Effectiveness of River Basin Organisations –
an institutional review of three African RBOs
5 February, 2015
Gunilla Ölund Wingqvist
Åke Nilsson
Sida's Helpdesk for Environment and Climate Change
www.sidaenvironmenthelpdesk.se
Contact: Gunilla Ölund Wingqvist [email protected]
Table of Contents
1.
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
1.1
Background .................................................................................................................. 1
1.2
Purpose ........................................................................................................................ 2
1.3
Method and scope ........................................................................................................ 2
1.4
Some definitions .......................................................................................................... 3
2.
Institutional effectiveness of an RBO ................................................................................ 3
3.
Theoretic framework of determinants of RBO effectiveness ............................................. 5
3.1
Exogenous factors........................................................................................................ 6
3.2
Institutional design of RBOs ....................................................................................... 6
3.2.1 Key features of an RBO ............................................................................................ 6
3.2.2 Determinants of effectiveness ................................................................................... 7
4.
3.3
Trade-offs .................................................................................................................... 9
3.4
General hypotheses promoting effective RBOs ........................................................ 10
Three river basin organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa.................................................... 11
4.1 Exogenous conditions – problem structure .................................................................... 11
4.2 Institutional characteristics ............................................................................................. 12
4.3.2 Institutional features of the three RBOs .................................................................. 15
4.3.3 Effectiveness of the three RBOs ............................................................................. 16
5.
Conclusions and recommendations .................................................................................. 18
5.1 Promoting effective RBOs ............................................................................................. 18
5.2 Next steps ....................................................................................................................... 19
References ................................................................................................................................ 20
Annex 1. OKACOM ................................................................................................................ 24
Annex 2: OMVS....................................................................................................................... 30
Annex 3: NBA .......................................................................................................................... 38
i
1. Introduction
1.1 Background
Water is an important input to many human activities and ecological functions and is truly a
prerequisite for life. River basins have for thousands of years been important for human
activities, as they provide resources (food, water, fertile land, etc) and economic opportunities
(e.g. energy and transport). An increasing global population in combination with urbanisation
and industrialisation place the water resources under heavy demand from competing interests
(e.g. household consumption, food and energy production, industry, etc.). As freshwater
resources are limited, it needs careful husbandry to be managed in a sustainable way.
Freshwater resources are commonly unevenly distributed in time and space. Water is
furthermore characterised by being a shared resource. There are 267 international water basins
covering almost half (45%) of the world’s surface – an area inhabited by more than 40% of
the global population. Africa holds 64 of these transboundary water basins, and about one
third of our planet’s major international water basins (basins larger than 100,000 km2) are
placed in Africa. Almost all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa share at least one international
water basin.1
Uncoordinated and unilateral development activities in transboundary watercourses often
have negative consequences on the quantity and quality of the water resources. The need for
riparian states to cooperate over their shared watercourses is recognised, for instance through
the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses
from 19972.
River Basin Organisations (RBOs) are “umbrella organisations for basin-wide management”
and can be established to manage domestic as well as international water resources3.
Managing a shared watercourse can be seen as a subset of international environmental
governance. One of the key challenges for environmental governance is related to effective
implementation of existing frameworks (including international treaties). There is a growing
consensus among scholars emphasising that institutions have a strong effect on environmental
actions and outcomes4. Researchers are increasingly realising that this is true also for a shared
watercourse: “institutional capacity within a basin […] is as important, if not more so, than
the physical aspects of a system”5.
The RBOs come in many formats, with many different mandates, dealing with a variety of
collective action problems. Schmeier (2013) has identified 117 RBOs covering 116 (of the
267) shared watercourses. Half of the RBOs have been established in the last two decades.
However, the mere existence of an RBO does not guarantee sustainable management of a
river basin. Some RBOs succeed to manage the watercourse in a sustainable and equitable
way while others fail. It is becoming increasingly important to assess the quality of the RBOs:
do they deliver results? Is there a way to identify certain institutional characteristics that are
important in order to solve the collective action problems?
1
Schmeier (2013)
The UN convention was agreed in 1997, although it has not yet entered into force as not enough countries have
ratified it.
3
GWP & INBO (2009)
4
Ölund Wingqvist et al (2012).
5
UN Water website; Wolf (2004) p 15; and Schmeier (2013).
2
1
1.2 Purpose
Sida’s Helpdesk for Environment and Climate Change6 has been requested by the regional
team at the Embassy of Sweden in Nairobi to investigate RBO effectiveness with a particular
focus on the role of development partners.
More specifically the assessment has included the following tasks:
1) Describe an effective RBO.
a. Literature review to identify a theoretical framework of RBO effectiveness
b. Desk study of 3 RBOs
2) Identify common characteristics that promote and challenge the development of an
effective RBO
3) Draw conclusions and provide recommendations
1.3 Method and scope
The assignment has been performed as a desk study. The first step was to perform a literature
review and – based mainly on research articles, books, and handbooks – identify a theoretic
framework that would provide the basis for the assessment. Thereafter, a new literature
review was carried out mainly of evaluations, assessment reports, organisational descriptions,
etc. for three selected RBOs.
Various organisations, data bases, and researchers have published handbooks, indicators and
methods for describing and assessing RBOs7. Most of them highlight the importance of the
functions of the RBO, the organisational bodies, mandates and roles, legal frameworks and
governance aspects as determinants of effectiveness.
For this study, the theoretic framework is relying heavily on the research of Susanne
Schmeier8. Schmeier is interesting due to the combination of two academic fields (hydropolitics and institutionalism), a broad evidence base (116 RBOs), depth (case studies), and the
inclusion of both endogenous and exogenous factors in the assessment of RBO effectiveness.
This study has focused on the endogenous aspects of RBO effectiveness.
In addition to the theoretic framework, Schmeier’s in-depth studies have provided crucial
input to the effectiveness assessment of the case studies (section 4.3).
The RBOs included in the review were selected in a dialogue with the Embassy of Sweden in
Nairobi. The selection was based on the organisational characteristics of the RBOs, with the
aim to cover a variety of RBOs and different types of transboundary river basin governance.
The RBOs selected were:
-
The Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission – OKACOM
Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal – OMVS
6
This report was written by Gunilla Ölund Wingqvist at Sida’s Helpdesk for Environment and Climate Change
and Åke Nilsson, Geoscope AB, during August-December 2014, upon the request of Maria Vink and Patrik
Stålgren at the Embassy of Sweden in Nairobi. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the views of Sida.
7
Organisations, such as Global Water Partnership (GWP) and the International Network of Basin Organisations
(INBO); Databases, such as the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, and Indicators, such as the IWRM
Performance Indicators for African Transboundary Basin Management.
8
Dr. Susanne Schmeier is an Earth System Governance Research Fellow, a Technical Advisor to the Mekong
River Commission (MRC) – (GIZ) Cooperation, and a Research Fellow at Oregon State University.
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/about/Previous%20contributors/Schmeier.html
Programme.
2
-
Niger Basin Authority - NBA
1.4 Some definitions
The following definitions are used:
-
A river basin organisation is defined as “institutionalized forms of cooperation that are
based on binding international agreements covering the geographically defined area of
international river or lake basins characterized by principles, norms, rules and governance
mechanisms”.9
-
An international RBO is established between states.
-
RBO effectiveness is defined as “the extent to which an RBO contributes to behaviour
changes among riparian actors, ultimately contributing to the solution of the collective
action problem that prompted the RBO’s establishment and the promotion of joint
governance of water-related collective action problems in the basin”.10
This definition of effectiveness deals with both with:
-

Goal attainment - the extent to which an institution achieves its goals. Here, one
problem is that the goals of RBOs are often insufficiently described.
Problem solving - the degree to which a regime eliminates or alleviates the
problem that prompts its creation; changes in the problem the institution has been
established to address.
Compliance means conformity between behaviour and rules.
2. Institutional effectiveness of an RBO
Effectiveness can be measured at different result levels, where the output-level generally
refers to effectiveness in the short-term, medium term aspects are referred to as the outcome
level, while longer term effectiveness refers to the impact level (see Table 1).



Output effectiveness: relates to concrete and direct results such as the establishment of
the organisation itself, with principles, rules, norms and procedures, and a secretariat
with adequate staff, infrastructure and equipment.
Outcome effectiveness: often refers to changes in actors’ behaviour; “the degree to
which actor behaviour conforms with an explicit treaty provision”11. The treaty
provisions can be grouped in different themes (see Table 1, effectiveness scope).
Impact effectiveness (see definition of effectiveness in Section 1.4); related both to
goal achievement and ability to solve problems.
Output effectiveness is often quite easy to monitor and measure, but it doesn’t provide any
information about the effects. The outcome effectiveness is also insufficient as a measure of
goal achievement effectiveness, since changes in behaviour alone do not necessarily lead to a
solution of the collective action problem; the state of the environment does not necessarily
change. Similarly, a change in the state of the environment is not necessarily caused by
changed behaviour but can be induced by other factors, including exogenous ones.
9
Schmeier et al. (2013).
Schmeier (2013), p.26
11
Schmeier (2013), p.24
10
3
Besides the level, also the scope and the range are interesting features to include when
assessing the effectiveness of an RBO. Commonly, the scope includes issues related to
political stability, environmental sustainability, economic growth and social development.
These are conditions that many of the RBOs are established to promote.
The range is linked to if the RBO deals purely with water resources governance or goes
beyond the river, to include cooperation in areas in addition to those directly related to water.
In summary, the three dimensions of effectiveness relate to the causal hierarchy of results
achieved (result level), what types of issues the results are related to (scope) and the extent to
which the results are beneficial also in a context of cooperation broader than just water
(range).
Table 1. Dimensions of river basin effectiveness
Effectiveness
level
Effectiveness
scope
Effectiveness
range
Output
The extent to which the RBO produces products or
services as a direct result of its activities
Outcome
The extent to which the RBO contributes to behaviour
changes among its members
Impact
The extent to which the RBO achieves the goals set by
its founding documents and its strategic plans, or helps
to solve the collective action problems that prompted
its establishment
Political stability
The extent to which the RBO contributes to the
peaceful resolution of water-related collective action
problems and the promotion of cooperation among
riparians
Environmental sustainability
The extent to which the RBO contributes to the
improvement of the state of the environment in the
basin
Economic growth
The extent to which the RBO contributes to the efficient
use of the river basin’s resources for economic growth
and development
Social development
The extent to which the RBO contributes to the
improvement of riparian population’s livelihoods and
their river-related well-being
To the river
The extent to which the RBO effectively governs the
river’s water resources
Beyond the river
The extent to which the RBO contributes to
improvements in issue-areas other than water
resources governance in the basin
Source: Schmeier (2013), modified by authors
A report on results measurement in transboundary water management has concluded that
monitoring and evaluation is generally weak, and often based on inconsistent frameworks
with inadequate indicators12. In consequence, reporting largely focuses on activities, and
results are mostly measured and reported only at the output level. Typical outputs reported
12
Nilsson (2014).
4
include offices and other small-scale infrastructure, equipment, software, reports, plans,
organisations formed, capacity assessments made and staff trained.
Reported outcomes include enhanced resource mobilisation, improved safety (dams,
navigation, peace and stability) and improved efficiency and quality in institutions,
communication, awareness, capacity building and cooperation. With regard to institutional
outcomes such as procedures and protocols, it is noted that actual compliance and
enforcement is difficult to assess.
Due to the time perspective and difficulty in attribution, reported results at impact level are
few and mostly anecdotal. However, some health, environmental and socio-economic impacts
have been reported, as well as long-term effects on investment climate, peace-building and
regional integration.
3. Theoretic framework of determinants of RBO effectiveness
The effectiveness of an RBO depends on both exogenous and endogenous factors. According
to Schmeier (2013), the exogenous factors are determined by the nature of the collective
problem (the problem structure) and the constellation of actors and power relations in the
basin (the situation structure). The endogenous factors, on the other hand, relate to factors that
are internal to the organisation.
Many scholars and studies focus on the exogenous factors when attempting to explain why
some RBOs are successful in finding solutions to the collective action problem while others
fail. Less attention has been placed on the institutional characteristics. Schmeier (2013)
combines these two approaches13 in an attempt to better describe the effectiveness of an RBO
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1. The causal chain of RBO effectiveness
Exogenous factors
Endogenous factors
Problem structure
RBO institutional design
Effectiveness
Situation structure
Source: Schmeier (2013), p.5, modified by authors.
In reality, of course, the linkages are more complicated than what is illustrated in Figure 1.
The exogenous and endogenous factors are not isolated from each other, and changes in one
may affect the other.
13
In her research, Schmeier combines theories from the hydro-political/realist research that focus on exogenous
factors with the institutionalist research that focus more on factors that are internal to the organisation.
5
3.1 Exogenous factors
While the current study focuses on the institutional design of the RBOs, the exogenous
conditions that constitute the basis for the creation of an RBO also have an obvious and
important influence on effectiveness. Both the problem structure and the type of situation will
influence the RBO effectiveness. A collective action problem that is political, complex and
linked to values and relatively assessed goods, is likely more difficult to cooperate effectively
around than problems that are technical and less complex, linked to the means rather than
values and absolutely assessed goods. Many scholars agree that problems related to water
quantity are the least conducive to cooperation14.
Similarly, the situation structure will be more or less conducive to effective cooperation,
where the game structure, the distribution of power among the riparian states and the general
regional cooperation structure are factors that will influence the conduciveness. In reality, the
problem structure and the situation structure are interlinked and can be mutually reinforcing.
Looking specifically at the problem-situation, the collective action problems can be grouped
in 12 types, in order of declining malignity15:
1. Water quantity and allocation problems
2. Water quality and pollution problems
3. Environmental problems and drought management
4. Hydropower and dam construction problems
5. Climate change problems
6. Fisheries problems
7. Infrastructure developments
8. Economic development
9. Invasive species
10. Flood effects on the basins
11. Biodiversity protection
12. Navigation and transport-related problems
Linked to the problem structure, the effectiveness can be expected to be higher for an RBO
that is put in place to deal with less malign problems. However, the most malign problems,
particularly water quantity and allocation problems, are also the most frequent problems
RBOs are established to solve.
With regard to the situation structure, effectiveness can be expected to be higher if all
riparians want to cooperate, based on the provision of benefits to all riparians and nonexistence of incentives to defect. Effectiveness can be expected to be higher if power is
distributed equally among riparians, where there is cooperation among the riparians also in
areas other than water, and where regional integration is well developed.
3.2 Institutional design of RBOs
3.2.1 Key features of an RBO
There are three general types of RBOs:
14
E.g. Bernauer (1997, pp 160-162); Dinar (2009); Wolf et al. (2003, pp 44-46)
‘Malignity’ refers to the conduciveness of the RBOs to solve the collective action problems, and does not refer
to the severity of the problem itself. Less malign problems are more likely to be solved through effective river
basin governance.
15
6
-
River Basin Committees or Councils, which are generally characterised by little formality.
They act as advisory bodies only and do not have bodies for implementation.
River Basin Commissions have a certain degree of independence from their member states
but have only coordination functions.
River Basin Authorities have broad mandates covering implementation and management
of joint infrastructure. They are relatively autonomous and independent in relation to the
riparian governments.
The structures of RBOs and their secretariats vary widely, to a large extent depending on
whether they are oriented towards coordination or implementation. While coordinationoriented RBOs are generally small, with limited number of subsidiary bodies and with lean
secretariats, the implementation-oriented ones have more subsidiary bodies (working or
expert groups) and larger secretariats with several specialised technical departments.
Technical subsidiary bodies and departments can cover a range of Integrated Water Resource
Management (IWRM) functions, including river basin management; project planning,
development, implementation and management; data and information management, including
GIS and other monitoring and information systems; specific resource issues such as flood
protection, pollution management, hydrology, groundwater, water quality, ecology,
biodiversity; and public participation and socio-economic issues (Schmeier 2010 and 2013).
3.2.2 Determinants of effectiveness
Based on a study of 116 RBOs in 119 river basins around the world and a combination of
realist and institutionalist theories, Schmeier (2013) concludes that the institutional design of
an RBO, including the organisational set-up and the governance mechanisms, is important for
the effectiveness of an RBO. Key aspects of the institutional design of an RBO are
summarised below.
Organisational set-up, the way the institution is organised and structured. The organisational
set-up is usually linked to the functional scope.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
Membership structure: Laterality (# of riparians in a basin) and inclusiveness (are all
riparians members of the RBO)
Functional scope (depending on the purpose and the collective action problems to be
solved). Some RBOs have only one issue to deal with (e.g. mgmt. of shared
infrastructure, or fisheries) while others have multiple purposes.
Legal foundation – water law principles: Does the legal foundation of the RBO rest
on international water law principles (key principles are Principle of Equitable and
sustainable use; Obligation not to Cause Significant Harm; and Principle of Prior
Notification).
Legal foundation – legalisation: is there a legally binding agreement, and level of
institutionalisation
Organisational structures – organisational bodies: What type of organisational
structures at what levels.
Organisational structures – role of secretariat: Is there an established executive
and/or administrative body in the form of a secretariat, and what are its roles and
mandates.
Financing – cost sharing: The funding mechanism of RBOs varies significantly, from
not being defined at all, via equal cost-sharing to key-based cost sharing. Key-based
cost-sharing can be based on territorial features (contribution to the basin), the
member state’s share of the basin population, economic capacity of the member state,
7
viii.
or benefits gained from joint projects. In some basins riparians that contribute with
less than 1% are neither members to the RBO nor contribute to its budget.
Financing – donor involvement: Reliable and sustainable funding is both a
prerequisite for an RBO’s functioning and its long-term effectiveness and an indicator
for member countries’ commitment to cooperative water resources management.
Interesting features include if the budget is sufficient, the degree of self-financing of
recurrent and investment budgets (the share that is donor contributions), and the
reliability of the funds16. High reliance on external funding can increase the RBO’s
vulnerability and/or indicate ownership and commitment problems.
Governance mechanisms
ix.
x.
xi.
xii.
xiii.
16
Decision-making mechanisms: There are three types of decision-making mechanisms
of an RBO:
a) Majority-based mechanisms,
b) Consensus-based mechanisms (decisions are taken on the basis of a negotiated
agreement by all participants), and
c) Unanimity mechanisms (decisions are taken with the endorsement of all
members).
Another important feature is if the decisions are binding or not. Binding decisions are
those that have compulsory legal obligations for participating actors, while nonbinding decisions have recommendatory character only.
Data and information management can be either in the form of bilateral informal
information sharing or centralised and formalised information sharing. Informationsharing mechanisms beyond bilateral exchange, providing clear rules for the exchange
of and the access to information can be expected to be more effective than bilateral
information sharing.
Monitoring and compliance mechanisms: Even if a state has committed to signing an
agreement, unilateral water resource exploitation continues to take place in many
international river basins. Once the cooperation mechanisms are established,
successful implementation depends on the ability to enforce the terms of the
agreement, and monitoring compliance is therefore important in order to pre-empt
conflicts. It can be expected that broad mechanisms for monitoring, engaging state as
well as non-state actors, are particularly effective.
Dispute resolution mechanisms: Provisioning of mechanisms for overcoming new or
pre-existent conflicts over the watercourse is one of the key functions of an RBO. Two
different types exist:
a) Negotiation-based mechanism: simple, often informal and non-specified
processes in which conflicting parties voluntarily discuss potential solutions.
This is the most common mechanisms.
b) Formalised arbitration mechanism: relying on pre-defined mechanisms
through which disputes can be solved. Effective in actually solving disputes
due to impartiality and experience.
External actor involvement – public participation: The RBOs activities affect local
communities, and vice-versa, the activities of these communities can support or hinder
the success of an RBO in implementing specific policies. Making sure that the voices
of all those having an interest in the decision-making processes are heard, are
important for the effectiveness of an RBO. Public participation can occur in different
SADC (2010); GWP & INBO (2009)
8
xiv.
xv.
forms: information sharing, consultations, involvement in discussion and participation
in meetings, and direct inclusion in decision-making processes.
External actor – epistemic community involvement: Epistemic communities
contribute to effectiveness by improving the knowledge base.
External actor – cooperation with other institutions: The effectiveness of an RBO
depends on how and to what extent it interacts with other institutions.
3.3 Trade-offs17
Achieving effective RBOs involves considering a large number of trade-offs, some of which
are listed below.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Membership structure: trade-off between efficiency and inclusiveness. There is a trade-off
“between cooperation efficiency in terms of establishing and maintaining institutionalised
cooperation and coming to joint decisions and cooperation achievements in terms of
solving the problem”.
Functional scope: how many functions should an organisation have and how many issues
should it deal with and yet be effective? There is a trade-off “between governance
efficiency (prospect of reaching an agreement) and ultimate effectiveness in terms of
problem-solution”.
Legal framework and institutionalisation: high level of institutionalisation vs. flexibility:
Centralised institutions can achieve low costs and high coordination levels, and facilitate
communication but can become slow and inflexible structures. There needs to be a
balance between high organisational differentiation and institutional efficiency.
Financing - cost sharing: equality vs. equity. Equal cost sharing reflecting equal will and
commitment to institutionalised cooperation vs. key-based cost sharing according to
resources available or benefits expected.
Financing – external donors: resources vs. ownership: adequate resources is often
needed from external sources to actually implement activities, but the external funding can
diminish ownership and commitment.
Decision-making mechanisms: effectiveness vs. compliance. Agreement of all (consensus
or unanimity) is likely to increase compliance but lose in effectiveness and efficiency due
loss of time and the risk that a “single reluctant ‘laggard’ state” obstructs the vast majority
of states from agreeing.
Decision-making mechanisms: Effectiveness vs sovereignty
o Majority based decisions are more effective, at least from a goal-oriented
perspective because decisions are more easily taken. More majority-based regimes
than consensus- or unanimity-based regimes have actually improved the problem
they have been created to solve. However, majority based decisions-making
mechanisms are related to a higher loss of control over institutional decisions and
thus indicates a higher level of commitment/loss of power vis-á-vis the RBO.
o Bindingness: Binding decisions are generally more effective. However, it might be
difficult to come to an agreement to bindingness, as it can be interpreted as a loss
of the member state’s relative power vis-á-vis the RBO.
17
Most of these trade-offs are deducted from Schmeier (2013), pp 40-51 and p.249. The exception is “Financing
– external donors”, which is the Authors’ own.
9
-
Public participation: Time vs. quality of implementation: there is often a trade-off
between taking central decisions, which is quicker, or including stakeholders views into
decision-making, which takes longer time but may improve effectiveness.
3.4 General hypotheses promoting effective RBOs
Based on the identified institutional determinants of effectiveness (section 3.2.2) and a
comprehensive study of RBOs around the world including in-depth case studies, Schmeier
(2013) has identified key attributes influencing the effectiveness of RBOs, as listed below.
Hypotheses related to the Organisational set-up.
Membership structure
i.
RBOs are more effective if all relevant riparian states are included in the
governance process as RBO members.
Functional scope
ii.
RBOs are more effective if their functional scope is sufficiently broad to allow for
integrated water resources management without overstretching the RBO.
Legal foundations
iii.
RBOs are more effective in governing shared watercourses if they incorporate
principles of international water law into their governance work, in particular the
principles of equitable and sustainable use, the obligation not to cause significant
harm and the principle of prior notification.
iv. RBOs are more effective if the level of legalization and institutionalisation is
sufficiently high to act as independent players in the river basin.
Organisational bodies
v.
vi.
RBOs are more effective in governing shared watercourses if their organisational
set-up is sufficiently differentiated to account for IWRM requirements but does not
surpass the institution’s financial and technical capacities
RBOs are more effective in governing shared watercourses if they have secretariats
in place that fulfil a well-defined set of functions, matching their respective
functional scope and focus.
Financing
vii.
viii.
RBOs are more effective if they are provided with sufficient financial resources –
shared on the basis of member states’ capacity to contribute to the RBO’s work as
well as the benefits they gain from cooperation.
RBOs in the developing world are more effective if their financial sustainability is
ensured through exogenous contributions from development partners, nevertheless
ensuring donor alignment and harmonization.
Hypotheses related to the Governance mechanisms
Decision-making mechanisms
ix.
RBOs are more effective if decisions are taken in a clearly defined, timely and
efficient manner and become binding to member states
Data and information management
x.
RBOs are more effective if they ensure the exchange of data and information on a
formalised and centralised level
10
Monitoring and compliance mechanisms
RBOs are more effective if they include mechanisms for monitoring member states’
behaviour and the state of the basin in order to ensure compliance with river basin
governance principles, norms and rules.
Dispute resolution mechanisms
xi.
xii.
RBOs are more effective if dispute-resolution mechanisms are clearly defined,
binding and institutionalised
Inclusion of external actors in river basin governance
xiii.
xiv.
xv.
RBOs are more effective if all stakeholders in the river basin have the possibility to
contribute to the governance process
RBOs are more effective if epistemic community actors are enabled to contribute
knowledge to river basin governance activities
RBOs are more effective if their activities are well-coordinated with other regional
institutions in the river basin.
4. Three river basin organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa
The three selected RBOs represent different types of RBOs in several regards. OKACOM is
a relatively recently established organisation with a scope limited to providing advice to a
small number of riparian states in a basin with relatively little economic development and
infrastructure investments. Both OMVS and NRA have a much wider scope, including the
implementation and management of joint infrastructure projects. While OMVS manages a
relatively small basin with few riparian states, NRA manages a huge basin with 11 riparian
states and with diverse climatic, geographic and ecological conditions.
4.1 Exogenous conditions – problem structure
The exogenous conditions that the three RBOs are facing with regard to the problem structure
are illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2. Collective action problems for the three RBOs.
Collective action problem
Type
1.
Water quantity and allocation problems
x
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Water quality and pollution problems
Environmental problems and drought mgmt
Hydropower and dam construction problems
Climate change problems
Fisheries problems
Infrastructure developments
Economic development (incl. irrigation)
Invasive species
Flood effects on the basins
Biodiversity protection
Navigation and transport-related problems
Malign
Largely malign
Largely malign
Largely malign
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Largely benign
Largely benign
x
Benign
Benign
Benign
OKACOM
x
x
OMVS
NBA
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Authors, based on Schmeier, 2013
The ‘type’ (malign, neutral or benign) of problem in Table 2, refers to the conduciveness of
the RBOs to solve the collective action problem and does not reflect the severity of the
11
problem itself. Hence, ‘malign’ implies that the likelihood of the RBOs solving the problem is
lower than for a ‘benign’ collective action problem, where the likelihood is higher.
4.2 Institutional characteristics
Based on the theoretic framework described above, a desk study has been performed on the
selected RBOs, with the purpose of assessing the institutional characteristics for each RBO
and how these reflect on their effectiveness. The results of the institutional assessment are
presented in detail in Appendices 1-3 and summarised in Table 3.
Table 3. Summary of institutional characteristics – organisational set-up of three RBOs
Criteria
River Basin Organisation
Permanent Okavango River
Basin Water Commission
OKACOM
Organisation pour la Mise en
Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal
OMVS
Niger Basin Authority
NBA
Organisational set-up
Membership
structure
3 of 4 riparian States are
members. Zimbabwe (with
limited contribution to and no
major use of water in the basin) is
not a member.
All 4 riparian States are members
9 out of 11 riparian States are
members. Sierra Leone (with
very small area in the basin)
and Algeria (with limited
contribution to and no major
use of water in the basin) are
not members.
Functional
scope
Provides advice to member states
on conservation, development
and utilisation of resources of
common interest. Four thematic
areas: (i) responsive livelihood
strategies (ii) shared water
resources (iii) harmonized land
management practices and (iv)
transboundary conservation
practices.
Three main goals: hydropower
generation, irrigation and
navigation. Functional scope has
changed from pure resource
development for economic
growth originally, to include also
integration of environmental and
socio-economic aspects in order
to counteract negative impacts of
previous development.
Multiple issues: ensuring
multi-sectorial development
including energy, water,
agriculture, forestry,
livelihoods, transport, industry
and communication; resource
management; integrated
planning; fund sourcing,
implementation and
management of joint projects;
navigation management; flood
and drought control; and
ensuring human health.
Legal
foundations
The agreement refers to (i)
reasonable and equitable sharing
of beneficial uses, (ii) equitable
and optimal utilisation, and (iii)
sharing of relevant information.
No specific mention of prior
notification or not to cause
significant harm, although there
is explicit reference to Helsinki
rules in preamble.
The Water Charter includes key
water law principles, such as
prior notification and fair and
rational use; and obligations such
as ensuring a balanced
management of the water
resource, preserving nature, and
negotiating in conflict. However,
the Charter has not been
implemented in national law in
the riparian States.
The convention refers to one
of the international principles,
namely the one on prior
notification. The Water
Charter emphasises that
cooperation is based on
solidarity and reciprocity for
sustainable, equitable and
coordinated use of the basin.
- Water law
principles
---- Legalisation
and
institutionalisation
The agreement limits the
responsibilities of OKACOM to
technical matters, such as studies
on water yield, water demand
and infrastructure; establishing
criteria for allocation and use;
and developing and
recommending pollution control
and other measures.
Implementation of programmes
in the basin is done by the
---The Senegal River was declared
an international river in 1962,
which implies that the principle
of absolute national sovereignty
as regards basin management is
foregone. This is reflected also in
more recent legislation that
provides for obligations related
to development and
management of jointly owned
12
---The original convention and a
later revision are legally
binding and ensure a legal
personality to the NBA. The
NBA is i.a. responsible for
works and studies, negotiating
loans, etc. The cooperation is
institutionalised.
respective states.
infrastructure, integration of
environmental and social
concerns, and rules for
stakeholder participation.
Organisational
bodies
Three organisational levels: (i)
commission (ii) basin steering
committee, which has three
thematic task forces attached to
it and (iii) secretariat with
contracted and seconded staff
Six organisational levels: (i)
conference of heads of state and
government (ii) council of
ministers with three consultative
bodies attached to it ((iii) high
commission (iv) three companies
for management of joint
infrastructure (v) national
coordination committees and (vi)
local coordination committees.
Five organisational levels: (i)
summit of heads of state and
government (ii) council of
ministers (iii) technical
committee of experts (iv)
executive secretariat and (v)
national coordination
committees. There is also a
development partner group in
charge of coordinating donor
contributions.
Financing
Recurrent budget: Member states
cover costs for their own
participation and staff
secondment. Other costs are
shared equally, if nothing else is
agreed. The secretariat is funded
to 54% by the member states, the
rest by donors.
Recurrent budget: The costs for
the secretariat are shared equally
among the member states.
Recurrent budget: The
secretariat is mainly funded by
member states, with equal
contributions. However, the
funding has been irregular and
too low.
---Implementation budget:
Implementation of strategic and
national action plans is financed
to about 84% by donors.
Financing partners include Sida,
USAID and GEF.
---Implementation budget: Sharing
of costs for developing and
managing joint infrastructure is
based on a key that takes into
account the benefits from the
joint projects for the respective
countries.
---Following an increased
environmental focus, donors
have become more interested in
providing support. The authors
have not been able to confirm if
the external support includes
support to the recurrent budget.
Financing partners have included
the World Bank, AfDB, France,
Germany, Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait.
---Implementation budget: The
member states contribute to
projects and programmes
based on a specific costsharing key. Donors provide a
large share of the financing to
the investment budget. Key
financing partners are AfDB,
AWF, CIDA, ECOWAS, EU,
Germany and the World Bank.
Governance mechanisms
Decisionmaking
mechanisms
Decisions in the Commission are
taken on the basis of consensus.
Decisions in both Conference of
Heads of State and in the Council
of Ministers are based on the
unanimity principle. The decisionmaking process can be slow but
the process ensures compliance.
Decisions in the Council of
Ministers are taken on the
basis of consensus, and are
binding.
Information
management
Making as much information
available as possible with respect
to national law is one of
OKACOM’s objectives. OKASEC is
responsible for information
management.
OMVS contributes significantly to
collection and sharing of data and
information. Information on
upper reaches of the basin, and
from Guinea, is limited.
Institutionally related information
is hard to come by due to lack of
transparency.
NBA is responsible for
gathering and dissemination
of technical and related data
as well as coordination of
projects in the member states.
The executive secretariat
manages documentation and
dissemination.
Monitoring and
compliance
An M&E system is in place which
covers effectiveness and
efficiency; impact and
sustainability; all collective action
problems except biota;
organisational efficiency and
There is still no comprehensive
system in place for compliance
monitoring.
Member states are required to
report on projects in the basin
and NBA is responsible for
compliance monitoring and
“subsequent exploitation of
reports”.
13
internal governance; and even
attitude changes among water
users.
Dispute
resolution
Disputes are to be settled by the
member states through
negotiation. There is no disputeresolution mechanism specified
for a case when this would not
work.
According to the 1992
Conventions, the first step of
conflict resolution is bilateral
negotiation. Unresolved issues
could be referred to the then
OAU arbitrage tribunal. Since no
such tribunal exists today, OMVS
does not have an institutionalised
dispute-resolution mechanism.
The NBA has an internal
dispute resolution mechanism
through which a dispute shall
be amicably settled through
direct negotiations. If the
negotiations fail to settle the
dispute, the matter shall be
referred to the Summit, which
takes a final decision.
Inclusion of
external actors
Stakeholder participation was
originally extensive, partly due to
CSOs and through the
establishment of a basin-wide
forum. After project funding from
donors was over, these activities
ceased. There are recent
strategies for stakeholder
participation and for access to
information. Academia has
played an important role in the
basin, and the Okavango
Research Institute was set up and
designed to focus research
activities on the basin. There are
linkages with SADC but
communication seems to be
limited.
OMVS has recently become more
open to stakeholder engagement.
The Senegal River Basin
Committee has provided a
window of opportunity for
stakeholder participation. The
Committee, which has civil
society representation, has an
advisory role relating to issues
concerning tariffs and
social/environmental impacts of
larger projects. While the
epistemic community has
assisted OMVS, particularly in
relation to the issue of cost
sharing, there has been limited
coordination with regional
organisations.
A decision has been taken to
institutionalise a mechanism
for civil society participation in
the basin and national
coordination units have been
established for this purpose.
Information from researchers
is part of the data gathering
performed by the executive
secretariat, and relations are
maintained with sub-regional,
regional and international
organizations, including
donors.
Source: Authors, based on Schmeier (2013) and TFDD http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/rbo_new.php
OMVS is an example of a complex organisation with a wide scope, covering many functional
issues including implementation, with six organisational levels: Due to the size of OMVS, its
efficiency and flexibility has been questioned (i.a. in Schmeier, 2013).
OKACOM, which has an advisory function, is at the other end of the scale with (i) a
commission, (ii) a basin steering committee, which has three thematic task forces attached to
it, and (iii) a small secretariat with contracted and seconded staff. OKACOM deals with a
smaller number of functional issues and works around 4 thematic themes.
NBA is an Authority with quite high level of institutionalisation, albeit more streamlined than
the OMVS and with more power than the OKACOM. The NBA covers as many functional
issues as the OMVS, but has a less complex organisational set-up. Decisions to make some
institutional changes (create national structures and establish a permanent technical
committee) in order to facilitate implementation of the Water Charter, have not yet been
implemented. Combined with the “chronic difficulties in recovering state contributions”18 the
commitment of the member states can be questioned.
More information including organograms of OKACOM, OMVS and NBA are provided in
Appendix 1-3 respectively.
All RBOs have a secretariat, which typically has the following functions: organisation of
meetings, strategic planning, project coordination, monitoring/reporting, financial
18
AFD (2014, p 19)
14
management, resource mobilization, external relations, and information management and
dissemination. All three RBOs share the costs for the secretariat functions equally, but the
cost sharing of projects and infrastructure etc. is based on a key for OMVS and NBA. All
RBOs are dependent on external financing, particularly for implementation of projects and
programmes in the basin.
Although not all riparian states are included in all three RBOs, they can all be seen as
inclusive because of the small share of the basin area of the states that are not members.
All three RBOs utilise unanimity or consensus based decision making mechanisms and all use
negotiation as the means for settling disputes. All RBOs include stakeholders in their work,
mainly related to information sharing.
4.3.2 Institutional features of the three RBOs
In order to illustrate how the different characteristics of the three RBOs are matched against
the key effectiveness attributes (see section 3.2.2 and 3.4), the authors have made a subjective
assessment of the RBOs. The assessment is based on desk-study information (see Appendix
1-3) and the score is presented in Table 4, and briefly justified below.
Table 4. Matching RBO traits to Schmeier’s attributes for effectiveness (0 = average, 1 = good,
-1 = bad)
Criteria
River Basin Organisation
OKACOM
OMVS
NBA
Organisational set-up
Membership structure: all relevant riparian states are included
1
1
1
Functional scope: sufficiently broad without over-stretching
0
0
1
Legal foundations: incorporate principles of international water law
1
1
1
Legal foundations: sufficient level of legalisation and
institutionalisation
1
1
1
Organisational bodies: sufficiently differentiated organisational setup for IWRM without surpassing financial and technical capacities
0
-1
0
Organisational bodies: secretariats in place with well-defined
functions, matching their functional scope
1
1
1
Financing: sufficient financial resources on the basis of member
states’ capacity and benefits
0
1
-1
Financing: financial sustainability ensured through external aligned
and harmonised contributions,
1
1
1
Decision-making mechanisms: clearly defined decisions, timely and
binding
0
0
-1
Information management: institutionalised exchange of data and
information
1
1
0
Monitoring and compliance: mechanism to monitor compliance of
member states
1
-1
0
Dispute resolution: clearly defined, binding and institutionalised
0
0
0
Inclusion of external actors: all stakeholders can contribute
0
0
1
Inclusion of external actors: the epistemic community can contribute
1
1
0
Inclusion of external actors: the activities are well-coordinated with
other regional institutions
0
0
1
Governance mechanisms
Source: Subjective assessment by the Authors, based on Schmeier (2013) and TFDD
15
All RBOs are assessed to be inclusive. The functional scope of OMVS appears to be
sufficient, although there is a risk for overstretch and therefore the score “0” is given. The
OKACOM face the opposite challenge, with limited functions and a mostly advisory role.
OKACOM’s secretariat is very small, and they face challenges to implement everything that
is in the plan due to human resource constraints19, why they score “0” for organisational
bodies. OMVS can be considered overly complicated, thus scores “-1”. Financing is hard to
score since no detailed information from OMVS and NBA has been obtained, although at a
general level, NBA appears to face severe challenges to obtain the agreed contributions from
the member states. The OMVS has a well-functioning cost-sharing key based on benefits
received from the investments; therefore they score “1”. All RBOs have external support. We
therefore assume that financing is adequate and provide the score “1”.
Regarding the decision-making mechanisms, the decisions of the NBA are binding why NBA
should receive a higher score than the others. However, it appears that the decisions are not
always implemented, why they receive a low score anyway.
OKACOM and OMVS receive a score “1” on information management, as they appear to
have institutionalised information sharing procedures that are functioning (increasingly so but
not entirely yet for OMVS’s newest member Guinea). NBA scores “0” because the
information sharing is still a challenge in the basin, not least due to language barriers20.
Related to transparency, no RBO has made public any evaluation, reviews or results
assessment, although OKACOM has distributed a system audit report, upon request21.
OKACOM has set up a framework for compliance monitoring even if it might still be
premature to say whether or not it is in use. The OMVS has failed to establish an M&E
framework and is given the score “-1”. There is no information available on this for NBA.
All three RBOs utilise negotiation as the dispute resolution mechanism and all three receives
the score “0”. Regarding ‘inclusion of external actors’, NBA scores higher than the other two.
OKACOM receives a “0” but since a previously existing system for consultation does not
appear to be in use any longer, the 0 is weak on the verge of a “-1”.
Again, Table 4 is based on a subjective assessment rather than verifiable facts, and should be
seen as a preliminary indication only.
4.3.3 Effectiveness of the three RBOs
An attempt has been made to assess the effectiveness of the three RBOs based on current
information. The effectiveness is assessed of the dimensions: level, scope and range. The
results of the effectiveness assessment are summarised in Table 5.
As can be seen Table 5 is not yet complete as information relating to effectiveness for
OKACOM and NBA has not yet been accessed. It is possible that more information is
available in terms of evaluations and reviews of the selected RBOs. However, it is likely that
a field visit with interviews combined with a more in-depth literature review would be
required in order to carry out the effectiveness assessment.
19
OKACOM (2014).
AFD, et al., (2014)
21
Moore Stephens (2012).
20
16
Table 5. Effectiveness assessment of the three RBOs (0 = average, 1 = good, -1 = bad)
Effectiveness
River Basin Organisation
OKACOM
OMVS
NBA
Effectiveness level
Output
Successful (“1”) in setting
up the Secretariat, applying
for funding, and fulfilling
other Secretarial
obligations.
Outcome
Successful in changing behaviour of
MS to jointly undertake basin
development projects. (+1)
Impact
Partly successful relating to problemsolving dimension. However, a lack of
transmission lines constraints
electricity distribution; the irrigated
area is only a third of the original
goal; and navigation is not yet
included in the scope of work.
Environmental and health effects
have been negative. The score is
assessed to be (“-1”).
Effectiveness scope
Political stability
Cooperation successful in
promoting dialogue and
solving conflicts (“1”).
Not totally successful (“0”). On-going
conflicts linked to inefficient planning
and implementation, particularly
environmental and social aspects.
Environmental
sustainability
Development of water
resources in the basin not
yet initiated (“0”).
Very weak effectiveness (“-1”), with
severe environmental consequences
due to early neglect of environmental
concerns and later lack of
implementation.
Economic growth
Not yet successful (“0”), due to
delays in hydropower production and
low agricultural productivity.
Social
development
Mixed success: Positive impacts due
to increased access to irrigation and
water for other purposes. Urban
population has improved electricity
access (“1”).
Negative impacts on health and
wellbeing (“-1”), and top-down
resettlement of population.
Effectiveness range
To the river
Some positive, some negative effects
of development (“0”)
Beyond the river
Negative effects, particularly on
health (“-1”)
Total score
Not effective
Source: Authors, based on Schmeier (2013)
The assessment of the effectiveness of the three RBOs as presented in Table 5 may not be fair: it is
difficult to compare “old” and “new” RBOs, effects in river basins with high or low levels of
17
infrastructure investments, or well-investigated impacts with lesser documented dittos, etc. It is
possible that the less investigated and documented RBO has an advantage over the more investigated
and documented RBO. Again, the information should not be interpreted as a verifiable truth, but
should be seen as a subjective initial indication of RBO effectiveness, which is highly dependent on
what information has been accessed. This initial assessment could, hopefully, be used as a basis for
future more in-depth assessments.
5. Conclusions and recommendations
This brief desk study reveals the importance of institutions for the governance of
transboundary water resources. While scholars previously have focused mostly on exogenous
aspects, such as the constellation and power relations of riparian states and the type of
problems the basin is facing, it is increasingly understood that also endogenous aspects matter
for achieving results in a transboundary river basin setting. Schmeier (2013) has developed a
theoretical framework linked to the organisational set-up and governance mechanisms of
RBOs that has been used in this assignment. Schmeier has furthermore developed, tested and
revised a number of hypotheses (listed in section 4.3.1) related to both exogenous and
endogenous aspects important to enable an effective RBO and effective management of the
basin resources. Mainly the endogenous aspects have been included in this assignment.
5.1 Promoting effective RBOs
There are many different types of RBOs ranging from small, single-issue organisation to
complex organisations with multiple functional issues and a broad mandate in the basin. It is
probably fair to say that there is no blue print for what an effective RBO should look like; it
depends on the situational structure in the basin, the types of collective action problems the
basin is attempting to manage, and the functional issues to be dealt with by the RBO.
However, an institutionalised cooperation, where the RBO has a clear mandate, role and
explicit functional scope, is promoting effectiveness. Ideally, the RBO should be able to
manage all interdependent water-related collective action problems in the basin. A secretariat
in place that fulfils a well-defined set of functions that matches the RBO’s functional scope
and focus is critical.
Formalised and centralised (as opposed to bilateral and ad-hoc) exchange of data and
information promotes effectiveness. Another import feature is the inclusiveness: inclusive
membership to all riparian states and inclusiveness of different stakeholders such as
communities, the epistemic community and other regional institutions. Moving from
information sharing – the lowest level of stakeholder involvement – towards meaningful
participation of empowered stakeholders is effectiveness conducive, as it enhances
legitimacy, facilitates implementation and promotes sustainability.
Also the issue of transparency is of great importance. Data and information should be
available and accessible to the public. There is a tendency to share information that is
descriptive, but be more restrictive with sharing information that is analytical or critical.
External financial support from development partners to African RBO is another key issue
that promotes effectiveness. Without external support there are seldom enough resources for
these RBOs to make any change. Furthermore, international donors have been instrumental
for integration of environmental and social concerns and to promote stakeholder participation.
This is important as the issues might not have been included in the RBOs’ scope without the
support and pressure from international financiers. However, there is a risk that aspects
pushed for from the outside will be treated at add-ons, subject to external project funding
rather than internalised and implemented. This appears, for instance, to have been the case for
18
OMVS relating to environmental integration and the OKACOM relating to stakeholder
participation.
RBOs are established to promote a goal or to solve common problems in a shared river basin.
However important the organisation is for effectiveness, reporting on the specific
organisational features and functions is not enough. It should be complemented with an
assessment of the goal attainment and the problem solving, of member states’ compliance and
implementation of the joint decisions taken. Monitoring of compliance and impacts is
currently a rather weak spot of most RBOs. Monitoring and reporting should go beyond
activities and outputs, to include monitoring member states’ behaviour and the state of the
basin in order to ensure compliance with river basin governance principles, norms and rules.
External reviews and evaluations could be a good complement to the RBO’s own monitoring
and more functional audits of the organisation.
5.2 Next steps
The aim of the assignment was three-fold:
 To identify a theoretical framework relevant for African RBOs, including ways to assess
RBO effectiveness.
 To describe institutional features of three selected RBOs, and
 To provide recommendations on
o How to assess the quality of an RBO at different levels of development and in
different context.
o How to trade-off between different characteristics of quality in an RBO.
o How to effectively promote different characteristics of a qualitative RBO, in
particular the role of international development partner.
The assignment has a broad scope. However, with the time that has been available (20 days)
and the method used (desk study) for the assignment, we have not been able to answer them
all. For instance, pursuing the assessment of effectiveness, or specific trade-offs for certain
RBOs, is likely to require additional work, either through:
1) A continued desk study with a deepened literature review and analysis, and/or
2) A field visit to the RBOs and interviews with representatives.
19
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ANBO, IOWater and ECOLOGIC, financed by European Commission and AFD. (accessed
on 11 December 2014): (http://www.inbo-news.org/IMG/pdf/12_AlainBernard.pdf
OKACOM website (accessed 29 September, 2014): www.okacom.org
OMVS website (accessed 24 September, 2014): www.portail-omvs.org/
Oregon State University, accessed 29 September 2014:
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/OMVS_New.htm
NBA website (accessed 10 October, 2014): www.abn.ne/
SADC Water Sector, accessed 29 September 2014: http://www.icp-confluencesadc.org/sites/default/files/images/GTZ1419_09Okavango2.preview.jpg
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TDFF) (accessed in October 2014)
-
-
-
River Basin organisation database: http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/rbo_new.php
Niger: Convention Creating the Niger Basin Authority
http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/rbo_new.php?page=full&origin=river&id=335
Cubango-Okavango: Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of
Angola, the Republic of Botswana, and the Republic of Namibia on the establishment
of a Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission:
http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/rbo_new.php?page=full&origin=river&id=370
OMVS: Convention Relative au Statut du Fleuve Senegal/convention portant Creation
de l'OMVS (1972); Convention relative au statut juridique des Ouvrages communs
(1978); Convention relative aux modalités de financement des Ouvrages Communs
(1982); Charte des Eaux du Fleuve Sénégal (2002).
http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/rbo_new.php?page=full&origin=river&id=375
Delli Priscoli, Jerome. River Basin Organizations:
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/RBO/index.html
General The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) at Oregon State
University www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/DatabaseIntro.html
International treaties in Africa:
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/atlas/atlas_pdf/4_Treaties_afric
a.pdf
22
UNESCO World water assessment program (accessed July 2014)
webworld.unesco.org/water/wwap/case_studies/senegal_river/
UN Water website (accessed 11 December 2014): http://www.unwater.org/water-cooperation2013/water-cooperation/facts-and-figures/en/
Wetlands International Africa, accessed 24 September 2014.
http://africa.wetlands.org/Homepage/tabid/2907/language/en-GB/Default.aspx
World Bank, Feature story from July 8, 2014: “Niger River Basin Management Project to
support institutional strengthening of the Niger Basin Authority and enhance benefit sharing
around the planned Fomi Dam” (accessed 10 October 2014):
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/08/niger-river-basin-managementproject-to-support-institutional-strengthening-of-the-niger-basin-authority-and-enhancebenefit-sharing-around-the-planned-fomi-dam
23
Annex 1. OKACOM
The Cubango-Okavango River is shared by Angola, Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe and
flows into the Okavango delta, a unique wetland of international importance in the Kalahari
sands.22 Okavango is mostly undeveloped, and recognized as one of the few "near pristine"
rivers in the world. The river provides direct livelihoods to over half a million rural people
that live remote from each country’s capital cities and main economic centres.
Source: SADC Water Sector, http://www.icp-confluencesadc.org/sites/default/files/images/GTZ1419_09Okavango2.preview.jpg
The river basin is also important to the national economies: a source of national income from
tourism for Botswana, and a potential source for improved agriculture and water supply in
Angola and Namibia. The member states have different development plans for the river basin,
and OKACOM was established in order to balance river basin development with social and
environmental concerns. Economic development activities (such as irrigation in Angola,
water supply in Namibia, and Botswana’s wishes to sustain the unique delta) must be
balanced with improved livelihoods and well-functioning ecosystem services.
In the OKACOM Agreement (1994) Angola, Botswana and Namibia establish the Permanent
Okavango River Basin Water Commission, OKACOM. Initially, OKACOM had no
secretariat. Each member state arranged meetings on a rotational basis, supported by national
water ministries. The civil war in Angola challenged the work of the OKACOM, but after the
peace agreement in 2002 OKACOM’s work in the basin could intensify.
22
Zimbabwe also holds a small share of the basin but is neither a big user of nor contributor to the water flows.
24
Collective action problems
The challenge in the Okavango River basin is to utilise the water resources for development
while at the same time protecting the unique Okavango delta. The OKACOM member states
are increasingly talking about sharing the benefits of the river basin, and not only the water.
The previous GEF-funded Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA) carried out for the
basin identified four collective action problems and underlying driving factors.
Table A-1.1. Collective action problems in the Okavango River basin
Collective action problem
Driving factors
Variation and reduction of hydrological flows
Population dynamics
Changes in sediment dynamics
Land-use changes
Changes in water quality
Poverty
Changes in the abundance and distribution of biota Climate change
Source: OKACOM website: www.okacom.org
As can be seen from Table A-1.1, the collective action problems are related to volume and
quality of the water, biodiversity, and sediments.
Organisational set-up
Membership structure: Three of the four riparian states of the Okavango River basin are
members of the OKACOM. Zimbabwe, which is not a member, is neither a big user of or
contributor to the water flows in the basin.
Functional scope23: OKACOM deals with multiple issues and has basin-wide operations
exclusively on matters of transboundary resources of common interest within the Basin.
OKACOM’s objective is to provide technical advice to the governments of the three member
states related to conserving, developing and utilising the resources or common interests in the
Okavango river basin. OKACOM strives to anticipate and mitigate unintended negative
impacts that can result from uncoordinated resource development.
OKACOM’s Strategic Action Programme (SAP) is based on the TDA and includes
development of a shared vision that defines an acceptable development space for the basin.
The vision incorporates the four thematic areas: (i) responsive livelihood strategies; (ii) shared
water resources; (iii) harmonized land management practices; and (iv) transboundary
conservation practices that benefit people and ecosystems.
Legal foundation – water law principles24: The OKACOM Agreement from 1994 is
referring to ‘reasonable and equitable sharing of beneficial uses’ and ‘equitable and optimal
utilisation’. The agreement also refers to sharing of relevant information to the extent
permitted by national laws and procedures. The functions of the OKACOM highlight the
integrated approach between conservation, development and utilisation. No mention of ‘prior
notification’ or ‘not to cause significant harm’ although there is an explicit reference to the
Helsinki rules in the preamble.
23
24
OKACOM (2006); OKACOM Agreement (1994)
Chonguiça (2008); and OKACOM Agreement (1994)
25
Legal foundation – legalisation and institutionalisation25: The 1994 OKACOM Agreement
gives OKACOM legal responsibility relating to technical matters of the shared water
resources. OKACOM is assigned to:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
Determine the long-term safe yield of water available from the river
Estimate reasonable demand from the consumers
Prepare criteria for conservation, equitable allocation and sustainable utilisation of
water
Conduct investigations related to water infrastructure
Recommend pollution prevention measures
Develop measures for the alleviation of short term difficulties, such as temporary
droughts
OKACOM shall also address other matters as determined by the Commission.
Organisational structures – organisational bodies26: In 2007 the riparian states agreed on a
new organisational structure for OKACOM. The agreement outlines three bodies of the
OKACOM: the Commission, the Okavango Basin Steering Committee (OBSC) and the
Secretariat. In addition, task forces can be set up to manage different technical issues (see
Figure A-1.2).
Figure A-1.2. Organogram of OKACOM
OKACOM
Commission
Okavango Basin Steering
Committee
(OBSC)
Institutional
Task Force
Biodiversity
Task Force
Hydrology
Task Force
OKACOM Secretariat
OKASEC
Direct OKASEC
Contractees
Seconded Technical
Staff
Source: OKACOM website www.okacom.org
The Commission is the principal decision making body of OKACOM and provides policyand general strategic direction. The Commission consists of three delegations with senior
officials from government ministries, representing the member states. The Commission meets
25
26
Chonguiça (2008); and OKACOM website www.okacom.org
Chonguiça (2008); and OKACOM website www.okacom.org
26
once a year, plus extraordinary meetings as necessary. The Chair is rotating between the three
countries.
The Okavango Basin Steering Committee (OBSC) is a technical advisory body of the
OKACOM and consists of permanent and non-permanent members. It is chaired by a
Commissioner from the member state holding the Chair of the Commission at the time.
The OBSC establishes task forces of technical specialists as needed to examine specific types
of issue. Three task forces currently advise the Commission: the Institutional Task Force, the
Biodiversity Task Force and the Hydrology Task Force. However, the task forces will be
replaced by permanent Technical Committees, one for each of the four SAP thematic areas,
and one related to institutional development27.
OKACOM Secretariat (OKASEC) provides administrative, financial and coordinative
services to OKACOM in the day-to-day-operations. OKASEC has a permanent staff of 5
individuals (executive secretary, financial, administrative, communication and a records
officer) in addition to seconded staff from the member states.
Organisational structures – role of secretariat28: OKASEC is an internal body of
OKACOM, with the legal capacity and mandate to assist OKACOM in implementing its
decisions. It has no decision making powers, but provides administrative, financial and
general secretarial services to the Commission and assumes an instrumental role in
information management on behalf of the Commission. The Secretariat is headed by the
Executive Secretary who works under the guidance of the Commission through the OBSC.
The secretariat is currently hosted by the Government of Botswana in Maun.
OKASEC, as approved by the OKACOM meeting in May 2012, will address the following
functions:




Administrative Functions – to ensure that the office environment is effective, in
providing secretarial and administrative services for OKACOM work, including efficient
organisation and arrangements of OKACOM meetings and activities.
Knowledge Support Functions – to provide well-functioning Cubango-Okavango Basin
communication and decision support systems.
Policy Analysis Functions – to provide well informed evidence-based policy analysis and
advice to OKACOM.
Programme Coordination Functions – to provide effective coordination, programme
management and monitoring of all OKACOM activities, and, notably coordination,
management and monitoring of SAP implementation.
The OKASEC does not carry out activities in the three countries. The implementation of the
SAP is mostly done through National Action Programmes (NAPs) and is performed by each
member states through national structures, or through regional projects. The role of OKASEC
is thus predominately to coordinate and monitor implementation of NAPs and Regional
Projects, and less in actual management of interventions.
Financing – cost sharing29: Each member state is responsible to cover its own costs in
relation to OKACOM activities, such as costs for attending OKACOM, OBSC or Technical
27
PEM Consult (2012); and OKACOM (2013)
PEM Consult (2012);
29
Chonguiça (2008); OKACOM Agreement (1994); and TFDD
28
27
Committee meetings, as well as salaries from National seconded staff. All other costs shall be
shared equally between the member states, if nothing else is agreed.
Financing – donor involvement: Prior to 2002, the member states financed the OKACOM
meetings themselves. In the beginning of the 2000s, support from international donors30 was
instrumental for setting up the secretariat and to perform a joint analyses of the river basin.
In June 2011 the member states provided the first direct funding of the Secretariat from
government budgets. According to the budget for 2014, the member states shall finance over
half of the OKASEC recurrent costs through direct financial support (21%) as well as in-kind
support (33%) through for instance seconded experts at the secretariat. Donors finance the
rest of OKASEC’s recurrent costs (26% direct financial support and 20% in-kind support)31.
Schmeier (2014) states that the share of the riparian funding of OKASEC was around 12% in
2012, and that the contribution doubled between 2012 and 2013.
A majority of the activities (e.g. SAP, NAPs and other regional projects) are financed by
donors; around 30% through direct financial support and around 54% through in-kind support.
The member states finance the rest themselves through in-kind support.
Governance mechanisms
Decision-making mechanisms32: The Commission consists of nine members (one delegation
with maximum three members from each member state). Six commissionaires (two
representatives from each country) form a quorum. All decisions are taken on the basis of
consensus. If no consensus can be reached, there parties are referred to further negotiation.
There is no information on whether the decisions are binding.
Data and information management: One of the key roles of OKACOM is the gathering and
processing of information related to the river, in order to improve decision making in the river
basin. The OKASEC is responsible for the information management (collecting, storing,
sharing, communicating, etc). OKACOM’s objective is to make as much information as
possible available, as long as it is in accordance with national law.33
Monitoring and compliance mechanisms: OKACOM has developed an M&E framework
that includes monitoring effectiveness and efficiency of resources used and outputs delivered,
as well as more long-term dimensions related to impact and sustainability. There are
indicators for all collective action problems (volume, sedimentation and quality) except
changes in biota. Also attitude changes among water users are measured, and aspects related
to organisational efficiency and internal governance aspects are monitored.34 However, the
information found this far mainly includes reporting on administrative information linked to
the ODASEC rather than effectiveness of OKACOM at outcome or impact level.
Dispute resolution mechanisms: According to the OKACOM Agreement, any disputes shall
be settled by the member states through negotiations. No other dispute resolution mechanism
is stated, so if disputes arise that the members states are not able to solve, OKACOM is
without an institutionalised dispute-resolution mechanism.
30
Sida, USAID and GEF (implemented by UNDP) are some of the international partners to OKACOM.
OKACOM (2013) and the attached Budget
32
OKACOM Agreement (1994); and TFDD for OKACOM
http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/rbo_new.php?page=full&origin=river&id=368
33
OKACOM Agreement (1994) and TFDD for OKACOM
34
OKACOM (2013)
31
28
External actor involvement – public participation in river basin governance: During the
2000s, OKACOM engaged in stakeholder participatory processes, for instance during the
elaboration of Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA), the SAP and the corresponding
NAPs. Civil society organisations were active in developing structures to sustain stakeholder
engagements, such as the Basin wide forum where basin community representatives were
invited to express their views on basin development. However, it appears that most
participatory processes were project based and donor funded and stopped when the projects
were ending.
A proposed strategy for participation of basin stakeholders was developed in 2012. It remains
to be seen how it will be implemented. OKACOM has also developed a policy and a strategy
regarding access to information (2011), with the aim to improve transparency and
accountability rather than developing participatory processes.35
External actor involvement – epistemic community involvement: Academia plays an
important role in the Cubango-Okavango basin, as the University of Botswana has established
the Okavango Research Institute; a special institute set up and designed to focus all research
activities on the Cubango-Okavango river basin. However, lately there has been a
“decoupling of science/policy/technical agendas, resulting in a lack of integration between
these fields”36. Increased cooperation will be necessary in order to integrate research
knowledge firmly into OKACOM’s decisions.
External actor involvement – cooperation with other institutions: The Cubango-Okavango
river basin is situated in the Southern African region. Therefore, the activities of the regional
institution SADC (the Southern African Development Community) are linked to the
OKACOM activities. However, the communication between SADC and OKACOM appear
not to be very developed.
35
36
KCS et al. (2012); OKACOM (2011)
KCS et al. (2012)
29
Annex 2: OMVS37
Cooperation in the Senegal River basin is an example of highly institutionalised river basin
governance. The Senegal River basin is shared by Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal,
runs through an arid region characterized by water scarcity and subsistence economies. Six
million people live in the river basin and their main economic activities are agriculture,
fishery and livestock. The river is also supplying water to urban areas and for hydropower
production.
Source: Oregon State University,
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/OMVS_New.htm
After independence, the four riparian countries formed the Comité inter-états pour
l’améngement du Bassin du Fleuve Sénégal38 in 1963, which was based on the Convention
relative a l’aménagement general du Bassin du Fleuve Sénégal, which declared the Senegal
to be an international river. This is important, as it – at least in theory – means that the
concept of absolute sovereignty is foregone.39 However, all attempts at that time to formalise
the cooperation failed.
During the Sahel drought 1968-1974 the region suffered from a severe food crisis. The
downstream countries Mauritania and Senegal, wanted a more regular water flow to enable
irrigation and to promote socio-economic development. Mali was interested in developing
navigation. Hence, the interests to cooperate around river basin issues were complementary,
and Mali, Mauritania and Senegal formed the Organisation pour la mise en valeur du Fleuve
Sénégal (OMVS) in 1972. At that time, Guinea did not participate due to internal political
difficulties, and joined the OMVS in 2006. All member states agree on the exploitation of the
river’s resources for economic purposes. Developing the resources is, in fact, the main raisond’être of the OMVS.
37
If no other references are stated, the section on OMVS builds on Schmeier (2013).
Intergovernmental Committee for the Development of the Senegal River Basin
39
Alam et al. 2009
38
30
Limited attention has been given to the institutional features of the OMVS. The institutional
analysis is constrained by the lack of transparency: “availability of official documents of the
OMVS is limited, information sharing with the public is weak and access to documents is
largely restricted”40.
Collective action problems
The collective action problems in the basin were originally linked to flow variability,
especially droughts. However, the development efforts in the basin have created new socioeconomic collective action problems. One example of these new problems is the decreasing
fishing productivity in the beginning of the 2000s, which was associated with the
environmental impacts of the river development projects (dams and dikes), such as a
significant decrease in salinity (due to the dam at the mouth of the river), proliferation of
floating water weeds, eutrophication, etc. Another, more serious problem, is the impact of the
dams on public health, with rapid increases in the prevalence of water- and vector borne
diseases (malaria, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, intestinal parasitic disease).41
Organisational set-up
Membership structure: Originally, three of the four riparians were members of the OMVS,
and the fourth country (Guinea) only joined the OMVS in 2006. Thus, there are currently four
member states of the OMVS, or 100% of the riparians.
Functional scope: OMVS has the triple goal of hydropower generation, irrigation and
navigation42. There is a large willingness of the Senegal riparian countries to cooperate and to
transfer significant power to the OMVS, which is mandated to develop the entire Senegal
River and its tributaries in the tree areas. The goal of the OMVS, as stated in the 1972
Convention, is “to promote and intensify the economic cooperation and exchanges” between
member states through development of the resources of the Senegal River for economic
development. The focus was mainly on economic growth.
The functional scope of OMVS has changed over the years. The last decade environmental
and socio-economic aspects were to be integrated in the functional scope of the OMVS,
aiming at correcting the negative impacts of previous developments (especially the dams) on
the environment and public health.
Legal foundation – water law principles: The initial legal foundation (conventions from the
1960s, -70s and -80s) included the ‘principle of prior notification’, but did neither mention
‘equitable and sustainable use’ nor the ‘obligation not to cause significant harm’. Instead, the
focus was on water resource exploitation. Later on, the Water Charter from 2002 includes a
number of key water law principles, including the ‘principles of prior notification’, and ‘fair
and rational use’, and obligations such as ensuring a balanced management of the water
resource, preserve nature, and negotiate in conflict. However, as of 2013 the riparian states
had not yet implemented the Water Charter into national law.
In 2008, the Strategic Action Plan (SAP) was developed, with a large focus on environmental
sustainability. The SAP is an important step towards a more integrated governance of the
Senegal River basin’s water resources.
40
Schmeier (2013), p 217
UN (2003); Schmeier (2013)
42
Kramer et al. (2009)
41
31
Table A-2.1. Legal foundation – legalisation
Organisation
Year
Legal base
Contents and goal
Member
Intergov.
Committee for
the Development
of the Senegal
River Basin
1963
Convention relative a
l’aménagement general
du Bassin du Fleuve
Sénégal,
Declared Senegal to be an
inter-national river
4 countries
(failed)
OMVS
1972
Convention portant
création de
l’organisation pour la
mise en valeur du
Fleuve Sénégal
Economic growth,
infrastructure development
Senegal,
Mauritania and
Mali.
Guinea joined
the OMVS
2006
SOGEM
1978
Convention on the Legal
Status of the JointlyOwned Structures
Definitions and obligations
for the jointly owned
structures
1982
Convention on the
Financing of the JointlyOwned Structures
Definitions and obligations
for the financing modalities
2002
Water Charter
Integration of
environmental and social
concerns, rules for
stakeholder participation
SOGED
Multistakeholder
Permanent
Water
Commission
Organisational structures – organisational bodies43: At the top, the OMVS has three
principal bodies:
1) Supreme guidance is given by the Conference of Heads of State and Government. Its
decisions must be taken unanimously and are binding for the member governments.
2) The Council of Ministers decides on general policy for the river’s development. The
council decides on the budget, prioritise projects, determines how costs are shared
between member states, etc. The Council has the authority to obtain financing for
projects. The chairmanship is rotating and typically held by water-related ministers.
3) The High Commission is the executive body, implementing decisions taken by the
Council. It monitors and reports on performance and activities in the river basin.
Each of the organisational bodies of OMVS (see Figure A-2.1) is staffed according to the
principle of national parity, i.e. with equal number of staff from each member country.
Project-specific institutions are established for the management of jointly owned hydropower
projects. For instance, the interstate public companies SOGEM (Société de Gestion de
l’Energie de Manantali) and SOGED (Société de Gestion et de l’Exploitation du Barrage de
Diama) were created as subordinate bodies to the OMVS with responsibility for the operation
and management of the Manantali and Diama Dams respectively. Similarly SOGENAV
43
OMVS website www.portail-omvs.org; Schmeier (2013); Kramer et al. (2009)
32
(Société de Gestion et d’Exploitation de la Navigation sur le Fleuve Sénégal) has been
established to manage and implement OMVS projects related to navigation.
Figure A-2.1: Organogram of OMVS
Consultative bodies
Permanent water
commission
Regional planning
committee
Consultative committee
Conference of Heads of
State and Government
Council of Ministers
National cells
National coordination
committee
Local coordination
committee
High commission
SOGED
SOGEM
SOGENAV
Source: Schmeier (2013)
Three consultative bodies bring together different stakeholders, such as donors, national
planning committees, representatives of OMVS member states and technical experts, and
provide advice and coordination. In addition, national cells are set up to better link the OMVS
to its member states, share information, prepare for negotiations, and enhance coordination.
Furthermore, in 2009 the Senegal River Basin Committee was established, to enable a more
inclusive approach to civil society representatives, public authorities, user groups, and the
scientific community.
The OMVS has the highest number of organisational bodies of all RBOs. The OMVS is an
example of where an overly high organisational differentiation can reduce efficiency,
especially if resources are rare, and thus decrease the overall effectiveness of the RBO.44
Organisational structures – role of secretariat: The High Commission of OMVS constitutes
its secretarial body. The High Commission is large in size and equipped with sufficient power
vis-á-vis the member states and is able to successfully fulfil a number of basin governance
tasks. However, its effectiveness – especially impact effectiveness – is hampered by the
overall goals of OMVS and its members.
Financing – cost sharing: The OMVS has a comparatively large budget due to its broad
mandate, dived into one “regular budget” for the High Commission/Secretariat and one
budget for project implementation. The costs of the High Commission/Secretariat (regular
budget) is shared equally by all countries, while the costs for developing and managing
infrastructure are based on a key that reflects each country‘s benefits from joint projects in
irrigation/agriculture, hydropower and navigation. This cost- and benefit-sharing mechanism
has worked well (inclusion of Guinea in the cost-sharing system is currently underway).
44
Schmeier (2013)
33
Table A-2.2. Cost sharing of large infrastructure projects in the Senegal River basin
Country
Cost sharing for IS
projects
Mali
35.3%
Mauritania 22.6%
Senegal
42.1%
Source: Schmeier (2014)
Financing – donor involvement: OMVS has not had adequate financial resources and is
depending on external support to finance projects. External funding contributed to the
development of the infrastructure, but many external financiers pulled out when the
environmental and social consequences started to be visible. Recently donors have engaged in
the river basin again, often focusing on mitigation of the environmental impacts of previous
developments. According to Schmeier (2013) the OMVS would likely not have developed the
environmental focus without donor engagement. Furthermore donors, especially the World
Bank, have been instrumental in the integration of Guinea into the OMVS.
Governance mechanisms
Decision-making mechanisms: The decision making in OMVS is based on the unanimity
principle both at the Conference of Heads and in the Council. Decision can take a long time.
However, although slow, this decision-making mechanism generally contributes to
effectiveness in the outcome dimension, as the consensus building process ensures
compliance of member states.
Data and information management: The OMVS contributes significantly to collecting and
sharing data and information and enhancing knowledge about the river and the basin. Overall,
data availability is very high, with the exception of the upper part of the basin. As Guinea was
not a part of the OMVS during the first three decades, the knowledge of the Guinean part of
the basin is still limited.
Monitoring and compliance mechanisms: For a long time, monitoring was focusing on
socio-economic aspects and did not include environmental aspects or member state
compliance. Following the initiation of the Environmental Impact Mitigation and Monitoring
Programme (PASIE) in 1998, environmental monitoring is a part of the OMVS’s work, and
compliance and implementation monitoring was added in the context of the SAP in 2008.
However, still no comprehensive monitoring system has been developed.
Dispute resolution mechanisms: The dispute resolution mechanism of OMVS is mentioned
in the 1972 Convention to be bilateral negotiation in the first hand. If that fails, unresolved
issues can be transferred to the OAU’s arbitrage tribunal, and thereafter to the International
Court of Justice. As the OAU’s successor AU doesn’t have such a body, OMVS is de facto
without an institutionalised dispute-resolution mechanism. Disputes have indeed emerged in
the basin (e.g. Mauritania and Senegal in the 1980s and again in the 2000s Fossil Valley
Project). The informal dispute resolution mechanism has been praised by some (e.g. Nday and
Sall, 2002, page 13) although some disputes remain unresolved. Schmeier (2013) states, that
OMVS’s contribution to solving disputes has been weak.
External actor involvement – public participation in river basin governance: Originally
there were no provisions for public participation and the external stakeholder involvement
was minimal. This has affected the OMVS’s effectiveness, particularly regarding the social
dimension, but can also affect the political stability. Following the initiation of PASIE and the
34
introduction of the Water Charter, the OMVS has become more open to stakeholder
engagement, mostly related to information sharing. The Senegal River Basin Committee has
provided a window of opportunity for stakeholder participation. The Committee has an
advisory role relating to issues concerning tariffs and social/environmental impacts of larger
projects. Although the Committee is not open to any civil society representative (participants
must be approved by the OMVS), it is a step further in involving stakeholders in basin
development.
External actor involvement – epistemic community involvement: The OMVS has actively
requested help from technical experts and academics, particularly relating to the cost-sharing
mechanism, which has enabled joint financing of shared projects.
External actor involvement – cooperation with other institutions: Key regional institutions
are ECOWAS and UEMOA, but there is limited coordination with OMVS. There is scope for
coordination, for instance relating to cross-border power trade.
Effectiveness of OMVS
Effectiveness is assessed in all three effectiveness dimensions: level, scope, and range.
Effectiveness level
The OMVS has been successful at the outcome level, to change the member states behaviour
towards cooperation, to jointly undertake river basin development projects. However, at the
impact level the OMVS has not been that successful, particularly relating to the problemsolving dimension. The effects of the river basin have often been negative, especially on the
environment and its population. The limited success is not related to the exogenous conditions
of the basin, but linked to the OMVS itself; most importantly to the functional scope of the
OMVS. Environmental and social considerations were included into the legal basis of OMVS
only in 2002 and continuously lack implementation.
The OMVS still follows an economic-development oriented strategy but has included
additional goals mainly related to environmental and social aspects of river basin governance.
However, despite the inclusion of environmental and social concerns, the primary obligation
of the OMVS rests unchanged: socio-economic development based on economic growth.
Three Scope dimensions of effectiveness
Political stability45: The triple goal of the OMVS was originally based on the complete
cessation of natural floods. The traditional pattern where farmers and herders would follow
each other in the use of the flooded plains was destroyed and both groups competed for the
land and water, sometimes violently. The potential for water-related conflicts, triggered by the
activities of OMVS, remains in the basin.
Two on-going challenges are: conflicts of interest between regional/international, national and
local actors; and between the peasantry that prefers recessional agriculture and the state’s
interest in irrigation. These problems are linked to inefficient planning and implementation,
particularly regarding environmental and social mitigation measures. However, despite a
higher level of conflict in the Senegal River basin than in many other basins, OMVS
Secretariat staff still claims that the cooperation benefits outweigh occasional conflict on
specific issues.
Another challenge is linked to the unawareness of water as a political issue: OMVS officials
perceive water resources governance as a technical rather than a political issue and thus
45
Kramer et al. (2009); Schmeier (2013)
35
follow an engineering rather than governance approach, sometimes avoiding acknowledging
that conflicts are water related. This can be viewed as one of the main impediments to water
resources governance effectiveness in the Senegal River Basin along the political stability
scope dimension.
Environmental sustainability46: In this area the OMVS’s achievements are extremely weak,
with severe environmental consequences of the strong focus on economic growth. The
creation of permanent water levels led to the spread of diarrhoea, schistosomiasis, malaria,
lowering of water levels in local aquifers, reduction in pastureland, increased soil salinity,
riverbank erosion, intrusion of invasive species and concentrated industrial pollution, a
significant loss in fish catch, reduced water availability, threatened hydropower production
and blocking of navigational pathways.
The initiation of PASIE, aiming at institutionalising long-term mitigation of negative
environmental impacts, was a condition from donors to continue financing OMVS. The Water
Charter is a direct result of PASIE. According to the World Bank, PASIE developed the
“foundation of an institutional framework for effective transboundary communication and
participation emerged”.
However, these first attempts to mitigate environmental impacts have shown limited success
only, thus leaving the OMVS’s environmental effectiveness on a very low level. Awareness
for the potential negative impacts still appears weak. OMVS’s effectiveness on the
environmental scope dimension is therefore expected to remain weak.
Economic growth47: To obtain the ambitious economic development goals of the basin and its
riparian states, several infrastructure projects have been launched. The two most important
ones are the Diama and Manantali Dams. The purposes were to prevent saltwater intrusion
(Diama), generate hydropower (Manantali), as well as to provide water for irrigation and
stabilise the river’s water flows.
The hydropower production started in 2002 after a ten-year delay. The capacity is still far
below the demands of the riparians. A lack of transmission lines complicates distribution of
electricity to member states. The electricity benefits urban populations while rural areas
continue to lack the benefits. The delay in power production has had an impact also on
planned industrial development, and mining activities, which has not taken off. Neither
SOGEM nor SOGED are financially sustainable.
Irrigation has enabled year-around production but the irrigated area is still only about a third
of the original goals. The ambitious goal of a rice production of 12 tons/ha/year has not been
reached, but has stayed at 3 tons. All Senegal riparian states are still net food importers. One
of OMVS’s main goals, food security for riparian populations, has not been reached.
In the original plans, it was expected that more than half of the benefits to be achieved from
the Diama and Manantali Dams would be related to navigation. However, progress related to
navigation has been particularly slow, and still 30 years after the formation of OMVS,
navigation on the river hardly exists. One reason is the lack of interest from international
donors to invest in the navigation sector. This has been criticised particularly by Mali, who
gains limited benefits from agriculture but is highly interested in improving its navigational
link to the Atlantic coast.
46
47
UN 1st WWDR (2003); Kramer et al. (2009); Schmeier (2013); OMVS website
Kramer et al. (2009); Schmeier (2013)
36
Thus, the OMVS has not been successful in any of the three scope dimensions of
effectiveness. The OMVS struggles to fulfil the ambitious goals with regard to economic
growth and development on both the goal-attainment and the problem-solving aspect of
effectiveness. Still the OMVS is often praised for its contribution to economic growth in the
basin, although there is an obvious gap between ambitious development goals and actual
achievements.
Social development48: There are both negative and positive impacts of the development in the
Senegal River basin. People in the valley have more access to irrigation and water for other
purposes and urban populations has improved access to water supply and electricity.
On the negative side, there have been serious negative effects on health and well-being. Many
of the basin inhabitants who do not have access to irrigation water, or who prefer recessional
agriculture, became dependent on remittances from migrant workers to buy food. Despite
introduction of fish in the Manantali Dam, the total fish catches dropped with 90% and food
security decreased.
Another negative effect was the resettlement of local populations. The process was top-down,
the compensation insufficient and most resettled people suffered from increasing poverty due
to lack of land and livestock. Still, the total resettlement costs amounted to USD 27 million,
provided by USAID, UNDP and the government of Mali.
48
UN 1st WWDR (2003); Kramer et al. (2009); Schmeier (2013)
37
Annex 3: NBA
The Niger River basin covers 11 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ivory
Coast, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Algeria and Sierra Leone.
Source: World Future Society, http://www.wfs.org/blogs/len-rosen/climate-change-and-its-impact-our-worldsrivers-africa-part-three
The Niger River is economically important to the whole region, particularly in the arid and
semi-arid regions of the Sahel. The 4,200 km long river supports the riparian population’s
livelihoods through i.a. farming, grazing, fishing, and other household purposes. The Niger
forms two deltas, one on the Atlantic coast and one inland delta in Mali, the latter supporting
the livelihoods of over 500,000 people who depend on the seasonal flooding in the area.
While the basin faces challenges such as food insecurity and poverty, there is a potential for
infrastructure development for hydropower, irrigation schemes and navigation. However, as
hydropower dams, irrigation schemes and climate change affect the water flow and,
indirectly, the poverty reduction efforts, water management and development must be done
with great care. 49
The Convention for the creation of the Niger Basin Authority (NBA) was signed in 1980, and
revised in 1987, although its predecessor dates back to 1964 and is one of the oldest
intergovernmental organisations in Africa. The NBA is an inter-governmental organisation
responsible for promoting cooperation amongst Member states and contributing to improve
the living conditions of the basin populations through sustainable management of water
resources and associated ecosystems. The aim of the NBA is to “promote cooperation among
the member countries and to ensure integrated development in all fields through development
of its resources”50.
The revised 1987 Convention assigned the following five goals to NBA:
49
Wetlands International Africa
http://africa.wetlands.org/Whatwedo/NigerRiverandDeltas/tabid/2944/language/en-GB/Default.aspx
50
NBA website http://www.abn.ne/
38





Harmonize and coordinate national policies for the development of water resources in
the basin;
Participate in development planning through the establishment and implementation of
an integrated development plan for the basin;
Promote and participate in the design and operation of common structures and joint
projects;
Control and regulate all forms of navigation on the river, its tributaries and subtributaries;
Participate in the formulation of requests for assistance and mobilization of financial
resources in order to effectuate studies and work necessary to develop the basin's
resources.
Collective action problems
The NBA deals principally with issues related to water quality, water quantity, flood and
drought control, economic development, hydro-power and dam construction, irrigation,
infrastructure, fisheries and navigation. NBA thus deals with a mix of malign and benign
collective action problems, and goes beyond the river
Organisational set-up
Membership structure: The original Convention in 1980 was signed by 11 riparian countries,
while the revised convention in 1987 was signed by nine of the eleven riparian states,
excluding Sierra Leone and Algeria. Sierra Leone’s share of the basin is very small, and
Algeria is neither a significant contributor nor a major user of water in the basin.
Functional scope: The NBA deals, as can be expected, with multiple issues related to the
collective action problems. It ensures development of the basins in areas of energy, water
management, agriculture, livelihood production, fisheries, forestry, transport, industry and
communication; manages the basin's resources; plan development of the basin in an integrated
manner; develops, implements and maintains joint projects and infrastructures; ensures the
management of navigation; participates in the formulation of aid and financing requests for
joint projects, flood control infrastructure and drought prevention/control; and support of
human health.
Legal foundation – water law principles51: The Convention creating the Niger Basin
Authority (1980) refers to one international water law principle, namely the principle of prior
notification52. The Water Charter from 2008 (which entered into force in 2010) emphasises
that cooperation is based on solidarity and reciprocity for sustainable, equitable and
coordinated use of Niger Basin.
Legal foundation – legalisation and institutionalisation: The Convention (1980) and the
1987 revision are legally binding and ensure a legal personality to the NBA.
Organisational structures – organisational bodies53: The NBA is made up of the following
bodies:
-
The Summit of Heads of State and Government
Council of Ministers
51
TFDD http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/atlas/atlas_pdf/4_Treaties_africa.pdf
There are also bilateral agreements within the basin that refers to international water law principles, such as
the agreement between Nigeria and Niger regarding “equitable sharing in the development, conservation and use
of their common water resources”.
53
NBA website http://www.abn.ne/
52
39
-
Technical Committee of Experts
Executive Secretariat
National Focal Structures
The Summit of Heads of State and Government is the supreme body of NBA. The Summit
defines the general orientation of the development policy of the Authority. It meets once
every two years in ordinary sessions in the member state that chairs the NBA at that time, and
in extraordinary sessions according to demand.
The Council of ministers is the control organ of the NBA, responsible for monitoring the
activities of the Secretariat and reporting to the Summit. It prepares the sessions of the
Summit, examines all issues, deals with matters submitted to it and, in turn, submits
recommendations to the Summit. The ministers meet once a year in ordinary sessions in the
country that holds the chair at that time. The Chair has a two-year term and represents the
council during that time.
Figure A-3.1. Organogram of NBA
Source: Schmeier, 2010.
The Technical committee of experts is composed of representatives of the member states. Its
mandate is to prepare the sessions of the Council, and to submit reports and recommendations
to the Council. The Technical Committee of Experts meets at the request of the Executive
Secretariat according to a calendar approved by the Council of Ministers.
The Executive secretariat is the executive body of the NBA. The secretariat is headed by an
Executive Secretary, appointed by the Summit upon the recommendation of the Council, for a
period of four years renewable only once. Each member state can present a candidate for the
post of Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary is relieved of his functions by the
Summit upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. In the exercise of his
functions, the Executive Secretary is answerable to the High Authorities of the NBA. The
other officers of the Secretariat are answerable to the Executive Secretary.
National coordination committees are established in each member country and act as an
interface between the regional and national level. The national committees are placed under
the ministry in charge of water, environment, agriculture or land planning, depending on the
country.
There is also a Development Partner Group, which is in charge of coordinating contributions
40
to the NBA from development partners, under the auspices of the World Bank.
Additional bodies initiated by the Water Charter, to promote good water governance
include54:
a) Permanent Technical Committee (in the process of being established), to facilitate the
settlement of all issues relating to water use. It also contributes to the planning and
implementation of any project or programme related to the Niger River Basin.
b) Regional Advisory Group, responsible for applying management and good governance
principles for a sustainable and shared development of the basin;
c) Panel of Experts, which acts as an independent expert group in charge of giving specific
technical advice on issues related to basin developments;
d) Sub-basin Commissions, responsible for proposing terms for water resource use, helping
to settle water use conflicts, and collaborating in the planning and implementation of any
project or programme concerning the river sub-basin;
e) Niger Basin Observation System, which aims to monitor changes in the basin’s various
components.
Organisational structures – role of secretariat: The Executive Secretariat is in charge of the
administration of the Authority, its organs and all its structures for implementation of the
decisions taken by the higher authorities. The Executive Secretary is mandated to undertake
all works and studies to ensure attainment of the objectives of the Authority, and to make all
appropriate proposals capable of contributing to its harmonious development. It can negotiate
loans and receive gifts on behalf of the Authority; translate documents; maintain relations to
regional and sub-regional and international organisations, including donors; and develop and
propose a research strategy. Thus, the Executive Secretariat is responsible for administrative
services, coordination of projects and programs, data and information management,
monitoring, as well as external relations, and the acquisitioning of funding.
Financing – cost sharing: The operating budget of the Executive Secretariat is financed by
equal contributions from each member state, plus donor financing. It appears that the
secretariat it almost entirely funded by revenues from the member states contributions55.
However, the revenues have fluctuated and MS have not always effectuated their payments,
with grave consequences for the operations of the NBA.
Other types of costs are shared by the member states based on a specific cost-sharing key, and
with large donor contributions.
Financing – donor involvement: Donors are supporting NBA directly and indirectly. Key
financing partners are the African Development Bank, African Water Facility, Canada,
ECOWAS, EU, Germany, and the World Bank.
Governance mechanisms
Decision-making mechanisms: The Summit and Council quorum is formed by simple
majority. In Council, the recommendations and resolutions are adopted by consensus. The
decisions are binding.
Data and information management: NBA is responsible to collect, standardise, centralise,
disseminate and exchange technical and related data. Furthermore, plans, projects and
research carried out in the member states are coordinated by NBA. The Secretariat is
54
55
AFD (2014)
GIZ (2014); NBA (2010)
41
responsible for documentation and dissemination of information. Dissemination of
information is performed through a bulletin and a documentation centre.
The type of information that is shared is “to and beyond” the river, relating to: agriculture,
fishery, transport, communication infrastructure, industry, energy, navigation, research, floodand drought management, and health protection/sanitary measures.
Monitoring and compliance mechanisms: NBA has established institutionalised compliance
monitoring in the basin. The member states shall inform the Executive Secretariat about all
projects and works they wish to undertake in the basin. NBA is responsible for monitoring the
research and works carried out by member states as well as the “subsequent exploitation of
reports which such States should submit periodically”.
Dispute resolution mechanisms: The NBA has a defined an internal dispute resolution
mechanism, which is negotiation: any dispute that may arise over the implementation and/or
interpretation of the convention shall be amicably settled through direct negotiations. If the
negotiations fail to settle the dispute, the “matter shall be referred to the Summit by a party to
such disputes and the decision on the same shall be final”.
External actor involvement – public participation in river basin governance56: Civil society
organisations were invited to participate in the Shared vision process.
Supported by the NBA and donors, the international NGO Eau Vive Niger identified
stakeholders in the basin. In 2006, for the first time, civil society organisations were meeting
at the regional level to discuss issues of common interest relating to the basin’s resources. At
the extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers in 2007, a decision was taken to
institutionalise a mechanism for civil society participation in the basin. By 2008, national
representations (coordinating units) were established in nine member states, to promote
effective participation of civil society. The NBA is considering setting up a regional
coordinating unit.
External actor involvement – epistemic community involvement: Information from
researchers is part of the data gathering performed by the executive secretariat.
External actor involvement – cooperation with other institutions: Secretariat maintains
relations with sub-regional, regional and international organizations, including donors.
Three Scope dimensions of effectiveness
During a period of five years the NBA member states developed a process leading to a
consensual investment programme and the development of a transboundary legal tool (the
Water Charter). This was made possible by support from high political levels; during this
period Heads of State met three times and ministers up to three times per year. However,
retrieving the MS’s financial contributions are difficult.
The communication between the NBA and its member states need to be improved and should
especially lead to a two-way information system with Member States.
Political stability: In general, the member states favour agriculture over pastoralism, private
ownership over common property rights, which occasionally leads to conflicts over land.
Conflicts over water are difficult to identify, but the causal relationship is highly complex and
the role of policy is crucial in the emergence of conflict (Goulding et al 2011). It is difficult to
assess the potential of NBA in facilitating the solving of conflicts in the basin. However, the
56
NBA website www.abn.ne/
42
fact that even to date, member states pursue national resource management, may not promote
sustainable conflict resolution.
Environmental sustainability and Social Development57: There are reverse environmental
trends in the Niger River Basin. Projects related to, i.a. land and water degradation (GEFfunded) and protection against water-related erosion (ADB), managed a large number of data.
The databases and GIS of these two projects were handed over to the Niger Basin Observation
System. The Niger Basin Observation System is supervised by the NBA and aims at
monitoring basin’s hydrological, environmental and socio-economic aspects. It has been
operational since 2006. Its main results include: a baseline, identifed priority indicators,
established procedures and a system for data and information management, an inventory of
environmental and socio-economic data, and a development and financial plan. Hence, the
results are most at output- level rather than related to the impact-level, associated with effects
on state of environment or socio-economic development as a result of NBA activities.
Economic growth: NBA has only informative and advisory functions still. The MS focus on
infrastructure development, but NBA was during 2013 still not in a position to delegate the
contracting of major hydraulic structures. Delays in the institutional reorganization needed for
implementing the investment programme, likely have a negative impact on the economic
growth associated with the joint investment programmes.
57
AFD (2014)
43