The Royal African Society
Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought: The Colonial State and Soil Conservation in
East Africa during the 1930s
Author(s): David Anderson
Source: African Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 332 (Jul., 1984), pp. 321-343
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/722351
Accessed: 27/08/2010 06:39
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://links.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you
have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may
use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://links.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Oxford University Press and The Royal African Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to African Affairs.
http://links.jstor.org
DEPRESSION,DUST BOWL,DEMOGRAPHY,
AND DROUGHT:THE COLONIALSTATEAND
SOILCONSERVATIONIN EASTAFRICADURING
THE 1930s
DAVIDANDERSON
THE STRONG
INFLUENCE
of colonialagrarianpolicieson the processof decoloniz-
ationin EasternAfricahasbeenrecognizedby historiansfor sometime. Most
recently, David Throuphas emphasizedthe role of the anti-terracingcampaignsin Kikuyulandduringthe 1940sin furtheringthe causeof the MauMau
movement,whilealmosttwentyyearsago LionelCliffestressedthe close correlationbetweenthe enforcementof agricultural
changein Tanganyika
andthe
growthof organizednationalism.l Similarlyin Uganda,ruralprotest, significantbetweenthe warsin the Batakamovement,playeda partin the campaignfor politicalindependence.2The 'secondcolonialoccupation',as it has
beencalled,withits 'do good'justification
for meddlingin Africanagriculture,
heightenedpolitical consciousnessby giving Africanfarmerssomethingto
complainabout.
The colonialstate mayhavebeen correctin its policies, andwise to resort
to compulsion,but it failedto showthe farmerwhattangiblebenefitsthe conservationeffortwouldbringon the land,andrarelycouldit provideanadequate
incentivefor this effort. Whilethis view of the failureof colonialagrarian
reformis now well understood,muchless attentionhasbeen givento the process by whichthese newpoliciesemerged. Beforethe outbreakof the Second
WorldWara numberof factorshadalreadyactedto persuadeadministrators
in London, and in the colonies, that the agrarianconditionof East Africa
demandeddrastic action. This article examines why these new policies
gvolvedduringthe 1930s,andinvestigatesthe complexmannerin whicheach
of the variouslevels of the colonialadministration
cameto playa partin their
formulation.
The author is a Research Fellow in History at New Hall, Cambridge. Earlier versions of this
article were discussed at a workshop on 'ConservationPolicy in Africa' at Queen Elizabeth House,
Oxford, and by the East African Studies seminarat the African Studies Centre, Cambridge,whose
comments are all gratetully acknowledged.
1. D. W. Throup, 'The Governorshipof Sir Philip Mitchell in Kenya, 194S1952', unpub. Ph.D.
thesis, Cambridge 1983, esp. chapters 3, 6 and 8; L. Cliffe, 'Nationalism and the Reaction to
Enforced AgriculturalChange in Tanganyikaduring the Colonial Period', in L. Cliffe and J. Saul
(eds), Socialismin Tanzania: An InterdisciplinaryReader (EAPH, Nairobi, 1972), pp.17-24. See
also D. A. Low and J. M. Lonsdale, 'Introduction:Towards the New Order 1945-1963', in D. A.
Low and Alison Smith (eds), The OxfordHistoryof East Africa, iii (Oxford, 1976), pp 454 6
2. C. C. Wrigley, Crops and Wealth in Uganda (East African Institute of Social Research,
Kampala1959), pp.52-55 and 80-81. Adsohis 'Changesin the East AfricanSociety', pp. 515-516,
and C. Gertzel, 'Kingdoms, Districts and the Unitary State: Uganda 1945-1962', pp.67-69, both
in D. A. Low and Alison Smith (eds) Historyof East Africa, iii.
321
322
AFRICANAFFAIRS
It was duringthe 1930sthat the Britishadministration
in the EastAfrican
territoriesfirstbeganto take an activeinterestin the patternsandmethodsof
Africanagrarianproduction. This interest was initiallypromptedby the
desireto increaseAfricanagriculturalproduction,as a way of meetingsome
of the difficultiesof the Depression,but rapidlybecamepreoccupiedwiththe
apparentthreatposed to the productivecapacityof Africanlands by overcrowding,overproduction,and soil erosion. As the decademovedon, the
questionof the conservationof the naturalresourcesof the coloniesbecame
a moreimportantsubjectof concern,andattentionto it contributedto a very
fundamentalshift in colonialpolicy, towardsthe developmentof ruralEast
Africa. By 1938, both the ColonialOfficein Londonandthe administrators
in East Africa were committedto a policy of direct interventionin the
husbandry
practicesof Africanfarmersandherders,in anycircumstance
where
it was fearedthat these practicesmightbe detrimentalto the long-termproductivityof the land. The period 1930to 1938, whenthe passiveprinciples
of 'indirectrule' began to give way in colonialthinkingto a more active
and interventioniststrategyof administration,is thereforecrucial to any
explanationof Africanresponseto colonialrule in the years leadingup to
Independence.3In particular,if we areto understand
the roleof ruralprotest
in the processof decolonisation,we mustfirstcometo gripswiththe changes
in colonial attitudes towards African agrarian production during the
1930s. The firsttinkeringswiththe mechanismof agrarianproductionbefore
1939formedthe embryoof whatwereto becomethe large-scaledevelopment
projectsof the post-waryears. The BettermentCampaigns,LandUtilization
Schemes,and Rehabilitation
Projectswhichabsorbedthe energiesandfunds
of the local administration
andthe metropolitan
resourcesprovidedunderthe
ColonialDevelopmentandWelfareAct duringthe 1940sand 1950s,shouldbe
seen as a directconsequenceof thosepoliciesdevisedbeforethe war.
Fourmajorfactorsworkedto encouragethe movetowardspoliciesof interventionin Africanagriculture:the economicreassessmentsbroughtaboutin
the colonies,as elsewhere,by the Depressionof the early 1930s;the internationalalarmgeneratedby the catastrophic
experienceof the southernplains
of Americain the Dust Bowl, at its heightin 1935;the recognitionduringthe
1930sthat rapidincreasein the humanand stock populationsof the African
Reserveswas creatingseriouspressureon the land;and, finally,the fearthat
3. On the moves towards colonial reforms during the 1930s, see R. 1). Pearce, TurningPoint
in Africa: British Colonial Policy, 1938-1948 (Cass, London, 1982); P. Hetherington, British
Paternalismand Africa, 192s1940 (Cass, London, 1978); D. J. Morgan, The Official History of
Colonial Developmenl, vol 1 (Macmillan, London 1980), pp. 14 63; R. Robinson, 'The Moral
Disarmamentof African Empire, l919-1947', ffournal of Imperialand CommonwealthHistory, 8
(1979/80), pp. 89104. Recent debate in this journal has examined the connections between
pre-war reforms and post-war decolonization;see J. Flint, 'Planned Decolonizationand its Failure
in British Africa', African Affairs, 82, no. 328 (July 1983), pp. 38s411, and the reply by R. D.
Pearce, 'The Colonial Office and Planned Decolonization in Africa', African Affairs, 83, no. 330
(January1984), pp. 77-94.
DEPRESSION,DUST BOWL, DEMOGRAPHY,AND DROUGHT
323
the apparentlyincreasingincidenceof droughtconditionsin manypartsof East
Africaover the period 1926 to 1935 indicatedthat the regionwas becoming
progressivelymorearid. The relativeinfluenceof eachof these factorsnaturally varied between the three BritishEast Africanterritories,depending
upon differencesin political,economicandenvironmental
circumstances,
but
they combinedto shapean essentialbackclothto the agrarianreformsworked
out by the eve of the SecondWorldWar.
The Depression
The Depressionstrucksavagelyat the economiesof all the Africancolonies
from 1929until 1935, affectingboth EuropeansettleragricultureandAfrican
production. ManyEuropeansettlersin KenyaandTanganyikacamenearto
bankruptcyas their export marketscollapsed,and only the resilienceof the
sisal plantersand the slow but steadyrecoveryof coffee pricesofferedhope
for the survivalof the settler farmingsector.4 The vast majorityof white
settlerslackedthe reservesof capitalnecessaryto withstandthe slump,and
so met their crisis politically,ratherthan economically,by pressuringthe
governmentto propup theirproductionwithsubsidiesandformsof protection.
By exposingthe weaknessof the settlereconomy,the yearsof the Depression
generateda widerdebatethatquestionedthe veryvalidityof the settlerposition
in EastAfrica. Not surprisingly,in respondingto the Depressionthe settler
communitiesadopteda defensiveposture,andespeciallyin the case of Kenya,
they actively campaignedto establishgreatersecurity for their status and
long-termpositionin the colony.5 The focus of white settleranxietyduring
the Depressionwas thereforethe legitimacyof Europeanlandownership,the
very keystone of white settlement. The appointmentof the Kenya Land
Commissionin 1933presenteda directchallengeto the settlercommunityto
justifytheirposition,whilealsoofferingthe opportunityto entrenchtheirclaim
to unalienablerightsto landownership. It wasin the arenaof the KenyaLand
Commissionthatthe firstskirmishesover Africanlanduse were fought.
Althoughthe Commissionwas intendedto establishthatadequateprovision
hadbeenmadein Kenyafor the landneedsof the Africanpopulation,criticism
of indigenouspatternsof landuse andAfricanfarmingpracticesbecameprominent in the enquiry. These issues were broughtto the fore as the settlers
4. E. A. Brett, Colonialismand Underdevelopment
in East Africa: ThePolitics of EconomicChange
191F1939 (Heinemann, London 1973), pp. 18s185; C. C. Wrigley, 'Kenya: The Patterns of
Economic Life, 1902-1945', in V. Harlow and E. M. Chilver (eds), The OvcfordHistory of East
Africa, ii (Oxford 1965), pp. 247-250; N. Westcott, 'The East African Sisal Industry, 192s1949:
The Marketingof a ColonialCommodityduring Depression and War', mimeo, (London, September
1983); M. F. Hill, Planters Progress(Coffee Board of Kenya, Nairobi 1956).
5. On the Kenya settlers and the depression, see, C. C. Wrigley, 'Kenya: The Patterns of
Ecomonic Life', pp. 247-260- G. Bennett, 'Settlers and Politics in Kenya, up to 1945', in V. Harlow
and E. M. Chilver (eds), OxfordHistoryof East Africa, ii pp. 318-328; M. G. Redley, 'The Politics
of a Predicament:The White Communityin Kenya 1918-1932', unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge
1976, chs 10 and 11; P. Mosley, The Setder Economies:Studiesin the EconomicHistory of Kenya
and SouthernRhodesia 1900-1963 (Cambridge1983), pp. 178-180.
324
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
foughta politicalbattleto preventthe AfricanReservesbeingextendedat the
expense of the White Highlands.6Africanhusbandrywas typicallystigmatized as wastefuland deleteriousto the soil, and settlerwitnessesbeforethe
Commissioncommonlyexpressedconcernthat soil erosionmightspreadfrom
Africanlands,wheretheycouldalreadyidentifyit as a potentiallyseriousproblem, to the white-ownedfarmlands. In fact, manypartsof the WhiteHighlands were alreadyexperiencingsoil exhaustionand decliningfertility as a
resultof overproduction
throughcerealmonoculture.7Butin the settlerview
this wasnot wherethe problemlay. Instead,they drewattentionto the large
numbersof African'squatters'occupyingEuropean-owned
farms,andparticularlythe illegalanduncontrolled
movementof Africansontofarmsleft unoccupied as a resultof the Depression.8 The actualcauseof landdegradation
was
less importantto the settlersthanwas the politicizationof the wholequestion
of Africanlanduse; the point was, quite simply,thatif the Africancouldnot
managethe landhe had,wherewasthe sensein givinghimmorelandto abuse?
Havingput forwardtheir view that Africanhusbandryplacedthe fertilityof
the Kenyansoil underthreat,the settler communityfurtherarguedthat, in
the stringentdaysof the Depression,they lackedthe financeto cope with the
problemthemselves,andthereforethatgovernmentshouldacceptthe burden
of responsibility. The KenyaArborSociety,formedin 1934,joinedthe many
settler FarmingAssociationsin bombarding
the administration
with pleas for
actionagainstthe evilsof Africanhusbandry. Conservation
of the soilbecame
the overt issue after 1933, but behindthis lay the emotivequestionof the
sanctityof the White Highlands. Settler concernwas not purely environmental, and was only given expressionbecause of the need to meet the
economiccrisisof the Depression.9
6. The findings of the Commissionare presented in the Kenya Land Commission(Carter) Report,
Cmd. 4556 (1934), but the Kenya Land Commission:Evidenceand Memoranda.3 volumes (Nairobi
1934), is a more useful account of the proceedings. For a clear example of the settler view, see
pp. 3295-3300: evidence of Capt. The Hon. H. F. Ward, 're: AdditionalLand for Natives'. For
a study of the Land Commission see R. M. Breen, 'The Politics of Land: the Kenya Land
Commission, 1932-1933, and its eff'ects on land policy in Kenya', unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Michigan
State University 1976.
7. Kenya Land Commission:Evidence, pp. 1803-1805, evidence of the Solai FarmersAssociation:
pp 1815-1818, evidence of Maj. F. D. Boyce, representing the SabukiaFarmersAssociation;pp.
1876-1878, evidence of the EldamaRavine FarmersAssociation;pp. 1789-1790, Secretary'sPrecis,
commenting on European cereal farming. On maize monoculture, see V. Liversage, 'Official
Economic Management in Kenya 193s1945', typescript 1945, Rhodes House Mss. Afr. s. 510;
and Liversage to Director of Agriculture, January 1936, Kenya National Archives (KNA)
CNC/10/4
8. Kenya Land Commission:Evidence, pp. 2072-2074, evidence of E. G. Whittall; pp.
2410-2415, evidence of Maj. R. M. Dunbar;pp. 3313-3322, evidence of H. D. Hill. On squatters
see, R. M. vanZwanenberg, Colonial CapitalismandLabourinKenya, 19191939(EALB, Nairobi
1975), pp. 219221. R. M. van Zwanenberg and A. King, An Economic History of Kenya and
Uganda, 1800-1970 (Macmillan,London 1975), p. 39, estimate that 20 per cent of Europeanfarms
were left unoccupied during the depression.
9. Kenya Land Commission:Evidence, p. 1786, Secretary'sPrecis, clearly stated what the settlers
saw as the most crucial principle in the issue of African land use. Although acknowledgingthat
only 'barren, rocky, waterless land was left for the natives' in the Baringo District, the
Commissionerswere advised that: 'There is one principle which should be here affirmed before
DEPRESSION,DUST BOWL, DEMOGRAPHY,AND DROUGHT
325
The slump in commodity prices also hit hard at African producers. The
steady trend of the 1920s, which had seen the prices for most African crops
improve significantly, notably maize in Kenya and cotton in Uganda, came to
an abrupt end. This much Africansand Europeansettlers shared, yet whereas
the settler response to this crisis was defensive, the response of many African
producers was essentially aggressive. With only limited margins of profit to
be gained even from most cash crop production, and influencedby manyfactors
other than price, African farmers continued to increase their cultivated
acreages throughout the years of the Depression. Sometimes this expansion
of production was stimulatedby government encouragement,in other cases it
was a more independentresponse to local economic conditions.l? Kitching and
Mosley have each illustratedthe point that the 1930s was a decade duringwhich
African cultivation in Kenya increased significantly, with producers able to
ride out depression, often by enlargingtheir activities in local markets.ll This
parallels the experience of Uganda, where cotton and coffee acreagescontinued
to increase slowly through the early 1930s, rising more dramaticallyafter 1934,
and also the case of Tanganyika, where the government encouraged regional
self-sufficiency in food crops with its 'Plant-More-Crops'campaign. In their
response to the Depression the governments of Uganda and Tanganyika had
fewer alternatives than their Kenya counterparts. Cotton cultivation was
already expanding dramaticallyin Uganda, and as Wrigley has shown, it was
not easy for the African producer to respond quickly to fluctuations in the
price received for his crops. By maintainingthe expansion of cotton through
the early 1930s the Ugandan economy recovered reasonably speedily as the
Depression lifted.l2 The Tanganyikaadministration,lacking an economically
importantAfricangrown export crop, attemptedto avoid the need for importsof
foodstuffs by encouraginggreaterlocal producton.l3
considering what solutions may be sought: It is that Government has been responsible for the
mistake and that the cost, whatever it may be, of providing sufficient land and water for the natives
concerned ought and must be provided by Government'. On the strong conservation lobby in
Kenya during the 1930s, see the AnnualReportof the KenyaArborSociety,1936 and 1937, in
KNA PC/RVP.6A/11/26, and R. Ward, Desertsin the Making:A Studyof the Causesand Effects
of SoilErosion(Kenya Arbor Society, Nairobi 1937), in PRO CO 533/483/6.
10. R. M. van Zwanenbergand A. King, Ecomonic
Historyof Kenyaand Uganda,pp. 20S213;
K. Ingram, 'Tanganyika:Slump and Short-term Governors, 1932-1945', in V. Harlow and E. M.
Chilver (eds) Onsford
Historyof East Africa,ii, pp. 59S598; 'Greater Production in Kenya:
GovernmentCampaignin the Native Reserves', EastAfricanWeekly,
26 November 1931.
11. G. Kitching, Classand EconomicChangein Kenya: The Makingof an AfricanPetileBourgeoisie
(Yale UP, London 1980), ch. 4; P. Mosley, TheSettlerEconomies,
ch. 3 and Conclusion.
See also I. D. Talbott, 'AgriculturalInnovationand Policy Changesin Kenya in the 1930's', unpub.
Ph.D. West Virginia 1976.
12. C. C. Wrigley, Cropsand Wealth,pp. 594 1; J. Vincent, Tesoin Transformation
(Univ. of
California, Berkeley 1982), pp. 21s211; V. Jamal, 'The Role of Cotton and Coffee in Uganda's
EconornicDevelopment', unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford 1976, p. 31, for cotton prices through the
colonial period; and for a broader view, C. Ehrlich, 'The Uganda Economy 1903-1945', in
V. Harlow and E. M. Chilver (eds), OxfordHistoryof EastAfrica,ii, pp.4554 69.
13. J. Iliffe, A ModernHistoryof Tanganyika
(Cambridge1979), pp.301-305,342-345, and 349;
N. J. Westcott, 'The Impact of the Second World War on Tanganyika, 1939-1949', unpub. Ph.D.
thesis, Cambridge 1982, ch. 2; K. Ingram, 'Tanganyika:Slump and Short-term Governors', pp.
596-597.
326
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
The yearsof the Depressionthereforeworkedto emphasizethe potential,
and often very real antagonismbetween the settler farmingeconomyand
Africanagrarianproduction. In the settlerperception,the Africaneconomy
continuedto pressin on him,at a timewhenhis owneconomywasunderthreat.
This antagonismbecamemanifestin manyways,but the issue of landuse and
conservationtook on greaterimportanceas settlerstriedto stakeclaimto the
landin the face of an expandingAfricanagrarianfrontier. The causeof the
Europeansettlerin EastAfricawasnot helpedby the realizationthat,in many
respects,Africanagrarianproductionin UgandaandTanganyika
withstoodthe
rigoursof the Depressionbetter than did the settler dominatedeconomyof
Kenya. This didnot escapethe noticeof the ColonialOffice,andwasa matter
that troubledthe Kenya settlers, who came to fear that their securityas a
communitywas undergreaterthreatthanever, andthattheircontroloverthe
utilizationof land in Kenya needed to be furtherbolsteredif the fragile
resourcesof the soil were to be preserved.'4
Images of the Dust Bozvl
The devastationthat could be broughtabout by erosionof the soil was
forcefullydemonstrated
by the experienceof NorthAmericain the 'DustBowl'
of the 1930s. Throughthe reportsof newspapersandmagazinesthe images
of the agriculturalwastelandof the southernplainsof America,an areathat
hadpreviouslybeenrichfarmland,reachedEastAfrica. Pamphletsandbooks
alertingpeople to the dangersof erosionandinstructingthemon methodsof
soil conservationbeganto arrivein East Africabefore 1930. This copious
literature,muchof it emanatingdirectlyfromthe UnitedStatesDepartment
of Agriculture'sSoil ConservationService, under the guidanceof Hugh
Bennett,l5seemed to have particularrelevanceto the overcrowdedAfrican
Reservesof Kenya,to heavilypopulatedpartsof uplandTanganyika,andto
manyintensivelycroppedareasof Uganda. Severalof thesepublications
were
producedin the late 1920s, the most famousbeing Bennettand Chapline's
popular study, Soil Erosion, a National Menace.16 Such studies warned
14. For a full discussion of the sharp differences between Kenya and her two neighbours over
the inter-war period, see E. A. Brett, Colonialismand Underdevelopmentin East Africa, chs. 6
and 7.
15. The impact of this Americanliterature is clear in the early Kenyan pamphlets on soil erosion;
V. A. Beckley, Soil Deteriorationin Kenya (Kenya Department of Agriculture Bulletin, no. 4 of
1930), and by the same author, Soil Erosion (Kenya Department of Agriculture Bulletin, no. 1
of 1935). For the impact on Central and Southern Africa, see J. McCracken, 'Experts and
Expertise in Colonial Malawi', African Agairs, 81, no. 322, pp. 11s114- and W. Beinart, 'Soil
Erosion, Conservationism,and Ideas About Development in Southern Africa', paper presented at
the workshop on 'Conservation Policy in Africa' at Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, October
1983. For a biographyof Bennett, see W. Brink, Big Hugh (Macmillan, New York 1951).
16. H. H. Bennett and W. R. Chapline, Soil Erosion, a National Menace (United States Department of Agriculture, Civ. 33. 1928). Later publicationsby Bennett were equally influential, see
Soil Conservation(New York 1939), Our AmericanLand. The Story of its Abuse and its Conservation (United States Department of Agriculture, Misc. Pub. No. 596, 1946), and (with W. C.
Pryor) ThisLand WeDefend (New York 1942).
DEPRESSION,DUST BOWL, DEMOGRAPHY,AND DROUGHT
327
againstthe possibledangersof over-taxingthe soil, and as the story of the
Dust Bowl unfoldedbetween 1930 and 1936, the horrificprophecyof these
writingscame surginghometo observerseverywhere. Becauseof the Dust
Bowl soil erosion was not only viewed as a serious nationalproblem,but
becamethe firstglobalenvironmental
problem. The grandscale of the issue
wasportrayedin articlesappearingin learnedjournalsandfarmingperiodicals
throughoutthe 1930s, undersuch evocativetitles as Erosion and the Empire
andSoil Erosionin TropicalAfrica, andmostvividlyof all in JacksandWhyte's
bookRape of the Earth.17
These imagescompoundedthe concernof the Kenyasettlerover the land
issue, andcausedAgriculturalOfficersall over BritishAfricato examinetheir
own localitiesfor signs of this menace. In a sense, it becamefashionableto
be awareof soil erosion,andthe zeal withwhichmanyyoungofficerspursued
the problemis testimonyto the fact thatthe acquisitionof a Diplomain Agriculturecameto havea knowledgeof this aspectof agricultural
scienceas one
of its essentialrequirements. Armedwith their new perceptions,this small
cadre of AgriculturalOfficersquickly identifiedthe dangerareas of East
Africa KondoaandSukumaland
in Tanganyika,KituiandBaringoin Kenya,
and Teso and Kigezi in Uganda.l8 Otherswouldbe addedto this list later,
andin eachcase the preventionof soil erosionwas to be a primejustification
for interferingin customarypatternsof Africanland use. In the case of
Kenya, the cause was given the active and vociferoussupportof the settler
community,while in Ugandaand Tanganyika,as we shallsee, the issue was
takenup with rathermorecaution.
As well as the Americaninfluence,the conservation
lobbyin SouthernAfrica
encouragedthe East Africanadministrations
to tackle the problemof land
degradation. Links of kinshipand camaraderie
drew the settler coloniesof
EasternandSouthernAfricatogether,andKenya'ssettlerswere neverreluctant to drawupon the exampleof SouthAfrica. Recommendations
madeby
the SouthAfricanDroughtCommissionof 1922for legislationto controlmany
aspectsof Africanhusbandrywere reiteratedto the KenyaLandCommission
in 1933,andin particularthe 'firmhand'advocatedby the SouthAfricanCom17. G. C. Watson, 'Erosion and the Empire', East African Agricultural3fournal, (1936),
pp.
305-308;
H. C. Sampson, 'Soil Erosion in Tropical Africa', RhodesianAgriculturalffournal, 33
(1936), pp. 197-205; G. V. Jacks and R. O. Whyte, The Rape of the Earth: A WorldSurvey of
Soil Erosion(Faber and Faber, London 1939); and many others. The best study of the Dust Bowl
is D. Worster, Dust Bowl: The SouthernPlains in the 1930s (Oxford UP, 1979).
18. Tanganyika TerritoryAnnual Report, 1934, Appendix VI, 'Measures taken in various Provinces, 1933 and 1934, in connexion with soil erosion', pp. 171-176; 'Soil Erosion in Tanganyika
Territory: A Brief Account of the Problem, the Prime Causal Factors) and some suggested lines
of cure and prevention', from the InformalConference at Dodoma, 16 May 1929, CO 822/26/9;
C. Maher, 'Soil Erosion and Land Utilisationin the Ukamba(Kitui) Reserve'(Nairobi 1937), and
'SozlErosionand Land Utilisationin the Kamasia, Njemps,and East Suk Reserves',(Nairobi 1937);
Reportof the TesoInformalCommittee(Department of Agriculture, Entebbe 1937); C. C. Wrigley
Cropsand Wealth, pp. 6546; For a brief general survey of early conservation measures in East
Africa, see Lord Hailey, An African Survey (HMSO, London, revised 1956), pp. 1036-1048.
328
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
missionwasapplaudedby Kenya'ssettlers.l9 The South
AfricanSoil Erosion
Conferenceof 1929, andthe creationof a Soil ErosionCouncil
in the Union,
resulted in the implementationof anti-erosionschemes
by 1933. These
schemeswere undertakenon Europeanfarmland, with
heavysubsidyfrom
the State, in preciselythe mannerwhichthe Kenya
settlerswishedtheirown
governmentto adopt. SouthAfricaninfluencewas therefore
important,but
practicesandpoliciesin SouthAfricawerethemselvesguided
to a largeextent
by the Americanexperience.20The crucialaspectof
boththe SouthAfrican
andthe Americanexampleslay in the willingnessof the
Stateto enforcebetter
husbandrythroughlegislation.
DemographicPressure
The needto enforceconservation
measureswasgivengreaterurgencyduring
the 1930sby the realizationthatthe populationof East
Africawas increasing
rapidly. Demographic
statisticsfor the regionare notoriouslyunreliable,but
it is clearthat aftera periodof stagnation(or even
decline),the populations
ofallthreeEastAfricanterritoriesbeganto increasein
the mid-1920s,growing
moredramatically
in the 1930s.21 The populationof Ugandawould
seem to
havebeguna slow increaseafter 1923, with the period
1927to 1933marking
avery alarmingclimbfromestimatesof 3 1 millionto
3 6 million. A slower,
butsteadyrate of increasecontinueduntil the end of
the 1930s.22 Broader
estimates
suggesta 25 per cent increasebetween1918and 1936,while
Hailey
putsforwarda less conservativefigureof 60 per cent
for the years 1921 to
1948.23These figurestake on a gloomiersignificance
when linked to the
greater
areasof landbeingplacedundercultivation. Reportsfrom
the Uganda
Department
of Agricultureindicatethat land pressurewas most
severe in
19. Interim Report of the South African Drought
Investigation Commtttee,April 1922 (Govt.
Printer,
Cape Town 1922), reprintedin M. Glantz (ed),
Desertification:EnvironmentalDegradation
inand around Arid Lands (Westview Press,
Boulder,
Report
of the Native Economic Commission,Union of Colorado 1977), pp. 233-274. Also The
South Africa, 193s1932 (Govt. Printer,
Pretoria
1932); Kenya Land Commission:Evidence, pp.
3295-3300: evidence of Capt. The Hon.
H.
F. Ward.
20. W. Beinart, 'Soil Erosion, Conservationism,
and Ideas About Development', pp. 11-16; Lord
Hailey,
An African Survey, pp. 1016-1017; J. C. Ross,
Land Utilizationand Soil Conservationin
the
Union of South Africa (Pretoria 1947), passim;
'National Fight Against Soil Erosion in South
Africa',
East African Standard, 8 March 1930.
21.Much of the following discussion is based on
the data assembledin R. R. Kuczynski, Demographic
Survey of the British Colonial Empire, ii
of InternationalAffairs, Oxford 1949),
chs
7-10; C. J. Martin, 'Some Estimates of the (Institute
General Age, Distribution, Fertility and Rate of
Natural
Increaseof the African Populationof British East Africa',
pp.181-199;
and J. E. Goldthorpe, 'The African Population of PopulationStudies,7, (1953/54),
East Africa:A Summaryof its Past
and
Present Trends', Appendix 7, Reportof East African
Royal Commission,1933-1955, Cmd.9475
(HMSO,
London 1955), pp.462-473.
22.R. R. Kuczynski, DemographicSurvey, ii, pp.
C. J. Martin, 'Some Estimates of
the
General Age... ', calculates that the annual rate239-240.
of natural increase over the period 1931 to
1948
was 1 4 per cent. This is quoted in the Report
of the East African Royal Commission,
p.31.
23.J. D. Tothill, A Report on 19 Surveys done
in
view
to ascertainingthe position with regard to Soilsmall AgriculturalAreas in Uganda, with a
Deterioration(Department of Agriculture,
Entebbe
1938), pp. 54; Lord Hailey, An African Survey,
p. 1046.
DEPRESSION,DUST BOWL, DEMOGRAPHY,AND DROUGHT
329
areaswherepopulationincreasecouldbe correlatedwith an expansionof the
cultivatedacreage.24This was true of Teso, where cotton cultivationhad
been expandedwhilelivestockholdingshadalsobecomegreater,andin Kigezi,
wherelocal migrationcontributedto an estimatedpopulationincreaseof 75
per cent between1931and 1948.25 These calculationsare, of course,imprecise, andfew sourcesagreeas to the exactrate of growthor the actuallevels
of population,yet the upwardtrendof the decadeis unmistakable.
A similar, though less spectacularpattern, has been presented for
Tanganyika,where populationincreasewas identifiedfrom 1928. An estimatedpopulationof 4 1 millionin 1921, graduallyclimbedto 5 2 millionby
the eve of the SecondWorldWar.26 The effect of this trendon landuse was
perhapsmorelocalizedthanin Uganda,andwithmorelandavailablefor expancampaignwent ahead. The frontiersof cultivsion the 'Plant-More-Crops'
ationwere being pushedforwardat the sametime by the tsetse reclaimation
alonesome8,000 squarekilometerswereopenedup
schemes. In Sukumaland
to humansettlementbetween 1924and 1947.27 However,the campaignsto
encourageAfricanproductiondid eventuallysparka revivalof interestin the
problemof soil erosion,with AgriculturalOfficersbecoming'concernedabout
effort'.28
the long-termeffectson the soil of this non-voluntary
establishedin Kenya
been
clearly
having
settlement
The patternof European
Reserves,it had
African
of
the
demarcation
the
final
with
mid-1920s,
in the
becomeapparentwithinonly a few yearsthat these Reserveswere too small
to housetheirrapidlygrowingpopulations. Froman estimatedfigureof 2 5
millionin 1925, Kenya'sAfricanpopulationhad risen to 3 millionby 1935,
andto 3 5 millionby 1940. Densitiesof populationstoodat over 140persons
per squaremile in the Kikuyudistrictsof Fort Hall andKiambuby 1938,and
over220 personsper squaremilein the Luo areaof CentralKavirondo,where
landpressurewas as seriousas in partsof the EasternProvinceof Uganda.29
Europeansettlersfarminglandsadjacentto the AfricanReserveswere most
acutelyawareof this overcrowding,as they witnesseddegradationsettingin
acrossthe farmboundary. Forthese farmersthe spectreof erosiongalloping
24. J. D. Tothill, A Reporton 19 Surveysin Small AgriculturalAreas, passim- W. S. Martin, 'Soil
ErosionProblemsin Uganda', in J. D. Tothill (ed) Agnculturein Uganda(Oxford 1940), pp. 7387.
25. Reportof the Teso Informal Committee,pp. 13-l9; D. J. Vail, A Historyof AgriculturalInnovation and Developmentin Teso District, Uganda (East African Studies Program, Syracuse 1972)
pp. 127-135; Lord Hailey, An African Survey, pp. 1046-1047.
26. R. R. Kuczynski, DemographicSurvey, vol 2, pp. 339-343.
27. J. Illife, A Modern History of Tanganyika,p. 316. See also D. W. Malcolm, Sukamaland:
an African People and their country(OUP, London 1953), passim.
28. A. Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy (Oxford UP, 1982), pp. 48. E. Harrison, Soil
Erosion: TanganyikaTenitory (Govt. Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, 1938), passim.
29. R. R. Kuczynski, DemographicSurvey, vol. 2, pp. 145-150; Kenya Land Commtssion:Evidence, pp. 971-1039, 'Memo: An Ecomonic Survey of the Kikuyu Reserves', by S. H. Fazan
suggests a rate of growth in the Kikuyu districts of 1 6 per cent per annum over the inter-war
period. The Reportof the East Africa Royal Commissionaccepts C. J. Martin's estimate of 1 9
per cent per annum, p. 31.
330
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
out of the Reserves and into the White Highlandsseemed all too real.30
Governmentrecognitionof populationpressurewas implicitin the termsof
referenceof the KenyaLandCommission,
but, as we haveseen,anysuggestion
thatmorelandshouldbe freed for Africanuse met with stiff oppositionfrom
the settler community. Their influencelay behindthe finaldecisionof the
Commissionto freeze the apportionment
of lands once and for all. While
this satisfiedsettler opinionit was a controversialdecision, taken in clear
recognitionthatthe pressureon Africanlandswas becomingmoresevere. It
was the opinionof the Commissionthatthe problemwasnot primarilyone of
landshortage,but of landuse.3l
Landpressurecreatedby populationincreaseandby expandingcultivation
was furtherexacerbatedby the accumulationof largernumbersof livestock
by groupsof sedentarycultivators. These purchaseswere often financedby
the surplusesgainedfrom greateragriculturalproduction,but becausethe
arableacreagewas normallyexpandedat the expense of grazingland, this
resultedin morelivestockhavingless landto graze. In these circumstances
the problemof overcrowding
couldemergewith alarmingrapidity. Kitching
has demonstrated
that this occurredin the KikuyuReserveof Kenyaduring
the 1930s,and bothVincentandVail haveshownthatit formeda substantial
partof the landproblemin the Teso Districtof Uganda,whilethe development
of cotton cultivationcoupled with the increasedpurchaseof livestockfinancedby the earningsfromcotton- clearlycontributedto the pressureon
landin Sukumaland.32Evenin the drierrangelandswherehumanpopulation
wasmoresparselysettled,therewerevisiblesignsof landpressureby the late
1920s. In districtssuch as Machakosand Baringo)in Kenya,the imposition
of quarantineregulationshad restrictedthe marketingof Africanli^restock
whilethe alienationof importantdryseasongrazinglandsfor Europeansettlementhad seriouslyunderminedthe viabilityof localherdingsystems.33 The
reductionof livestocknumberswasseento be the simplestsolutionto the overgrazinganddegradation
of these rangelands,but the unwillingnessof African
herdersto sell low-qualityscrubstockat thepricesoSeredby Europeanbuyers
gavesupportto the view thatAfricancattleshouldbe culledthroughthe direct
30. The trespass of African cattle on European farmlands, in search of water and grazing, did
much to intensify settler awarenessof land degradationand land shortage. See my doctoralthesis,
'Herder, Settler, and Colonial Rule: A History of the Peoples of the Baringo Plains, Kenya, c.
1890-1940', unpub. Ph.D thesis, Cambridge1982, esp. chs 4 and 5.
31. The whole tone of the Report of the Commissionmakesthis evident, but for specific examples;
Kenya Land Commission:Report,sections 536, and 1980-2558. For a critique of the Report, see
R. M. Breen, 'The Politics of Land', ch. 5.
32. G. Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya, pp. 106-107 and 217-224; J. Vincent,
Teso in Transformation,pp. 194-197; D. J. Vail, A Historyof AgriculturalInnovation. . . in Teso,
pp. 127-135; P. F. M. McLoughlin, 'Tanzania:agriculturaldevelopment in Sukumaland',in J. C.
de Wilde, et al, Experiences with Agricultural Developmentin Tropical Africa, vol. 2, (Johns
Hopkins UP, Baltimore 1967), pp. 415-450.
33. J. Forbes Munro, Colonial Rule and the Kamba: Social Change in the Kenya Highlands,
188F1939(0UP, Oxford 1975), pp. 7740; D. M. Anderson,'Herder, Settler, andColonial Rule',
pp. 7245.
DEPRESSION,DUST BOWL, DEMOGRAPHY,AND DROUGHT
331
actionof the government,eitherby someformof cattletax, or by compulsory
purchases.34Calculationsof the 'carryingcapacities'of grazinglandswere
accordinglymade,and these were set as targetsfor the reductionof African
livestock. Events in Machakosin 1938, and later in Sukumaland,were to
showthat enforcedcullingwas not easyto implement,but the ideaof limiting
humanandstockpopulationswithinwell definedzones,basedon the estimates
of the lands' 'carryingcapacity',remaineda guidingprincipleas land use
planningbecamethe concernof colonialgovernmentin Africa.35
Drought
Fromthe mid-1920sthroughto the mid-1930srainfalllevelsin muchof East
Africaweresignificantly
belowaverage. Droughtwasmostpronouncedin the
low-lyingsemi-aridareasof NorthernUganda,NorthernKenya,andthe plains
of the Rift Valley, but also affectedthe agriculturalareasin the Highlands
of Kenya, and aroundthe shores of Lake Victoria.36Droughtheightened
perceptionsof environmental
crisis,providingammunition
to thosewhowould
fire warningshots over the question of soil conservation,but also raising
fearsof food shortagesin the affectedareas;it wasonlywhendroughtbecame
faminethat the colonialadministration
generallyconcerneditself with the
consequences. Concernwasgreatestin Tanganyika,wheredroughtwasmore
widespreadand faminemorecommon. The dry areasof Ugogo andUzigua
experienceddroughtandfaminein 1926, 1928-30, andfrom 1932-35; but in
such unproductiveareas this was not unusual,and so raisedlittle anxiety.
Localized, isolated droughtsin areas where they were not expected had
more impact. In 1925 and 1933 the Tanga hinterlandexperiencedserious
droughts,andthe sameoccuredin Bugufiin 1929,andin Tundurufrom1930
to 1932.37 Droughtssuch as these seemedto indicatethat East Africawas
'dryingup', callingintoquestionthe long-termfutureof agricultureandanimal
34. Interim Reportof a Committeeappointedto Advise as to the stepsto be taken to Deal with the
Problemof Overstockingin orderto Preservethe Future Welfareof the Native Pastoral Areas (East
Africa Pamphlet no. 293, Nairobi 1941), and the papers connected with this Committee, KNA
ARC(MAWR)-3Vet-1/8 to 16. Stock marketing was more successful in Tanganyika, see P. L.
Raikes, LivestockDevelopmentand Policy in East Africa (ScandanavianInstitute of AfricanStudies,
Uppsala 1981), passim. See also, Kenya Land Commission:Evidence, pp. 31093114, evidence
of Maj. H. H. Brassey-Edwards,pp. 329s3295, evidence of a Delegation of Elected Members.
35. R. L. Tignor, 'Kamba Political Protest: The Destocking Controversyof 1938X,International
3rournalof African Historical Studies, 4, 2 (1971) pp. 237-251; P. F. M. McLoughlin, 'Tanzania:
Agriculturaldevelopment in Sukumaland',passim. The work of Allan and Trapnell, in Northern
Rhodesia, was particularlyinfluentialin this, see W. Allan, Studiesin African Land Usagein Northern Rhodesia (Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, no. 15, Oxford 1949, though carriedout much earlier),
and C. G. Trapnell and J. M. Clothier, The Soils, Vegetationand AgriculturalSystemsof North- West
Rhodesia(Govt. Printer, Lusaka 1937).
36. MeteorologzcalDepartmentAnnual Report, 1921-1928 (Govt. Printer, Nairobi)- J. C. Bille
and H. H. Heemstra, An IllustratedIntroductionto the Rainfall Pattern of Kenya (ILCA Working
Document no. 12, Nairobi 1979); Uganda ProtectorateAnnual Reports, 1925-1936 (HMSO
London); TanganyikaTerritoryAnnual Reports,1926-1936 (HMSO London). Of course, there
were exceptions to the general pattern: see for example J. Forbes Munro, Colonial Rule and the
Kamba, pp. 192-193.
37. J. Iliffe, A Modern Historyof Tanganyika,pp. 315-316.
332
AFrRICANAFFAIRS
husbandry
in the affectedareas. The mainthrustof policyin Tanganyika
was
to eradicatefamineby increasingfood production,but by over-taxingthe soil
this policy could be seen as accentuatingthe damagecaused by drought.
Leadingmembersof the TanganyikaDepartmentof Agriculturebegan to
suggestthat,whilethe eradicationof faminewasa positiveaim,the permanent
loss of soil fertilitywastoo higha priceto pay, droughtbeinga majorindicator
thatthe processesof degradation
wereadvancing.38
Withthe notableexceptionof Karamoja,
droughthadless effect in Uganda.
In manypartsof the protectoratethe cultivationof droughtresistantcassava
had been activelyencouragedsince the last seriousfamineat the end of the
First WorldWar. In Teso each farmerwas 'persuaded'to cultivateat least
one quarterof an acre of manioc,and local schemeswere devisedto collect
seed for the next yearsplantingimmediatelyafterthe harvestin orderto provide a reserveagainstdrought.39Foodshortagewas neverserious,but from
1927to 1930the erraticnatureof the rainfallanda periodof droughtcombined
to hamperthe cotton crop.40 Shortageof rainsin Karamojaover the same
period, and againin 1933 and 1934, led to anxietylest the aridnorthmight
be extendingits dusty tentaclesinto the fertile landsadjacentto the south.
This was reflectedin governmentsurveysof Karamoja
conductedduringthe
mid-1930s,focusing upon the dual problemsof water supply and desert
encroachment,
themesthen also receivingattentionin West Africain regard
to the southwarddriftof the Saharainto the savannahlands.4l
In Kenyadroughtsweremostdramaticin the pastoralareasof the RiftValley
andthe North-East. The droughtsof 1927-29and 1933-34took a heavytoll
of Africanlivestock,but to the alarmof observersthis did little to relieve
the pressureon the parchedgrasslands. These periodsof droughtdid much
to furtheragitationfor direct action to controlstock numbersas, far from
restoringthe equilibriumbetween land and livestock, it demonstratedthe
formidablepowersof recoveryof Africancattleherds.42 The privationsof the
38. 'Memo. on Soil Erosion in TanganyikaTerritory', preparedfor the Conference of Governors
of British East Africa, June 1938, CO 822/88/6; 'A Review of the Position in Regard to Soil
Conservationin TanganyikaTerritory in 1938', CO 852/249/15.
39. D. J. Vail, A IIistoryof AgriculturalInnovation...in 7seso,pp. 106-108; Reportofthe Teso
Informal Committee,passim.
40. Uganda ProtectorateAnnual Reports, 1927-1930. J. D. Tothill (ed), Agriculturein Uganda,
pp. 189-190.
41. Waylandto Bottomley, 22nd April, 1937, enclosing E. J. Waylandand N. V. Brasnett, Interim
Report on Soil Erosion and Water Supplies in Uganda (Uganda Prot., 1937) and Minutes by
Stockdale, 24 May 1937, and F7lood,9 August 1937, CO 822/82/6. On West Africa, see E. P.
Stebbing, 'The EncroachingSahara:the threatto the West AfricanColonies', Geographical3foarnal
85 (1935), pp. 506-524; B. Jones, 'Dessication and the West AfricanColonies', Geographic3rournai,
91 (1938) pp. 401-423; and L. D. Stamp, 'The SouthernMargin of the Sahara:Commentson some
recent studies on the Question of Dessication in West Africa', GeographicalReview, 30 (1940),
pp. 297-300.
42. KenyaLand Commission:Evidence,pp. 3103-3119: evidenceofMaj. Brassey-Edwardsand
Capt. E. J. Mulligan; pp. 3142-3147: evidence of H. E. Welby, C. Maher, Soil Erosionand Land
Utilisation in the Kamasia. . . Reserves, passim; 'The Native Stock Problem', East African
Standard, 9 April 1930.
DEPRESSION,DUST BOWL, DEMOGRAPHY,AND DROUGHT
333
migratorylocustdenudedpastureandcroplandsstill furtherin a majorinvasion
during1928. Locustswarmsrecurredannuallyin EastAfricathroughoutthe
next decade.43 Althoughthe agriculturalareas of Nyanzaand the Central
Provinceescapedthe worsteffectsof droughtandlocusts,in 1929the combinationof two consecutivefailedharvestsled to foodshortagesin Kitui, Embu,
andMeruDistricts,andin partsof Nyanza. This faminewas seriousenough
to warrantthe settingup of a Food ControlBoard,andthe prohibitionof the
export of foodstuffsfrom the affected areas.44 Governmentawarenessof
sharpenedin 1929by anexpenproblemswasundoubtedly
theseenvironmental
on the anti-locustcam?55,000
ditureof over ?60,000 on faminerelief and
in Nyanzafrom1931
purposes
these
paign,andby furthersumsexpendedfor
againin 1938-39.45
and
1934
to
1931
from
to 1933, and in the Rift Valley
as environmental
well
as
in
financial
Droughthada costthatcouldbe measured
terms.
The Evolution of Policy
The issue of soil conservationhademergedas a centralconcernof governmentin EastAfricaby 1938. Whilethe responsesdevisedwerebroadlysimilar acrossall threeterritories,the factorswe havenotedso far influencedthe
formulationof policy withineach territoryto varyingdegrees. Most significantly,differencesappearin the extentto whichpoliticalfactorsplayeda role
ideology. In Kenya,wherewhite
in the evolutionof the new conservationist
and where the images of the
administration,
on
the
acted
pressure
settler
Dust Bowl were most vividly and frequentlyreiteratedas warningsof the
threatposed, governmentactionwas betterco-ordinatedandquicklyadopted
a colony-wideperspective. Stepstowarddirectinterventionin Africanfarming practicescanbe plottedthroughthe strategyfor nativeagriculturein 1931,
the Reportof the Kenya LandCommission,the Departmentof Agriculture
pamphletscirculatedin the early1930s,the visit to the colonyby the Colonial
AdvisorFrankStockdale,andthe visitsof Kenyanofficials
OfficeAgricultural
Americato observeconservationmethods.46Particularly
and
Africa
to South
importantin givingcontinuityto this graduallyevolvingpolicywas the work
43. E. Harrison, History and Activities of Locusts in Kenya and Relative costs of Destruction,
(Department of Agriculture, Nairobi, Bulletin no. 9 of 1929); D. L. Blunt, Reportof the Locust
Invasion of Kenya, (Department of Agriculture, Nairobi, Bulletin no. 21 of 1931)- Kenya Colony
Annual Reports,1928-1939. For Uganda, see J. D. Tothill, Agriculturein Uganda, pp. 51S521,
and for Tanganyika, TanganyikaTerritoryAnnual Reports,1927-1939.
44. Kenya ColonyAnnual Report, 1929, pp. 17-19 and 28.
45. Kenya Colony Annual Report, 1929, pp. 17-21; See various correspondenceand accounts in
KNA PC/RVP.6A/11/5 to 7, on famine relief, and KNA PC/RVP.6A/ll/9 to 11, on anti-locust
measures.
46. G. Kitching, Class and EconomicChangein Kenya, pp. 6142; Kenya Land CommissionEvidence, pp. 3065-3072, evidence of Mr Alex Holm (Director of Agriculture)- V. A. Beckley, Soil
Deteriorationin Kenya and Soil Erosion, both passim; F. A. Stockdale, Reporton His Visitto South
and East Africa, Seychelles, The Sudan, Egypt, and Cyprus,193s1931, (Colonial Office, London
1931), passim; C. Maher, A Visitto the United States to Study Soil Conservation,(Department of
Agriculture, Nairobi 1940), passim.
334
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
of an Agricultural Officer named Colin Maher. Committed to the cause of
soil conservationfrom an early stage, Maher fought what amountedto a fullyfledged campaign from 1932 to 1938 to publicise the potential dangers of soil
erosion in Kenya. A prolific writer, he contributeda multitude of newspaper
and magazine articles on the subject, while also compiling many length reports
and memoranda for circulation among his colleagues.47 The setting up of
a Soil Conservation Service in 1938, under his dynamic leadership, was
something of a personal triumph, but it also stood as testimony to the power
of the many settler pressure groups who had actively supportedthis cause; after
all, the new Soil Conservation Service would work for the benefit of white
farmers.48 Lacking these strong unofficial accomplices, those Agricultural
Officers in Uganda and Tanganyika who advocated similar developments had
to adapt their ideas to fit in with the prevailing policies of the Agricultural
Department.
In Uganda the determiningfactor was the commitmenttowardsAfrican cash
crop production, attention being drawn to soil conservation by falling crop
yields through declining fertility. The first detailed report on soil deterioration in Uganda, a collection of surveys compiled and analysedby the Director
of Agriculture, Tothill, was prompted by the fears of the Empire Cotton
Growers Association.49 It was the Teso District that absorbed much of
Uganda's conservation effort, where cotton yields had declined most sharply
during the late 1920s and early 1930s, despite a rapid acreage expansion stimulated by the introduction of oxen ploughing.50 A committee set up to look
into the problem in 1935 made several suggestions for far reaching changes in
farming methods. Among these were the resettlement of people from overcrowded and exhausted areas of the District, the introduction of a cattle tax
to discourage the accumulationof livestock, and the enforcementof mandatory
contour ploughing. After discussion the measures actually implementedwere
more piecemeal; earthworkbunds were constructed on only about 4,000 acres;
selected small areas were closed to livestock to rest the pasture; and strip cropping with grass barrierswas enforced. Of these, and many other methods of
conservationsuggested in Teso, only the strip-croppingproved really successful in the long-term. Supported by a well administeredBye-law, 90 per cent
of all cotton land in Teso had been strip-cropped by 1941. An important
47. For details of his career, see his personal file, KNA Min. of Agr./2/274, and also D. M.
Anderson, 'Herder, Settler, and Colonial Rule', pp. 11s113 and 253-257. Several of his
publications have already been cited, others of interest include Peasantry or Prosperity.;,(East
AfricanProblemsno. 3, East AfricanStandard,Nairobi 1943), and 'The People and the Land:Some
Problems', East African Agriculturalffournal,7 (1942/43) pp. 6349.
48. Brooke-Pophamto Ormsby-Gore, 18 September 1937, and minutes by Flood, 30 September
1937, and Stoclrdale,13 October 1937, CO 533/483/7; 'Soil Conservationand Soil Erosionin Kenya
Colony, 1937 and 1938', CO 852/249/16; MacDonald to Brooke-Popham, Despatch no. 810, 11
December 1939 KNA PC/RVP.6A/ 11/23.
49. J. D. Tothill, A Reporton 19 Surveys in small AgriculturalAreas, passim.
50. J. Vincent, Teso in Transformation,pp. 173-177; G.B. Masefield, A History of the Colonial
AgriculturalService (Oxford 1972), pp. 103-104.
DEPRESSION,DUST BOWL, DEMOGRAPHY,AND DROUGHT
335
factor in this was the imposition of cash fines for failure to comply with the
regulations. The shortening of the fallow period, as a result of increased
population and greater cultivation, was recognised as the real cause of the
decline in soil fertility in Teso, but this could not be so easily handled by
legislation at a local level without a much greatercommitmentto enforcement.5l
Soil erosion was an importantquestion in Ugandaby 1938, but it was monitored
and treated only in those areas where it seemed likely to threatenthe cash crop
economy.
A local approach was adopted in Tanganyika. Here the settler community
was mainly involved in the plantation production of sisal, and in the growing
of coffee. The uncertain political status of the territory during the 1930s
absorbed much of the settlers political energies, the rest being taken up with
belated attempts to control the spread of coffee production among Africans.52
Therefore, the Tanganyika settlers did not make political currency out of the
erosion question as their Kenya neighbours did. An initial flush of concern
over soil erosion in 1930 saw the formationof a StandingCommitteeto monitor
the problem in the Territory, but, in the words of John Iliffe, 'the urgency
faded'.53 In their need to increase revenue and curtail expenditure to meet
the rigours of the Depression, the Administrationadopted a more cautious attitude. The Plant-More-Crops campaign went ahead, but the question of soil
erosion was never completely ignored.54 The onus for implementingconservation regulations was handed down to the Native Authorities from 1930, and
over the following seven years the majorityof Tanganyika'sAuthoritiespassed
local regulationsmakingcertain anti-erosionmeasures compulsoryin their Districts. The results were, naturally, minimal and localized. The basic
methods were similar to those advocated elsewhere in Africa at the time, and
borrowed heavily from the experience of both Kenya and Nyasaland. They
included the demonstration of terracing on the contour; the protection of
forests; green manuring (in parts of the Central Province); the provision of
better water resources by the construction of dams and wells; and the resting
of areas of pasture. Often these measures were applied alongside the antitsetse campaign, new husbandryregulations being enforced on newly-cleared
areas as the settlers arrived.55 Policies in Tanganyikawere determinedfirstly
51. Reportof the TesoInformalCommittee,passim; InterimReportof the AgriculturalSurvey Committee, (Department of Agriculture, Entebbe ! 937), pp. 24; D. J. Vail, A Historyof Agricultural
Innovation. . . in Teso, pp. 127-135; 'Memo: Soil Erosion in Uganda', May 1938, CO 822/88/6;
Mitchell to MacDonald, 12 May 1939, CO 852/249/15.
52. N. J. Westcott, 'The Impact of the Second World War', ch.2; K. Ingram,'Tanganyika:Slump
and Short-term Governors', pp. 605410.
53. J. Iliffe, A Modern Historyof Tanganyika,pp. 348-349.
54. For example, see TanganyikaTerritoryAnnual Report, 1934, Appendix VI 'Measures taken
in various Provinces, 1933 and 1934, in connexion with Soil Erosion', pp. 171-176.
55. 'Memo: Soil Erosion in Tanganyika Territory', 28 May 1938, CO 822/88/6; 'A Review of
the position in Regard to Soil Conservation in Tanganyika in 1938', 27 March 1939, CO
852/249/15; Lord Hailey, An African Survey, pp. 10391038; J. Iliffe, A Modern History of
Tanganyika, pp. 349-352, points out that the erosion 'crisis' predicted by some agriculturalists
during the 1930s in Tanganyikanever materialized.
336
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
by the need to expandproduction,both of cash crops and food crops, and
secondlyby the localcircumstances
of populationpressureanddrought.
Awarenessof an environmental
threatto the land,andof a consequentthreat
to the futureviabilityand profitabilityof farming,promptedmorethorough
researchinto the methodsof arableandpastoralproductionin Africa.56 This
was firstinitiatedin the coloniesthemselves,with eachAgriculturalDepartmentmountingits own set of investigations. In Tanganyika,the Agricultural
ResearchStationat Amani,was reopenedin the 1920s, and over the next
decadeits influential,thoughsometimescontroversialresearch,was focussed
increasinglyon problemsconnectedwith soil erosion. During 1932 Amani
hosteda conferenceof soil chemistsfrom all over East and CentralAfrica.
Two yearsearlierthe TanganyikanStandingCommitteeon Soil Erosionhad
solicitedthe co-operationof Amani,encouragingthe Instituteto carryout
researchon the causes and processes of land degradation.57This work
ultimatelysoughtto demonstratethe valueof betterhusbandryunderstrictly
controlledconditionsof land management,and contributedsubstantiallyto
the opinionthat Africanland could be mademoreproductiveif appropriate
techniqueswereemployed.58
The researcheffortin Ugandatook a ratherdiSerentform,but alsoreached
conclusionsthat encouragedthose who wishedto institutereformsin African
agriculture. At Serere, in Teso District, experimentswere undertakento
establishthe causeof fertilityloss, andby 1935resultsclearlysuggestedthat
the breakdownof the soil structurewasfundamental
to the problem. Where
the actualmechanicsof the soil were breakingdown, fertilizersandmanures
woulddo little to maintainthe fertilityof the earth. The alarmingmessage
here was that aftera certainpointin the breakdownof the soil the declinein
fertilitywas irretrievable;modernmethodsof agriculturewouldbe of little
use. The implicationsof this werequicklyappreciatedby the EmpireCotton
GrowersAssociation,whosupportedmuchof the research;to be sureof maintainingsoil fertilityyou not only hadto gaina detailedknowledgeof localsoil
56. G. B. Masefield, History of the Colonial AgricultureService, pp. 7647; Lord Hailey, An
African Survey, pp. 912-917.
57. H. H. Storey, Basic Researchin Agriculture:A Brief Historyof Researchat Amani, 1928-1947,
(Govt. Printer, Nairobi n.d., but probably 1950)- Papers concerning the Informal Conference of
administrativeofficers, held at Dodoma May 1929, and Minutes by Passfield 25 April 1930, and
Stockdale, 29 January1930, CO 822/26/9; TechnicalConferencesof the East if rican Dependencies:
Proceedingsof a Conferenceof East African Soil Chemistsheld at the AgriculturalResearchStation,
Amani, (Govt. Printer, Nairobi 1932), and the connected papers in CO 822/47/3; Tanganyika
TerritoryAnnual Report, 1934, p. 39.
58. H. H. Storey, Brief Historyof Researchat Amani, passim. And for specific examples H. E.
Hornby, 'Overstockingin TanganyikaTerritory', East African Agricult71ral
3tournal,1 (1935/36)
pp. 353-360; R. R. Staples, H. E. Hornby and R. M. Hornby, 'A Study of the Comparativeeffects
of goats and cattle on a mixed grass-bushpasture', East African Agricultureffournal,8 (1942) pp.
62-70. Work at Amani on soil classificationand mapping was also very important, see G. Milne
(ed), A Provisional Soil Map of East Africa, (Amani Institute, Tanganyika, 1936).
DUST BOWL, DEMOGRAPHY,AND DROUGHT
DEPRESSION,
337
jeopardize
but had to enforcecultivationmethodsthat wouldnot
chemistry,
productivecapacityof the land.59
the
concentratedupon
Investigationof the erosionquestionin Kenyainitially
schemesbeingset up to reconditionovergrazed
withexperimental
pastureland,
of grazing
and then allow stock back on, in a controlledsystem
grasslands
demonstrated
In bothMachakosandBaringotheseexperiments
management.
be maintainedif
rested pasturewould recover,andthat recoverycould
that
cycle of overfurther
a
levels could be kept low enoughto prevent
stocking
faith in the
considerable
grazing.These minorsuccesseswere the basis for
by many
held
conviction,
of reconditioningin Kenya, andled to the
process
destocking
compulsory
the
officers and many settlers, that
administrative
would end the threat of erosion, while also easing
pastures
ofovergrazed
in the AfricanReservesas a whole.
congestion
clearlyindicated
The cumulativeresultof this researcheSort in EastAfrica
but that
erosion,
soil
thatactioncouldbe takento prevent,andto ameliorate
to
likely
were
consequences
whereAfricanhusbandrywas left uncheckedthe
something
believed
people
bedire. If somethingcould be done, then most
be done.60
should
weregraduallygivengreatercoherlocalinvestigations
Theseuncoordinated
withthe probenceandpurposeas the ColonialOfficebecamemoreconcerned notice of the
taken
first
had
lemof soil conservation. The ColonialOffice
end of the First World
peculiardifficultiesof tropicalagricultureand at the
ViscountMilnerestabwhen
the needforgreaterresearch
War,acknowledging
Trinidad. Openedin
in
lishedan ImperialCollegeof TropicalAgriculture
becamerecogquickly
College
1922,andgivenits RoyalCharterin 1926,the
in TroDiploma
post-graduate
centrefor research,its
nizedas aninternational
yearin
a
by
followed
Cambridge
picalAgriculture,involvinga year spent at
land
of
problems
The
Trinidad,recognizedas a prestigiousqualification.
erosionsoil
of
evils
the
in the tropicalenvironment,including
management
of the
knownin the West Indies- werethe breadandbutter
well
were
which
College
Trinidad
the
of
Trinidadsyllabus.6l In the early 1930s graduates
betterqualifiedin theirsubject
beganto infiltratethe colonialadministration,
thinkingthanthe preandmorein touch with currenttrendsin researchand
havehopedto have
ever
could
officers
viousgenerationof colonialagricultural
of AgriDepartment
Kenyan
the
to
been. These mendominatedthe recruits
the
through
quickly
progressing
cultureby 1935, a largeproportionof them
CO 822/88/6; C. C. Wrigley, Cropsand Wealth,
59. 'Memo: Soil Erosion in Uganda', May 1938,pp. 101-110.
Uganda,
in
Agriculture
pp. 6G66; J. D. Tothill,
Problemof Overstocking,passim; 'Soil Erosion
60. InterimReportof a Committeeto Deal with the
852/249/16; J. Forbes Munro, ColonialRule
CO
1938',
and
1937
Kenya,
in
and Soil Conservation
Settler, and Colonial Rule', pp. 217-260.
'Herder,
Anderson,
M.
D.
219223.
pp.
and the Kamba,
pp. 3743; 'TropicalAgriculture:
Service,
Agricultural
Colonial
the
of
History
Masefield,
61. G. B.
April 1930.
5
Standard,
African
East
College',
Trinidad
the
Work of
338
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ranksto holdseniorpostsby the 1940s.62 The ColonialOfficeitselftookmore
noticeof this cadreof expertsas it beganto re-examinethe administration
of
the coloniesandoverhaulits own bureaucracy. Withthe appointmentof an
Agricultural
Advisorto the ColonialOfficein 1929,andthe creationof a separate EconomicDepartmentwithinthe ColonialOfficein 1935,andlaterthrough
the establishmentof numerousadvisorycommitteesconnectedwithquestions
of colonialadministration
and development,such as the AdvisoryCouncil
on Agricultureand Animal Health, the Colonial DevelopmentAdvisory
Committeeand the ColonialResearchCouncil,the CouncilOfficesoughtto
coordinateits policiesovera widerangeof topicsthroughoutthe colonies.63
As questionsconnectedwithlanddegradation
becomeever moreprominent
in the day to day businessof the ColonialOffice,soil erosionr rather,the
fear of it was the commonthreadthat boundtogetheragriculturalpolicies
for the tropicalcolonies. Frombeing a problemidentifiedand handledat a
local level in each colony in 1928, soil erosionhad by 1938come to assume
an importantpositionin generalpolicymakingfor the colonies,demandinga
coordinated
responsefromWhitehall. As theproblemtranscended
the various
levels of administration,
fromthe DistrictOfficerto the PermanentSecretary,
its implicationswere given new meaningandthe policiesfor its amelioration
were framedmore broadly. Fromthe examplesof the Districtsof Kondoa
in Tanganyika,Teso in Uganda,and Baringoin Kenya,we can identifyfour
phasesin this graduallyexpandingpolicy:
i. Initialexpressionsof concernaboutlanddegradation
withinthe District.
ii. Officialrecognitionof the problemby the Districtadministration.
iii. Action at the District level, with the implementation
of anti-erosion
measures.
iv. Wider colonialconcern, with the formulationof large-scaleplans at
Provincial,or even Colonylevel, andapplications
for centralfundingfor
ameliorativemeasures.
As the table below illustrates,by 1938 each of these three Districts,from
widely divergingstartingpoints and throughdivergentsets of agricultural
policy aims, had arrivedat the samebasic approachto the questionof land
degradation.
The time delayof aboutten yearsbetweenrecognitionandactioncanperhapsbe dismissedas the naturalslow gestationof a conservativebureaucracy.
To some extentthis is true, but the passingof time also saw an accumulation
of forces in favourof agrarianreformsin Africa,and allowedthe facts and
figuresto be gatheredand analysed. The ColonialOfficebeganto examine
the relationshipof causeandeffect in Africanhusbandry,andas a resultwere
62. G. B. Masefield, ibid, pp. 43-48; Colonial Office Lists, 192F1948 (HMSO London), give
the qualificationsof Kenyan AgriculturalOfficers, though not for other colonies. By 1948 almost
half the field staff and more than half the technical staff were Trinidadtrained.
63. G. B. Masefield, ibid, pp. 41-42; Sir C. Jeffries, The Colonial Office(Allen & Unwin, London
1956), pp. 108-113.
DEPRESSION,DUST BOWL, DEMOGRAPHY,AND DROUGHT
339
TABLE
Phases in the evolutionof Soil Conservationpolicies: Kondoa, Teso, and Baringo, 1928 to 1938
Kondoa
i.
1928- Kondoadescribedas
being 'deeply eroded'.
ii.
193District
administrationcommenton
erosion, especially gullying.
1932 Native Authority
Bye-Laws begin to deal with
conservationmeasures.
1933 Kondoadescribedas
'worst erosion' in
Tanganyika.
1937 Secretariatin
Dar-es-Salaammarksarea as
'firstpriority'in anti-erosion
work.
iii.
iv.
1938/39 Development plan
drawnup for Kondoa, and
requests madeto central
governmentfor finance.64
Teso
Late 1920s Falling yields
noted by EmpireCotton
Growers Assoc, and
overstockingof area
discussed.
1932 Teso officially
acknowledgedto have lowest
cotton yield in Uganda.
1935 InformalCommittee
formedby District
administrationto advise on
conservationmeasures.
1937 General surveys of
erosion throughoutcolony.
Teso mainareaof concern.
1938 Strip cropping, and
other conservationmeasures
implemented.
1938/39 Uganda
administrationseeks CDF
funding for resettlementand
re-afforestationschemes, to
prevent spreadof erosion.65
Baringo
1928 Drought causes first
commentson land
degradation.
1929 First officialconcern,
connected to the issue of
overstocking.
193Reconditioning
schemes begun in District,
funded by Provincial
administration.
1933/34 Kenya Land
Commissionhighlightsland
use problems, identifying
Baringoas an acute example.
1935/37 Surveys of erosion
throughoutcolony declare
Baringoto be 'amongthe
worst'.
1938/39 Detailed
RehabilitationScheme drawn
up for Baringo,supportedby
centralgovernment,and put
forwardfor considerationby
the CDF.66
preparedto reassesstheir own role as reformers. Mountingconcernled to
a graduallymountingcommitmentto act.67
An ideologyof conservation,basedupon soil erosion,hademergedwithin
the ColonialOffice before the SecondWorldWar. The Dust Bowl, at its
heightin 1935, andits cost spectacularlymeasuredin poundsof soil lost per
64. I am grateful to John Iliffe for allowing me to use his notes on Kondoa District, mostly from
the Tanzania National Archive (TNA). The following sources were used in compiling the table:
GillmanDiaries, entry for 6 October 1928, Rhodes House Library;Kondoa-IrangiAnnualReports,
192s1934; re. gully erosion in Kondoa, TNA 691/109/2; re. meeting on soil erosion, 1937, TNA
Sec. 19685/2/279; re. plans for rehabilitation and development, TNA CP 26393/1/1 and CP
26393/2/ 1A.
65. Teso column compiled from: Report of the Teso Informal Committee;Interim Report of the
AgriculturalSurvey Committee;Report of the Uganda Cotton Commission,1938, (Govt. Printer,
Entebbe 1939), pp. 15-27; J. D. Tothill, A Reporton 19 Surveys in small AgriculturalAreas; J.
D. Vail, A History of AgriculturalInnovation. . . in Teso, pp. 127-135- E. J. Waylandand N. V.
Brasnett, Interim Report on Soil Erosion in Uganda, in CO 822/82/6; 'Memo: Soil Erosion in
Uganda', May 1938, CO 822/88/6; Mitchell to MacDonald, 12 May 1939, CO 852/249/15.
66. Baringo column compiled from: Kenya Land Commission: Evidence, pp. 1773-1799,
Secretary's Precis of the Rift Valley Province proposals and recommendations,and pp. 180(}1906,
all evidence concerning Baringo- Governors Deputy to MacDonald, 13 August 1939, enclosing
Memo. by E. M. Hyde-Clarke, 'Baringo District RehabilitationScheme', January1939, and reply,
11 December 1939, KNA PC/RVP.6A/11/23; C. Maher, Soil Erosionand Land Utilisationin the
Kamasia Reserves,passim.
67. 'Soil Conservation in the Tropics', by Sir F. Stockdale, prepared for the Netherlands
Conference on Tropical Agriculture, 1939, CO 852/249/17.
340
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
personandsquarefeet of topsoilblownhundredsof milesacrosscountry,had
madeconservation
of the environment
an international
issue. This impactdid
muchto push the ColonialOfficeto tacklethe issue on an equallygrandscale.
Administrators
fromthe coloniesandbureaucratsfromWhitehalltravelledto
Americato see the devastationat first handand, moreimportantly,to view
the anti-erosionmeasuresbeingappliedby the UnitedStatesSoilConservation
Service.68 But the Americans,for all their effortsto deal with the problem,
were barelyworththeiracknowledged
statusof 'experts'on soil conservation.
Havingcreatedone of the most serioussingleenvironmental
disastersknown
to manthey simplyhadto set abouttryingto solveit.69 In a sense,therewere
no 'experts';only those who were doing something. More of necessitywas
beingdonein NorthAmericathanelsewhere,andso it wasprimarilyfromthis
pool of experiencethat the ColonialOffice drew its ideas. Even when the
ColonialOfficetried to drawupon more appropriateexamplesfrom Africa,
they discoveredthatall roadsled backto HughBennettandthe AmericanSoil
ConservationService. Before establishinga Soil ConservationService in
Kenya, it was suggestedthat an AgriculturalOfficerbe sent to Basutoland,
whereanti-erosionschemeswere reportedlyat a moreadvancedstage. The
Basutoland
administration
respondedenthusiastically
to the requestto entertain
the Kenyanvisitor,but askedthat the trip be postponeduntiltheirown Soil
ConservationOfficerhad returnedfrom his fact-findingtour to the United
States.70
It wasduringMalcolmMacDonald'ssecondtermat the ColonialOfficethat
soil conservationwas given priorityas a matterof very real Imperialimportance. Macdonalddid much to crystallizethe ideas on agrarianreforminto
harderpolicies, but even before his returnthe ColonialOffice had already
begunto throwits weightbehindthe pushfora conservation-conscious
agrarian
strategy. The previousyear, in June 1937, Ormsby-Gorehad pledgedthe
governmentto greaterexpenditureon anti-erosionmeasuresin East Africa,
acknowledgingthat direct actionwas now an urgentnecessity.7l This was
followedin February1938by a circularto all colonies,demandingthat they
68. D. Worster, Dust Bowl: The SouthernPlains in the 1930s, pp. 1s25- 'Notes on Soil Conservation Work in America', by Sir F. Stockdale, 17 November 1937, following his visit to the United
States, CO 533/483/7.
69. This was a common theme in the writings of Hugh Bennett. See also P. B. Sears, Deserts
on the March (London edition, 1949), and V. G. Carterand T. Dale, Topsoiland Civilisation,(Univ.
of OklahomaPress, revised edition 1974, first edition 1955), a book dedicated to Bennett.
70. High CommissionerBasutolandto Brooke-Popham,25 September 1937, CO 533/483/7. For
the Americaninfluence in Southern Africa, see W. Beinart, 'Soil Erosion, Conservationism,and
Ideas About Development', pp. 25-26.
71. On MacDonald, see J. Flint, 'The Failure of Planned Decolonization', pp. 398402, but also
R. D. Pearce, 'The Colonial Office and Planned Decolonization', pp. 78-80. Ormsby-Gore to
Wade, 23 June 1937, and Minute by Stockdale, 9 June 1937, arguingstronglyfor increasedexpenditure, claimingpresent efforts against erosion to be 'about as affective as attemptingto build a bridge
across Sydney harbour with a Meccano set', in CO 533/483/6. For one of the earliest official
references to the dangers of erosion in East Africa, see Reportof the East Africa (Ormsby-Gore)
Commission,Cmd. 2387, pp. 32 and 72.
DEPRESSION,DUST BOWL, DEMOGRAPHY,AND DROUGHT
341
submitan annualaccountof all the conservationwork undertakenby their
variousdepartmentseach year. Some colonieswere slow to respondto this
circular afterall, erosionwasnot a pressingissuein all partsof the Empirebut the ColonialOfficesent out regularremindersuntil all the reportswere
furnished. As the fat files containingcolonialsoil erosionreportsfrom 1938
onwardstestify, this was a subjectaboutwhicheverycolonialadministration
wasexpectedto be aware.72 Soilerosioncanbe seento havereachedits place
as a topic of 'High Policy'in East Africawhen a specialsessionof the 1938
GovernorsConferencewas devotedto a discussionof conservationpolicies.
The paperspreparedforthismeetingwerelaterpublishedin full andcirculated
to other colonies, a rare enoughoccurancein itself to signalthat something
of significancewas takingplace.73 A similarindicationwas providedby the
demandfor a pamphleton soil conservationin Tanganyika,preparedin 1937
by Harrison,the Directorof Agriculture. The initialprint-runof 600 copies
wasdistributedin EastAfrica,andsent to othercoloniesfor theirinformation,
but interestwas so greatthatthe CrownAgentswere askedto arrangefor the
printingof a further500 copies in 1938, these being sent, on request,as far
afieldas BritishGuiana,the GoldCoast,andFiji.74
At the ColonialOfficein Londonone manstandsout as havingbeen most
influentialin all of this:Sir FrankStockdale. Lookingat his career,one might
be temptedto suggestthat as Stockdalegainedposition,so did the question
of soil erosion. Stockdalefirst becameconcernedwith the problemof land
degradation
in the tropicsas Directorof AgricultureiIlCeylonin 1920,where
he was responsiblefor setting up anti-erosionworkon the large tea estates.
By the 1930s, as AgriculturalAdvisorto the ColonialOffice, his particular
experienccof the problemmadehimmoresensitiveto the rumblingsof concern
in the coloniesaboutthe threatof erosion. As the issue of soil conservation
becamea recurrentthemein ColonialOfficediscussionson tropicalagriculture,
it wasStockdalewhoprovidedthe 'expert'opinionandmadepolicyrecommendations;who advisedwhichideas shouldbe supportedand whichdismissed;
who draftedthe minutesthat alertedmanyof his junior,andless experienced
officers,to the essentialimportanceof the erosionquestion. Aboveall, it was
FrankStockdalewho encouragedthe ColonialOfficeto view conservationof
the soil as an issue commonto all the Britishcolonies.75 Withhis close contactswith HughBennettandothersinvolvedin the Americanfightagainstbad
72. Lord Harlech's (Ormsby-Gore) despatch no. 74, 9 February 1938, CO 852/249/15. Annual
Reports from the Colonies on soil erosion can be found in CO 852, beginning in 1938-39, CO
852/249/15 and 16.
73. 'Papers concerning the Conference of Governors of British East Africa, June 1938', CO
822/88/6, later published as Soil Erosion, Memorandaby the Governmentsof Uganda, Kenya, and
Tanganyika,(Govt. Printer, Nairobi 1938).
74. Crown Agents to Under Sec. of State, Colonial Office, 25 August 1939, CO 852/250/1.
75. G. B. Masefield, History of the ColonialAgriculturalService, pp. 161-162; F. Stockdale, 'Soil
Erosion in the Colonial Empire', Empireffournal of ExperimentalAgriculture,5 (1937)- Minute
by Stockdale, 9 June 1937, CO 533/483/6; and, for an early example, Minute by Stockdale, 29
January1930, CO 822/26/9.
342
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
farming, Stockdale was committedto direct action to enforce better husbandry
on often reluctant and sometimes ignorant farmers.76 But it would be wrong
to see Frank Stockdale as the orchestratorof a campaignto draw attention to
the erosion issue. He did not create the problem, it landed on his desk in the
form of reports and memorandafrom the various colonies and, as the official
with overall responsibility for colonial agriculturalpolicy, he set about trying
to make sense of it and devising policies that would tackle it.
It is interesting to note that by 1938 Stockdale was already suggesting that
the methods of constructing anti-erosion works then being advocated in the
colonies were, in many cases, counter-productive. Following the American
experience once again, Stockdalecalculatedthat the overallproductive capacity
of most African lands could not sustain the current costs of maintainingantierosion works, particularlywhere heavy mechanizationwas involved. It was
uneconomic to rehabilitate, or even protect, African lands by such capitalintensive means. Instead, the natural landscape should be used as the basis
for conservationplanning, and where larger works of constructionwere deemed
necessary these should be undertaken without the use of heavy machinery.77
By this time the Colonial Office was already considering proposals for the
ameliorationof land degradationinvolving mechanizationand its attendanthigh
costs. These were accepted as the large-scale solutions to what were viewed
as large-scale problems, and after 1945 mechanizationplayed a significantpart
in the implementation of development schemes throughout British Africa.
Indeed, although the costs of such action were high, the implicationsof solving
the landuse problem by labour intensive means went far beyond the advantages
apparent in simply applying methods of good husbandry. Voluntary labour
cost the colonial administrationnothing, but was a heavy burden to the farmer,
who objected to this interventionist policy, however well meaning it may have
been.78
Conclusion
The rise of soil erosion as a subject of 'Imperial importance' was not an
isolated development, but was part of a much wider and historically more
significant transition in British colonial thinking that took place during the
1930s. However real or imaginary the economic and environmental crises
were, the 1930s became a decade of reassessment in British colonies and in
the Colonial Office itself. It cannot simply be argued that events in the
76. Minute by Stockdale, 9 June 1937, CO 533/483/6; Stockdale to Dr J. H. Reisner, United
States Soil Conservation Service, 26 October 1937, and reply 9 November 1937; and, 'Notes on
Soil Conservation Work in America', by Stockdale, 17 November 1937, all in CO 533/483/7;
Bennett to Reisner, 6 December 1937 CO 533/483/8.
77. Notes on Soil Conservation Work in America', by Stockdale, 17 November 1937, CO
533/483/7.
78. D. W. Throup, 'The Governorship of Sir Philip Mitchell', pp. 212-261; L. Cliffe,
'Nationalism and Reaction to Enforced AgriculturalChange', passim; C. C. Wrigley, Cropsand
Wealth,pp. 76-79.
DEPRESSION,DUST BOWL, DEMOGRAPHY,AND DROUGHT
343
coloniesforceda shift in policies,or thatan awakeningof concernfor African
developmentin Londonprompteda new set of policies 'fromabove'. Both
andignorethe movementsof ideasthatwent
explanationsare unsophisticated,
again,
thatweremodifiedby experienceboth
and
back
to
London
fromcolony
withinand outsidethe Empire,and that often resultedin reformsthat went
farbeyondwhatwasinitiallyintended. The cumulativeeffectwasimportant,
in EastAfricaandseniormembersof the
andby the late 1930sadministrators
ColonialServicein Londonwerewellawarethatthe reformstheycontemplated
were certainto be profoundand pervasive.79How far they connectedthe
beginningsof 'development'in East Africawith ultimatelyacceleratingthe
process to decolonisation,is a much broaderquestion;what is clear is that
the changesof the 1930sestablisheda frameworkwithinwhichthe policiesof
the late 1940scouldbe implemented. The SecondWorldWarwas, of course,
to addimportantpartsto this structure,but to fully understandthe effect of
the War,andthe reasoningbehindthe agrarianreformsof the post-waryears,
during
we mustrecognisethe significanceof the shiftsin policyaccomplished
the 1930s. The policiesthathadevolvedby 1938werethe productof a combination of local and internationalcircumstances,of a complex interaction
each with theirown
betweenthe variouslevels of the colonialadministration
perceptions of the nature of the problemsthat confrontedthem. Soil
conservationbecamea fundamentalissue becauseit lay at the very heartof
the strategiesthatemergedfor Africandevelopment.
79. Wade to Ormsby-Gore, 17 March 1937, and reply 23 June 1937- Minute by Stockdale, 9 June
1937, all in CO 533/483/6; Brooke-Pophamto Ormsby-Gore, 18 September 1937, and related
papers, in CO 533/483/7; 'Soil Conservation in the Tropics', by Stockdale, June 1939, CO
852/249/17.