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“Is Milgram’s Deceptive Research Ethically Acceptable?” by Diana Baumrind: Two
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comments
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By Augustine Brannigan
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Professor Emeritus of Sociology, University of Calgary
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At the recent 2013 “Obedience to Authority Conference” at the University of
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Nipissing (Bracebridge Campus August 6-8), Arthur G. Miller commented that, in his view,
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Diana Baumrind’s latest analysis of Milgram’s ethics continued to be as intemperate, angry
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and imbalanced as ever. At that point I had not read her position, so it was difficult to either
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agree or disagree with his assessment. Having now read her contribution, I would have to
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disagree with Professor Miller, but I understand his misgivings. Professor Baumrind takes
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a very principled position that premises the consent of the experimental subjects to a full,
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a priori briefing on the objectives and methods of the experiment. In this comment, I offer
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two basic points that I believe better ground Professor Baumrind’s critique of Milgram
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without necessarily taking sides with the Milgram establishment or its critics. My first point
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raises questions about the use of random assignment of subjects to investigate the outcomes
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of alternative treatment regimes, and the limits of disclosure that are essential to ensure the
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reliability of scientific inferences about treatment effects. Here I believe Professor Baumrind
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overstates her case both conceptually and linguistically. My second point is based on recent
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archival analyses of the questionable protocols that Milgram actually employed in his
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research, and that were never acknowledged in his publications. This material gives
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Professor Baumrind even more powerful reasons to challenge the ethics of his work,
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although these were not the points from which her critique was drawn.
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First point. Clinical treatment regimes in medicine, psychiatry and other applied
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fields rely on experimental evidence of treatment effects based on random assignments of
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subjects to a treatment condition (or multiple alternative treatments), and a placebo, or non-
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treatment condition. The concept of placebo makes it profoundly ill advised to inform the
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participants to which condition they have been assigned since this knowledge introduces a
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potential expectation effect that undermines the logic of random assignment. The fact is that
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in many cases where there is legitimate disagreement about the efficacy of alternative
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interventions the ‘random assignment controlled experiment’ is the gold standard for
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resolving such disagreements, and contributing to the growth of knowledge. It is not a
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fundamental human right to be informed to which condition one has been assigned in these
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types of experiments. It falls short of fully informed consent (to avoid confounding the
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treatment effect with placebo expectations), but never approaches outright coercion, as in
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the German and Japanese medical experiments on detained prisoners during World War II.
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This suggests that the use of this type of methodology and its required subject naiveté is
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morally defensible. Consequently, it would be incorrect to say that participants have been
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the subject of “lying” and “deceit,” as Baumrind suggests. These terms are deeply
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prejudicial, and connote professional culpability. It is more accurate to say that participants
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have entered into a social exchange in which their participation is “blind” for defensible
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methodological reasons, and their naiveté is accepted with some expectation, however
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vague, of a social benefit.
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Do the Milgram experiments meet the standards that we find in clinical trials? There
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was actually no placebo group in Milgram – unless one counts the preliminary protocols in
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which subjects received no feedback of harm to the learner, and all subjects administered
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the maximum shock level. However, we have numerous alternative treatment effects based
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on proximity, gender, group intervention, location, etc. What is the quantum of scientific
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insight about human social behaviour that is learned uniquely through such random
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assignment controlled experiments, and does it justify the misrepresentation of the rationale
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of the experiment to potential recruits? Professor Baumrind is skeptical that Milgram
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uncovered anything truly unexpected or novel, or attributable exclusively to his
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methodology. That is a view that I share in a recent work on genocide (Brannigan 2013).
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However, that does not mean that his work was unethical. It simply means that, in spite of
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his blind protocol, he never made much scientific progress. Consider the clinical case in the
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same light. I do not believe that many observers would condemn as unethical a clinician who
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tested the effects of alternative treatment interventions (such as drugs or therapies) through
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random assignment of subjects, but failed to identify significant, alternative treatment
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outcomes. The evaluation of the ethical propriety of double blind testing cannot be linked
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exclusively to specific successful achievements. On the other hand, Baumrind’s position
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would be more compelling if the case could be made that the extensive utilization of
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deceptive cover stories during the golden age of experimental social psychology generally
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had not yielded cumulative, non-trial knowledge that enjoyed significant consensus in the
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profession, but nonetheless continued to premise its research protocols on secrecy. That is
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a tall order to meet, but it would clearly differentiate the justification of blind treatments in
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clinical work that have enjoyed palpable results, and the more general field of experimental
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social psychology where such as case has been harder to make (Brannigan 2004). I do not
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believe that Professor Baumrind’s misgivings about the achievements of this particular case
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approach a general condemnation of blind assignment in contemporary psychological
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experiments that sets them essentially apart from the use of this methodology. Given its
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efficacy in other fields, we have no grounds to equate blind assignment per se to lying.
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Having said that, the clinical model, as opposed to the psychological model, is
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sensitive to the need to revise protocols to terminate treatments that were unexpectedly
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adverse, on the one hand, and ultimately to gravitate the placebo group into the experimental
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treatment where this was more effective on the other. Here Baumrind makes an excellent
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point: whatever reservations Milgram may have had about adverse reactions, there is no
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evidence that he significantly altered his protocols to minimize these outcomes, and in this
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respect his blind assignment was qualitatively different from revisions found in, for
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example, such studies as the CAST studies of ventricular arrhythmia following cardiac
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infarctions. Certain drug therapies designed to suppress arrhythmia that was thought to be
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associated with subsequent fatal heart attacks produced increased fatalities in a small
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number of subjects, contrary to expectations. The medicine fixed the arrhythmias but killed
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the patients! Adjustments were made to drug trials to differentiate the arrhythmia
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suppression drugs implicated, and the different vulnerabilities of the patients to counter this
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unexpected effect (Pratt and Moyé 1995). In other words, the blind process was dynamic,
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and subject to review depending on the very serious mortality outcomes. Milgram seems to
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have given little consideration to this possibility. His work was not premised on identifying
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an optimum solution or amelioration of destructive obedience. This stands him apart from
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the more narrowly focused clinical utilization of ‘random assignment with control’ method,
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but it dos not automatically obviate all social benefits from this type of method in the social
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sciences.
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I turn now to my second point. Recent archival work on the Milgram archives by
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Nicholson, Gibson and Perry provides a much more nuanced account of how the experiment
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was carried out than was generally reported. Baumrind omits any reference to this work. Ian
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Nicholson (2011) explicitly describes the laboratory conditions at Milgram’s Yale as
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“torture.” Nicholson focuses on debriefing of several subjects by psychiatrist, Paul Errera,
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who received reports of significant levels of trauma among subjects in the aftermath of the
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experiment, and from Milgram’s 1962 “reaction of subjects” report. Indeed, Milgram reports
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being ‘clobbered’ by professional criticism of his methods and, according to Nicholson, he
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“evidently decided to lie his way out through the criticism” (p. 744-45), and to report, in
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Nicholson’s term, “dishonestly” that all his subjects were adequately debriefed immediately
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following the experiment. Nicholson employs the term “lying” to suggest a departure from
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professional protocol. “It is clear from the archival record that Milgram did traumatize many
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of his participants and there is evidence that in several cases he did not help his participants
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adequately deal with what they had experienced” (p. 746). All this contradicts reports from
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the Milgram establishment that the negative experiences were minor, transitory and
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tolerable. These conclusions amplify Baumrind’s skepticism.
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Gina Perry is an Australian journalist who has broadcast several documentaries on
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the research of leading psychologists such as Sherif and Milgram. Again, Baumrind omits
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reference to this work. The Milgram experiment was replicated at La Trobe University’s
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psychology department in Melbourne in the 1970s, but never published. Perry came across
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several accounts of long-lasting trauma from psychology majors who participated in the
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study as program requirements, a condition approaching compulsion, and reflecting
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Baumrind’s misgivings about voluntariness. Given the poverty of documentary materials
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surviving the unpublished replication, Perry undertook an investigation of the original Yale
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archives. Her work took 4 years of international travel throughout North America and
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resulted in a provocative book, Behind the Shock Machine (2012). Some of her key findings
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include the following. First, she was able to contact several of the original subjects, and
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found high levels of trauma, resentment, and misgivings among them based on their
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experiences. Her book is a moving portrayal of the reactions of subjects contacted decades
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after their exposure to the experiment and still smarting from their experiences. Second, one
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reason for this trauma was that the vast majority of subjects were not “de-hoaxed”
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(Milgram’s expression for de-briefing) immediately after the study, and the majority
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departed Yale believing that they had administered electrical shocks to an innocent man, in
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some cases, a man with a reported heart condition. Subjects who were debriefed were told
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that their reactions, whether defiant or obedient, were normal. Milgram later characterized
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the compliance of the obedient subjects as “shockingly immoral.” Third, certain subjects did
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not accept the cover story about a learning experiment, did not believe anyone was hurt, and
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complied accordingly. Milgram broadly rejected their skepticism as denial of their
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culpability. However, Milgram’s assistant, Taketo Murata, wrote a report that suggested that
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in the vast majority of treatment groups where subjects suspected that anyone was getting
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hurt, the mean shock levels were lower, indicating that aggression declined where harm was
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suspected. There was other evidence of suspicious subject reactions. Many asked the
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Learner to bang on the wall if he could hear them, and offered to switch places. In many
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cases the Teachers emphasized the correct responses orally to encourage the Learner – all
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to no avail, and all drawing into question the internal validity of the protocol. Fourth, the
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Scientist, Mr. Williams, did not adhere rigidly to the 4-prong protocol for orders to pressure
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subjects to obey. The evidence of this was especially evident in the all-female condition.
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One subject was challenged 26 times. Another sat for a half-hour in defiance as Mr.
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Williams offered her a coffee to encourage compliance. This draws into question the
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assumption of standardization of the various treatment groups. A similar point was made by
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Stephen Gibson (2011) who found evidence that at several points at the insistence of
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subjects, Mr. Williams left the room supposedly to consult with the Learner to determine
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if he wished to continue. He reported that he was willing to continue, a fact that contradicted
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the internal validity of the violence. Finally, Milgram suppressed the results of the intimate
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relationships design in which close family members were matched as teachers and learners.
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His evidence of defiance – 85% – contradicted the power he attributed to the transitory
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‘situational determinants of action,’ i.e. bureaucracy, and suggested that the almighty ‘power
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of the situation’ was mediated by longer-term relationships based on intimacy.
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On the side of her arguments that emphasize harm to subjects, the unacknowledged
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fiduciary responsibility towards subjects, and the deficient transparency of Milgram’s
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methods, Bauman’s position could be considerably strengthened by acknowledgement of
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these materials. I hope my comments have contributed in that direction. This will be of little
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consolation to the Milgram establishment who have never acknowledged that the questions
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of ethical problems in Milgram’s work have been far graver than they have ever
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acknowledged. The full Yale archives need to be released to the general public after
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removing any personal references to individual subjects. Only then will we be able to draw
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more reliable conclusions about the ethical and methodological integrity of this classic
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study.
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References
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Brannigan, Augustine (2004) The Rise and Fall of Social Psychology: The Use and Misuse
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of the Experimental Method, New Brunswick: Aldine-Transaction.
Brannigan, Augustine (2013) Beyond the Banality of Evil: Genocide and Criminology,
Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
Pratt, Craig M. & Moyé, Lemuel A. (1995) “The Cardiac Arrhythmia Suppression Trial,”
Circulation 91: 245-247.
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Gibson, Stephen (2011) “Milgram’s obedience experiments: A rhetorical analysis,” British
Journal of Psychology DOI:10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02070.x
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Nicholson, Ian (2011) ''Torture at Yale'': Experimental subjects, laboratory torment and
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the ''rehabilitation'' of Milgram's ''Obedience to Authority,'' Theory and
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Psychology 21 (6): 737-761. DOI: 10.1177/0959354311420199
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Perry, Gina (2012) Behind the Shock Machine, Melbourne: Scribe Books. Revised
and re-released in 2013 by New York: The New Press.
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