A turning point in military methods and mentality:
Germany and the significance of the 1916 Battle of the Somme
“There our dead lay, not individually, nor next to one another, but piled up.
Repeatedly, our men must have rushed to defend this vital place and again and
again they fell as fresh victims, on top of those who had gone before.”
—Heinrich Warneck, Guillemont, 3 September 1916.1
The Battle of the Somme witnessed the mass loss of life for what appeared to be little
strategic change. By the time fighting wound down in mid-November, both sides
were exhausted in manpower and machinery, leaving 500,000 German and 596,000
British and French casualties.2 The front lines, however, moved no more than eleven
kilometers.3 The offensive became, in contemporary and modern memory, a symbol
of the futility of trench warfare in World War One. It was nevertheless a tactical
turning point for both the German and Allied forces. The Somme exposed the
weaknesses of German military leadership and strategy, instigating a new high
command and different defensive doctrine. The British emerged from the Somme as a
more experienced fighting force which could absorb the costs of material warfare. By
contributing to the exhaustion of German men and material, the Somme played a part
in Germany’s shift in focus towards unrestricted submarine warfare. Written evidence
from German troops on the Somme reveals that morale was divided between soldiers
desirous of peace and those who took on a zeal for mechanised warfare. Prolonged
fighting and domestic shortages also contributed to growing war weariness on the
home front.
The Somme Offensive was a not a precondition to Entente success in the last two
years of war, but certainly laid the foundations for German defeat. It played an
important part in the gradual wearing down of the German Army. Although the losses
sustained by the British army were great, they were perhaps more easily absorbed
than those of the Germans.4 German casualties included large numbers of experienced
Heinrich Warnecke, quoted in Jack Sheldon, The German Army on the Somme, 1914-1916 (Barnsley,
2005), p. 277.
2
Holger Herwig, ‘War in the West, 1914-1916’, in John Horne (ed.), A Companion to World War One
(Oxford, 2010), 49-63, p. 62.
3
Ibid.
4
Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War. Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1986),
p. 351.
1
Germany and the significance of the 1916 Somme Offensive
soldiers and officers, in comparison with Britain’s largely civilian army.5 This added
to Germany’s losses at the Verdun offensive, which had failed to achieve a
breakthrough in 1916.6 For Crown Prince Rupprecht, “what still remained of the old
first-class peace-trained, German infantry had been expended on the battlefield.” 7
During July and August, forty-two additional divisions were sent to the Somme from
Verdun and the eastern front.8 A decisive breakthrough on the western front, however,
remained elusive. In the face of Allied superiority in men and material, it became
clear to the army command by August 1916 that a decision-at-arms would not be
reached on land. 9 This was decisive in determining the course of war. From mid1916, Germany focused its offensive aims towards unrestricted submarine warfare.10
The chief of the Admiralty Staff was not alone in his conviction that this shift would
force Britain “to sue for peace within five months as a result of launching an
unrestricted U-boat war.” 11 Aggravated by German attacks on merchant ships, the
United States entered the conflict on 6 April 1918.12 The Somme thus was a major
causal factor in contributing to an ill-fated shift in German offensive aims.
The Somme exposed the weaknesses in German tactical leadership. It
undermined the counter-offensive doctrine adopted by its Chief of the General Staff.13
Erich von Falkenhayn ordered 330 counter-attacks during the battle, which helped to
balance enormous casualties on both sides.14 His orders were to “throw in even the
last man in an immediate counter-attack” if ground was lost.15 Army commanders
initially saw this method as the key to victory. A 3 July order by General von Bülow
read: “The outcome of the war depends on the Second Army being victorious on the
Somme … The large areas of ground that we have lost in certain places will be
attacked and wrested back.”16 Operations officer Gerhard Tappen ordered before the 1
5
Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myths and Realities (London, 2001), p. 185.
David Zabecki, ‘Battle of the Somme, 1 July-19 November 1916’, in Spencer Tucker (ed.) The
European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopedia (London, 1996), p. 651.
7
Rupprecht of Bavaria, quoted in John Terraine, The Great War (Hertfordshire, 1997), p. 122.
8
Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, p. 184.
9
Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-18 (Cambridge, 2004), p. 88.
10
Matthew Stibbe, German Anglophobia and the Great War, 1914-18 (Cambridge, 2001), p. 136.
11
Holger Herwig, ‘Germany’s U-Boat Campaign’, in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.), Great
War, Total War (Cambridge, 2000), 189-206, p. 193.
12
Chickering, Imperial Germany, p. 92.
13
Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, p. 183.
14
Robert Foley, ‘A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916-1916’,
Journal of Strategic Studies, no vol., (2012), 1-29, p. 9.
15
Ibid., p. 9.
16
Jack Sheldon, The German Army on the Somme 1914-1916 (Barnsley, 2005), p. 176.
6
2
Germany and the significance of the 1916 Somme Offensive
June British offensive: “When the English attack and storm is broken, they must be
driven back.”17 However, its impracticability soon became evident to army officers.
General Grünert was dismissed as chief of the Second Army for acting contrary to
Falkenhayn’s policy. 18 Another commander recalled being rejected permission to
withdraw, even when his regiment was cut off by British infantry: “‘It was quite out
of question to withdraw men from the firing line’ … in this situation, I felt that further
sacrifice was pointless.”19 The futility of German losses at the Somme undermined
Falkenhayn’s tactics and the leader himself. Faced with the combined setbacks of
losses at the Somme, the lack of a clear victory at Verdun, and ongoing hostilities on
the eastern front, he was replaced mid-battle in August 1916.20 The Somme Offensive
thus marked a watershed in the German military leadership.
With a new military command came a radical shift in German defensive tactics.
The High Command under Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff shifted the
focus of the German army from land offensive on the western front to the defensive.
In contrast with Falkenhayn’s aim for the French to be “bled white” on Verdun, the
new leaders wanted to eliminate Russia on the eastern front and employ defensive
action in the west.21 The outcome of the Somme marked the German retreat to the
Siegfried Line. This highly fortified front, situated twenty miles to the east of the
Somme, aimed to prevent further losses in German defences.22 To avoid the move as
an admission of defeat, troops were ordered to carry out a destructive scorched earth
policy in order to render abandoned territory worthless.23 By the end of the battle, the
German army had developed a near-impenetrable defensive system. This had the
effect of reducing the possibility of a breakthrough on land for either side. As late as
mid-October 1918, the German defenders led by Rupprecht considerably slowed the
Allies’ advance through the Siegfried Line.24
17
Gerhard Tappen (21 Jun 1916), quoted in Robert Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun.
Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916 (Cambridge, 2005), p. 246.
18
Sheldon, The German Army, p. 179.
19
Ibid., pp. 166-7.
20
Peter Liddle, The 1916 Battle of the Somme: A Reappraisal (Hertfordshire, 1992), p. 140.
21
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The Somme (London, 2005), p. 201.
22
Sheldon, The German Army, p. 279.
23
Ernst Jünger, Storm of Steel, trans. Michael Hoffman (London, 2003; first edn; n.p., 1920), p. 127.
24
Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, ‘Combat’ in John Horne (ed.) A Companion to World War One (Oxford,
2010), 173-187, p. 179; Spencer Tucker, A Global Chronology of Conflict: From the Ancient World to
the Modern Middle East (Santa Barbara, 2010), p. 1672.
3
Germany and the significance of the 1916 Somme Offensive
The tactical turning point truly took place during battle. From August 1916,
Hindenburg and Ludendorff reorganised the army’s leadership and organisation. 25
They expanded the concept of storm troop tactics. In this system, troops were
organised into small combat units under a largely autonomous and experienced
officer.26 This formation, which utilised surprise attacks, later achieved considerable
success from March to June of the 1918 Spring Offensive.27 The Somme also taught
the German army to respond to the weakness of its defensive position. The deep
trenches of 1914 to 1916 proved deadly in the battle, as they were easily identified
from the air and were targets for grenades. 28 Ludendorff described the dugouts as
“fatal mantraps”, where “the use of the rifle had been forgotten. The hand grenade
had become the primary weapon.” 29 A German commander recalls one soldier’s
response this vulnerable situation: “[He] jumped up onto the shot-up parapet and
killed a British officer, before being killed himself by a hand grenade.”30 From midAugust, German infantry resided in craters formed by artillery blasts, which were less
visible to enemy attacks.31 Fewer troops were stationed in these shell-hole positions
(Trichterstellung) in order to increase the safety and availability of backup forces. 32
This new method of ‘in-depth’ defence attempted to block Allied advances, and only
reclaimed territory if it was considered important.33 One British soldier marvelled at
the impenetrability of German positions: “But the German dug-outs! My word, they
were things of beauty, art and safety.”34
The Somme was the ultimate testing ground for tactics and a novel style of
warfare: the Materialschlacht.35 In this material battle, each side used weaponry and
technology to its fullest capability in order to exert the most damage.36 Crucially for
Germany, the Somme exposed the limitations of its industrial productive capabilities.
25
Gerhard Hirschfeld, ‘Die Somme-Schlacht von 1916’, in Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich and
Irina Renz (eds.), Die Deutschen an der Somme 1914-1918. Krieg, Besatzung, Verbrannte Erde (Essen,
2006), 79-162, p. 85.
26
Ibid., p. 87
27
Gary Sheffield, War on the Western Front: in the Trenches of World War One (London, 2008), p. 53.
28
Foley, ‘A Case Study’, p. 11.
29
Sheldon, The Germany Army, p. 279.
30
Ibid., p. 141.
31
Foley, ‘A Case Study’, p. 11.
32
Ibid.
33
Audoin-Rouzeau, ‘Combat’, p. 179.
34
Letter to The Times (8 Aug 1916), quoted in Wilson, Myriad Faces of War, p. 323.
35
Robert Foley, ‘A Case Study’, p. 7.
36
Alan Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction. Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War (Oxford,
2008), p. 222.
4
Germany and the significance of the 1916 Somme Offensive
The advantage of the Allied forces in material was evident from the start. In the leadup to the British-led offensive on 1 July 1916, 1,500,000 shells were fired towards
German trenches, which grew to 7.8 million in the following three months. 37
Although this did not penetrate the German defences as deeply as the British General
Douglas Haig had hoped, the defenders did not emerge unscathed. Germans losses
were approximately 8,500 on the first day, compared with 60,000 British casualties.38
The bombardment “smashed men and material in a manner never seen before”
according to one German soldier, and weakened their defences: “The enemy’s fire …
tore fearful gaps in the ranks of the defenders.39 The Germans responded to material
with the machine gun, which was a decisive tool in preventing a British breakthrough.
However, just four days after the first Allied offensive, General Fritz Von Bülow
observed he could only deploy one battery every 800 metres, whereas previously he
had placed one every 350 metres. 40 Material power was revealed as the key to
exacting losses in this battle of attrition.41 But with mass killing came the exhaustion
of manpower and resources.
The Somme offensive widened the technological gulf between German and
Allied forces. British tanks were deployed for the first time on the Somme in
September 1916, and were to the German soldiers were an unknown tool of industrial
warfare.42 A British spy pilot reported that “a tank is walking up the high street of
Flers with the British Army cheering behind” after German soldiers ran from the
vehicle.43 But in action the tanks proved vulnerable and unreliable.44 Only eighteen of
forty-nine tanks deployed at the Somme saw action.45 After noting his great surprise
at the vehicles, German cavalry officer von Krosjik wrote: “after four rounds, the
armoured vehicle was knocked out.” 46 The impact of British aerial power at the
Somme was more acute. Allied aeroplanes spotted defensive locations and attacked
37
John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London, 1976), p. 231; Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The
Somme (London, 2005), p. 190.
38
Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, p. 68; Herwig, ‘War in the West’, p. 61.
39
Soldier of the 27th Württemberg Division, quoted in Sheldon, The German Army, p. 183.
40
Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, p. 184.
41
William Philpott, Bloody Victory. The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth
Century (London, 2009), p. 29.
42
Hirschfeld, Krumeich and Renz, Die Deutschen an der Somme, p. 8.
43
Michael Neiberg, Fighting the Great War (New Haven, 2005), p. 200.
44
Hermann Cron, Imperial German Army 1914-18. Organisation, Structure, Orders of Battle, trans.
C.F. Colton (Solihull, 2002; first edn; Berlin, 1937), p. 588.
45
Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, p. 200.
46
Sheldon, The German Army, p. 293.
5
Germany and the significance of the 1916 Somme Offensive
infantry with grenades and machine guns. 47 Aerial photography often proved
inconclusive, but attacks had the potential to devastate German bases.48 Some German
infantry regiments were ordered to dig foxholes or cover under earth in order to deter
machine-gunning aircraft.49 A German lieutenant, Georg Will, wrote on the night of
17 to 18 August: “Although doubt is sometimes cast on the assertion that aircraft
descend twenty to thirty metres to attack the infantry with grenades and machine
guns, we are experiencing it as the bitter truth.”50 The Germans did not have tanks at
the Somme, and by the end of the war the British had five times as many aeroplanes.51
The technology of the Somme was in its formative stages, but was nonetheless a
salient reminder of the material superiority of the Allies.
The race to match Allied material had profound effects on the German workforce,
which geared itself towards wartime production.52 Throughout 1916 and 1917, there
was a combined average of three million troops to support on the Somme, at Verdun,
and the Siegfried Line. 53 From August 1916, Hindenburg instigated an ambitious
programme to double industrial output for the war.54 Employment sectors not directly
vital to the war effort declined. The number of employees in the textile industry, for
example, dropped by three quarters in the period 1913 to 1918.55 In contrast, the year
to August 1917 saw the production of ammunition and trench mortars double, while
artillery and machine guns trebled. 56 Even captive enemy soldiers were mobilised for
production. In August 1916, 331,000 were employed in German industry.57 However,
the programme failed as a response to the demands of Materialschlacht. Not only did
the nation fail to garner the resources to sustain the war, it exacerbated existing
tensions in Germany over food and material shortages at home.58 The plan was so
47
Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914-18. The Live and Let Live System (London, 1980), p. 155.
Prior and Wilson, The Somme, p. 226.
49
Sheldon, The German Army, p. 238.
50
Georg Wil (17/18 Aug 1916), quoted in Sheldon, The German Army, p. 239.
51
Cron, Imperial German Army, p. 188.
52
Wilhelm Deist, ‘Strategy and Unlimited Warfare in Germany: Moltke, Falkenhayn and Ludendorff,
in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.), Great War, Total War. Combat and Mobilization on the
Western Front, 1914-18 (Cambridge, 2000), 265-80, p. 275.
53
David Stevenson, With our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London, 2011), p. 36.
54
Richard Bessel, ‘Mobilizing German Society for War’, in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.),
Great War, Total War. Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front (Cambridge, 2000), 437-52, p.
443.
55
Ibid.
56
Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, p. 222.
57
Bessel, ‘Mobilizing German Society’, p. 442.
58
Ibid., p. 445.
48
6
Germany and the significance of the 1916 Somme Offensive
ambitious that building new factories alone exhausted the necessary raw material for
armaments production.59 Unlike Britain and France, an isolated Germany could not
supplement its shortfall in domestic production through imports.60
In addition to the resource advantage, the British and French forces gained crucial
battle experience from the Somme.61 This meant Germany faced a renewed challenge
in the land confrontations of 1917 and 1918. Already during the battle, British
commanders began to learn from the losses of July 1916. In a successful attack on
Thiepval Ridge in September, British infantry approached a German defence from the
east and captured a nearby farm instead of a frontal assault. 62 From late 1916,
creeping barrage became a regular part of offensive operations.63 However, the British
command still held to the pre-1916 assumption that artillery alone would obliterate
German defences.64 In planning for the Third Battle of Ypres from 31 July 1917, Haig
repeated the pattern of shellfire and forward movement of infantry. 65 Once more,
German machine gunners exacted huge casualties of 250,000 British soldiers, with
German casualties estimated at between 217,000 and 400,000. 66 Even though the
British armies did not learn all the lessons of the Somme, this scale of loss was not
sustainable for the exhaustive German army. 67 Germany’s holdings of artillery, for
example, fell to 5,000 guns in November 1917 from 7,130 the previous February.68
What the Allies began at the Somme – an offensive effort to exert pressure on
German men and resources – had by the end of the war achieved its purpose.
The Battle of the Somme shaped the mentalities of its troops. For the German
army, the cumulative effect of mechanised warfare took its toll on morale and order.
The Somme is the first instance of many soldiers voicing a desire for peace and even
59
Ashworth, Trench Warfare, p. 154.
Theo Balderston, ‘Industrial Mobilization and War Economies’, in John Horne (ed.) A Companion to
World War One (Oxford, 2010), 217-33, p. 219.
61
Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, p. 185.
62
Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, p. 200-1.
63
Ashworth, Trench Warfare, p. 155.
64
Herwig, ‘War in the West, 1914-16’, p. 60.
65
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, ‘War in the West, 1917-18’ in John Horne (ed.), A Companion to
World War One (Oxford, 2010), 127-40, p. 131.
66
Ashworth, Trench Warfare, p. 56; Jack Sheldon, The German Army at Passchendaele (Barnsley,
2007), p. 315; Gerhard Hirschfeld, ‘Germany’, in John Horne (ed.), A Companion to World War One
(Oxford, 2010), 432-46, p. 441.
67
Sheldon, The German Army, p. 397.
68
Hew Strachan, The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War (Oxford, 1998), p. 146.
60
7
Germany and the significance of the 1916 Somme Offensive
revolt in their letters and diaries.69 Artillery soldier Herbert Sulzbach recalled that by
summer 1916, his fellow troops no longer held the “everything for victory” sentiment
of 1915.70 Ernst Jünger was stationed at Guillemont where he was first “made aware
of the effects of the war of material … we had to adapt ourselves to an entirely new
phase of war.”71 The Somme as a ‘new phase’ was marked by helplessness among its
troops, who faced constant bombardment. A German major wrote that “some of the
gunners were buried alive and others, stupefied by gas, suffered for hours or even
days.”72 Those who remained alive “had to spend the entire day in our rabbit holes …
we wanted to breath freely again, suffocating in these tiny holes when the shells
whizzed past.”73 The trenches at the Somme amplified the psychological impact of
warfare by restricting soldiers’ movement and vision.74 In a plea for food relief in
September, Reserve Lieutenant Speikermann confessed he “cannot take responsibility
for the consequences … if the relief promised yesterday does not take place tonight.”
Intense fear often led to disorder in action, as a German officer recalled. When
bombardment began, his men “broke into a complete, senseless dissolution and flight,
which resulted in many wounded.” 75 However, it was only at the Third Battle of
Ypres in 1917 that German soldiers first broke out in open mutiny. 76 The Somme
nevertheless contributed to the exhaustion of German soldiers’ resolve as well as
numeric strength.
The moral effect of Materialschlacht was mixed among German troops. Whereas
some reviled the violent measures, others adapted to machine warfare with zeal. A
German gunner recalls his time on the front with relish: “I had only one desire: to
shoot, to shoot and watch some of them go down. If I did not have a Tommy to fire at,
I shot at the aircraft above me. I felt more animal than human.”77 An official German
report notes the work of one gunner with admiration: “Examination of the [British]
69
Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, p. 215.
Herbert Sulzbach, With the German Guns: Four Years on the Western Front, trans. Richard Thonger
(Barnsley, 2003; first edn; Germany, 1918), p. 165.
71
Jünger, Storm of Steel, p. 107.
72
Sheldon, The German Army, p. 185.
73
Ibid., p. 250.
74
Trevor Watson, Enduring the Great War. Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British
Armies, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 2008), p. 30.
75
Paul Plaut, quoted in Watson, Enduring the Great War, p. 41.
76
Watson, Enduring the Great War, p. 168.
77
Sheldon, The German Army, p. 298.
70
8
Germany and the significance of the 1916 Somme Offensive
corpses showed that he had fired with great calmness.”78 Undeterred by the resources
of the Allied forces, some claimed the Somme as a moral victory. “Our few battleweary regiments stood like heroes against this overwhelming numerical superiority,”
wrote one soldier in July.79 The majority of soldiers, however, were horrified by the
protracted brutality of the Somme offensive. “The strain was too immense,” wrote
Hans Frimmel on 15 September: “the greatest part of the trench garrison was certainly
killed or buried alive … what remained wanted to surrender but was mostly killed.”80
A young student, Hugo Frick, described the material battle to his family: “This is not
just a war, but mutual destruction using technological power, what is left of
humankind in that?”81 Sulzbach observed troops leaving the Somme as “ragged and
filthy, with blunted nerves and indifferent expressions; while other troops, all fresh,
clean and without a notion of what it was like, were pushing the other way.”82
Outside of the battlefield, the Somme also had lasting repercussions. Its human
cost provided no small contribution to the growth of war weariness on the German
home front. By late 1916, official monthly home reports chartered a growing crisis in
civilian morale. 83 The loss of 500,000 German troops to death, injury and capture
inevitably affected family structures at home. 84 Food shortages on the home front
were exacerbated by the demands of the military and poor harvests; by mid-1916
consumption had reached up to seventy percent of peacetime levels.85 As a defensive
confrontation, the Somme did not have the same potential to boost morale as the
Battle of Verdun, which despite losses experienced successes like the capture of
Douaumont.86 Due to censorship, anti-war feeling was not too evident in the German
press.87 Even pro-war commentators recognised the weakness of the German position
on the Somme. The Berliner Tageblatt tried to give this a positive spin: “The more
prodigiously [British] artillery preparation is developed, the more does the enemy
78
Ibid., p. 141.
Sulzbach (3 Jul 1916), With the German Guns, p. 85.
80
Watson, Enduring the Great War, p. 167.
81
Hugo Frick, ‘Briefe an seine Familie in Ellwangen’ (29 Sep 1916), quoted in Hirschfeld et al., Die
Deutschen an der Somme, trans. Kate Palmer, p. 142.
82
Herbert Sulzbach (20 Sep 1916), With the German Guns, p. 90.
83
Philpott, Bloody Victory, p. 307.
84
Sheldon, The German Army, p. 277.
85
Jürgen Kocka, Facing Total War. German Society 1914-1918, trans. Barbara Weinberger
(Leamington Spa, 1984), p. 190.
86
Watson, Enduring the Great War, p. 165.
87
Robert Nelson, ‘Soldier Newspapers: A Useful Source in the Social and Cultural History of the First
World War and Beyond’, War in History 17:2 (2010), 167-191, p. 177.
79
9
Germany and the significance of the 1916 Somme Offensive
admit that the fighting worth of his troops is less.”88 In the long term, the destructive
dynamic of the Somme permeated German society. The battle was “bad for men’s
morale and honour,” wrote Ernst Jünger, which he would “later in life see to
excess.”89 Charities were set up to deal with the psychological effects of battle. In late
1916, for example, the Marburg Home was founded for soldiers who had learned the
“dark side of human nature” in order to “lead them to believe again in the moral value
of humanity.”90
The Battle of the Somme thus had an immediate and long-ranging significance
for Germany in World War One. The battlefield exposed the weaknesses of
Falkenhayn’s leadership and defensive tactics, instigating an overhaul in German
military command. The duumvirate under Hindenburg and Ludendorff led to a drastic
change in fighting methodology and overall war aims. In the midst of the battle, the
German army changed its defensive tactics, culminating in retreat to the Siegfried
Line. With a defensive position on the western front, German war aims turned
towards unrestricted submarine warfare. Hence the outcome of the Somme played a
part in determining the course of the war. Significantly for both sides, the battle was
an active testing ground for material warfare. Materialschlacht exposed the limited
productive capability of the German home front and had a devastating mental effect
on the front line. The inhumane experience of material warfare broke the resolve for
war among many of its troops. The same went for civilians, and by mid-1916
widespread support for war had thinned dramatically. The Somme’s legacy as a
symbol of futility is perhaps undeserved; it instigated a turning point in German
tactics and attitudes to war among its soldiers and civilians.
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