Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang Ownership
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※Brief Analysis of Important Issues※
Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang
Ownership
Kuei-hsiang Hsu
(MTAC Counselor;Ph.D. of National Chengchi University)
Abstract
The Sino-Indian border issue is one of the touchiest issues in the
relationship between the two countries, being unresolved for more than fifty
years. Since the 1990s, the two countries, driven by the demands for national
development, have become increasingly close. However, border issue has
become an obstacle in the development of a friendly relationship. This paper
explores the progress on border negotiations between Mainland China and India
and the limitations, with special focus on the controversies and disputes
following the signing of Agreement on the Political Guiding Principles for Solving
the Border Issue between China and India in 2005. One of the most notable
issues in the border negotiations is the ownership of Tawang district.
Key Words：Sino-Indian border issue, Sino-Indian relationship,
Arunachal Pradesh, Tawang, the Tibetan issue
Ⅰ. Introduction
China and India are two developing countries that attracted much attention in the
previous century for their economic development, especially after being named by
Goldman Sachs as part of the BRICs in 2003. The term “Chindia” was even coined in
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2005. Many comparisons are being made about these two countries. Some believe that
that China will continue outperforming India with its endless supply of foreign
investments, while others believe that India will surpass China in the near future with its
better-working democratic and financial systems. It has become a popular subject to
compare the two countries, and the close cooperative relationship between the two
countries since 2003 has attracted the attention of the world. On the other hand, as the two
countries share a border, the question of defining border has been a subject of dispute for
more than fifty years, and it is a question that still awaits resolution.
1
Chindia was a term coined by Indian Minister of Commerce Jairam Ramesh with the intention of pushing for cooperation and
exchange between China and India.
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Bi-Monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.4
Ⅱ. Background of Border Issues between China and India
Border dispute between China and India has been going on for a long time. In early
twentieth century, when India was ruled by the British, the McMahon Line created in the
northeast border between China and India in 1914 became the center of dispute between
the two countries later, and the dispute remains unresolved after nearly a century’s time.
Both two countries are dedicated to the cause of economic development in the context of
globalization, a situation which inevitably created a cooperative but also competitive
relationship between them. China and India have to deal with the border issue which
compromises the cooperative relationship between them while trying hard to enhance
economic development. China shares a 22,000-kilometer border with 14 countries. In the
1960s, China concluded border treaties or agreements with countries including Myanmar,
Nepal, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Since the 1990s, China has settled border
issues with Russia, Laos, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. By the end
of 2004, China has signed border treaties or agreements with 12 countries, confirming
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90% of its border line. Only India and Bhutan have yet to settle border disputes with
China, and India is the more important of the two. Once India settles its border dispute
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with China, China’s border dispute with Bhutan will be settled easily. The vast majority
of China-India border is located in Tibet territory, and a small part of it is located in
Xinjiang Province. China-India border stretches from the mouth of Karakorum Mountains
in the west to the point where China, India, and Myanmar meet in the east. China-India
border is several kilometers long, and runs through Nepal and Bhutan. There is not a
single boundary tablet on the border because China and India have yet to conclude any
border agreement. Under such circumstances, it is not possible to have a precise
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measurement of the length of China-India border. China and India each gave different
accounts of the exact length, with China saying the border is 2000 or 1700 kilometers
long, and India saying the border is 4057 kilometers long.
Since the 21st century, China and India both intend to speed up the process of border
dispute resolution. China is hoping to resolve border disputes with India in order to
develop a cooperative relationship with India and create a win-win situation in economic
and other areas. Many in India believe that before 1950, it was unnecessary to set up
border patrol stations in India-Tibet border, but now that China has controlled Tibet, India
2
“90% of China’s Border with Neighbor Countries Demarcated,” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website, August 31,
2005,
http://www.gmw.cn/content/2005-08/31/content_297875.htm.
3
Kuei-hsiang Hsu, “A Preliminary Study of the Triangular Relationship between Bhutan, China, and India,” Bi-Monthly Journal
on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.14, No.2, pp. 21-44.
4
“Sino-Indian Border Lines,” Global Times, December 10, 2006, retrieved from http://diandian.tibetcul.com/20811.html.
Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang Ownership
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is forced to spend sixty million rupees per day to guard the India-Tibet border. These
people believe that a quick resolution to the border dispute would not only solve the
problem of national security in the north but also relieves India of the threat from its
neighbors in the east and in the west: Pakistan and Bangladesh, thereby greatly reducing
India’s financial burden and allowing India to concentrate on economic development and
domestic development to become a stronger nation. Both India and China want to resolve
border issues, but such complicated issues cannot be resolved in the short term.
Ⅲ. Recent Development of China-India Relationship
Since the 1990s, there has been some progress in the development of China-India
relationship, but the progress has been slow due to disagreements in the past and mutual
suspicion. In 1996, former China President Jiang Zemin paid a visit to India and
established a “cooperative and constructive partnership into the 21st century” between
India and China. In 1998, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s coalition government conducted
nuclear weapon testing, and there were talks in India about the “threat from China,”
which cast a dark shadow over India’s relationship with China. Yet on the whole, ChinaIndia relationship is gradually improving. India changed its Tibet policy in 2003 when in
June of that year, former India Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid a visit to China
and signed the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation
Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India to promote a long-term
constructive and cooperative partnership. Both sides made some sacrifice as a friendly
gesture to each other, with China acknowledging Sikkim as part of India territory in
exchange for India publicly acknowledging for the first time that “Tibet Autonomous
Region” is a part of China territory and reiterating India’s stance against anti-China
political activities organized by exile Tibetans in India. China and India also agreed to
start sending special delegations to each other since 2003 to speed up the process of
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resolving border disputes.
Since 2003, India has been more active in pursuing a relationship with China. In
April 2005, China Premier Wen Jiabao paid a visit to India and signed the Joint
Declaration between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India which
officially switched the nature of China-India relationship from a “long-term constructive
and cooperative partnership” to a “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and
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prosperity." In November 2006, China President Hu Jintao visited India and signed the
Joint Declaration to develop the “ten strategies” to deepen bilateral cooperation and
5
“Seminar on Tibet held at Jammu,” ITCO, August 18, 2007, http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=17664&t=1.
6
Kuei-hsiang Hsu, “A Preliminary Discussion on Sino-Indian Relationship Development—Focusing on Border Issue and Tibet
Issue,” Bi-Monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.12, No.4, pp. 45-46
7
“A Dragon Shakes Hand with an Elephant: Sino-Indian Relationship in the New Century,” The Contemporary World, 2005,
Issue 6,
http://www.51dh.net/magazine/article/1006-4206/2005/06/264305.html.
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Bi-Monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.4
develop the “thirteen-point agreement” to further strengthen China-India strategic and
cooperative partnership. In the period from November 2006 to June 2007, Hu Jintao and
Wen Jiabao met with India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for three times in a third
country. In October 2007, Sonia Gandhi, President of Indian National Congress and
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President of United Progressive Alliance, visited China. India Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh visited China in mid January 2008 and signed with China Premier Wen Jiabao on
January 14 A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the People's Republic of China and
the Republic of India which addresses the issues of diplomacy, economy and trade,
strategies, border disputes, and climate change. 9 All these are signs suggesting that China
and India are willing to set aside their differences in border issue and develop a
cooperative relationship in other aspects. The frequent mutual visits between leaders of
both sides suggest a closer relationship between China and India.
For the past decade or so, China and India have been setting aside their differences to
develop relationship in other areas. This strategy has yielded positive results, most
remarkably in the growth of economic and trade relationship between the two countries.
China-India trade expanded three times from USD 13.6 billion in 2004 to near USD 39
billion in 2007. 10 Military exchanges between China and India were also on the rise. In
the fall of 2003, Chinese and Indian naval forces conducted a joint search and rescue
exercise off the coast of Shanghai. In December 2007, Chinese and Indian armed forces
conducted a joint anti-terrorist military exercise in Yunnan Province of China. With
regard to international and regional affairs, China and India created mechanisms to
promote strategic dialogues, foreign policy negotiations, and anti-terrorist dialogues. In
addition to frequent mutual visits between leaders of both sides, China and India also
managed to have exchanges in the areas of culture, technology, education, energy, and
non-traditional security. While exchanges between China and India are increasing in
frequency, 11 disagreements arise from time to time as a result of a lack of mutual trust.
China and India now have a “strategic and cooperative partnership,” and there is a
mutual trust mechanism for them to negotiate border disputes, border trade, and military
issues. However, suspicions still exist between them as they have not signed any kind of
non-aggression treaty. For a long time, China and India have been making slow progress
in building a friendly relationship because of the lack of communication and mutual trust.
It is crucial for China and India to develop mutual trust to stand any chance of developing
extensive relationship in the long term. Disagreements in the past and long-standing lack
of mutual trust and communication have stood in the way of extensive development
8
“Indian Prime Minister’s Visit to China a Milestone on Sino-Indian Relationship ‘Expressway’,” People, January 23, 2008
http://world.people.com.cn/GB/14549/6813101.html.
9
“China and India Sign Key Agreement on Joint Anti-Terrorist Drills,” China, January 14, 2008,
http;//big5.china.com.cn/news/txt/2008-01/14/content_9531144.htm.
10
See Note 8.
11
“Interview With Zhang Yan: Sino-Indian Strategic Cooperative Partnership Enters Expressway,” Xinhua Net, January 11, 2008,
http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-01/11/content_74...
Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang Ownership
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between India and China. As a result, problems such as China-India border disputes,
India’s two-faced attitude toward the subject of the Dalai Lama, and India’s suspicions
toward China-Pakistan cooperation might not be easily resolved in the near future.
India’s suspicions toward China are mostly centered on two areas: national defense
and security, and economy and trade.
With regard to national defense and security, after adopting the reform and openingup policy, China has been trying to enhance economic development in Tibet under the
pretext of “assisting Tibet” as part of the Great Western Development Strategy. Especially
in recent years, China has been actively pushing for infrastructure development in Tibet,
building five highways, four airports, and the Qinghai-Tibet Railway in Tibet, much to
the uneasiness of India. Take the Qinghai-Tibet Railway for example. It had carried 5.95
million passengers (43% of total tourists in Tibet in the period) from its opening in July
2006 to the end of 2007, and may be regarded as a major breakthrough in transportation
development for Tibet. 12 In its annual report, India’s Ministry of Defence pointed out that
China would pose a long-standing challenge to India’s national security, not just by
actively conducting infrastructure in Tibet to enhance logistics and supply for the
People’s Liberation Army, but also by targeting its missiles deployed in the military zones
in Qinghai Province and Kunming at fifty to sixty cities of India. China has not taken any
kind of substantive measures to ease suspicions of India. By pushing for development in
Tibet, China has forced India to invest more money in strengthening infrastructure in its
border regions. It is worth noting that according to media reports in India, India was
planning to reopen its military airbases, like the ones in the mouth of Karakoram
Mountains and in the Arunachal Pradesh which had been put out of service since the end
of border wars in the 1960s. 13 According to the reports, India was also planning to build
two division-sized mountain forces 14 to add to its military clout in the border regions and
have more bargaining chips in border negotiations.
Cooperation between China and Pakistan has made India deeply uneasy. India was
worried that by helping Pakistan build nuclear power plants, China might share some of
its nuclear weapon technologies with Pakistan. India was also bitter with the Chinese for
providing assistance to Pakistan naval forces. India was also worried that Chinese naval
forces might appear off the coast of India after the Chinese finished building the Gwadar
Port in Pakistan. India was very much alarmed by China’s military cooperation with
several countries in South Asia, such as China’s signing defense cooperation agreement
with Bangladesh and China’s providing assistance to Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Myanmar.
These gestures on China’s part caused certain Indian politicians to raise their eyebrows,
12
Xinhua News Agency, February 9, 2008.
13
“India to Reopen the World’s Highest Military Airport Against China,” Central News Agency, April 19, 2008. “India to Open
Border Airport Against China, Lack of Air Defense Might Spell Trouble,” Huanqiu, June 8, 2008,
http://mil.huanqiu.com/hot/2008-06/134796.html.
14
“India to Build Two Divisions of Mountain Forces Against Border Threats from China and Pakistan,” Central News Agency,
June 13, 2008.
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believing that China is trying to maintain balanced relationships with India and Pakistan
for its own good. China’s claim that it was adopting the “equal treatment” policy in
dealing with India and Pakistan failed to completely remove suspicions of certain Indian
politicians. 15
India and China are both heavyweight developing countries displaying significant
economic growth. Economic and trade relationship between China and India into the 21st
century is characterized by cooperation as well as competition. According to the 20072008 economic survey report released by India’s Ministry of Finance, China has become
India’s largest trading partner. However, India’s exports to China only accounted for 30%
of China’s imports, and iron sand accounted for 44% of India’s exports to China,
followed by colored metal products (6%). Many in India are unhappy about India’s
increasing trade deficit against China. 16 While China and India are cooperating on the
economic front, India is highly wary of Chinese investments and China-India border trade.
India attempted to counter the risks by enacting new policies regarding foreign
investments in India, by putting China on its “security risk” countries list for the first time,
and by repeatedly blocking Chinese investments in certain areas in India. One example
would be that India, out of security concerns, issued a ban in August 2006 on Chinese
companies investing in the development and operation of ports in India. Even the Hong
Kong-based Hutch Ports was affected by the ban. The plans proposed by Chinese
companies to increase investments in production and marketing in India were objected by
India on the grounds of security concerns. India also reacted sensitively to the investment
plans of China’s telecommunication companies. 17 According to The Times of India on
February 22, 2008, India’s national security agency set up the Line of Control rules to
restrict presence and investments of foreign companies in India’s national borders with
other countries. Countries on India’s “security risk” countries list would need to seek
approval of the India government before they could participate in investment projects
concerning sensitive areas and certain special economic zones in India, and sometimes
they would be completely banned from doing so. This applies to companies from China, a
country that is on India’s “security-risk” countries list. 18 In addition, India has launched a
lot of anti-dumping investigations against Chinese products, 19 and has imposed
restrictions on China-India border trade, rather than being completely open to it. India
government and the Indian Chamber of Commerce objected to China’s proposal to
establish free trade zones in Tibet and northern India out of fear that China would pose a
15
16
Wu Yong-nian, “Sino-Indian Bilateral Cooperation: Basis, Problems, and Prospects,” South Asian Studies, 2007, Issue 2, p.22.
Central News Agency, February 29, 2008.
17
Liu Chao-hua, “Proceedings of Forum on China-India Border Issue (II),” South Asian Studies, 2007, Issue 2, pp. 38-39.
18
“Is India Afraid? On India’s Restrictions on Chinese Investments in Arunachal Pradesh,” Netmil, February 29, 2008,
http://www.netmil.net/news/2008/0229/article_1340.html.
19
Wu Yong-nian, see Note 15, pp.21-22.
Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang Ownership
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threat to India’s market economy by dumping its cheap products to places outside
northern India. 20
In a word, security concerns present a major obstacle to the development of ChinaIndia relationship. The core issue in China-India border disputes is the Tibet issue. China
still suspects India of supporting Tibet’s independence movement. Disagreements
between China and India concern not only border issues and the Tibet issue but also the
fight over energy and water resources. A group of US-led western countries are trying
hard to secure the support of India against China. This caused China-India relationship to
show more competition and opposition than cooperation. 21 The greatest obstacle in ChinaIndia relationship is a lack of trust. Security concerns between them would not vanish
before border issues are completely resolved.
Ⅳ. China-India Border Issues: Negotiations and Disputes
Border issues are the touchiest issues between China and India. For a long time,
there exist two borders between China and India: the traditional customary line and the
Line of Actual Control. The former is a border line that China and its neighbors pointed
out based on customs and traditional territories in the old days, and is no longer valid. The
currently effective Line of Actual Control is mainly based on the McMahon Line (The
McMahon line is a line agreed to by A. Henry McMahon, foreign secretary of British
India, and Tibet in 1914. It is still disputed by China. The line is largely placed along the
divide of the highest peak of the Himalayas. China believes that the line effectively moves
up the China-India traditional customary line by 100 kilometers north and puts China’s
90,000 square kilometers territory under the jurisdiction of British India). China and India
fought a brief war in 1962 over border disputes. Despite its victory, the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army retreated to the north of the Line of Actual Control after the war. Border
disputes between China and India remained unresolved. India claimed that China had
occupied 38,000 square kilometers of Indian territory in Ladakh, while China repeatedly
claimed that the Arunachal Pradesh to the northeast of India is Chinese territory. 22
China-India border is divided into the western, central, and eastern sections, and each
is surrounded by different degrees of disputes. A total of 8 areas (measuring around
125,000 square kilometers in total) on the China-India border are under jurisdictional
dispute. The three areas in the western section of China-India border measure 33,500
square kilometers in total, and most of them have long been under the control of China,
apart from a small section which has been controlled by India. Most of the four areas in
20
Voice of America, Mandarin Version, November 2, 2007,
http://www.voafanti.com/gate/big5/www.voanews.com/chinese/archive/2007-11/w2007-11-01-voa48.cfm.
21
Mohan Malik, “India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes,” Power and Interest News Report, October 9,
2007, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=695&language_id=1.
22
Kuei-hsiang Hsu, “A Preliminary Discussion on Sino-Indian Relationship Development—Focusing on Border Issue and Tibet
Issue,” pp. 38-44.
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the central border section (around 2000 square kilometers in total) are controlled by India.
The most-disputed eastern section areas are also the largest in size (around 90,000 square
kilometers in total), and are all under the control of India. 23
(1) The Procedure and Mechanism for Negotiations
According to Liu Zhen-min, Director of the Department of Treaty and Law under
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China has adopted a series of principles and methods
in conducting border negotiations with India, which include (1) firmly safeguarding
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) conducting friendly negotiations on the
basis of equal footing to secure fair and reasonable resolutions through mutual
understanding and mutual accommodation, and maintaining the status quo before a
resolution is agreed upon, (3) achieving a resolution that takes into account historical
backgrounds and the practical current situation, and (4) handling old border treaties in
accordance with the general principles outlined in international laws and following
international customs in delineation and demarcation of the boundary. 24 According to
Zhou Gang, former Chinese ambassador to India, China as a rule follows a three-step
procedure in conducting border negotiations: the first step is to reach agreements over
principles, the second step centers on discussions and adjustments in the plans, and the
third step is about surveying the disputed borders. Zhou remarked that China and India
have basically concluded the first stage, but the real difficulties lie in the later stages. 25 As
for India’s side of the story, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the Indian National
Congress on December 2005 that resolution of border issues with China would be a twostage process. The first stage, which has been concluded, involved setting the guiding
principles for border surveying. The second stage will focus on creating a mutually
acceptable border surveying framework on which delineation and demarcation of the
boundary will be carried out. All disagreements will be resolved in this process. 26 M. K.
Narayanan, Special Representative of India on the Boundary Issue between China and
India and India’s National Security Advisor, remarked in early 2007 that resolution of
China-India border issues would be a three-stage process: first agreeing on the political
guiding principles, then creating a framework for resolution of border issues, and finally
delineation and demarcation of the boundary. 27 This three-stage process happens to be the
same as the one mentioned by China. Manmohan Singh’s second stage is the same in
23
“Practical Sino-Indian Border Talks Begin, India Moving Out of ‘Shadow,” Military News Sohu, October 27, 2003,
http://news.sohu.com/27/49/news214874927.shtml.
24
See Note 2.
25
Oyang Bin, “Behind the Scenes of China’s Final Land Border Negotiations,” Phoenix Weekly, 2005 Issue 31 (200th Issue, November 8,
2005, http://news.ifeng.com/phoenixtv/83887286885810176/20051108/682567.shtml.
26
“Indian Prime Minister: Sino-Indian Border Issue to be Completely Resolved,” People’s Daily Online, December 2, 2005,
http://news.tom.com/1002/20051202-2708927.html.
27
“Indian Representative: Sino-Indian Border Talks are Seeing Breakthrough,” Global Times, January 30, 2007,
http://war.news.163.com/07/0130/14/363DVHQI00011MTO.html.
Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang Ownership
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nature as the third stage mentioned by Narayanan and Zhou. Therefore, they were
basically talking about the same thing. Narayanan also pointed out that negotiations have
entered the second stage, which is the most difficult stage.
With regard to China-India border negotiations, Zhou Enlai, former Chinese Minister
of Foreign Affairs, proposed in the 1950s a “package settlement” of border disputes with
the view of resorting to political ways to settle border disputes. Zhou’s proposal was
objected by then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. 28 But when former Indian
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid a state visit to China in 2003, he had agreed
explicitly that political resolution would be the only way to settle China-India border
disputes, 29 since China-India border lines have yet to be defined, and a political resolution
appears to be a better option in the absence of legal resolution.
At present, there are three mechanisms dealing with China-India border disputes:
Sino-Indian Joint Working Group, expert panel on border issues, and special
representatives on border talks.
In 1980, former Chinese Deputy Premier Huang Hua paid a state visit to India,
opening the door to border issue negotiations. Border negotiations at ministerial and
deputy level between China and India officially began in 1981. Eight rounds of
negotiations took place in the period between 1981 and 1987, but no progress was made
due to a substantial difference of views. In December 1988, former Indian Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi paid a state visit to China, and both countries agreed to establish the SinoIndian Joint Working Group on border issues to continue seeking resolution to border
issues. The Joint Working Group has conducted 15 rounds of negotiations since 1989, and
made some progress in 2001 by settling disputes surrounding central sections of ChinaIndia border. In November 2002, China and India exchanged maps depicting their
respective lines of actual control to begin negotiations on the eastern and western sections
of border. 30
However, it would be difficult for the negotiations to achieve any kind of
breakthrough under the original mechanism because the Joint Working Group mainly
consisted of department or bureau directors from the governments of China and India,
who did not possess sufficient authority needed to make breakthroughs. In June 2003,
former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid a state visit to China, and both
countries agreed to appoint deputy ministerial level special representatives on border
issues. It was also agreed that the capitals of China and India would take turns hosting the
annual border negotiations. Deputy ministerial level representatives would possess higher
authority, which would be conducive to the resolution of border issues. 31 Special
28
Liu Chao-hua, “Proceedings of Forum on China-India Border Issue (I),” South Asian Studies, 2007, Issue 1, p. 44.
29
Ibid, p.45.
30
“Practical Sino-Indian Border Talks Begin, India Moving Out of ‘Shadow,” http://news.sohu.com/27/49/news214874927.shtml.
31
See Note 25.
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Bi-Monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.4
representatives from both sides “would try to work out a framework on resolution of
border issues from the political perspective in the bilateral relationship.” India appointed
National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra as its first special representative on border
issues, while China appointed first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Dai Bing-guo as its
first special representative. Later, the Indian Prime Minister Office took over the task of
organizing negotiations on the framework on border dispute resolutions. It was widely
believed that by appointing special representatives, China and India were prepared to
agree on a resolution as soon as possible through highest-level political decisions. 32 Since
2003, special representatives from both sides have conducted eleven rounds of border
negotiations. 33
(2) Negotiation Results and Border Agreement
While there has been no breakthrough in the many years of border negotiations
between China and India, there has been some progress in the form of three agreements
and one memorandum on border issues. Meanwhile, the border regions have remained
peaceful and tranquil, and China and India have agreed on the political guiding principles
on border issues, and have decided to reopen border trade though Nathula Pass, a
mountain pass connecting China’s Yadong County to Sikkim. China and India signed the
Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace along the Line of Actual Control in the IndiaChina Border in 1993, and signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the
Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas in 1996
with the intention of preventing conflicts and easing tension in border regions. In 2003,
former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and China signed the Memorandum
on Expanding Border Trade that provided for the use of Nathula in border trade between
China and India, in which China effectively recognized for the first time Indian
sovereignty over Sikkim. 34 Nathula was officially opened for passage on July 6, 2006,
signifying a breakthrough in Sino-China border issues. In 2003, China and India reached
agreements on guiding principles for the settlement of boundary question, and in April
2005 signed the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding
Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question which provided a
basis and framework for maintaining peace in border regions and settling border issues.
The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding
Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question contains 11 articles,
which include contents such as: The two sides will resolve the boundary question through
32
See Note 30.
33
“Singh to Visit China in Mid January, Sino-Indian Border Issue Hard to be Resolved,” Sing Tao, January 7, 2008,
http://www.stnn.cc:82/pacific_asia/200801/t20080107_707588.html.
34
See Note 25.
Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang Ownership
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peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against
the other by any means (Article I). The two sides should, in accordance with the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable
solution to the boundary question through consultations on an equal footing, proceeding
from the political perspective of overall bilateral relations (Article II). Both sides should,
in the spirit of mutual respect and mutual understanding, make meaningful and mutually
acceptable adjustments to their respective positions on the boundary question, so as to
arrive at a package settlement to the boundary question (Article III). The two sides will
give due consideration to each other's strategic and reasonable interests, and the principle
of mutual and equal security (Article IV). The two sides will take into account, inter alia,
historical evidence, national sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and
sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of border areas (Article V). The boundary
should be along well-defined and easily identifiable natural geographical features to be
mutually agreed upon between the two sides (Article VI). In reaching a boundary
settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the
border areas (Article VII). Within the agreed framework of the final boundary settlement,
the delineation of the boundary will be carried out utilising means such as modern
cartographic and surveying practices and joint surveys (Article VIII). Pending an ultimate
settlement of the boundary question, the two sides should strictly respect and observe the
line of actual control and work together to maintain peace and tranquility in the border
areas. The India-China Joint Working Group and the India-China Diplomatic and Military
Expert Group shall continue their work under the Agreements of 7 September 1993 and
29 November 1996, including the clarification of the line of actual control and the
implementation of confidence building measures (Article IX). The Special
Representatives on the boundary question shall continue their consultations in an earnest
manner with the objective of arriving at an agreed framework for a boundary settlement,
which will provide the basis for the delineation and demarcation of the India-China
boundary to be subsequently undertaken by civil and military officials and surveyors of
35
the two sides (Article X).
According to these principles, the two sides agreed to arrive at a package settlement
to the boundary question, proceeding from the political perspective of overall bilateral
relations, will give due consideration to each other's strategic and reasonable interests, and
the principle of mutual and equal security, will take into account, inter alia, historical
evidence, national sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and
sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of border areas, and will protect the
interests of residents of border areas. It would be difficult and time-consuming to come up
35
“India, China to Evolve Framework to Resolve Indo-Tibetan Boundary,” ICT, January 14, 2006, http://www.
phayul.com/news/tools/print.aspx?id=11623&t=1；Also see, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Political Guiding Principles
over Sino-Indian Border Issues,” Xinhua Net, April 13, 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/200504/13/content_2824999.htm.
12
Bi-Monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.4
with a mutually acceptable resolution that takes into account factors such as history,
culture, and due interests of their settled populations.
There are certain Chinese experts who believe that some of the principles in the
Agreement should be implemented with prudence. Take the “natural geographical
features” principle, for example. Some Chinese experts believe that this essentially means
demarcating the border based on the McMahon Line, and China should be careful that
India would use this principle to its advantage. Regarding the principle about “due
interests of their settled population,” certain Chinese experts pointed out that India had
deliberately created a “settled population” by moving 7 million of its population to the
eastern border sections over the past five decades, and that China should be careful not to
be taken advantage of. 36 Indian experts, on the other hand, were concerned that China was
thinking about using the settlement principle since the Chinese had been moving closer to
the Line of Actual Control for the past two years. Indian experts were also worried that
China would look to over-interpret Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Agreement and ask to take
back Ladakh and Tawang from India, citing “cultural necessity. 37 ” Experts from both
sides were concerned about the principles in the Agreement. In fact, the Agreement was
the beginning of a difficult period in Sino-Indian border negotiations during which certain
disputes arose.
(3) Disputes Arising from Negotiations
Observers of Sino-Indian relationship all agree that Sino-Indian border negotiations
have entered “the most difficult moment.” A problem that has existed for nearly a century
might not be so easily resolved in a short span of time. 38
Disagreements over border issues between China and India have caused border
negotiations to come to a halt. According to experts on both sides, India wanted to make
the McMahon Line the official border line, and cited China’s failure to recognize the
Arunachal Pradesh as the major obstacle standing in the way of negotiations. China, on
the other hand, was hardly able to accept British India’s idea of the McMahon Line as the
official border line since neither Qing Dynasty court nor the Republic of China
government had accepted it. China is inclined to treat this matter seriously as it is a matter
of national pride, ethnic relationship, and ethnic policies.
Border issues between China and India were so sensitive that a diplomatic war nearly
broke out between the two countries. On November 13, 2006, right before Hu Jintao’s
state visit to India, former Chinese ambassador to India Sun Yu-xi told India’s CNN-IBN
that, “Our stance is that your ‘Arunachal Pradesh’ is Chinese territory, and China has
sovereignty over all parts of it. This is our stance.” This comment was publicly
36
37
38
See Note 25.
P. Stobdan, “Stand up to China,” The Times of India, January 8,2008,
http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=18994&t=1.
See Note 25.
Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang Ownership
13
objected by the Indian Minister of External Affairs, and nearly led to a diplomatic
war. In the end, Ambassador Sun was removed from his post in late December 2007.
In the course of border negotiations, neither side publicly revealed the process
and details of negotiations. However, Indian Express reported that India had
insisted that resolution of border issues should not involve moving the settled
populations elsewhere. China, however, wanted to divide the disputed border
regions into small, medium, and concentration areas, and contemplated making
small-scale relocation of settled population. It was reported that China was against
the idea of exchanging Line of Actual Control territories with India. China claimed
that it was trying to maintain the status quo, or else the Line of Actual Control
would become a legal border line. 39
There have been many reports of China and India accusing each other of
intruding on national territories over the past two years. In 2005 and 2006, Indian
media launched frequent attacks against China. Since 2006, Indian media have
reported repeatedly the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s marching into Indian
border. According to Indian media, “Chinese border troops intruded on Indian
territories for 120 times in 1999, 96 times in 2000, 98 times in 2001, 20 times in
2002, and 27 times in 2005. 40” On May 7, 2007, an Indian congress member of the
People’s Party in Arunachal Pradesh pointed out that Chinese border troops had
marched 20 kilometers into Arunachal Pradesh and had built permanent military
facilities such as helicopter landing platform. 41 On October 15, 2007, India Today
cited intelligence information which suggested that over the past two years,
Chinese troops had intruded more than 300 times on Indian territories, including
the 130 times since 2007. It was even suggested that since 2007, as many as more
than ten thousand Chinese soldiers have intruded on Indian border. Indian
authorities were deeply concerned about the fact that Chinese soldiers of a
division’s quantity had crossed the Sino-Indian border. The report cited Indian
intelligence officials’ statistics as suggesting that Chinese troops had intruded as
many as 73 times on the territories of Jammu and Kashmir in northwest India in
2007. It was reported that on September 13 alone, there had been six cases of
intrusion, in which Chinese soldiers marched for as deep as 5.5 kilometers into
Indian territories in the company of military helicopters and amphibious vehicles.
Chinese media called this report “a complete fabrication” and accused Indian troops
of intruding on areas under Chinese control in recent years, citing the incident on
39
“Border, other issues glossed over in Indian PM’s goodwill China visit,” Tibetan Review, February, 2008, p.21.
40
“Indian Media Make a Large Issue Out of ‘Chinese Invasion’ to Make Bargaining Chips for India in Border Talks,” China
Economics, October 15, 2007,
http://big5.ce.cn/xwzx/gjss/gdxw/200710/15/t20071015_13241479.shtml.
41
“Indian Defence Ministry Denied Indian Congressman’s Claim of China’s Invasion into 20 Kilometers of Indian Territory,”
Sichuan News Network, May 13, 2007,
http://news.163.com/07/0513/05/3EBN2IJH0001121M.html.
14
Bi-Monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.4
January 26, 2003, when four Indian intelligence officials and six Indian special
force soldiers were intercepted when doing their routine patrols by Chinese border
guards in Arunachal Pradesh. China believed this as a case of Indian troops
invading Chinese territory, and the Indian intelligence officials were released after
being asked to surrender their weapons. 42 The Times of India reported a headline
story on December 1, 2007 entitled “Chinese Troops Destroying Indian Forts and
Sentry Posts,” referring to India’s two military forts and several sentry posts
established in a triangular zone on Indian borders with Sikkim, Bhutan, and Tibet
two years ago. Chinese army did not protest the presence of the forts and sentry
posts until July 2007, and the protests were ignored by India on the grounds that the
Chinese should have made the protest within a year after establishment of the
facilities. As a result, Chinese troops destroyed the two forts and the sentry posts
nearby on November 8, 2007, a move which was described by The Times of India
as “the Chinese People’s Liberation Army deliberately showing off their power. 43”
China believed that the Indian media were making stories out of this kind of
incidents to win more bargaining chips for India in border negotiations. However,
frequent occurrence of border disputes suggests that Sino-Indian border
negotiations have left much room for conflicts.
(4) Disputes over Tawang
Although China and India have held many rounds of border negotiations, the details
of negotiations were never made public. However, almost all observers agree that the
eastern section of Sino-Indian border is the most disputed section. It is a region currently
known as “Arunachal Pradesh” to India, a region located to the south of the
McMahon Line and to the north of Sino-Indian traditional customary border line.
And Arunachal has become a focal point in Sino-Indian border negotiations. 44
Arunachal is part of territories under India’s actual control, and has long been a
disputed place in Sino-Indian border negotiations. Arunachal is also a place of rich
forest and water resources. India made Arunachal its “special border zone in
northeast” in 1954. In the official Indian map released in 1954, the McMahon Line
appeared for the first time since 1936 as an “official border line.” Then in 1972,
India turned the region into the Arunachal municipal district. In late 1986, Indian
National Congress enacted laws to give Arunachal the higher status of Pradesh.
India officially established the “Arunachal Pradesh” (meaning “land of the rising
sun”) on February 20, 1987, making it India’s 24th Pradesh. But China has since
42
See Note 40.
43
United Daily News, December 3, 2007, p. A14, “India Repeatedly Denies Indian Media Reports of ‘China’s Destruction of
Indian Forts,’” Global Times, December 3, 2007,
http://www.gcpnews.com/zh-tw/articles/2007-12-03/C1046_17544.html.
44
Liu Chao-hua, “Proceedings of Forum on China-India Border Issue (II),” p. 35.
Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang Ownership
15
then refused to recognize it as part of Indian territories. 45 India has managed to
move a large quantity of its population to Arunachal Pradesh to create a settled
population there. The question of sovereignty over the region has become a key
point of debate in border negotiations between China and India. China has made it
its policy to refuse to recognize the region as part of Indian territories. The region
is known to China as Zangnan, and is designated by China as under the jurisdiction
of six counties: Mêdog County, Mainling County, Nang County, Zayü County, Lhünzê
County, and Cona County of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
Tawang is located in the western part of the region. Urgelling in Tawang is the
hometown of Tsangyang Gyatso, the sixth Dalai Lama, and therefore is regarded by
Tibetans as a holy place. 46 Former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sent troops to
occupy Tawang while China was busy assisting Korea against the US. The move did not
face immediate protest from China at the time.
It was the opinion of Indian media that China has been quite unyielding in its
attitude toward border issues, while China considers India as not being flexible and
practical enough in dealing with border issues, standing firm on its ground for a long time.
Chinese senior researchers on border issues are of the opinion that it will be impossible
for China to give in with regard to the much disputed eastern border section, because
giving in would be the same as recognizing the McMahon Line as the official border line,
and would be the same as admitting that the war of 1962 was a war of aggression. Besides,
leaders of China have the feelings of the Chinese people to think about, in particular the
feelings of the Tibetan people, because the eastern border section is exactly where the
sixth Dalai Lama was born. The key to border negotiations lies in the McMahon Line. 47
China shocked India by claiming in the 1990s that Tawang was part of Chinese
48
territory. Many Chinese experts concurred by saying that the McMahon Line should be
broken to return Tawang to China, because they believed that Sino-Indian border issues
were actually a relic left by the British India government. They believed that since it was
clearly marked on the map that Tawang was located to the south of the McMahon Line,
returning Tawang to China would mean breaking the McMahon Line. They argued that
India had occupied Tawang only after becoming an independent country, and China
would have a difficult time explaining to the people of Tibet Autonomous Region why
Tawang could not be taken back from India. They believed that for the Sino-Indian border
45
“Indian Building ‘Arunachal Pradesh’ in Chinese Territory in 1987,” May 31, 2006,
http://news.china.com/zh_cn/focus/China-India/black/11050641/20060531/13365119.html.
46
The place was mentioned in a poem written by Tsangyang Gyatso, the sixth Dalai Lama. Two examples of his poem would be
“On the grassland are withered and yellow grasses/pale trees standing on the sad plains/cuckoos fly toward the direction of
Menyu/swallows admire the light of sky” and “Cuckoos return to Menyu/because they are so attracted by the holy trees/if the
holy trees have no feelings for them/then cuckoos would never linger.” Menyu is the name of a place in Cona County.
Tsangyang Gyatso was born in Menyu in 1683. See translated by Gesang Renzhen and Gesang Cicheng, Last Songs of a
Romantic Monk, (Hong Kong: Hundred Pages Press Co., Ltd., 2003), pp.79-80.
47
See Note 25.
48
Liu Chao-hua, “Proceedings of Forum on China-India Border Issue (I),” p. 49
16
Bi-Monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.4
issue to be resolved, it was imperative to resolve the Tawang issue first. However, it
seemed that India had no intention to returning Tawang to China. According to Sun Shihai, a Chinese expert, when the Chinese expert delegation went to India to open
negotiations in 1998, the issue of Tawang was discussed, with the result of certain Indian
experts saying that India could not return Tawang, a place of strategic importance to India
49
and the home to quite a large number of Indian citizens, to China.
China refused to issue entry visa to Indian citizens coming from the “Arunachal
Pradesh” because the Chinese could not understand why anyone would need an
entry visa to visit his own country. In 1987, China rejected visa application from T.
Rajkumar, a resident of Arunachal Pradesh who was at the time speaker of Arunachal
Pradesh council. In May 2007, China rejected visa application from Gamesh Koyu, a
local official of Arunachal Pradesh, forcing India to cancel a plan to send a
delegation of more than 100 people to embark on a “confidence-building trip” to
50
China. In late 2007, controversies surrounding visa application for citizens of
Arunachal Pradesh took an interesting turn. In December 2007, Chinese Embassy in
51
Delhi approved visa application from Professor Marpe Sora of Arunachal Pradesh,
while India approved in May 2008 the application of four Chinese engineers to
52
work at the petroleum sector of Arunachal Pradesh. Yet further observations are
needed to determine whether things have taken a turn for the better.
India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh paid a state visit to China in the period from
January 13 to January 15, 2008. After returning to India, he paid a visit to Itanagar, capital
of Arunachal Pradesh on January 31. He was the first Indian Prime Minister in
nearly ten years to visit this place. 53 During his visit, he attended the
commencement ceremony for the construction projects of infrastructures such as
utilities and highway, and announced the Indian government’s plan to invest USD
1.75 billion build water and power stations, railways, highways, airports, and
54
education and medical facilities in the region. Immediately after this, the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Indian ambassador to China to protest about
it and to reiterate that the region has traditionally been known as Zangnan of China
55
and has been a part of Chinese territories. China told India that Prime Minister
49
Ibid, p.48.
50
“Singh visits remote state contested by China,” The Financial Times, February 1, 2008,
http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/802.
51
“Chinese’ border gesture’ to India,” BBC News, December 7, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-2/hi/south_asia/7132636.stm.
“Chinese engineers working in Arunachal Pradesh,” The Times of India, May 27, 2008,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-3077457,prtpage-1.cms.
52
53
“Singh visits remote state contested by China,” The Financial Times, February 1, 2008,
http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/802.
54
“Indian Prime Minister’s Visit to Disputed Border Region Raises Concern,” Asia Times, 2008/2/5,
http://www.atchinese.com/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&45904&Itemid=110&pop=1&p…
55
Voice of America, February 12, 2008.
Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang Ownership
17
Manmohan Singh’s remarks at Arunachal Pradesh were inappropriate given that India
56
was in the middle of border negotiations with China. China and India have been
accusing each other of launching unjustified large-scale construction projects in
this much-disputed region. The debate is a sure sign of how sensitive and touchy
57
the issue of Tawang has become.
What is exactly the cause of the lack of substantive results in the many years of
border negotiations between China and India? The Federation for a Democratic China and
the Society of Chinese Students revealed in 2005 possible adjustments China and India
had agreed upon:
China and India have agreed to demarcate the boundary based on their respective
Line of Actual Control. The Chinese territories under dispute measure 125,000 square
kilometers in total, which is roughly the size of Fujian Province. India will possess 74%,
and the rest 36% will come to China. If China is willing to take the territories on the
eastern sections of the McMahon Line, and let India take the Chinese territories to the
south of the McMahon Line, then India will cease asking China for the Aksai Chin of
Xinjiang. In addition, both sides are willing to make very small-scale adjustments to the
McMahon Line, mostly in the Tawang region. The territories affected will not be more
than 2000 square kilometers, which will hardly be larger than the size of Shenzhen City
and will account for only 2% of the disputed eastern border sections. India will return the
region in the eastern section to China, and in exchange will receive a piece of Chinese
territory of roughly the same size in Aksai Chin in the western section of the border. It is
58
highly likely that the exchange will only concern part of Tawang.
According to this theory, China wants to take back the 2000 square kilometers in
Tawang, and in exchange might be willing to give India a piece of territory of the same
size in Aksai Chin. Indian special representative M. K. Narayanan remarked in early 2007
that an impasse might appear in the last stage of negotiations toward a framework
agreement. He believed that China and India would eventually come up with a mutually
acceptable resolution, which he believed would be essentially about certain small-scale
adjustments to the McMahon Line. He argued that the meeting of special representatives
and other channels of negotiations were all focused on exploring the possibilities of
adjustments. He believed that as long as the second stage was successfully concluded, the
third stage would be easy. After demarcation of boundary, the largest problem would be
moving the settled population in the border region elsewhere. He remarked that China and
59
India had agreed not to make large-scale transfer of settled population. From his words,
56
“China irked by Indian PM’s rising sun comment about Arunachal Pradesh,” Tibetan Review, March 2008, p.25.
57
See Note 54.
The Federation for a Democratic China and the Society of Chinese Students, “Take Care Not to Lose National Territories in
Sino-Indian Border Again,” Epoch Times Taiwan, September 5, 2005,
http://tw.epochtimes.com/bt/7/9/5/n1824520.htm.
58
59
“Indian Representative: Sino-Indian Border Talks are Seeing Breakthrough,” Global Times, January 30, 2007,
http://war.news.163.com/07/0130/14/363DVHQI00011MTO.html.
18
Bi-Monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.4
it is clear that the touchiest issue in Sino-Indian border negotiations is boundary
adjustments surrounding the Arunachal Pradesh, and Tawang has been the focal point
of debate between China and India.
(5) The Stance of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile
The fourteenth Dalai Lama began his exile in 1959, and has been living in
Dharamsala in northern India under political asylum since then, and built the Tibetan
Government in Exile there. It has always been the wish of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan
Government in Exile that China would resolve the Tibet issue as soon as possible. But the
Dalai Lama is caught in a difficult situation of not being able to criticize India even
though India occupied a great deal of Tibetan territory. It is the opinion of exile Tibetan
people that there is no border issue between China and India. To them, the so-called SinoIndian border issue actually arose after China “invaded” and “unjustifiably occupied”
Tibet. They are of the opinion that a government that “unjustifiably occupied” Tibet has
no right to enter border talks on behalf of the occupied country. They believed that if
India really wanted to settle border issues, it should enter peace talks with the Tibetan
60
Government in Exile to stand any chance of completely resolving border issue. The pro
Tibet independence Tibetan Youth Congress always assemble a mass protest outside the
venue of Sino-Indian border negotiations in India, or whenever Chinese leaders pay a
state visit to India. They noted that China has made it a policy to be anti-India and has no
intention of resolving border issues at all, so they urged India to terminate border talks
61
with China. The Dalai Lama was asked about his view regarding the issue of Tawang
when he visited there in 2003. He refused to comment on that issue and merely remarked
that “Arunachal Pradesh” was in fact part of Tibetan territory. However, according
to a report in The Times of India on June 4, 2008, the Dalai Lama told the Navbharat
Times that the McMahon Line established based on the Simla Agreement of 1914 was in
fact a legal border line. The Dalai Lama remarked that based on the agreement between
62
Tibet and British India, “Arunachal Pradesh” was part of Indian territory. This was
the Dalai Lama’s first public statement about Tawang being part of Indian territory,
and apparently he was saying this to please India. No doubt this statement would
make China angry, but it is unlikely that this statement would have any major
impact on the ongoing Sino-Indian border talks.
60
“Tibetans Urged India to Terminate Border Talks with China,” Page of Tibet, July 26, 2004,
http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0407/index.html.
61
“Lies Cannot Cover Facts—On Tibetan Youth Congress’s Statement on Sino-Indian Relationship,” China’s Tibet, 2005, Issue
4, August 31, 2005, http://tibet.cn/periodical/zgxz/2005/04/t20051031_66388.htm.
62
“Tawang is part of India : Dalai Lama,” The Times of India, June 4, 2008,
http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/2468.
Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang Ownership
19
Ⅴ. Prospects of Sino-Indian Border Talks
Sino-Indian border talks have entered the most difficult stage. The issue that has
been affecting diplomatic relations between China and India has come to the hardest part.
Unresolved border issues would be the hidden worries in China-India relationship. Should
border issues remain unresolved, it would be difficult for China and India to put aside past
differences toward a new future. At present there is no substantive breakthrough in SinoIndian border negotiations. There are four possible resolutions in the future: resolution by
the use of force, resolution based on traditions and customs, resolution based on the
principle of natural geographical features, and resolution based on the Line of Actual
Control. The first resolution should never be considered, the second resolution lacks a
sound basis, and the third and fourth resolutions require China and India to make some
adjustments and compromise regarding their respective Line of Actual Control. China and
India would need to face and resolve the difficult issues of agreeing on the Line of Actual
Control and dealing with China’s claim in the 1990s that Tawang was part of Chinese
territories. Exactly how should the adjustments be made? Chinese experts recommended
breaking the McMahon Line as a break from the colonial period, while there are also
experts suggesting that India should seek to make its existing Line of Actual Control the
63
official Sino-Indian border line. China and India have been keeping silent about the
progress and process of border talks.
No matter how the adjustments might be, China and India will have to face certain
problems:
Firstly, there is a difference in stance between the two countries, for example with
regard to the exact Line of Actual Control. China’s version of the Line of Actual Control
is based on the one established on November 7, 1959, which has changed since then.
China believed that India had broken the boundary and occupied some of Chinese
territory. China and India’s disagreement over the choice of the Line of Actual Control
64
posed another obstacle to negotiations. In the past, any misunderstanding with regard to
the Line of Actual Control would be resolved through border meetings and hotline
dialogues. Once there is a disagreement, troops from both sides would retreat immediately
to their bases and informed their headquarters of the issue so that the issue could be
65
resolved through diplomatic means. However, disagreements over the Line of Actual
Control often led to disputes, which were why India often criticized China of “invasion.”
Secondly, China and India each has to face pressure from their people in dealing
with border issues, because border talks have much to do with national sovereignty,
dignity, the lives of settled population in border regions, allocation of resources, and
future development of the country. In other words, border issue could be a highly
63
Liu Chao-hua, “Proceedings of Forum on China-India Border Issue (I),” pp. 49-51.
64
Ibid, p.58.
65
See Note 61.
20
Bi-Monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.4
nationalist issue. The people of India have always reacted sensitively to Sino-Indian
border issue. China and India would have to find the right way to control and deal with
66
the feelings of the people in order to resolve border issue successfully. The political and
social situation in India is extremely complicated, and political factions have different
ideas and views toward Sino-Indian border issue. There are some in India who strongly
believe that the McMahon Line is in fact the official Sino-Indian border line, and urge the
Indian government to guard “every inch of national territory.” View such as these
naturally would affect the decisions of the Indian government. The people of India tend to
regard the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 as China’s invasion of India, and Indian media
frequently demand China to return the western border territories to India. Some Indian
67
politicians are still able to describe China as a potential threat for their own advantage.
Thirdly, India faces greater pressure from its congress compared to China. Being a
democratic country, India has to deal with supervision and questioning from its congress,
which means that the government needs congress approval before making any kind of
change to national territory. It is uncertain whether Indian congress would support the
government’s proposed adjustments to national border.
Concluding Remarks
China and India have entered the most difficult stage in their many years of border
talks. Since 2003, special representatives on border issues from China and India have met
many times to tackle this touchy issue, yet so far no mutually acceptable resolution has
come up. China and India inevitably have to compete against and cooperate with each
other in the course of economic reform. China and India agreed to put aside border
disputes to facilitate development in other fields, in particular cooperation in economic
and trade. Yet development in other relationships would have a direct effect on border
negotiation process, and the border issue itself would affect development of China-India
relationship, especially in the field of national defense and security. India is still
concerned about the threat from China, and this has affected Chinese investments in India
and border trade development. Both countries need to deal with the questioning of their
people as border talks have entered the most difficult stage. Therefore, Sino-Indian border
issue might not be resolved in the near future.
﹝ The paper was reviewed on the 557th MTAC commissioner meeting and the 1110th MTAC
administrative meeting on May 9, 2008. Revision was completed on June 27, 2008.﹞
66
See Note 25.
67
Wu Yong-nian, see Note 15, p.21
Progress on Sino-Indian Border Negotiations—the Issue of Tawang Ownership
21