African Journal of Social Sciences
Volume 2 Number 3 (2012) 145-155
ISSN 2045-8452 (Print)
ISSN 2045-8460 (Online)
www.sachajournals.com
A SYSTEMATIC
TEMATIC LOOK AT THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN
1
Azmat Ali SHAH
HAH1; Fahmeeda Aslam PERVEZ1; and Bibi Hakim ZADI
Z
1
Department of Political Science
University of Sindh Jamshoro Pakistan.
ABSTRACT
This paper presents the argument to substantiate that, despite the fact that
the geographical and historical considerations demand a federal system
for Pakistan, the Muslims were able to secure this territory because of
their untiring efforts under the dynamic
dynamic leadership of Quaid-i-Azam
Quaid
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in order to maintain their separate entity free
from Hindu domination. Pakistan`s social structure being generally
pluralistic, its polity demanded a federal structure of government. It is
also no surprise
se that, given the impact of colonial rule and rigidity of
social reformations reinforced by the partition, the country should have
continued to strive for unity and integrity, while being federal.
Constitutional provisions only constitute the skeleton of the federal
system. What provides flesh and blood to it the way the constitutional
provisions are understood and implemented? A national perspective of
the issues involved is essential. No number of constitutional provisions
and institutional mechanisms can
can be a safeguard against functionaries
who subvert the system by acting in a partial and improper manner.
Keywords: Pakistan, Federalism, Islam, Constitutional Crises.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The function of federalism in Pakistan as a tool of national incorporation, from the very
start, was generated constantly as a federation. As long as East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was
element of Pakistan, a federal structure was observed as the dictated of
of geography because of
the partition of the East and West Pakistan by more than one thousand miles of foreign
countries. Pakistan wanted to accomplish national harmony and integration by offering a central
solution to a geographically distinctive state. But
But the central solution was not sufficient to
prevent the final partition of the two-wings
two
of the state in 1971.
After the crises of the Bangladesh, the 1973 constitution of Pakistan selected for a
federal structure. At the time of making the 1973 constitution,
constitution, it was pointed out that Pakistan
has to have a federal arrangement. There are diverse provinces; dissimilar inhabitants, people
with dissimilar culture, habits, language, economic are somewhat different. Pakistan
consequently maintained the federal type
type of rule assuring sovereignty to the provinces,
maximum independence in consonance with one combined Pakistan under the 1973
constitution. The constitutional scheme of Pakistan continued to be labeled as federal but
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remained unitary in character. Pakistan has experienced many constitutional schemes the one
factor that has remained constant in every scheme is the persistent preference for the federal
principle. Every constitution distributed the legislative, administrative and financial powers, and
ensured the independence of the judiciary. But in political practice, efforts were also made to
curtail individual liberties, dilute the judicial power, and circumscribe the autonomy of the
provinces. The fact remains that the constitutional commitment to federalism has never been
true in letter and spirit.
What makes federalism successful is its capacity to evolve the mechanisms and
processes of problem solving through crisis-management, conflict-resolution, consensus,
coordination and cooperation. Such mechanisms and processes may from part of a written
constitution, which should, in the course of time, given birth to sound institutionalization. But
they can be reinforced and made durable only with mutual interaction and reciprocal
understanding between the functionaries of the centre and the provinces, regarding the rules of
the game and the imperatives of a federalized way of running a government. Event the necessity
of unity and integrity can be understandable only with the willing cooperation and
understanding of the federating units, and not by bullets, or by maneuvering the ballots. The
history of federalism in Pakistan shows a definite trend: the centre has always remained stronger
as compared to the provinces. No efforts were made to institutionalize the Pakistani polity,
though in the beginning, this was done through the instrumentality of a party, i.e., the Muslim
league. The league, apart from being a political party, also represented a movement.
The Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan could not live longer to
give strength to the basic institutions necessary for the successful functioning of the federal
system. The federal process, therefore, received a setback. The later leadership relied heavily
upon the bureaucracy and military, which did not allow the birth of democratic institutions. The
Martial Law era (1958-1971) concentrated all power in the centre, depriving the provinces of
any participation in governmental affairs, which gave birth to antipathy and distrust. The
judiciary was never allowed to work independently, and it remained under the strict vigilance of
the executive.
We can deduct two common features from this style of governance: (a) the decline of
institutional politics and their replacement by personal and power politics, and (b) the erosion of
respect and confidence between the federal and provincial leadership, especially in the case of
East and West Pakistan, and more recently since 1988 after General Zia, during Mr. Ghulam
Ishaq Khan’s tenure as the President of Pakistan vis-à-vis Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto and Main
Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister. Parliamentary democracy in Pakistan has not been allowed
to work for along: and even the period in which it was practiced, was not without these
demerits.
The goals of the national system were either not debated, or debated in purely populist
terms. That can never bring the necessary consensus, compromises and concessions on certain
national and constitutional goals. What made the situation worse was the fact that the opposition
parties in their internal functioning, their attitude towards their competitors and their stance on
functional institutionalism, showed the familiar irreverence and disrespect for norms whenever
democracy was allowed to function. They proved to poor substitutes, because they brought with
own internal squabbles, showing scant unity of purpose in governance. The cure for these ills is
to be found in the re-emergence of institutional politics and adherence to certain consensual
goals and methods of working.
Federalism cannot work satisfactorily in the absence of organized political parties. It is
necessary that political parties follow and reflect the democratic-pluralist ethos, and reconcile it
with some of the agreed upon goals, in their internal organization, method of relationship with
other parties and observance of rules and norms. Coordination within political parties is an
essential prerequisite for a viable system of government. Political parties must perform
aggregative and integrative functions. They should bring together sectional interests, overcome
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geographical distance, and provide coherence to government structure. They should seek and
how definite directions in matters of national importance.
The federal structure cannot work smoothly, if the political parties which are
responsible for running it take contradictory stands and depend a great deal on political
expediency. What is needed to secure the successes of Federalism is the federal spirit. The
successes of the federal system in Pakistan depend on the extent to which the parliamentary
system of government can function smoothly in the provinces and the centre.
The provinces must be allowed to work as decentralized political units, with
parliamentary governments of their own operating within the conspectus of the federal system.
Pakistan like many other countries has social diversities which if neglected or negated, can
create problems of secessionist threat and foreign interference. The answer to the problem lies
in giving autonomy to the provinces, and creating local initiative, participation and
decentralization. The provisions of the constitution and words of legal document do not
necessarily restrain the unscrupulous. Much depends the way the state and local functionaries
behave and the limits sanction or legitimacy that political culture creates for them to play their
role. In order to make the federal system a success in Pakistan, it is necessary that the following
steps be taken to avoid centre province rivalries.
The attorney general, Yahya Bakhtiar, (Golam: 1988:183) declared that the 1973
constitution sought to lay the foundation of the federation and not only has the regional
autonomy been built into the structure of the unity organization has also been engaged; the
subject of the general interest which will be answerable to this council, the province will be
connected with central management. Under the different constitutions an extremely centralized
federal structure was founded in Pakistan. The Government of India Acts 1935 offered enough
provisions and practices to assure the full majority of the central power. Those provisions and
practices were completely operated. The central regime’s hold in the legislative, economic,
organizational and political areas was so huge for practical functions because we have already
pointed out the state governmental composition could rigidly be explained as really federal.
Another feature of a federation is the superiority of the constitution. Each organ of the
country’s executive, legislative or judiciary is subordinate to the constitution. The constitution is
considered as the supreme law of the territory. Federalism needs for its arrangement 2conditions i.e. on the one hand there must be a body of countries so closely attached by area, by
history, by race or the like to be capable of tolerating in the eyes of their inhabitants an impress
of common nationality. On the other hand there must exist a peculiar state of emotions between
the populations of the countries which it is proposed to unite. They must wish union and must
not want unity.
One may find out whether the impress of common nationality as referred to Dicey is
adequately strong in Pakistan to uphold the federal trial or whether the peculiar emotions he
refers to are gravely challenged in Pakistan by centrifugal forces. Unlike the federal structure of
the united countries or Australia the sense of diverse nationality, was getting stronger and the
sense of common nationality was getting weaker in Pakistan. Actually federalism owes its value
as political structure to the fact that this structure is helpful in societies whose feature is their
socio-culture and financial pluralism. Civilization in Pakistan is basically diverse in nature.
Pakistan is basically a multi-cultural state. The social group cleavages are horizontal (i.e.; racial,
spiritual, linguistic, tribal) and vertical (i.e. group, caste, sectarian). Due to this deep-rooted
civilization pluralism, the most immediate loyalties of the greater part of people go to
component units other than the nation state. These diversities required the awareness of a
practical federal constitution. However, a real federal constitution was never shaped in Pakistan.
The population of each area is proud of their peculiar inheritance and due to socio-economic
issues, are reluctant to adopt what they consider to be alien manners.
The socio- cultural differences between the eras play vital role in the sphere of politics.
They put forth straight impact over centre- province or inter- regional relations and on the
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process of nation-building at large. The policies of the federal rule during fifties strengthened
the centralizing style that appeared in the earlier stage of politics. The central regime used its
constitutional authorities and political management to interfere in regional matters. The center
also developed factional and personality disagreements in regional politics to emphasize its
power over the regions. The One Unit Scheme was approved by the Constituent Assembly in
the face of resistance from the provinces. Without the dominant role of the center, the system
could not be approved; the center’s interference in East Pakistan affairs destabilized the centerEast Pakistan relations as well as violated the strength of federalism.
2.
DISCUSSIONS
2.1 COERCIVE USE OF CENTRALISED POWER
The framing and working with the combined province of West Pakistan (the One Unit
Scheme) reflected all the key themes of these sensitivities of the minor provincial identities in
West Pakistan, maintained forcefulness of the center and its management of regional politics,
and the elimination of regional cabinets and the divergence among the center and the provinces.
While the provinces and other management units were combined into one province of West
Pakistan in October 1955, its origins could be traced back to the instant result of the
establishment of Pakistan. In November 1948, Sir Archibald a monetary consultant to Governor
General recommended the unification of Western area on a financial basis. The Quaid-i-Azam,
though liked the suggestion, did not support it as he thought it as “premature” at this phase.
Later on, the followers of one unit system created the impression that Jinnah was determined to
implement the plan in 1948. Dicey’s typical declaration relating to the basics of a federation
may be repeated here. The national press debated the integration of West Pakistan into one
manageable unit. The majority of newspapers analyzed this as a measure for the promotion of
harmony and accord.
2.2 SEGREGATION OF MUSLIMS
Under the federal system, the declaration of the concept of Muslim nationhood was
based on the statement that the Muslims irrespective of their caste, faith and areas were a nation.
The regional and provincial identities were false and caused unnecessary separations among the
Muslims of Pakistan. Therefore, the obtainable regional identities should be done away with.
The English daily Dawn wrote viewpoint of December 16, 1948, that's a huge deal more is to be
gained than tested by a joining of the provinces into particular unit, of course, due to pure
geographical reasons, there would have to be really 2 units - West Pakistan and East Pakistan.
Similar visions were expressed by the associates of the Constituent Assembly from the Punjab.
In March 1949 Malik Feroz Khan Noon supported the merger at West Pakistan provinces into
a one unit for the sake of “efficient management”. He also suggested the ministerial quotas
stored for each province in the constitution”( DAWN: 7 March,1949). The suggestion was
supported by Begum Shahnawaz, who stated that provinces of Western area, if combined
into a one province could be efficient and economically administered and in such case,
Pakistan could have a bicameral legislature in which lower house would be selected on the basis
of the inhabitants and upper house was to be constituted as to eradicate any terror of Punjabi
supremacy.
Khan Muhammad Yousaf Khattak from NWFP (Khyber Pukhtoon Khwa) the general
secretary of Pakistan Muslim League also at this phase supported the plan, as he felt that the
plan would eventually create unity, prosperity and harmony for Pakistan. It would also help to
delay the mounting provincialism, as well as inject 'the unending strength of unified Pakistani
nationality (DAWN:1st April, 1949). The proposal of founding a combined province of West
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Pakistan, once again attracted the attention in 1953 as a way out of the constitutional
deadlock generated by the refusal of the BPC (2nd) statement. The Punjabi journalists and
leadership powerfully emphasized that the establishment of the integrated province of West
Pakistan was the only way to contest provincialism and the terror of supremacy of one wing
over the other.
Some political elites in East Pakistan also supported the plan arguing that East Pakistan
had better opportunities of achieving greater sovereignty, if there were only two provinces in
Pakistan. The supporting leaders like Mumtaz Daultana, Malik Feroz Khan Noon, Chaudhry,
Muhammad Ali and Sardar Amir Azam Khan supported the plan with great eagerness at this
phase. The West Pakistan journalists also favoured the plan. The arguments given in support of
the scheme involved the cultural, environmental, and financial as well as political features. The
supporters of the plan explained the whole of West Pakistan as a single hydraulic unit and saw
the solution of the irrigation crisis of the region as as well as inter regional conflicts into the
recommended One Unit Scheme. It was contended that existing partition of provinces was the
effect of the British system of “divide and rule” and that during the Muslim rule no such local
boundaries could be traced (DAWN: 4 August, 1954). The minor provinces also expressed the
fright of being overpowered by the larger province i.e., the Punjab. It is interesting to note here
that Punjab was to have 40 percent representation in the proposed government.
One Unit constitutional system which was less than it was entitled to the basis of
inhabitants. However, this did not assuage the minor units who freighted Punjab’s supremacy.
They felt that the elimination of separate provinces in West Pakistan denied them the political
standard over Punjab amongst themselves with East Pakistan. They felt that within the one unit,
Punjab would have a controlling voice by acquiring only 11 percent of votes from other
provinces. The most virulent opposition surfaced in Sindh. The East Pakistani leadership also
decided to fight the plan by joining hands with members from minor provinces. The central
government, however, was determined to follow plan against the desires of the minor provinces.
The PM Muhammad Ali Bogra with backing of the Governor General, Ghulam
Muhammad tried to arrange the ground for acceptance of the scheme outside the Constituent
Assembly. In his communal address, he projected plan as a protection against the danger of
provincialism. He pressurized that right for survival of separate provinces would only serve the
interests of enemies of Pakistan. The supporting elites from Punjab maintained to work for the
alliance of West Pakistan units into a single province, arguing that the separation of Western
provinces would make stronger the disruptive forces, already functioning in Pakistan.
2.3 CAUSES OF THE FALL OF EAST PAKISTAN
It is because of many internal and external factors that disintegration of a country
happens. One incident may cause the immediate blow to the long process. Similarly separation
of East Pakistan was not a sudden or unexpected phenomenon. It was in fact, the result of the
process which had been started since the birth of Pakistan. These factors may be quoted as
responsible for the fall of East Pakistan.
(a) Geographical Discontinuity
There was a distance of more than one thousand miles between the two wings of
Pakistan. It made the difference in East Pakistan very weak. The army men, military hardwares
and other weapons could not be shifted to the other wing in as a quick speed as was required. If
there had not been the distance of so many miles between the two units, the hatred between
them might not have generated. The social intercourse might have changed the opinion of the
general public.
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(b)
Negative Desire of Autonomy
In a federal system of government units are given autonomy in their internal affairs.
Everywhere in the world the autonomy of the provinces or parts is subject to the common
national interest. But unfortunately the leaders of East Pakistan were demanding absolute
autonomy. Free trade involving trading with India and Afghanistan also permits China’s
maintenance of arms, absolute control on revenue, control over foreign exchange earned by the
provincial produced goods. No federation of the world could fulfill such foolish and
unreasonable demands. So the situation became more and more serious.
(c) No Desire for Union
It is a regrettable fact that the people of East Pakistan were so much affected by wellorganized propagation of India and other interested parties that they had no desire for the Unity.
They talked in terms of economic development. They had some fair grievances for nonutilization of natural resources equally. Once the seeds of separation came into the growing
minds of people no force could bind them with any sort of tie.
(d) Absence of Common Cultural and Other Interest
There was a lack of cultural similarity between the two wings. The lifestyle, mode of
living, customs, social behavior, rites of marriage was different in East and West Pakistan.
Different cultural traditions did not create goodwill among people of both parts.
(e) Inequality among the Federating Units
The economic inequality between East and West Pakistan created such a bridge of
misunderstanding as could not be crossed by the political leaders of the time. There was a clear
cut difference in terms of prosperity, resources and development; which did nothing but
generates feelings of deprivation and the yoke of the federation and demanded independence.
The deep and profound analysis of that matter indicates that if the component units of federation
vary in economic prosperity, the unavoidable, as it is a natural phenomenon- an economic
demand of the modern era of materialism.
(f)
Selfish And Inefficient Leadership
After the demise of Quaid-i-Azam, there was not even as a single Muslim leader who
could enjoy the favor of the people of all parts of the country. The country was led by absolutely
selfish, dishonest, corrupt, inefficient political leaders who failed to maintain the integrity of the
state. Had political leaders been sincere, devoted, and efficient and true to the cause of the
nation, they might have stopped the dangerous and undesirable process of disintegration.
Unfortunately they preferred their personal interest to national interest. They were unable to
create patriotism among the people. The Punjabi management had strong unwillingness about
the Bogra Formula for the future constitutions because they felt that this allowed the minor
federating units in West Pakistan to align with East Pakistan to generate majority to put stress
on Punjab. On the other hand, the groups of Bengali elected officials like Nazimuddin-Fazlu
Rehman, Tazmmudin Khan and, Nur at Arrun and Muslim League leadership in Sindh and
Baluchistan, such as Abdus Sittar Pirzada and Muhammad Hashim Gazder felt that it was a
grand chance to strengthen their position viz. a viz. Punjab.
The Punjabi leadership decided to switch away from their support for the Bogra
formula, mostly agreed upon by the Constituent Assembly and pressed a substitute plan for
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“zonal federation” (Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan Debates: June, 1954:356-9:Vol.XVI).
The “zonal federation” plan aimed at creating a sub federation of the provinces and
governmental units of West Pakistan, The component units were to enjoy greater sovereignty.
But the efforts did not achieve much and the zonal federation suggestion could not win the
support in the Constituent Assembly. Its challengers illustrated it as yet another move Punjab to
have a dominating voice in West Pakistan issues ( National Press :The report about the intention
of Iskander Mirza). There were rumors that Iskander Mirza (the Governor of East Pakistan),
under the directions of Governor General, was preparing to begin legal events against East
Pakistani leaders under the Pubic and Representative office Disqualification Act, 1949. In order
to avoid the possibilities of invocation of the PRODA against the parliamentarians in East
Pakistan the Constituent Assembly cancelled the PRODA on September 20, 1954.
2.3.1
RECKLESS USE OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS
The Constituent Assembly adopted a bill to limit the authorities of the Governor
General (Rizwan: 1988:48). However, the bill was supported in the assembly under his
leadership in the face of the opposition's boycott; the cause being his “Volta face” revealed in
his report given before his removal as the CM. He stated that his party men decided to provide
their support to the plan only after they received certain declarations such as
“representation of his officials in the new one unit system, the organization of the capital of the
new province in NWFP (Khyber Pukhtoon Khwa) and the assurance not to install Dr. Khan
Sahib as the CM of single unit government from the federal government. (Ibid: 48) But all these
guarantees was not fulfilled. Outside the assembly, the plan met with more determined
opposition and Ghaffar Khan (Khyber Pukhtoon Khwa) was leading adversary who demanded
of the federal government not to take quick decisions, which might deteriorate the conditions
(The Pakistan Times: Oct 20, 1954). The One Unit Scheme faced hard resistance in Sindh.
Abdus Sattar Pirzada ( the chief minister of Sindh) took a solid stand against the alliance plan.
He secured the signed statement of 74 members of the Sindh assembly in favour of his stand.
Outside the assembly, he was supported by G.M Sayed, Sh. Abdul Majeed Sindhi, Ghulam
Mustafa Bhargan and Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur. They argued the single Unit would be
unfavorable to the interests of the inhabitants of minor provinces because Punjab would have
more opportunities to exploit the smaller provinces, they would be totally on pity of the Punjab.
The federal management was determined to crush any opposition, discharged the Pirzada
government and replaced him with Khuro on Nov 7, 1954. In a report Pirzada alleged that he
was eliminated from the office due to his opposition to the One Unit plan. About the selection of
Khuro, he stated that “it seems Mr. Khuro, who has been called upon to structure the ministry,
has recognized One Unit and taken upon himself the accountability of framing the members of
the assembly and the citizens of Sindh to acknowledge this move (DAWN: Nov, 13, 1954).
Daily newspapers like Al-Wahid, which resisted the plan, was forbidden. Hundreds of students
were put in prison, while they demonstrated against the government’s coercive measures (The
Pakistan Times: Nov, 23, 1954). The remarks of a political leader present a concise explanation
of the condition.
Hyderabad was changed in the armed forces camp to decide the whole constitutional
matter. The merger suggestion has been passed with the help of province wide intimidation,
coercion repression and suppression of public opinion. Punjab was the only province, where the
plan did not encounter a solid resistance. It was normally welcomed and even illustrated as “the
greatest that could have happened to this state after the formation of Pakistan. While for the
princely states, only 2-states Bahawalpur and Khairpur had their respective legislatures, which
approved the single unit plan without any criticism. The sovereigns of these states and members
of their legislatures were loyal to the offer. The Amir of Bahawalpur stressed that “the pace now
taken might involve sacrifices on the part of some, but if the sacrifices are for a stronger and
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superior Pakistan, none of us should stand firm in our assurance that we are the first to make a
sacrifice for the harmony of the state and the nation”. He pressurized that people of Bahawalpur
had “never stood in resistance to the scheme of single Unit”.
Finally after protecting the approval of the provinces and courtiers, the unification of
West Pakistan's province's plan was proclaimed by the government. However, the
implementation of the scheme was delayed until the voting of the 2nd Constituent Assembly
was held; as the Supreme Court in a ruling gave the decision that “it was beyond the authorities
of Governor General to combine the provinces”. A motivating incident developed in the Punjab
with reference to the elections to the Constituent Assembly, which had unhelpful insinuations
for parliamentary system and regional sovereignty. Feroze Khan Noon was heading Punjab
regional ministry but he faced serious in-party opposition. (Muslim League, from Mumtaz
Daultana and other members).
As the two groups developed serious diversities in association with the allocation of
party tickets for the Constituent Assembly election, Daultana wanted the support of Governor
Gurmani. In May 1951; the Governor released the Noon regime with the sanction of Governor
General Ghulam Muhammad. The governor neither referred the issue to the Punjab Muslim
League Parliamentary Party nor did he summon the regional assembly to see if Noon
commanded support on the floor of the house. Noon was eradicated from office and Abdul
Hamid Dasti was put in as the Punjab's new CM. The Muslim League acknowledged the
change. This was followed by the voting to the Constituent Assembly through the local
assemblies. The fresh Constituent Assembly had its 1st meeting in July 1955 and the bill for the
establishment of a single province of West Pakistan was officially moved on August 23, 1955.
The discussion in the 2nd Constituent Assembly once more established the reality that
the One Unit plan was devoid of “popular sanction” particularly in the minor provinces, and
processes adopted by the center to draw out the support of the scheme were extremely
undemocratic. The support was mainly obtained through intimidation, threats and dismissal of
ministries. During discussion, proposals were made to circulate the bill for eliciting community
opinion or hold a referendum or refer it to select committee of the house for deliberation, so that
the desires of people are determined. But all such ideas were twisted down. The elites like Fazeur- Rehman originated the bill detrimental to the interests of the state, which would direct the
distribution of Pakistani community on the origin of Bengalis and non-Bengalis.
Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy declined to support the bill on explanation of the
Constituent Assembly’s lack of representative character. He argued that the Constituent
Assembly represented the regional assemblies but not the people’s He called for direct ejections
to determine the peoples’ wishes on the problem. Even in the Punjab, a number of leaders like
Mian Iftikhar uddin expressed powerful reservations. He resisted the opinion that “centralization
leads to unity” and maintained that Punjabi community was in favour of zonal federation plan
instead of single Unit.
The single Unit bill was passed on September 30, 1955 and the scheme became
effective on October 14,1955. With this new province West Pakistan was established, Lahore
was made the capital of the new province. The United Front won the regional voting by
defeating the ruling Muslim League in 1954. It shaped an alliance government in the province
under the leadership of Fazalul Haq, head of the Krishak Saramak Party. A federal political
structure tends to have adequate flexibility to the accommodation of the diverse political
parties at the central and provincial levels, provided there is joint accommodation and
harmonization. However in Pakistan, this strength could not be maintained, as the central
government did not let opposing political parties rule the provinces efficiently. This model of
politics manifested in a harsh way in East Pakistan during 1954. The central rule did not tolerate
the United Front's ministry in East Pakistan that challenged its policies. In the beginning after
the success of United Front both regimes (central and regional) pressurized their wish to
collaborate with each other. In March, 1954 during his budget speech, the PM guaranteed his
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government's full support to the United Front government. He said that “we are a democratic
country”. Our people have the full liberty to select their own government. The East Bengal
election demonstrated beyond doubt that our citizens do not in fact enjoy that freedom. It is a
welcome tribute to our structure of government (Lord:1954:215:Vol.V). However, the policies
followed by both parties undermined the spirit of these reports.
The United Front rule which was the gathering of dissimilar parties with different
aspects, organized its election movement on the basis of the 21 point programme which
included demands that were in disagreement with the central government’s policies. These
demands such as the acknowledgment of Bengali as an official language and whole provincial
sovereignty of East Pakistan were the major combining force among the United Front and the
Center. The point 9 of the United Front's policies which read: secure all subjects, including
residuary authorities apart from defence, foreign issues and currency for East Bengal, which
shall be fully independent and sovereign as envisaged in the history.
Lahore Resolution established Naval Head Quarters and Ordinance factory in East
Bengal, so as to create it militarily autonomous (DAWN: Dec, 20, 1953); it became a reason of
resistance in the conciliations among the central Government and regional government. The
ruling Muslim League kept insisting on its stand on the national harmony and incorporation on
the basis of same Islamic identity, in contrast to United Front's secular approach, emphasizing
the highest sovereignty and socio-economic matters.
The United front elites demanded the termination of the Constituent Assembly and
asked for a common election. They argued that it had lost its representative quality after the
defeat of the Muslim League in East Pakistan regional elections (DAWN: March 28, 29 &12
April, 1954). Some West Pakistani leaders like Pir Sahib Manki Sharif of Awami League in
West Pakistan, Main Iftikhar uddin (Elite of the Azad Pakistan Party), the Red Shirts from
NWFP (Khyber Pukhtoon Khwa) and progressive parties in Sindh united them in their demand
for a change in the center. (The Pakistan Times: 3April, 1954) But the central government
outrightly refused their demand.
A further problem that enhanced the diversities between the centre and United Front
government was Pakistan's contribution in armed forces pacts with America. The United Front
leaders time and again voiced their opposition towards the center's foreign policy of alignment
with the West, which they understand as mortgaging Pakistan’s sovereignty. The relationship
between two governments worsened in view of CM Fazalul Haq's alleged report during his visit
to Calcutta. He was reported and said that he had wished “to eliminate the false barriers that had
been produced between the two- Bengalis”, as they were (Bengalis) bound together by the same
language and tradition. But the federal government did not accept his clarifications. It was no
longer in the mood to let the united ministry to have a free hand. Numerous industries in
different cities of East Pakistan provided the central role with an excuse to interfere. Firstly,
severe disturbances erupted in the industrialized regions of Karnafulli Paper Mills near
Chittagong in which thirteen people were killed. Later on more aggressive insurgences broke
out at the Adamjee Jute Mills in Narayanganj, in which, the massacre of 100 people took place.
The regional government emerged helpless in the face of labour riots. The center also asked the
East Pakistan government to put East Pakistan Riffles as a paramilitary force, under the power
of the Army to deal with the circumstances (DAWN: May 8, 13, 1954). The circumstances took
a grave twist with the publication of the chief minister's interview in the New York Times. He
was reported to have talked of autonomy of East Pakistan as his regime's objective.
Nevertheless he disowned the statement and contended that provincial autonomy “is our model
and will struggle for it. I never said for a moment that our ideal is independence.
East Pakistan was the main source of raw material and after they saw that material was
being processed in West Pakistan industries, they sold materials at a higher price than in West
Pakistan e.g. tea and sugar. This also aroused the discontent of the people of East Pakistan. The
election held in the country in 1970 under Yahya Khan declared Awami League’s majority in
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African Journal of Social Sciences, Volume 2 Number 3 (2012), pp. 145-155
East Pakistan(160 out of 162) and Pakistan People’s Party(PPP) in West Pakistan (81 out of 138
seats). There was also gross under presentation of the inhabitants of East Pakistan in Armed
forces (10%) and in the government services (15%) most of military bases were in West
Pakistan.
A considerable portion of the population of the East Pakistan consists of Hindus who
were dead against the creation of Pakistan. They had close relation with intelligence bodies of
India. They were controlled by Indian Leaders. These Hindus had dedicated all their energies,
resources, and abilities in propagating against Pakistan. Inefficient leadership provided them a
chance to make a mountain out of a mole.
3. CONCLUSION
It has been seen that in order to unite various diverse groups of a society a system is
required to be evolved to meet the aspirations of a society having multilingual and multi-cultural
character. To ensure participation of every group in the governmental structure, Federalism
seems to be the most appropriate systems, as compared to Unitarianism. The latter concentrates
all powers in one hand or one government and the regional units of society are thus deprived of
their right to participatory democracy the supporter of Federalism believe that this system
provides two sets of government in which the federating regions are given an opportunity to
participate , and thus brings complete cohesion in a society. Although both the Constitutions of
1962 and 1973 did make provision for Federalism, like other federal constitutions, they were
never allowed to be implemented. An important factor of institutionalization in Pakistan has
been the nature of the multi-party system.
The multi-party system has created problems with its local, regional, and even personalsplinters and one man show, failed to solve the national problems. Each, with its own pet
programme, refused to recognize the other as an equal. If any party succeeded in getting the
reins of the country, it tried to implement such policies, as were never acceptable to other
parties. The absence of a viable national political party with roots in all the provinces gave birth
to many regional parties. The latter encouraged the separatist trends and even regional
movements, in order to gain political power at the centre by temporary alliances. When such
alliance failed, the regional parties established their government in the provinces, with the result
that tension between the centre and the provinces was almost institutionalized. The
centralization trend in both the constitutions paved the way for creating resentment amongst the
federating units. Every ruler tried to maintain himself in power, ignoring all constitutional
provisions and depriving the federating units of their legitimate share in the power structure of
the government.
The federating units, in turn, looked at the central leadership with suspicion and
disrespect. In this persistent behavior pattern, the federalizing process in the country has
received a severe jolt. What has not been realized is the fact that there is a greater lack of the
spirit of federalism in the province which is being ruled by the agents of the central government,
in one way or the other. Federalism is not a just a matter of the division and
coordination/cooperation of power between two or several layers of government, it is a value
system and a way of life. Powers can be delegated and authorities devolved, particularly in local
government, and for social welfare and community development. The Pakistanis have ceased to
do work in cooperation with others because they lack the basic confidence to work together
under normal circumstances for a common social or national cause. It is easier to work for the
spoils of power and for personal and mutual benefits. But it requires the spirit of statesmanship
to work for common and national causes. Until and unless Federalism becomes a way of life,
the federalization of the government structure will lack a sound and solid base.
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PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS
DAWN dated May 8, 13, 1954, as quoted by Afzal.M. Rafiq, (1976), “Political Parties in
Pakistan” National Commission on Historical & Cultural Research.
DAWN dated Dec, 20, 1953.
DAWN, dated Nov, 13, 1954.
DAWN, dated 4 August, 1954.
DAWN dated March 28, 29 &12 April, 1954.
The Pakistan Times, dated 3April, 1954.
The Pakistan Times, dated Nov, 23, 1954.
The Pakistan Times, dated Oct 20, 1954.
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