Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition
I99fi; Vol. 22. No. 5, 1196-1207
Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0278-7393/96/$3.00
Processing Narrative Time Shifts
Rolf A. Zwaan
Florida State University
This study examined how the chronological distance between 2 consecutively narrated story events
affects the on-line comprehension and mental representation of these events. College students
read short narrative passages from a computer screen and responded to recognition probes. The
results of 4 experiments consistently demonstrated that readers used temporal information to
construct situation models while comprehending narratives. First, sentence reading times increased when there was a narrative time shift (e.g., as denoted by an hour later) as opposed to when
there was no narrative time shift (e.g., as denoted by a moment later). Second, information from the
previously narrated event was less accessible when it was followed by a time shift than when it was
not. Third, 2 events that were separated by a narrative time shift were less strongly connected in
long-term memory than 2 events that were not separated by a narrative time shift. The results
suggest that readers use a strong iconicity assumption during story comprehension.
Temporal information is ubiquitous in narratives. Not only
does every sentence in a narrative carry temporal information,
temporal information can be expressed in every major word
class (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Quine, 1960). Temporal
information in language allows the comprehender to locate in
time the situations that are referred to in the discourse. Tense
is a grammaticalized expression of location in time and the
temporal contour of events, which occurs in most, but not all,
languages of the world (Comrie, 1985).] Tense is a rather
crude indicator of temporal location in that it can be used only
to indicate whether an event occurred before, after, or simultaneous with the time of speaking. More temporal specificity can
be achieved by lexical information, such as time adverbs and
adverbials, which can be used to specify the chronological
distance between events. For example, in Sentence la the
pluperfect in the first clause and the past tense in the second
indicate that the buying took place before the opening. In
Sentence lb, the time adverbial three days earlier also specifies
the chronological distance between the two actions.
(1) (a) John opened the book he had bought.
(b) John opened the book he had bought three days earlier.
The Iconicity Assumption
The temporal location of a situation is not always stated
explicitly in narratives. It has been proposed that the default
assumption of readers is that the order in which the situations
are reported corresponds to the situations' chronological order
(e.g., Chafe, 1979; Comrie, 1985; DeClerck, 1991; Fleischman,
Arthur C. Graesser provided helpful comments on a previous
version of this article. John Abramowitz, Ashley Fielding, and Brian
Vaughn assisted in collecting the data. Part of the research reported in
this article was presented at a poster session at the 35th Annual
Meeting of the Psychonomic Society, St. Louis, Missouri, November
1994.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Rolf
A. Zwaan, Department of Psychology, Florida State University,
Tallahassee, Florida 32306-1051. Electronic mail may be sent via
Internet to zwaan.psy.fsu.edu.
1990; Givon, 1992; Hopper, 1979). This has been called the
iconicity assumption (Fleischman, 1990; Hopper, 1979). Consider Sentence 2. Here, tense does not provide information on
the temporal locations of the two reported situations. However, according to the iconicity assumption, readers will
interpret Sentences 2a and 2b as if the first reported situation
occurred prior to the second and the second prior to the third.
Thus, Sentences 2a and 2b describe different situations.
(2) (a) The President opened the door, looked around, and coughed.
fb) The President coughed, looked around, and opened the
door.
Psycholinguistic research has provided empirical support for
the iconicity assumption. Young children follow an order-ofmention strategy when comprehending sentences like Sentence 3. ignoring the semantic meaning of the time adverb
(Clark, 1971).
(3) Before he patted the dog, he jumped the gate.
Furthermore, discrepancies between order of mention and
chronological order lead to (momentary) comprehension difficulties in adult readers. Mandler (1986) reported that sentences that have a mismatch between the chronological and
the reported order of events can lead to elevated reading
times, compared with sentences in which chronological and
reported order are matched. Ohtsuka and Brewer (1992)
found that the more the reported order of events in a text
deviates from their chronological order, the more difficult that
text is to understand, as evidenced by readers' performance on
a comprehension task.
These findings can be accommodated by theories that
assume that readers construct situation models of the events,
actions, processes, states, participants, and objects that are
described in a discourse (e.g., Glenberg, Kruley, & Langston,
1994; Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). As
readers comprehend a story, each incoming event is integrated
1
Aspect is another way of grammaticizing time. Aspect denotes the
temporal contour of events-for example, whether they are punctual
(see Comrie, 1976; Verkuyl, 1972).
1196
PROCESSING NARRATIVE TIME SHIFTS
with the evolving situation model. The construction of a
situation model is facilitated when the iconicity assumption is
met because readers can temporally locate each incoming
event after the most recent event in the model. Models of text
comprehension that assume that readers create semantic text
representations only, such as the first incarnation of Kintsch
and van Dijk's (1978) model, would not be able to account for
these findings.
The Strong Iconicity Assumption
A strong version of the iconicity assumption is Dowty's
(19 86) tempora I discourse in terpreta tion principle (TDIP):
Given a sequence of sentences 5/, 5^ ..., Sn to be interpreted as a
narrative discourse, the reference time of each sentence 5; (for i
such that 1 < i < = n) is interpreted to be: (a) a time consistent
with the definite time adverbials in Si, if there are any; (b)
otherwise, a time which immediately [italics added] follows the
reference time of the previous sentence Si — 1. (p. 45)
The TDIP is a strong version of the iconicity principle because
it postulates that the default assumption in the interpretation
of narrative time is not only that successive sentences describe
successive events but also that contiguous sentences describe
contiguous events.
The TDIP, which is a formal model of text interpretation,
can be turned into a model of online discourse comprehension
by treating the (a) and (b) postulates as cognitive procedures
and by reversing their order. That is, the expectation that S,
immediately follows 5, - 1 would be the default. Many
sentences in narratives do not have time adverbs or adverbials,
so it would be computationally inefficient for a processing
system to defer the assignment of a temporal interpretation
until a time adverb or adverbial is encountered, which may not
happen at all in a particular sentence. It is more plausible to
assume that the default assumption of readers is that an
incoming story event immediately follows the previously mentioned event, unless a time adverb or adverbial is encountered
that introduces a shift in narrative time. In the latter case, the
adverb or adverbial will function as a processing cue to
override the default assumption. This would presumably introduce some extra processing load for the reader.
Linguistic analysis lends some credence to this interpretation of the strong iconicity assumption. Consider Sentence 4.
(4) The pianist finished the piece, sighed, and shook his head.
Because there are no time adverbs in the sentence, the reader
assumes that the three actions described in the sentence
occurred subsequently and contiguously. That is, the reader
does not assume that a significant amount of time has elapsed
betweenfinishingthe piece and sighing. Rather, we would find
it odd if we would learn later on that several hours had gone by
between finishing the piece and sighing. Thus, in the absence
of explicit information to the contrary, readers assume that
events that are consecutive and contiguous in the text are
consecutive and contiguous in the story world. This assumption
follows from Givon's (1992) grammatical code-quantity principle: "Information that is already activated requires the
smallest amount of code" (p. 25). Thus, the time interval
activated by the first verb in Sentence 4, finished, remains
1197
active throughout the sentence because no other interval is
specified by additional grammatical code, such as a temporal
adverbial.
The strong iconicity assumption makes the specific prediction that, even if two events are reported in chronological order, the
second event may be relatively difficult to integrate when it occurs
after a narrative time shift, as in Sentence 5a, compared with
when the events are contiguous, as in Sentence 5b.
(5) (a) The professor started analyzing the data. An hour later, her
phone rang.
(b) The professor started analyzing the data. At that moment,
her phone rang.
In Sentence 5b, the time adverbial is consistent with the
default assumption that the two situations are temporally
contiguous. However, in Sentence 5a the adverbial indicates a
shift in narrative time that overrides the default assumption.
This should lead to a momentary increase in processing load
according to the strong iconicity assumption.
The strong iconicity assumption has an interesting grammatical parallel in some languages. Grimes (1975) noted that in
Kate, a language of Papua New Guinea, events that are
contiguous in time are grammatically distinguished from events
"that are separated by a lapse in which nothing of significance
for the story happens" (p. 36). Although languages such as
English have not grammaticalized this distinction, it is plausible that time lapses in stories have psychological significance
in English as well.
Time Adverbs and Adverbials as Processing Cues
The expected effects of different temporal adverbials on the
mental representation of story situations can be described in
relation to a recent perspective on language comprehension
(Givon, 1979,1992,1993; see also Britton, 1994; Gernsbacher,
1990; Kintsch, 1992; Perfetti & Britt, 1995), according to which
syntactic and lexical items function as processing instructions
to the reader on how to construct a referential representation
of the situations denoted by a text. For example, a cataphoric
device like this as in this girl entered the lab functions as a cue for
the reader to construct a highly active situational node
representing the girl, whereas a as in a girl entered the lab
prompts the reader to construct a less active node (Gernsbacher & Schroyer, 1989; Kintsch, 1992). Similarly, time
adverbs and adverbials may function as cues about the activation of situational nodes. The strong iconicity assumption
predicts that a moment later, which is the default assumption,
should function as a cue for readers to maintain activation of a
previously established node (the events before and after the
adverbial are temporally contiguous), whereas temporal discontinuities such as an hour or a day later should prompt readers to
decrease activation of the previously constructed node and set
up a new time interval.
A study by Anderson, Garrod, and Sanford (1983) is
relevant to this issue. These researchers examined the effects
of narrative time shifts in the context of scenarios. They
examined the comprehension of stories such as At the cinema:
Jenny found thefilmrather boring.
The projectionist had to keep changing reels.
1198
It was supposed to be a silent classic.
Ten minutes/seven hours later the film was forgotten.
He/she was fast asleep (p. 430).
ZWAAN
elevated for A day later, Maurice turned very pale because the
opening will have finished by then. However, the opening is
still going on in the moment later or the hour later versions.
Furthermore, according to the scenario model, the event of
Anderson et al.'s readers read either the ten minutes or the
Maurice turning pale will be dissociated in the mental represenseven hours version. It is important to note that the 10-min
tation from the previous event, Maurice shaking hands and
interval falls within the bounds of the scenario of watching a
beaming, in the day later version, but not in the other two
movie, whereas the 7-hr interval does not. The last sentence of
versions, where it is still part of the scenario.
each story was either about the scenario-bound character (the
The strong iconicity assumption predicts that every narrative
projectionist in this case) or the main character (Jenny).
time shift (a) causes a momentary increase in processing load
Reading times were longer for the beyond-range (e.g., seven
hours later) than for the within-range (e.g., ten minutes later) and (b) prompts readers to mentally dissociate the critical event
from the previous event, regardless of whether the critical event is
time shift sentences. Also, the scenario-bound character was
within the boundaries of a scenario or not. The strong iconicity
less accessible in the readers' memory after the beyond-range
assumption thus predicts close < intermediate = distant.
time shift than after the within-rangc time shift. According to
Anderson et al., these results suggest that readers construct
It should also be noted that according to text base models,
situational representations in discrete chunks (e.g., scenarios).
such as the early Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) model, there
Temporal markers serve as cues to readers on whether to keep a
should be no effect of chronological distance whatsoever
scenario activated or to deactivate it (see also Gernsbacher, 1990).
because the sentences in all versions of the stories are
connected by means of argument overlap, which means they
The scenario account presupposes that readers use their
are indistinguishable on the textbase level. It is also possible to
world knowledge about the typical length of various scenarios
consider
a hybrid of the strong iconicity monitoring and
while comprehending stories. This is somewhat problematic in
scenario
models:
the strong iconicity + scenario model. The
that knowledge about the typical duration of a given scenario is
hybrid model would support the prediction close < intermedinot always generally available. It may also be related to social,
ate < far. Theoretically, this prediction would also be made by
geographical, and cultural factors (cf. Friedman, 1990). For
a model that assumes that readers create analog representaexample, the large majority of the world's population has no
tions of temporal information. According to this model, a day
idea about the typical duration of a football game, a Japanese
later
should have much larger effects than an hour later.
tea ceremony, a Bach fugue, or a train trip from Amsterdam to
However,
this model is rather implausible considering what
Rotterdam. Yet, people may read stories about these events.
would happen to sentence reading times and processing load
Furthermore, stories can describefictionalevents for which no
after an extremely long time shift (e.g., forty years later). Thus,
readers may have a scenario available, such as traveling from
the focus of the analyses reported below is on the strong
Earth to Alpha Centauri using warp drive. In short, if the scenario
iconicity assumption and the scenario model.
model is correct, then readers would keep track of temporal
information only when presented with highly familiar scenarios.
Experiment 1
The present study tested predictions about the effect of
narrative time shifts on processing load and mental representaThe readers in Experiment 1 read stories and made recognition. Readers read stories like the ones in the Appendix. The
tion
decisions about words. Reading times were collected for
first half of the stories described a scenario of an event that
the critical sentences and response latencies for the probe
lasts longer than an hour, but runs to completion well within a
words. Each recognition word (e.g., beaming) in the experimenday (e.g., a grand opening, a baseball game, a dress rehearsal
tal texts was presented right after the critical sentence (e.g., A
for a play, a morning at the beach, a visit to a museum). The
moment later, he turned very pale), which contained the temponinth sentence is the critical sentence, which describes a new
ral adverbial that introduced the time shift: a moment/hour/
and causally unrelated event. The chronological distance of
day
later. Each recognition word came from the sentence
this event to the previous story event was systematically varied
preceding
the critical sentence. Filler texts were included that
from close (a moment later or at that moment), through
contained false recognition words, or true recognition words
intermediate but within the boundaries of the scenario (an
from several sentences back, rather than the previous sentence. In
hour later), to distant (a day later or on the next day).
addition, the location in which the recognition word appeared was
Two models were identified that make contrasting predicvaried in thefillertexts. This prevented readers from detecting a
tions about the effects of chronological distance on the on-line
pattern in the presentations of the probe words.
comprehension and mental representation of narratives such
as the one in the Appendix. The scenario model (Anderson et
Method
al., 1983) assumes that readers process and represent texts in
chunks, called scenarios. This model predicts that readers will
Readers. Thirty psychology undergraduates at the University of
slow down on temporal intervals that are beyond the boundMemphis participated in the experiment for course credit.
aries of a scenario (e.g., a baseball game). However, a temporal
Materials. Eighteen stories were written as the experimental mateinterval that is within the boundaries of a scenario should not
rials. In addition, 20 filler stories were written. Each experimental
be more difficult to integrate than temporally close events.
story was 13 sentences long. The first 7 sentences introduced a
This model predicts the following pattern of reading times of
character and a scenario (e.g., a dress rehearsal for a play, painting a
fence, a thundershower, the opening of an art gallery). The 8th
the critical sentences: close = intermediate < distant. For
sentence foregrounded the story protagonist performing a certain
example, in the story in the Appendix, reading times will be
1199
PROCESSING NARRATIVE TIME SHIFTS
action (entering the stage, starting to paint, turning on the TV, shaking
hands). The 9th sentence then described a subsequent unrelated event
(collapsing, a ringing phone, being called by someone, turning pale).
This was the critical sentence. The chronological distance of the
interrupting event was systematically varied by using one of the
following temporal adverbials: a moment later, an hour later, or a day
later. The critical event was always described in five syllables. Finally,
the last 4 sentences described the conclusion of each story. These
conclusions were constructed in such a manner that they did not
directly refer back to the initial scenario, so that the story did not seem
anomalous from any time interval. The filler stories varied in length
from 8 to 15 sentences.
There was a recognition word for each text. For the experimental
texts, the recognition word was the last or second-to-last verb or noun
from the sentence that preceded the critical sentence. Hence, all the
critical words required a yes response. The critical recognition probes
were presented directly after the critical sentence. Eight of the test
words for the filler texts also required a yes response. However, these
words came from several sentences before the location at which the
test word was presented. Twelve recognition words in the filler texts
were false. For each text, a question was constructed that required a
yes or no response. The function of these questions was to ensure that
the readers were reading for comprehension.
Procedure and design. The stories were presented line by line on a
computer screen. The readers were told to read at a normal pace. They
used the space bar to advance through the stories. Each new sentence
appeared on the 10th line, replacing the previous sentence after the
space bar was released. The recognition task was announced by a
screen that read DID THE FOLLOWING WORD OCCUR TN THE STORY?
RESPOND YES OR NO. Subsequently, the test word was presented. The
readers used the k and the d keys on the keyboard, which were marked
yes and no respectively, to respond to the recognition words. After the
recognition response, the story would continue. After each story, the
readers responded to the question. The questions were used to ensure
that readers were reading for comprehension. The readers were
instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. They were
told to keep their index fingers on the yes and no keys the whole time.
The experimental and filler stories were presented in a different
random order for each reader, with the constraints that the first three
stories were filler stories and that there was always a filler story in
between two experimental stories. Each reader saw six "moment," six
"hour," and six "day" stories; thefillerstories did not contain moment,
hour or day intervals. There were two dependent variables in the
experiment: reading times for the critical sentences and response
latencies to the recognition words. The same design was used for both.
The independent variable was chronological distance, which had three
levels: moment, hour, and day. Chronological distance was counterbalanced within readers and within items, such that each reader saw six
texts in each condition and each text was seen by 10 readers.
the reading times and response latencies, with a low of 2%
(reading times temporal marker, Experiment 2B) and a high of
8% (response latencies, Experiment 2A).
Reading times. The mean reading times are shown in Table
1. The difference between the close and the intermediate
condition was reliable, t}(29) = 2.96 (confidence interval
[CI] = ±66 ms); t2(l7) = 2.48 (CI = ±79 ms). This is consistent with the strong iconicity assumption. Contrary to what was
predicted by the scenario model, there was no significant
difference between the intermediate and far conditions, both
|/|s < l(CIs ± 75 ms and ±77ms,respectively).
The reading times are consistent with the strong iconicity
assumption, but not with the other models. It should also be
noted that the critical sentences in the close condition were
one syllable longer than the critical sentences in the intermediate and far conditions. Given that syllables are typically a more
robust predictor of reading times than words (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1980), the present data may underestimate the actual difference between the close and intermediate conditions.
Response latencies. Analyses of the response latencies were
based on the correct responses only. As Table 1 shows, the
error percentages were rather low and displayed a pattern
similar to that of the response latencies. These data indicate
that there was no speed-accuracy trade-off. The difference
between the close and the intermediate condition was significant in the analysis by subjects, *;(29) - 2.49 (CI = ±54 ms)
but did not reach significance in the analysis by items, ^(17) =
1.72, p = .10 (CI = ±75 ms). The difference between the
intermediate and far conditions was not significant, both
|/|s < 1 (CIs ± 58 ms and ±94 ms, respectively). When
considered in conjunction with the reading times, these results
provide support for the strong iconicity assumption.
Apparently, temporal discontinuities, even those that are
within the range of a scenario, prompt readers to set up a new
time interval in the evolving situation model. Constructing this
substructure is resource consuming, as evidenced by the
elevated reading times in the intermediate and far conditions.
Once the substructure is established, information from the
Table 1
Average Reading Time (in Milliseconds) and Response Latency
(in Milliseconds) to Test Words as a Function
of Chronological Distance
Chronological distance
Results and Discussion
All analyses reported below involved planned contrasts
between the close and intermediate and the intermediate and
far conditions, respectively. The Bonferroni equation was used
to correct for the number of comparisons. Therefore, an alpha
level of .025 was assumed in all of the analyses reported below.
Following a recommendation by Loftus and Masson (1994),
the 95% confidence intervals around the mean difference
scores for each comparison are reported. Analyses were
performed with subjects (tj) and items (t2) as the random
variables. Times that were 2 SDs from each reader's mean
were eliminated from all analyses reported below (cf. Ratcliff,
1993). Across all experiments, this led to the exclusion of 5% of
Close
Intermediate
Distant
Experiment 1
Reading time
1,558
1,654
1,688
Response latency
1,291 (2)
1,356 (6)
1,361 (6)
Experiment 2A
Reading time
842
882
931
Temporal marker
996
Critical event
1,075
1,099
Response latency
1,284 (5)
1,359 (4)
1,376 (4)
Experiment 2B
Reading time
836
910
899
Temporal marker
Critical event
1,179
1,250
1,309
Note. Error percentages are in parentheses. No response latencies
were collected in Experiment 2B.
1200
ZWAAN
previous substructure (before the narrative time shift) becomes less accessible, as evidenced by the elevated response
latencies in the intermediate and far conditions.
Experiment 2A
Experiment 1 clearly demonstrated that readers use temporal information to construct situation models during narrative
comprehension. In addition, there was support for the strong
iconicity assumption, but not for the other models. Experiment
2A was conducted to answer several additional questions.
First, the absence of a difference between the intermediate
and the far conditions in Experiment 1 may have been due to
the wording of the experimental stories. The stories in the
three conditions differed in one word, which specified the
duration of the interval between two story events (moment/
hour/day). This manipulation might not have been strong
enough to produce significant differences in reading times and
response latencies between the intermediate and far conditions. In particular, the use of the temporal adverb later, may
have reduced potential effects. The underlying semantic structure of later can be informally described as later than that,
whereby that is understood to refer to a previous proposition
(cf. Hinrichs, 1986; Richards, 1989). Therefore, the adverb
later may have prompted readers to keep the information of
the previous proposition to some extent active in the far
condition, despite the fact that the noun phrase a day clearly
pushed the narrative now beyond the boundaries of the
scenario.
In Experiment 2A, the critical sentences in the far condition
were changed to on the next day. It is plausible to assume that
this prepositional phrase announces the termination of a
scenario more strongly than a day later. Experiment 2A also
featured a change in the critical sentence of the close condition. Specifically, the phrase at that moment was used, instead
of a moment later. The idea was that at that moment locates the
subsequently mentioned event temporally even closer to the
preceding event than a moment later. In short, the wording
changes were assumed to increase the differences in chronological distance between the event in the critical sentence and the
previous event in the three conditions.
Another potential reason why there was no significant
difference between the intermediate and far conditions in
Experiment 1 is that the readers may not have been very well
aware of the typical duration of some of the scenarios used in
the stories. The selection of the scenarios was based on the
experimenter's assumption that the average (Memphis, Tennessee) reader would know that the scenarios' typical duration
was (much) longer than an hour and shorter than a day. This
assumption could be tested by obtaining from the participant
pool empirical data on the average estimated duration of the
events (cf. Anderson et al., 1983). In an independent posttest,
14 readers estimated the average duration of the scenarios
used in the experiments.
An additional issue involved the reading times. Reading
times for the critical sentences in both the intermediate and
the far conditions were slower than those in the close condition. It is informative to know at which point in the critical
sentence the readers in the intermediate and far conditions
slow down, relative to the close condition. An immediacy
assumption (Just & Carpenter, 1987) with respect to the
interpretation of temporal markers would predict that readers
slow down immediately upon encountering a temporal marker
that denotes a time shift. An alternative prediction is that
readers postpone the interpretation of the temporal marker
until they encounter a new story event. This would suggest that
readers have difficulty integrating the event with the prior
situation. To gain insight into these questions, the critical
sentences were split in half. The first half now contained the
temporal marker, and the second half contained the critical
event. Reading times were collected for both halves. To make
sure that this manner of presentation was not unusual to the
readers, sentences were broken up in similar ways in the filler
stories.
A final concern with the results from Experiment 1 was that
the results were not as clear cut in the item analyses as they
were in the subject analyses. This may have been due to a lack
of power in the item analyses. Three more experimental stories
were written, along the lines of Experiment 1, so that Experiment 2A comprised 21 experimental stories.
Method
Readers. Twenty-one psychology undergraduates at the University
of Memphis participated in the experiment for course credit. None of
these readers had participated in Experiment 1.
Materials. Three experimental stories were added to the 18 stories
from Experiment 1. A recognition word was selected for each of these
stories. The recognition word always was one of the last nouns or verbs
in the sentence preceding the critical sentence. In addition, three more
filler stories were written.
Procedure and design. The same procedure as in Experiment 1 was
used. The experimental andfillerstories were presented in a different
random order for each reader, with the constraints that thefirstfive
stories were filler stories and that there was always a filler story in
between two experimental stories. Each reader saw seven moment,
seven hour, and seven day stories and each story was read by 7 readers.
The design was the same as in Experiment 1.
Results
Reading times. The mean reading times for the temporal
markers and critical events are shown in the middle panel of
Table 1. Planned contrasts revealed no significant differences
between the close and intermediate condition for the temporal
markers, t,(20) = 1.53 (CI = ±55 ms); t2(20) - .86 (CI = ±51
ms). The difference between the intermediate and far conditions for the temporal markers also did not reach significance,
r,(20) = 2.\5,p = .044 (CI = ±47 ms); (2(20) = 1.76, p = .094
(CI = ±52 ms). However, the fact that the difference between
intermediate and far was larger than in the previous experiment may have been due to the wording of the day interval. As
one reviewer noted, on the next day is slightly unusual.
The reading times for the critical events showed a clearer
pattern. The intermediate condition was reliably slower than
the close condition, r,(20) = 2.46 (CI = ±47 ms); t2(20) = 2.86
(CI = ±82 ms). The intermediate and far conditions did not
differ significantly, both ts < 1 (CIs ± 70 ms and ±68 ms,
respectively). These results perfectly replicate those of Experi-
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PROCESSING NARRATIVE TIME SHIFTS
merit 1. They are consistent with the strong iconicity assumption but not with any of the other models. The results also
suggest that the effect of chronological distance is largest when
readers read the critical event, and not when they encounter
the temporal marker. Thus, it seems that it is the integration of
the critical event, rather than the processing of the temporal
marker, that is affected by a narrative time shift.
Finally, two repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed with phrase type (temporal marker vs.
critical event) and time interval as within-subjects and withinitems variables to examine whether these variables interacted
statistically. This was not the case; both interactions were
nonsignificant, F; < I J F J P , 40) = 2.75.
Response latencies. As Table 1 shows, the error rates were
rather low and similar across conditions. Planned contrasts on
the response latencies revealed a significant difference (at least
in the analysis by subjects) between the close and intermediate
conditions, r;(20) = 3.50 (CI = ±44 ms); t2(20) = 2.22
(CI = ±64 ms), whereas there was no difference between the
intermediate and far conditions, both |f[s < 1 (CIs ± 57 ms
and ±52 ms, respectively). These results replicate those of
Experiment 1 and thus are consistent with the strong iconicity
assumption. Moreover, they reinforce the results from Experiment 1 in that they show significant effects in the item analyses.
Duration of scenarios. The absence of reliable differences
between the far and intermediate conditions may have been
due to the possibility that the readers had no clear idea about
the typical duration of the scenarios that were used in the
experimental stories. To test this assumption, 14 psychology
undergraduates, who had not participated in the previous
experiments, estimated the typical duration, in hours and
minutes, of the 21 scenarios that were used in Experiment 2A
(of which the 18 scenarios in Experiment 1 were a subset). The
average duration across scenarios was 5 hr 47 min. All
scenarios were rated to last longer than 1 hr. The shortest
estimated durations were for writing a page of text (1 hr 33
min) and violin practice (1 hr 16 min). All other scenarios were
estimated to last 2 hr or more. The longest durations were for
flying from New York to Europe (8 hr 47 min) and visiting
Disneyland (10 hr). These results demonstrate that both the
close and intermediate conditions were well within the estimated range of the scenarios, whereas the far condition clearly
was not. Therefore, the lack of reliable differences between the
intermediate and far conditions was not due to an unusual
selection of scenarios.
In summary, Experiment 2A replicated the findings of
Experiment 1 in yielding significant differences between the
close and intermediate conditions but not between the intermediate and far conditions. In addition, the effect of narrative
time shifts on reading times was most prominent at loci where
readers attempted to integrate an incoming event with the
current mental representation, rather than on the temporal
marker that introduced the time shift.
The results support the strong iconicity assumption. The
strong iconicity assumption was supported because reading
times and response latencies in the intermediate condition
were significantly shorter than those in the close condition,
whereas there were no reliable differences between the intermediate and far conditions. Two alternative explanations for
the lack of an effect of scenario boundaries were examined and
ruled out. First, changing the temporal marker from a day later
to the next day had no appreciable effect. Hence, the lack of
effects was not due to wording problems. Second, a posttest
revealed that all scenarios were estimated to last longer than
an hour and shorter than a day. This coincides with the
boundaries between the close, intermediate, and far conditions. Therefore, the lack of effects was not due to a poor
selection of scenarios.
A shortcoming of Experiment 2A is that the reading-time
results were rather inconclusive as to where readers will set up
a new time interval. According to an immediacy hypothesis
(Just & Carpenter, 1987), readers will set up a new time
interval as soon as a time adverb is encountered. Thus, if the
strong iconicity assumption is correct, then reading times for
the temporal markers that denote a time shift (an hour later
and on the next day in Experiment 2A) should be significantly
slower than reading times for temporal markers, such as at that
moment, which perpetuate the current interval. The results
were not quite consistent with this account. Although the
reading times for on the next day were a significant 89 ms longer
than those for at that moment, the reading times for an hour
later were only a nonsignificant 40 ms longer. However, the
second part of the sentence, in which a new event was mentioned,
showed the pattern predicted by the strong iconicity assumption:
The critical events took significantly longer to read after the
hour and day markers than after the moment marker and there
was no significant difference between hour and day.
These results are difficult to interpret. On the one hand,
there is some indication that a new time interval is set up
immediately when a time shift is encountered, in the case of on
the next day. On the other hand, a day later did not lead to a
significant increase in reading times, casting some doubt on the
generality of the immediacy assumption with respect to temporal markers. A potential confound in the materials of Experiment 2A is that an hour later and on the next day differ not only
in the magnitude of the time interval (hour vs. day) that is
referred to but also syntactically and lexically. It should be
remembered that the syntactic and lexical differences between
the intermediate and far conditions were deliberately introduced in Experiment 2A to increase the likelihood of finding
differences between the intermediate and far conditions.
An additional complication is that the pattern of effects for
the critical events differed from that for the temporal markers.
The fact that there were effects of time shifts at all for the
critical events is problematic for an immediacy assumption
with respect to narrative time shifts. There are two alternative
explanations for the delayed effects of the time shifts. First,
they may have been the result of so-called sentence wrap-up
effects (Just & Carpenter, 1987). That is, readers may have
partly postponed the creation of a new time interval until the
end of a sentence. An alternative explanation is that a story
event is more difficult to integrate when it is the first one of a
new time interval.
Experiment 2B
The purpose of Experiment 2B was to address these questions empirically. This was accomplished by separating the
1202
ZWAAN
temporal markers from the critical events and placing them in
scenario explanation completely. However, although the patdifferent sentences. For example, the sentence An hour later, tern in Table 1 suggests a statistical interaction between
the phone rang was changed to^4« hour went by. Then, the phone chronological distance and sentence type (temporal marker vs.
rang. This change isolates the narrative time shift in a sentence, critical event), a 3 (chronological distance) x 2 (temporal
which describes nothing more than the passage of time. The
marker vs. critical event) ANOVA revealed no significant
critical event is described in the next sentence. This should
interactions, ^(2,46) = 1.63, MSE = 11,248; F2(2, 34) = 2.96,
eliminate the possibility of a confound between the possible
MSE = 5,276.
effects of time shifts and the sentence wrap-up process. If an
The key result of Experiment 2B is that temporal markers
immediacy assumption with respect to the interpretation of
that denoted a shift in narrative time caused an immediate
temporal markers is correct, then reading times for a sentence
increase in processing load for the reader compared with
that perpetuates the current time interval,/! moment passed, in temporal markers that merely perpetuated the current time
the present set of materials, should be significantly faster than
interval. Time shifts that pushed the narrative now beyond the
reading times for sentences that introduce a new time interval,
boundaries of the current scenario did not immediately lead to
such as An hour went by or A day went by. (A moment passed was an increase in processing load compared with smaller time
chosen, rather than A moment went by to equate the number of shifts. These results are consistent with the strong iconicity
syllables for the different temporal markers.)
assumption. The results for the critical events suggest (a) that
the integration of a new event into the evolving situation model
Because the focus of this experiment was on reading times,
may cause some additional processing load, (b) that the effect
and because recognition probes might be somewhat disruptive,
of the narrative time shifts spills over to the next sentence, or
it was decided not to present the recognition words during
(c) a combination of both.
comprehension.
Method
Control Experiments
Readers. Twenty-four psychology undergraduates at Florida State
University participated for course credit.
Materials. The same 18 experimental and 22fillerstories as well as
the same test sentences were used as in Experiment 1. The only
difference was that the critical sentences were now segregated into two
sentences, one specifying a time interval and one describing the critical
event. Reading times were recorded for both types of sentences.
Procedure and design. Story and test item presentation was identical to Experiment 1. Reading times for the time-shift sentences and for
the critical events were recorded. Chronological distance was varied
within subjects and within items.
Three control experiments were conducted to rule out
alternative explanations for the pattern of reading times. The
first control experiment addressed the possibility that the
pattern of reading times merely reflected base-rate differences
in reading times for the time-shift sentences and has nothing to
do with the processing of narrative time shifts. The second and
third control experiments examined the possibility that the
pattern of reading times was caused by differences in plausibility of the time shifts in the context of the prior text or in
combination with the critical event.
Base-rate reading times. Reading-time analyses of the effect
of phrases expressing temporal continuity versus discontinuity
necessarily rely on comparisons of different phrases. For
example, an adverbial like a moment later can only express
temporal continuity. Thus, one cannot design a control condition in which it suddenly expresses temporal discontinuity. The
reverse argument holds for an hour later and a day later.
Because reading times may be influenced by many different
factors, such as the number of characters and syllables and the
frequency of the component words, it is important to collect
base-rate reading times. Therefore, a list of 20 unrelated
sentences, randomly taken from flyers, memos, and other
textual materials, was prepared, in which the moment, hour,
and day sentences were included in Positions 6, 11, and 16.
Three versions of the list were prepared, such that each
temporal sentence appeared in a different position on each
list. Twelve psychology students at Florida State University,
who had not participated in Experiment 2B or any of the other
control studies, participated in this control experiment, which
was piggybacked on an unrelated experiment. The students
were told that they would see a list of 20 unrelated sentences,
which they were to read at a normal pace. Each list version was
read by 4 students.
The average reading times were as follows: 1,518 ms for the
moment sentences, 1,265 ms for the hour sentences, and 1,213
ms for the day sentences. The difference between the moment
Results
The results, shown in Table 1, suggest that readers set up a
new time interval when prompted by a temporal marker.
Reading times were longer for the hour and day sentences
than for the moment sentences. As in Experiment 1, there was
a significant difference between the moment and hour intervals, f/(23) = 2.90 (CI = ±52 ms); *2(17) = 2.64 (CI = ±54
ms). Also as in Experiment 1, there was no significant
difference between the hour and day intervals, both |f|s < 1
(CIs = ± 49 ms and ±83 ms, respectively). Thus, readers did
not necessarily wait until a new event had to be integrated.
However, an analysis of the reading times for the critical events
showed that an extra processing load may occur further
downstream when a new event has to be integrated. The
difference between the moment and hour sentences was not
significant in the analysis by subjects,*; (23) = 1.27 (CI = ± 100
ms), but reached significance in the analysis by items, t2(i7) =
2.60 (CI — ± 61 ms). Once again, there was no significant
difference between the hour and day conditions, \t}\ < 1
(CI = ±93ms);/ 2 = 1.06 (CI = ±111 ms). However, it should
be noted that the difference between moment and hour was
approximately 70 ms, whereas the difference between hour
and day was 60 ms. The absolute difference between the two
conditions suggests that it might be premature to dismiss the
PROCESSING NARRATIVE TIME SHIFTS
and hour sentences was marginally significant, |f |(11) = 2.11,
p = .058 (CI = ±264 ms), whereas the difference between the
hour and day sentences was not significant, |f|(ll) - 0.56
(CI = ±208 ms). Finally, the difference between the moment
and day sentences was highly significant, |*|(11) = 4.40,
(CI = ±153 ms). It should be noted that reading times were
longer than in Experiment 2B, suggesting that the sentences
were processed more easily when embedded in a narrative
than when presented in relative isolation. However, the critical
point is that the pattern is completely different from that
obtained in Experiment 2B. Whereas the moment version was
read significantly faster than the hour and day versions in the
story context (moment < hour = day), it was read more slowly
in a list of unrelated sentences (moment > hour = day). Thus,
if anything, the base-rate reading times for the.time shifts would
appear to work against the strong iconicity hypothesis. Therefore,
these results reinforce the strong iconicity assumption.
Plausibility, It could be argued that the observed differences in reading times for the temporal markers were not due
to a disruption of temporal continuity per se. Rather, the
differences could have been caused by differences in plausibility among the temporal interval markers. For example, A day
went by seems intuitively implausible in the context of the
stories, given that this temporal marker pushes the narrative
now beyond the boundaries of a previously established and still
unclosed scenario. This intuition can be accounted for by the
scenario model. However, it should be noted that the critical
differences in reading times and response latencies were not
between the hour and day intervals but between the moment
and hour intervals. Thus, the crucial question is whether An
hour went by is less plausible in the context of the stories than A
moment went by. On the one hand, An hour went by might be
found the less plausible of the two because it follows a
moment-by-moment description of events. Thus, reading times
are longer for the hour markers not because of a temporal
discontinuity but because of a stylistic oddity. On the other
hand, according to the strong iconicity assumption, the moment interval might be considered the less plausible alternative, because readers assume by default that stories progress
on a moment-by-moment basis, so that the explicit mentioning
of a moment interval would be redundant.
To test these assumptions, two rating experiments were
conducted. In each experiment, 18 psychology students at
Florida State University, none of whom had participated in
Experiment 2B or any of the other control experiments in this
study, rated the plausibility of the temporal markers in the
context of the stories. Experiment 2B clearly established that
differences in reading times occurred on the temporal markers
themselves. Therefore, in the first rating experiment, the story
context consisted of the eight sentences in each story that
preceded the temporal interval markers (rather than the whole
stories). In the second rating experiment, a critical sentence,
such as in Experiment 2A was also included. This was done to
examine whether there were differences in the plausibility of
the combination of a particular time shift with a critical event.
These plausibility data would provide information on the
plausibility of time shifts in the context of the other experiments in this study.
Two sets of booklets were prepared consisting of the same
1203
18 experimental stories that were used in Experiment 2B. The
first eight sentences of each story were printed on a separate
page. Beneath the eighth sentence were five temporal marker
sentences {A moment went by, A minute went by, An hour went
by, A day went by, and A week went by) in a random order. Five
temporal markers, rather than three, were used to give raters a
wide range of options. Next to each temporal marker sentence
was a six-point rating scale, ranging from 1 (very implausible) to
6 (very plausible). Beneath the temporal marker sentences was
a sentence frame A
went by in the first rating experiment. In the second experiment, the sentence frame was
A
later, followed by the critical event for each story. The
purpose of the sentence frames was to make the context as
similar as possible to the contexts in Experiments 2A and 2B.
A second purpose was to provide a lead-in for the critical
event.
Participants in both experiments were instructed that the
experimenter was interested in readers' intuitions about the
use of time shifts in stories and that they were to rate the
plausibility of time shifts in the context of different stories. The
concept of time shift was explained in the instruction. The
students rated the plausibility of the five temporal marker
sentences for each story. The plausibility ratings show a
decisively different pattern than the reading and judgment
times. In addition, the ratings were highly similar for the no
critical event and the critical event contexts. In both cases,
hour was rated as the most plausible time interval in the
context of the story frames (Ms = 4.83 and 4.84, respectively).
Also in both cases, moment was rated as less plausible but still
rather plausible (Ms = 4.30 and 4.67, respectively). Finally, in
both cases, a day later was regarded as much less plausible
than moment and hour (Ms = 2.59 and 2.13, respectively). In
both studies, day was rated as significantly less plausible than
moment and hour (p < .01), whereas, overall, there was no
significant difference between hour and moment (p > .05),
although hour was rated as slightly more plausible in both
experiments.
These results rule out that the reading times in the experiments reported in this study were caused by differences in
plausibility of the time shifts (a) with respect to the prior text
and (b) with respect to the prior text and the critical events.
Thus, even though hour is, if anything, more plausible in the
context of the stories than moment, reading times for hour
were significantly longer than for moment.
It is also important to note that the plausibility ratings lend
some credence to the scenario model (and to the manipulation
of scenario in the experimental materials in this study). The
day interval, which violates the boundaries of previously
established scenarios, was regarded as considerably less plausible than the moment and hour intervals, which do not violate
scenario boundaries. However, the difference in plausibility
ratings between the hour and day sentences did not appear to
translate to a difference in reading times. The differences
between the plausibility ratings and reading times suggest that
these tasks are tapping into different cognitive mechanisms.
For example, in performing plausibility ratings, participants
may have consciously considered the chronological distance
between consecutively narrated story events, whereas such a
conscious process is unlikely to occur during on-line compre-
1204
ZWAAN
hension. Thus, whereas a temporal discontinuity affects online comprehension (irrespective of the extent of the discontinuity), violations of scenario seem to influence deeper levels of
understanding, such as those tapped by plausibility ratings.
This suggests that a scenario effect might occur under deeper
processing conditions than the type of processing examined in
this study. This is an interesting question for future research.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B provided consistent patterns in
the reading times and response latencies. There was a significant increase in reading times and response latencies with
chronological distance. This increase occurred when there was
a time shift between two consecutive story events. It did not
make a clear difference whether the event after the time shift
fell within the boundaries of a previously established scenario
or not.
The reading-time data provide a convincing argument in
favor of the strong iconicity assumption, especially given the
results of the control studies, which ruled out that these
differences were caused by (a) base-rate differences in reading
times for temporal markers and (b) differences in plausibility
of the temporal markers. However, the response latencies
might seem less convincing at this point. Specifically, one might
argue that the differences in reading times were responsible
for the pattern in the response latencies. The readers in
Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B saw a recognition word directly
after they read the critical sentence. It took them longer to
read the critical sentences in the intermediate and far conditions compared with the close condition. Consequently, the
time between reading and recognizing the probe word, which
occurred in the sentence preceding the critical sentence, was
longer in the intermediate and far conditions than in the close
condition. Thus, the activation level of the representation of
the recognition word had more time to decay in the intermediate and far conditions than in the close condition. Therefore,
readers were slower to respond to the probe words in the
intermediate and far conditions. The purpose of Experiment 3
was to rule out this explanation by using an alternative method
for assessing the temporal representations.
The method used in Experiment 3 was based on a priming
task developed by Ratcliff and McKoon (1978). The readers
first read all of the stories and were later tested on a list of
sentences mentioning events that either had or had not
occurred in the stories. Each critical event was preceded by the
prior event in its story. For example, the readers first judged
Maurice was shaking hands and beaming and then they judged
He turned very pale. If readers construct a temporal representation, then the degree of priming for the critical events by the
previous events should be a function of chronological distance.
In other words, in the situation model constructed in the close
condition, these events should be closely linked, whereas the
links should be weaker in the intermediate and far conditions.
The stronger the links between the two events, the greater the
degree of priming should be.
The priming task also made it possible to probe the status of
situational representations at a later stage than the recognition
task did. The recognition task probed the situational represen-
tations on-line, whereas the priming task probed the situational representations off-line, after the reading task. This
provided information about the extent to which temporal
representations are preserved in memory.
Method
Readers. Twenty-seven psychology undergraduates at the University of Memphis participated for course credit. None of the readers
had participated in Experiments 1, 2A, or 2B.
Materials. The same 18 experimental and 22 filler stories were used
as in Experiment 1. The recognition words were not used. Instead, a
list of four test sentences was constructed for each experimental story.
Each list typically consisted of (a) a sentence from the introduction;
(b) the eighth sentence, which was the prime; (c) the critical event
(without the temporal marker), which was the target; and (d) a
sentence from the conclusion. The critical event items were always five
syllables long. The four test items for each filler text were randomly
selected.
The prime and the target events, the third and fourth item for each
experimental text, required yes responses. However, at least one of the
other two items required a no response, because they described an
event that had not occurred in the story. Therefore, either one or two
out of four test items for the experimental texts were incorrect. For the
filler texts, two or three items were incorrect. Moreover, the incorrect
items were often the third or the fourth item for a story, to prevent the
readers from discovering a pattern in the required responses.
Procedure and design. Story presentation was identical to that in
Experiments 1 and 2A, with the exception that the recognition task
was removed, so that the reading process now occurred uninterrupted.
After the final text was read, an instruction appeared on the screen,
informing the readers about the upcoming judgment task. The readers
were told to judge as quickly and accurately as possible whether the
events mentioned in the test sentences actually occurred in the stories.
They were told to keep their index fingers on the yea- and no keys the
whole time.
The experimental and filler stories were presented in a different
random order for each reader, with the constraints that the first three
stories were filler stories and that there was always a filler story in
between two experimental stories. Each reader saw six moment, six
hour, and six day stories. Each set of four test items was preceded by
the sentence TEST ITEMS FOR NEXT STORY and the appropriate story
title. The blocks of test items were presented in a different random
order to each reader.
There were two dependent variables in the experiment: reading
times for the critical sentences and degree of priming for the target
event. The same design was used for both. The independent variable
was chronological distance, which had three levels: moment, hour, and
day. Chronological distance was varied within subjects and within
items.
Results and Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 are presented in Table 2.
Reading times. Planned contrasts revealed that the reading
times in the close condition were significantly faster than those
in the intermediate condition in the analysis by subjects,
ti{26) = 2.50 (CI = ±90 ms) but not by items, *2(17) = 1.99,
p = .063 (CI = ±123 ms). As in the previous experiments,
there were no significant differences between hour and day,
both |/|s < 1 (CIs ± 77 ms and ± 149 ms, respectively). These
results are again consistent with the strong iconicity assumption, but not with any of the other models.
PROCESSING NARRATIVE TIME SHIFTS
Table 2
Average Reading Time (in Milliseconds) for Critical Sentences
and Response Latency (in Milliseconds) to Target Sentences
in Experiment 3
Chronological distance
Reading time
Response latency
Close
Intermediate
Distant
1,485
1,595
1,607
1,236 ( 9)
1,335 ( 8)
1,364 (10)
Note. Error percentages are in parentheses.
Response latencies. As Table 2 shows, the response latencies show the same pattern as those in the previous experiments, although the error percentages were somewhat higher.
The difference between the moment and hour sentences was
significant, r ; (26) = 3.14 (CI = ±65 ms); t2(\7) = 2.66
(CI = ±87 ms). The difference between the hour and day
sentences was not significant, both |*|s < 1 (CIs ± 81 ms
and ± 128 ms, respectively). These results are highly consistent with the previous data. They provide support for the
strong iconicity assumption. Thus, these results show that the
patterns of the response latencies obtained with the recognition task were actually due to temporal discontinuity, rather
than to differences in reading times. If anything, the priming
task yielded larger effects of temporal discontinuities than the
recognition tasks.
General Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine whether, when,
and how readers monitor temporal information in stories. The
results clearly demonstrate that readers constructed situational representations while reading stories (and used temporal information in that process). If readers would have only
constructed textbase representations (Kintsch & van Dijk,
1978), then there would have been no effects of narrative time
shifts on comprehension. The results are not quite consistent
with the scenario model as proposed by Anderson et al. (1983).
According to this model, readers interpret discourse in chunks
called scenarios. Information that falls within the boundaries
of the scenario is less accessible when the narrative now moves
beyond the boundaries of the scenario. However, the experiments did produce reliable differences in reading times and
latencies to recognition probes between the close and intermediate conditions. These two conditions kept the narrative now
within scenario boundaries. Thus, the scenario model should
predict a null effect here. In addition, the experiments did not
produce reliable differences between the intermediate and far
conditions, even though the critical sentences in the intermediate condition kept the narrative now within the scenario,
whereas the critical sentences in the far condition pushed the
narrative now beyond the boundaries of the scenario. However, a rating study revealed that violations of scenario
boundaries may affect deeper levels of comprehension, such as
those assessed by plausibility ratings.
The results are consistent with the strong iconicity assumption (e.g., Dowty, 1986). The default assumption of readers is
that subsequent sentences or clauses in a narrative relate
subsequent and contiguous events. If a time adverb or adver-
1205
bial introduces a time shift, then the default assumption is
overridden. The reader takes the time shift as a cue to
decrease the activation of information preceding the time shift
and to set up a new time interval. This causes a momentary
increase in on-line processing load.
It should be noted, however, that the mean reading times
and response latencies were in all but one case longer in the
distant condition than in the intermediate condition. Also, the
plausibility ratings collected in Experiment 2B suggest that
readers may become aware of violations of scenario boundaries at deeper levels of processing. Therefore, future studies
may find a scenario effect in addition to a temporal discontinuity effect. One interesting way to address this issue might be to
use different reading instructions to manipulate the depth of
processing (e.g., in the manner done by Foertsch & Gernsbacher, 1994, or Zwaan & van Oostendorp, 1993). Moreover, it
is conceivable that more extreme time shifts may cause
additional processing load in the reader. For example, suppose
that the critical sentence in the Appendix readv4 century later,
the art gallery celebrated its first centennial. This time shift
pushes the narrative beyond Maurice's life span. It might
function as a cue to deactivate the situational node coding for
the character Maurice. Deactivation of a node may require
extra processing resources (Givon, 1992).
What underlying cognitive mechanism could be responsible
for the reported results? The mechanism proposed in this
article is the following. When readers read a narrative, their
default assumption is that successively reported events occurred successively and contiguously. However, specific lexical
(e.g., time adverbials) or grammatical (tense) information may
function as a processing cue to the reader to override the
strong iconicity assumption, deactivate the current time interval, and set up a new one. This account fits in nicely with
Gernsbacher's (1990) structure-building framework. According to the structure-build ing framework, readers map incoming information onto a developing mental structure. As soon as
the incoming information is incoherent with the evolving
structure, readers will start developing a new substructure.
Following Anderson et al. (1983), Gemsbacher assumed that
time shifts beyond the range of a scenario would prompt
readers to initiate a new substructure. The present results
suggest that temporal discontinuities may provide sufficient
prompts, regardless of scenarios.
The account also fits in with the event-indexing model
(Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995; see also Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). According to this model, readers index
incoming story events on a number of dimensions: time, space,
causation, motivation, and agent(s). With respect to time, the
assumption is that each story event is indexed on the interval in
which it occurs. As the present results suggest, a temporal
interval is a set of temporally continuous events. Events that
share a time index are more strongly connected in the memory
representation than events that do not share a time index. In
addition, updating an event index requires processing resources. Zwaan, Magliano, et al. (1995) obtained support for
this hypothesis by using multiple-regression analyses of sentence-reading times for naturalistic stories. The present results
extend these findings by (a) using an experimental design and
1206
ZWAAN
(b) comparing the strong iconicity assumption with the scenario model.
Why do readers entertain a strong iconicity assumption?
Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that readers use their
world knowledge to construct referential representations during text comprehension (e.g., Glenberg et al., 1994; JohnsonLaird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan, Magliano, et al.,
1995). Real-life situations occur to people in a continuous flow.
People do not jump around in time, for example, from the
present into the past and then into the future. Subsequent
real-world situations appear as temporally contiguous. It is
plausible that the processes people use to construct mental
models of real-life situations function as defaults when people
construct models of situations that are reported in narratives.
However, as language users, people are also able to use specific
linguistic cues to construct models of reported situations
containing temporal discontinuities.
As pointed out earlier, temporal information is ubiquitous in
narratives and can be expressed in various ways. The present
study investigated only the role of temporal adverbials, such as
an hour later. Previous research has demonstrated that temporal information in the form of tense is accessed rapidly during
sentence comprehension (Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 1991).
Important issues for future research are how tense and aspect
interact with temporal adverbials and other temporal expressions to affect the construction of situation models. The notion
developed in linguistics (e.g., Givon, 1979, 1993; Hopper,
1979) that pieces of grammatical and lexical information are
used as cues on how to construct referential representations
has met with recent support in cognitive psychology (e.g.,
Britton, 1994; Gernsbacher, 1990; Kintsch, 1992; Perfetti &
Britt, 1995). For example, Kintsch (1992) has pointed out that
syntax may be regarded as a set of processing instructions on
how to construct situation models. Consequently, Kintsch
argued that syntax deserves closer scrutiny if insight is to be
gained into how readers construct situation models from text.
What the present results suggest, is that the same holds true
for the semantics of time.
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Appendix
Example Stones from Experiment 1
THE GRAND OPENING
Today was the grand opening of Maurice's new art gallery.
He had invited everybody in town,
who was important in the arts.
Everyone who had been invited, had said that they would come.
It seemed like the opening would be a big success.
At seven o'clock, the first guests arrived.
Maurice was in an excellent mood.
He was shaking hands and beaming.
A moment/an hour/a day later, he turned very pale.
He had completely forgotten to invite the local art critic.
And sure enough, the opening was very negatively reviewed in the weekend edition of the local newspaper.
Maurice decided to take some Advil and stay in bed the whole day.
Recognition probe (Experiments 1 and 2A): beaming
Test items (Experiment 3): Maurice was shaking hands and beaming (prime); He turned very pale (target)
THE NOVELIST
Jamie was an aspiring novelist.
However, lately, he had been experiencing a writer's block.
He had not written a page in weeks.
He decided to change his approach.
From now on, he would systematically write one page a day.
The next morning, Jamie got up very early.
After drinking two cups of coffee, he entered his study.
Jamie turned on his PC and started typing.
a moment I an hour I a day later, the telephone rang.
It was Jamie's friend Warren.
Warren invited Jamie to a game of golf.
Jamie quickly agreed.
He jumped at every opportunity to finally beat his friend.
Recognition probe (Experiments 1 and 2A): typing
Test items (Experiment 3): Jamie started typing (prime), The telephone rang (target)
Received September 21,1995
Revision received February 8,1996
Accepted February 8,1996