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Workshop 12
National Traditions of Democratic Thought
ECPR 32nd Joint Sessions of Workshops
April 13-18, 2004
Uppsala
Three Concepts of Democracy in Swedish Political Science1
(Draft)
By Mats Lundström
Department of Government
Uppsala University
[email protected]
The solution of the task of definition is often distorted by the fact that it is guided by
considerations other than scientific ones… (Ross 1968, p. 85)
Introduction
The concept of democracy is frequently said to be “essentially contested” (Gallie
1956). This is because those defining the term “democracy” often seek to formulate
something more than just the definition of a term. They wish to present a normative
argument about the nature of good Government. Therefore, in the view of many, a
choice of concept of democracy, implies a normative standing about the value of
democracy. Jack Lively, for example, takes such a view (Lively 1975, p. 2):
any attempt to define democracy[...]must involve some commitment to political positions, some
positive evaluation of the justifications proffered for different kinds of political systems.
Lively defines "democracy" broadly, in terms of “political equality" (Lively 1975, p.
8f.). He fails to distinguish, however, between an abstract principle that prescribes
political equality and institutions that embody political equality in an empirical sense
(c.f. Beitz 1989, p. 6). Thus, according to Lively, choosing a definition of
"democracy" means choosing a normative political principle.
In this article, Lively’s argument will be questioned. In my view, the choice of a
definition of "democracy" is just a question of terminology, a mere matter of semantic
convention; it does not involve taking a political or moral position (see Lundström
2000). Nevertheless, many political scientists reason as Lively does. When different
definitions of “democracy” are examined, therefore, both analytical and normative
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theses about democracy typically turn up. Two distinct questions often get mixed up
when concepts of democracy are discussed: (1) What is democracy? and (2) Why is
democracy valuable? These two questions shall be put here to three Swedish political
scientists: Herbert Tingsten, Jörgen Westerståhl, and Olof Petersson.2
The reasons for this selection are several.3 Herbert Tingsten, of course, cannot be
overlooked. His influence on the Swedish debate over democracy—both among
political scientists and among politicians—has been dominant. His books on
democracy have influenced several generations of Swedish political scientists, and his
idea of a “democratic super-ideology” (Tingsten 1945) has wielded great influence on
Swedish political culture in the post-war period.
Jörgen Westerståhl, for his part, is in many ways Tingsten’s disciple. Yet he has
developed a concept of democracy differing from the latter’s—in which the stress is
sooner on the “realisation of the popular will” than on procedures and decisionmaking techniques. His ambition has been to derive his concept of democracy from
the principles of the Swedish Constitution (which he has analysed in several books;
see, e.g., Birgersson and Westerståhl 1979). His concept of democracy continues to
wield great influence over empirical research on democracy. The degree of
congruence of opinion between voters and representatives is often considered a
measure of a well-functioning democracy (see, e.g., Gilljam and Holmberg 1995, p.
138).
Olof Petersson, finally, has been very prominent in current Swedish debate on
democracy, due to his membership on the Lindbeck Commission and his
chairmanship of the "Demokratirådet" (Council on Democracy) established by the
Centre for Business Studies and Social Research (SNS”). Since 1995, the
"Demokratirådet" has committed an annual Audit of the democratic system in
Sweden.
Formerly professor of Government at Uppsala University, he is now a Research
Director at SNS. At present he is leading a large-scale research project within SNS on
the Swedish constitution. He has also published a great number of pamphlets and
newspaper articles on problems of democracy in Sweden. Petersson advocates a
liberal and constitutionalist concept of democracy, which differs in many respects
from that of Tingsten and Westerståhl.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the concept of democracy held by these three
political scientists, I will give a brief review of how some common answers to the
semantic question about the meaning of “democracy” and to the normative question
about the value of democracy
Definitions of “Democracy”
One peculiarity found among some theorists of democracy, as we have seen, is that
they regard their definition of "democracy" as tantamount to a normative thesis
stipulating that the arrangements denoted by the term ought to be implemented. The
word democracy has, of course, positive evaluative loading—a fact which tempts
many analysts to use the term to denote phenomena which they evaluate positively,
and which they want others to evaluate positively as well.
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A term’s evaluative loading, however, should be distinguished from a normative
meaning (Lundström 2000). Evaluative loading refers to a kind of emotive response to
the use of a term. Normative meaning, by contrast, has to do with the semantic
properties of the term.
Terms that is used to express a normative position — e.g., “justice”, “injustice”,
"good, "bad, etc — have a evaluative loading also; however, the evaluative loading is
not a semantic property. It is rather a triggered psychological reaction of the person
who reads the term or hears it uttered. A term’s normative meaning is determined by
its connotation, while its evaluative loading is determined by the values and emotional
reactions associated with its denotation (reference). A term without a normative
meaning can have a negative or positive evaluative loading (or be neutral). In our
political culture, a term like “fascism” has a descriptive meaning and a negative
evaluative loading. In the same way, “democracy” can have a descriptive meaning
and a positive evaluative loading. The meaning and the value loading of both terms
can vary, but need not co-vary. “Democracy”, for example, has had a relatively
constant descriptive meaning across history, but its evaluative loading has varied
(Bobbio 1993, p. 27).
This does not prevent the choice of definition, however, from being governed by
motivations of a normative kind (as I shall show below). The fact that the choice of
definition if governed by values does not mean that the meaning of the term is
normative. The purpose behind changing the descriptive meaning of a term is often to
influence people’s attitudes, by means of the term’s evaluative loading. The American
philosopher Charles Stevenson coined the phrase “persuasive definitions” to signify
such attempts to direct people’s attitudes.4
Rather often, the talk about “essential contestedness” is an excuse for fuzzy thinking,
and for defining “democracy” more or less as one wishes. Several things are often
meant when it is argued that the concept of democracy is “essentially contested”: that
the term “democracy” has an evaluative loading, that the concept of democracy is
normative, or that the choice of definitions of democracy is governed by values (see
Connolly 1983, p. 10 f.). In political rhetoric, without a doubt, the concept of
democracy is “essentially contested” in all three senses. In political-science discourse,
however, it is not fully so “contested”. Norberto Bobbio (Bobbio 1993, p. 27) claims
that
.... democracy, as its etymology tells us, is government by the people, as opposed to government
by one or by a few. Whatever may be said, and despite the passage of centuries and the
innumerable arguments that have taken place about the difference between the democracy of the
ancients and that of the moderns, the general descriptive significance of the term has not
changed, though its evaluative load has altered with the changing times and beliefs...
The semantic disagreement among political scientists is exaggerated. Brian Barry
(Barry 1974, p. 493) rightly points out that “… the normal way of understanding
‘democracy’ is to suppose that it refers to the internal distribution of power within a
political unit”. By a "democratic procedure" he means the following (Barry 1991, p.
25):
...a method of determining the content of laws (and other legally binding decisions) such as that
the preferences of the citizens have some formal connection with the outcome in which each
counts equally. That is to say, I reject the notion that one should build into ‘democracy’ any
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constraints on the content of the outcomes produced, such as substantive equality, respect for
human rights, concern for the general welfare, personal liberty, or the rule of law. The only
exceptions (and these are significant) are those required by democracy itself as a procedure.
The fundamental meaning of "democracy" is seems to be that citizens are given equal
legal resources for taking part in the governing of a state. The conceptual
disagreement often concerns the degree of equality needed for it to possible to speak
of democracy. Does male suffrage suffice, as in Switzerland before 1971? Or is
universal suffrage necessary? By Jon Elster’s minimalist definition, some form of
popular control over a state is enough (Elster 1998, p. 98):
…let me explain what I mean by democracy. I understand the idea in a minimal sense, as any
kind of effective and formalized control by citizens over leaders or policies: ‘effective’ to
exclude ritual forms of participation, and ‘formalized’ to exclude rebellion as means of control.
The existence of democracy does not depend on whether the control is ex ante or ex post, direct
or representative, one-step or two-step, divided or undivided, or based on a narrow or a broad
electorate. Although the extent of democracy may depend on these features of the political
system.
Elster regards the concept of democracy as a dimension (or continuum) indicating the
degree of popular control over a state. A dimensional concept of democracy
presupposes an ideal-type definition, of the type formulated by the Danish legal
philosopher Alf Ross in Varför demokrati (Why Democracy?) 1946.5
As we shall see below, Herbert Tingsten took the same view as Ross did on the
question of how to formulate a definition of "democracy". Both proceeded on the
basis of two principles. First, the definition should link up to predominant linguistic
usage; second, it must be scientifically fruitful (Tingsten 1933, p. 58; Ross 1968, p.
84). The definition of "democracy" is not, in their view, determined by what one
considers desirable or possible to implement; rather, it is a conceptual reconstruction
of principles for a form of government which has existed since Athenian democracy
saw the light of day. Lexical and scientific reasons, not political reasons, ought to
govern our choice of democracy’s definition, they argued.
They advocated the idea of minimal, reconstructive definition, which only states the
semantically necessary elements in the concept of democracy (cf. Sartori 1984, p. 56).
But definitions of “democracy” are often modified in order to devise a conception of
democracy, which serves to legitimate a normative political theory.
The conflict between the two doctrines of democracy which is usually presented in
political-science classes (see, e.g., Lively 1975)—that between elitists (or revisionists)
and participationists (or classicists)—is often formulated in semantic terms. The most
famous representative of the elitist school, Joseph Schumpeter, formulated the
difference between the two schools in terms of different definitions of “democracy”
(Schumpeter 1952, p. 250). His own definition reads as follows:
The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's
votes.
Opponents considered his definition to be “revisionist”, since it altered the classical
meaning of “democracy”. Schumpeter formulated the classical meaning of
“democracy” as follows (Schumpeter 1952, p. 250):
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...that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realises the
common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of
individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.
Schumpeter revised this definition because he thought classical participatory
democracy both dangerous and unrealistic. Robert Dahl, on the other hand, used a
different semantic strategy; he proposed a new term for elite democracy: “polyarchy”
(Dahl 1971). Dahl preferred to reserve the term “democracy” for classical Athenian
democracy. He defined it (“full procedural democracy”) in terms of five procedural
conditions (Dahl 1989, p. 222):
Voting equality. 2. Effective participation. 3. Enlightened understanding. 4. Control of the
agenda. 5. Inclusion.
In a “polyarchy”, by contrast, seven institutions form the counterpart to these
principles (Dahl 1989, p. 222):
1. Elected officials. 2. Free and fair elections. 3. Inclusive suffrage. 4. Right to run for office. 5.
Freedom of expression. 6. Alternative information. 7. Associational freedom.
Dahl’s definition of “full procedural democracy” may be seen as an ideal-type
definition. A polyarchy can in that case be regarded as a “real type” along the same
dimension, with a certain distance from the ideal type (Cf. Ross 1968, p. 94.)
An ideal-type definition should not be confused with an ideal in the political or moral
sense. It is simply a question of refining a concept. No “one-sided value-maximising”
is implied.6 An ideal-type definition can be descriptive and value-neutral.
Schumpeter’s definition may be interpreted as describing a real type, which diverges
from an ideal type. In that case, the difference between his definition and that which
he ascribes to participationists has more to do with differing distances from an ideal
type than with different concepts of democracy. Yet neither Schumpeter’s definition
of democracy nor the “classical” one (as he formulated it) implies, logically speaking,
the taking of any normative position vis-á-vi the arrangements denoted by the term.
Nor does it imply any empirical argument regarding the realism of instituting such
arrangements.
The Value of Democracy
If one wishes to say something about the desirability of democracy, one must talk
about something more than just the term "democracy". One must stipulate a value—a
value to be fulfilled by the thing denoted by the term.
The elitists (Joseph Schumpeter, Giovanni Sartori, Anthony Downs, Harry Eckstein,
the earlier Robert Dahl) recommend an elite-dominated form of democracy, on the
grounds that such a system serves to promote social peace, stability, and efficiency.
They regard a democratic competition between elites as more realistic and appropriate
than a broad democratic participation in the exercise in political power. The
participationists—among whom Rousseau, J.S. Mill, G.D.H. Cole, and C. Pateman
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are usually counted—recommend participatory democracy, on the grounds that this
form of government fosters a sense for the common good, personal development, and
equality. Political participation, they aver, brings good consequences.
The deliberative democracy championed by Jürgen Habermas may also be said to
defend democracy with reference to its consequences. The purpose of public
deliberation is to discover what justice is and implement it by means of a democratic
state.
This division into elitists and participationists, however, is a rather rough way of
classifying democratic theorists. Within these groups there are critical differences.
Certain elitists see democracy as a way of maximising preference-satisfaction (Downs
1957); others see it simply as a way to prevent the contest for political power from
assuming a violent form (Schumpeter 1952; Popper 1972; Bobbio 1993; Riker 1982).
Among participationists too, there is disagreement about the ultimate ends of
democracy. Pateman emphasises personal development; J S Mill and Habermas also
stress the discovery of principles of justice (cf. Nelson 1980).
Charles Beitz has proposed a more abstract and clear-cut way of categorising
arguments for democracy. Democracy, he writes, can be defended with three types of
argument (Beitz 1989, p. 20):
1. Democracy is a just procedure. (Procedural theories)
2. Democracy leads to morally desirable outcomes. (Best-outcome theories)
3. Democracy results in the realisation of the popular will. (Popular-will theories)
All three arguments are based on a specific conception of political equality. The first
focuses on equal terms of participation in political decision-making. The second on
the equal moral status of all citizens's in regard to the outcome of democratic
decision-making. The third conceives political equality in terms of equal weight of
citizen's preferences in the aggregation of collective decisions.
A procedural theory says that democratic procedures have an intrinsic value,
irrespective of their consequences. It sees in democracy a form of pure procedural
justice—an argument akin to Nozick’s defence for private ownership (Nozick 1974).
Best-outcome theories presume that democracy realises an independent value; the
value of democracy is merely instrumental. It is the consequences of democracy that
make it desirable. Such consequences should be justified, however, by reference to a
moral principle that treats everyone equally, e.g., utilitarianism. Another theory falling
in this category is Rawls theory of justice, with its call for social equality (Rawls
1980). All normative theories which rank-order different social states of affairs can
defend (or deny) the value of democracy in terms of its results. Many elitists and
participationists defend democracy (as they define it) by reference to the desirable
outcomes it produces. Habermas, for his part, may be said to advocate an indirect
outcome theory: he sees democracy as leading citizens to discover what justice is and
then to implement it (Habermas 1988; Dryzek 1994).
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Popular-will theories defend democracy to the extent that it realises the popular will.
This is primarily a question of what are usually called “collectively rational
decisions”, i.e., decisions which can be derived from individual rank-orderings of
different public decisions. So-called social-choice theory is based on this normative
premise (Elster 1986). Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 1963) also
takes its point of departure in a popular-will theory. Arrow shows that democracies
cannot reach decisions, which are collectively rational—unless some reasonable
conditions are set aside.
Among these arguments it is only the procedural one that sees democracy as a good in
it self. The other two regard it as merely an instrumental value. In the best-outcome
theory, however, it is a moral value to be maximised. The popular-will theory
disregards the moral legitimacy of the decisions and the outcomes. It is solely its
ability to maximise the popular will—whatever it is—that endows democracy with
value. To this extent the popular-will theory calls to mind neo-classical market
theory—only the preference-satisfaction of individuals counts.
This categorisation of arguments for democracy would appear to be fruitful, although
neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. As I will show below, moreover, Beitz’
typology of arguments for democracy help us differentiate between the arguments for
democracy adduced by the three political scientists examined in this article.
Herbert Tingsten
Herbert Tingsten’s writings in political science were dominated by questions having
to do with democratic government. Tingsten defended his doctoral thesis in political
science at Skytteanum in Uppsala in 1923. His thesis concerned public referendums in
the United States. In Demokratiens seger och kris (1933)— a book delving into both
political science and the history of ideas—he reviewed the history of modern
democracy. In Demokratiens problem (1945), he focused more on conceptual
analysis; it was here that he formulated his well-known thesis about the “belief in
democracy” as an “super-ideology” (Tingsten 1945, p. 57). In Från idéer till idyll
(1966)—the subtitle of which reads Den lyckliga demokratien—Tingsten claimed that
ideologies are dead, and that a “harmonious democracy may on the whole be
considered the political form of the welfare state” (Tingsten 1966, p. 60).
Tingsten has been associated with a “formal” and “procedural” concept of
democracy—one neutral in relation to different ideological positions along the "rightleft" dimension. In principle, he argued, both capitalism and socialism are compatible
with democracy. But he thought, influenced by Hayek, that a socialist planned
economy would issue in a concentration of power that would threaten democracy over
the long run (Tingsten 1945, p. 201f.). After reading Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, in
fact, he left the Social Democratic Party, and became a liberal. During the 1950th he
was a Editor in chief of the liberal newspaper Dagens Nyheter.
Tingsten’s concept of democracy stood at centre in the debate over democracy
initiated by the so-called New Left at the end of the 1960s. Tingsten was accused of
having a formalistic or even “ceremonial” notion of democracy (Tännsjö 1975). Nils
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Elvander defended Tingsten, and coined the expression “content-oriented definitions
of democracy” to denote definitions which included possible outcomes of democratic
procedures—e.g., socialist conditions of production (Elvander 1975a, 1975b).
Definition or Argument?
Tingsten never devised any exhaustive definition of “democracy”. He thought it was
fruitless to formulate a “definition in a few lines” (Tingsten 1945, p. 58). Instead, he
believed, scholars ought to try to illuminate the “difficulties, obscurities, [and]
tendencies towards tension and contradiction that lie hidden within the term as
generally used” (Tingsten 1945, p. 98). In Demokratiens seger och kris (Tingsten
1933, p. 58), however, Tingsten wrote that “democracy” refers to:
… a particular organisation of government; an organisation, in which regular and legally
unconstrained expressions of popular opinion—largely in the form of elections, in practise—are
central elements.
When Tingsten discussed the meaning of “democracy”, his perspective was not
normative but semantic. At bottom, he wrote, it is only a “question of definitions”
(Tingsten 1933, p. 58). He did not mean thereby to say, however, that the definition of
“democracy” could be chosen arbitrarily. He gave two reasons for his choice of
definition—to accord with a predominant usage among political scientists, and to
facilitate a “lucid presentation” (Tingsten 1933, p. 58).
In Demokratiens problem (Tingsten 1945, p. 57), he formulated his concept of
democracy indirectly, in the form of what the “belief” in democracy means:
The belief in democracy is not a political outlook in the same sense as, e.g., conservatism,
liberalism, or socialism. It refers to an idea about the form of government, the technique for
political decisions—not the content of state decisions or the structure of society. It may thus be
considered a kind of super-ideology—in the sense, that is, that it is common to a range of political
outlooks. One is a democrat, but also a conservative, a liberal, or a socialist.
The idea that a belief in democracy is a “super-ideology” has had great influence, both
in the field of political science and in the debate over democracy in the political
realm. It may be said, without exaggeration, to have formed the democratic, political
culture, which has predominated in post-war Sweden.
Many scholars have interpreted the super-ideology thesis as a normative argument for
democracy. The assumption is that Tingsten defends democracy because it entails a
neutral procedure for political decision-making (see Hermansson 1992, p. 94). This
would mean he disregards the consequences of democracy in his argument for it, and
instead adopts a variant of the procedural theory of democracy laid out in Beitz’
categorisation (see above). In the last sentence in Demokratiens problem, however,
Tingsten submits a consequentialist argument for democracy (Tingsten 1945, p. 264):
Yet it may be legitimate, in today’s situation, to stress first and foremost that democracy
presupposes personal independence, and that it cannot be justified except as a striving to liberate and
develop the personality. (My emphasis.)
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Here Tingsten offers a consequentialist argument along the lines of J.S. Mill’s defence
of democracy (Mill 1983). It is the liberal perfectionist idea that the freedom and
personal development of the individual has value in it self that forms the basis for
democracy’s defence. This is not a neutral defence for democracy; nor is it an
argument for it on the grounds that it constitutes a neutral procedure. Moreover,
Tingsten presents consequentialist arguments for democracy elsewhere:
One can, from a broadly pacifistic point of view, see in democracy the best means of bridging or
successively eliminating social differences through compromise…(Tingsten 1933, p. 63)
…Democracy does not necessarily bring about a community of values, but it presumes such a
community of values in a higher degree than do other forms of government. (Tingsten 1945, p.
88.)
Tingsten saw in democracy a way of creating peace and harmony in society, and
facilitating the free personal development of the individual. In Beitz’ terms, Tingsten
defended democracy in terms of “best outcomes”.
How can this focus on democracy’s good consequences be reconciled with Tingsten’s
thesis of a “democratic super-ideology”? If democracy actually increased tension in
society, and undermined the liberation and personal development of the individual,
Tingsten would be forced to call its value into question. But that would appear to
contradict his claim that one is a democrat first of all, and only then a conservative,
liberal, or socialist, i.e. that democracy is more important than the different values
defended by your political ideology.
One way of resolving this contradiction is to interpret Tingsten’s super-ideology
thesis as an explication of the concept of democracy, rather than as a normative
defence for democracy. Tingsten simply wished to point out certain analytical
relationships. If one advocates democracy, Tingsten argued, then one has to accept
decisions running contrary to one’s ideological convictions. The thesis of a
democratic super-ideology may be interpreted simply as an effort to clarify the rules
of the democratic game. The rules are such that one must accept outcomes opposed to
one’s own ideological preferences. The rules of chess could be explicated in the same
way: one must accept the loss of one’s queen, even if one does not want to. It does not
follow from this, however, that one ought to play chess. Likewise, the rules of the
democratic game do not say that one ought to be a democrat or that democracy has a
supreme political value; they merely specify what it means to be a democrat.
Tingsten’s liberal argument for democracy sets boundaries for loyalty to democracy.
It may be unlikely that democracy will have the consequence of suppressing the free
personal development of the individual, but in principle it is possible. The likelihood
that positive consequences will outweigh negative ones makes it reasonable, on the
basis of Tingsten’s argument for democracy, to defend the democratic system. In
principle it is not reasonable, however, to defend democracy and then argue that one
should disobey a particular democratic decision because you dislike it. One must
accept that democratic procedures are neutral in relation to different outcomes—
including outcomes to which one is opposed.
But Tingsten does not base his defence of democracy on the idea that such a system is
neutral vis-à-vis different outcomes. Instead, his defence is plainly based on
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something resembling a perfectionistic, liberal doctrine of autonomy—which is hardly
neutral (cf. Petersson 1989).7 A socialist would not describe the merits of democracy
as Tingsten did: equality and social justice would weigh more heavily than the free
personal development of the individual. Nevertheless, both liberals and socialists must
accept the different outcomes generated by the democratic system—insofar as they
want democracy (for whatever reason). The procedural import of democracy must be
distinguished from procedural arguments for democracy.
We may compare Tingsten with another theorist with a procedural concept of
democracy: Robert Dahl. In “Procedural Democracy” (Dahl 1992), Dahl defines
“democracy” in terms of certain procedural conditions (see above). But for Dahl too,
this is first and foremost a matter of conceptual analysis, not of arguments for
democracy. A term’s definition can never, as a logical matter, be an argument for that
which the term designates.
Dahl bases his argument for democracy on “the strong principle of equality” (Dahl
1989, p. 97 f.). This principle of equality prescribes both political equality (i.e.
democracy) and fair outcomes (equal social and economic resources). Like Tingsten,
Dahl defends democracy in terms of autonomy and personal development. The moral
foundation of democracy is the idea that all shall enjoy equality of opportunity to
fulfil their conception of the good.
When Dahl explains why democracy is just, he cites Rawls’ division of procedural
justice into two categories (Dahl 1989, p. 165; Rawls 1980, p. 83f.). Pure procedural
justice obtains when justice consists in the following of rules, while the outcome is
irrelevant (as in various games). By contrast, perfect (or imperfect) justice obtains
when a certain procedure issues in a certain outcome. Here justice consists in the fact
that the use of a certain procedure serves to realise a criterion of justice, which is
defined independently of the procedure. If the procedure is not wholly reliable, and so
sometimes “misses the target”, it may be said that imperfect procedural justice
obtains. As an example of the latter, Rawls adduces the rules followed in courts of
law, the observance of which sometimes issues in the conviction of the innocent or the
acquittal of the guilty. The independent criterion of justice in a court of law states that
the guilty are to be convicted and the innocent acquitted. But no juridical procedure
can guarantee a just outcome.
It is essentially in these terms that Dahl and Rawls view democracy (Dahl 1989, p.
168; Rawls 1980, p 198). Democratic decisions have, they believe, good
consequences in terms of social and economic equality. Thus, democracy is a form of
imperfect procedural justice, according to Dahl. The independent criterion has to do
with equality of opportunity—in both the political and the private sphere. If
democratic actors are enlightened and informed, they will make use of the democratic
system to treat people in accordance with justice (Dahl 1989, p. 168). However, the
relationship between democracy and justice is contingent, not analytic.
In sum, democracy cannot justify itself. The fact that democracy is neutral in relation
to different outcomes is no reason to hold oneself morally neutral—whether vis-à-vis
democracy or vis-à-vis various democratic outcomes. Dahl puts the following words
in the mouth of democracy’s defenders: “I find it mindless to suppose that we could
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justify the democratic process on moral grounds if we believed that no moral grounds
exist external to process itself” (Dahl 1989, p. 268).
On the other hand, if we proceed on the basis of what the democratic rules of the
game mean, we can view democracy as a form of pure procedural justice, which
legitimates its own decisions. Democracy is a legal order which stipulates that certain
decision-making rules are to be followed—not that certain decisions are to be made or
that certain consequences are to be reached. Yet the internal procedural justice of
democracy is one thing; defending this procedural justice is another. The legal
principles of democracy do not coincide with the moral principles than can legitimate
democracy. Abstract moral principles of justice—such as those articulated by
Rawls—might be adduced in defence of introducing certain legal principles of rights,
e.g., democracy.
Tingsten’s view of democracy can be interpreted in the same way. Democracy is
defended on the grounds that it represents imperfect procedural justice. There is an
independent criterion (peace and the free personal development of the individual) to
which democracy is presumed to lead. Yet from an internal, conceptual standpoint,
democracy may be said to entail neutral procedural justice: all outcomes are
democratically legitimate which have emerged from a process governed by
democratic rules. However, the neutrality of democracy is no argument for moral or
ideological neutrality in relation to democracy—or the decisions made in a
democracy.
If Tingsten’s super-ideology thesis is taken to mean that all outcomes of democracy
ought to be tolerated, it becomes absurd and self-contradictory. The contradiction
disappears, however, if we interpret it as an explanation of what democracy means
and, hence, what it means to adhere to democracy. Dahl may be similarly understood.
His notion of “procedural democracy” (Dahl 1992) based on a conceptual analysis,
while his “strong principle of equality” is an argument for democracy. The latter
cannot be deduced from the concept of democracy as such, any more than Rawls’
principles of justice can be. The value of democracy is derived instead from a theory
of what justice is, not from a conceptual analysis of what "democracy" means.
From the standpoint of justification, the “belief in democracy” is subordinate to
general normative political principles, in the sense that democracy’s value can only be
defended by reference to such principles. On the other hand, the acceptance of
democratic decisions has priority over other political values if one has chosen to
accept democracy. This point is crucial for the understanding of Tingstens conception
of democracy. He did not argue that democracy should be regarded as the highest
value. It was the other way round: he defended democracy on the basis of a higher
political value (a perfectionist liberal one, in his case).
The “democratic super-ideology” may be compared with what Rawls calls an
“overlapping consensus” (Rawls 1983, p. 133ff.), which is to say: a shared
understanding of the legitimacy of democratic principles. But this “consensus” does
not mean that all actors see democracy as something more important than their basic
ideological values; it simply means that they all support democracy - for some
reason.8 But their arguments for democracy can vary. A socialist, a liberal, and a
12
conservative may in the first instance profess their own ideology, and in the second
adhere to democracy—insofar as their own ideology gives them good reasons to be
democrats.
There are three questions that must be distinguished: 1. Why should there be
democracy? 2. Which political obligations do political actors have in a democracy?
3. Which political obligations must political actors believe that they have in a
democracy?
With his idea of a democratic “super-ideology”, Tingsten sought to answer the second
and third questions—not the first. He is often misunderstood on this point. Jörgen
Hermansson interprets Tingsten’s “super-ideology thesis” as a procedural argument
for democracy—an interpretation open to question.9 The “super-ideology thesis” may
be compared with what the Swedish philosopher Ingemar Hedenius called a "oäkta
rättssats", i.e. a statement of positive law (Hedenius 1963). It addresses the question
of which rules actually apply in a democracy. A "äkta rättssats", i.e. a statement of
what is just, on the other hand, addresses itself to the question of which rules ought to
apply. A normative defence of democracy is based on a statement of what is just.
Strictly speaking, however, Tingsten’s super-ideology thesis does not address this
matter. It has the form of an analytical claim, not a prescription.
The question of democracy’s value never troubled Tingsten particularly. He never
formulated any theoretically elaborated defence for democracy. He did not spend so
much time on normative political theory. In Demokratiens problem (1945), he took
the importance and value of democracy more or less for granted, making no effort at
exhaustive justification. The value of democracy in post-war Europe was more or less
self-evident. Tingsten's argument was to a great extent negative: the alternatives to
democracy had turned out to be horrific (c.f. Popper 1972).
But many of Tingsten’s formulations show the influence of J.S. Mill. He argued that
popular government is based on certain conceptions of the good, which are a matter of
welfare, liberation, diversity and solidarity (Tingsten 1945, p. 264). The defence of
democracy is thus conditional, as in the case of J.S. Mill. It is the good
consequences—not the inherent value—of democracy that makes it worth defending.
Many modern egalitarian liberals ( such as Dahl, Rawls and Dworkin) argue in the
same consequentialistic fashion. Tingsten may be placed in this liberal mainstream.
Tingsten offers an outcome-based defence for democracy. The fact that he analyses
democracy in terms of procedures for decision-making does not mean that he argues
that such procedures have any intrinsic value. Nor does he argue for the precedence of
any such intrinsic value of democratic procedures over other values stipulated by
political ideologies.
Tingsten’s focus on procedures and “decision-making techniques” should be
interpreted as an effort to explicate the concept of democracy. But it is important to
note that Tingsten had in mind the decision-making practices specified in a
constitution of a state—not decision-making practices in general. Thus he followed
Alf Ross in making analytical connection between democracy on the one hand, and
power over a legal system on the other. Democracy is not the same thing as a
13
“procedure”; rather, it is a distribution of power institutionalised through a procedure
(c.f. Barry 1972). On this point Tingsten could have been clearer.
Tingsten and Elvander
Nils Elvander, Professor in political science in Uppsala, defended in the early 1970th
Tingsten's procedural concept of democracy. He accused the New Left for using a
"content-oriented" definition of "democracy".
If we focus on the meaning of “democracy” as a distribution of power, we can more
readily detect the misinterpretation involved in what Elvander (Elvander 1975a, p. 35)
called a “outcome-oriented” definition of democracy.10 One cannot “fill” the concept
of power with demands that the power be used in a specific way. It is an open
question as to how those with power will use it. If someone is in a position of power,
it would seem to follow that she is able to use her power as she wants—otherwise, she
are not in a position of power.
It is the neutrality of the concept of power vis-à-vis different outcomes, which forms
the basis for democracy’s neutrality in relation to different outcomes. Were one to try
to get normative implications out a definition of “democracy” (which is not possible,
as I have argued), the conclusion would have to be that Tingsten’s definition was
more radical than that of the New Left, who wanted to include socialism in the
definition of democracy. He based his definition, after all, on what the term had meant
since ancient times: “popular power” or “popular rule” over a state—irrespective of
the particular laws the people want. The legislative power can then be used to
establish the economic system that is supported by the majority of the people.
But the argument for defining “democracy” in a certain way is not that the concept of
democracy ought to be neutral. Nor is it that democracy itself ought to be neutral. On
this point Elvander differed from Tingsten. Elvander cited both normative and
political reasons for Tingsten’s definition of “democracy” (Elvander 1975b, p. 120):
In stipulating the formal definition, one takes a normative position: our concept of democracy
should be so constituted that it can be accepted by all currents of political opinion which accept
the rules of the game specified in the definition. It follows from this that the definition must be
formal and not content-oriented; it cannot embrace a particular party ideology.
Elvander thinks the definition of “democracy” must be adjusted to what the actors
consider to be legitimate rules of the game. His reasons for adopting a “formal”
definition of democracy thus differ from Tingsten’s. Relativising the concept of
democracy according to what could be accepted was foreign to the latter. It was not
the role of the democratic super-ideology to govern the definition of “democracy”. On
the other hand, a democratic super-ideology was precisely a democratic superideology, and nothing else. When Tingsten wrote, “One is a democrat, but also a
conservative, a liberal, or a socialist”, his purpose was not to adjust the concept of
democracy according to what conservatives, liberals, or socialists could accept. His
purpose was to explain what democracy means—irrespective of what conservatives,
liberals, or socialists consider it to mean.
14
The difference between Tingsten and Elvander is not unimportant. Elvander cites
political reasons for accepting a certain definition of “democracy”; Tingsten, by
contrast, cites semantic reasons for his definition of democracy, and political reasons
for accepting democracy. His polemic against the New Left on the question of
definitions was not political but semantic: their definition was mistaken. However, the
semantic question was not just a question of semantics; it was also a question of
rational argumentation about democracy.
When, in after years, one studies the debate over democracy initiated by the New Left
in the 1960s, it becomes clear there were several basic misunderstandings about the
meaning of Tingsten’s concept of democracy. The charge was that he disregarded
“real” conditions and focused on “formalities”.
All definitions are formal in a technical sense, in that all can be expressed as a
formula. But that which the term “democracy” denotes in its “formal” definition is
something altogether real—namely, the legally institutionalised power of citizens over
a legal system that controls the whole society (i.e., a state). The structure of power
denoted by “democracy” in its “formal” definition is in fact more sweeping and
radical than the one which the New Left wished to include within the concept of
democracy. In Tingsten’s definition of “democracy”, after all, citizens have the power
to choose their economic system.
As a matter of fact, the expression “procedural definition”—often used in reference to
Tingsten’s (and Dahl’s) definition of democracy—is misleading. Firstly, the definition
is not “procedural” (a definition cannot be “procedural”) but reconstructive (i.e., it is a
lexically based stipulative definition). Secondly, that which “democracy” designates is
not a procedure, but a distribution of power by means of a procedure. Expressions like
“technique for decision-making”, “form for decision-making” etc. give a misleading
description of the type of entity denoted by the term “democracy”.11 They fail to
capture the dimension of power present in the concept of democracy.
Tingsten’s focus on forms and techniques for decision-making was shared by Alf
Ross (Ross 1968) and Hans Kelsen (Kelsen 1955), with whose notions of democracy
he strongly sympathised. Their concept of democracy was founded on a legal-realist
concept of the state. A state is a legal order ultimately consisting of effective relations
of obedience. Democracy is a legal structure, which gives citizens the legal resources
to control an apparatus of coercion. But the stress on legal resources should not be
confused with “formalism”. What Tingsten had in mind was positive constitutional
law, i.e., what Brusewitz called the "levande statsskick". Positive law finds its
counterpart in actual relations of obedience within a state (c.f. Hart 1960?).
Tingsten often made use of what is called real or class definitions of “democracy”,
which describes institutions characteristic of existing democratic states (c.f. Naess
1956, p. 27). As Bengt-Ove Boström points out, this is a weakness on Tingsten’s part
(Boström 1988, p. 158). A class definition of “democracy” states analytically
necessary conditions for democracy. But one cannot rank-order states with respect of
their degree of democracy by help of a class definition. A rank ordering requires an
ideal-type definition that defines “democracy” in terms of one or several dimensions.
15
Alf Ross, whom Tingsten admired, formulated an ideal-type definition of
“democracy” that makes possible a rank ordering of states with respect of democracy
(see note 4). Tingsten’s claim that the development of parliamentarism means
democratisation (Boström 1988, p. 128) seems implicitly to assume the same basic
ideal-type definition that Alf Ross used. The fact that he saw the United States as less
democratic than countries governed by sovereign democratically elected parliaments
reflected above all the fact that majority rule in the U.S. is restricted by material
constitutional principles which are protected by the Supreme Court.12
From this it does not follow, however, that Tingsten rejected presidentialism and the
separation of powers in favour of parliamentary democracy. His concept of
democracy, like Ross’, is value-neutral; the term “democracy” has a descriptive
meaning. Tingsten often referred favourably, in fact, to the American type of
democracy. He regarded its combination of majority rule and an “old-liberal”
constitution as an example to the democracies of Europe (Tingsten 1945, p. 33).
Tingsten’s criterion for good government seems not only to have been the degree of
democracy, but rather what he considered to be good results—i.e., social harmony and
personal freedom.
It is the degree of popular control over a state that determines the degree of
democracy. Parliamentary systems furnish broader opportunities for popular control
than do systems with a separation of powers; they are therefore more democratic than
the latter. Popular control over a state should not be confused, however, with the
realisation of the “people’s will” where the outcome of political decisions is
concerned. Tingsten did not equate democracy with the implementation of the popular
will. To be sure, he wrote “The core of democracy lies in the fact that free
manifestations of the voters’ will are binding on the government of the state”
(Tingsten 1933, p. 12). However, the “voters’ will” here bears on the choice of
representatives or (if the democracy in question is a direct one) on the choice of
decisions. In principle, it is the aggregation of “manifestations of the voters’ will” in
accordance with the majority principle which distinguishes democracy—not the
realisation of the people’s will.13 Democracy, like constitutionally regulated political
power in general, extends only to the control of human behaviour through a legal
system (i.e., through the threat of force, ultimately). Whether this in fact results in the
fulfilment of the people’s wishes is irrelevant.
If “manifestations of the voters’ will” are to be binding, political liberties are also
needed. Herein lies the conceptual connection between democracy and the protection
of political minorities. The continued existence of majority rule requires that existing
minorities be able to develop into majorities. Minorities must, accordingly, be
guaranteed political rights and freedoms. But this merely follows from the fact that
these rights are universal. Democracy’s legitimacy may also require that the concrete
political decisions of a majority not ignore the intensive opposition of a minority to a
certain decision. The first kind of minority protection is contained within the concept
of democracy itself. The second kind, according to Tingsten, is a matter of the
conditions requisite to the successful operation of democracy. Yet democracy is a
monistic form of government, in the sense that the citizens form a single sovereign
political body.14
16
Tingsten cannot really be said to have had his own doctrine of democracy. His great
contribution lies rather on the pedagogical and analytical level. Where definitions are
concerned, he adhered to a dominant semantic convention among political scientists.
Where values are concerned, he formed part of the social-liberal tradition, with its
stress on the free personal development of the individual.
Tingsten’s concept of democracy has no normative connotations.15 He did not choose
a definition of “democracy” in order to justify either democracy or the value he
ascribed to democracy. His refinement of the concept of democracy separates him
partly from the other two political scientists studied in this paper. As we shall see,
they have had a tendency to define "democracy" in such a manner as to stipulate a
goal of democratic government, within the concept of democracy itself.
Jörgen Westerståhl
In a social-science textbook from 1954, Westerståhl argued that a democratic
government has two features (Westerståhl 1964, p. 21f.):
1. A political apparatus expressing the people’s will.
2. Civic freedoms and the rule of law.
Subsequently, Westerståhl presented these two features as fundamental “values of
democracy”: the “realisation of the people’s will”, and a “free or independent
formation of opinion” (Westerståhl 1964, cited in Boström 1988, p. 191). The first
value seems the most fundamental. In fact, one could argue that the second value is
instrumental vis-à-vis the first, since the will of the people must be freely expressed if
leaders are to be affected by it.
In an article in Dagens Nyheter in 1956, Westerståhl coined the term “service
democracy” (Boström 1988, p. 165). The term refers to a kind of elite democracy in
which different parties compete for votes by “serving” up solutions to the problems of
large groups. A theoretical kinship is evident here with Anthony Down’s “economic"
theory of democracy, according to which it is the preferences of the median voter,
which govern the actions of the parties (Downs 1957). Vote-maximisation, rather than
any ideological mission, is the goal of the parties in Downs’ model of democracy.
The concordance of opinion—or "åsiktsrepresentativitet" (“opinion representativity”),
as the term goes—between voters and leaders served as the central criterion for
evaluation in the big municipal-research project initiated and supervised by
Westerståhl in the 1970s (Westerståhl 1970, p. 43). The purpose was to evaluate the
functioning of local democracy following the major reforms of 1952 and 1962, in
which smaller municipalities had been amalgamated into larger ones.
In the course of this municipal-research project, Westerståhl devised a rather
complicated model of democracy for the interaction between voters and leaders
(Westerståhl 1970, p. 44). With the help of certain techniques (“technical values”),
voters can influence their leaders so that the popular will is carried out. Using
17
Lincoln’s famous democratic formula "Government of the people, by the people, and
for the people" as his point of departure, Westerståhl distinguished three types of
technique for democratic decision-making: participation, representation, and
anticipation. Participation creates an identity between citizens and lawmakers.
Representation results in a concordance of opinion between them. Respect for
opinion, finally, is supposed to enable lawmakers to anticipate voter opinion.
The notion that democracy means the realisation of the popular will is based,
according to Westerståhl, on an interpretation of the democratic principle enshrined in
the Swedish constitution (Westerståhl 1994, p. 99). In their book Den Svenska
folkstyrelsen, Westerståhl and his co-author took the declaration in the constitution
about “All public power in Sweden proceed from the people” as the point of departure
for their subsequent discussion (Birgersson and Westerståhl 1979, p. 14):
In order for it to be possible to say that all public power ‘proceeds from the people’, the popular
will must be realized in a reasonable degree. And in order for it to be possible to speak of a
popular will, the formation of opinion must take place under conditions meeting reasonable
criteria for a free formation of opinion.
Westerståhl claimed that, and this is crucial for the understanding of his normative
conception of democracy, there is no fundamental difference between direct and
representative democracy. The following argument is found in a report from the
municipal-research project (Westerståhl and Johansson 1981, p. 12):
…A well-functioning representative popular government ought to produce the same results as
direct government by the people would have done, on the assumption that all citizens have had
the same opportunity as their representatives to participate in decisions and to acquaint
themselves with the issues. From this standpoint it would appear that the people govern in a
representative popular government too, and that the idea of the ‘realisation of the popular will’
can be kept as the overriding goal.
If the above-mentioned “technical values” bearing on the interaction between voters
and leaders are maximised, the will of the people can be realised. Westerståhl had no
institutional recommendations to make other than those laid out in the Swedish
constitution, i.e.: democratic rights, general elections, parliamentarism, and local selfgovernment. In addition to the constitutionally regulated democratic institutions,
moreover, parties, organisations, and the mass media provide important resources for
realising the popular will.
Westerståhl’s normative theory of democracy, which he thought could be derived
from the Swedish constitution, may be said to belong to the category of popular-will
theories (Beitz 1989, p. 21). The central value of democracy (even its meaning) is the
implementation of the people’s will. This norm can be translated into two imperatives
where voters and leaders are concerned. Voters should make their will known, and
leaders should carry it out. From this follows a particular theory of representation:
namely mandate representation (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999, p. 30). Voters
should elect leaders on the basis of their views; leaders in turn should act according to
the views they have declared.
18
Definition or Argument?
Westerståhl’s definition of democracy raises numerous questions, both conceptual and
normative. One crucial question is what is meant by “realisation of the people’s will”.
Does this refer to popular wishes in regard to decisions, or in regard to social
conditions (i.e., the outcomes of decisions)? Westerståhl writes (Westerståhl 1970, p.
44):
Democracy or popular government may be said, keeping close to the definition of the word, to
mean that the people’s will or wishes with regard to political decisions are implemented.
Here it seems to be the choice of decisions—rather than of subsequent outcomes—
which is to reflect the will of the people. From a normative perspective, however, it is
far from obvious that decisions are more important than the effects of decisions.
In view of Westerståhl’s notion of a “service democracy”, the effects of political
decisions would seem to be more important than the decisions themselves. The idea,
after all, is that politicians “serve” up solutions to the problems of different groups
(Boström 1988, p. 166). But solving voters’ problems is not the same thing as
carrying out their wishes in regard to decisions. Voters can entertain misconceptions,
after all, about the effects following on various decisions.
Furthermore, the drive of politicians to maximise their vote—which Westerståhl cites
(Boström 1988, p. 166)—would appear to show that the results of decisions are more
important than the decisions themselves. The question is what is more important to
voters: that their leaders have the same views, or that they implement policies the
voters are happy with. According to the theory of “retrospective voting” (Fiorina
1981), the electorate pays more attention to results achieved than to politicians’
agendas.
Retrospective voting is based more on representation through accountability than on
representation through a mandate to carry out the “people’s will” (Manin, Przeworski,
and Stokes 1999, p. 41). But regardless of whether the behaviour of voters is governed
by prospective judgements or retrospective ones, it is hardly reasonable to see in
representative democracy simply a mechanism for mandate representation. If we
consider the principles enunciated in the constitution, it lies closer to hand to argue
that the model of government therein laid down builds more on accountability than on
mandate representation. There are no legal regulations holding politicians to the views
they have declared. But there are legal regulations giving voters the right to dismiss
politicians from their post.
In Westerståhl’s view, representatives ought to make the same decisions as voters
would have done, had they been able to “acquaint themselves” with the issues to the
same extent as the former (Westerståhl and Johansson 1981, p. 12). One must
presume he is referring here to knowledge about the circumstances under which the
decisions are made, as well as about the consequences of the measures taken.
Westerståhl’s argument would seem to mean, however, that the requirement of
19
opinion representativity is secondary, and that outcomes are more important than
decisions.
It would seem reasonable to assume that voters’ preferences— over both decisions
and outcomes are—will vary according to the information they have. Since they lack
relevant information, we cannot know what decisions and outcomes they will prefer
ex ante. On the other hand, voters can judge both decisions and outcomes ex post.
Their judgement need not rest, moreover, on the views they have declared ex ante.
If voters are rational utility-maximisers, which the Downsian theory of democracy
implies, they will not tend to see any intrinsic value either in opinion representativity
or in any decision as such, but in an outcome. And if leaders ought to do what they
think voters would have done in the same situation, they should make such decisions
as they believe will lead to an outcome the voters want. But since voters often lack the
necessary information for making a rational decision, the real will of the people
regarding a given decision will often contradict the “hypothetical” will of the
people—i.e., the decision the voters would have been made if they had had access to
the relevant information.
With his notion that politicians ought to make decisions as they think the voters would
have done if they been sufficiently well-informed, Westerståhl expresses a kind of
“ideal” popular-will theory—a theory, be it noted, which renders the requirements of
“opinion representativity” and “respect for opinion” uncertain. It would seem, rather,
to be preference-satisfaction and utility-maximisation which are important. This does
not mean voters think only about themselves. They can have a utility function which
includes justice and other moral values. The critical point here, though, is that voters
do not focus on politicians’ views in regard to decisions; rather, they focus on
decisional outcomes which they themselves find to be (for whatever reason)
satisfactory. This goal-oriented rationality is implicit in Westerståhl’s demand that
leaders make the same decisions as voters would have done had they been sufficiently
well informed.
To complicate the relationship between voters and leaders further, we might question
whether the utility function of voters is constant. Perhaps it changes when politicians
go against the popular will regarding decisions and/or outcomes. Simply put, voters
may be influenced by their leaders and so change their values. The popular will can be
different ex ante and ex post. If the focus is on preference-satisfaction ex post, this
problem can be avoided. In a theory of “service democracy”, moreover, that would
seem to be the main thing: voters should be satisfied “consumers”.
It would appear, then, that Westerståhl falls back all the same on the idea that
democracy is a question of accountability—not of mandate representation (as
presumed by his notion about the implementation of the people’s will in respect of
decisions).
For the sake of argument, however, let us persist in the assumption that Westerståhl
regards the implementation of the people’s will (whether regarding decisions or
regarding outcomes) as the important thing in a democracy. In that case we may ask:
is this a conceptual or an empirical connection? (See Boström 1988, p. 194.)
Westerståhl expresses himself in a manner suggesting he has a conceptual connection
20
in mind. The connection between democracy and the implementation of the people’s
will derives from “the definition of the word” (see quote above from Westerståhl
1970, p. 44).
Elsewhere Westerståhl writes that democracy “is characterised” by the
implementation of the popular will. This characteristic can be a contingent, empirical
characteristic, logically unconnected with democracy. The statement that the
implementation of the people’s will is a “democratic value” can be interpreted as
meaning that an empirical relationship obtains between democracy and the
implementation of the people’s will. The latter is quite simply a value that ultimately
legitimates the introduction of democracy.
Popular power or popular will?
The problem in Westerståhl’s idea about the implementation of the popular will is that
he avoids the issue of power. In his view, the concept of power is so ideological and
abstruse as to be of no use in political-science research (Boström 1988, p. 169). He
chooses a system-oriented perspective instead. Since he assumes the political system
is a system for decision-making, he makes the concordance of decisions with the
popular will into the central evaluative criterion. But the question is whether the
concept of the “popular will” is any less abstruse than the concept of “power”.
An alternative perspective is that a political system distributes public power through
legal resources. Were one to cite the “definition of the word”, one could argue that
democracy is often equated with “the power of the people”. It is also rendered as
“popular sovereignty”.
In fact, “democracy” is seldom regarded as synonymous with “the implementation of
the people’s will”. As a matter of conceptual analysis, Westerståhl’s equation of
democracy with the implementation of the people’s will is highly doubtful. One can
govern and have power without achieving one’s will—and one can achieve one’s will
without governing or having power.
It is remarkable that Westerståhl seeks to derive his doctrine of democracy from the
Swedish constitution, even as he refuses to deal with the concept of power. In the first
paragraph of the constitution, after all, it is precisely the power of the people which is
set forth as a fundamental principle: “All public power in Sweden proceeds from the
people” (RF 1:1).
What can be meant by “power” in this context? There are a variety of concepts of
power. According to one, power is the “production of intended effects” (Russell 1975,
p. 25). Political scientists often view power as a counterfactual capacity: having
power means being able to overcome opposition but not necessarily to achieve one’s
goals. One can fail to reach one’s goals even while possessing maximal power.16
According to a common view, political power is a relationship of dominance or
control between people (cf. Dahl 1982, p. 22). One who has power can prevent
another actor from performing a certain act. Power can be seen as a potential resource
“to make a difference”, which is not the same thing as enjoying “prospects of success”
(Beitz 1989, p. 10).
21
It is certainly open to question whether the popular power prescribed in the
constitution can be equated with “the implementation of the popular will”. The
popular will can be implemented in the absence of popular power, and popular power
can prevail without political decisions (still less outcomes) corresponding to the
popular will. What the constitution prescribes is a legal order giving citizens the legal
resources to control holders of political power. The most important resource is the
right to choose and thus to dismiss representatives in political assemblies.
If the constitution is interpreted in terms of the implementation of the popular will,
then it is primarily the choice of political representatives which is in question. When
they vote in local or national elections, citizens give expression to a preference for a
party or candidate. But there is no rule saying they must vote for the party or
candidate whose opinions they share. It would seem misleading to claim that our
representative form of government builds on the principle of opinion representativity,
as is claimed in a textbook (Larsson 1993, p. 121). The basic principle is legally
regulated voter power. What the motives of the voters are when they exercise their
power is irrelevant. They may choose their candidates for a multitude of reasons
having nothing to do with opinion representativity, e.g., identity-related matters
associated with gender or ethnicity (Phillips 1995).
Westerståhl’s analogy between direct democracy and representative democracy would
also seem to be misleading. It may be reasonably said that, in a direct democracy,
decisions on political matters correspond to the popular will (disregarding Arrow’s
impossibility theorem). In a representative democracy, by contrast, the will of the
people bears on the selection of the persons charged with the making of political
decisions. Herein lies a decisive difference. Three different questions should be
distinguished when discussing democracy and the popular will:
1. What decisions do the people want?
2. Whom do the people want as decision-makers?
3. What outcomes do the people want?
The people can have preferences over three different domains: that of decisionmakers, of decisions, and of social states of affairs. In a representative democracy,
citizens enjoy political equality in the choice of decision-makers. It is not, strictly
speaking, their preferences about opinions or social states of affairs which are
aggregated—only their preferences about the choice of decision-makers. Universal
and equal suffrage in accordance with the majority principle (in some form) means
that the preferences of all are given equal weight in the selection of representatives;
however, the voters need not base their choice on the opinions of the different
candidates or on the desirability of different social states of affairs. The voters may
say, with Burke, that their representative owes you "...not his industry only, but his
judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion"
coated in Rawitch 1992, p. 50) - and they may choose representatives entertaining the
same ideal of representation.
Westerståhl seems to presume that representative democracy is based on a certain
concept of representation—namely, mandate representation. But if the focus is rather
on power in a representative democracy, representation proves to be a question of
22
delegation and accountability. Voters can only choose or dismiss the persons who
make the decisions. What motive the voters have in so doing does not matter, from a
democratic standpoint: they have the sovereign power to choose.
It is not the implementation of the people’s will which is the common denominator
between direct and indirect democracy, but rather the power of the people. In a direct
democracy, popular power is used to make decisions (and order measures); in a
representative democracy, popular power is used to choose the persons who make
decisions (and order measures). Citizens have “a capacity to make a difference” (Beitz
1989, p. 10). In the end, the right to vote gives only the right of control ex post—
nothing more (cf. Riker 1988, p. 9).
If any democratic norm can be derived from the Swedish constitution, it is that of
accountability, i.e., voter power. Using the words of Elvander, Westerståhl may be
said to champion a “content-oriented” definition of democracy. He transforms a likely
- and perhaps desirable - but not necessary result of democracy into a conceptual
condition for democracy.17
While the implementation of the popular will is not the same thing as democracy, it
can certainly be a criterion for evaluating a democratic system. The value of a
democratic system will thus increase to the extent it results in the implementation of
the people’s will. (The degree of democracy itself, however, will not increase). An
efficiency perspective is thus applied to democracy.
There are two efficiency aspects of democratic decision-making. First, the degree of
correspondence between decisions and the popular will (decisional efficiency);
second, the degree of correspondence between outcomes and the popular will
(outcome efficiency). If outcome efficiency is considered the important thing, then
decisional efficiency might be defended by reference to its instrumental value. But
decisional efficiency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for outcome
efficiency. Decisional efficiency can even stand in direct contradiction to outcome
efficiency—if a collective decision does not lead to the desired outcome.
From a theoretical standpoint, it might be imagined that undemocratic systems are
more efficient at implementing the people’s will in regard to outcomes. In the course
of the debate about whether or not Sweden should join the EU, the argument was
heard that, while the EU is not democratic, it can be defended on democratic
grounds—because it is efficient in reaching desired policy outcomes (see Jacobsson
1997). This is the idea behind the functionalistic perspective on the EU taken by Fritz
Scharpf (Scharpf 1988). Indeed, Scharpf defines democracy in terms of goals
achieved.18
The value Westerståhl ascribes to democracy can be interpreted in one of two ways.
Either he emphasises decisional efficiency, or he emphasises outcome efficiency. In
the first case, his argument for democracy can be interpreted as a popular-will theory;
in the second, it can be interpreted as a preference-utilitarian outcome theory. In either
case, however, the value of democracy is merely instrumental.
Evaluating a democratic system always means choosing an evaluative criterion.
Westerståhl’s ambition was not to choose, but rather to interpret something already
23
chosen—namely, the constitution. But what the constitution prescribes is democracy,
not the effects of democracy.
The constitution can serve as a norm if, instead of measuring the effects of
democracy, we measure the degree of democracy. But the degree of democracy ought
in that case to be defined in terms of popular control over those in power. How well is
the process of accountability functioning? (This question is not, be it noted, identical
with the question: how well are the views of the voters being represented?)
If the constitution is to be used as a norm, we can also ask whether Swedish
democracy ought to be evaluated solely on the basis of its degree of democracy. After
all, the constitution stipulates a number of liberal and constitutionalist principles that
go well beyond the bounds of democracy (see RF, chapter 2). It also prescribes other
outcomes than the enactment of the people’s will. Olof Petersson has seized upon
several of these liberal principles in his concept of democracy, to which I turn in the
following section.
Olof Petersson
Olof Petersson’s general perspective on democracy bears a distinct liberal imprint.
Whether in his writings in Power Commission or in the reports put out by the SNS
Democratic Audit, the difference between democracy and liberalism is hard to detect.
The connection between democracy and liberalism is expressed in conceptual,
empirical, and normative terms. The core idea of the concept of democracy, according
to Petersson, is “autonomy” (Petersson 1989, p. 99). A state is democratic to the
extent its citizens autonomously govern it, he argues (Petersson 1989, p. 100). But his
concept of democracy relates not just to the collective governance of a state, but also
to individual autonomy in the private and civil spheres. An important aspect of
democracy is also what is called the “small democracy”, which refers to the citizen's
freedom of choice in different spheres of society (Petersson et al. 1998, p. 44). The
values that public policy ought to maximise in a democracy have to do with
autonomy—i.e., “pluralism, diversity, and real opportunities to utilise freedom”
(Petersson 1989, p. 103).
In Petersson’s writings, a “monistic” concept of democracy is set against a “pluralist”
one. The first is collectivist and geared towards society; the latter is pluralist and
centres on the individual (Petersson 1993, p. 38; cf. Olsen 1990, p. 25). In a monistic
democracy, citizens wield collective power over the state through a legislative
assembly. A pluralist democracy, by contrast, features a constitutionally regulated
system of authority with a separation of powers, a constitutionalist state, and a vital
civil society. Democracy and liberal constitutionalism almost merge. The close
connection between these two concepts is formulated in both analytical and empirical
terms (Petersson 1996, p. 32), a fact which creates logical problems.19
Definitions, Values, and Empirical Data
24
Petersson seems to select his concept of democracy on the basis of three arguments: a
semantic argument, a normative political argument, and an argument involving a kind
of empirical extrapolation of the current trend of “societal development”.
In Swedish Politics, a textbook written for use in an introductory political-science
course, Petersson writes: “The democratic model of society has been called the “open
society” (Petersson 1993, p. 40). The expression “open society”, however, was used
by Karl Popper to denote a liberal society with constitutional limitations on state
power (Popper 1972, p. 350). Friedrich Hayek spoke of “the Great Society” (a term
derived from Adam Smith) in reference to the same broad constitutionalist ideal
(Hayek 1969, p. 163). If one consults a political dictionary, one finds the following
definition of an “open society”: “In short, it is a society which is as free from the state
as possible, while maintaining good order, cohesion and constitutional politics”
(Scruton 1989, p. 334).
From the standpoint of the history of ideas, the equation of “democracy” with “the
open society” is misleading. Neither Popper nor Hayek used the word “democracy” to
designate the constitutionalist ideals they championed. By “democracy” they meant
what is usually meant: collective citizen power over a state, i.e., what Petersson calls
“monistic democracy”.20 Both men shared the fears entertained by classical liberals—
Montesquieu, Madison, Constant, Smith—regarding democracy (see Popper 1972, p.
350; Hayek 1979, p. 98f.). Accordingly, they called for constitutional limitations on
popular government. But none of these authors argued for such limitations on the
grounds that the concept of democracy and that of an open society are the same.
States that do not meet Petersson’s criteria for “democracy”—e.g., universal
suffrage—can still be open societies in Popper’s sense. The governments of the
United States and Great Britain were stamped by the principles of the open society
before they became democratic. Conversely, a concentration of political power in a
single parliamentary chamber, an economy controlled by the state, a governmentdirected cultural life—these things do not clash with democratic principles. But they
are certainly at odds with the constitutionalist ideal on which the notion of an open
society is based.
A more accurate parallel, from the standpoint of the history of ideas, is that between
democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat (understanding the latter term in the
sense applicable during the Paris Commune of 1871; see Marx 1969). An unrestricted
popular sovereignty reigned there; political representatives and officials were chosen
with binding mandates. The reader can well imagine what the reaction would have
been if a textbook in political science had claimed that “democracy” has been called
“the dictatorship of the proletariat”, and had then proceeded to argue for a
“collectivist” view of democracy. Nevertheless, such a line of argument is more
appropriate—from the standpoint of the history of ideas—than is any attempt to
derive liberal constitutionalist ideals from the concept of democracy. In the
democracies of antiquity, for example, a kind of dictatorship of the citizenry
prevailed. The citizen collective had the sovereign power to make any decision
whatsoever—even to enact retroactive laws (Elster 1999). In Petersson’s terms, one
might say that ancient democracy served to maximise the collective autonomy of
citizens in regard to the governance of a state. But Petersson would hardly describe
the democracy of ancient times as an “open society”.
25
The ideal-typical concept of democracy, as formulated by Ross and Dahl, reaches
back to the democracy of classical times. The conventional understanding of the term
“democracy” is no different from the one, which has been applied since then (Bobbio
1993, p. 27). Nor have champions of the open society like Hayek and Popper had any
different understanding of what democracy means. Their arguments for a limited
democracy presume a “monistic” definition of democracy. Otherwise their argument
makes no sense.
The idea of the open society expresses a material constitutionalist ideal in which the
“rule of law” is deemed more important than the “rule of men”. The Norwegian
historian Francis Sejersted has described the opposition between democracy and “the
rule of law” as follows: “ The Rule of law was meant to curb state authority, while
democracy was meant to mobilise society in the exercising of state authority”
(Sejersted 1988, p. 132). “The rule of law” and democracy may be said to represent
two different types of freedom: negative and positive (Berlin 1984). The material
constitutionalist state protects the individual from coercion, while democracy provides
collective freedom through binding common decisions (Sejersted 1988, p. 131). In the
one case, the individual enjoys freedom from the state; in the other, he/she has the
freedom to participate in the exercise of state power. The political freedom provided
by democracy is not identical with the individual freedom which the constitutionalist
state is designed to protect. This does not mean, of course, that democracy cannot be
used to safeguard the negative freedom of individuals. Such freedom is dependent,
however, on the support of the prevailing majority. In a material constitutionalist
state, by contrast, it is protected against majority rule by a constitution.
Petersson appears to see an intellectual connection between democracy and two forms
of liberalism—the one a constitutionalist classical liberalism emphasising
constitutional government and the separation of powers, the other a social liberalism
emphasising the individual’s actual opportunities for self-realisation. The first report
of the Council on Democracy cites Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of
powers (see Rothstein ed. 1995, p. 93). In Makt i det öppna samhället, Petersson
adduces the social-liberal idea—taken from J.S. Mill and Joseph Raz—that all have
the right to carry out their life plans (Petersson 1989, p. 102). Petersson’s concept of
democracy combines autonomy for institutions, for collectives, and for individuals.
The tensions and conflicts between these different forms of autonomy also
characterise his concept of democracy. He seems to confuse value conflicts in a
democratic constitution with conceptual contradiction. The concept of democracy
need not itself include the different values which democracy is supposed to
safeguard.21
The conflict between collective and individual autonomy is made into a conceptual
conflict within the concept of democracy—since both are included in the latter.
However, a conflict between different goals for a democratic constitution is not the
same as a conceptual conflict within the concept of democracy itself. Democracy can
be given a meaning, which is both free from contradiction and relatively
unambiguous, at the same time that one might argue it ought to seek to realise
contradictory goals. The conflict between collective and individual autonomy can be
illuminated without changing the definition of democracy. Indeed, the conflict
26
becomes clearer if the conventional meaning of “democracy”—collective autonomy
in respect of lawmaking—is retained (Ross 1968, p. 111).
Petersson defines individual autonomy as both negative and positive freedom for the
individual. The opportunity of the individual to fulfil his/her life plans requires both
negative rights and actual resources. But it is difficult to see any conceptual
connection between democracy and individual autonomy in this sense. Democracy
grants positive freedom to the collective to enact laws which individuals must obey.
But the laws can be such a kind as to violate the freedom of the individual—in both a
negative and a positive sense. For example, democracy can violate the rights of
ownership and introduce policies of redistribution, with the result that some
individuals will lack the resources to realise their life plans (see Roemer 1999).
Citing Popper’s critical rationalism, Petersson calls democracy a “critical concept”
(SOU 1994:40, p. 15f; Petersson 1989, p. 72 ff.). However, Popper’s view was sooner
that liberalism is a critical concept: “Principles of Liberalism may be described as
principles of assessing, and if necessary of modifying or changing, existing
institutions, rather then replacing existing institutions.” (Popper 1972, p. 351). Liberal
freedoms “can also be justified pragmatically in terms of the part they play in the
search for truth” (Popper 1972, p. 352). The ideas of “trial and error” and “piecemeal
engineering” are not analytically tied to the concept of democracy, but rather to an
epistemological falsificationism derived from Socratic rationalism. In terms of moral
philosophy, these ideas builds on a “negative utilitarianism” (Popper 1972, p. 345).
Democracy too is defended negatively; its foremost value is that—unlike under
tyranny—its leaders can be dismissed “without bloodshed” (Popper 1972, p. 350).
Modern Western democracies are built on liberal principles, to be sure. But for
Popper, democracy and liberalism were not the same thing.22
Petersson also makes a connection between constitutional norms and autonomy in a
sense related to the “capacity for secondary ordering”, i.e. the ability to examine one’s
first-order preferences critically (cf. Dworkin 1988). Petersson writes: “If democracy
is viewed as autonomy, this relationship becomes evident. The ‘second-order
preferences’ of autonomy represent, when enacted within a state, precisely a
constitution. A constitution consists of ‘meta-norms’—norms about norms”
(Petersson 1989, p. 100).
Petersson applies the concept of autonomy both to institutions and to the capacity of
individuals to reflect on their preferences critically. Institutional autonomy, however,
is a legal relationship, and its prevalence need not mean that citizens have an
“capacity for secondary ordering” in their preference-formation. Once again, a
slippage between differing concepts of autonomy can be observed. The existence of
constitutional norms need not entail any individual capacity for secondary ordering.
What is needed is that judges be able to test whether a given law accords with a
constitutional norm. The individual capacity for secondary ordering—whether in the
case of judges, officials, or citizens—lies on another level. It is a question of their
personal “conscience”. Democracy can prevail even in a state where officials and
citizens are deficient in their capacity for secondary ordering. What is crucial is that
they adhere to a democratic system of law.
27
In general, Petersson seems to equate institutional and personal autonomy. There is a
slippage here between a legal principle on the one hand, and a more moralistic,
Kantian principle on the other. Autonomous institutions need not be populated by
autonomous individuals. The Catholic Church, for instance, is an autonomous
institution in many countries. Yet many would question whether this institution is run
by autonomous individuals (see Lundström 1991 for a discussion).
Petersson’s arguments for autonomy would be clearer if his philosophical reasoning
did not rest on an analysis of the concept of democracy. His plea for a “capacity for
secondary ordering” expresses a perfectionist doctrine of autonomy without any
conceptual connection to democracy. This doctrine should accordingly be defended
on the basis of a normative theory in which the value of democracy is left open. (The
value of democracy was derived, it bears recalling, from its ability to promote
individual autonomy.)
J.S. Mill and Joseph Raz, whom Petersson (Petersson 1989, p. 101) adduces, have a
“comprehensive theory of the good” in which individual autonomy is deemed to
possess inherent value (Raz 1986, p. 395). Yet neither Mill nor Raz see any inherent
value in democracy—only an instrumental one. The value which democracy is
supposed to further is derived from a moral-philosophical argument. “Autonomy is a
distinct ideal, and it can be pursued in different societies which vary considerably…”,
Raz writes (Raz 1989, p. 395). If one accept this normative reasoning, one must do so
on other grounds than that one is simply a democrat. Perfectionist liberalism is but
one of many possible defences for democracy.
Another important argument for democracy in the liberal tradition is that democracy
facilitates impartiality between different “comprehensive theories of the good” (Rawls
1993; Barry 1995). In a democracy, both those who are for autonomy as a life ideal
and those who are against it can coexist. In this case, the moral foundation of
democracy is political liberalism, not the perfectionist liberalism Mill and Raz
represent (cf. Galston 1991 and Dworkin 1996). Petersson appears to have confused
these two types of liberalism. The pluralism and “diversity in manifesting the good
life” (Petersson 1989, p. 90) that he sees in the concept of democracy also includes
tolerance for other ideals than a liberal lifestyle.
A third line of argument for the “pluralist” and individual-centred” definition of
democracy is more empirical. Pluralist democracy is in accord with the trend of
societal development, and ultimately with what citizens want. The “monistic” model
of democracy, by contrast, is losing its relevance as the Swedish model is abandoned.
There are protagonist elements in this argument for a “pluralist” definition of
democracy. In the final report of the Inquiry on Power (SOU 1994:44, p. 406), the
claim is made that:
The notion that democracy is realised to the extent that a single national centre of power can
oversee and govern society’s development is becoming increasingly unrealistic. In a society that
is becoming more and more differentiated, specialised, and internationalised, it is unlikely that a
single central organ, such as Parliament, will be able to fill the role of a dominant centre of
authority… The general idea of democracy will have to be realised along other lines instead.
On the basis of his democratic ideal, Petersson welcomes deregulation, the fall of
corporatism, a reduced public sector, and greater individual freedom. The “other
28
lines” along which “the general idea of democracy” may be realised consist of various
kinds of individual citizen power. One possibility is the “free-choice revolution”,
which has increased the leeway for “small democracy”: i.e., the direct influence of
individual citizens on residential conditions, schools, health care, and the like
(Petersson et al. 1998, pp. 32-47).
Petersson does not derive his definition of democracy from the trend of societal
development; rather, he argues that the trend is “favourable” from a “democratic
standpoint” (SOU 1994:44, p. 403). All the same, the impression one gets is that the
trend of development serves in some sense to legitimate the democratic ideal he
espouses. He regards the fall of the Swedish model as both a necessary and a desirable
development. History has thereby dispatched, in some sense, the “monistic” ideal of
democracy from the current discussion. In this regard Petersson recalls Joseph
Schumpeter, who adduced the limits of “realism” when he launched his revised
definition of democracy (see Lively 1975, p. 38).
There are elements of historical relativism in the defence Petersson offers for his
“pluralist” concept of democracy: “The development of the concept of democracy has
been an element in a cultural process of definition…” (SOU 1994:44, p. 408). The
concept of democracy had been earlier influenced by the “bourgeoisie, the farmers’
movement, and the labour movement”. The “women’s movement” has helped to
modify the concept of democracy also. Now the concept of democracy is changing in
accordance with a reduced trust in what politics can achieve and an increased faith in
the market and civil society.
If one sees the concept of democracy as a sort of mirror of societal changes, and if one
furthermore regards the concept of democracy as normative—which Petersson does—
the door is opened to a relativist view of democracy. One ends up championing that
which a “cultural process of definition” has produced. One cannot escape the notion
that Petersson has formulated his ideal as he has because it accords with the spirit of
the age. As Petersson notes, we live in a time when the conditions of politics have
changed. The Swedish model has been forced to retreat. The question is whether
Petersson would have formulated a different democratic ideal if he had been studying
the power structure in the 1960s, when the Swedish model was at its height and
“monistic” democracy was working quite well. If at that time one had cited a “cultural
process of definition”, it would been a functioning welfare state—rather than
constitutionalism and the separation of powers—which would have been considered
an important element in the concept of democracy.
In his analysis of the changing conditions of politics, Petersson confuses legal
prerogatives with actual power over societal processes. The difficulties which policymakers have encountered in trying to control developments with discretionary
measures (e.g., Keynesian economic policies) do not necessarily undermine the role
of Parliament as a “dominant centre of authority”. Nor are privatisation, deregulation,
and a reduced public sector in themselves indications that Parliament is no longer a
“dominant centre of authority”. What Parliament does is enact such laws and public
policies as its members consider most suitable for achieving their goals in a given
situation.
29
As for the societal developments which, according to Petersson, speak for the
“pluralist” and “individual-centred” model of democracy—these can be parried and
handled by the “monistic” and “society-oriented” model. As a matter of fact, that is
exactly what has occurred. Parliament has decided to join the EU, carried out farreaching deregulation, and given the central bank a more independent position. The
“free-choice revolution” welcomed by Petersson has been implemented by Parliament
in traditional democratic order. Parliament has not, however, renounced its “monistic”
power over Swedish law. Parliamentary democracy (which Petersson calls
“monistic”) does not require that a society be subjected to political direction—only
that applicable law be determined by a sovereign parliament. This legislative power
can then be utilised to give individuals a large room for manoeuvre—or a small one—
within various societal sectors. Indeed, “monistic” democracy can be used to establish
laissez-faire, or to institute a “minimal state” of the sort championed by Nozick.
That which distinguishes “monistic” democracy—i.e., democracy, according to
traditional usage in political science—is that the citizen collective has sovereign
power over the state, i.e., over the legal system penetrating a territory. The content of
this legal order can vary without the degree of democracy varying. It lies in the
concept of popular power that such power can be used in a variety of ways. Public
ownership and a planned economy can be instituted—or, just as well, private
ownership and a market economy.
In addition, Petersson seems to confuse power over law with power within the
framework of law. Citizens, organisations, and corporations which obtain greater
freedom of action do not thereby achieve power over law. Nor do agencies
responsible for the public direction of society. The Swedish model is not based, any
more than its dismantling, on “monistic” democracy. Both the one and the other can
be legitimated and implemented through “monistic” democracy”. Democracy may
presuppose the existence of a “power centre”, but it does not require that the public
sector be large.
One can, of course, argue for the separation of powers and against allowing
Parliament to be a “dominant centre of authority”. However, the changes in the
conditions of politics to which Petersson refers do not suffice for this. One must
present a substantive normative argument to the effect that certain values ought to
form the foundation for our system of government. If one ascribes a higher value to
individual liberty than to democracy, one may reasonably argue for imposing
constitutional restrictions on popular sovereignty. However, referring to such limits as
“pluralist democracy” more nearly resembles an attempt at persuasive definition than
the taking of a clear normative stance.
It is possible to argue for both liberal constitutional reforms and liberal policies within
various areas without altering the definition of democracy. There is a tension between
liberalism and democracy, which should not be defined away. There is also a conflict
between democracy and efficiency which should not be defined away (see Barry 1974
and Jacobsson 1997). It must be possible to argue—without self-contradiction—for
limitations on democracy for the sake of enhanced constitutionalism and greater
efficiency.
30
The Council on Democracy gives a reasonable argument for reinforcing
constitutionalism and introducing constitutional reforms to increase efficiency. It
argues that “popular governments which do not respect constitutionalist ideals, and
which show themselves to lack any capacity for effective action—such governments
bring about, experience tells us, their own end” (Rothstein ed. 1995, p. 11). Here the
Council on Democracy puts forward an empirical thesis—one which presumes, be it
noted, that democracy is defined independently of constitutionalism and efficiency.
An empirical argument of this kind presupposes exactly the definition of democracy
that the Council wants to alter.
Disregarding the methodological problems in Petersson’s argument for a pluralist
concept of democracy, we can interpret his position as a best-outcomes defence for
democracy. Democracy is valuable because it maximises people’s autonomy. The
problem here is that, by his definition, democracy means autonomy. His argument
tends therefore to be circular. Others who have sought to defend similar values—
Tingsten and Dahl, for example—have avoided this circularity by retaining the
conventional definition of democracy.
Concluding remarks
The three Swedish political scientists discussed in this article do not ascribe the same
meaning to the term “democracy”. Tingsten subscribes to a conventional view of
democracy. He puts the stress on legally regulated procedures for decision-making in
a state. There is an indirect tie to questions of power, moreover, in his emphasis on the
forms and techniques of decision-making. Democratic procedures involve the
distribution of legal resources of power among citizens. In defining the term
“democracy”, Tingsten has no normative purposes other than purely linguistic ones.
The term should be assigned a meaning that both accords with a predominant usage
and is scientifically fruitful.
Democracy means the collective power of citizens over a state. The degree of
democracy is higher in a parliamentary system than in one with a separation of
powers. In Petersson’s terminology, one would say that Tingsten’s concept of
democracy was “monistic”.
Tingsten held a value-neutral and naturalistic concept of democracy (see Tännsjö
1991, p. 9). The term “democracy” denotes a measurable state of affairs. The choice
of definition cannot be justified by reference to any political position. The moral
charge carried by the word is no argument for using the term to designate the object of
one’s desires.
Tingsten’s famous thesis concerning a “belief in democracy” and an “super-ideology”
ought, in my opinion, to be interpreted as an explication of the meaning of democratic
procedures—not as a normative thesis placing the defence of democracy above
ideological principles. The question is one of principles for the acceptance of
decisions in a democracy, not of principles for the acceptance of democracy itself.
One could say that a democratic super-ideology serves as guidance in “questions of
action” in a democratic state, rather than in “questions of regulation” in a state, i.e.,
the choice of form of government (cf. Riker och Ordershook 1973, p. 273). One may
be guided in one’s choice of form of government by a political ideology; if one
31
chooses democracy, however, one must accept the decisions of the majority. To be
sure, Tingsten regarded a democratic super-ideology as a desirable thing. But it is
desirable because it is a precondition of democracy. Its value derives from the value
of democracy; it does not justify democracy.
Tingsten’s procedural concept of democracy is often misunderstood. It does not
imply, any more than Dahl’s does, any procedural argument for democracy.
Tingsten’s defence of democracy was sooner based on its outcomes. He formulated no
original defence for democracy, but simply expressed his agreement with what others
had said before. The value of democracy lies in how it gives rise to peace
(Schumpeter), and in how it facilitates the free and independent development of
individuals (J.S. Mill). These arguments for democracy are neither neutral nor
procedure-oriented. Those taking part in a democratic community need not all have
the same arguments for democracy. They must all understand, however, what it means
to take part in a democratic community. Tingsten further considered democracy, for
the reasons he cited, to be a desirable thing. But his argument for democracy lies
neither in his concept of democracy nor in his thesis of a democratic super-ideology.
Westerståhl’s concept of democracy has much in common with Tingsten’s. It accords
with a convention among political scientists. For Westerståhl, as for Tingsten,
democracy is the power of citizens over a state.
But instead of stressing procedures for decision-making, he puts the emphasis on what
he considers to be the purpose of these procedures—namely, the implementation of
the popular will. He formulates himself in such a manner as to suggest he has in mind
the popular will in regard to decisions. In his idea of a “service democracy”, on the
other hand, it is the outcomes of decisions which are important. Politicians are
assumed to “serve” up solutions to the problems of different groups.
Westerståhl has the ambition of deriving a democratic norm from the Swedish
constitution. He reads into the formulation found in the first paragraph—that “All
public power in Sweden proceeds from the people”—the idea that what marks a
democracy is the implementation of the people’s will. An alternative interpretation,
however, is that what distinguishes a democracy is the power of the people. But
Westerståhl avoids the concept of power. He focuses instead on what power can be
used for. Yet the power possessed by citizens in a representative democracy is
restricted to the choice of decision-makers. It is control rather than opinionrepresentativity, which is the constitutional principle of democracy.
Westerståhl’s thesis about the implementation of the popular will may be seen,
however, as a criterion for evaluating democracy’s success. His concept of democracy
thus slides into a popular-will argument for democracy: democracy is valuable to the
extent that it implements the will of the people in regard to decisions. But the idea of a
service democracy can also be interpreted along preference-utilitarian lines:
democracy is valuable to the extent that it maximises preference-satisfaction among
citizens. This welfare-economics perspective on democracy amounts to a kind of bestoutcomes theory, in which the stress is not on opinion-representativity but on welfare.
The normative connotations in Westerståhl’s concept of democracy are more plentiful
than in Tingsten’s. One could argue that Westerståhl has a “substantive” definition of
32
democracy. He stipulates within the definition something which is a desirable but not
a necessary condition for democracy—welfare or, alternatively, the implementation of
the popular will. The crux of the matter is that he disregards the question of power,
and fastens instead on possible outcomes of the exercise of power.
Yet the normative elements in Westerståhl’s concept of democracy are not so
pronounced as those in Olof Petersson’s. Petersson sees “autonomy” as the core of the
concept of democracy. If he had limited himself to the legal autonomy of the citizen
collective in connection with legislation, his concept of democracy would have been
in line with the conventional understanding. But he reads a general principle of
autonomy into the definition of democracy—and in respect to a wide range of societal
phenomena: institutions, collectives, and individuals. Individual autonomy requires
both a “capacity for secondary ordering” (i.e., an ability to reflect critically on one’s
preferences) and a real opportunity to realise one’s preferences. Petersson thereby
makes himself the voice of a perfectionist liberalism of the sort espoused by J.S. Mill.
But Mill did not defend his principle of autonomy on the grounds that it forms part of
the concept of democracy. The values that democracy ought to maximise are defined
independently of “democracy”. Mill sooner subscribed to the common definition of
“democracy”, i.e., popular control over a state. He saw representative democracy as a
salutary limitation on democracy, inasmuch as representatives could be assumed to
make wiser decisions than voters do. Like Popper and Hayek, Mill was fearful of
democracy; but he considered it the best alternative.
Petersson attempts, however, to fuse the idea of democracy with the ideals he thinks
democracy ought to realise. In this way the door is opened to a new concept of
democracy—a “pluralist” or “individual-centred” one. This type of democracy entails
not just rule by the citizens, but also material constitutionalism and a separation of
powers. Democracy is found both on the macro-level (citizen control over a state) and
on the micro- (individual influence over daily life).
In our political culture, it may be presumed, Petersson’s normative principles enjoy
strong support. They express a liberal individualism in line with the times. This is also
one of the reasons, in fact, why he includes said principles within his definition of
democracy. Democracy assumes its meaning, he avers, through a “cultural process of
definition”. This conceptual relativism serves, however, to obscure Petersson’s
argumentation on behalf of his ideal.
Tingsten too argues for democracy in terms of personal liberation. But he does not
alter the definition of democracy for that. Dahl and Rawls do not change the definition
of democracy either, in any effort to legitimate the values they think democracy ought
to maximise. Such a change is not needed—to the extent one refuses to resort to
persuasive definitions.
Petersson uses the term “democracy” as a synonym for “good society”. The meaning
of the term is thus derived from a normative ideal of justice. Such use of language is
common in political rhetoric; in political science, however, it gives rise to an
objectivity problem. The underlying value premises are not made clear (see Myrdal
1968). The empirical relationship between democracy on the one hand, and what in
one’s estimation makes a society good, on the other, are obscured.
33
A “secularised” concept of democracy facilitates both empirical and normative
research on democracy. The definition of democracy used in modern political
science—as formulated by Tingsten, Kelsen, Ross, and others—has its roots in a
legal-positivist perspective on law. Law and morality are distinguished from each
other. Democracy too is thereby distinguished from morality. Democracy is a legal
order in which legal resources for governing the state are distributed equally. Its moral
value is an open question. Arguments for its value must not be replaced by
definitions. Such a substitution is unfortunate, from both a scientific and a democratic
point of view. The legitimacy of democracy is undermined if the arguments on its
behalf are not made clear.
In an article entitled “Does Democracy Engender Justice?”, John Roemer (Roemer
1999) has nicely captured the value of distinguishing the concept of democracy from
normative concepts:
We must I believe insist upon a division of labor between the concepts of democracy and
justice… Democracy should be defined as a set of institutions and practices whose intention is to
implement a certain kind of equal participation of citizens in the political process. Justice, on the
other hand, consists in a set of relations among persons, and between persons and goods, in a
society. With this division of labor, the initial question becomes a scientific one: will a given set of
institutions and practices bring about the particular set of relationships that justice requires?
Which concept of democracy is to be preferred: that of Tingsten, Westerståhl, or
Petersson? As the reader has doubtless noticed, my own sympathies lie with
Tingsten—but for scientific reasons, not political ones.23 The choice of concept of
democracy should facilitate a “lucid” presentation. This calls for both linguistic
conventionalism and scientific precision. Both Westerståhl and Petersson tend to
equate democracy with what they think the goals of democracy ought to be. In an
exchange in Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, Westerståhl criticises Petersson for having an
“Anglo-Saxon” notion of democracy. But Westerståhl’s concept has an “AngloSaxon” character too, inasmuch as he sees democracy as a “service organ” for
maximising voter welfare. Petersson’s “Anglo-Saxon” ideas are more republican. A
market philosophy confronts a doctrine of political virtue.
Westerståhl’s view of the goals of democracy is more secularised than is Petersson’s.
But both could argue for what such goals ought to be, instead of defining
“democracy” in such a way as to render argument superfluous.
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1
This is a translation by Peter Meyers of a text based on my "Tre demokratibegrepp i svensk
statskunskap", published in Berggren, Karlsson and Nergelius (eds). 2001. Demokratins
konstitutionella val", Stockholm: City University Press.
2
A distinction is made between a concept and a conception of democracy. This distinction is not always
clear-cut. But a concept is semantic notion, whereas a conception also has normative elements. The
answer to first question gives the concept of democracy; the answers to both the first and the second
question form a conception of democracy In English the expression “conception of democracy” may be
rendered in Swedish as “demokratisyn”. Przeworski defines “conception of democracy” as follows:
“...a description that has value connotations, where the move from the empirical to the evaluative is
definitional” (Przeworski 1989, p. 23).
3
Leif Lewin’s “interactive” conception of democracy would well merit a discussion in this article (see
Lewin 1970). It is above all for reasons of space that I have chosen to disregard it. To a degree,
moreover, such an oversight may be justified by the fact that his conception of democracy is less
prominent in the debate on democracy in Sweden today. For a critical analysis of Lewin’s conception
of democracy, see Boström 1988.
4
A persuasive definition has the following characteristics, according to Stevenson (1969, p. 210): “In
any ‘persuasive definition’ the term defined is a familiar one, whose meaning is both descriptive and
strongly emotive. The purport of the definition is to alter the descriptive meaning of the term, usually
by giving it greater precision within the boundaries of its customary vagueness; but the definition does
not make any change in the term’s emotive meaning. And the definition is used, consciously or
unconsciously, in an effort to secure, by this interplay between emotive and descriptive meaning, a
redirection of people’s attitudes.”
5
Ross formulated his definition of “democracy” as follows (Ross 1968, p. 94): “The democratic
element, the influence of the people over the exercise of public power, can vary with respect to:
Intensity, i.e., with respect to the size of the circle of persons permitted to take part in voting and
elections.
Effectiveness, i.e., with respect to the degree to which the people are able to assert their viewpoints
effectively.
Extensity, i.e., with respect to the extent to which popular influence and popular control are extended to
a greater or lesser number of the various branches of state power”.
Arne Naess too formulates a definition of democracy in terms of several dimensions (Naess 1968, p.
111):
“A state A is governed more democratically than a state B if and only if:
suffrage or eligibility is wider or elections are more direct or
the mandate can be more easily withdrawn or ‘the range of opinion’ is greater when it comes to policy
issues or the degree of "intentional depth" in popular opinion is greater or
popular opinion about public problems is created under less ‘intense’ or one-sided propaganda”. (My
translation.)
6
On this point I disagree with Boström, who writes that “one-sided value-maximizing” is the “signum”
of ideal-type definitions (Boström 1988, p. 227). Neither Ross’s ideal-type definition nor that of Dahl,
namely, stipulate the maximising of democracy; they merely stipulate a linguistic usage.
7
Other expressions used in Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy are “excellence” and “a comprehensive
theory of the good”. (See Rawls 1993, p. 179 f.).
8
On this point I am hesitant towards Jörgen Hermansson’s interpretation of Tingsten. Hermansson
interprets the thesis of a democratic super-ideology as a procedural argument for democracy
(Hermansson 1992, p. 94). Tingsten defended democracy because it is a neutral procedure.
Hermansson accuses Tingsten of “assuming that which is to be proven” (ibid.). As I interpret Tingsten,
however, his thesis of a democratic super-ideology does not presume democracy’s desirability. He
simply elucidated the meaning of the rules of democracy. He argued for the desirability of democracy
elsewhere (see above).
9
Cf. Hermansson, who interprets the thesis of a “democratic super-ideology” as meaning that, from a
values standpoint, “the idea of democracy stands above other political notions, such as conservatism,
liberalism, and socialism” (Hermansson 1992, p. 93). I argue that no such conclusion can be drawn
from Tingsten’s super-ideology thesis.
37
10
Some scholars argue that Tingsten too used a substantive definition of “democracy”, inasmuch as he
included certain rights within the concept of democracy itself. In a critical commentary on Tingsten’s
critique of “substantive definitions of democracy”, Jörgen Hermansson claims that the argument
against a “socialist” definition of democracy is substantively… “useless” (Hermansson 1986, p. 255).
The argument is that a definition which includes political rights within the concept of democracy is
substantive in the same degree: “the traditional definition of democracy embraces substantive
components”. Tingsten was thereby responsible for the same mistakes as those he criticised; he did not
abide by the same “restriction” he imposed on them. What Hermansson seems to say is that Tingsten’s
definition also restricts the content of democratic decisions, inasmuch as democratic rights and
freedoms cannot be abolished. However, Tingsten had in mind not the content of democratic decisions,
but the content of the definition of democracy. There are two questions that must be distinguished here:
1. Is it self-contradictory to claim that a decision is democratic if the participants lack democratic rights
and freedoms in the process of decision-making? 2. Is it self-contradictory to term a decision
democratic if it entails the abolition of democratic rights and freedoms? The first question should be
answered with a yes. Herein lies the decisive difference between stipulating democratic rights and
freedoms and stipulating socialist relations of production within the definition of democracy. The
answer to the second question depends on whether one defines “democratic procedures” in such a way
as to stipulate a restriction on outcomes. Brian Barry’s definition of “democratic procedures”
adumbrated above stipulates that a democratic procedure cannot involve the abolition of democratic
rights and freedoms. Whether or not such a definition is appropriate is a semantic issue—not a
normative one. It is not unreasonable to define “democratic procedures” in such a way that all
outcomes are compatible with them. Otherwise, it would be impossible to describe the decision-making
process that issued in Hitler’s assumption of power as democratic (which many people do). A
definition of “democracy” does not serve to legitimate political actions—only a certain use of
language.
11
In a commentary on the constitution, Holmberg and Stjernquist indicate the meaning of such terms as
“technique for decision-making” (Holmberg and Stjernquist 1995, p. 40).
12
Tingsten (Tingsten 1933, p. 339) described the fear of democracy felt by the American Founding
Fathers in the following fashion: “The Founding Fathers regarded unlimited democracy as likely to
result in oppression by the majority. They wished therefore to limit the impact of popular
government—even while affirming its basic principle—by dividing up state power among different
organs…the separation of powers became a safeguard against the power of the majority.”
13
Boström’s interpretation of Tingsten is doubtful on this point. Boström argues that “the realisation of
the popular will” is an element in Tingsten’s concept of democracy (Boström 1988, p. 157). But he
does not make clear what the popular will refers to—the choice of representatives, the choice of
decisions, or the outcome of decisions.
14
Tingsten approvingly cited Lord Bryce, who wrote that democracy is “that type of constitution in
which the government belongs legally to the members of the community as a whole, not to one or
several particular classes. This means that the majority rules in societies where questions are decided
by the ballot, as there is no other peaceful, legal way of ascertaining what the will of the community
shall be considered to be when unanimity cannot be reached (Tingsten 1933, p. 12).
15
Rune Premfors, however (Premfors 2000, p. 17), argues that Tingsten set forth a “liberal” conception
of democracy: “This basic view—that democracy equals a number of ‘neutral’ procedural rules for
decision-making at state and local levels, and thus does not, in a broader sense, concern how we choose
to live our lives——this point of view has remained, it seems, the dominant one among leading
Swedish political scientists. It need hardly be pointed out that that which many see as staking out a
position in a debate ‘limited to the discipline’ is tantamount—if not always consciously, then at least in
its consequences—to an unequivocal endorsement of a liberal conception of democracy.” Premfors
seems to take the view that Tingsten’s concept of democracy prohibits democratic procedures in other
areas than the state and the municipality. But the popular power over a state entailed by democracy as
Tingsten defined it can be used to install democratic procedures at other levels (schools, workplaces,
etc.). The “strong democracy” Premfors commends can be chosen democratically if the people so
desire, but other options are also possible. A “liberal democracy” is compatible with, but not identical
to, democracy in Tingsten’s sense. Premfors does not need to change Tingsten’s definition of
democracy in order to argue for a “strong democracy”; he can simply present his own case on its
merits.
16
This notion of power has been formulated by Beitz (1989, p. 10) as follows: “Power is a
counterfactual notion. In attributing power to someone, we imply that there is some possible world in
which her action (or omission) will change the future course of events by converting an outcome she
38
does not want, but that would have occurred if she had not acted (or had acted otherwise) into an
outcome she wants. Having power, she has the potential to make a difference. However, the world in
which one’s power makes a difference need not be the actual world—one can have (and exercise)
power without getting what one wants, and one can get what one wants without exercising power (or
by exercising it superfluously: when the desired outcome would have occurred anyway).” Brian Barry
has formulated a similar idea (Barry 1992, p. 272). Cf. Dahl 1982, p. 22.
17
Boström presents a similar idea (Boström 1988, p. 197), but claims that Westerståhl prescribes that
leaders make decisions in accordance with the people’s will. One can argue, however, that it is wrong
to include the implementation of the people’s will within the concept of democratic procedures
generally. The popular will is defined in terms of a social-choice function independent of democracy.
(Beitz 1989, p. 20).
18
Scharpf writes: “Democracy aims at collective self-determination. It must accordingly be regarded as
a two-dimensional concept which relates the inputs and outputs of the system. On the input side, selfdetermination requires that policy decisions stem either directly or indirectly from the authentic
preferences of citizens, and that governments be held accountable to the latter. On the output side, on
the other hand, self-determination means effective control over destiny.” (Scharpf 1998, p. 105.) Cf.
Barry’s (1974) critique of Dahl and Tufte (1973).
19
Petersson writes: “If one chooses a pluralist interpretation of democracy, the concepts of democracy
and of constitutionalism come largely to coincide. A pluralist democracy cannot exist without the rule
of law, the separation of powers, and rights.” (Petersson 1996, p. 32). Petersson moves back and forth
here between conceptual analysis and empirical assertion. If the last argument is correct,
constitutionalism cannot form part of the “pluralist concept of democracy”. A causal relationship
cannot exist between entities which analytically coincide.
20
Hayek writes about the term “democracy”: “In the case of democracy we must not forget that the
word refers solely to a particular method of government. It meant originally no more than a certain
procedure for arriving at political decisions, and tells us nothing about what the aims of government
ought to be.” (Hayek 1979, p. 98). Popper takes a similar view: “Democracy as such cannot confer any
benefits upon the citizens and should not be expected to do so. In fact democracy can do nothing—only
the citizens of the democracy can act[...] Democracy provides no more than a framework within which
the citizens may act in a more or less organised and coherent way.” (Popper 1972, p. 350).
21
The confusion between concepts and values can be seen in the following statement from the first
report of the Council on Democracy: “The debate has also shown that the concept of democracy cannot
be reduced to a single value. A democratic government must fulfil several different and partly
incompatible demands at the same time” (Rothstein ed. 1995, p. 24). In the first report put out by the
Council on Democracy, democracy was defined as the sum of three phenomena: namely, rule by
citizens, a constitutionalist state (with a separation of powers), and effectiveness (Rothstein ed. 1995, p.
122f.). The first corresponds to Dahl’s five conditions for democracy. The second corresponds to both
formal and material constitutionalist principles. Both the principle of legality and a kind of separationof-powers doctrine form part of the concept of constitutionalism set forth by the Council on
Democracy. The third component has to do with do with resources, with the ability to make decisions,
and with the ability to carry them out. In its first report, the Council on Democracy devised an additive
index with thirteen indicators which, taken together, were presumed to measure the degree of
democracy which prevailed in Sweden. In this index, the degree of citizens’ rule, of constitutionalism,
and of effectiveness was added up. This would seem to imply that a reduction in citizen power can be
compensated for by enhanced constitutionalism and/or effectiveness. It could even be the case that the
degree of democracy increases at the same time as citizen power is non-existent. In subsequent reports
from the Council on Democracy, this method for measuring Swedish democracy was not used again.
(See Lundström 1996 for a critical discussion.)
22
Popper writes: “Democracy as such cannot confer any benefits upon the citizens and should not be
expected to do so. In fact democracy can do nothing—only the citizens of the democracy can act[...]
Democracy provides no more than a framework within which the citizens may act in a more or less
organised and coherent way”. (Popper 1972, p. 350). The first principle of liberalism is that “The state
is a necessary evil: its powers are not to be multiplied beyond what is necessary” (Popper 1972, p.
350). Kelsen too sees a conceptual conflict between democracy and liberalism: “It is of importance to
be aware that the principle of democracy and that of liberalism are not identical, that there exists even a
certain antagonism between them. For according to the principle of democracy the power of the people
is unrestricted… Liberalism, however, means restriction of governmental power, what ever form the
governmental power may assume. It means restriction on democratic power. Hence democracy is
essentially government by the people.” (Kelsen 1955, p. 3f.). That democracy and liberalism are
39
different phenomena is also emphasised by Ross (1968, p. 111): “The fact that there is a historical
connection cannot be allowed to “conceal the truth that democracy and liberalism are distinct concepts
without any mutual connection.” (Ross, 1968, p. 111).
23
Premfors (Premfors 2000, p. 22) argues that “… no one can claim—and keep his credibility at the
same time—that one’s own definition of the concept is the only right one, and that, further, a proposed
definition must always be accompanied by an argument as to why just this one has been chosen. And—
to close the circle, such arguments are always at bottom normative.” Premfors seems to equate the
choice of definitions with the choice of political ideals. If one reasons in such a fashion, all normative
democratic theory can be replaced with semantics. Taking a semantic position does not imply,
however, taking a moral or political one. A rule of linguistic usage is not a norm prescribing a societal
ideal. If Premfors wishes to defend a societal ideal, he must express this position in the form of a
normative thesis—not just define it in terms of “democracy”.