What Is An Emotional Argument? or
Why Do Argument Theorists Quarrel with Their Mates?*
Gilbert, Michael A. 1995. “Emotional Argumentation, or, Why Do Argumentation
Theorists Argue with their Mates?” Analysis and Evaluation: Proceedings of the Third
ISSA Conference on Argumentation Vol II, F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair,
and C.A. Willard, eds. Amsterdam 1994. Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Michael A. Gilbert
York University, Toronto, Canada
Introduction
Arguments, as they occur in everyday life, are extremely complex social
interactions. Only rarely do they initially exhibit a form that lends them susceptible to
easy analysis by logical or Argumentation Theory means. A great deal of manipulation or
transformation is required to shape the naturally occurring argumentation into something
that can be identified as having premisses and claims, let alone differentiating between
such items as data, warrants, and so on. Still, this can be done, and different systems for so
doing have been offered and studied for some time. The difficulty with most if not all of
these methods is that they invariably assume that the logical structure of the “underlying”
argument is what forms its essential nature. As a result most systems involve stripping
away, eliminating or transforming those components of the argument that are not deemed
essential.
I have argued elsewhere that arguments invariably include components essential to
their proper understanding that are non-logical (Gilbert, 1994). In particular, the nonlogical modes include the emotional, the visceral, and what I have called the kisceral or
intuitive modes. To analyze an argument without considering these modes is to risk
completely misunderstanding its import, and, ergo, missing the essential nature of the
communication. This is so, I have claimed, because often the logical mode is not the sole
bearer of the intended import or crucial elements of the message. That is to say, one might
model the argument along logical lines and completely miss the point as it is being
understood by the participants to the interaction. Indeed, in at least some, if not many,
instances the argument may best be considered as being dominated by another mode in the
sense that it can really only be understood by appealing to that particular mode.
One major impediment to the exploration of emotional argumentation is found in
the standard definitions of argument offered in the literature. These almost always require
that the argument have a certain structure, intention, or what have you, which means that
there must be some concrete connection between the claim that has been identified and the
process of the argument. In some instances it is located in the intention of the participants
*
Read at ISSA Conf, amst June 1994; read at OPS, York Univ, Nov 1994
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while in other cases it is the way in which the argument unfolds.1 Rather than quarrel with
these definitions I will instead introduce two paired distinctions that will permit us to
discuss the issue more easily.
The two pair of distinctions run along two axes. The first axis concerns the degree
to which the argumentation is structured. To the extent that the interaction has identifiable
premisses, claims, and to the degree that the participants proceed in a fashion that honours
the presentation of such argumentative items, we shall say the argumentation is more or
less linear (a term I choose rather than the more theory-laden ‘logical’.) The opposite end
of this axis is exemplified by arguments where little heed is paid to what has just been said,
where the participants would have difficulty answering the query, “what is the argument
about?”, and would have great difficulty in describing the position of their dispute partner
in a way acceptable to that partner.2 Arguments exemplifying this characteristic will be
said to be ‘chaotic’. It must be remembered that this is an axis, and the range of
argumentation from the highly linear to the completely chaotic covers great deal of
territory.
The second axis is anchored at one end by highly abstract argumentation where
there is little evidence that the participants are attached to the positions they defend. Such
an argument shall be called ‘clinical’. At the other extreme are arguments where there is a
great deal of personal involvement, and where the psychological stake appears to be more
crucial to the outcome than the actual claims being uttered. Such arguments will be
described as ‘emotional’, and this axis will run from the purely clinical to the highly
emotional. It is important to realize that an argument may sound clinical when, in fact, it is
quite emotional. The clinical/emotional axis is not necessarily characterized by sound and
fury, though, of course, an emotional argument may be. In fact, shouting and overt
displays of anger and/or aggression are not necessary concomitants of either axial extreme.
One can have an emotional/chaotic argument that is reasonably quiet and exhibits no overt
rudeness or what have you.
The following diagram illustrates the two axes.
I will not spend time here discussing the various ways in which argument may be
defined and the implications of such definitions. See Gilbert, 1990, for a full discussion of
this topic.
2
As a test of good rapport in an argumentation, this is a good one. It will, however,
also be the case that in fairly linear argumentation misunderstanding also occurs, though in
a chaotic argument it may almost be counted on.
1
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Emotional
Linear
Chaotic
Clinical
Figure 1. The two axes, with circle indicating range of normal.
Argument itself I shall define simply as a communicative interaction centred on a
disagreement. This is obviously a very broad definition, and those who want to make the
term ‘argument’ an honourific bestowed only on that subset of dispute communications
that are both linear and clinical will find it far too broad. However, to make the definition
narrow at this point would be to beg the entire question of the existence, let alone the role,
of emotional arguments, and so the broad definition will, I hope, be allowed.
There are Emotional Arguments
There is clearly no question or cavil concerning the existence of emotion in
arguments. All scholars recognize that some arguments are emotional and, indeed, some
are very emotional. However, and here we come to the nub of the question, many scholars
claim that in order to understand the argumentation we must eliminate, analyze away, or
otherwise filter out the emotional component. The argumentation is to be found in the
words and structures, but not in the feelings of the participants. In other words, the real
debate is not over whether or not emotional arguments exist, but whether emotional
arguments need be purified or, at least, largely decontaminated, prior to their being
investigated. Views on this range from those who seem to feel that emotion has no place
in argumentation, through those who feel it’s all right if there is some emotional content,
provided it does not become the central focus or obscure the logical structure or dialectical
nature of the argumentative enterprise. I believe these views are too narrow, and will argue
that various techniques and suggestions available in Argumentation Theory allow more
room for emotional argumentation than might be thought. I will review these techniques,
and then argue that there are very strong grounds for supposing that ignoring the emotional
content of an argument is liable to lead to an incorrect analysis of that argument.
Back when Argumentation Theory still had ooze from the primordial logical
swamp adhering to its skin, D.J. O’keefe introduced the distinction between argument1 and
argument2. This distinction, so common in the natural language was not particularly
honoured within Argumentation Theory, and, the suggestion was, this resulted in a good
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deal of confusion. With regard to emotional arguments the point I want to make here is as
follows. Clearly, emotional arguments occur more obviously when viewing argument2
than argument1, since it is in the exchange of opinions that emotion is most likely to be
visible. O’keefe, after all, indicated no requirement that an argument2 be clinical or linear
in order to qualify as an argument per se. To the contrary, one of the purposes of the
distinction is to allow us to use the term ‘argument’ in those contexts where the
identifications traditionally made might not be so clear. Argumentation Theorists might,
after all, value a certain kind of argument, but that does not mean it is the only kind that
occurs—not even among Argumentation Theorists themselves. The more difficult question
is whether it makes sense to talk about an emotional argument1 on O’keefe’s model.
Consider the following excerpt from an argument2.
[1.] Paul: You never listen to a word I say.
Mary: Right, and you hang on my every syllable.
Example [1.] can be analyzed by viewing Mary’s claim as the denial of Paul’s
assertion. Her premiss then becomes the assertion that Paul is also not a good listener.
The argument is a classic tu quoque, and would not be considered a very good argument
by most analytical standards. Still, it is not very difficult to extract the argument1 from the
argument2. We can also easily imagine the words of [1.] being spoken with some
considerable heat, perhaps even vehemence. I believe that we have an emotional argument1
in example [1.]. How do we know it is an emotional argument? Because we were
witnesses to it. By itself, the argument is only a poor argument. Taken in the context of a
typical intimate relationship, most of us can readily identify the style the example exhibits,
viz., a marital tit-for-tat argument that, one hopes, will not go off the deep end. The point,
however, is that to analyze and dismiss Mary’s argument as a mere tu quoque is to miss the
core dynamic of the argument: she feels that her partner is as bad a communicator as he
accuses her of being. Furthermore, embedded in this exchange and missing from a logical
analysis is the belief that A] good listening and communication is important, and B] that
they are not doing it well.
Let us consider another, slightly longer example.
[2.] Lisa: What do you mean, you’re going away when my mother
comes to visit?
Paul: Just what I said: I’m going fishing.
Lisa: But I broke my back for you when your mother was
here!
Paul: I never asked you to do a thing. Besides, my
mother’s a lot easier to take than yours.
Lisa: (Loudly) The hell you say! She’s just like you—she
expects to be waited on hand and foot!
Paul: (Louder) Oh, so now I’m no good either!
Lisa: (Very loud) You’re not good enough to be around my
mother!
Paul: (Shouting) Well, maybe I’m not good enough to be
around at all!
Lisa: (Icily calm) There’s no maybe about it.
[Paul storms out of the house.]
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The first question, of course, concerns whether or not example [2.] is an argument.
Frankly, I do not see how it can be classed as anything else. There may be finer categories
under the general umbrella of argument, but even if it is a row or fight or quarrel, it is still
an argument. Any claims that it is not or, worse, that it ought not be considered an
argument are prescriptive, value-laden and theory dependent.3 The second question is
whether or not it is a good argument, and this is less easy to answer. First of all, it depends
on just what one means. Often describing an argument as ‘good’ means that it achieves
certain goals or follows certain rules for a particular class of argument. On this
understanding, [2.] is certainly, for example, not a very good dialectic argument; in fact it’s
a downright awful one. But the point I want to make about emotional arguments is not that
they are good dialectical arguments, merely that they are arguments. They need, therefore,
to be judged on their own terms.
Argument [2.] might be what Walton (1992) calls a quarrel. The hallmarks of a
quarrel, according to Walton, are that the participants say hurtful things and that they
sometimes end in an epiphany that can be eye-opening and valuable to the relationship (p.
21). Certainly when we consider the category of highly emotional and highly chaotic
arguments we see many instances of arguments that might well be classed as quarrels.
When emotions are high and linearity is low, we can expect either a situation where the
partners are not paying any attention to each other at all, or one in which there is a good
deal of striking out at each other’s feelings. Even in a quarrel, the most extreme form of
chaotic/emotional argumentation, there are often benefits (Walton, p. 215). These include
the epiphanic expression of emotion and anger, the exposure of dark-side commitments,
and the potential for the discussion of these newly exposed factors once the most extreme
heat of the moment has subsided. Indeed, there is even the possibility, contra Walton (p.
21), that witnessing the depth of one’s partner’s feelings can lead to new and more open
communication.
Most emotional arguments are not quarrels. Emotional arguments vary greatly by
degree, and the degree is a function not just of the raw emotion, but of the context and the
individual arguers. We have, for example, no difficulty with a colleague who gets
frustrated in a debate and becomes somewhat heated, or with two colleagues whose
emotions get aroused when arguing about grade inflation. Yet in each case we might be
shocked or surprised depending on who the participants are and where the argument is
taking place. Emotional arguments tend to occur in two main contexts. The first is when
one partner is particularly attached to the viewpoint she or he is defending. The second is
when the argument becomes personal in the sense of ad hominem. Argument [2.] is an
example involving both aspects. Each partner is, naturally enough, prone to defend his or
her mother. And each is also liable to be sensitive to an attack on themselves. But the
same process can be witnessed in many circumstances, not just in arguments between
intimates concerning touchy subjects. In the following example Prof. A takes exception to
Prof. B’s remark precisely because it is an attack on her dearly held position.
3.
Prof. B: …and so, you see, the view you describe is internally
inconsistent.
This is not to say that one cannot defend such a view, be it theory-laden or no.
Rather, I merely want to point out that the view is not self-evident.
3
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Prof. A: [with some heat] It’s nothing of the kind! You’ve
totally misrepresented the position!
Prof. A’s response can fairly easily be re-composed as a proper countermove
claiming that the criticism leveled at her position is invalid because the position it purports
to be about is, in fact, not hers. In this case, we have no difficulty continuing with the
argument and agreeing with either Prof. A or Prof. B, or waiting for more argumentation.
In such an instance we do not let the emotion divert us from the logical aspects of the
argument. On the contrary, a modest show of emotion makes following even a linear and
(relatively) clinical argument more interesting: we find it more involving when the
argument is not completely clinical, when there is a feeling of something at stake. On the
other hand, Prof. A’s reaction might have been uncalled for or, even, out of character. In
such circumstances, those in which one knows Prof. A and has not seen her react in this
fashion before, even when being baited, one immediately wonders, “what’s going on?”
The judgment is that her words and the way in which they were delivered are dissonant.
And this leads us to a key to what is an emotional argument: an emotional argument is one
in which the words used are less important than the feelings being expressed.
This insight can be expanded. We might surmise, for example, that the greater the
degree of chaos, the less relevant are the actual words spoken. What becomes important is
what the words express. The fear, anger, distrust, frustration, and so on that are carried by
the words is more important than the actual words chosen (though they are not themselves
completely devoid of significance.) This becomes clear if we return to example [2.] on
page (.4). Consider applying Wenzel’s (1980) tripartite categories to it. We can identify
products, i.e., CRCs that seem to be logical, though they do take a bit of enthymematic
juggling to get straight. Procedure, on the other hand, the dialectical component predicated
on two parties attempting to sort out an issue, seems to be completely lacking insofar as
there is no attempt to find the truth as opposed to striking out. What Wenzel labels the
process, that component of an argument that may be described as rhetorical, is quite rich,
though lacking in classical rhetorical flourishes. Indeed, the weakness of Wenzel’s
categorization is that it falls to the process component, the rhetorical aspect, to cover
everything that does not fall into the logical or dialectical components. While this might
be suitable for arguments falling into the circle in Figure [1], it is difficult for arguments
that are highly emotional or chaotic. It simply does not provide sufficient analytical tools
for exploring them.
Understanding Emotional Arguments
In order to understand an argument one must understand the meanings of the words
and expressions used in it. Often, this is a straightforward matter. Other times it is not.
Trying to comprehend an argument between two young people over whether or not Billy
Joel is ‘hot’ or ‘rad’ might take an involvement with the subtleties of youthful language
beyond the abilities of many commentators. With a nod to Quine, we have no trouble
accepting that translations from either another language or a dialect or slang within one
language might run into the indeterminacy of translation. Words are sometimes used to
convey non-standard meanings; words have equivocal meanings; words even have different meanings (or shades thereof) for different people. The term ‘sweetheart’ might be an
endearment for most couples, but a red flag for one. There is no way of determining this
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prior to an inquiry. And if that inquiry does not take into account the emotive aspect of the
communication it is liable to miss the entire point and, for example, translate as agreement
something quite to the contrary.
In order to understand an emotional argument we must get into it. The greater the
degree of emotion, the more important it is to examine what is being said in its actual
context. Heightened emotion tends to occur more frequently when a] the arguers are
familiar with each other, and b] the issue is a serially recurring one. When both these
factors are taken into account it becomes even more clear that interpretations and transformations cannot be made in isolation of the feelings and personal history of the participants. In explaining the importance of perceptual analysis in dissecting argumentation,
Nancy Legge (1992) explains that without in depth contextual analysis researchers may
misunderstand many of the dynamics basic to an argument. When people know each other
it is impossible to be aware of what they are saying without breaking the codes of past
discussions, implicit taboos, and unconsciously agreed to rules and prescriptions. Willard
(1989) makes a similar point when he argues that people who know each other constantly
and implicitly draw upon previous conversations and, indeed, their entire communicative
history.
As a result of these considerations the idea of removing emotional aspects of an
argument prior to its analysis becomes not only overly narrow, but dangerous as well. It is
dangerous precisely because it is liable to lead to an analysis that interprets the argument in
a way quite different from the participants. This may be the reason many theorists want to
exclude those arguments that are obviously highly emotional and chaotic. Leave them to
the psychologists—they are not even arguments. But this approach won’t work: we have
no way of knowing what the emotional aspect of an argument is until we have investigated
the feelings and emotions of the participants and learned how they enter into the dispute.
Understanding emotional arguments means respecting the influence that emotion
has on communication. If we do this, if we allow that even the simple comprehension of
what is being said must take into account the emotional configuration of the arguers, then
we can move forward to try to understand what is, for example, good and bad emotional
argument. A good emotional argument might be one in which the arguments correlate
directly to feelings expressed rather than being embedded in oblique references. In this
case the definition I offered above must be demoted to a sufficient but not necessary
condition of emotional argumentation. Further, certain classical fallacies can be seen as
particular signals of emotional argument. Irrelevant Reason, for example, can sometimes
signal the entrance into an emotional sphere. Such conclusions cannot be considered until
argumentation that has emotion at it’s core is accepted, respected, and studied.
Why Do Argument Theorists Quarrel with Their Mates?
An emotional argument, I have suggested, is one in which the feelings being
communicated by the participants are more important than the words being used to
communicate those feelings.4 Emotional arguments occur because there are times when
Please note that nowhere have I said that the words are irrelevant, unimportant, or
otherwise devoid of significance. It is the relative importance of the words versus the
feelings they express that is crucial.
4
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the expression of such feelings is important to us. These arguments can begin as quite
linear and clinical arguments, where the emotional aspect grows as the argument becomes
more pressing, more urgent. Alternatively, emotional arguments can begin with high
emotional content from the very beginning. The issue, one’s partner, or a combination of
the two can result in an argument that is initially very emotional.
Where then, does the quarrel come in? And why is it that people who are trained in
the ways of argumentation, who teach it and study it, still sometimes fall into the sort of
dispute they themselves abhor: one that is intended to be hurtful and damaging and that is
“nothing more than” an outpouring of negative emotions? It must also be remembered that
not all quarrels are loud shouting matches. Icy calm, frigid silence, and the “silent
treatment” are also ways of conducting quarrels. Walton says of quarrels: “The goal of the
quarrel is to ‘hit out’ verbally at the other party and, if possible, to humiliate the other
party” (op. cit., p.215). The advantages cited, such as the cathartic effect, the expression of
dark-side emotions, and the avoidance of physical violence can all be had without the
deleterious and even embarrassing effects of a real quarrel. Why, then, do we do it?
I believe the answer, while very complex, can be described as resulting from one of
two main things. Sometimes we quarrel because we are hearing something we do not want
to hear—whether in the words or in the meanings communicated by the tone; and
sometimes we quarrel because we are saying something we want to be heard that we
believe is not being heard—again whether the communication is explicit within the words
or embedded within the tone. In the first instance the anger and strong reaction stem from
the psychological resistance to taking in information we do not want. In the second, there
is the mirror reaction of having information that we believe is true, but that is being
intentionally (or so we believe) resisted by the intended recipient. It is also important to
note that there are important visceral or situational factors that are always involved. Stress
levels, hormonal influences (think of teenagers,) and the status of the issue and/or
relationship of the participants are all major factors in how well one deals with surging
emotions every bit as much as how well and effectively we can reason in a linear
argument. As, however, the ‘I won’t hear you / you must hear me’ frustration and anger
escalates we sometimes succumb to the expression of sentiments that are hurtful and
damaging. In these cases, the rage and quarrel seems to be, more than anything else, a way
of bringing one’s dispute partner’s attention to the great need one has. Naturally, when the
frustration occurs on both sides, anything can happen.
Argumentation Theorists quarrel with their mates because we are no better than
anyone else. Perhaps we do not do it as often, perhaps more so. I’ve done no surveys. I
just know that for most if not all of us the quarrel is an occurrence, though hopefully not a
frequent one. But let us not blame emotion for this, let us not isolate it into a subordinate
corner where we trim it away, transform it, or filter it out. That will never help us to
incorporate its reality into our everyday argumentation. What we should aim for is not the
elimination of the emotional aspect of argumentation but rather its study and
comprehension in order that we might better utilize this very real and actual happening. In
other words, we must not identify emotional argumentation with quarrels—it may be our
goal to eliminate the latter, but not the former.
Argumentation Theorists argue with their mates because frustration does not
disappear with knowledge. The causes of quarrels can be known and understood, but that
does not mean they will not occur. It just means that Argumentation Theorists might end
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up more embarrassed than most quarrelers. This, of course, may tend to diminish its
occurrence among ourselves, but its elimination is, unfortunately, a distant dream.
Why Is Reason Better Than Emotion?
I believe that, ultimately, the real problem is that we do not encourage and pursue
the study of emotional argumenst, which, in turn, leaves us ignorant about them. The
cause of this ignorance lies in the separation of reason and emotion which itself goes back
to one main (false) assumption: The belief that no one is ever carried away by reason.
The theory is that no one ever begins shouting, hitting, screaming, or crying because of
reason. It is emotion that seems to be involved with these things much more than reason.
As a result it is far more frightening, and becomes something that calls out for control, for
separation from the more calm, cool, and reliable process of reasoning. That reason is so
reliable and safe is, of course, a myth. Thousands have been put to death because their
ideas and beliefs were thought wrong by people who coolly and slowly gave concrete unemotional reasons for the justice of their actions. Reason may be like a rock, and emotion
may be like water, but both are capable of being used for good or bad, for agreement or
conflict, for honest exploration of ideas or the willful manipulation of the ends of others.
That rocks are easier to move, hold, and inspect does not make them safer.
What we have to abandon is the idea that there is a good child and a bad child of
the human psyche. While emotions can run hot, and that can lead to unfortunate consequences and even devastating results, the same is true of reason. Vast injustices and
horrible events have been perpetrated in the name of “cold reason.” Linear, clinical
arguments that are conducted without the softening effect of emotion, (for example, in the
form of compassion,) can lead to frightening conclusions that are accepted solely because
they are viewed as the inevitable consequence of cold reason. In the name of cold reason
children starve to protect complicated economic systems, ancient feuds grounded as much
in alleged historical facts as raw emotion resurface with sickening regularity, and people
are beaten and punished due to differences in belief systems. No. It is not that being
logical is so much safer than being emotional, it is just that when we think of being logical
we do not think of the husband who stifles his wife’s emotions with a demand for
logicality, or the lawyer who looks at death in only financial terms, or the general who
reasons that the casualties expected in a particular battle are “within acceptable
parameters.”
Argumentation Theorists quarrel with their mates because people, and especially
people in intimate relationships, quarrel, and Argumentation Theorists are people. But
quarrels can end with benefits, with epiphanies, with the realization that some hurt or
wound is not healed or even that it exists. The trick is for us all to include such communicative interactions as part and parcel of Argumentation Theory, and not to try to pretend
that we are above it all. We are not.
REFERENCES
Gilbert, Michael A. 1990. “The Delimitation of ‘Argument’”. Delivered to the 6th Annual
Ontario Philosophical Society conference, Trent University, Peterborough,
Ontario.
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Gilbert, Michael A. 1994. “Multi-Modal Argumentation”. Philosophy of the Social
Sciences. June. 24:2:159-177.
Legge, Nancy J.. 1992. “‘What Did You Mean By That?’: The Function of Perceptions in
Interpersonal Argument.” Argumentation & Advocacy, 29:2:41-60.
O'Keefe, D.J. 1982. “The Concepts of Argument & Arguing.” In Cox, J.R., & Willard,
C.A., 1982. Advances in Argumentation Theory & Research. pp. 3-23.
Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Univ. Press.
Walton, Doug. 1992. The Place of Emotion in Argument. The Pennsylvania State U.P.,
University Park, PA.
Wenzel, J. 1980. “Perspectives On Argument.” In Rhodes & Newell. Proceedings of the
[1979] Summer Conference on Argumentation. SCA/AFA, Annandale,
VA.
Willard, C.A. 1989. A Theory Of Argumentation. Tuscaloosa: U. Alabama Press.