find many combat lessons that led up even to this information age.
3. Information and Communications Network during the Battle of Tsushima
(1) Wire Cables Network Infrastructure
In 1868, the Japanese new government decided that an electrical cable would be installed
and run by own hands. The government saw the condition of Southeast Asian countries being
colonized and he worried about allowing foreign capitals for installation of electric cables
could allow the foreign powers to have a stepping stone to dominate Japan. Since then, the
development of land lines was vigorously promoted initiated by this government policy.
Thus, the information and communications network infrastructure was at its highest
possible level during the period before the Russo-Japanese War was beginning.
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Vladivostok
Manchuria
Lushun/Port Arthur
Zhifu
Pusan
Shanghai
Fuzhou
Tsushima
Iki
Yobuko
Nagasaki
Figure 2-1 shows the layout of submarine
cables, except military ones, laid in the
surrounding sea areas of the Far East
around the time of outbreak of the
Russo-Japanese War. Most of these cables
were laid by the Great Northern Telegraph
Company in Denmark
(2) Military Water-Bottom cables
The Imperial Navy had secretly begun
laying provisional military Water-Bottom
cables before the beginning of the War.
Figure
2-2
shows
the
military
Water-Bottom cables locations.
Okinawa
Taiwan
Figure 2-1 Submarine cables in the Far East
To Ulleungdo
To Lushun
Shoshin Military Telegram
Service Center
Pusan
Jinhae Bay
Tsushima
Palgupo
Okinoshima
Iki
Yobuko
Jejudo
Ainoura(Sasebo)
Figure 2-2 Military Water-Bottom Cables 5
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Kottoi
(3) Wireless Telegraphs
Marconi from Italy, he succeeded communicating using a wireless telegraph using Morse
Codes in 1895. He continued remodeling and developing it. In 1902, an examination of
wireless telegraphs between a ship heading for America from Britain and the mainland of
Britain was successfully communicated across the Atlantic Ocean. With this success, it was
considered that the use of wireless telegrams for the purpose of ships’ communications.
The Imperial Navy was interested in it and ordered a quotation of Marconi’s telegraph, but
then the Navy had to give it up because of the vast amount of patent fees required, along with
expensive instrument costs. Minster of Navy, Vice Admiral Yamamoto recognized the
necessity of wireless telegraphs and decided to promote further development of Japanese
telegraphs. As a result, in October , 1903, they completed making a new wireless telegraph
that was capable of communicating a distance of 80 miles between ships, and the Imperial
Navy adopted it as the “ Type 36 Wireless telegraph”. It was four months before the
Russo-Japanese War began. Starting from the capital warship, all the destroyers and coastal
watchtowers were equipped with wireless telegraphs by the time the Battle of Tsushima
started.
(4) Coastal Watchtowers
The Imperial Navy had prepared alert positioning watchtowers in the coastal key areas.
Electric wires for telegrams were put up to each watchtower. Also, were specially selected to
be equipped with wireless communication system. Water-Bottom cables were laid to connect
to the watchtowers in isolated islands. At the time of the Battle, more than 200 watchtowers
had been established.
Figure 2-3 shows the locations and the numbers of the watchtowers in the surrounding
water areas of Tsushima Islands.
Telephone
Wire Telegraph
Wireless Telegraph
Figure 2-3 Costal Watchtowers 6
The patrol combatant ships at sea and the watchtowers were connected by wireless
telegraph, and the watchtowers and the key areas in the mainland, including the Imperial
headquarters were also connected by wired and wireless cable.
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4 Telegraphs in Russia
(1) Popov’s wireless Telegraph
In a school textbook in Russia, Alexander Popov is named as the inventor of the wireless
telegraph instrument. He developed a bell signal receiver whilst. This was nearly
simultaneous with the time Marconi invented. While Marconi’s receiver adopted a “decoherer”
cymoscope, which recover demodulation characteristics by hitting the coherer tube at every
reception of signal, Popov’s receiver used carbon cymoscope detection, which receives sound
signals by consecutively detecting magnetic waves.
However, Russia had never made preparation like Japan did for the development and
produce “Type 36 Wireless Telegraph” with the unity of military, bureaucrat, and civilian
sectors. The wireless telegraphs designed by Popov were produced in the Russian brunch
factory of Siemens Co., Germany (latter-day, Telefunken Co.).7
(2) Great Doubling of the Baltic Fleet
It was Russia’s great accomplishment that approximately 50 battle ships were brought to
Tsushima from Libau in Russia, 18,000 miles distant. Ships were all equipped with wireless
telegraph when they departed from Libau in October 1904. The wireless telegraph equipped
on Russian ships was mainly the product of Telefunken Co., which was called “Slaby-Arco”
type.8
Rozhdestvensky could not rely on their wireless telegraphs, which occasionally broke. The
Russian Fleet had made an accident of shooting British fishing boats right after their
departure from Libau. At that time, each ship in the Fleet emitted signals at the same time
and caused interference and confusion without being able to grasp the correct information to
know the true condition. This was one of the reasons for the commander not having faith to
the wireless communication system.
The Commander ordered silence mode to the Fleet on May 16, two days after leaving Van
Phong Bay, Vietnam. He thought that outgoing signals should be only allowed for his
necessity and wireless telegrams should only be used for the purpose of communication for
general administrative matters, but not for operational purposes.9
5. The Outcome of the War, from the Viewpoint of NCW Factors
Looking over the facts mentioned above, I can point out the root of Japanese Victory. I
consider that there are three key factors for winning a war: Information Superiority, Speed of
Command, and Self-Synchronization.
(1) Formation of the Information and Communications Network
The Imperial Navy secured its “information superiority” utilizing an information and
communications network and wireless telegraphs. The telegram from “Shinano-Maru” on
discovery of the Russian Fleet, arrived at 0505, and the Fleet Flag Ship “Mikasa” left the port
at 0555. The main unit of the Japanese fleet left at 0634. They made unusually “Speed of
commanding”. Information regarding conditions of the enemy such as the number, kind,
courses, speed and formation of ships came from the Cruiser “Izumi” she took over watch
mission from “Shinano-Maru” and was shared with each ship. Information such as the color of
the enemy ships as being black and the funnels being yellow was turned the information into
knowledge shared by all.
How remarkable it was that a network system comprising both wireless and cable
telegraphs between watchtowers and ships, contributed to the operational achievement.
There was a good example showing how well wireless telegraphs were used. According to
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telegraph communication records from the Warship “Izumo” the number of signals received
during the battle, was 117 messages on May 27, and 112 on May 28. If there was no use of
these telegraphic messages, it is open to question whether such a complete victory.
(2) Blocking the Russian Information and Communications Network
To gain own “information superiority” also means preventing the enemy from gaining
“information sharing”. Japanese military forces made various sabotage operations against the
Russian network.
The Japanese Imperial Army had cut off land telegraphic and telephone lines in Korea,
which were connected to both Qing and Russia, and the Imperial Navy seized control of
telegraph offices in Pusan and Masan before the beginning of the War. Communication lines
were connected from a fortress in Lushun to other places such as Dailaian, Mukden, and
further to Vladivostok and Europe through land cables. The Army also disconnected these
lines. There were submarine cables laid from Lushun to Zhifu in Shangdong Peninsula and
telegraphic cables connecting Lushun and the Russian inland via Zhifu. As a matter of course,
the Imperial Navy disconnected the cables in Zhifu right after the outbreak of war.
Furthermore, A Japanese navy officer broke into the Russian Consulate building in Zhifu and
vandalized its wireless telegram system. Also, the Navy broke away from the submarine cable
between Nagasaki and Vladivostok. The Navy evacuated cables from the sea, and reused
them as provisional military Water-Bottom cables linking among Korea, Tsushima, and the
mainland of Japan. This was brilliant and there was no waste of the methods they created.
(3) The Active Role of Dispatch Boats
The fine showing of dispatch boats should not be overlooked. One dispatch boat was
assigned to each Japanese fleet. When dispatch boats are located between ships engaging in
communications, the distance of communications becomes longer. Dispatch boats may be
allocated between the fleet and coastal stations and may link up telegraphic messages. The
Navy used the dispatch boats for information exchange with the shore by deploying them
inside and outside ports and offshore near watchtowers.
Moreover, dispatch boats undertook the role of relay ships for flag stream signals within the
visual signal range. Squadron one with six of battle ships and cruisers, always moved in trail
formation during combat, while Dispatch boat “Tatsuta” took a position on the opposite side of
the gunwale of the formation. In a trail formation, there is always time consumption for the
transition of the flag signal to reach to the last ship, since each ship has to receive the signals
from the next ship sequentially. However, if a dispatch boat is positioned there, the next ships
can raise their signal flags at once by observing the signals from the dispatch boat. The
performance of the dispatch boats can be regarded as an achievement of “Information
Superiority” and “Speed of Command”.
(4) Issues of Russian Navy’s Command and Control
The internal communications in Russian Fleet were not smooth. Rozhdestvensky who were
considered to be dogmatic and authoritarian, supposedly, there was atmosphere that no
subordinate officers could give one’s opinions or even questions. In fact, no operational
meetings were held when the Third Fleet, led by Rear Admiral Negogatov, joined to the main
fleet. No commanding officers of the ships were informed about the route to the destination of
Vladivostok, either. Without communications, the “self-synchronization” would be totally
beyond their power.
Military organizations require imperative command-and-control channels and
communication means. On May 23, four days before the outbreak of the Battle of Tsushima,
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Deputy Commander Rear Admiral Folkersam, who was on his sick bed, passed away, but
Rozhdestvensky kept it secret for the reason that the news would shatter sailors’ morale. The
Commander’s flag praised the “Oslyabya”, on which Folkersam had been on board.
The Sea Battle began at 1408 on May 27. Russia’s flag ship “Suvorov” had been damaged
and became no better than an obsolete vessel after 30 minutes from the beginning of the
battle. The Commander in Chief was also wounded severely and became incapable of
commanding the ship. However, it was at the dusk of that evening that Negogatov finally
heard from Destroyer “Bezupreshchny”, about the transfer of the wounded Commander to
Destroyer “Buiny”, and his reception of the commanding authority as the
Commander-in-Chief. Nebogatov raised a signal “Conform to Movements of me, Steady on
course 023” but the timing had been already lost. There had been no command since 30
minutes after the outbreak of the sea battle. It was obvious that the Russian fleet were not
able to exert their combat power enough given the absence of commanders.
Conclusion
Initially, the tile of this essay was “NCW and the Battle of Tsushima” However, I decided to
change the title “the Battle of Tsushima was a true NCW”. I strongly recognized how
extensively the NCW was unreeled during the entire the Russo-Japanese War.
I have respectful admiration for the men who succeeded in developing a communication
system to be used in actual battles within a short time, and the efforts and sense of
responsibility of the people who formed the network and developed wireless telegraphs for the
nation.
Considering this, it is regrettable that the Japanese became high-handed and stopped
thinking forward after the victory of the Russo-Japanese War. As a lesson from the War, the
things emphasized were the naval aspects such as the strength of ship amour and the size of
the warships, arms capability such as artillery powers, and tactical matters as represented by
fire techniques and a T-shape formation tactic. There was even a clause of combat lessons
such as “spirit of attacking whenever enemy ships were seen.” Was there such a big difference
between spiritual strength and morale between the Japanese and the Russians? There were
many Russian officers and sailors who died with the sinking ship because they refused to
become a captive by surrendering or being rescued, or those who continued firing guns from
the ship whilst it was sinking.
Scant differences of machine power (material) and tactical power (immaterial) could appear
as a huge margin because the Combined Fleet fought under the umbrella of “information
superiority.” Cebrowski once said, taking a stance based on the concept of NCW, that
modern-day war could be won even with the weapons used during World War II, as long the
war was engaged in with information superiority.10 We should know that the value of
information has been relatively more reinforced than the value of weapons in the age of
information.
Emotional spirits and morale can change overnight but science and technology always
make us faced with reality. I think that education related to science and technology is
necessary for naval officers. We need to remember as a historical fact, there were many people
who thought about the future of Japan and understood the true nature of information and
communication.
Kind acknowledgement to Takuya Ueji for assisting with the translation.
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NOTES
1. Arthur K. Cebrowski, “Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future”, Proceeding,
January 1998
2. Lecture, Japan Maritime Staff College, Tokyo, 25 October 2000.
3. Cebrowski, op.cit.p.35.
4. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka and Frederick P. Stein: Network Centric Warfare (CCRP,
1998) from http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_NCW.pdf
5. Chief of Japan Imperial Navy, “Gokuhi-bon Meiji 37-8-nen Kaisenshi (Japanese), (Naval
War History 1994-1995, Secret)” Dai-4bu, 4kan, Gunyou-Denshin-Renraku Suiteisen
Ichiranzu (Chapter4, Section4, Figure Military Water-Bottom Cables), 1911. This is in
safekeeping in the archive of National Defence College.
6. Ibid, Sasebo-Chinjifu-Kannai Bourouzu (Figure Sasebo-District Coastal Watchtowers)
7. Ichirou Tomizawa, “Kaisen wo meguru jouhou tuushin kankyou to A.S.popov (Japanese),
(A.S.Popov and Circumstances of Telecommunications Technology for Naval Battles)”,
Journal of the Pacific Society, May 2005, pp. 24-29.
8. Ibid, p.31.
9. M. Domecq Garcia, “Nihonkai-kaisen kara 100-nen −Argentine Kansen Bukan no Shogen−
(Japanese), (After a hunded years, from the Battle of Tsushima −Record by Argentina
Military War Observer at Tsushima−)” Taka- Shobo-Umi-Press, 6 April 2005, p.256.
10. Lecture, Japan Maritime Staff College, Tokyo, 25 October 2000.
PERSONAL HISTORY
Name: Kazuo ITOH
Date of Birth: 14 September 1947
Present Post: NTT DATA Corporation (September, 2003 – Present)
Advisor, National Security Business Unit,
Second Public Administration Systems Sector
Office mail address: Toyosu Center Bldg. Annex, 3-9, Toyosu 3-chome,
Koto-ku, Tokyo 135-8671, Japan
Office E-mail address:[email protected] (My return address)
Office Phone numbers: +81 3 3532 7269
Office Facsimile
: +81 3 3532 7348
Present Address: 20-18, Maekubo Minami 2-chome, Moroyama-cho, Irumagun, Saitama-ken,
350-0463, Japan
Education: March 1970, Graduated from National Defense Academy
Business Career: April 1970 – August 2003
Japan Maritime Self Defense Force
Retired as Rear Admiral, Deputy Superintendent Officer Candidate School
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