Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Response to Nationalism
Chapter 5
T
he previous chapter treated those Muslim scholars‟ response to
nationalism who refuted it for its not having genuine roots and
principles rather creates fragments and discriminations on
superficial basis. The present chapter will focus on another elite Muslim
figure of the early twentieth century, namely, Muhammad Ali Jinnah who
though was more an intellectual than a scholar in the strict sense of the
term. However, in general way, he can be read as a Muslim scholar. He
was earlier supporter of Indian nationalism represented by Indian
National Congress but later on turned to Muslim nationalism. He has,
therefore, a mixed attitude towards nationalism.
5:1. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and His Ideas about
Nationalism
Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the most enigmatic, stubborn and
prosaic among the leaders who shaped the density of Modern India. He
was born at Karachi in 1875 or 1876. According to his school register at
Karachi, he was born on 20th October 1875. But Jinnah always said that
he was born on 25th December 1876 (Sunday). He came of a lower
middle-class family, his father Jinnah Poonja being a small hide
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merchant.1The family originally came form Kathiawad (now in Gujarat),
and had been converted from Hinduism to Islam some generations earlier.
The Jinnahs belonged to the Khoja (followers of the Aga Khan) sect
among the Muslims. Jinnah had two brothers, Ahmed Ali and Bande Ali,
who remained quite obscure even when Jinnah was at the height of his
reputation and influence, and three sisters, Fatima, Maryam and Shireen.2
Jinnah was sent to a primary school at Karachi at the age of six. In 188586 he was at the Gokuldas Tejpal Primary School in Bombay. Returning
to Karachi he studied for a few years at the Sindh Madrasa High School
and then at the Christian Missionary Society High School. In 1892, he
was sent to England to qualify himself for the Bar, at the persuasion for
an English exchange broker, Frederick Leighcroft. He was called to the
Bar from the Lincoln‟s Inn in 1896. The four years in England he turned
to good use by extensive studies in the British Museum, closely watching
the British parliamentary system and taking an intelligent interest in
public affairs.3
In the history of Indian Muslim life and thought, Muhammad Ali
Jinnah (1876-1948) is one of the most striking and enigmatic figures4.
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Quaid-i-Azam to millions of Muslims in the
South Asian subcontinent, father of the Pakistan movement, founder and
first helmsman of the brand new state of Pakistan, was a man of profound
political instincts and great political skills. To carve out a state where
there had never before been one, and to do so without an army or a
guerrilla movement backing it, cannot but be an achievement of a very
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astute politician. That he was successful in securing the establishment of
the state of Pakistan on August 14th , 19475.
When Jinnah rose to the supreme leadership of Indian Muslims in
1937, it was not by his own seeking. Rather, it was a case of a people of
finding a leader to match the hour. By then, Jinnah had behind him three
crowded decades of public life and service6. Within a decade of his return
to India, Jinnah started taking an active interest in politics which, apart
from Law, remained his dominating passion for the rest of his life.
Jinnah‟s public career may be divided into four distinct periods: from
1906 to 1920, when he was a fighting nationalist, a great Congress leader
and a believer in secularism and national unity; from 1920 to 1928, when
he withdrew himself from the Congress but yet remained a believer in his
earlier ideals; from 1928 to 1937, when he gradually changed his political
complexion and came to identify himself more and more with the
Muslim League and its separatist ideas; and finally from 1937 to 1947.7
In this first phase of his political career encompassing the period of
his deep involvement with the Congress (1906-20), Jinnah called himself
an Indian rather than a Muslim. In this phase, he was concerned with the
regeneration of Indians as a whole rather than that of Muslims alone; he
was dedicated to the cause of Indian independence. He felt, that the
Muslims would be co-partners along with the Hindus rather strive only
for Muslim freedom. He was, above all, a confirmed “nationalist”8.
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Dr. Ajeet Jawed has quoted Legislative Assembly debates, March
16, 1925, Vol. 1, p. 478 in his book, Secular and Nationalist Jinnah, in
which Muhammad Ali Jinnah had once said:
9
I am a nationalist first, a nationalist second and a nationalist last .
Jinnah appeared on the Indian political scene as a great patriot with
a burning desire for the emancipation of his country from the foreign
rule, he joined the Indian National Congress which had become a symbol
of Indian nationalism and very swiftly acquired a place for himself
among its top ranking leaders. He worked along with Dadabhai Nauroji,
Gokhale, Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, Surendra Nath Banerjee, Sir Badr udDin Tyabji and C. R. Das, the great political leader of modern India. He
had great respect for them and regarded the first two his political gurus 10.
For sometime he acted as private secretary to Dadabhoy Nauroji. Bolitho
rightly holds that “it is reasonable to suppose that Jinnah learned much
from Nauroji‟s speeches; that he absorbed some ideas from the Grand
Old Man”11. Jinnah was also a friend of Gokhale. He is also reported to
have said that “It is my ambition to become a Muslim Gokhale”12. He
was also influenced by Surendranath Banerjee and C. R. Das. He says, “I
learnt my first lesson in politics at the feet of Sir Surendranath Banerjee. I
looked upto him as a leader”. The lesson which he drew from the career
of S. N. Banerjee and C. R. Das was “that in unity lies salvation”13.
Both Nauroji and Gokhale had “recognized in him, even in those
early years, promising signs of his political career. They were favourably
impressed by his patriotic spirit, courage, independence, spirit of service
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and organizing ability”. They took him under their wings and young
Jinnah vowed to accomplish his mentor‟s task of taking India to the road
of liberation, integration, peace, progress and prosperity.
Jinnah had faith in the principles of liberal politics. He was a
constitutionalist and believed in the peaceful and legitimate methods of
achieving self-government. He was against violence, blood-shed or any
other revolutionary means for obtaining this goal and because of this he
joined the moderate group within the Congress. He attended the Congress
session for the first time in 1904 and was selected along with Surendra
Nath Banerjee, Lala Lajpat Rai and Gokhale to place the claims of India
before the political leaders in England. In 1906 Jinnah attended the
Congress session of Calcutta as a Secretary to Dadabhai Nauroji, the
president of the Congress. It was Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya who
introduced Jinnah and persuaded him to make a speech which was
Jinnah‟s first speech on the platform of the Indian National Congress
held at Surat in 1907 where the split between the moderates and
extremists took place14. Jinnah opposed such onslaughts of the extremists
and sided with the moderates as for him politics was a gentleman‟s game.
Under the guidance of his moderate leaders, Jinnah worked sincerely for
the national cause15. He tried to explain and interpret the actual process of
social, political and economic change in terms of his doctrine of
liberalism16. The core of liberalism as an ideology is liberty – civil, fiscal,
personal, social, economic, political, national and international. Jinnah
believed in that liberalism which implies “the inherent moral worth and
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spiritual equality of each individual, the dignity of human personality, the
autonomy of individual will and essential rationality of men”. But liberty
demands law. The resultant is equality, impartial judiciary, cheap
procedure and accessible courts, abolition of privileges of class, abolition
of power of money. Thus Jinnah‟s liberal creed stood for freedom,
constitutionalism, and the absence of any type of fanaticism in political
and social life. The elements of his liberalism were cooperation with the
British government constitutional agitation for the right cause, unity of
country, and rule of law17. Jinnah adhered to it because he was the
spokesman of the liberal middle class and his middle class liberalism
could express the intellectual and economic aspirations of the middle
class of all the communities18.
It was the opinion of Jinnah that Indian nationalism was the
product of British rule in this country. The English language, the British
system of education, and the establishment of universities contributed to
a considerable extent to the making of Indian nationalism. Indian
nationalism was more than a question of the attitude of Indians towards
the British government. He was inclined to think that they were only of a
religious character and were of no political significance. He often
emphasized the necessity of friendly relationship between the Hindus and
Muslims. He always advised the Hindus as well as the Muslims to create
and maintain mutual goodwill and brotherly feelings. This was a
permanent political necessity. Religion, he felt was no hindrance and
Islam also enjoins Muslims to live peacefully with the people professing
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different religions. And to Jinnah religion was a private affair of the
individual. This was the basic of his theory of nationality19.
Jinnah sincerely followed the footsteps of his mentors Dadabhai
Nauroji and Gokhale who laid great stress on Hindu-Muslim unity and
devoted all his energies to the strengthening of ties between the two
communities. He was fearless, incorruptible and had no desire for any
post of position from the government. He thought and worked for the
well-being of the Indian people and not of a particular community. It is
because of this that he commanded love, respect and regards from all the
communities and had a large following among both Hindus and Muslims.
He was given importance in all the political circles and his views carried
weight. He believed in equality of all the people and was against any
special favours to be given to any particular community20.
Jinnah made hard efforts to bring the Hindus and Muslims together
by wiping out the influence of the communal leaders of their respective
communities and making them aware of the mischievous government to
divide them. Unity of the people and integrity of the country became a
mission of his life. His efforts in this direction bore fruit in 1916 when
the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League decided
to join hands and fight together for self-government. Jinnah‟s success
greatly strengthened the nationalism and his contribution was lauded and
appreciated by all the nationalist forces. He was hailed not only as the
“best ambassador” but an “emblem of Hindu-Muslim unity”. He
continued making efforts to keep people united in order to achieve
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India‟s freedom despite disappointments and failures till the end of the
fourth decade of the 20th century21.
In the 23rd session of the Congress held at Calcutta in 1905, Jinnah
boldly declared:
I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the Muhammadan
community should be treated in the same way as the Hindu
community. The foundation upon which the Indian National
Congress is based is that we are all equal, that there should be no
reservation for any community22.
Jinnah opposed the partition of Bengal which intended to break the
unity of the Hindus and Muslims 23. He started out as an Indian nationalist
in 1906 when he first attended the Congress session. He was opposed to
his demand of separate electorates and did not join the Muslim League
until 1913. When he did join it in London at the persuasion of Maulana
Mahmud Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan, he made a condition that his League
membership would not be a bar to the larger national cause he was
working for. But this stipulation seems to be directed more against the
League creed of loyalty to the British Crown than against the Muslim
character of the League, for not only had he accepted election to the
Imperial Legislative Council in 1910 by the Muslims of Bombay, but one
of his earliest actions as a legislator was to introduce the Muslim Waqf
property Bill in that legislature. It was also on a resolution on Muslim
Waqf Property that he delivered his first speech in the Congress in 1906.
True, under his presidentship he steered the League to come closer to the
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Congress and adopt similar resolutions, which it did between 1915 and
1922, and in 1916 he and Tilak fathered the Lucknow pact for the League
and the Congress (though the Congress President in 1916 was A.C.
Majumdar) respectively. But the Lucknow Pact was based upon the
Congress recognition of the League as the spokesman of the Muslims and
the accommodation of specific Muslim demands for their safeguards.
Though initially opposed to separate electorates for Muslims 24, and
proclaimed “an acknowledged „ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity‟”25
by his Congress comrades, Jinnah, already in 1916, was advocating that
Muslim representation to various legislatures „should be secured … by
means of separate electorates.. The demand for separate electorates is not a
matter of policy but a mater of necessity to the Muslims, who require to be
roused from the coma and torpor into which they had fallen so long‟26.
He was also against separate Electorate given to the Muslim
community. He prepared ground for holding a unity conference in 1910
at Allahabad. Negotiations were held with the Muslim leaders. Jinnah
represented the Congress in these talks27. In the same year he was elected
the member of the deputation that was to wait upon the viceroy of India
to place before him the Congress point of view28. Jinnah left no stone
unturned to bring two communities together. He presided over a meeting
of Anjuman-i-Islam at Bombay in 1913 and there he said, “Salvation of
India lies in the true union of the people and here onward march of
progress depends upon the constitutional and constructive methods29. In
the year 1915, Jinnah was the president of the Muslim Students Union.
On February 13 of the same year Jinnah in his inaugural address said:
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Then again one of the chief objects should always be
cooperation, unity and goodwill not only among the different
sections of Muhammadans but also sections of Muhammadans
30
and other communities of the country .
Jinnah was in the forefront of the Congress as well as the Muslim
League. With cooperation from Tilak, Jinnah succeeded in making the
two organizations to sign a pact which is famous as Lucknow Pact or
Tilak-Jinnah pact31. Jinnah was the principle architect of the Lucknow
Pact of Hindu-Muslim unity. He presided over the League session at
Lucknow in December 1916. It seemed that the liberal wing in the
League was in complete ascendancy. Jinnah observed:
Towards the Hindus our attitude should be of goodwill and
brotherly feelings. Cooperation in the cause of our motherland
should be our guiding principle. India‟s real progress can only be
achieved by a true understanding and harmonous relations
between the two great sister communities. With regard to our
own affairs, we can depend upon nobody but ourselves32.
Jinnah appealed to them to shed off the attitude of self-gain. He
said:
We should not loose the sympathy of our well-wishers in India
and England by creating a wrong impression that we as a
community, are out only for self-interest and self-gain. We must
show by our words and deeds that we sincerely and earnestly
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desire a healthy national unity. For the rest, the 70 millions of
Musalmans need not fear33.
The Colonial government got perturbed about this undesirable
development, the unity between the two could threaten their rule in the
country, hence the government announced the appointment of Simon
Commission34 to scan the Indian view about the reforms35. Jinnah once
again was in the forefront of the nationalist forces determined to oppose
the Simon Commission. Along with Sapru Dinshaw Petit, Ali Imam,
Abdur Rahim and others Jinnah signed a manifestor protesting against
the exclusion of Indians from the Commission. A committee under the
leadership of Jinnah and setalved as formed to propagate the boycott of
the Commission. He also warned the communal leaders of both the
communities not to disrupt the unity against the commission by dividing
the people on the communal lines. In a public meeting held in December
1927, Jinnah declared:
I warn those who want to exploit Muhammadans to leave off
their duty miserably. If they try it, they will fail miserably as they
have failed in the past. I appeal to you Hindus not to pass your
judgment on the Muslims prematurely. Do not doubt or blame
them. I appeal to you, the major community to be true to your
faith, and if you do that, let me tell you that the minor
communities including the Muslims will follow you36.
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5:2. Change in Jinnah’s Thought
By the end of the third decade of the 20th century, there was a seachange in Jinnah‟s ideas and ideals. From an uncompromising secular
nationalist of Nauroji and Gokhale‟s mould, Jinnah turned into a leader
of reactionary and communal forces. An Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim
unity and an Apostle of United India marched ahead and demanded a
separate nation for Muslims.
Many explanations have been given for this somersault of Jinnah.
The communal Hindu thinkers found the change in Jinnah when he left
the Congress and raised demands for the sectional interests of the
Muslims. To some Jinnah was unable to reconcile to the second position
or place within the Congress. To others, Jinnah was egoistic, arrogant and
was in League with British who encouraged him to part with the
Congress and establish Pakistan37.
Stream and the Muslim communal forces in wooing him as the
only Muslim leader who could lead them. There were other important
factors like the presence of the third party, the British as the final
decision-maker, the international situation, the increasing economic
power of the Hindu bourgeoisie and its hold over the Congress
leadership, the attitude of some of the rapid growth and the militancy of
the Hindu communal organizations and their influence on the Congress
policies along with Jinnah‟s demands38.
Gandhiji‟s attitude and approach dishearted Jinnah who wanted to
strengthen the nationalist movement by uniting the two communities, the
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Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Response to Nationalism
Chapter 5
way he had done in 1916 at Lucknow. He approached other Congress
leaders as Gandhiji had left the Congress. He formulated Delhi proposals
for solving the conflict between the two communities. It caused a split in
the Muslim League. Jinnah was dubbed as Congress agent by antiCongress Muslim Leaguers but he was not deterred39.
On one side it was Gandhijis approach which dishearted Jinnah
and on other side it was Nehru report which disappointed him. An All
Parties National Convention was called on November 22, 1928 in order
to secure general approval of the Nehru report and the Draft Constitution
prepared by the Nehru Committee40.
The following are the recommendations on communal matters:
I.
There shall be joint mixed electorates throughout India for
the House of Representatives and the provincial legislatures.
II.
There shall be no reservation of seats for the House of
Representatives except for Muslims in provinces where they
are in a minority and non-Muslims in the N.W.F. province.
Such reservation will be in strict proportion to the Muslim
population in every province where they are in a minority
and in proportion to the non-Muslim population in N.W.F.
province. The Muslims or non-Muslims where reservation is
allowed to them shall have the right to contest additional
seats.
III.
In the provinces
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Chapter 5
a. There shall be no reservation of seats for any community in
the Punjab and Bengal;
b. In provinces other than the Punjab and Bengal there will be
reservation basis with the right to contest additional seats;
c. In the N.W.F. province there shall be similar reservation of
seats for non-Muslims with the right to contest other seats.
IV.
Reservation of seats where allowed shall be for a fixed
period of ten years.
V.
Sind should be separated from Bombay and constituted into
a separate province after such enquiry about the financial
position as may be considered necessary.
VI.
Parts of Karnataka, except the small islands on the other side
of the Mysore territory, should primarily be separated from
the provinces in which they are at present included and
formed into a single separate province.
VII. The N.W.F. province, and all newly formed provinces by
separation from other provinces, shall have the same form of
government as the other provinces in India41.
The League was also invited and Jinnah, as its President, managed
to prevail upon the Central Khilafat Committee – which had decided to
boycott the Convention – to join the League for a united representation of
the Muslim viewpoint. The League proposals were presented in the form
of amendments for Muslims in the Central
Legislature, Muslim
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representation in proportion to their population in the Punjab and Bengal,
and the allocation of residuary powers to the provinces, not to the Centre.
The sub-committee of the Convention that considered these proposals
rejected all of them. Jinnah had decided to take the case of the Muslims
to the Convention itself he pleaded the Muslim case, requesting the
Convention and the majority community to show magnanimity and
accept Muslim demands as presented by the Muslim Conference of 1927
and by the joint League-Khilafat delegation. He pointed out that the
Muslim minority in India needed safeguards because it was a cultural and
religious minority and therefore its status was unalterable42.
I am exceedingly sorry that the report of the Committee is neither
helpful nor fruitful in anyway whatsoever… I think it will be
recognized that it is absolutely essential to our progress, that a
Hindu-Muslim settlement should be reached, and that all
communities should live in a friendly and harmonious spirit in
this vast country of ours43.
And finally Jinnah warned that the inevitable result of any
constitution, under which minorities felt insecure, was “revolution and
civil war”44.
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the leader of the Liberals, supported
Jinnah, but M.R. Jayakar, the Bombay Mahasabha leader, warned the
Convention that the Report and the Draft Constitution had already been
accepted by many organizations and their amendment would reopen the
question with the possibility of rejection45. In the end Jinnah‟s
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amendments were rejected. Not only that, but he was taunted that he
spoke for none else but himself and had no right to represent the
Muslims46. Jamshed Nusserwanjee, a Parsee and Mayor of Karachi, told
Jinnah‟s biographer:
The first time I saw (Jinnah) weep was after his amendments had
been rejected by Calcutta meeting to consider the Nehru
Report… 47
On leaving Calcutta, Jinnah, with tears in his eyes, said to
Nusserwanjee, “Jamsheed, this is the parting of the ways”48. For the
Muslims, this was the end of their support for the Congress and from then
on the Congress was to be almost completely a Hindu body.
Multiple factors were responsible for converting Jinnah besides the
one played by the Hindu communal forces. He was “willing to work for a
free India and to accept joint electorates, if his demand for special
representation for Muslims was conceded”49. He was “not given the
attention and respect that was due to a great emissary of Hindu-Muslim
unity”50. He was called a “communal zealot” by the communal Hindus
and a “stooge of the Congress” by the communal Muslims who were
deadly against Jinnah‟s acceptance of joint electorates. Jinnah‟s pride
was hurt. He felt betrayed. Separate electorates had been considered an
obstacle in the way of unity by the Sabhaites51. About the Nehru report
Jinnah writes:
The Nehru report proposal can, therefore, at the best be treated
only as counter Hindu proposals to the Muslim proposals. And as
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Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Response to Nationalism
Chapter 5
there is no agreement reached it is now for the All India Muslim
League to take such action or adopt such course as the league
may think proper in the best interest of the community and the
52
country .
Jinnah‟s “fifteen points” about safeguards for Muslims in
India are given here:
1.
The form of the future constitution should be federal with
residuary powers vested in the province, central government to
have the control only of such matters of common interest as may
be guaranteed by the Constitution.
2.
Uniform measure of autonomy shall be guaranteed to all provinces.
3.
All legislatures in the country and other elected bodies should be
reconstituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective
representation of minorities in every province without reducing the
majority of any province to a minority or even equality.
4.
In the central legislative Muslim representatives should not be less
than one-third.
5.
The representation of communal groups should continue to be by
means of separate electorates as at present, provided that it should
be open to any time to abandon its separate electorate in favour of
joint electorates.
6.
Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary
should not in any way effect the Muslim majority in the Punjab,
Bengal and North-West Frontier Province.
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7.
Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Response to Nationalism
Full religious liberty, that is, liberty of belief, worship,
observances, propaganda, association and education should be
guaranteed to all communities.
8.
No bill or resolution or any part thereof, should be passed in any
legislature or any other elected body, if three-fourths of the
members of any community in that particular body oppose such a
bill or resolution or part thereof, on the ground that it would be
injurious to the interests of that community or, in that alternative,
such other method is devised as may be found feasible and
practicable to deal with such cases.
9.
Sind should be separated from the Bombay presidency.
10.
Reforms should be introduced in the North-West Frontier Province
and Baluchistan on the same footing as a other provision.
11.
Provision should be made in the constitution giving the Muslim an
adequate share along with other Indians in all the services of the
state and in self-governing bodies, having due regard to the
requirements of efficiency.
12.
The Constitution should embody adequate safeguards on the
protection of Muslim religion, culture and personal law, and the
promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws,
Muslim charitable institutions, and for their due share in grants-inaid given by the state and by self-governing bodies.
13.
No cabinet, either central or provincial, should be formed without
there being a proportion of Muslim Ministers of at least one-third.
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14.
Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Response to Nationalism
No change to be made in the Constitution by the central legislature
except with the concurrence of the states constituting the Indian
Federation.
15.
That in the present circumstances the representation of Musalmans
in the different legislatures of the country, and of the other elected
bodies through separate electorate is inevitable, and further,
government being pledged not to deprive the Musalmans of this
right, it cannot be taken away without their consent, and so long as
the Musalmans are not satisfied that their rights and interest are
safeguarded in the manner specified above (or herein) they would
in no way consent to the establishment of joint electorates of with
or without conditions53.
5:3. Jinnah’s Differences and Seeking The Alternative
On January 31, 1929 Gandhiji warned the Britishers, “If the Nehru
Report is not accepted by or on behalf of the British people before the
end of December 31 next, it will cease to have any meaning for me, I
must declare myself an independence wallah”54. Gandhiji also rejected
Jinnah‟s fourteen points in which he had kept open the issue of joint
electorates. Sabhaites were against any compromise with Jinnah. Moonje
wrote to Gandhi on 5, 1929 not to agree to any modification of the Nehru
Report in order to placate the Muslims. Moonje also wrote to Malaviya
who had intimate relations with Jinnah not to negotiate with him 55.
Fourteen points were termed as communal demands and Jinah was
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characterized a Muslim communalist. But Jinnah was keen to have a
settlement with Congress. He said:
Say to Hindu not to misrepresent everybody. I hope and trust that
we shall be yet in a position to settle the question which will
bring peace and happiness to the millions in our country56.
Gandhiji in August 11, 1929 tried to persuade Jinnah to accept the
Nehru Report but failed continuous failures and humiliations made
Jinnah angry and he burst out on the floor of the Assembly on March 7,
1930:
… seventy millions of Musalmans should not be afraid of facing
the issue squarely and fairly no matter what the government do,
no matter what the Hindus do you are seventy millions. What is
the good of learning upon the government? What is the good of
your appealing to the Hindus? Do you want concessions? I do not
want concessions. What is the good? You are seventy million
Musalmans. Organize yourselves in this country, and you will be
a power, and you will be able to dictate not only to the
government, but to the Hindus and to everyone else your just
57
rights, show a manly attitude .
In 1934 Jinnah again appealed to Gandhiji to solve the communal
problem for the united struggle. Gandhiji‟s fast had led to Poona pact.
Jinnah urged him to show the same spirit to the Muslims which he had
shown to Harijans58.
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By 1939 Jinnah had become completely anti-Gandhi. He became
allergic to Gandhiji and was irritated when the later addressed him as
„Shri Jinnah‟ and „Janab-e-Jinnah Saheb‟. Gandhi became his main target
of attack. In press statements, public meetings and personal chats, he
bitterly criticized Gandhiji.
He publicly criticized Gandhiji and accused him for every thing,
deteriorating communal situation in country, for sidetracking struggle for
independence and deviating the Congress from the path set by its
founder59. He said in December 1938, “… it is Mr. Gandhi who is
destroying the ideal with which the Congress was started. He is the one
man responsible for turning the Congress into an instrument for the
revival of Hinduism”60.
Gandhiji did not want any compromise with Jinnah. Jinnah made
an appeal, three months before changing his track to Gandhiji in a letter
dated January 1, 1940. Jinnah said:
Events are moving fast, a campaign of polemics or your weekly
discourse in the Harijan on metaphysics, philosophy and spinning
are not going to win Indian freedom. Action and statesmanship
along will help us in our forward march. I believe that you might
still rise to your stature in the service of our land and make your
proper contribution towards leading India to contentment and
happiness61.
Gandhiji‟s refusal to have any agreement with Jinnah undermined
Jinnah‟s position among his followers in the Muslim League who stood
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for united India. Jinnah was a former Congressman, a staunch nationalist
and secularist. He was not only a prominent Congressman but also a
front-rank leader of the Muslim League, president of the Home Rule
League and a champion of the Hindu-Muslim unity when Gandhiji
entered on the Indian political stage difference and disagreements with
Gandhiji‟s politics and policies forced Jinnah to withdraw from all the
positions he was occupying. B. R. Nanda opines, “There are indications
that Jinnah suffered from a feeling that he had been unfairly edged out of
the forefront of the political stage by Gandhi”. His anger against Gandhiji
turned into determination to take revenge and to score more and more till
he left his beloved Bombay and India for Pakistan, a land he had not
desired and dreamt before he changed his track62.
Another person who was responsible for change in Jinnah‟s
ideology was no one, but his Moti Lal Nehru. They were good friends.
Both trusted each other and shared the same political ideology and
secular outlook. Both were moderates, constitutionalist and used to
discuss and prepare a strategy before placing it before the Congress
platform or the British Government63.
Although Moti Lal was secular and wanted to settle the communal
question with the help of Jinnah but time and again whenever the
opportunity and occasion occurred he either sided with the Hindu
communal leaders or under their pressure adopted a neutral attitude. For
his own political survival he needed their support and hence he avoided
to annoy the Sabhaites by coming to terms with Jinnah. He spurned
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Jinnah‟s hands of cooperation with regard to the solution of the HinduMuslim problem and in a communiqué issued on March 2, 1925; he
informed the people that there was no likelihood of a settlement.
In a statement read to Hindu Mahasaba at Delhi on March 15,
1926, Moti Lal urged the Sabha to join the Congress rather than start a
separate organization of its own. Though Jinnah always took nationalist
stand in the Legislative Assembly and also supported the Swarajists64. In
the month of May (May 5, 1928) Jinnah left for England65. He came back
on October 26, 1928. Moti Lal was so keen on enlisting Jinnah‟s support
for the report that he expressed his readiness to go to Bombay to receive
him. Seeing the possibility of the two leaders (who were also good
friends) to reach a settlement, the communal elements became very
active.
Jinnah had no hand in shaping the Nehru report as he was not in
India. This report was mainly prepared by Moti Lal and Tej Bahadur
Sapru. The report had opted joint electorate, without sufficient safeguards
for the minorities. The Muslim League got alarmed lest it would be in a
disadvantageous position. The Bombay provincial Muslim League
advocated rejection of the report. Nevertheless, Jinnah asked the Muslim
League not to be unduly alarmed by the Nehru proposals. An untiring
advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity, he was anxious to eliminate the legacy
of mutual suspicion and utilize the forthcoming National Convention at
Calcutta (December 1928) for yet another desperate bid for a communal
settlement. He, therefore, refused to accept the Bombay provincial
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League Council‟s rejection of the Nehru proposals. And in the teeth of
stiff opposition, he persuaded the League Session held at Calcutta about
the same time to send a delegation to the convention already in session.
In the light of the Delhi proposals, the League committee, presided over
by Jinnah, formulated some proposals for incorporation in the Draft
Constitution of the Nehru Committee. The three main proposals were:
1.
One-third of the elected representatives of both the Houses of
the Central Legislature should be Muslims;
2.
In the Punjab and Bengal, in the event of adult suffrage not
being established, there should be reservation of seats for the
Muslims on the population basis for ten years subject to a reexamination after that period, but they shall have no right to
contest additional seats;
3.
Residuary powers should be left to the provinces and should not
rest with the Central Legislature66.
Jinnah hoped that by incorporating these demands in the report he
would be able to remove the suspicion of Hindu dominance created by
Aga Khan who had bitterly opposed the Nehru report for United India,
joint struggle was essential and for that separate electorate had to be
replaced by joint electorate and Jinnah was its advocate.
Jinnah‟s failure led him to formulate his fourteen points. Pt. Moti
Lal opposed Jinnah‟s new offer. “He (Jinnah) is simply trying to reinstate
himself with his followers” he wrote to Gandhiji in August 1929, “by
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making preposterous demands… I am quite clear in my own mind that
the only way to reach a compromise with the truly nationalist Muslims is
to ignore Mr Jinnah and Ali Brothers altogether.67 Thus Pt. Moti Lal was
against any compromise with Jinnah and did not consider him even a
„true nationalist‟.
Though the necessity of his political survival led Jinnah to increase
his demands from four to fourteen. Yet his keen desire to have a
compromise with the Congress in the future, led him to keep open the
issue of joint electorates. His political differences had not derailed him
from nationalism and his fourteen points. For the speedy progress in the
Constitutional advancement of the country, it was necessary that the
British rulers should initiate a talk with the Indian leaders. Jinnah made
hard efforts in his direction. He along with Vithalbhai Patel went to meet
Gandhiji on November 30, 1929 at the Sabarmati Ashram. Throwing a
light on Jinnah‟s role in arranging a meeting of Indian leaders with the
Viceroy, Irwin, Vithalbhai, writes:
that meeting was brought about by me at the desire of Mr Jinnah.
It was settled at the meeting that Gandhi, Moti Lal, Sapru (cousin
brother of Moti Lal) Jinnah and myself should meet the Viceroy
on 23rd December 1929. That Gandhi should write to Moti Lal to
agree to the arrangement68.
Pt. Moti Lal initially agreed but later changed his mind. He was
against Jinnah‟s presence in the meeting. He wrote to Vithalbhai Patel on
December 9, 1929, “the members of the deputation at least should be of
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one mind. Do you expect Jinnah, Sapru, Gandhi and myself and yourself
to be of one mind when we meet the Viceroy”. Pt. Moti Lal also sent a
telegram to Gandhiji stating that Congressmen along should discuss the
Congress point of view with the Viceroy69.
Later Moti Lal agreed to meet the Viceroy on December 23. He
was of course in close touch with Gandhiji and it was evident that they
had come to a clear decision about what they should do at the Viceroy‟s
interview on 23rd December. The conclusions they had reached were
treated as a close secret and were not communicated to Vithalbhai or to
Sapru or to Jinnah all of whom were in Delhi on 23rd for the interview.
On the very 23rd Gandhiji started his weekly, „silence‟ vow that
morning to be broken at the Conference time at 4 pm. Because of his
silence it was not possible for Jinnah, Sapru and Vithalbhai Patel to know
if there was any change in Gandhiji‟s mind about the acceptance of the
invitation to the Round Table Conference. In the interview Gandhiji
declared “at the very outset, that unless the Viceroy was prepared to give
a pledge that the Round Table Conference would recommend nothing
short of full dominion status, and to assure him that the said pledge
would be honoured by the British Government, he did not see any useful
purpose in carrying on any further talk. Jinnah, Vithalbhai Patel and
Sapru were stunned at this sudden and at the same time, inexplicable
change in the attitude taken up by Gandhiji and Moti Lal. This attitude on
this part of the two leaders “torpedoes that well laod plan without so
much as a though for what the engineer of that plan might feel”70.
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The secret understanding between the Moti Lal and Gandhiji
regarding the interview not only smashed Jinnah‟s efforts but also greatly
disappointed and disheartened him and gradually led him to drift away
from those with whom he had once intimate social and political
relationships71.
In the election of the Provincial Assemblies held in the beginning
of the year 1937 that a kind of war started between the two leaders
(Jinnah and Nehru) which ended with the partition of the country.
Though Nehru himself stated on April 2, 1936 at the Lucknow Congress
that independence could not be got through the Act which was in fact a
„charter of slavery‟ yet under his leadership the Congress fought the
elections and he was the topmost campaigner. Nehru stalking the
campaign trial declared: “There are only two forced in the country, the
Congress and the Government”, and “it is the Congress alone which is
capable of fighting the government”72. He also emphasized that the
parties that mattered in India were the Congress and the British and that
others should live up. “I refuse to line up with the Congress” Jinnah
retorted when he heard Nehru‟s remarks in Calcutta in January 1937.
“There is a third party namely Muslims. We are not going to be dictated
by anybody”, Jinnah said. He also argued, “We are not going to be the
camp follower of any party. We are ready to walk as equal partners for
the welfare of India”. A few days later Jinnah publicly warned Nehru and
the Congress to “leave the Muslim alone”, but sensing victory Nehru
refused to be intimidated and decided instead to attack the Muslim
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League and Jinnah. Nehru said, “Mr Jinnah objects to the Congress
interfering with Muslim affairs in Bengal and calls upon the Congress to
leave Muslims alone… Who are the Muslims? Apparently only those
who follow Mr Jinnah and the Muslim League73.
Once an ardent Congressman and one of the builders of the
Congress and a preacher of its philosophy Jinnah left the Congress in
1920, when he felt that it was deviating from its principle. During the
period between 1920-1938 he felt more and more disillusioned with the
Congress policies and its functioning. The attitude of Congress leaders
made Jinnah bitter. He was “a desperate driven to extremes, both by his
failure to find a solution for an intractable problem and by the
intransigence of the Congress leadership”.74 He had made all efforts to
work along with the Congress front against the British government75.
Jinnah urged the Congress not to act as if it were the “Sovereign power”
but to deal with the League on the footing of complete equality. He also
characterized it fascist and its executive a „Fascist Grand Council‟. When
dubbed Communalist by the Congress leaders Jinnah declared:
Gentleman – if for bettering the conditions of this country; if for
lifting the socio-economic and political standards of the
Musalmans of India, I am branded communalist, I assure you,
gentlemen, that I am proud to be a communalist76.
The formation and functioning of the Congress ministries after
1937 elections made Jinnah not only an opponent but an arch-enemy of
the Congress and he spared no words to denounce the Congress policies
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and its leaders77. Jinnah further lashed out at the intolerant philosophy of
the Congress:
Hindi is to be the national language of all India and the Bande
Matram is to be the national song and is forced upon all. The
Congress flag is to be obeyed and revered by all and sundry. On
the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given,
the majority community has clearly shown their hand that
Hindustan is for the Hindus78.
He challenged the Congress contention of being a national body at
Patna on December 26, 1938:
The Congress is nothing but a Hindu body, that is the truth
and the Congress leaders know it. The presence of few
Muslims, the few misled and misguided ones, and the few
who are there with the ulterior motives, does not, cannot
make it a national body. I challenge anybody to deny that the
Congress is not mainly a Hindu body79. Though the
Congress had been in power for a very short time, it had
already made Hindi the national language, Bande Matram
the national song, and the Congress banner the national flag.
Thus it had shown that Hindustan was for Hindus only. No
settlement none of its leaders had shown any concern for the
minorities80. The function of the Congress ministries and
above all the uncompromising attitude of the congress made
him more and more bitter. It is during 1937 to 1939 that
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Jinnah acquired a negative frame. He became communalist,
lost belief in Hindu-Muslim unity, characterized the
Congress a Hindu party, its leaders as Hindu leaders, its rule
as Hindu Raj and its ideology as Hindutva. A man who was
once proud to be a Congressman thus turned into an archenemy of the same organization81.
Thus, Jinnah like most of Muslim scholars‟ was not against
united India. This is clear from his own statement that “I am a nationalist
first, a nationalist second, a nationalist last”. But it was bitter attitude of
Congress leaders which made him to realize that Muslims are not safe in
India. So he demanded a separate nation for Indian Muslims. In this
connection he made hard and successful efforts to awaken the Muslim
community and make them able to face the problems boldly. Jinnah
wanted Muslims to become true Muslims in thoughts and deeds. So that a
Muslim state can be created and maintained.
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References
1. Nagendra Kr. Singh, Encyclopedia of the Indian Biographers, A.P.H.
Publishing Corporation, Vol. IV, New Delhi, 2000, p. 227.1
2. Loc. cit.
3. Nagendra Kr. Singh, Encyclopedia of Muslims Bibliography, A.P.H.
Publishing Corporation, Vol. III, New Delhi, p. 168.
4. Moin Shakir, Khilafat to Partition, Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1983, p. 172.
5. Saleem M. M. Qureshi, The Politics of Jinnah, Royal Book Company,
Pakistan, 1988, p. VIII.
6. Sharif al-Mujahid, Quaid-Azam Jinnah, Low Price Publications, Delhi, 1993,
p. 1.
7. Nagendra Kr. Singh, Loc.cit.
8. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
9. Hasan, Mushirul, Legacy of a Divided Nation, India’s Muslims Since
Independence, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1997.
10. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, Secular and Nationalist Jinnah, Kitab Publishing House,
New Delhi, 1997, p. 30.
11. H. Bolitho, Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan, John Murray, London, 1964, p. 11.
12. M. R. Duggal, Jinnah – The Mufti-e-Azam of Malabar Hill (U), Bombay,
1944 (n.p.), p.11.
13. Moin Shakir op. cit pp. 172-23.
14. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
15. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
16. Moin Shaker, op. cit., p. 177.
17. Ibid., p. 173.
18. Ibid., pp. 177-178.
19. Idem.
20. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
21. Idem.
22. Idem.
23. Ibid., p. 79.
24. Jinnah had signed a memorandum opposing the separate electorates of 1906.
25. Sarojini Naidu, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, An Ambassador of Unity, Ganesh and
Co., Madras, 1918, p. x.
26. Jinnah‟s presidential address to the XVI Bombay Provincial Conference held
in Ahmedabad in 1916 in M.H. Saiyid, Jinnah: A Political Study, Ashraf
Publications, Lahore, 1962, pp. 66-67.
27. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, Loc. cit.
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28. M. H. Sajad, The Sound of Fury, A Political Study of Muhamad Ali Jinnah,
Akbar Publishing House, New Delhi, 1945, p. 41.
29. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, op. cit., p. 61.
30. Ibid., p. 82.
31. Ibid., p. 86.
32. Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948, Oxford
University Press London, 1968, pp. 40-41.
33. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
34. The British government announced the constitution of a commission under
Sir John Simon in November 1927. The commission, which had no Indian
members on it, was being sent to investigate India‟s constitution problems and
make recommendations to the government on the future constitution of India.;
Pakistan: the Formative Phase, op. cit., p. 64.
35. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, op. cit., p. 101.
36. Ibid., p. 102.
37. Ibid., p. 184.
38. Ibid., pp. 185-186.
39. Ibid., p. 219.
40. M. H. Sayyid, op.cit., pp. 190-94.
41. All Parties Conference 1928: Report of the Committee appointed by the
Conference to determine the principles of the Constitution for India,
Allahabad, 1928, pp. 50, 123-126.
42. M. H. Sayyid, loc. cit.
43. H. Bolitho, op.cit., p. 94.
44. Idem .
45. Sayyid, op.cit., pp. 193.
46. Abid Hussain, The Destiny of Indian Muslims, Asia Publishing House,
London, 1959, p. 73.
47. H. Bolitho, op. cit., p. 95.
48. Idem.
49. J. N. Sahni, The Lid Off. Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1971, p. 90.
50. Keer Dhananjay, Mahatma Gandhi — Political Saint and Unarmed Prophet,
Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1973, p. 576.
51. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, op. cit., p. 221.
52. M. A. Jinnah, History of the Origin of Fourteen Points, Bombay, n.d., Sharif
Al-Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, loc.cit
53. Shari Al-Mujahid, Quad-i-Azam Jinnah, Studies in Interpretation, Low Price
Publications, Delhi, 1993, pp. 279-81.
54. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, op. cit., pp. 222-223.
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55. Idem.
56. B. R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or Partition of India, Thacker and Company,
Bombay, 1946, pp. 315-16.
57. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, op. cit., pp. 223-224.
58. Ibid., p. 229.
59. Ibid., pp. 233-34.
60. C. H. Philips, ed. The Partition of India, Allen George and Unwin
Publications, London, 1970, p. 33.
61. P.C. Roy Choudry, Gandhi and his Contemporaries, Sterling Publications,
New Delhi, 1972, p.184.
62. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, op. cit., pp. 235-36.
63. Ibid., p. 236.
64. Ibid., pp. 241-42.
65. Ibid., p. 103.
66. Ibid., pp. 104-5.
67. David page, Prelude to Partition Delhi, Manohar Publishers, 1982, p. 200.
68. Ibid., p. 242.
69. Idem.
70. Ibid., pp. 245-45.
71. Idem.
72. S. Gopal, ed., Selected Works of Jawahar Lal Nehru, Vol. III, New Delhi,
1975, pp. 7-8.
73. Dr. Ajeet Jawed, op. cit., pp. 249-50.
74. Sasadhar Sinha, Indian Independence in perspective, Asia Publications,
Calcutta, 1964, p. 97.
75. Ibid., pp. 256-57.
76. Ibid., p. 258.
77. Idem.
78. Ibid., p. 259.
79. Ibid., pp. 260-61.
80. Idem.
81. Ibid., pp. 261-62.
82. Ibid., p. 183.
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Chapter 5
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170