Identifying the Limiting Factors to State
Wetland Programs
by
Nicholas Guehlstorf, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Tel (618) 650-3852; Fax (618) 650-3509
[email protected]
Department of Political Science, Environmental Sciences Program
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
Brittany L. Poletti
Masters Candidate
Tel (618) 791-3093
[email protected]
Environmental Sciences
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
Presented at 2012 Western Political Science Association Conference Draft:
Not for Citation or Attribution
ABSTRACT: Adequately managing wetlands on private property in the rural areas of the
United States has been a regulatory challenge. Voluntary and incentivized programs such as the
Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) have been an effective and efficient tool for starting to ensure
the health of necessary watersheds; however, the WRP is a state ran program that has
experienced inconsistent policy success. This study will evaluate factors affecting the WRP to
determine their influence upon differing growth rates with shapefiles in Geographic Information
System (GIS) software for two comparable Midwest states. As data from the Natural Resource
Conservation Service (NRCS) indicates recent variance with greater growth of WRP contracts
and enrolled acres in Wisconsin than Illinois, this analysis conducts statistical analyses to enable
the testing of three hypotheses to explain program variance: urban sprawl, average crop yields,
and easement value. Risk analyses indicate that the favored market based approach—
demonstrated by WRP—may not be appropriate for all state areas attempting wetland
management. Although unpopular to many private landowners, a command and control
approach may be imperative for the sustained life of wetlands. As states have differing capacity
to manage wetlands within their borders, it is imperative that they choose the correct approach or
one of the nations’ most vital ecosystems will continue to disappear.
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1. Introduction and Statement of the Research Problem:
Land use in the United States has historically dismissed the ecological benefits of wetlands—to
filter and recharge groundwater and hold excess floodwater—for economic gains as millions of
acres of wetlands were destroyed in order to make the land useable for farming and urban
development. To preserve wetland acres and functions despite the perceived lost economic
values, both regulatory and non-regulatory or volunteer programs have been implemented.
Federal wetland regulation began in 1972 with the Clean Water Act and worked in conjunction
with incentive programs to mitigate wetland losses. While developers have continued to be
regulated under the Clean Water Act, legislation aimed at agriculture has focused on incentives.
For example, commodity producers must mitigate or comepsate for destroying and eradicating
wetlands since the 1980s in order to retain some federally subsidized agricultural programs
(Hemminger 2003). In fact, the Agricultural Reform Act of 2002 and the Congressionally
accepted 2008 Farm Bill includes over a dozen conservation policies which offer approximately
10 million dollars of financial incentives for private landowners to restore wetlands that were
previously farmed or to stop agricultural producers from draining farmland to produce foodstuffs
(Yaich et. al. 2006). Please note all of these farming policies are voluntary and non-regulatory.
In most cases they involve temporary conservation easements or restoration agreements that
require initial action by private landowners.
To explore the relationship between wetland preservation and agricultural use, this
project will assess the effectiveness of the only meaningful rural conservation program, the
Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), in two Midwestern states. It is our thesis that agricultural
communities are losing original wetlands, gaining synthetic wetlands, experiencing poor water
quality, and not returning farmland to wetlands by using banking mitigation. To fulfill regulatory
obligations of restoring or creating equivalent acreage of wetland that is being used for farming
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practices rural landowners could utilize banking mitigation. Banking mitigation would allow
agricultural producers to simply buy shares in a natural resource bank which transfers all
conservation responsibilities including ecological restoration and long-term monitoring. (ELI
2002). Farmers have not historically mitigated their own wetland losses because it is not
perceived to be economically attractive. Nonetheless, agricultural wetland mitigation banking
for ground that has been drained for agricultural purposes offers a lower fee for commodity
producers to buy credits which theoretically allows a third party to manage the wetlands; thus
saving the farmer money, time, and paperwork (Hemminger 2003).
While the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) indicates that the WRP is the
most successful farm program with more than 1,750,000 acres enrolled nationwide by 2005, we
argue it is a limited incentive-based program for restoring and conserving marginal or floodprone agricultural lands (Yaich et. al. 2006). Although moderately successful for wetlands on
public lands, conservation efforts on private lands remain challenging. Issues such as economic
feasibility, zoning laws, and real estate property values create opposition by landowners affected
by conservation goals. To lessen this opposition, particularly in rural areas where the land value
is significantly less than urban and suburban areas, many environmental regulators support
market based incentives to successfully manage many of the earth’s resources. In an attempt to
adequately manage wetlands using this approach, voluntary programs have been formulated and
implemented in the United States. For example, the WRP has been used to augment the Clean
Water Act (CWA) to ensure the health of wetlands on private property. To examine this
conservation tool and factors that may be limiting its level of success, this study focuses on three
areas of interest, urban sprawl, anticipated profits from agriculture, and geographical rate caps.
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An evaluation of these factors allows an offering of avenues for future research on the topic of
wetland conservation.
2. Background of Study:
Once thought of as useless land assets by government and citizens alike, wetlands are
now validated as vital components to the environment as they are permitted and protected in
order to offer beneficial services to both people and wildlife. The most important social and
economic utility of watersheds for this study is that wetlands act as filters of unregulated nonpoint source run-off for future drinking water and barriers to storm drainage. When water enters
a wetland, it slows and moves around plants causing suspended sediment to settle to the wetland
floor. Plant roots and microorganisms in the soil then absorb excess nutrients found in the water
from fertilizers, manure, leaking septic tanks and municipal sewage, producing superior water
quality (Office of Water, 2006). This is correlated with the fact that wetlands can reduce the
frequency and intensity of floods by acting as natural buffers, soaking up and storing a
significant amount of floodwater. Just one acre of wetland can store approximately 1 million
gallons of floodwater (Office of Water, 2006).
Prior to the passage of the CWA, wetlands were destroyed on a massive scale.
Considered a worthless, inhibiting land use, wetlands were a prime candidate for conversion into
development, particularly for use in agriculture. Twenty two states have lost at least 50% of their
original wetlands and ten states including Illinois have lost over 70% of their original wetlands
(Dahl, 1990). Historically most wetland loss was the result of a need for more agricultural land
as federal programs encouraged drainage and destruction of wetlands to increase tillable acres.
This resulted in substantial losses of productive wetlands in a relatively short period of time. By
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1955, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) had assisted in the implementation of
drainage systems for 103 million acres of land spending over $900 million to do so (Connolly et
al., 2005). The federal government has since limited its assistance and encouragement of wetland
development and created wetland regulations in the CWA of 1972. However, the CWA lacks
definitive wetland regulation and does not begin to solve or address many continuing and recent
issues regarding wetland management.
Wetland conservation has remained difficult due to increased need for land production
stemming from biofuels and growing populations (Verhoeven and Setter, 2010). Therefore, the
risk for wetlands to be drained and destroyed has not necessarily decreased from years ago. This
suburban and urban phenomenon is exacerbated because some human actions are also
eliminating the chances for new or subsequent wetland formations. Specifically, as the
development of levees and channelization grows, the opportunity for new wetland formation
decreases. (King et al., 2006). This conundrum is further complicated by limited regulation on
both the state and federal level. Albeit political power exists, all too often the CWA’s Section
404 permitting program allows, if not encourages, the filling and draining of wetlands as the
United States Army Corp of Engineers (Corps) mitigates the risk on watersheds 86% of the time
nationally. The language of Section 404 states, “the secretary of the army may issue permits,
after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into
navigable waters at specified disposal sites” (CWA §404).
As displayed in the language of Section 404, wetland regulation is loosely framed and
subject to interpretation. Because of this vagueness and the absence of any other federal
regulation, clarifications have been addressed through decisions by the court regarding the
regulation of wetlands. Wetland regulations go under conflict resolution for several reasons.
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Some landowners initially question whether a government agency has jurisdiction over their land
to invoke regulations while others challenge the terms used in statutory language to escape
applicability to their land. Both of these arguments have resulted in limited power of regulatory
agencies over wetlands. Broad jurisdiction of wetlands has been narrowed by various court
cases including, but not limited to, Solid Waste Agency of North Cook County v. U.S Army Corps
of Engineers (2001) and Rapanos v. United States (2006). These cases tasked the Supreme Court
with clarifying federal jurisdiction of wetlands by defining “the waters of the United States”. It
was determined that this phrase applied to relatively permanent flowing bodies of water, such as
streams, rivers, lakes and oceans (Kubasek and Silverman, 2008). The Supreme Court decided
that the Corps had previously exceeded its jurisdiction by interpreting the CWA’s reach to
include isolated, inland, non-navigable waters (SWANNC v. U.S Army Corps of Engineers,
2001). Additionally, temporary bodies of water or those that are loosely connected to major
waterways were determined to be excluded from Corps’ jurisdiction because they are not
protected under the CWA (Rapanos v. United States, 2006). This definition and the sequential
limiting of Corps jurisdiction have made acres of wetlands available and vulnerable to
development. Rhodes (2005) reported that as few as 438,000 acres or as many as 1.3 million
acres of wetlands have been made vulnerable due to the new limitations on federal jurisdiction.
Impediments to conserving wetlands on private property are numerous, complicated and
well established. Thus, Ando and Getzner (2006) demonstrate that public ownership of land has
a positive effect on conservation as opposed to private ownership, regardless of whether the
landowner is considered large or small. The increased difficulty present for conservation efforts
on private lands can be contributed to many factors including issues such as economic feasibility
that create opposition by landowners affected by conservation goals. To lessen this opposition
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many regulators and environmental enthusiasts support market based incentives as opposed to
command and control regulation to successfully manage many of the earth’s resources.
Due to vague federal guidance, states hold a critical role in the sustainment or
disappearance of wetlands. State regulations may be more restrictive than their federal
counterparts. Therefore, state laws and programs can be enacted to eliminate some litigation and
incorporate lands that have been excluded from regulation by Supreme Court decisions. The
SWANNC decision, discussed above, created a significant gap in wetland regulation illustrated
by Kusler and Christie (2006) who report that only three states, Wisconsin, Indiana and Ohio
have issued legislation to fill the gap between limited federal jurisdiction and state action.
Specifically, Wisconsin has reported that 25 to 90% of wetlands in the state could become
unregulated by the CWA as a result of the SWANNC decision (Kusler and Christie, 2006). In
order to test our three hypotheses, the ecologically progressive Wisconsin will be compared to a
more moderate Illinois as it has stark differences regarding expanded state wetland regulation.
Although Wisconsin and Illinois both have some protection for freshwater wetlands (Kusler and
Christie, 2006) for Illinois, this is where additional state regulation ends.
The majority of states appear to mirror Illinois in lacking initiative to protect wetlands.
According to the Association of State Wetland Managers, two thirds of states, as of 2003, did not
have in place regulatory programs that comprehensively address wetlands in general, and
isolated wetlands in particular (Cohen, 2003). Even in the presence of state initiatives, wetland
management faces obstacles. Especially challenging is the rudimentary step of determining the
most felicitous approach to management; command and control regulation or market based
incentives. One policy approach that is used by both states is voluntary easement programs like
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) which offers market-based incentives to take high risk
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land out of agricultural production. A related program, the WRP, is also a voluntary easement
program utilized for the conservation of wetlands. Contrary to the CRP which has a main focal
point of conserving soil and its overall quality, the WRP endeavors to restore entire wetland
ecosystems (Parks and Kramer, 1995). Both programs can be highly efficient and effective at
conserving different aspects of the environment regarding land use; however, they come with
limitations. Administered by the Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS), landowners
enrolled in the WRP agree to the implementation of a Wetlands Reserve Plan of Operations
(WRPO) with a goal to “restore, protect, enhance, maintain and manage” the hydrologic
conditions of inundation or saturation of the “soil, native vegetation and natural topography of
eligible lands” (Connolly, et al., 2005). In line with all governmental programs, there are certain
enrollment eligibility requirements for the WRP. The land in question must be eligible (presence
of hydric soil) as well as the landowner (able to receive farm program payments). Additionally,
sites are ranked using factors of percentage of changed hydrology, native vegetation and
proximity to other areas. If land and landowner meet all specifications, an offer to purchase the
easement ensues from the NRCS, a survey of the land is conducted, parties go through closing,
landowners receive their payment (in one payment or multiple payments depending upon the size
and value of the easement) and restoration begins.
There are two choices for restoration. The first involves a high level of participation from
the landowner with the landowner performing all restoration to the specifications of the NRCS
and is then reimbursed for the costs ensued (T. Wachter, personal communication, September 21,
2011). The second approach requires no work from the landowner. In this approach the NRCS
uses federal contractors in the form of excavating companies and vegetative specialists to
complete all restoration to NRCS specifications (T. Wachter, personal communication,
8
September 21, 2011). By offering a choice for the restoration process, the WRP allows
landowners to control their level of involvement perhaps creating more appeal for the program
overall.
3. Literature Review and Research Design
Parks, Kramer and Heimlich (1995) summarize the clash between agriculture and the
environment in one statement, “participation in wetlands protection and restoration programs can
be understood as part of a general model of profit-maximizing land use” (p. 88). Therefore, this
study builds off of the framework of Parks and Kramer (1995) in the same way as many
following it have (Shultz and Taff, 2004, Forshay, 2005, and Olatubi and Hughes, 2002). Their
work lists three factors for enrollment that are also the basis of this analysis. The first,
opportunity costs, is partially analyzed in hypothesis three regarding urban influence. The
second, program payments, is analyzed by the incorporation of geographical rate caps. Lastly,
land quality, is included in the first hypothesis of average crop yields; however this analysis
relates back to opportunity costs as well.
Multiple studies have been conducted in an attempt to determine factors that affect
enrollment in the WRP, or voluntary conservation easement programs in general (Shultz, 2005,
Luzar and Diagne, 1999, Ando and Getzner, 2006, Zhang et al., 2011 and Shultz and Taff, 2004).
A portion of limiting factor studies are conducted by scholars intrigued by the sociological
factors that affect landowners’ decisions to enter into voluntary conservation programs (Luzar
and Diagne, 1999 and Forshay et. al, 2005). Although some consistency in results is evident,
there are discrepancies. This study further investigates these discrepancies. In particular, this
study builds off the idea that Luzar and Diagne’s (1999) next generation of environmental
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management has not yet occurred. Rather, environmental management regarding agriculture
continues to be stuck in a purely economically driven framework.
Clashes between agriculture and the environment are apparent in many environmental
topics and especially relevant in the study of wetland management. Heimlich and Claassen
(1998) present two relevant factors that create difficulty for agricultural conservation policy,
(1) enthusiasm for market based incentives and (2) the expanding range of environmental and
conservation problems confronting agriculture. Following this framework, a market based
approach using incentive based mechanisms (IBM) has been researched and suggested by
scholars (Kroeger and Casey, 2007, and Olatubi and Hughes, 2002) for successful conservation
in the growing areas of conservation, initially from overall soil erosion and conservation (CRP)
to wetland conservation (WRP). Using this approach however, comes with limitations. It has
been found that asymmetric information leads to an increase in the cost of conserving private
lands (Ando and Getzner, 2006). Therefore, conservationists focus upon land that can be
obtained and protected at a decreased cost. As a result, conservation on rural lands is left both
vulnerable and challenging.
Not only is private land more costly to conserve, but it is also often considered to hold
more opportunity and high use value, especially in the mind of the landowner. High land use
correlates with high land prices. This is displayed by Shultz and Taff (2004) through a hedonic
regression on easements in North Dakota. Their analysis found that land prices reflect the
relative opportunity costs associated with foregone agricultural production. Thus, landowners
value the opportunity costs of their land and expect that value to be reflected in offers for
conservation. This is partially supported by Ando and Getzner (2006) who find that wetlands
with high use values cannot be protected without extensive compensation. Such extensive
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compensation does not exist in the WRP for either Illinois or Wisconsin. This supports the
prediction in hypothesis one that land with high crop yields, or high use values, will not be
extensively enrolled in the WRP.
Proportional compensation is partially addressed in determining geographical rate caps
for easement offers. As a result of the 2008 Farm Bill, each state is responsible for determining
geographical areas and a method for calculating a monetary cap on easement offers for that area.
Caps are designed to incorporate the base of agriculture land sales by excluding inflation and
timber land. Land sales in close proximity to urban development are also excluded as their sales
often represent inflated land values. Two caps are calculated for each geographical area, one
applicable for land that is in crop production, and one that is for land that is not in crop
production with caps consistently higher for land that is currently in crop production compared to
land that is not. Thus land with higher use values, cropland, as discussed by Ando and Getzner
(2006), is offered more extensive compensation; however, some scholars would argue that
opportunities for profit maximizing are still absent (Zhang et. al, 2011). Zhang et. al (2011)
found that only after profits are maximized will landowners engage in conservation. However, in
a conservation easement profits from agriculture diminish and once productive cropland, or land
that could be altered to produce successful crops, diminishes so do the opportunities for profit
maximizing. This idea is also partly included in the determination of the WRP geographical rate
caps with higher rates for land that is in cropland than land that is not but payments are still not
identified as profit maximizing by many landowners. Part of this is due to the fact that many
benefits of conserved wetlands are not easily assigned a dollar value. Furthermore, the benefits
can be for an entire community, not just the individual landowner, thus further widening the gap
between perceived profit maximizing by the landowner.
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Individual landowner responsibility for ecosystem benefits is the basis of most
agriculture verses the environment debates. Landowners do not wish to be burdened with
environmental compliance, and more importantly the finances it requires and corresponding
possible decrease in potential profits, to conserve environmental quality that benefits a much
larger population. Therefore many promote programs such as the WRP because as Kroeger and
Casey (2007) discus, market based is viewed as “financially attractive to the private sector”(p.
324). This is directly applicable to wetland conservation due to the fact that the benefits of
wetlands, including improved water quality, can benefit the overall health of the public
especially in rural areas that suffer from agriculture runoff in waterways and water supplies.
Although beneficial to an entire community, one private landowner is responsible for the supply,
or sustainment, of a wetland. It was concluded by Kroeger and Casey (2007) that the supply of
ecosystem services by a private landowner depend heavily on prices received and the type of
payment mechanisms compared to alternative land uses. This is the genesis of our second
hypothesized inquiry to test urban clusters and metropolitan land uses compared to rural use. As
urban populations continue to grow, land on the urban fringe becomes highly susceptible to
development. The profits from selling land for this development far outweigh those earned by
agricultural production much less conservation easement payments. The presence of these
opportunities makes conservation less appealing to landowners thus increasing the need for
incentives to be offered to rural landowner to conserve an ecosystem, in this case wetlands,
which benefit everyone. Thus, Kroeger and Casey (2007) support market based approaches for
allocation of ecosystem services in general and those provided by agricultural lands in particular.
An IBM approach to environmental management of conservation on agricultural
landscapes has been positively reviewed by both landowners and scholars. It is also
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representative of the next generation of agricultural policy. This is evident through a survey of
private Louisiana landowners (Luzar and Diagne, 1999) that found both success and promise in
the WRP. Luzar and Diagne (1999) do note however, that IBM may be limited in use because of
“pervasive mistrust of market forces in dealing with environmental issues” (p.346).
Limiting factors to conservation programs can cover a wide variety of economic,
geographic and sociological factors. Pertinent to discussion in this study are those that allow a
further understanding of the most important factors that affect the majority of rural landowners’
decisions regarding conservation. Parks and Kramer (1995) conclude that are three factors that
determine acceptance or enrollment in a conservation program based upon a behavioral model.
Their findings show that opportunity costs, program payments, and land quality were all
determining factors in enrollment in the WRP. This study has been reinforced through the work
of Ando and Getzner (2006) who show that opportunity costs are one of the major factors in a
private landowner’s decision making process regarding conservation. Drawing from these works,
this study analysis the influence of opportunity costs, in the form of foregone development
rights and agriculture production, program payments, in the form of predefined geographical rate
caps, and land quality, in the form of average agricultural production.
4. Methodology and Hypothesis:
The WRP target population is rural landowners, more specifically those involved in agriculture
which is evident in both the goals of the program and evaluation of agriculture land sales when
determining payment caps. This study focuses upon that concentration to determine which
factors are affecting the differing growth rates of the WRP in Wisconsin and Illinois. This
analysis is of the greatest importance because currently there is no exploration of the two
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neighboring states’ approaches to managing the small percentages of private wetlands remaining
within their borders.
Data from the NRCS indicates differing roles in state wetland management with greater
growth of WRP contracts in Wisconsin than Illinois. Although Illinois still maintains more
easement acres in the WRP than Wisconsin, the previous three years of data from 2009 to 2011
show stark differences between the states. Within this time frame Wisconsin entered into 93
easements totaling a little over 10,000 acres while Illinois only entered into 44 easements
totaling approximately 5,500 acres. As these numbers seem to exhibit a current trend in wetland
management, an intriguing area of wetland research is presented. Perhaps the differences can be
partly explained by limiting factors to the WRP overall. To examine this idea this study focuses
on three proposed factors, anticipated profits from agriculture, geographical rate caps and urban
area influence. More specifically, we hypothesize the following:
H (1): WRP easements are affected by anticipated profits from agriculture. Thus, wetland
easements are negatively correlated to average crop yields.
H (2): Geographical rate caps will not have a significant effect on participation in the
WRP. Thus, there will be no correlation between easements and corresponding rate caps
for cropland or for non-cropland.
H (3): WRP easements are affected by urban sprawl and opportunities for development.
Thus, wetland easements are negatively correlated to urban influence.
This study is designed to identify potential trends in wetland easements throughout
Illinois and Wisconsin. Using WRP easement maps and supporting data from agriculture
production and population density, this analysis seeks to identify factors impacting the success of
the WRP. Due to program variances, this study evaluates both programs separately and then
comparatively to show relations and reveal potential impact factors to both programs.
Independent variables of average county crop yields for corn and soybeans, county
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geographical rate caps, and urban-rural continuum codes are used with a dependent variable of
WRP easements coded in two ways. The first, total easement count, is used to determine the
correlation between the number of easements located in a county and each independent variable.
The second, total easement acres, is a summation of all acres enrolled in the WRP per county.
The dependent variable is coded in two ways to account for the wide range of sizes in easements.
In this analysis a single easement can range from 1 acre to 6,285 acres in Illinois and 1.9 acres to
2,008 acres in Wisconsin. As total wetlands acres conserved is as much of a focus as simply how
many easements exist, easement acreage must be included in analysis.
The first hypothesis attempts to show a relationship between average crop yields, or
perceived profit possibility, and WRP easements. This is analyzed using the average county
yields for the two leading crops in both states, corn for grain and soybeans. It is anticipated that
higher average yields will lead to less WRP easements. The second hypothesis in this study seeks
to display the significance of geographical rate caps in the study area. The geographical caps for
each state are shown in the Appendix Figure 1 for Illinois and Figure 2 for Wisconsin (Illinois
NRCS, 2010 and Wisconsin NRCS, 2010). As evident in the rate maps, non-cropland caps are
consistently lower than cropland caps. Due to the design of cap determination and incorporation
of land values, it seems apparent that geographical caps should aid efforts of equal easement
opportunity across counties. Therefore, hypothesis two uses a county analysis of the impact of
geographical rate caps with the anticipation that rate caps should not be correlated to WRP
easements. The third hypothesis to be tested seeks to define a relationship between urban areas
and wetland easements. As urban sprawl and development continue to affect rural land use, this
analysis allows a view of the impact of urban land needs on rural wetland conservation. This is
done through the use of the urban-rural continuum data developed by the USDA’s Economic
15
Research Service. Each county’s continuum code provides a measure of potential interaction
between nearby urban-related population. The levels range from one to nine; one constituting
total metropolitan areas and nine representing completely rural areas with no metropolitan
adjacencies and can be viewed in the Appendix, Figure 3 for Illinois and Figure 4 for Wisconsin.
It is anticipated that county codes will be correlated to WRP easements. More specifically,
hypothesis three seeks to test if higher urban influence leads to a decrease in wetlands easements.
Data required for this study varies from hypothesis to hypothesis, however geographical
information for all wetland easements in Illinois and Wisconsin are utilized in each test. Illinois
WRP easements as of July 2010 totaled 372 easements accounting for approximately 83,202
acres while Wisconsin had a total of 603 easements totaling 59,532 acres. Of all 72 counties in
Wisconsin, 16 Counties were not included in analysis because they have no current enrollment in
the WRP. Equally, in Illinois 39 counties were excluded from analysis. A map of the easements
and corresponding county can be viewed in the appendix, Figure 5 for Illinois and Figure 6 for
Wisconsin. Discussion of these exclusions and their effects will be presented later in this work
as well as the implications such an irregular distribution has on the overall value of the program.
Geographic Information Software (GIS) was used to display and group all data. Through
spatial overlays, the number and size of easements per county was calculated to use as the
dependent variable in analysis. Corresponding county crop production data, geographical rate
caps and urban-rural continuum codes were compiled for use as independent variable in analysis.
To summarize, data by county includes corn and soybean average yields, number of easements,
acres enrolled in the WRP, geographical rate cap, and rural-urban continuum code. This data is
then used for correlation and regression analysis in order to evaluate the proposed factors’ effects
on the WRP to offer avenues for future research on the topic of wetland conservation.
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5. Results
Statistical analyses were conducted for each state separately in order to show the differences
between factors potentially affecting the WRP in Illinois compared to Wisconsin. The results
from the correlations are presented in Table 1 for Illinois and Table 2 for Wisconsin.
Table 1: Illinois Correlations
Illinois County Data
Independent Variable
Easement Count
Easement Acres
Average Corn Yield
-0.115
(0.371)
-0.336
(0.007**)
Average Soybean Yield
-0.284
(0.024*)
-0.425
(0.001**)
Cropland Rate Cap
-0.167
(0.190)
-0.292
(0.020*)
Non-cropland Rate Cap
-0.078
(0.543)
-0.188
(0.141)
Urban Influence
0.273
(0.030*)
.391
(0.02**)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
Note: All tests are two-tailed.
In Illinois, corn and soybean yields along with cropland rate caps were found to be
negatively correlated to total easements per county. Generally, as county yields increase the total
number of WRP acres decreased. This supports the first hypothesis, that more productive
farmland and higher land value through perceived potential profits from agricultural production
have a negative effect on the WRP in Illinois. Similarly, as rate caps for cropland increased, total
acres decreased. Although this does not support hypothesis two, it does give more credence to
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hypothesis one. Due to the fact that cropland caps take into account farmland sales, it would
seem likely that higher rate caps would be found in areas with higher value land, ergo better
quality farmland that produces higher yields. Following this trend, land thought to be more
subjected to urban sprawl was found to have a negative correlation with WRP acres. Thus the
opportunity costs, in the form of foregone development rights, did seem to have a negative
impact upon WRP acres. The dependent variable of number of easements per county in Illinois
was significantly negatively correlated only to soybean yields and positively correlated to ruralurban codes. Thus, the remainder of this analysis and regression equation will be based upon
total easements.
Using the significant findings from the correlations in Illinois a regression equation was
calculated to present a model for county acres: This equation reads as follows:
County acres= Average corn yield + Average soybean yield +
Cropland Cap+ Urban influence
Applying the parameters found in the regression analysis this translates to county acres=2597+
.127(corn yield) + -1.050(soybean yield) -.0003(Cropland Cap)+2.134(continuum code). With an
R squared value of .219, it appears that this regression equation only begins to identify factors
involved in WRP easements.
Despite using identical equations and data collection protocols, statistical results for
Wisconsin’s voluntary wetland programs differed greatly. Whereas Illinois agriculture yields
were found significant, no correlation was found between yield data from Wisconsin and WRP
easement count, or total acres. These results do not support hypothesis one. Conversely,
geographical rate caps for both cropland and non-cropland seem to exhibit a positive relationship
to both easement acres. As rate caps increase, total acres increase as well. These results do not
support the second hypothesis, as there appears to be a positive relationship between Wisconsin
18
geographical rate caps and WRP easements. Furthermore, urban influence shows a negative
impact on the WRP in Wisconsin but was not found to be significant for easement count or total
acres. Although possible interpretations are offered the empirical results are as follows:
Table 2: Wisconsin Correlations
Wisconsin County Data
Independent Variable
Easement Count
Easement Acres
Average Corn Yield
0.207
(0.125)
0.256
(0.057)
Average Soybean Yield
0.200
(0.139)
0.182
(0.179)
Cropland Rate Cap
0.230
(0.088)
0.271
(0.043)*
Non-cropland Rate Cap
0.258
0.055
0.310
(0.20)*
Urban Influence
.020
(.885)
.039
(.773)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
Note: All tests are two-tailed.
The differences that surface through these analyses present an interesting avenue for
discussion. As noted previously, Wisconsin and Illinois wetland regulations and conservation
differ on many levels. It was hypothesized that agriculture yields would impact any WRP;
however results of statistical significance show a different realization. Whereas agriculture seems
to hold an inverse relationship to the WRP in Illinois, there appears to be no significant
relationship between the two in Wisconsin. Furthermore, geographical rate cap analysis shows
additional variance. The observed results do not support the previous hypothesis that rate caps
19
would not have a significant impact on WRP easements. Hypothesis three is also not fully
supported as the analysis shows that there is no significant correlation between urban influence
and easements in Wisconsin. However, there is a correlation present for Illinois that shows urban
influence decreases the amount of WRP acres. Evaluating excluded data along with other factors,
such as general wetland regulation differences, may help explain the differences observed in
these county level state analyses.
6. Conclusion and Significance of Study:
Conducting a comparative study can incorporate factors to help explain and identify differences.
Thus a comparison tool is employed for variances between two WRPs with the expectation that
it will provide grounds for discussion of improvements to existing circumstances affecting the
easement program. The WRP data sets and areas studied are similar in some aspects but differ in
others. These differences become the focus of examination with an objective to determine how
the cases vary and through doing so, reveal the general underlying structure which generates or
allows such a variation. It was expected that correlations would not be as strong or apparent for
Wisconsin displaying that the state may be experiencing less limiting factors than Illinois due to
variables outside of those tested in this study including higher levels of wetland education and
regulation in the form of both wetland quality standards and jurisdiction in Wisconsin.
Although limiting factors were not found significant for Wisconsin, the comparison
between the two states is still serviceable as both states follow a common trend across the United
States of extreme decreases in wetland acres. Illinois has lost over 90 percent of its original
wetlands, ranking fifth of all states in total wetland acre loss (Dahl, 1990). In Wisconsin, nearly
half of the 10 million acres of wetlands present in the 1800s have been lost (Wisconsin Wetland
20
Team, 2008). Wetland loss is beginning to level off with the assistance of state regulation;
however, wetland regulation is complex and unique to each state. Illinois regulation of wetlands,
broadly stated, is less stringent than the regulation of wetlands in Wisconsin. Some major
differences that help account for this perception include Wisconsin’s defined compliance and
enforcement that is above requirements in Section 404 of the CWA, and proactive wetland
protection laws in reaction to court decisions (SWANNC) that limit regulation of nonnavigable
intrastate “isolated” wetlands (ELI, 2007). All of these studied attributes of wetland regulation
do not take into account the influence of voluntary wetland conservation on rural lands and more
specifically utilization of the WRP. The findings in this study can supplement these broad
conclusions of overall environmental policy differences and begin to explain the observed
differences in the WRPs within the last three years. As it is apparent that Illinois has struggled in
comparison to Wisconsin, entering into roughly half of the easements for half of the acres of
wetland conservation since 2009, the significant correlations found in this study could be an
indicator of the observed differences, and the program’s success in the future.
It is well represented by scholars, and hopefully this paper, that wetland management is
complex, difficult and heavily reliant upon state action and initiative. Although some may look
towards more stringent federal action, the results of this study emphasize the need for state
specific policies. Through the analysis of two neighboring states’ WRPs it appears that
management is not universal or easily applied to all areas. Rather, each state’s geographical and
economical makeup requires different approaches and strategies for successful wetland
management. In Illinois intensive uses, such as agriculture, are posing an obstacle to the WRP
that will continue on into the future of the program. Geographical rate caps further exhibit the
need for state specific policy. One would hope that Illinois would tailor geographical rate caps in
21
order to give an equal advantage to all areas to be enrolled in the program, based upon the use
value of the land. However, it appears that attempts to do so are falling short as it does not
weigh the influence of agriculture heavily enough. Equally, Illinois does not appear to be
attempting to incorporate another major land use, that for development, especially in areas
around the urban fringe. This is unfortunate as it both limits the amount of acres likely to be
enrolled and further restrains the benefits of wetlands to areas with smaller populations. Taken
together, these two findings violate two of the three factors that influence voluntary conservation
the most, opportunity costs and land quality. (Parks and Kramer 1995). Wisconsin appears to be
faring better with both of these factors, perhaps with better incorporation of both opportunity
costs and land value as urban influence and agriculture were not found to significantly impact
easement acres. Additionally, these values appear to be better represented in both cropland and
non-cropland rate caps as higher rate caps were found to lead to higher participation. It should be
noted however that although the factors analyzed in this study did not prove limiting to
Wisconsin’s program, there is still much to be accomplished, especially in regards to
proportional benefits across the state of the WRP.
In the process of data collection and analysis it became adherently apparent that wetlands
conserved under the WRP are not evenly distributed throughout the state. Not only does this
complicate analysis by a limited sample size, but it also shows that not all areas are benefiting
proportionally from the program. For a visual representation please view Figures 5 and 6 in the
Appendix. This observation is noteworthy because wetland filtration is increasingly important in
areas where runoff from crop fields is one of the primary sources of non-point source pollution.
Perhaps, this is more significant in the state of Illinois which supports more river wetland areas
than any other state. Agricultural runoff often contains chemical residuals from herbicides and
22
pesticides which flow into nearby creeks and streams ending up in drinking water sources. This
presents a problem, as nearly 100% of self-supplied water is from groundwater (Baumgartner
2006). Normal treatment methods at water treatment facilities are able to remove many of these
contaminants before sending the water on to consumers, but in some cases the pollutant levels
are abnormally high or require extra treatment. Self-supplied sources, such as rural wells serving
individual families, may not receive any treatment for these contaminants, and are most likely to
be located in agricultural areas most susceptible to pesticide runoff. Since wetlands have the
capability to lower the concentrations of these pollutants, an increased presence of quality
wetlands in these areas would help to lessen chemical concentrations resulting from runoff. More
importantly, the loss of wetlands in rural areas warrants investigation as there seems to be some
unintended consequences of current methods. As it appears that the current trend of WRP
enrollment will continue, perhaps other methods should be promoted that help negate these
effects and offer more control and oversight for equally distributed benefits of wetlands.
One such method that has the potential to fill in the gaps of the WRP is mitigation
banking for wetland loss. Over a hundred million acres of wetlands have been eradicated in the
continental United States (Dahl and Allord 1997). The numerous benefits that they would have
provided to the landscape and to the general public are lost, often in order to meet an expanding
population’s needs for more farmland or metropolitan growth. Traditionally, the preferred
method of rural wetland compensation is on-site mitigation where the developer must recreate
the wetland at the same site where it is destroyed. Another option is in-lieu fees where
developers pay fines that go towards wetland rehabilitation. According to environmental policy
experts, the method of compensatory mitigation is the most effective way for achieving the
national goal of “no net loss” of wetlands established by the Bush Administration in 1989
23
(USEPA 2005). This method is regarded as a moderately successful market based program
which allows the selling of wetland units located in natural resource banks in rural areas by
urban and metropolitan developers who need to legally compensate for any wetland losses that
result from their development projects. Although this tool is available to farmers, most banking
activity is by private metropolitan developers and public regulatory communities. Traditionally,
farmers have compensated for wetland using on-site mitigation because they have the additional
ground necessary to do so. Experts claim, however, that banking mitigation off-site has more
ecological and financial benefits for agricultural producers because off-site wetlands are more
efficient and better maintained (Hemminger 2003). Therefore, this method has the ability to offer
further stability in rural wetland acres and conservation, when used in addition to the WRP.
On both a federal and state level, wetlands on public land have been held to a higher
standard for destruction of, and construction on, wetlands because of the difficulty presented by
judicial interpretation outlined previously. As such, it appears that a public policy initiative that
promotes mitigation banking for rural communities may change farmer perceptions. This might
come to a regulatory fruition if there is a meaningful increase of governmental, university, and
industry reports that explain the scientific and monetary acceptance of banking mitigation. Many
political scientists who study environmental policy have argued that green decision making
consists of scientific knowledge, specific technology, complicated economics, and political
ethics (Dryzek 1997; Paehlke 1990). We hope that our research can suggest that despite the
limits of the WRP, farmers’ perspectives of wetland conservation are similar to urban developers
who are legally forced to balance sustainable economic growth with ecological preservation.
Ergo, a consequence of this study is to question if farmers ought to adopt the way urban policy
planners and metropolitan administrators rationally manage the benefits and risks of wetland
24
banks. The farming communities risk perception of wetland preservation is noteworthy because
the current policy and practice is voluntary and growers who conserve or restore watershed
property make their own decision, notify a governmental office, and must follow all specific
environmental guidelines without assistance.
The ostensibly silenced voices of farmers in wetland conservation and banking mitigation
is unfortunate because farmers have the practical knowledge that could resolve many policy
disputes between the scientific community, which encourages further research and development
of wetland restoration and preservation. The modern and conventional farming community who
traditionally refute the importance of state sponsored environmentalism might consider the
ecological and economic benefits of market based voluntary programs like WRP. Given the
technically specific knowledge of environmental policy today, however, democratic values and
traditional political perceptions are often dominated by technology, science, and regulations that
do not encourage participation in new programs. This study which investigates rural programs
for wetland conservation by analyzing current practices that favor economic gain over
environmental benefit may facilitate new wetland conversations on the most propitious approach
to successful management of rural wetlands.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: Ms. Poletti thanks the graduate school at Southern Illinois
University Edwardsville for their financial support. Additionally, we acknowledge the benefits
received from anonymous reviewers of this study. Finally, we thank panel members at the 2012
Annual Meetings of the Western Political Science Association who offered critical feedback on
this manuscript.
28
APPENDICES
Figure1: Illinois WRP Geographical Rate Caps (Illinois NRCS, 2010)
29
Figure 2: Wisconsin WRP Geographical Rate Caps (Wisconsin NRCS, 2010)
30
Figure 3: Illinois Rural-Urban Continuum Codes (USDA Economic Research Service, 2003)
31
Figure 4: Wisconsin Rural-Urban Continuum Codes (USDA Economic Research Service, 2003)
32
Figure 5: Locations of Illinois WRP easements and representation of corresponding acres
33
Figure 6: Locations of Wisconsin WRP easements and representation of corresponding acres