The ICSA Grand Strategy Seminar Series 2014
Seminar Four: Hobbes’ Leviathan and
the Arab States’ Crises
10th July 2014
ICSA hosts a lunchtime seminar series on ‘grand strategy, in which the work of an influential
thinker is brought to bear on a contemporary issue in international relations. Our fourth seminar
discussed Thomas Hobbes’ ‘Leviathan’ (and social contract theory more widely) in the context of
the turmoil presently engulfing the Arab world. The paper that follows summarises the discussion.
Amidst all the comfort and convenience of modern society, the ‘state of nature’ described by
Thomas Hobbes some three and a half centuries ago can seem astonishingly distant. The
prospects of a life of unrestrained competition, habitual violence and constant fear are
inconceivable to the majority of modern Britons. In reality, though, our carefully guarded
civilisation is often merely a thin veneer covering more primordial human instincts and
motivations. The 2011 riots in London were only the most proximate example of the potential for
a breakdown of order in modern society. Around the world, wars, atrocities and humanitarian
crises demonstrate that Hobbes’ state of nature is not, in fact, so very far away.
Thomas Hobbes has long been an important figure in the discipline of international relations: his
theories on the ‘state of nature’ have formed the basis for what has become known as the ‘realist’
school, arguing that states act first and foremost according to their own self-interest, rather than
out of a commitment to an overarching ideology. Instead of dwelling on the already well-trodden
ground of international relations theory, however, it would be well to consider how Hobbes’
writings on political organisation apply, if at all, to the Arab states’ crises. Since 2011, a series of
uprisings have sprung up across the Arab world, challenging the authority of long-standing
Sovereigns and plunging much of the region into bloody civil wars. How would Hobbes evaluate
the legitimacy of these uprisings? Could Hobbes’ theories make western governments question
their approach towards the Levant? And finally, what useful advice does Hobbes offer as to the
best way forward in this war-torn part of the world?
In a work as long and detailed as Leviathan, innumerable themes could be identified as potentially
relevant. One should not, for example, overlook the fact that the book was written in the wake of
the English Civil War, in part as Hobbes’ attempt to convince his fellow former-Royalists that they
could accept the rule of parliament and the Council of the State in good conscience. This issue
was increasingly important after Parliament’s call on 11th October 1649 for the adult male
population to swear its allegiance by an ‘oath of engagement’ to the new republican regime.
However, Hobbes’ ideas were not determined solely by historical context: his earlier works De
Cive and The Elements of Law, published before the outbreak of war, had already propounded
much of the political theory that Hobbes further refined and clarified in Leviathan.
The key aspects of these theories can be briefly (if somewhat inadequately) summarised. Hobbes
approached politics from a ‘scientific’ point of view; that is, politics was conceived as belonging to
the realm of rational thought, conforming to the same natural laws as geometry, physics and
natural philosophy. Above all, Hobbes was concerned with answering the question of how to
generate generally accepted principles for political life in societies with diverse beliefs and moral
values. For Hobbes, the important point was not the justification of particular doctrines (all moral
judgements were equally ill-founded in Hobbes’ view). Instead, the establishment of safety,
‘The Sovereign
has a duty to
provide for the
protection and
preservation of
the people,
both in terms
of their
physical safety
and more
general
wellbeing’
‘The apparent
vindication of
Hobbesian
theory in the
Middle East
presents
problems for
the liberalminded
approaches to
foreign policy
dominant in
the West’
security and stability were the key goals of politics. Starting from the assumption that the basic
motive of human action is self-preservation, Hobbes describes a ‘state of nature’ in which the
human appetite for power, combined with the scarcity of resources, leads to competition and war
between individuals. In order to escape violence, death and the constant fear of attack,
individuals enter into a ‘social contract’, in which certain rights are forfeited in return for the
protection of a ‘Sovereign’ – whether a monarch, aristocracy or democratic assembly. Whether
this contract is formed via ‘institution’ (consensual agreement) or via ‘acquisition’ (force), the
same rights and consequences apply in what Hobbes terms the ‘Commonwealth’. Although there
is a degree of ambiguity in exactly how the transition from state of nature to Commonwealth
takes place practically, Hobbes’ focus is more on the specific rights and duties of citizens and the
Sovereign in the Commonwealth. While subjects lose the right to change the form of government
and are obliged to consent with the Sovereign’s laws and decrees, they nevertheless maintain a
right of self-defence and preservation. Meanwhile, the Sovereign has a duty to provide for the
protection and preservation of the people, both in terms of their physical safety and more general
wellbeing; as Hobbes says, the Commonwealth only lasts ‘as long, and no longer, than the power
lasteth, by which he is able to protect them’.
How far have events in the Arab world vindicated Hobbes’ theories? Whether the uprisings in
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and elsewhere are seen to be ‘legitimate’ in Hobbesian terms rests to a
large extent upon the particular view taken of the success of the states’ respective leaders in
providing for the ‘safety’ of their populations. If they are judged to have been ineffective in
providing adequate protection and economic provision, then one might argue that the
Commonwealth had fallen, a state of nature was in existence, and therefore there was no
morality or law by which to condemn the uprisings. If, on the other hand, leaders such as Ben Ali
and Mubarak are seen to have been responsible Hobbesian Sovereigns, then those involved in the
uprisings were breaking the terms of the social contract and violating natural law. Either way, one
might claim that Hobbes’ claim for the necessity of a strong sovereign leader has been proved
correct. Arguably, it was the relative weakness of states’ sovereigns which precipitated their
downfall, thus underlining Hobbes’ emphasis on the indivisible rights and strength of a
Commonwealth’s leader.
Nor is Hobbes’ model applicable only to the Arab nations in a state of crisis: Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
the UAE and Jordan are examples of ‘successful’ Hobbesian states in their preservation of stability
and control under strong sovereigns. Although Saudi Arabia has a lamentable human rights record
and shows few signs of the democratic mandate so valued in the West, there is little doubt that it
is an effective Hobbesian state in terms of maintaining order and preserving its populace.
Meanwhile, the survival of the Gulf monarchies has been predicated on unwritten, unspoken
ruling bargains – essentially social contracts – that exist between the ruling families and their
populations. Together with the neo-patriarchal governments that have been formed, these
bargains, and their common emphasis on the role of the state as dispenser of wealth and social
status, have mostly been enough to secure the acquiescence of most citizens.
However, the apparent vindication of Hobbesian theory in the Middle East presents problems for
the liberal-minded approaches to foreign policy dominant in the West. For western states, stable
governments in the Middle East have often not been enough. An unwavering, and arguably
somewhat arrogant, belief in the superiority of democracy has coexisted uneasily with a tacit
acceptance of the need for alliances and peace in the area, regardless of the political leanings of
regimes. The United States, for instance, commonly recognised as the main global proponent of
what might has been termed ‘liberal internationalism’, is perhaps less able to pursue a pragmatic
strategy in relation to the Middle East than other western states. America’s brief period of tacit
support for the democratically-elected Mohamed Morsi in 2012, despite his affiliation with the
Muslim Brotherhood, lends credence to such a claim. However, the wavering U.S. policy with
regards to Sisi’s coup, and the tolerance of his new regime despite the condemnation of
thousands of political opponents to death, highlights again the precarious balance in western
policy between pragmatism and moralism.
‘Stability
becomes a
higher priority
than liberal
democratic
values as
proximity to
areas of
disruption
increases’
The relative emphasis placed on liberal moral values versus stability in the foreign policy of
western ‘democratic’ states seems to depend to a significant extent on geo-strategic location.
This is nowhere more evident, perhaps, than in Israel. Israel was an active supporter of Sisi’s
presidential campaign, with some reports suggesting that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
offered Sisi $80 million in support, as well as promising help in negotiating the continuation of
U.S. military aid to Egypt. The logic behind such support is easily apparent given Egypt’s historic
role as a peace-broker between Israel and Palestine, and seems to have been vindicated in Sisi’s
reluctance to intervene in the on-going crisis in Gaza, (thus denying help to Hamas in obtaining
face-saving concessions in any potential ceasefire deal). For obvious reasons, stability becomes a
higher priority than liberal democratic values as proximity to areas of disruption increases. Given
the moral relativism of ‘western’ attitudes to democracy, Hobbes’ position at least offers a more
consistent approach to political organisation than is the case in modern times.
How can we account for the disjuncture between Hobbesian ideals and modern foreign policy in
the Middle East? Firstly, it is important to remember that Hobbes’ ideas were by no means
readily accepted in seventeenth-century England. In fact, Hobbes’ theories were denounced both
by parliamentarians and royalists, whilst his religious views (subordinating doctrine and dogma to
the Sovereign’s will) were also widely challenged. More importantly, the current international
context is radically different from the time of Hobbes. Whereas modern-day western states
would be loath to tolerate any notion of second-class citizenry by which certain groups are
excluded from the full rights and privileges that come from full membership of a state, this was
by no means the case in the seventeenth century. The extension of the Test and Corporation Acts
in Britain from the 1660s onwards made the holding of public office and attendance at university
conditional on being a practising member of the Church of England. This is arguably similar to the
current situation in Iraq: Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, attempted to preserve the
army as a Shia-dominated institution, replacing Sunni officers with Shia ones. It was only
American pressure which led to the inclusion of Sunni soldiers – some of whom subsequently laid
down their guns, stripped their uniforms and absconded without a fight when ISIS entered
Mosul.
Given, therefore, that realist, pragmatic agendas are not sufficient in the modern-day context,
what value do Hobbes’ theories have for developing policies for the Arab states’ crises? In some
ways, the usefulness of Hobbes’ theories is limited: he has relatively little to say, for instance,
about the cases of populations divided on ethnic and sectarian lines, as so many states in the
Arab world are. There is certainly a tension between Hobbes’ insistence on universal consent or
tacit acceptance in order to escape the state of nature, and the deep and seemingly
insurmountable religious and social divides in Arab states. This tension is further highlighted by
the fact that a common characteristic of other ‘successful’ Hobbesian states is the maintenance
of a strong cultural identity. The success of Iran (admittedly a non-Arab country) owes much to its
coherent establishment of a cultural identity: the presence of an affluent middle class, the
reasonable degree of democracy, and the relative absence of sectarian divisions are perhaps the
reason for, and product of, a more coherent national identity than is found in most Arab states.
Language is another essential factor in the development of distinct cultural identities. In Morocco
– a good example of a more successful Arab state – there is a distinct linguistic culture: Moroccan
Arabic, known as Darija, is the native vernacular, while Berber (the other official language)
provides a more distinctive connection to the nation’s ethnic identity, and French remains the
unofficial third language as a relic from Morocco’s imperial past.
This raises a potential paradox for a Hobbesian model of the Middle East: Hobbes insists on the
indivisibility of sovereignty and the maintenance of the unity of the commonwealth, however the
strength of a commonwealth seems to rely to a significant extent on a coherent cultural identity;
a characteristic which in many cases requires the division of a state on ethnic or sectarian lines.
The issue of state fragmentation and national borders is especially pertinent today given the
declaration of a trans-national Caliphate by Isis, the consequent threat to the 1916 Sykes-Picot
borders, and the Kurdish desire for independence from Iraq. The prospect of splitting Iraq into
three separate states comprising Sunni, Shia and Kurdish zones now seems a realistic possibility.
However, if Hobbes tells us anything, it may be that fragmentary tendencies within a state
should be resisted as far as possible. For one thing, it is unlikely that the United States would
permit the break-up of Iraq, given the enormous investment of lives and resources over the last
decade in support of its integrity and security. There is also the fact that fragmentary tendencies
tend to exist in states of all sizes and populations: setting a precedent in Iraq for the division of a
state along ethnic or religious lines could have destabilising repercussions for the rest of the
region.
No matter how foundational, a single work cannot be expected to provide the answers to a
problem as complex as the Arab crisis. However, it is clear that even three and a half centuries
on, Hobbes’ ideas on political organisation and governance provide a valuable starting point for
the re-evaluation of our views of the Arab world and the assumptions upon which western
policies are based. Leading western governments will have to make difficult choices between
stability and despotism on one hand, and volatility and democracy on the other. The goals of
liberal humanitarianism and democracy, despite best intentions, are by no means easy to
accomplish in an area as divided as the Middle East, and where patterns of despotic governance
are so deeply rooted. Hobbes was correct, perhaps, in identifying that it took a strong sovereign
leader – ideally an absolute monarch – in order to maintain control and security in an ethnically
diverse state. In 2003, the United States and the U.K. spent vast amounts of resources ousting
Saddam Hussein from power. Perhaps, despite the bitter taste it might leave in our mouths, a
Saddam-like figure is exactly what is needed in order to bring peace to Iraq once again.
Compiled by Richard Brown and Sam Dickson
Other seminars in the ICSA Grand Strategy series
Paul Kennedy on Chinese Ascendancy and American ‘Decline’
(30th January 2014)
Applying Halford Mackinder’s Heartland Theory: Is there still a physical ‘pivot’ in
international relations?
(20th March 2014)
The Decline and Fall of the European Empire (What would Gibbon make of the EU?)
(15th May 2014)
Thinking across Regions: Braudel, the Annalistes and the Mediterranean
(18th September 2014)
Still the City on the Hill? Alexis de Tocqueville on Democracy in (Modern) America
(20th November 2014)
For more information on the ICSA grand strategy seminar series, please
contact the series organiser, Richard Brown, at [email protected]