The processes, principles and goals of constitutional design
Class #11 – DPI403
14
Mon 25 Oct
Constitution‐building in peace‐building processes: International IDEA
15
Wed 27 Oct
Elections: ACE/International IDEA
16
Mon 1 Nov
CASE STUDY GROUP PRESENTATION A: (MENA) : Jinnyn, Suhail, Tim, Muhamed, Charles
17
Wed 3 Nov
Elections: ACE/International IDEA
18
Mon 8 Nov
CASE STUDY GROUP PRESENTATIONS Group D (South Asia) : Syed, Sonam, Abdul, Victoria; Group F (Central, Eastern Europe): Elspeth, Katya, Maxim, Inna
19
Wed 10 Nov
Parliaments, parties, and women’s empowerment: the Inter‐parliamentary
Union
20
Mon 15 Nov
Public administration reform, local governance, and anti‐corruption:
Transparency International
21
Wed 17 Nov
CASE STUDY GROUP PRESENTATIONS: Group E (East and South East Asia) : Mila, Lansong, Chaminda, Kevin, Kim; Group G (Latin America and Caribbean) : Michael, Lucilla, Kelsi
22
Mon 22 Nov
Civil society, social capital and the news media: Committee to Protect
Journalists and the Open Society Institute
23
Wed 24 Nov
Human rights, justice, and rule of law: Amnesty International
24
Mon 29 Nov
CASE STUDY GROUP PRESENTATIONS: Group B (Sub‐Saharan Africa) : Alexandra, Matthias, Musa, Emily, Sophia; Group C (Sub‐Saharan Africa) : Daniel, Brandon, Caroline, Assefa, Sahr, Hideko
25
Wed 1 Dec
Conclusion & wrap up
#1
#2
Lijphart 3
Class Structure
Why are constitutions important?
Processes of constitutional design
I.
II.
Inclusive or elite‐driven (Ginsburg, Samuels)

Principles of constitutional design
III.
Power‐concentrating or power‐sharing? (Lijphart)
Nine choices


Contrasting case‐studies
IV.
Majoritarian democracy: Case study of the UK May 2005 and 2010 elections
Consensus democracy: Case study of the Swiss 2003 election 

V.
Discussion 
What would be the arguments for adopting either type of constitutions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Nepal?
Lijphart 4
Required readings

PROCESSES: 

PRINCIPLES: 

Elkins, Zach. 2010. ‘Diffusion and the Constitutionalization of Europe.’ Comparative Political Studies 43(8‐9): 969‐999. DOI: 10.1177/0010414010370433
Pippa Norris. 2008. Driving Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 pp22‐31. CASE STUDIES: 
Kirsti Samuels. 2007 Constitution building processes and democratization: A discussion of twelve case studies. International IDEA
Lijphart 5
Additional useful resources

Comparative Constitutions Project


International Constitutional Law Documents


http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions
http://www.uni‐wuerzburg.de/law/index.html
International IDEA 
www.IDEA.int
Lijphart 6
Lijphart 7
Lijphart 8
1. Why are constitutions important?
Lijphart 9
I: Why are constitutions important?
1.
Constitutions structure patterns of legitimate authority within nation‐states e.g.



2.
3.
Constitutions embody symbolic national goals and aspirations
Negotiated constitutional settlements integral to peace‐
building and reconciliation process

4.
Electoral rules determine the number of parties in parliament and in government
Executive‐legislative relations influence capacity for effective governance
Federalism determines vertical power‐sharing
In Bosnia, Cambodia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, Iraq, Nepal, Sudan
Potential for practical policy reforms e.g. 

Electoral reforms in Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Venezuela
Constitutional change in Bolivia, UK, Turkey
Lijphart 10
What are constitutions?


The body of highest‐order legal rules and principles that specify how other laws are to be produced, applied, enforced and interpreted
What counts?




A single Constitutional document Supplementary charters of human rights
Or a series of basic laws and unwritten conventions
Major contrasts can exist between de jure Constitutions and de facto constitutions
Lijphart 11
Constitutional Change
“In any given year…some 4 or 5 constitutions will be replaced, 10‐15 will be amended, and another 20 or so proposals for revision will be under consideration.”
 Worldwide, the average lifespan of a constitution is 17 years


Ginsberg, Elkins and Blount 2009 p202
Lijphart 12
0
2
4
Percent
6
8
10
Lifespan Duration of Constitutions
0
50
100
Lifespan
Source: Comparative Constitutions Project
150
200
Lijphart 13
Types of Constitutional Change

State building

Post‐conflict peace settlements 

E.g. Afghanistan constitution
State reform

Transition from autocracy 

Eg Choice of electoral system in post‐Communist states Common in established democracies


Revision or amendment of existing arrangements within a limited set of parameters/options eg UK green paper “The Governance of Britain” (2007)
Lijphart 14
Stages of constitution‐making
Drafting
Consultation
Deliberation
Adoption
Ratification
Implementati
on
Feedback
Lijphart 15
Who decides?
Executive
Expert commissions and international advisors
Legislative bodies and committees
Special constituent assemblies
Inclusive constitutional referendums
Lijphart 16
Does inclusion matter?



Trend is growing use of public participation in constitution making (Ginsburg et al Fig 1 p207)
Processes involving a referendum produce constitutions that are more likely to have virtually every category of right..more likely to ensure universal suffrage, secret ballot, use of referenda.
More inclusive processes may produce more democratic outcomes

Source: Ginsburg, Elkins and Blount (2009) p218
Lijphart 17
2. Principles of constitutional design
Lijphart 18
II: Principles of constitutional design 
Arend Lijphart
The Politics of Accommodation (1968)
 Democracy in Plural Society (1979)
 Democracies (1984)
 Electoral systems and party systems (1994)
 Institutional design in new democracies (1996)
 Patterns of Democracy (1999)
 “Constitutional design for divided societies” (2004)
 Thinking about Democracy (2008)

Lijphart 19
Choices for divided societies
1.
Legislative electoral system
Proportional representation eg party list
 Mixed eg mixed member proportional
 Majoritarian – eg Single member plurality
 Pros and cons?

2.
Within PR




Open or closed lists
Size of multimember districts
Degree of proportionality
Pros and cons?
Lijphart 20
Choices
3. Parliamentary or presidential government?
Parliamentary executives have collegial executive
 Avoid zero‐sum majoritarian elections
 Avoid executive‐legislative stalemate
 Avoid rigidity
 Pros and cons?

Lijphart 21
Choices
4. Power‐sharing executive
Collegial cabinets
 Mandates specific group representation



Eg Belgium
Party ministers on proportional basis for those with 5%+ seats

E.g. South Africa
Lijphart 22
Choices
5. Cabinet stability
No‐confidence vote
 Fixed term parliaments
 Constructive vote of no‐confidence

6. Head of state
Ceremonial role eg monarchy
 If selected



Limited powers
Appointed by multiple actors Lijphart 23
Choices
7. Federalism and decentralization
Second federal chamber over‐represents less populous units
 Federal boundaries?
 Size of federal states?

8. Non‐territorial autonomy

Eg minority rights over education 9. Power‐sharing in appointed positions

Civil service, judiciary, police
Lijphart 24
Types of democratic constitutions
Source: Lijphart Democracies (1999)
Democracies
Majoritarian
(Westminster)
Mixed
Consensus
(Consociational)
eg
UK?
New Zealand?
Barbados
eg
USA
Costa Rica
France
eg
EU
Belgium
Switzerland
Lijphart 25
Consociational democracy
Lijphart (1968) The Politics of Accommodation
Netherlands exemplified ‘pillorized’ divided society
Yet there was stable democracy and elite consensus
Why? Constitutional arrangements










Executive power‐sharing/grand coalition
Minority veto in government
Proportional representation of all major groups in elected/appointed office
Cultural autonomy for groups
Model for other divided (plural) societies?
E.g.Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon, Cyprus Lijphart 26
Normative values
Majoritarian democracy
Consociational
democracy
Goals…
 government accountability and  Goals…
transparency of decision‐making  consensual decision‐making,  single‐party executives,
bargaining and compromise  effective opposition parties,
 multiple parliamentary parties, each with a stake in coalition  vigorous parliamentary debate, and
government, and
 decisive elections.
 dispersed decision‐making  Yet dangers of processes.
 elective dictatorship,
 Yet dangers of  permanent majorities,  ineffective governance,
 lack of checks and balances.
 extreme multiparty fragmentation,  lack of accountability.

Ref: Arend Lijphart Patterns of
Democracy 1999
‘Majoritarian’ Model
Power-concentrating
Effective and accountable
‘Consensus’ Model
Power-sharing
Inclusive &representative
Exec-Parties
One-party cabinet
Coalition government
Executive
Executive dominant
Balanced exec-legislature
Party system
Two-party
Multi-party
Electoral system
Majoritarian
Proportional Representation
Interest groups
Pluralist
Corporatist
Government
Centralized-unitary
Decentralized-federal
Parliament
Unicameral
Balanced Bicameral
Constitution
Flexible
More Rigid
Judiciary
Parlt. sovereign
Judicial review
Central Bank
Dependent
Independent
Federal-Unitary
Typology of Democracies
Lijphart 30
Ref: Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999
3
Consensual
GER
US
2
CAN
AUL
Unitary-Federal
SWI
AUT
1
SPA
JPN
VEN
0
BAHTRI
JAM
BARBOT
CR
IRE
POR
GRE
-1
BEL
ITA
MAU
FRA
MAL
PNGNET
NOR SWE
FIN
ISR
ICE
UK
DEN
NZ
-2 Majoritarian
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
Executive-Parties
1.0
2.0
Lijphart 31
Consensus democracy matters
For the inclusion of minority parties
 For the protection of minority interests
 For women’s representation
 For public policy, economic outcomes, and welfare states

Lijphart 32
The logical sequence of consociational theory
PR electoral
systems or
reserved seats
Election of
ethnic minority
parties
Greater support
within minority
communities
Plural
societies
Federalism &
decentralization
Election of
ethnic minority
parties
Does the logic make sense? Criticisms?
Peaceful
democratic
consolidation
Lijphart 33
Potential criticisms?

For constructivists, ethnic divisions have meanings shaped by political structures and elites. Power‐sharing regimes can thereby freeze/reinforce ethnic cleavages (Donald Horowitz)




Eg Bosnia‐Herzegovina
By contrast, majoritarian elections force vote‐pooling across groups and bridging appeals (Ben Reilly)
Not the only outcome: some peace settlements are negotiated, others result from outright victory
Majoritarian solutions may be more effective in restoring fragile states. Sequencing process in peace settlements? (Mansfield and Snyder)
III: Majoritarian institutions
Case study: UK May 2005 and 2010 general elections
Lijphart 35
Institutions: UK 1945‐1997 

Unwritten constitution – Magna Carta etc.
One‐party cabinet government since 1945


Two‐party parliamentary competition





Labour and Conservative in govnt and opposition
Programmatic & disciplined parties


Collective responsibility, primus inter pares
Mass‐branch party organizations, few independents, few backbench rebellions, manifesto program
Parliamentary sovereignty (no Supreme Court)
Unitary state (local government administration)
Bicameral parliament but Commons predominant
Plurality FPTP elections – exaggerates votes: seats for winner
Lijphart 36
UK Ballot paper
Lijphart 37
2005 UK election result
June 2005
% of Votes
% of seats
Ratio
Labour
35.2
54.9
1.56
Number of
seats
355
Conservative
32.3
30.4
0.94
197
Lib Dem
22.0
9.5
0.43
62
SNP
1.5
0.9
0.60
6
PC
0.6
0.5
0.83
3
Other
8.4
3.4
0.40
23
Labour Maj.
2.9
24.5
66
Total
100
100
659
Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)
Lijphart 38
2010 UK election result
Party
Seats
Gain
Loss
Net
Votes %
+/‐%
Conservative
306
100
3
+97
10,706,647
36.1
+3.8
Labour
258
3
94
‐91
8,604,358
29.0
‐6.2
57
8
13
‐5
6,827,938
23.0
+1.0
Democratic Unionist Party
8
0
1
‐1
168,216
0.6
‐0.3
Scottish National Party
6
0
0
0
491,386
1.7
+0.1
Sinn Fein
5
0
0
0
171,942
0.6
‐0.1
Plaid Cymru
3
1
0
+1
165,394
0.6
‐0.1
Social Democratic & Labour Party
3
0
0
0
110,970
0.4
‐0.1
Green
1
1
0
+1
285,616
1.0
‐0.1
Alliance Party
1
1
0
+1
42,762
0.1
+0.0
UK Independence Party
0
0
0
0
917,832
3.1
+0.9
British National Party
0
0
0
0
563,743
1.9
+1.2
Ulster Conservatives and Unionists ‐ New Force
0
0
1
‐1
102,361
0.3
‐0.1
English Democrats
0
0
0
0
64,826
0.2
+0.2
Respect‐Unity Coalition
0
0
1
‐1
33,251
0.1
‐0.1
Traditional Unionist Voice
0
0
0
0
26,300
0.1
Christian Party
0
0
0
0
18,623
0.1
Independent Community and Health Concern
0
0
1
‐1
16,150
0.1
Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition
0
0
0
0
12,275
0.0
Scottish Socialist Party
0
0
0
0
3,157
0.0
‐0.1
Others
1
1
1
0
319,891
1.1
0.0
29,653,638
65.1
4.0
Liberal Democrat
Turnout
+0.0
Lijphart 39
UK House of Commons 1900‐2010
1900
1906
1910
1910
1918
1922
1923
1924
1929
1931
1935
1945
1950
1951
1955
1959
1964
1966
1970
1974
1974
1979
1983
1987
1992
1997
2001
2005
2010
Overall Maj Govnt
135 Con
129 Lib
None
None
283 Coalition
74 Con
None
210 Con
None
492 Nat
242 Nat
147 Lab
6 Lab
16 Con
59 Con
99 Con
5 Lab
97 Lab
31 Con
0 Lab
4 Lab
44 Con
144 Con
101 Con
21 Con
178 Lab
167 Lab
66 Lab
None
Salisbury/Balfour
Campbell Bannerman
Asquith
Asquith
Lloyd George
Bonar Law
Baldwin
MacDonald
MacDonald
MacDonald
Baldwin/Chamberlain/Churchill
Attlee
Attlee
Churchill
Eden/Macmillan
Macmillan/Douglas‐Home
Wilson
Wilson
Heath
Wilson Wilson/Callaghan
Thatcher
Thatcher
Thatcher
Major
Blair
Blair
Blair/Brown
Cameron?
Lijphart 40
‘Winner’s bonus’ UK
1.60
1.56
1.54
1.50
1.46
1.44
Votes: seats ratio
1.40
1.37
1.30
1.30
1.28
1.27
1.22
1.20
1.20
1.23
1.17
1.14
1.10
1.28
1.13
1.10
1.09
1.07
1.00
1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010
Note: The votes-seats ratio is calculated as the percentage of UK seats divided into the percentage of UK votes for the governing party. A ratio of 1.0
would indicate no electoral bias for the government. Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)
Lijphart 41
UK % Vote 1900‐2010
70
60
% of UK vote
50
Con
40
Lab
LD
30
Other
20
10
0
2010
2005
2001
1997
1992
1987
1983
1979
1974
1974
1970
1966
1964
1959
1955
1951
1950
1945
1935
1931
1929
1924
1923
1922
1918
1910
1910
1906
1900
Source: Pippa Norris ‘Elections & public Opinion’ The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005
Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press Updated
Lijphart 42
UK % Seats 1900‐2010
600
Number of MPs
500
400
Con
Lab
300
LD
Other
200
100
0
2010
2005
2001
1997
1992
1987
1983
1979
1974
1974
1970
1966
1964
1959
1955
1951
1950
1945
1935
1931
1929
1924
1923
1922
1918
1910
1910
1906
1900
Source: Pippa Norris ‘Elections & public Opinion’ The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005
Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press Updated
Lijphart 43
Why exaggerative bias for winner?
1. Malapportionment



Unequal size of electorates in each seat
Decline of urban pop/Labour constituency
Delayed effect of boundary changes
2. Differential turnout

Lowest in safe Labour seats
Geography also matters:
UK 2005 Election Seats
Source: Pippa Norris Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)
Lijphart 44
Lijphart 45
Simulated seats GB 2010
350
306
300
281
262
258
246
250
234
207
200
188
Con
Lab
162
150
150
LD
Other
100
79
78
57
50
35
28
28
0
FPTP
STV
AV
PR List
Lijphart 46
Moderate party competition
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project/ Judith Bara EPOP 2005
Lijphart 47
Breakdown of classic ideal type since 1997

Federalism:




Electoral reform:







Devolution for Scotland and Wales
Northern Ireland assembly
Elected Mayor/Assembly for London
Party list PR for Europe
AMS for Scotland/Wales
STV for Scottish local elections
May 2011 referendum on AV for Commons
House of Lords reform
Written Bill of Rights‐ Euro. Convention
Use of referendums
Advantages and disadvantages?
IV: Consensus democracy
Switzerland Lijphart 50
Swiss democracy


Pop 7.4m
Plural cleavages


Religion (46% Catholic, 40% Protestant) Language 




(65%German, 10% Italian, 18% French), Region/canton Class ($32,800 per capita PPP 2003)
Social divisions, yet elite consensus? Stable power‐sharing coalition but lack of accountability?
Lijphart 51
Swiss democracy 

Since 1848, Switzerland has been a confederation, currently with 26 cantons and 2873 communes. The Government (Federal Council) has 7 members elected by parliament for 4 years
 From 1959‐2003, ‘magic formula’ 2 seats each for the FDP, CVP, and SPS, and 1 seat for the SVP.
 October 2003, 2 seats given to SVP, 1 CVP
 Annual president rotates as primus inter pares
Lijphart 52
Swiss parliament

Bicameral Federal Assembly: 






Direct elections
PR List elections w. high proportionality votes : seats
The National Council (popular representation, 200 seats, based on population size per canton) and The Council of States (cantonal representation, 46 seats, 2 per canton)
Eight party factions in Federal Assembly and 13 parties in total.
Federal Supreme Court
Many popular initiatives and referendums.
Lijphart 53
October 2003 Election results
Nationalrat and Ständerat: 19 october 2003 (%)
%Vote
200
%Seats
46
Schweizerische Volkspartei
SVP
26.6
55
27.5%
8
Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz
SPS
23.4
52
26.0%
9
Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei der Schweiz
FDP
17.3
36
18.0%
14
Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz
CVP
14.4
28
14.0%
15
Grüne Partei der Schweiz
GPS
7.4
13
6.5%
-
Liberale Partei der Schweiz
LPS
2.2
4
2.0%
-
Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz
EVP
2.3
3
1.5%
-
Eidgenössische Demokratische Union
EDU
1.3
2
1.0%
-
SD
1.0
1
0.5%
-
Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz
PdA
0.7
2
1.0%
-
Lega dei Ticinese
LdT
0.4
1
0.5%
-
Solidarités
Sol
0.5
1
0.5%
-
Christlich-Soziale Partei
CSP
0.4
1
0.5%
-
AL
0.5
1
0.5%
-
Schweizer Demokraten
Alternative Liste
- Sozialistisch Grüne Alternative Zug
SGAZ
1
Freiheitspartei der Schweiz
FPS
0.2
-
-
Lijphart 54
Swiss party competition
European Liberal
CVP Christian
Democrats
SP Social
Democratic
Free
Democrats
Right
Left
SVP
Radical
right
Green
Party
Conservative
Note: Legislative voting patterns 1999-2003
Advantages and disadvantages?
Lijphart 56
V: Discussion In designing new constitutions for Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Nepal, what are the pros and cons of each type of democracy?
 What would be the major consequences of these institutional choices for stability and effectiveness?

Lijphart 57
Conclusions

Useful classification of democratic institutions





From ideal types to continuous measures
Clarifies values and normative debates
Systematic comparisons
Consequences of institutional design?
Next class: 
Electoral Systems
Lijphart 58