Draft Working Document
Private Investment in Infrastructure : How Can It Facilitate
Landlocked Developing Countries Access to World Markets
The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) is a multi-donor technical assistance
facility aimed at helping developing countries improve the quality of their infrastructure through
private sector involvement. For more information on the facility see the web site:
www.ppiaf.org
The World Bank
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report are entirely those of the authors
and should not be attributed in any manner to PPIAF or to the World Bank, to its affiliated
organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent.
Neither PPIAF nor the World Bank guarantees the accuracy of the data included in this publication or
accepts responsibility for any consequence of their use. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and
other information shown on any map in this report do not imply on the part of the PPIAF or the World
Bank Group any judgment on the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such
boundaries.
Table of Contents
PART ONE -- Survey of Strategies for Enabling Cross-Border Investment in
Infrastructure for Landlocked Countries
Introduction: The Nature of the Handicaps Facing Landlocked Countries
The Ministerial Conference and the Investors’ Forum
Objective of the Study
High Transit Transport Costs and the Implications for Trade and Development
Alternative Routes
Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments Affecting LLDCs: Status and Potential
Low Investments Thus Far in Privatization of Transit Transport Infrastructure
The Benefits from Privatization and Their Distribution
Overcoming Barriers to Private Investments in Transit-Related Infrastructure for LLDCs
Cross-Border Investments
Harmonizing Regulations and Contracts and Improving Investment Environment
Financial Barriers
Physical Barriers
A Review of the Concessioning Process
Survey of Investors and Operators
A Private Participation Action Program for Landlocked Transit Cooperation
Assessing the Potential for Privatization
A Focus on Dry Ports
Fast Transport Administrative Corridors
Intermediate Steps for Road Privatization
Expanding Air Transport
PART TWO -- Survey of Private Investors and Operators
Introduction
A Comparison of Different Types of Infrastructure Investment
Privatization Projects in Landlocked Countries as a Nucleus for Cross-Border Projects
A View of the History of Infrastructure Investments in Developing Countries
US Railroad Short Lines as a Source of Investors in Developing Countries
Early Rail Concessions
IFC and World Bank Support
Private Investment Based on an Origin Materials Model
Railroad Efficiency and Productivity: Realistic Expectations
The True Object of Concessioning: Productivity Gains by Changing Railroad
Management
Problems in Railroad Tendering
Alternative Offers vs. Transparency and the World Bank
Negotiation vs. Competition in Concession Arrangements
Other Recent African Railroad Concessioning Efforts
Railroad Concessioning and Possible Further Areas for its Use
Enforcing Compliance with the Terms of Concessions, and
the Role of the World Bank
Public/Private Partnerships and the IFC
The Costs of Bidding
How Can We Shorten the Time and Lower the Cost of Bidding?
Open Access
Passenger Service
Overbuilding and Unnecessary Aid
The Role of the World Bank
Ports
Roads
Airports
Risk
The Views of an Investment Banker on Risk:
Rates of Return
The Views of an Investment Banker on Rates of Return:
Corruption
Management, Control and Expertise
ANNEX 1 – Boxes
Box 1
Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (PPI)
Box 2
Maputo Corridor Development Initiative (MDCI) : The N4 Toll Road
Box 3
The Abidjan-Ouagadougou Railway Concession: SITARAIL
Box 4
The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project
Box 5
The Bolivia-Brazil Natural Gas Pipeline Project
Box 6
Examples of Private Participation Projects for Airports and Ports Serving Landlocked
Developing Countries
Box 7
Contrasts between English Common Law and Non-Anglophone Civil Law: An Example
of a Basic Issue: Do International Instruments Prevail over Domestic Legislation?
Box 8
Some Possible Elements of a Transit Transport Framework Agreement Between
Landlocked Developing Countries and Their Transit Transport Neighbors in a Particular
Sub-Region
Box 9
The World Bank Group’s Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS)
Box 10
The World Bank Group’s Support for Private Participation Infrastructure
Box 11
Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)
Box 12
TRACECA, a European Union Funded Technical Assistance Program to Develop a
Europe, Black Sea, Caspian Sea Transport Corridor to Central Asia
Box 13
USTDA Funding for Project Evaluation and Feasibility Studies
Box 14
MIGA’s Political Risk Guarantees
Box 15
World Bank Guarantee Instruments
Box 16
IFC Financial Products
Box 17
Unsolicited Proposals
Box 18
Potential Benefits of Dry Ports (Inland Clearance Depots – ICDs)
Box 19
Maintaining Roads: Experience with Output-Based Contracts in Argentina
ANNEX II – Tables
Table 1A
31 Landlocked Developing Countries: Summary of Population, GDP, Exports, Imports,
FDI (Stocks & Flows) and Official Finance Flows—Total and Per Capita Values, by
Region
Table 1B
31 Landlocked Developing Countries: Summary of Population, GDP, Exports and
Imports – Selected Growth Rates, by Region
Table 1C
Rankings of 31 Landlocked Developing Countries by Population, by Per Capita GDP,
FDI and ODF, and by Growth Rates of GDP Per Capita and Exports
Table 1D
41 Transit Countries; Summary of Population, GDP, Exports, Imports, FDI (Stocks &
Flows) and Official Finance Flows—Total and Per Capital Values, by Region
Table 1E
41 Transit Countries; Summary of Selected Growth Rates for GDP and Exports, by
Region
Table 1F
Rankings of 41 Transit Countries by Population, , by Per Capita GDP, FDI and ODF, and
by Growth Rates of GDP Per Capita and Exports
Table 1G
Landlocked and Transit Countries Ranked by Exports Per Capita
Table 2A
Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments, Total Investments (Private plus
Public)—31 Landlocked Developing Countries, in Million US Dollars, by Sector and
Sub-Sector, 12 Year Totals, 1990-2001
Table 2B
Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments, Private Portion of Total
Investments—31 Landlocked Developing Countries, in Million US Dollars, by Sector
and Sub-Sector
12 Year Totals, 1990-2001
Table 2C
Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments, Total Investments (Private plus
Public)—39 Transit-Neighbor Developing Countries, in Million US Dollars, by Sector
and Sub-Sector, 12 Year Totals, 1990-2001
Table 2D
Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments, Total Investments (Private plus
Public)—31 Landlocked Developing Countries, in Million US Dollars, by Total All
Sectors, Annual Totals, 1990-2001
Table 2E
Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments, Total Investments (Private plus
Public)—39 Transit-Neighbor Developing Countries, in Million US Dollars, Total all
Sectors, Annual Totals, 1990-2001
Table 3A
Development Assistance for All Physical Infrastructure and for The Transport Sector
(and Its Major Components)—Gross Commitments in Millions US Dollars to 31
Individual Landlocked Countries, by Region
12 Year Total for 1990 to 2001—otal All Sources in DAC Purpose Reporting System
(i.e., Bilateral and Multilateral Sources of ODA and OOF)
Table 3B
Development Assistance for All Physical Infrastructure and for The Transport Sector
(and Its Major Components)—Gross Commitments in Millions US Dollars to 39
Individual Transit Countries, by Region
12 Year Total for 1990 to 2001—Total All Sources in DAC Purpose Reporting System
(i.e., Bilateral and Multilateral Sources of ODA and OOF)
Table 4
Development Assistance for All Physical Infrastructure and for The Transport Sector
(and Its Major Components)—Gross Commitments in Millions US Dollars to 31
Individual Landlocked and 39 Transit Countries, by Region
Annual Averages 1990-93, 1994-97, 1998-200—Total All Sources in DAC Purpose
Reporting System (i.e., Bilateral and Multilateral Sources of ODA and OOF)
Table 5
Commitments of Official Development Finance for The Transport Sector in 31
Landlocked Developing Countries, by Individual Project and Donor, 1998-2001, LLDCs
Listed by Region
Table 6
Airport Traffic in Landlocked Developing Countries—Airports Ranked by Air Freight
Tonnage Loaded, and Compared with Recent Trends and with Aid and Private Airport
Investments in 1990-2001
Table 7
Commitments of Official Development Finance for the Airport Sector in 31 Land locked
Developing Countries, by Individual Project and Donor, 1990-2001
PART ONE
Survey of Strategies for Enabling Cross-Border Investment in
Infrastructure for Landlocked Countries
Introduction: The Nature of the Handicaps Facing Landlocked Countries
The Ministerial Conference and the Investors’ Forum
1.
This report has been prepared on the part of the World Bank as a background document
for the forthcoming United Nations International Ministerial Conference on Transit Transport
Cooperation. The Conference will emphasize cooperation between landlocked developing
countries, neighboring transit countries, and donor countries and international financial and
development institutions in efforts to improve the quality and efficiency of the transit transport
corridors serving landlocked developing countries and to lower their costs. The Conference is
being convened in Almaty, Kazakhstan in August 2003. More particularly this study will serve
as a core paper for a High Level Investment Forum which will be a parallel event at the
Conference, will provide an opportunity for private sector participants to voice their concerns
and expectations as to their own investment projects on behalf of transit transport
improvements for landlocked developing countries, and will especially consider private
participation in infrastructure investments.
Objective of the Study
2.
The objective of the study is to identify the major barriers to and define strategies for
enabling and facilitating cross-border private investment in infrastructure for landlocked
developing countries (LLDCs).
3.
The paper below will therefore lay emphasis on the potential role of expanded private
participation in now publicly owned transit transport infrastructure, and will consider some of
the implications of the cross-border nature of transit transport corridors in terms of possible
adaptations of public and private institutions, harmonization of regulations, possible new or
changes in existing supranational or multinational entities, or creation of multi- national
parastatal bodies as possible partners with private investors, and possible adjustments in the
way that bilateral and multilateral donors provide loans or guaranties to take account of the
multi-country nature of cross-border projects; of course, it may be that the cross-border nature
of potential investments may continue to be handled on a piecemeal basis of separate parallel
country projects, as has typically been the case in road and rail investments in developing
countries in recent years.
4.
Before taking up the theme of private investment in transit-related infrastructure for
LLDCs, this report will consider some of the burdens imposed by the landlocked condition
generally, the comparative situation of landlocked developing countries and their transit
neighbors with respect to trade and development, and the role and importance of alternative
transit transport corridors.
High Transit Transport Costs and the Implications for Trade and Development
5.
The burden of high transit-transport costs on LLDCs in all regions is a major
impediment to their economic development and to the development of their foreign trade. The
2
additional transport costs facing landlocked developing countries in comparison with coastal
countries are frequently very high as indicated in the study by Stone (2001), 1 which shows that
for 12 of 30 LLDCs freight costs as a percent of imports (fob) were more than double the
percentage for their coastal neighbors, while for a further 6 LLDCs freight costs were mo re
than 50% higher. This differential is particularly high in Africa and especially in West Africa.
Of the 15 LLDCs in Africa, 12 were more than 50% higher and 8 of these were more than
double their coastal neighbors. Of the15 African coastal countries, 9 were more than double
the rate for all developing countries and 5 of these were more than triple that rate. Thus the
African coastal countries (8 of whom are classed as least developed countries) themselves
already face high freight ratios, but LLDCs in Africa face extremely high ratios.
6.
A paper by Radelet and Sachs (1998) 2 examines differentials in shipping costs between
various developing countries and world markets, and its impact on manufactured exports and
economic growth. They note that:
“Countries with lower shipping costs have had faster manufactured export growth and
overall economic growth during the past 30 years than countries with higher shipping costs.
The evidence suggests that high-shipping-cost countries will find it more difficult to promote
export-led development, even if they reduce tariff rates, remove quantitative restrictions, and
follow prudent macro economic policies. At a minimum, firms in such countries would be
forced to pay lower wages to compensate for higher transport costs in order to be able to
compete on world markets for manufactures. The required offset in wages might be quite
substantial in the usual case for developing countries in which imported inputs constitute a high
proportion of the value of exports. In such sectors, high transport costs can easily wipe out
export profitability even if wage levels were to fall to zero. As a result, geographically remote
countries, such as Mongolia, Rwanda, Burundi, Bolivia, may not realistically be able to
replicate the East Asian model of rapid growth based on the export of labor intensive
manufactures.”
7.
A study by Limao and Venables (2001) 3 found data comparing the transport costs of
land and sea legs of a container shipment from the US to the capitals of various LLDCs—with
land being seven times more costly per unit distance. They also wanted to know the extent to
which transport costs choke off landlocked countries’ trade, and computed estimates of the
elasticity of trade flows with respect to transport costs, concluding: “We find that this elasticity
is large, with a 10-percentage point increase in transport costs typically reducing trade volumes
by approximately 20 percent.” They conclude by noting that: “The representative landlocked
economy has transport costs 50 percent higher and trade volumes 60 percent lower than the
representative coastal economy.” But they further note that where improvements have been
made in a landlocked country’s own infrastructure and in that of their transit neighbor they are
able to overcome a substantial proportion of this disadvantage.
1
“Infrastructure Development in Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries: Foreign Aid, Private Investment
and the Transport Cost Burden of Landlocked Developing Countries,” by Jack I. Stone, UNCTAD/LDC/112 (See
Annex II, Table 4).
2
“Shipping Costs, Manufactured Exports, and Economic Growth,” by Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, January
1, 1998, Harvard Institute for International Development, Cambridge, Mass. Mimeo.
3
“Infrastructure, Geographical Disadvantage, Transport Costs, and Trade,” by Nuno Limao and Anthony J.
Venables, 2001, The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 451-479.
3
8.
To summarize the extent of the handicaps facing LLDCs, a comparative profile of the
trade and growth experience of each of 31 landlocked developing countries and 41 transit
countries, by region, is shown in Tables 1A and 1B for LLDCs and 1D and 1E for transit
countries. Tables 1C and 1F show rank orderings of the LLDCs and of the transit countries
according to seven indicators: population, per capita GDP, per capita goods exports, per capita
FDI inflows, per capita Official Development Finance (ODF) flows, growth rate of GDP per
capita, and growth rate of export of goods. The argument so far regarding the basic handicap
of high transit transport costs—that LLDCs suffer from great sea distances from developed
markets, compounded by additional transport needed to reach distant inland destinations, often
with transit costs further elevated by low quality, ill serviced, and ill- managed infrastructure,
and often further distorted by failure to develop intra-regional trade—is well encapsulated in
Table 1G, below, which compares landlocked countries with coastal neighbor transit countries,
the countries in each group ranked by the dollar value of goods exports per capita in 2001.
Export of goods per capita gives an absolute measure of a countries success in developing its
exports, and can be used for inter-country comparisons of countries of roughly similar size (for
example, very large countries, such as those with over 100 million population, by their very
nature are bound to have relatively smaller export sectors, so that for them successful levels of
exports per capita will be lower than for most developing countries). Thus, comparing
landlocked and coastal countries by region, we note: 1) In Latin America the 4 coastal
countries compared to the 2 LLDCs range from two-thirds more to seven times more exports
per capita (EPC); 2) In West and Central Africa the 12 coastal neighbors average an EPC six
times higher than the 5 LLDCs; 3) In East Africa the 6 coastal countries and the 4 LLDCs have
EPCs that are the lowest in the table shown, but even here the transit countries average twice
the level of the landlocked; 4) In Southern Africa 2 of the 6 LLDCs have high EPCs, higher
than all 4 transit countries, while the remaining 4 fall well below South Africa and Namibia but
exceed Mozambique and Congo, Dem. Rep.; 5) In Central Asia and the Caucasus the 5 transit
countries average an EPC about 40% higher than in the 8 LLDCs; 6) In East and South Asia the
6 coastal countries have an average EPC four times higher than the average for the 4 LLDCs;
7) Finally, in South East Europe, the EPC for 5 transit countries averages 25% more than that
for the 2 LLDCs. Thus the level of exports in most LLDCS has been severely choked off,
especially strongly where distances are greatest or where infrastructure and its use remains
most seriously wanting.
Alternative Routes
9.
A major concern of most landlocked developing countries is to ensure the availability of
alternative routes in case the principal transit transport routes are for any reason blocked by
natural disasters, or by wars, or by political events, or by inattention to priorities or inability to
provide satisfactory facilities for transit transport in ports or en route. In fact the existence of
alternative routes also provides a form of competitive pressure on these major routes to invest
in improvements, and could result in substantial reductions in the cost of transportation
services. So, alternative routes are a form of insurance to landlocked countries against the
possibility of interruption of their trade flows for any reason. The possibilities for private
participation in the public development of alternative routes needs to be explored to see where
the possible benefits of such participation are most likely to be successful in leading to major
efficiency gains. Where investment in an alternative is mainly motivated by insurance
4
considerations, it is unlikely to attract a private investor unless it is subsidized. As a practical
matter, most landlocked countries have available some alternatives, and in some cases many
alternatives, so that purely insurance related subsidies may seldom be justified.
10.
In general coastal ports in most parts of the developing world are thinly spread out, so
that they do not directly compete with each other; they are likely to be dominated by traffic
from the hinterland surrounding them and from other traffic from within the coastal country in
which they are located. In most cases, this results in an area where the port effectively has
considerable monopoly power. This is much less likely to be true in more developed areas
were additional ports may be located nearby and thus may be competing with each other. The
spacing of ports in the developing world is much less likely yet to have produced so much
traffic that nearby additional ports are warranted, although there are examples in east and south
Asia where local competition among ports is developing or has already developed. But,
another major factor contributing to this monopoly power is the absence of an adequate inland
road network which could establish the now missing links between existing adjacent ports
(perhaps in adjoining countries) and effectively broaden competition among them.
11.
The situation for interior landlocked countries is different. The existence of alternative
routes means that for their traffic there is competition among ports that are distant from each
other, even though perhaps most of the traffic may be going through a particular port; that port
is in this way subject to some competitive pressure from distant alternative ports. This raises
the question of whether some landlocked countries might effectively negotiate preferred
treatment at such ports to reflect their at least theoretical freedom to pick the lowest cost
alternative. In practice, differences in total transit transport costs, rather than just port costs,
will typically limit the effective choice of route in normal times to one or two options. Indeed,
the choice of an optimal port to use depends on the total cost from origin to destination,
including both the inland transit-transport costs and the cost of overseas shipment; many
studies compare only land transit costs between an inland LLDC and alternative coastal ports.
Why, for example, should Zambia use the port of Durban when it is considerably cheaper to
reach the port of Dar Es Salaam? The answer: ocean shipping rates to and from Durban are
substantially cheaper than via Dar ($500/TEU cheaper) because larger container vessels are
used.
12.
The above introduction has given a general view of the landlocked handicaps. The
remainder of this report will focus on the potential role of private investment as a major new
policy tool for overcoming the obstacles to more efficient, higher quality and lower cost access
to the sea and to world markets for LLDCs.
Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments Affecting LLDCs: Status and
Potential
Low Investments Thus Far in Privatization of Transit Transport Infrastructure
13.
The World Bank’s database on “private participation in infrastructure investment
projects” (PPI) shows the total amounts invested in projects involving private participants in
5
the ownership or control of previously publicly owned infrastructure—including concessions,
operating and management contracts, divestitures, or greenfield projects. [See Box 1, on the PPI
database.] The 31 landlocked developing countries, during the 12 years 1990-2001, have
received only a very small amount of such funding for transportation projects ($365 million, of
which $167 million was for airports, $123 million for rail, and $76 million for roads); indeed,
only 6 of the 31 countries received any such flows, Bolivia, Zimbabwe, Paraguay, Armenia,
Malawi, and Burkina Faso (and Laos had a private management contract for its airport, but
without an investment input). [See Table 2A.] In contrast, during the 1990-2001 period, the
transport sector of the landlocked countries received commitments with a 12-year total of
$10,386 million official aid from bilateral and multilateral donors, of which $7,319 million
was for roads, $931 million was for air, $688 million was for rail, and $1,407 million was for
policy and administrative management projects. [See Table 3A.] Thus private investment in
transportation infrastructure in LLDCs was equal to only 3.5% of commitments by aid donors
to LLDCs for this purpose. Clearly the inroads of private investment into transportation
infrastruc ture in LLDCs have been very limited thus far, especially in contrast to the stock of
all Foreign Direct Investment in all industries and services in landlocked countries at the end of
2001, which came to $42.6 billion. [See Table 1A, Column 8]. Furthermore, PPI database
investments in all physical infrastructure investments—Electricity, Natural Gas, Telecom, and
Water, in addition to Transport—came to $12.7 billion for all 31 LLDCs in the 12 year period,
with the largest amounts going to Telecom and Electricity and the smallest to Transport (2.9%).
[See Table 2A]. Telecom investments by private entities were made in each of the LLDCs,
while Electricity investments of more than $200 million were made in 8 of them, water
investments occurred in 4 of them, and natural gas investments in 3 of them. The question is
what are the prospects and the possibilities for significantly expanding this so-far very weak
flow of domestic and foreign private investment into transit-transport and related infrastructure,
particularly through expanded public-private cooperation arrangements and especially
involving improved cross-border cooperation arrangements with public and private investors
and regulators in transit countries on corridors serving LLDCs.
14.
Even though the flow of private investment to transportation in LLDCs has been tiny in
relation to other types of infrastructure, in fact, the 31 LLDCs received a very small share of
total international foreign direct investment : only $5.9 billion or 0.8 percent of world inflows
in 2001. Foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan was the highest among the LLDCs at $2.8
billion, mostly due to the development of the oil industry. The 15 LLDCs in Africa received a
total of only $886 million.
15.
The proportion of the private/public total investments in PPI projects which comes from
the private sector is indicated in Table 2B—for all LLDCs this came to 74% of investment in
total infrastructure projects, and ranges by sector from a high of 100% private funds for water
to a low of 68% for Telecom projects.
16.
For the 39 transit-neighbor developing countries (which include many very large
countries such as China, India, Russia, Brazil), the PPI database shows a 12-year total of $74.7
billion invested in the transport sectors of these transit countries by private/public participants
(with only a part of this aimed at providing improved transit services to adjacent landlocked
countries); of the total, roads came to $43.5 billion, rail $15.8 billion, ports $8.3 billion, and
6
airports $7.1 billion. [See Table 2C]. In fact, these private/public participations in the transport
sector in transit countries (TCs) were somewhat larger than the Official Aid commitments by
donors to the TCs during 1990-2001 ($62.4 billion), and this was true of commitments for
roads ($30.6 billion), rail ($14.5), ports ($5.9 billion), and airports ($2.6 billion). [See Table
3B].
17.
Of the $74.7 billion in private/public participation investments in infrastructure in the
transport sector of transit countries, $59.5 billion is accounted for by just 3 countries—China,
Brazil, and Argentina, with another $8.6 billion going to Chile and Thailand over the 12 year
period. African transit countries received only $2.9 billion (3.9%), of which $2.0 billion went
to South Africa. [See Table 2C]. These flows were thus particularly weak to Africa and
Southeast Europe.
18.
As background and a comparison for considering the potential for private investment
flows, 4 contains a more detailed look at aid commitments to LLDCs and transit countries for
various periods between 1990 and 2001, for each major sub-region. Furthermore, Table 5
contains a project-by-project look at the actual aid commitments for the four years 1998 to
2001, which covers about 500 individual projects in the area of transport, by donor and by
specific purpose, for each of the LLDCs, arranged by region.
The Benefits from Privatization and Their Distribution
19.
The theory and model analyzing the benefits arising from private participatio n in public
infrastructure investments through concessions or divestitures has been a powerful force
altering the nature of public infrastructure during the past decade. The World Bank has been
instrumental in providing strong leadership in examining various forms of privatization and in
particular in leading the way toward concessioning formerly publicly owned railroads, ports,
and airports, and to perhaps a lesser extent roads, in many parts of the developing world. The
essence of the theory is seen in the demonstrated inefficiencies and often virtual bankruptcies
facing many of the world’s publicly owned railroads. Aid donors along with governments had
been subsidizing such enterprises for a long time. The basic premise is that very large gains in
efficiency and productivity can come about with privatization. These gains start with the fact
that public enterprises in developing countries, such as railroads, have been heavily overstaffed
in practice or as a result of deliberate policy choice in order to provide employment. Many
privatizations have taken place in the nineties, with the aid of policies permitting new private
concessionaires to begin their management with the benefit of very substantial staff cuts, and
indeed the World Bank and others have played a role in providing adjustment assistance to
cushion the impact of these job losses on the individuals concerned or the local economies.
Staff cuts have been accompanied in a few cases by reduced rail networks, abandoning stops on
routes with presumably grossly insufficient traffic, but raising questions of the negative impacts
on the areas affected, and what adjustment measures may need to be taken to offset such
impacts. There may perhaps also be reductions in passenger services. But in several cases
branch lines have been effectively abandoned and passenger services reduced before
concessioning. Skilled managers with the authority of ownership can apply a very wide range
of innovations, investments and modernizations, such as computerized operations—all of these
with huge potentials for raising productivity. Privatization may also better contain corruption
7
and may be able to provide higher security standards. Thus the model begins with the observed
fact that privatization quickly brings about very large gains in productivity. The next stage of
consideration and of negotiations in privatization is the allocation of these productivity benefits
among four groups: 1) the employees (their number and their wages); 2) the government as
owner of the infrastructure that is being concessioned (the equity payment for the concession
and the stream of fees to be paid to the government, which will replace or reduce the former
subsidy outpayments by the government); 3) the owners of the concession, (i.e., the return on
their investment); 4) the users directly (the quality of service, its reliability, its timeliness, and
the freight and insurance charges) and the general public indirectly through the impact on the
whole economy (this may even include lowered charges for other modes of transport, such as
road freight, because of competitive pressures from the innovations; indeed, a key issue in
negotiations concerns the extent to which concessionaires retain monopoly rights on their
routes and the type of regulation they will have imposed on them, or whether they may be
obliged to provide some form of open access to allow competitors to use their routes, and thus
increase competition, while perhaps making more difficult some of the productivity gains being
sought).
20.
The pros and cons of private participation in public infrastructure arrangements
affecting landlocked developing countries need to be kept in mind. Among the positive
considerations are the following: 1) the likelihood of greater management efficiency; 2) the
possibilities for large gains in productivity from major reductions in unnecessary inputs; 3) the
likelihood of more funds becoming available; 4) the possibilities for more competition; 5) the
possibilities for better regulation, including better control of environmental damage; and 6) the
possibilities for better control of security and better avoidance of corruption. The negative
considerations include the following, and raise the question of how they can be cushioned
against where privatization is proceeding: 1) the consequences of route abandonment need to
be contemplated as part of the bidding negotiations; the abandonment of passenger service need
not be a major issue in privatization bidding on railroads if the bidding is split into two separate
projects one for freight, and one for passenger service; the burden of decision making on
abandonment can then be done in terms of two separate concessions; however, most railways
may be too small for two concessions, and some minimum level of service needs to be written
into the concession agreement, with some periodic review and objective criteria as to whether
the services should be continued; 2) negative impact on some of the poor from any
abandonment or the removal of past subsidies in favor of the poor and their possible
replacement with full cost recovery pricing; 3) there is the fear of a “take it and run” attitude by
the private sector; 4) there is the fear that privatization might reinforce monopolies where
competitive possibilities might not be included in the regulations (such as “open access”
provisions); however, while there might be a monopoly of rail services, there might be no such
monopoly of transport services in general—competition from subsidized roads is normally
intense in all countries and financial survival for the railways rather than monopoly profits is
likely to be the real concern; 5) a seemingly negative social and political factor is the effect on
employment, since much of the initial push for greater efficiency derives from eliminating or
reducing the enormous overstaffing—but the gains in economic efficiency are likely to be
much larger than the costs of adequate compensation and of appropriate training and
resettlement; it should also be stressed that adjustment assistance in connection with workers
laid off as part of railroad concessioning arrangements has typically been very effective, with
8
average lump-sum payments per worker laid off coming to perhaps $5,000 which, in a poor
landlocked or transit country is a large sum, often sufficient to start a small business; and 6) the
fear of a full privatization has been tempered somewhat by the use of concessions because of
the general desire to avoid the appearance of “giving away” the nation’s patrimony, which is
thought to consist of the ownership of such basic assets as roads and railways. All of these
considerations have to be kept in mind during possible concession negotiations and some of the
negatives can be mitigated through actions such as adjustment assistance to minimize the
effects of a decline in employment, and can also be offset from the point of view of labor
unions and others with a substantial rise in pay for remaining employees that becomes possible
with privatization. The possibilities for better regulation or better control over environmental
damage are likely to end up as pros—depending on the provisions imposed by the concession
agreement, and the anticipated effectiveness of privatized control of management and
operations.
21.
Privatization affecting transit corridors serving landlocked countries in Latin America is
fairly extensive; in Africa beginnings have been made in privatization with some of the ports
and railroads serving landlocked countries transit needs in process of privatization or already
privatized, and with some other potential routes in various stages of study, although roads and
airports remain largely public (with the exception of some toll roads in South Africa and
Mozambique); there has been little movement toward privatization in the routes serving
landlocked countries in central Asia or the other Asian landlocked countries, although road
privatizations have been important in the transit country, China, and there has been port and
airport privatization in China, India, Russia, and Turkey as well as ports in Pakistan and
Thailand; the publicly owned railroads in Russia and the Central Asian Republics do make
provision for private parties to provide their own container freight services, such as the Trans
Siberian Express Service (owned jointly by Maersk and the Russian railways).
22.
Analysis of the productivity gains in rail privatizations has focused so far on the
experiences in Latin America and in the developed world. It will be important to analyze the
more recent experiences in Africa to observe whether large gains in productivity are in fact
being gained in Africa as elsewhere. Indications in a few instances where results are available
look promising (for example, substantial productivity gains on the Cotes d’Ivoire and the
Cameroon railways), and the way these gains have been distributed will also be important to
gage. Evaluation of productivity gains must include quality improvements and some measure
of them such as reduction in delays, and will need to total up the negatives as well.
23.
John Nellis, in a recent working paper on “Privatization in Africa: What is to be done?”
(2003) for the Center for Global Development, summarized his findings as follows:
“Sub-Saharan African states urgently need expanded and more dynamic private sectors,
more efficient and effective infrastructure/utility provision, and increased investment from both
domestic and foreign sources. Privatization is one way to address these problems. But African
states have generally been slow and reluctant privatizers; a good percentage of industrial/
manufacturing and most infrastructure still remains in state hands. Given prevailing public
hostility towards privatization, and widespread institutional weaknesses, such caution is
defensible , but nonetheless very costly. The long-run and difficult solution is the creation and
reinforcement of the institutions that underpin and guide proper market operations. In the
9
interim, African governments and donors have little choice but to continue to experiment with
the use of externally supplied substitutes for gaps in local regulatory and legal systems.”
Overcoming Barriers to Private Investments in Transit-Related Infrastructure for
LLDCs
Cross-Border Investments
24.
In seeking cooperatio n between landlocked developing countries and their transit
neighbors in the development and improvement of existing transit transport corridors,
landlocked countries are essentially looking for effective cross-border projects. Traditionally
transport projects have been accomplished as separate activities by the government on each
side of a particular border. The two sides may act in concert and develop coordination
arrangements. But when it comes to seeking the major efficiencies and productivity increases
expected from privatization, it would appear that major gains might come about if the resulting
private entity were able to control the full length of a corridor, regardless of intervening
borders. This is especially true for railroads but in the case of highways it is also useful to have
an integrated approach over the whole length of a multi-country route, even though individual
sections of toll roads, or maintenance contracts, or other service contracts, or contracts for the
development of dry ports along the route, are in fact subcontracted separate private entities.
25.
The ability to develop true multi-country cross-border privatization projects requires the
cooperation of the countries involved in unusual ways. To pull together a single project
involving assets separately owned by the governments of two (or more) countries on which to
elicit single bids by a number of consortia of private parties, and which also might receive
support from multilateral entities, in a process guided by the World Bank but with advisors to
the governments concerned as to the terms they should seek in order to grant a cross-border
concession, is indeed a complex effort. Such efforts raise a host of questions which should be
addressed. Should cooperation of the count ries involved be in the form of a committee or
commission or should a first step be taken to actually transfer state owned enterprises into a
single multi-state owned parastatal so that it can be concessioned as a single entity. It might
not be necessary to go through such a stage which in itself would be complex and time
consuming, and it is probably important that the government negotiators represent the interests
of their governments and thus be separate from the old managements which might well be
reluctant to lose out to a private concessionaire. In any event, the fees from the concession
would be paid to each of the governments concerned according to an appropriate formula.
26.
There have in fact been a fair number of true cross-border projects affecting landlocked
developing countries:
a)
Examples in Africa are: 1) the N4 Mozambique-South Africa toll road project
[See Box 2] which indirectly affects traffic from Botswana and other landlocked
countries in Southern Africa in reaching the port of Maputo; 2) the recently awarded bid
for a Senegal/Mali Railroad concession; 3) the railroad system in Malawi which is now
with the Mozambique railroad line to the port of Nacala (this is a cross-border project
10
in that the two separate country parts were bid on as separate projects and they were
awarded to the same bidder); and 4) the Sitarail from Cotes d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso
[See Box 3]. There are many other situations were privatization is under active
consideration, but on the basis of a single country project even though the situation may
be ripe for cross-border privatization projects which would have decided efficiency
benefits; these include railroads in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. There are also a
number of multi-country publicly owned railroads which so far are not being considered
for privatization, such as the South African railroad network, or even the old Benguela
railroad across Angola which has been defunct for years but which conceivably could
be revived. On the other hand, the Tazara, between Zambia and Tanzania is now being
considered for privatization and an application made for grant funds to examine the
options.
b)
In South Asia, there is the new rail-based dry port in Nepal (an extension of
Indian Railways). In Latin America, two cross-border projects link Chile and Bolivia,
the Arica to La Paz concession, (currently inoperative because of floods) and the
Antofagasto and Bolivia, which has been a private railway for many years.
c)
Further examples include private investor pipelines, usually in cooperation with
governments, such as those serving oil production in the Central Asian Republics, the
oil pipeline project serving Chad [See Box 4], and in South America a major gas
pipeline project from Bolivia to Brazil [See Box 5]. Several cross-border power
transmission and pipeline projects have been supported by World Bank partial risk
guarantees, and a new one in Laos, the Nam Theun private sector power project
scheduled for 2004 involves construction of a 1,070 MW hydropower facility to
primarily export power to Thailand, at an estimated cost of $1,280 million, and to
include a partial risk guarantee for $80 million.
27.
Among the problems that need to be worked out in true cross-border projects, a legal
regimen that covers the newly created private entity needs to be clearly understood by all the
parties concerned in case of disputes. One approach might be greater involvement of the World
Bank and the IFC (or other suitable regional financial institution) in helping organize bidding
for such a project and in following the course of negotiations and in monitoring the process
after a winning bid has been awarded to help insure that adequate arrangements are in place in
a concession agreement to make sure of compliance by all parties and provide for arbitration of
disputes, and to ensure proper procedures for an adequate future revue and if necessary
adjustment of terms of any concession to take into account economic realities and political
changes that may be relevant. If the normal arrangements for monitoring and arbitration break
down the World Bank/IFC should be able to be called upon by either of the parties to assist in
restoring compliance. Such monitoring and the multinational character of the project might
offer the opportunity for private management to provide more effective, more productive, less
corrupt, more secure administration of the new concession.
28.
Cross-border projects will also raise questions that may require new types of actions by
the World Bank, the IFC, or international financial institution. For one thing, the terms for
lending to such a project should take into account where the main benefits are directed and the
11
fact that the major motivation for the project is to provide support for an effective
transportation corridor on behalf of a landlocked country, and that these in many cases are
among the poorest countries in the world (indeed partly due to the handicaps of their
geographic location). The insurance arrangements available from multilateral agencies need to
take into account the multi-country risks that the private investor will face, and should provide
guarantees to offset the arbitrary exercise of power by any of the states involved, in violation of
the concession agreement.
29.
Among the benefits of the cross-border project is that it can attract donor attention to
solving specific transit-transport problems and thus alter the priorities that the transit country
might otherwise apply to some relatively minor improvement or change in what is often a very
large transport system in the transit country itself (as for example China, India, or Russia). The
privatization of such a project makes it easier for seamless trans-border operations to take
place, since both sides of the operation will be under the same direct management.
30.
In the absence of successful efforts to combine all the different country operations into a
single unified project for bidding purposes, there will be a need to proceed piecemeal with the
hope these pieces can be well coordinated by some sub-regional authority already existing or
created specially for this purpose (such as an ad hoc bilateral committee of the two
governments concerned).
31. “Unconnected Linkages.” There is a need also to recognize that cross-border
arrangements will sometimes involve “leapfrogging” in order to create specific transit
connections with a more remote country than the immediate neighbor. This may involve for
example arrangements between a special private entity in a relatively remote ocean port
dedicated to handling shipments to and from say a dry port in a landlocked country, and using a
variety of routes and modes between the two—and having appropriate contractual or joint
ownership arrangements with public authorities in both countries. Of course, by their very
nature, airport and port projects, of direct benefit for LLDCs, are typically undertaken as
separate projects in landlocked or transit countries, and some examples are given in Box 6 .
Harmonizing Regulations and Contracts and Improving Investment Environment
32.
From the point of view of public policy considerations, greater attraction of private
investment depends on improvements in the legal, regulatory, and contractual instruments
sphere, and also on issues of investment environment as they relate specifically to the provision
of private infrastructure services, such as the harmonization of taxes, incentives and standards,
both to minimize inconsistencies in treatment of different parts of a cross-border project for
transit transport improvement, and to better conform to internationally recognized norms,
without which investors may be seriously reluctant to proceed. These standards include audits,
accounting procedures, labor and environmental standards, and customs and other transit
requirements and procedures. Examples of some of the potential conflicts that arise in
harmonizing the different legal cultures of ex-British and ex-French colonies in Africa are
shown in Box 7. Efforts to improve the climate regarding security on transit transport routes
and to reduce corruption in business practices and in relations with the government are of key
importance. Obviously, where efforts at regional economic/political cooperation are most
12
advanced, and supranational regional bodies have achieved real authority, there is a climate
where common and improved standards can be adopted and enforced and this should make
multi-country cross-border projects far more feasible and private investors more confident.
33.
Supranatio nal regulatory agencies and the network of cooperative multinational bodies,
public and private, worldwide or regional, are very much involved in the examination, analysis
and provision of services in support of international cooperative arrangements for transit
transport infrastructure. To begin with there is the network of treaties and agreements on
matters related to every aspect of transit transport and logistics. Next some specific regional or
sub-regional organizations may aim at the adoption and implementation of “Framework
Agreements” on the regulation of road and railway traffic and on border crossing and customs
clearance arrangements among the member countries; a description of the detailed elements
that might go into such an agreement, as well as a note on one such agreement, for the Northern
Corridor in East and Central Africa, is shown in Box 8. There is indeed a network of multipurpose and specialized regional and sub-regional cooperation organizations (serving both
LLDCs and transit countries); many of them are inter-alia concerned in various degrees with
transit transport coordination, regulation and improvement efforts. Examples of such
coordination include: in Sub-Saharan Africa, SADAC and its Spatial Corridors, COMESA,
ECOWAS, CEMAC, and UEMOA; transit transport coordination in SEE in South Eastern
Europe; the Andean Group and MERCOSUR IN South America; SAARC in South Asia; ECO,
CIS, and BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) in the Caucasus and Central Asia; and
ASEAN in East Asia.
34.
Aside from these formal state sponsored groups, the private sector itself in virtually all
landlocked and transit countries maintains a variety of informal coordinating bodies such as
chambers of commerce, shipper’s council’s, other user groups, and similar private business
groupings. These bodies have often been actively involved in cross-border coordination
efforts, on their own or in coordination with IFI or donor representatives and with public
officials.
35.
Potential supporters of measures to promote private infrastructure investment for
LLDCs at the international level include the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies, the
Regional Economic Commissions, UNDP, UNCTAD, ILO, UNIDO, IATA, the WTO, and the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs)—the IMF, the World Bank and its affiliates (IFC,
MIGA, IDA and ICSID), and the regional development banks, EBRD, ADB, IADB, AfDB, and
others. In addition, the U.S. Government, the European Union, and other bilateral donors have
a variety of programs which can give support to private infrastructure investment. Some
examples follow.
a)
The World Bank Group through its Foreign Investment Advisory Service
(FIAS) provides advice to governments on attracting FDI, and the changes needed in
investment climate to achieve this [See Box 9]; more specifically, the World Bank
Group supports Private Participation in Infrastructure in 5 main ways: advice, finance,
risk mitigation, sharing knowledge and information, and dispute settlement [See Box
10]. The PPIAF (Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility) is described in Box
11.
13
b)
The Rapid Response Unit at the World Bank (www.rru.worldbank.org)
specializes in providing quick answers on questions of investment climate and
privatization, and provides access to several infrastructure privatization and
concessioning “Toolkits” (also available on CD-Rom), including “Case by Case
Privatization,” “Concessions for Infrastructure,” “Public Private Partnerships in
Highways,” “Hiring and Managing Advisors,” “Port Reform,” and a new one, “Guide
for Concessioning Railways.” See also World Bank discussion paper no. 427, “Trade
and Transport Facilitation: A Toolkit for Audit, Analysis, and Remedial Action,” by
John Raven, which seeks to improve the effectiveness of diagnosis and corrective
activities in the field of trade and transport facilitation by providing, beyond guidelines
on how to carry out the preliminary Audit, insights on how to go over Analysis and
preparation of appropriate Remedial Action.
c)
TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia) is a European Union
funded technical assistance program to develop a transport corridor from Europe, across
the Black Sea, through the Caspian Sea to Central Asia, with many private participation
features [See Box 12].
d)
The U.S. Government provides support for U.S. investors through the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in the form of political risk insurance, loans and
guarantees, and equity fina nce; the Exim Bank guarantees export credits for U.S.
exporters; and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) provides support for
U.S. investors, inter alia, for infrastructure projects, technical assistance, or feasibility
studies [See Box 13].
Financial Barriers
36.
The financial barriers facing landlocked countries alone, or transit countries by
themselves, may be compounded for cross-border projects as a whole, since the overall country
sovereign credit risk may differ between them, and the investment climate in the pair of
countries may be substantially different. The question of sovereign country ratings is such that
for most landlocked countries and their transit neighbor countries, no such ratings are made by
the rating agencies since they are presumed to be below investment grade. For example
Standard and Poor’s rates about 93 countries worldwide; in Africa these include only
Botswana, Senegal and South Africa; independent ratings of other countries when requested
can sometimes be made where circumstances warrant. But when sovereign ratings have not
been made or are not of investment grade, investors then rely on the project rating itself (the socalled local rating), and if it would be of investment grade but for the sovereign risk, there are a
number of ways of breaking through the “sovereign ceiling” which would otherwise form a
maximum—and thus might be able to proceed to finance a project. These techniques generally
include the existence of parallel financing, such as longer term loans provided by international
agencies or other donors, with shorter term loans by commercial banks, or loans with
guarantees of various kinds, or various kinds of risk insurance.
14
37.
Political risk insurance is provided by MIGA, the World Bank affiliate, by OPIC, by
donor government export credit agencies, and by private sector insurance agencies. The usual
events insured against are: a). limitations on the transfer abroad or the convertibility of local
currency assets; b). expropriation of the assets of the project; and c). political violence leading
to damage to the assets of the project. [See Box 14, on MIGA’s program].
38.
Partial risk or partial credit guarantees are a potentially powerful relatively new addition
to the guarantees available from the World Bank (from its Project Finance and Guarantees
Group). Some 8 private sector power projects have so far used the guarantee. The guarantee
covers the failure of the government concerned to meet its performance obligations. The fee is
1% of the exposure that is guaranteed. So if a loan obligation by a thus guaranteed private
infrastructure investor cannot be met because of a government failure to perform, then the loan
will be repaid by the World Bank, which will have recourse to the government to repay the
World Bank, which would if it failed to do so be in default and cut off from all further donor
credit. This type of guarantee has to be initiated by the government concerned by letter to the
private party and the Bank. It is interesting to note, however, that this type of guarantee has yet
to be used in any transit transport project for LLDCs—perhaps because it may be difficult to
obtain the consent of the government. A new development is the opening up of partial risk
guarantees to local currency loans. The various types of guarantee offered by the Project
Finance and Guarantees Group are briefly summarized in Box 15.
39.
Some projects essentially earn revenues in hard currencies and purchase their inputs in
such currencies and thus are spared the risks of devaluation, as in the case of some of the
privately concessioned Bolivian railroads, which mainly carry raw materials sold for dollars on
the world market. For projects subject to the threat of devaluation, OPIC now has in place a
kind of devaluation cushioning guarantee, which allows a year or two to adjust to the new
exchange rate. The World Bank is preparing a similar facility to mitigate the risk of
devaluation. The loses from a surprise devaluation are offset by a temporary loan covering the
time it might take for internal prices in a developing country which has devalued to “catch up”
with the extent of the devaluation. The guarantee thus serves as a bridge loan during the period
of greatest disparity between the exchange rate and the local currency price level.
40.
The survey of investors carried out in preparing this report indicated widespread
concern among them about the difficulties in completing the financial requirements once a bid
for a concession has been awarded. Investors would like to see more of a sharing of the
especially high risks if a winning bidder fails to complete the financial closing requirements.
They also felt that it was important for donors to be able to supply the longer maturities needed
for a good part of infrastructure investment requirements, and that commercial banks can
supply the maturities up to 5 years. The various financial products offered by the IFC to help
meet the financial requirements of private investors in higher-risk and longer maturity
situations faced in developing countries are briefly described in Box 16.
41.
A useful report and analysis on “Capital Markets Financing for Developing-Country
Infrastructure Projects” by Robert Sheppard was presented as United Nations DESA
Discussion Paper No. 28, January 2003, having been used as a background paper on risk
sharing between public and private sector financial organizations at a UN expert group.
15
Physical Barriers
42.
In considering ways to make cross-border private investment in infrastructure for
landlocked developing countries more attractive, and to improve the linkages between
landlocked countries and world markets, efforts to overcome physical barriers will also be
required. Each transit transport corridor requires analysis of these barriers since at any
particular border there may be major changes between two countries, such as changes of gauge
on a railway line, or changes in the quality and capacity of highways, or differences in
maintenance regimens, or in road service facilities, or in the quality of physical facilities for
customs clearance, or there may be major geographic hurdles to overcome such as needed
bridges or tunnels, or changes in axle loads permitted, or different physical requirements for
rail or road equipment. Public or private planners may seek to unify, through a new crossborder private entity, control over what had been previously separated publicly-owned transport
infrastructure facilities independent of each other in each country along a corridor. It would be
a major challenge to link together as efficiently as possible such disparate physical and
operational elements and work toward a harmonized future investment program to overcome all
these barriers. One important goal would be to challenge private investors to work toward
developing a far more efficient transit transport service which minimizes delay at ports, gets
priority treatment in customs clearance procedures, utilizes a fully agreed sealing arrangement
for containers which requires their inspection only at final destination, bypasses or removes
almost all physical barriers now slowing traffic, with documentation simplified and agreed by
all governments concerned, and a single through bill of lading covering a shipment all the way
to a dry port in a landlocked country. One advantage of looking toward multi-state cooperation
in seeking a private concessionaire to operate roads or railways that make up a particular
corridor would be to facilitate such a through project as a realistic objective—“a fast transport
administrative corridor”—and to consider parallel investments in new infrastructure, financed
by donors or in other ways that may be needed. Overcoming some of the major physical,
procedural, legal, regulatory, financial and even cultural barriers now impeding realization of
such a dramatic improvement in the quality of infrastructure and service could contribute to an
equally dramatic effect on export development, investment climate, growth, jobs, and poverty
reduction.
A Review of the Concessioning Process
Survey of Investors and Operators
43.
A survey of investors and operators of privatized infrastructure was undertaken as part
of the preparations for this report, and a description of the survey along with a full discussion of
the individual points of view on a wide range of subjects related to private participation in
infrastructure investment is presented in Part Two to this report. Some of the major themes of
their comments, although there was no unanimity, include:
16
a)
The bidding process might be shortened perhaps by eliminating the prequalification stage and simplifying the technical qualification requirement to a simple
pass/fail test. [On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the prequalification stage
is important because it limits the actual bidders to no more than those who have
prequalified; thus in preparing a bid a participant will know who his potential
competition is and will not be blind-sided by the sudden appearance of a new
competitor at the last minute.] There was criticism of the inability of potential investors
to argue their objections to proposed bidding requirements before they are finalized.
There were complaints of lack of precision on the terms of concessions on the one hand,
while also criticizing lack of flexibility of rigidly fixed investment requirements in the
face of changing economic conditions. [In response, it should be noted that in many
cases the full investments are not actually made; once the concessionaire is in place, he
has great power because the costs of removing him and bringing in a new operator are
so high.]
b)
There was a strong sentiment that infrastructure investments for the long term
needed to be better financed, with the participation of the IFIs. It was suggested that the
IFC modify its rules so that it can play an active role in Africa in the somewhat longer
maturities required for major infrastructure, as it already has done in Latin America. If
an underlayer of heavy long term infrastructure investme nt remains in public hands or is
shared with private concessionaires, and is actively supported by donors also, the total
amount of investor interest in privatizing the operations and shorter term investment
needs could bring forward much more active bidding and a larger flow of private
investment in such more narrowly defined concessions.
c)
There was strong sentiment also that the risk exposure of private investors from
the time of announcing the winning bid to the completion of the financial contracting
requirements that follow is very high and that ways need to be found to share those risks
with government, or insurers, or IFC or other IFIs.
d)
There was a clear desire by several investors to see the World Bank and other
multilateral agencies take a stronger role in the follow-up of compliance with
concession requirements. Where governments fail to comply, investors would like to
see the weight of the World Bank brought to bear, and indeed to make correction of
such failures part of overall conditio nality requirements governing further lending by
the World Bank and others. They pointed out that stronger attention to follow-up issues
of this sort is essential, and is now inadequate. They noted further that the WB and
multilateral agencies need to be involved not only in enforcement, but also in
arbitrating, and in helping adjust concession agreements as they may need to change
over time in the face of new realities. [One observer felt that these proposals would
have the World Bank act as a privatization policeperson; furthermore he indicated, the
concession agreements should have arbitration arrangements already included.]. It
should be noted that other investors were quite unhappy about particular interventions
by the World Bank.
17
e)
There was emphasis on the issue of the cost of bidding for a railway
concession—most concessionaires estimate that they have to spend $200-300,000 on
the due diligence required to prepare a bid, and by the time the concession is awarded
the costs may be approaching $1 million. They want ways to reduce the cost, or to find
some way it could be subsidized.
44.
Some of the other key issues that need to be considered in viewing the entire bidding
negotiation process and some of the broader implications for the role of donor institutions are
the following:
a)
Extent to which the privatization process is viewed as not only an effort to
increase productivity and efficiency but also to attract more private investment, in part
as a replacement for dwindling aid inputs; some private investors see the main benefit
as that of higher productivity and that the expectation of substantial additional funding
from the private sector, especially for longer term inputs, is unrealistic given the market
conditions and high risks in most of the developing countries, and particularly in many
of the landlocked countries.
b)
There is the issue of when a negotiated sale of a concession might be in order as
against the benefits of bidding, and this is related to the question of how to get more
bidders into the process and keep it fully competitive, and how to keep the advantages
of the transparency of the bidding process. Finally there are questions that can be raised
in theory which have to do with whether there are alternatives to the type of auction
now involved in the bidding process for concessions. [See suggestions on “Unsolicited
Bids”, Box 17.]
c)
Another issue that is hotly debated has to do with when it may be reasonable to
require of the private concessionaire “open access” to his facilities, as against the
effectiveness of public regulation of what might otherwise be monopolistic pricing.
However, it should be noted that some experts consider the issue of open access to rail
infrastructure as a red herring in most developing countries; total traffic density is too
low to yield any real economies.
d)
Among proposals to get more competition in bidding indeed are those that
involve a greater participation of multilateral institutions in offsetting the risks in the
bidding process, and in providing for the longer maturities that are required for basic
infrastructure, as well as indeed the question of the extent of the continued involvement
of the public sector in at least partially supporting long term infrastructure investments,
and this may well be a key question in the future in privatization developments.
e)
There is a need for an analysis of the range of provisions in the various
concession agreements that have come into force in the last decade so that the variety of
arrangements can be understood, and that something like best practices can be
identified.
18
f)
There is a further question as to the role of the multinational institutions in the
privatization process and whether the roles for the world bank and its subsidiaries need
to be altered to better accommodate various hybrid arrangements in the privatization
process that are favorable economically but which may not now fall within the rules of
the multinational institutions—such as the IFC and its potential future role in facilitating
some of the African privatizations.
g)
Another issue that comes up is the conceptual one of the appropriateness or the
desirability of pressing for the inclusion of major transport users in the bidding
consortia and the results of non- inclusion or partial inclusion of one as against another
in terms of insuring a level playing field for the access of all users to the services of the
concession on the same terms.
h)
Finally there is a need for increasing the effectiveness of donor support for
participation in the risks and equity in the privatization process. There is a particular
need for trying to overcome some of the present insurance shortcomings, such as the
slowness of recovery, and the need to clarify some of the subtleties in the coverage that
are now subject to such broad interpretations that there is great uncertainty as to actual
coverages available; a more precise spelling out of real borderline situations would
effectively increase the usefulness of IFI insurance supports. The Bank offers partial
risk guarantees—which cover risks of governments changing the rules, foreign
exchange convertibility, etc, but not commercial risk. However, the WB has so far not
been able to sell a single partial risk guarantee in the transport sector. They have been
used successfully in the power sector.
A Private Participation Action Program for Landlocked Transit Cooperation
Assessing the Potential for Privatization
45.
As a significant new initiative, steps should be agreed upon to set in motion for each
LLDC with respect to its major transit transport corridors and in cooperation with its transit
neighbors, a survey of the present system of public transit-transport services to examine the
parts that might soon or ultimately be privatized, taking into account progress already made in
privatization of infrastructure along each corridor. The survey should proceed in three stages:
i)
An immediate stocktaking of the existing or planned public or public/private
transit transport assets, including roads, railways, waterways, seaports and dry inland
ports, terminals, warehouses, airports, and cross-border pipelines, telecommunications
connections and power transmission facilities, and including also facilities that are
partly or fully privately owned.
ii)
A rough assessment of the major parts of the inventory to indicate those that are
likely to be the best immediate targets for concessioning or other private contracting
arrangements, and including those that have recently been or are now in some stage of
consideration or negotiation.
19
iii)
A more detailed follow-up examination of the pros and cons of each such
proposed cross-border or national privatization, what problems to watch out for, but
most importantly to explain, where relevant, what present revenues and loses are
associated with publicly operated transit-transport operations and how these might be
replaced by an estimated flow of fees from a concession operator as well as any equity
payment that might be made for the concession to the cross-border country governments
involved.. The estimate should be in concrete terms of what might be expected and
should clearly identify the further issues to be clarified. An examination of potential in
every case should be paralleled by clear examples of the range of deals that have been
forthcoming in the past decade in other countries, exactly what these have entailed in
benefits and costs, and what kinds of returns governments and private investors have
obtained from such projects. Most particularly where there are public assets that are
now all heavily subsidized, or in such bad state that they are continually losing money,
the possibility of reversing this through an appropriate privatization should be
specifically analyzed and illustrated showing the amounts of revenue that might be
returned to governments and the amounts that might be available in greater service and
in reduced delay, or possibly in reduced costs to the public. The objective should be to
provide each landlocked country and its associated transit neighbors on each corridor
with an idea of the concrete benefits that might result from privatization.
The division of responsibilities for carrying out the above three steps should be adapted
to the actual stage of progress in each LLDC with respect to each major corridor.
Maximum use should be made of regional and sub-regional institutions and these
institutions and the World Bank should quickly agree with each LLDC or group of such
countries concerned on assigning responsibility for step 1), and a date for reporting
initial results. The various steps of the process will need special financial arrangements
to insure their effective implementation. A special working committee should be set up
by agreement at the High Leve l meeting to help mobilize funding for carrying out this
process, to monitor progress, and to recommend changes in the process as it evolves.
A Focus on Dry Ports
46.
A major focus for action on behalf of landlocked developing countries is the
development of dry ports in the major commercial areas of the landlocked countries, that is in
their major cities or industrial areas. There are already a number of establishments in all
countries that at least partly qualify as dry ports. A dry port is a facility to which a container
can be brought under seal so that it can clear customs in the center of the country near or at the
cargo destination. It can work extremely well with containers and it can be used also for bulk
cargo. Such facilities should be established at import rail heads in landlocked developing
countries or at major destinations of principal highways in the central cities of landlocked
countries. Dry port investments can be made by governments themselves or in partnerships
with private entities, and under some sort of government regulatory regimen. Some of them
have been established entirely by private entities in which case the issue of exclusive use versus
open access may arise, and the extent of priority to the owner’s traffic may come into play as a
regulatory issue. The size of investments that are likely for such projects appear to be on the
20
order $1 to $4 million, and they include warehouses, cranes, arrangements for customs
officials, and arrangements for distribution to final customers (and they might include
provisions for customs clearance at the final customers factory or office). [See excerpts on the
benefits of dry ports, from “Handbook on the Management and Operation of Dry Ports,” Box
18.] One of the questions that arises is who should best start the initiative for a new project.
Clearly the World Bank, the IFC, and other multinational institutions might play a role.
There’s no doubt that the establishment of such ports can provide an attractive private
investment potentially leading to greater efficiency and more reliability and greatly reduced
delays. Another advantage is the potential for greater efficiency in the legal documentation and
the insurance coverage of traffic, by extending bills of lading so that they are through bills of
lading to the final destination. The starting point for a review of a landlocked countries
situation with respect to privatization should clearly include an inventory of dry ports in
landlocked countries and on their main transit routes, the opportunities for further private
investment in them, and what access rights now exist for the shippers in general or whether
they are limited to particular shipping services. The initial situation in a landlocked country
may involve several less than ideal arrangements which might warrant an investment in their
consolidation. A related issue is the role of the big international freight forwarders/logistics
companies; they are still excluded from some LLDCs and freight forwarding and customs
clearance is restricted to nationals. The international companies may have much to offer, in
improving services and even investment in container depots, etc.
Fast Transport Administrative Corridors
47.
The possibility of establishing so called “fast transport administrative corridors” on
behalf of landlocked developing countries is one that could provide major benefits, reducing
the need for many of the delays at borders, and greatly expediting delivery times while
increasing security and reliability of import and export service. This could go a long way
toward providing a major new impetus to export initiatives in landlocked developing countries.
For such corridors to work well, the possibility for private entities to organize and manage such
a service is likely to provide the most efficient results. A look into the obstacles to the
establishment of such corridors should be made a top priority for planners and investors.
Intermediate Steps for Road Privatization
48.
The growing importance of road transportation as the leading method of freight
transport for landlocked developing countries and indeed their transit neighbors raises the
question what can be done to achieve greater involvement of the private sector in this important
area. With the exception of a few toll road projects, landlocked countries have not privatized
much of road operations. In Sub-Saharan Africa there are few roads with traffic densities great
enough to warrant toll roads. There is some move toward privatization of maintenance through
concessions on highways for this purpose, and this is an area that could well be expanded.
49.
There may be a middle way on roads and privatization. Private operators could bring
efficiency to the management of roads and there maintenance while leaving much of the
financing responsibility for construction and maintenance in the hands of the public authorities
with support from donors institutions. Private concessionaires can bring real efficiency to road
21
operations, with or without toll collections, and perhaps relying on license fees or gasoline
taxes, and might effectively improve road conditions, provide for greater observance of weight
limitations which are so destructive to highways if violated, and could increase the security on
routes and help reduce informal corruption at road barriers. Even more challenging is the
concessioning of roads with shadow tolls (paid by the government in relation to some measure
of performance) along with the more general aspect of privatizing the management of the road
network. A study in Kenya concluded that most of the main road network could be let on
maintenance concessions, financed by shadow tolls; donors would need to play a role in partfunding the initial rehabilitation costs. [See also Box 19, “Maintaining Roads: Experience with
Output-Based Contracts in Argentina.”].
Expanding Air Transport
50.
The role of air transport needs far greater emphasis in LLDCs. Surprisingly, the largest
port in the US measured by value of cargo is JFK airport—and this might be even more
significant in terms of the potential for many landlocked countries. According to Louis S.
Thompson, who just retired as a World Bank transport expert, a good airport, and good customs
management, might do more to improve the link to world markets for most landlocked
countries than any immediate program to invest in roads or rail. In the longer run, if there is
significant mineral production, of course, then rail will be important. For mid- value imports, if
not for exports as well, then roads will be important. Airports, especially the cargo parts of
airports, can easily be privatized, and there is ample precedent for privately funded customs
facilities and personnel as well.
51.
Some perspective on the present airports and air cargo tonnages and values for LLDCs
is given by the data in Table 6, “Airport Traffic in Landlocked Developing Countries.” Data on
freight loaded onto international flights (in metric tons per year) has been made available by
ICAO for 22 airports in 19 of the LLDCs. Freight loaded (which can be considered as
equivalent to exports) exceeded 1,000 tons per year for 8 of the airports and exceeded 4,000
tons in 5 cases. If we (probably quite conservatively) estimate a value of $5,000 to $10,000 per
ton of exports, this would mean at least $5 million to $10 million in export value per airport for
1,000 tons of export cargo and at least $20 to $40 million for 4,000 tons. It would imply $45$90 million for Uzbekistan, $60-$120 million for Ethiopia, and $110-$220 million for
Uganda—the latter, a very significant part of the $457 million in total merchandise exports
recorded for Uganda in 2001. For Ethiopia the share is smaller compared to total exports of
$462 million, but still significant. For Uzbekistan the air freight exports are quite small
compared to the much more robust total of $3,079 million for total exports. Thus only a very
few LLDC airports have begun to show significant export amounts, while the great majority
show only trivial amounts thus far. In only three of the 22 airports (i.e. Entebbe, Kathmandu,
and Samarkand) does freight loaded exceed freight unloaded; thus in most cases there is
sizeable backhaul capacity going unused, even assuming that inbound flights are fully loaded.
52.
The actual international aid, by individual project, for airport improvements in LLDCs
during the 12-year period, 1990-2001, is shown in Table 7—with projects in 27 of the LLDCs;
seven of these countries received more than $50 million, with the largest amount (more than
$180 million) going to Uzbekistan, and the others include Nepal, Ethiopia, Bolivia, Kyrgyz
22
Republic, Laos, and Uganda. Recall also that Table 2A shows PPI data on private flows to
airports of $117 million for Bolivia and $50 million for Armenia.
53.
Table 6, in addition to ranking LLDCs (where data is available) according to tonnage of
export freight loaded in the latest available year (2001 in most cases), also shows comparative
data for earlier years (1995 or 1996 in most cases) so that trends can be observed, and amounts
of aid received for airports are also noted so that the impact of such investments on actual
traffic volumes can perhaps also be observed. Five of the airports were up sharply—with
Uganda, the volume leader, almost tripling, as did Kyrgyzstan and Laos; each of these three
received investment or technical assistance aid for its airports in amounts exceeding $50
million in the mid-90s. Based on total freight figures (inbound plus outbound and domestic as
well as international) Zimbabwe and Zambia appear to have more than doubled their freight
volumes since 1995, although Zambia has shown large year-to-year fluctuations.
Unfortunately, 14 LLDC airports showed declines since mid-decade, and 8 of these declined by
50% or more—FYR Macedonia (Skopje and Ohrid), Chad, Moldova, Burundi, Burkina Faso,
Mali, and Central African Republic. Another 4 airports remained about even. Trend data were
not available thus far for Armenia and Bolivia, each of which had large private participation
investments, or for Kazakhstan. Indeed, there were no freight data for Botswana and Lesotho,
and no traffic data at all from ICAO or ACI for Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Tajikistan, or
Turkmenistan. It should be recalled that a good part of foreign aid investments in airports goes
for passenger service capacity and improvements rather than freight cargo handling or
facilitating. Indeed, the data for total passenger throughput (embarked plus disembarked) was
up since the mid-90s for 15 LLDC airports, about even in 4 others, and down in only 8 cases.
54.
There is clearly a need for each LLDC to re-examine the status of its air freight facilities
and connections with world markets as well as with regional and sub-regional markets, the
status of customs clearing and handling arrangements, the existence of or possibilities for
export processing zones near airports, improvements in road or rail linkages of airports to
industrial areas, and the availability of efficient and inexpensive connections to population
centers where processing zone and airport workers live; this should be done by governments,
international financial institutions, and by potential private investors with a view toward
improving the capacity and efficiency of cargo airports and reduc ing the costs of air freight as
part of efforts to build and expand the export capabilities of LLDCs. At the same time there is
need for a comparative study of freight cargo operations in relatively low volume situations
throughout the world in order to observe best practices and ways of adapting them to the
situation in each LLDC—so that innovations can be introduced in time to support reasonable
and planned expectations as to the growth of exports of relatively high-valued goods (including
value-added processing zone goods).
23
PART TWO
Survey of Private Investors and Operators
Introduction
1.
As part of the preparation of this report for the UN Ministerial Conference on
Transit Transport Cooperation for Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) and for
the Investor’s Forum to take place as a parallel event at the Conference, the World Bank
undertook an informal representative survey of present and potential investors and
operators of private sector participations in infrastructure projects, so as to learn their
perceptions of LLDC challenges and opportunities. Seventeen different firms and thirty
of their senior officials were interviewed, in April 2003, including 7 firms covering a
wide range of types of transport infrastructure, 6 primarily rail investors, 3 airport
investors, one credit rating agency, and one investment banker. To give a clear
impression of the very frank and diverse views expressed on a wide range of issues,
extensive excerpts or paraphrases of these interviews are presented below under a broad
listing of subject headings and without attribution to specific firms or individuals, except
by very general type of investor or operator.
A Comparison of Different Types of Infrastructure Investment
2.
The representative of a large infrastructure firm indicated that investors in
developing countries want true partnerships; and this can shorten payables period and can
help control downside risks. His firm doesn’t walk away and can take a long time for an
important client. Their relationship, for example, with one large firm on power was in
the form of a BOT project for 25 or 30 years. On the other hand, a water concession in
one developing country where farmers and others complained a few years ago had a
negative effect on his firm. They are nervous about continued public subsidies, especially
if the subsidies are up front. They fear rules changes from possible future public
pressures.
3.
He notes that in China toll roads and power projects have attracted private
investors. Toll roads are very tough; there is no track record of data to build on. With
airports there are lots of data. Furthermore the capital element in airports may be
separated, which may make financing arrangements for concessions easier. But airport
projects are constrained by the fact that if prices are too high there will be low traffic
levels. Railroad projects have much down side. Power plant projects have the downside
that if there are state customers and they stop paying there is no easy recourse. Indeed,
the leverage situation in any infrastructure project changes once your money is already
invested. Nevertheless, the projects that work best for his firm are those where there is a
direct link with the customer as in airport and water projects.
Privatization Projects in Landlocked Countries as a Nucleus for Cross-Border
Projects
4.
One railroad investor thought that it might be worth trying to start privatization
projects in landlocked countries in the hope that they can later become true cross-border
25
projects, reaching through transit countries. Bidders should be made to be serious by
having to put up say $1 million in escrow and be prepared to pay 1% as a break-up fee if
there bid is unsuccessful.
A View of the History of Infrastructure Investments in Developing Countries
5.
Another railroad investor looked back at the history of infrastructure investments
in the late eighties and early nineties, and notes that donors were eager to try to improve
the management of existing public railroads even though the main positions were
political appointees. Governments, pressed by donors, then tried management contracts,
giving former consultants active powers of management, subject to monitoring by the
governments and the donors. This provided a kind of transition to the next phase when
concessions were imposed by the World Bank on developing countries. Before this new
epoch, donors had subsidized public railroads on a vast scale—and often benefits went to
the suppliers of equipment, which was sometimes inappropriate or of inferior quality or
perhaps of quality too difficult to maintain in the environment in the recipient country.
Under the concession system imposed by the World Bank the full responsibility has been
transferred to the private party and the experience has presumably led to great increases
in productivity and in the rationality of decision- making on infrastructure investments.
6.
For him, in picking a good concession project for investment, the first
consideration is the market. To be effective you need bulk commodities such as mining,
cement, or construction materials. A second criterion is a requirement to have a lot of
exports and also imports; oil and cotton in Mali, for example, are paid in dollars hard
currency. A rail line that is internally oriented is vulnerable to internal economy
fluctuations. He noted that French investors look first at locomotives and then at what
other equipment is needed, while his firm looks first at the market.
7.
There’s an added constraint, in his view, on North American railroad bidders and
that is the sharp differences in culture when they operate in foreign areas; for example
management in North America is used to bonuses and going up the ladder to the top;
Europe has quite different standards and that can be a problem. Rail America, a U.S.
company operating in Chile, has had to adjust to this.
US Railroad Short Lines as a Source of Investors in Developing Countries
8.
The head of a consulting and investing firm pointed out that in the United States
Conrail was created (1976) out of the bankrupt pieces of most of the eastern US rail lines.
The Staggers Act (1980) allowed mergers and allowed the company to close or sell
branch lines. As a result there are some 500 short lines in the US, a quadrupling of the
past number. Some of these have ended up as part of investor groups active in
concessioning railroads in developing countries. Who owns a railroad matters a great
deal in determining its efficiency and effectiveness.
26
Early Rail Concessions
9.
A railroad president with experience in Latin America recalled that Carlos
Menem, in Argentina, had pushed for rail privatization in the early nineties. The British
had built and made money on the railroad in Argentina, but Peron had nationalized it in
the nineteen fifties. In the mean time the real situation of the railroads was deteriorating
due to reduction of rail traffic volumes with the growth of the modern highway network
in Argentina. The first developing country privatization took place in the early nineties.
Within a very short time employment on the line was squeezed down from 6,500 to 1,500
employees. Work rules were changed and featherbedding eliminated. There was
assistance from the WB for the readjustment of the labor force, and the remaining work
force received substantially higher real income. He believes privatizations everywhere
have avoided unrest. In Bolivia with the arrival of a concession, there were a couple of
days rock throwing and that is all, and real wages in the rail there are up by 50 percent in
five years.
10.
The Bolivia concession runs for 40 years and the Argentine one was for about 25
years. This is long enough for any investments in the early years to fully pay off well
before initial concession term ends.
11.
In Argentina the partners tried to negotiate the terms of the concession carefully
with the government but there was a major shortcoming in the preparations for the
transition. Government failed to make adequate preparation so that in the last six months
before takeover business went way down. The takeover was a hand to hand effort and
took some 30 days. In the Bolivia takeover there was a major problem in identifying
state versus railroad assets, because of the poor records that the railroad had kept. The
railroad people were managers but were not the sellers (i.e., the government) and were
only loosely knowledgeable of such detail. On the other hand, if the accounting had been
done right it might have taken much longer than the ad hoc arrangements which were
actually made. The non-railroad inventory included hospitals, housing, camps,
maintenance shops, and administrative offices. In state hands, nothing had been thrown
out and there were huge amounts of scrap, out-of-service cars, squatter housing, and
many social problems.
12.
In Bolivia, employment and social unrest are not significant problems and can be
fixed where necessary. The concession has competitive- margin industrial country
operations; the labor ratio as a percent of total costs in Bolivia is 25 percent in contrast to
40 or 45 percent in the U.S.—because labor is so cheap in Bolivia. This means that when
necessary the concession can operate with some excess margin of employees over rock
bottom needs—if politically required to do so.
13.
One Argentine concession, won in 1995, had a rough time for 4 or 5 years—he
feels the owner originally paid too much for it, but has since put more money into it and
it’s now doing better. The original bid should have been more than 25 percent less. It
turned out that there were greater requirements than the owner was aware of and the
27
government itself didn’t come through in the way expected. There was no competing bid
but one had been expected.
IFC and World Bank Support
14.
The IFC was not involved in the acquisition of the 1995 concession but did
participate in the improvement of assets along with the IADB and CAF. The investor
feels private banking doesn’t know railroads, while the IFC knows infrastructure and
knows how to do longer term lending tha n private banks are able to do.
15.
Another rail investor in Latin America noted that his firm had had good dealings
with the IFC, and where they have made tenders they get eight to nine years on maturities
and market rates of interest and these are reasonable. As to the World Bank, he feels
they’ve tried to work to bring projects to market, and they do get involved with the
question of changes in the size of the work force under privatization, and have sought to
cushion changes required with appropria te adjustment schemes.
16.
A consultant on concessioning points out that the IFC won’t invest in concessions
because it is not allowed to. But this is not really enforced in Latin America, where in
effect IFC invests in the operator. However IFC is not active in Africa. International
financial institutions don’t like to participate in competitive processes if they are on a non
exclusive basis. They don’t like to take sides in competitive processes, he believes.
Private Investment Based on an Origin Materials Model
17.
For one experienced rail investor in Latin America, the basis for effective private
investment is what he calls an origin materials model. The Orientale railroad in Southern
Bolivia fits the model, which in his view requires 1) sufficient length of haul, 2) the
existence of alternative corridors, and 3) major traditional exports that are well
developed. The origin country has an advantage in that it can control the efficiency of
the flow of the export commodity, and if necessary allocate it among alternative routes.
Transit countries are in a more difficult position because they cannot plan the flow of the
trade in the same way, and feel the competitive pressure of the alternative routes. In
Southern Bolivia there are three choices: river traffic by barge, land transfer into Brazil,
and land transfer into Argentina. The major products involved are soya and the
hydrocarbon business. Indeed the privatized railroad has already considerably reduced
truck competition from what it was before.
18.
He reiterated the requirements for an effective developing country railroad
investment: 1) control over pricing; 2) exclusive franchise; 3) customers have choices in
re alternative corridors; 4) the railroad should best be in an origin country; and 5) the
railroad should not be a short haul line since these are difficult to manage.
28
Railroad Efficiency and Productivity: Realistic Expectations
19.
This investor further feels that World Bank support for privatization is correct;
railroads off the government’s back in global terms is beneficial. Where private and
government investments fall down in some cases is because of unreal expectations: fixed
costs are high, and where there has been a long term decline because of neglect or the
competition of other transport modes, there is not going to be enough capital to reverse
this in most situations. Overzealous promises about future investments are often made,
even in concession agreements, sometimes in good faith, sometimes in bad faith. You
just can’t rationally go from a 15mph railroad line to a 40mph railroad line in any short
time. Where you have an average of 40tn. per wagon on your railroad versus over 100tn.
in the U.S. it takes a very long time to get there. In the 50s the U.S. itself had about 55tn.
per wagon and it has taken over a half century for that to double.
20.
The results of concessioning are dramatically summarized by this investor using
the example of Bolivia as follows: For the 5 years 1991-1995 ENFE (the state railroad)
received $87.4 million as aid from the government of Bolivia, for investment or for
subsidy. For the 5 years 1996-2000 the government of Bolivia received $37.5 million
from the two newly formed railroad concessions, and at the same time freight rates went
down.
The True Object of Concessioning: Productivity Gains by Changing Railroad
Management
21.
A former railroad operator in Africa expressed his overall view of the
concessioning process: The main interest in railroad concessioning is to change the
management. Most railroad investments had been financed in the past through aid donors
or IFI’s. The World Bank and others will no longer lend for public railroads, and
concessions are thus seen as a way to attract private funding. These arrangements have
been in some cases devastating to investors.
22.
The country risks are high. Private sources bring skills, but only a limited part of
the financing. The main problems are not interest rates but maturity lengths. There is a
five year private sector limit for private banks. Railroads are able to get private bank
loans for equipment, but they also need fifteen to twenty year loans for more basic
infrastructure which only donors can provide. The WB tried to involve IFC in the
Cameroon case but failed.
23.
Rehabilitation loans have succeeded, with $60 million a typical order of
magnitude for this type of loan. Donors are ready to support such efforts. But projects,
to go forward, need assurances that they’ll get donor financing.
24.
Efficiency is really the only issue. Sitarail, for example, raised rates and yet
increased market share substantially by delivering quality service. Country risk will
remain high and therefore private financing is quite limited. A 30% rate of return is
needed by the private sector, with thus only a few year payback period. No long term
29
private financing is feasible and IFIs must continue to support privatization efforts. The
main benefits from privatization are thus shifts in management and attendant productivity
gains and not more private money.
Problems in Railroad Tendering
25.
Senior representatives of a large firm with many African investments held that,
given the history of public inefficiency in railroad operations, and under pressure from
the WB, several African countries have opened their railroads to privatization. Their firm
has tendered six or seven times for railroads, has won in some cases, and has been in
discussions concerning Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Investments may be as much as
$100-150 million if they win, and the properties are likely to have been mismanaged for
years; some will also face the problem that concessions may need to be renewed within
as little as 5-7 years. Other problems it has encountered include: Non- negotiable
requests are made for signing concession contracts before the contract details have been
worked out and without the right of effectively presenting counter proposals. Consultants
advising governments are apparently unable to feel free to interfere even when
governments are making seriously unreasonable demands and before these are locked in
as concession requirements; furthermore good consultants have proved hard to keep. The
amount of investment requirements are unreasonably precise, for example the
requirement to make rail rehabilitation investments within five years is likely to amount
to more than half of the total investments called for in the entire tender, and may grossly
interfere with the flexibility of management to adapt to actual economic and operating
conditions. But obtaining the finance for very large rehabilitation requirements that are
often found in these railroads situations raises problems of finding adequate finance in
general. Competition in the bidding process would be substantia lly increased if a
significant part of the investment requirements were shifted to remain with the state
rather than onto the new private concessionaire. The inclusion of very strict financial
ratios to meet tendering requirements is unwarranted; there should be flexibility to
discuss such requirements in the negotiations for a concession contract.
Alternative Offers vs. Transparency and the World Bank
26.
In railroad concession projects, another large investor in many African countries
has made some proposals, for example in Ghana. In 2 years, there were eight
prequalifying companies, of which four qualified, but only three made technical offers
and only two continued to work on final offers, but in the end no final offers were made.
The investor supports transparency but now there is no possibility for creativity or
flexibility and there must be allowance for alternative offers. In the end the World Bank
decides, and here subjectivity is the problem with the decision making. There are now
some 20 port concession projects, and several of these have been won by his firm.
27.
Overall policy should provide for the following: 1) World Bank rules in re
transportation BOT projects should be followed, and projects should include public
private participation or also participation by private financial institutions. The WB
should organize competition so that it works. 2) The World Bank should apply a legal
30
framework since this can make things easier for everybody. New laws may be required
in some countries but an effort should be made to make these arrangements more
productive and more quickly. 3) Because it is so highly risky, there is a need to better
finance the development phase between the award of the bid and the financial contract; a
sharing of these risks, as was done in the past, would lead to more tendering, more ideas,
and more good projects. Results are more selective now than they need be, and there is
too much reliance on short term high interest loans. 85% of the headaches in the whole
process come at this stage.
Negotiation vs. Competition in Concession Arrangements
28.
One survey participant raised this subject by describing some recent West African
concessions. The Ouagadougou-Abidjan railroad was a public bi- national railroad up
until 1989 when it was split between the two countries. This didn’t work, since 90
percent of the traffic was international. The countries decided themselves that it was
necessary to reunify the railroad and privatize it. Cotes d’Ivoire had had experience
already with private management concessions for water and electricity. Then the World
Bank jumped in, and thus started a railroad privatization concession, Sitarail, in 1995.
The concession was awarded by the two governments on a negotiated, non-transparent,
non-competitive basis. The railroad has run very well and was considered a great
success. Of course it has now been shut down since last November because of the
fighting in Cote d’Ivoire. Both the road and the railroad routes to Abidjan have been
closed; the railroad had had more than half of traffic. Customs arrangements on the
Sitarail worked well, and 90 percent of the container traffic was using the railroad.
Burkina Faso is now forced to rely on Ghana roads, which in his view are in bad shape,
or on the rail to Lome which traditionally got about a quarter of the Burkina Faso trade.
29.
The World Bank has been wrong in wanting competition processes for
concessions in all cases. In Gabon there were two bidder groups: the first was led by the
manganese company, which was the largest customer on the railroad and the second by
logging companies which in fact won the bid. Indeed the government had guaranteed the
concession arrangements, [which included new higher rates for manganese traffic].
There should have been user’s cooperation, [but instead there was a continuing dispute
about the rates, which lead to the breakdown of the concession]. The World Bank made a
mistake in this case, although in general competition is the right way to concession. The
differences should have been negotiated.
30.
The Cameroon railroad serves Chad and the Central African Republic. Camrail
was privatized in 1999 with the winning bid going to Comazar, which is a partnership
between Bollore and the South African parastatal Spoornet. Traffic includes materials
for the new oil pipeline from Chad plus general cargo plus logs from the CAR. Another
survey participant noted that in Cameroon that there had been two bids for the concession
to operate Camrail; the government backed one of the bids, but then required the 2
bidders to join forces, and the railroad is operating under this arrangement.
31
Other Recent African Railroad Concessioning Efforts
31.
The Senegal-Mali privatization has been very long and complicated and has taken
seven years, as described by a survey member. Negotiations started in about 1996.
There were two separate rail lines, one Senegal and one Mali, which were split apart in
the 1960s. The two roads were in his view particularly inefficient, and failed to
cooperate, with bad overall results. It took the World Bank years to get agreement on a
joint concession covering the two countries and thus forming a true cross-border project
on behalf of a landlocked country and its transit neighbor. In the end there were two
bidders, and early in 2003 the consortium led by CANAC won the bid, although financial
closure had yet to be done. There had been a donors conference organized involving the
World Bank, the EIB, and the French and Canadian development banks.
32.
Another survey participant felt that the award of the contract in Senegal/Mali to
CANAC plus Getma should have gone to the other consortium, particularly since
Maersk/Bollore, a leader in this other consortium, is a major user of the rail line,
generating something like 80 percent of the traffic on the line. He believes it would have
been very smart to invite them into the winning consortium, and notes that traffic from
Senegal Cement further unbalances the flows. The railroad emp loys some 8,000 people
in Dakar and Bamako, and Bollore and Maersk would bring great strengths to the
concession.
33.
Another investor held a different view. In earlier years, the World Bank thought
that it was useful to link big users to a consortium bidding for concessions in order to
ensure their loyalty to a rail project. However, he believes that Maersk, if it is part of a
concession, won’t necessarily use the route, since service is more important than price to
them. On time and good reliable service is their first priority. Price is not a big
consideration, since charges are passed on to the client. In Cameroon part of the bidding
process was a requirement that 33 percent of shareholders had to be users. This
investor’s own opinion is that privatized service should be separate from ownership by
users, and let the market speak.
34.
Furthermore, he believes that the motivation of some bidders is not necessarily
optimal economically for the country concerned. For example Bollore wanted to export
cotton from Chad and wanted to control the missing link in its connection to the world
market even if it lost money on the route. Another problem is that there are too few bids,
usually one, two or three on a project. There are not many rail operators in the world and
the successful ones come largely from rail freight and really only from North American
railroads. They have tried to interest other private operators but it’s very complicated.
For example, in order to bid on Dakar-Bamako originally required two bid bonds totaling
$1.5 million, which lead his own firm to refuse.
35.
A different investor felt that the award of the contract was more a kind of
compromise since he believes the government may have thought that the CANARAIL
group with Maersk and Bollore in it may be too strong. Furthermore, he believes that
CANAC, in accepting all the pages of the bidding document as they were written, was
32
taking a big risk, believing that they will not in practice be held to some of the unrealistic
requirement s listed there. But there were many other unreasonable conditions, in his
view. From the day a winner was announced, there were 90 days to raise the limited
recourse loans required from banks. If you don’t meet this you lose your $2 million bid
guarantee; three months is not enough. He also believes that the debt burden of
concessionaires has to be lightened. Dakar-Bamako will take $60 million in long term
investment to fix the track; the burden of restoring this basic infrastructure would shut off
any other borrowing for current shorter term needs. Without this burden, a 1¢ per ton
kilometer toll could easily reimburse a new loan for rolling stock and planned expansion,
which is now cut off by their basic infrastructure obligation.
36.
Another investor recalled that there was a Swedish model for the first concessions
where you split the infrastructure from the users of a railroad or road. Of course the
railroad needed a signal system and telecommunications structures so the infrastructure
and the operations were clearly linked. But in an accident, reports would have to be
made to two different companies. There’s a second problem with separating operations
from maintenance and upgrades in basic infrastructure—these have to be a response to
traffic requirements and this makes for a distortion in planning, since the infrastructure
companies will probably get inadequate feedback from the operator about its longer term
projections, which may be kept confidential. The countries don’t want to sell there
government-owned often substantially bankrupt railroads. His firm pulled out of bidding
on Cameroon because of an $80 million requirement to rehabilitate the railroad. Now
there is a shift to recognize the need for government to finance the rehabilitation so that
private operators have an appropriate sharing formula with the government to cover these
costs.
37.
The head of a firm advising on concessions described efforts underway currently
or in recent years for privatization in East Africa. In 1998 a proposal for privatization
was put forward through what might have been a sole source initiative for running the
Ugandan railroad for 5 years, after which it would go for concessioning; but there had
been some unfortunate bank privatizations in Uganda at about the same time which had
created a fuss in parliament and the government decided not to go ahead with the project.
There is now a transaction advisor for privatization of the Uganda railroad being financed
by the World Bank.
38.
He noted that the IFC privatization unit is now doing an in- house study as a new
initiative for the Kenya railroad. Various donors are providing grant assistance in support
of this project, in the form of a supply of engineers, lawyers, and accountants.
39.
As to privatization in Tanzania, in his opinion, the consulting firm advising the
government had made mistakes. They had insisted that consortium bidders be led by an
operating freight railroad company. This led to many metaphysical questions, since for a
long time some adventurous investors have claimed to be operators, although sometimes
with nebulous real credentials. G & W and CANAC each prequalified, but in the end
chose not to bid. [Comazar undertook the necessary due diligence, but decided it was not
33
possible to submit a compliant bid. Tanzanian government is now seeking finance for a
new adviser].
40.
Another investor noted that his firm couldn’t meet the conditions precedent for
bidding on the Tanzania railroad concession, and alternatives proposed were not
accepted. The lawyer drafting the original tender letter as an advisor to the government
was excessively protective, and called for a $25 million performance guarantee, indexed
to U.S. costs, in a situation calling for a $40 to 60 million overall investment obligation.
Apparently the government, in his view, never really wanted the concession to go
through.
41.
A survey participant pointed out that in another developing country the problem
with a concession there is that the deal was done in secrecy since the government wished
to postpone discussions with labor, and they couldn’t meet with some vendors
beforehand, and had not talked in advance in parliament. Here it seems, in his view, that
misleading information and innuendo were worse than a full opening of information at an
early stage.
42.
An unsuccessful bidder for a concession in a different country thinks that the
contract award was in many ways a case of sour grapes. In his view, the whole process is
not as fair as it should be. It has taken too long. It is too corrupt. And there appears to
be collusion. He feels that the World Bank wanted results. The Bank has been turning a
blind eye to all this in order to get privatizing done. Now, the investor says, he won’t bid
on a project if the Bank is involved. He believes somebody said, “Just get it done.” His
own group was too cautious maybe. The process is unclear. They turned a blind eye.
People got burnt. It's a jungle.
Railroad Concessioning and Possible Further Areas for its Use
43.
Another investor, in railroads, thinks that the Argentine model has withstood the
test of time for private investment in formerly public rail facilities. There are two
extremes, ownership or leasing of assets. The relative cheapness of the amounts obtained
by the government from the transaction is easier to explain to its public in the case of a
lease than for an outright sale. Overall, he feels that his investments in Latin America
have done well, with one exception which has so far been a failure (although there
ultimately remains residual real estate values that are good). His investments in Africa
have so far been doing o.k., but completion of the financing proved to be difficult.
Nevertheless, he thinks Africa remains the most attractive region for private investment
in the developing world.
44.
When he went into Argentina in the early 1990s he was able to reduce the work
force from 12,000 to 2,000 almost overnight; at the same time he was able to double
salaries of the remaining staff. This combination worked, with the pay raises effectively
getting the agreement to the whole deal by the labor unions.
34
45.
As to the prospects for future rail privatization within South Africa, he does not
see any real possibilities, as long as the railroad has as its number one priority to
maximize rail employment. South Africa would also like to be a dominant force in rail in
its neighboring countries. So no privatization moves take place in South Africa, other
than World Bank studies by South African consultants which can last for ten years, and
thus freeze all action.
46.
In the former Soviet Union the separate national railways may make money even
with the reduced traffic flows now available, and are no doubt at least breaking even, and
presumably wo uld avoid any changes such as privatization that would increase
unemployment. In Latin America only Venezuela and Cuba has so far resisted
privatization.
47.
He feels the market place in Africa is putting corridors together. Uganda-Kenya
should come soon.
48.
Another railroad investor believes that the situation in Africa, despite the long
shut down, is such that the Zambia-Benguela railroad might be made to work again
profitably.
49.
A concessioning advisor commented further on the potential for concession of
railroads in South Africa. It appears that South Africa has lost the battle with the unions,
who would lose a substantial number of jobs in railroading with privatization. The ports
in South Africa have less overstaffing and privatization could probably go through, so
that ports there are ripe for such action now. The railroad however acts as if its own
privatization is off the books, and Spoornet acts to expand South Africa’s political and
economic interests by bidding for privatizations in adjoining and more distant countries
in Africa.
50.
He also pointed out that in Mongolia there is a move toward commercialization of
rail operations and installation of a traffic costing system but there is no thought of
privatization at this time.
Enforcing Compliance with the Terms of Concessions, and the Role of the World
Bank
51.
The President of a firm managing an African concession indicated that the
government had reneged on the terms of the concession, and he was deeply disturbed by
this development. He felt that they had little clout when it came to political manipulations
such as these. He suggested that were they a very large firm with wide connections in
many countries they could have used their influence to avoid the current debacle. Indeed
he feels that if the World Bank or the IFC were more closely involved in the monitoring
of concession performance it might have made continued WB finance conditional on
fulfillment of concession terms among other conditionality requirements. He noted that
the EBRD watched closely in Romania as difficulties with concession interpretations
arose and that this helped resolve them fairly.
35
52.
Senior officials of a sovereign credit rating agency noted the following: As to
public private partnerships, such as in ports and container terminals, the lesson was that
there was a risk of government failure to comply with the agreed terms. They noted that
the World Bank focuses on deals but does not follow up to see whether there are failures
to fulfill the terms or to bring pressure for compliance. The trend toward stressing
performance based aid might help improve this problem.
53.
An airport investor described the large losses (more than $300 million) they face
in an Asian country because of the refusal of the new government to honor the
concession agreement negotiated with a previous government—because the new
government claimed that the contract had not been honestly won. The investor was
considering whether to claim the political risk insurance that was involved. [Efforts to
get compensation from the government await a Supreme Court ruling. The investor has
also filed an arbitration claim against the government with the World Bank.]
Public-Private Partnerships and the IFC
54.
Another airport investor noted that if not enough money is available, then
public/private partnerships may be the solution in coming years—otherwise they won’t
be able to attract the necessary funds given the risks. They understand that the World
Bank is working on a new scheme for ensuring private investors for exchange risk. The
WB should put in place a new framework, not going through simple BOT, but rather
following the pattern that evolved in water utilities in France with municipalities
retaining part of ownership and with distribution through concessions to water
companies. Investment remains in the hands of municipalities but businesses are run by
private companies and some contracts will contain efficiency ratios and productivity
benchmarks. There are many schemes possib le, but there is no need for a unique
formula.
Rather there is a need to look at each country’s situation and its
creditworthiness in order to guide the terms. IFC is of course reluctant to have this
degree of adaptability because by its Charter it cannot finance projects where the
government still remains involved as a partner. Perhaps this can change, he says.
The Costs of Bidding
55.
In the view of a senior official from a large diversified infrastructure firm, up to
the prequalifying stage in the concessioning process, investment requirements are usually
quite small; in the next stage up to making an offer, expenditures may increase five- fold
to $200,000 to $1 million or more; the final closing stage may bring a further expansion
of more than tenfold in expenditures on the part of the winner; the World Bank and the
IFC never take the risk during this period, though private banks may take such risks. In
the case of railway concessions, expenditures by the client may run as high as $4 million,
although investors usually try to avoid paying much more than $1 million. Control of the
project negotiations is critical in the early stages if there are several investors. Investors
can try to mitigate risk by seeking to get the best financial engineering in the world,
36
resulting in expensive studies; these in turn must be selective, and this limits the number
of projects that can be undertaken.
56.
A smaller investor noted that bidding is always an in- house affair for him (along
with a partner from the local country who knows the ropes there) with costs to explore a
bid very low, unlike very large expenditures by some players with expensive consultants.
57.
On one occasion, he said, a delegation came to him from a developing country
along with IFC and asked them if they would bid against another firm in the bidding
process which was being planned—and he replied that he would do so if they would pay
him for submitting such a bid, since he had decided not to bid in the first place.
58.
Another railroad investor indicated that an initial inquiry into a potential bidding
situation might take a week or two without incurring any significant costs. Serious
preparation of a bid might take from $250,000 to $500,000 depending on the bidding
conditions; it might also require buying a bid bond which might cost a couple of million
dollars, which you would regain if you did not win. Such bonds were required for Peru
and NZ but they are not universally called for.
59.
In Mexico, according to another firm, it has cost them about $100,000 to develop
a bid. When it comes to financial closure, requirements can add as much as $1 million,
and investment bankers are likely to add five to eight percent of the total value of the deal
as their fee.
How Can We Shorten the Time and Lower the Cost of Bidding?
60.
An investor and concessioning advisor is now actively discouraging any
prequalification phase in bidding. It’s cheap to enter this phase—and there is no real
commitment to anything. In the Dar Es Salaam container bidding, twelve groups applied
for prequalification and six were quickly dropped—including the port of Barcelona
which had never invested overseas. Dropping the prequalification saves up to two years
in the whole process and there is no real loss since any serious bidder can come forward
and be screened when his actual bid is submitted. The bidding for port operations in
Congo Brazzaville brought forth twenty expressions of interest, but only two
prequalified, SNCFI (which is now the operator) and RITES. The government might
well have opened up without prequalifying and saved time with no change in the results.
[However, a specialist at the WB points out that some potential bidders will only consider
bidding where there is a prequalification requirement so that they avoid any situation
where they might be blind-sided by the sudden appearance of a last minute new bidder.]
61.
From this advisor’s point of view, how can the whole investment process be made
less expensive? He has already suggested removing the prequalification phase and
saving up to two years in time. Investors generally want their money back within eight
years. The bidding cycle typically takes six years from the decision to bid to the operator
taking the keys. Malawi was much faster taking only three and a half years. Malawi and
Mozambique both started the process at the same time and the Malawi government would
37
have slowed down by a few months if it could have; Mozambique was definitely faster in
its initial arrangements. The time from invitation to the announcement of bidding winner
in Zambia was a record five months. He recommends a simple pass/fail test on the
technical qualification part of the bidding and then moving far more quickly to the
financial proposals.
62.
As to the evaluation of proposals, he notes that the record and recommendation
goes to the cabinet and sums up everything, and there is an endorsement by the cabinet,
and then a negotiation phase begins which they can try to minimize. This leads to an
agreement and if you are the winning bidder you’ve got to sign it. The Attorney General
has to sign it, but he wants all the details worked out first. The bidder wants the freedom
to talk about it, and then he wants to be able to talk to MIGA or other insurers. This can
all take a long time. In Jordan a government potash company refused to sign the traffic
guaranty in the agreement and the deal fell through there. Bidders often push for
changes.
63.
When it comes to hand over time there are usually 30 days to take the assets off
the property that do not go with the concession. A bid bond was required in Malawi. The
amount in Zambia was $100,000; the proposal in Tanzania was for $500,000, each to be a
submitted on the day the bid is submitted. In Tanzania the government had, in his view,
draconian clauses if there were factual errors in proposals.
Open Access
64.
One railroad investor strongly opposes open access as a “Thatcherite dogma.”
65.
Separation of the ownership of railroad tracks from railroad operations creates
major problems, notes another investor. An effective transportation system doesn’t work
this way. It’s hard to invest in track with uncertainty about the volume of traffic to
project. Such a situation is very risky and would not be appetizing in Africa.
66.
As to open access, in Mexico with a 30 year concession the first eighteen years
are exclusive use, and this will be followed by twelve years of open access. In Australia
in theory all concessions are open access.
67.
If there’s no open access, and operations along the track have the same entity as
owner, allocation of investment funds can be more rational, there is better control of
safety, and management returns are better.
68.
Another survey participant noted that in the European Union the railroad
infrastructure systems are public as a matter of EU policy in the treaty. Operations,
however, may be privatized concessions with provisions calling for open access. Of
course there are costs for operators arising from open access requirements and a number
of governments retain the right to require open access. Open access does give customers
greater leverage and it also reduces the need for government regulations. There may be a
lot of competition in the Mali-Senegal railroad as a result.
38
69.
Another investor felt that open access, when required of a concessionaire, could
lead to an administrative problem. The governments, for example, of Mali and Senegal
might create a committee to oversee the dealings between two private companies, with
ministers from both governments. They would have freedom to ask for and see reports,
and micromanage, and oversee and approve the suppliers of spare parts, etc. Clearly a
user fee charged on the revenues would be simpler than such micromanagement, and
would reduce the risks to the investors.
70.
[On the other hand, a WB specialist feels that the issue of open access to rail
infrastructure is a red herring in most developing countries. Total traffic density is too
low to yield any real economies, in his view.]
Passenger Service
71.
Another problem, a rail investor notes, is the question of passenger service. It is
wrong to ask concessionaires to undertake a passenger service; these are two different
businesses, freight and passenger rail. For example, in Canada and the US, Canadian
National which is an enormous operation owns no stations at all. To ask a concessionaire
to provide passenger service is really requiring a subsidy to a public service. It should be
possible for there to be a separate contract to cover passenger traffic, perhaps with a
provision to pay the difference between actual ticket revenues and costs.
72.
Passenger and freight are widely different businesses requiring widely different
treatment. Zambia wanted to keep passenger service and they were willing to concession
general freight and mining freight but were insisting that the passenger service go with
one or the other as part of the deal. He, himself, would prefer two separate operations,
with different equipment, and people, and marketing, and stations.
73.
[The personal view of a WB specialist is that most railways may be too small for
two concessions, and therefore some minimum level of service needs to be written into
the concession agreement, with some periodic review and objective criteria as to whether
the services should be continued.]
Overbuilding and Unnecessary Aid
74.
Senior officials of a major infrastructure investor feel that the countries in Africa
face great pressure for overbuilding infrastructure facilities, including pressures from
suppliers. For example a big port investment is underway in a West African country.
But the real requirement needed is proper management. Extending the existing quays
may be all that is needed to get full productivity benefit and meet capacity
requirements—without building new quays. But African politics call for investments and
a country’s chunk of the pie. And indeed the WB likes to invest.
75.
A rail investor thinks that donors often make Africa worse not better.
Unnecessary capital projects delay necessary restructuring. Gifts by one donor of
39
expensive Alston railroad engines were completely wasted on an East African country,
since they were unsuited to the climate and could not be maintained. He thinks the
Europeans have tended to overbuild in their support for railways to increase sales and
employment in their supply industries for equipment, whereas the US has typically been
leaner, in his view. So in Africa you get overbuilding and no continuity in follow up
maintenance.
76.
Aid agencies in one African country are more willing to support humanitarian
activities if it is in connection with a project with a private investor present, viewing the
situation as less likely to be corrupt. Aid in his view introduces a wild card that distracts
and distorts, in his experience in Latin America and Africa.
The Role of the World Bank
77.
An investor recalled an unfortunate experience bidding for a rail project in an
Asian country in 1996-97 because of uncontrolled actions by some World Bank officials
who in his view had serious conflicts of interest—and had failed to get serious support
for the project by the country authorities. The project aimed to start a new open access
franchise for oil shipments. The WB guys were pushing the project vigorously. At the
same time one of them was a consultant to one of the bidding partners. The group won
the bid in the first round but had to be re-bid because of some technical objection. Some
$80 million was raised. The bid was then won by another group, but then it turned out
that the country didn’t want the project. The investor complained of conflict of interest to
the WB, but the bank pointed out that the consulting was in an area technically separate
from the project itself, and was therefore permissible.
78.
As to the good works of the World Bank, the investor cited the selective
interventions and the targeted investments in the transport sectors of a Latin American
and an African country prior to privatization, that he had observed.
79.
The investor found it odd that he had run into some World Bank opposition on a
Latin American railroad acquisition because of what was called an “environmental”
problem, namely that there were squatters along the long unused right-of-way.
Ports
80.
A large investor firm noted, with regard to ports, the situation in Francophone
West Africa is typically that public authorities are in charge of infrastructure but handling
is private, either in the form of joint ventures or separate entities. The experience in
Liberia with port privatization was a disaster, with a fake private actor making kickbacks
to the government, and with the ultimate result that the port was renationalized.
81.
In Douala in the last ten years there has been a 50 percent cut in rates to shippers
because of competition among handlers with regard to licenses to use the small set of
large modern cranes. The firm noted that efforts now to privatize the whole Douala port
have run into problems because of what the investor sees as the “dogmatic” views of the
40
World Bank on this subject. Arrangements that have been approved by the World Bank
in East Africa for complete port privatization have not been made available in the
tendering in West Africa, presumably for fear they won’t work there and may fail to
provide all the potential benefits from productivity gains. The firm fears that it is seen as
a “rapacious actor.” Despite changes in the tender requirements, the firm says it will
continue to tender as it has.
82.
A survey participant pointed to a successful privatization of a small container
terminal at the port of Dar Es Salaam. The management of the publicly owned port was
against privatizing the container terminal. But President Benjamin Mkapa, of Tanzania,
has led the move toward privatization. He established a Presidential Parastatal
Restructuring Commission which reports to the President and the necessary legislation
was passed. The terminal has been in private hands for two years, and is a major success
story in terms of increased productivity.
83.
In concession agreements, benefits should be shared between the government, the
new operators, and users. There is never any guarantee that the users will benefit. In the
case of the above container terminal, there was built into the agreement provision for a
maximum tariff rate with a clause providing for a three percent reduction per year for the
first 5 years of the 10 year lease. Conditions were favorable in that all the equipment was
already in place and there was no need for new investment for ten years. [In fact, the
lessee found that the existing rubber tired gantries were too slow, and has purchased
additional new RTGs.] Furthermore the existing tariff was already at the maximum rate
called for in the lease agreement. All of these were conditions which had been provided
by a prosperous public corporation running the port as a whole.
84.
The representative of a large shipping line and terminal operator noted that in
Africa and in other regions with landlocked countries it moves cargo internally as well as
providing ocean freight service, which is very competitive. It is involved in rail,
trucking, and barging in all sorts of places. In ports it provides for space availability and
handling facilities as well as financing terminal operators. Government operation of
ports is not working very well and privatization of ports is vital and should include
provision for a reserved part for the use of landlocked countries. Steamship lines
compete for cargo and they or their agents may invest in related forms of transport; his
firm’s agents own fleets of trucks in many places as well as interest in railroad
concessions.
85.
As to the landlocked problem, he notes that shippers have a fully sweeping view
of all of its ramifications. They also offer advice to governments and they seek to make
improvements in such vital matters as customs clearances.
86.
For prospective projects such as those aiming at improved landlocked transit
routes, he believes the IFC might usefully be involved and is likely to be more risk
friendly and carry lower interest rates than otherwise. Projects of this sort are especially
good for landlocked countries: they are more open, more risk friendly, and have lower
41
carrying costs, and they could expand private investment flows to landlocked developing
countries.
87.
He further believes that a major potential development that of special importance
to landlocked countries, is the establishment of dry inland ports in these countries. These
might be at the destination of shipping links from seaports through transit neighbors to
distribution centers in the landlocked country, particularly for container traffic. To obtain
private financing for such developments landlocked countries must be interested in
development. They must expect a payback to the investors of three or four years or
something in that league. To attract capable investors there has to be a quick payback and
high return. These projects may also benefit from various insur ance arrangements
provided by MIGA or other insurers in re political risk.
88.
He indicated that his firm is looking at a very broad range of countries for the
development of container terminals—that is, some 60 countries are possible areas for
further development.
89.
I mentioned to another investor the great stress that the above firm had put on dry
inland ports as a high priority for landlocked countries in simplifying and lowering the
bureaucratic costs and delays to and from ports. The investor felt that the firm would
indeed be eager to invest in such ports as an extension of its worldwide shipping services
which could give them a substantial competitive advantage over other shippers without
ownership of such facilities.
Roads
90.
One large investor noted that the trucking business in Africa is risky and hard to
control and competition is unfair since the competitors don't pay taxes. The roads are
very dangerous. Road maintenance and extension of the road network are badly needed.
91.
Another major investor emphasized that there is a tremendous need and future in
Africa for roads, even small roads. Public ownership in developing countries has meant
lateness in maintenance, with waits often until the needs are overwhelming. Concessions
are possible regarding road maintenance with appropriate inflation adjustments and
quality requirements. His firm never runs away from such projects.
92.
An official of another major infrastructure firm indicated that activities are
undertaken starting with studies of tendering situations which results in intermediate
reports that go before the company’s risk committee, including the Chairman, CFO and
internal legal counsel. When they move ahead with the project they will be with local
partners and will provide most of the expenses. They are open to public private
participation schemes. In the last eighteen months they have looked into output based aid
that links payments to delivered performance on a contract, such as road maintenance,
and are supported by medium to long-term credits of 5 or more years.
42
93.
In West Africa this firm is interested in construction and maintenance of roads but
they are very, very cautious. Their philosophy is very simple. They work under a
bubble. They want a protective shie ld of insurance and involvement by multilateral
agencies. They want specialists and experts to be in charge and a special regulatory
framework with maximum security with respect to legal, tax and customs regulations.
They have been trying to achieve this in Cameroon and the Ivory Coast. Since MIGA is
only for projects, they find that tendering is a cheap way of giving project development.
They look toward a regional framework, with well made documents for tendering, and
providing for effective local evaluation. Poor quality of projects and failures arise when
there are defects in documentation, in technical definitions, and in the capacity of local
authorities to evaluate and award contracts. Their first effort is always to offset the
country risk with political risk insurance.
94.
As to toll roads, another investor looked at Malawi and found traffic densities too
low to warrant such investments—it would require a million gross tons to justify a
project.
95.
Another participant stressed that toll roads can be beneficial if run properly. Chile
is a best case with a north-south toll road, route 5, formed by separately bid segment.
The more segments were completed the faster north-south traffic could move and the
more trucks take advantage of the route.
96.
An investor and concession advisor, with regard to roads and privatization
projects, thinks there might be a middle way in which roads could be operated privately
and supplement this with continued public ownership of the basic roads with donor
financing of construction and maintenance, thus retaining an under layer of subsidies for
road building and maintenance, with private efficiency and perhaps competition built into
the upper layer.
97.
Senior officials of a rating agency feel that toll roads are particularly hard to
forecast with respect to perspective traffic flows. Furthermore government actions
greatly affect outcomes as well as policy decisions taken. For example Mexico requires
that all of its toll roads are to be paralleled by non toll roads. This has obviously a great
effect on potential revenues for concessionaires.
98.
The Dulles toll road in the Washington suburbs defaulted soon after it first opened
because of the difficulties of the kind mentioned above. The road was restructured and
then the dot.com revolution occurred and the road even had to be widened.
99.
Rules changed in China regarding toll roads and this has made such investments
less attractive to outsiders. Studies of results of such investments are mixed but it is clear
that there is a trend now for investors to resist toll roads and water projects.
100. Toll roads in Mexico often have had hard currency financing, with a provision
that tolls collected in local currency are kept adjusted to the exchange rate. This type of
finance is now no longer forthcoming.
43
101. Finally with regard to toll roads, these projects are not easy to finance. They
require enormous capital and the whole thing has to be finished before there is any
revenue flow. This may sharply limit investment potential.
Airports
102. One airport investor believes that it takes about one to 1.5 million passengers
before a privatization project for an airport is likely to succeed. Management
requirements for a private cargo operation would be different. The firm is a partner in the
ownership of a concession in Mexico, as well as investments in China, with smaller
investments in Cambodia, Egypt, Cameroon, Guinea, and Madagascar. The firm is itself
a state owned enterprise, although there is to be some move toward privatization in the
next two years. There are about twenty to 30 players in the world market for airport
privatization concessions. In the long run they are looking for fast growth possibilities
may be in Asia so as to diversify away from Europe.
103. If China were to privatize extensively, they would be hard put to get the capital
for this now. The firm would insist on control of any project it entered into even if it was
a minority shareholder. In China they now own 9.9 percent of a major airport, but
together with the management contract, they are able to advise and influence the
management of the company. They have one man on the board of directors, and their
auditors will have enough control to consolidate the accounts. They paid a premium to
get this into their bid.
104. A main issue for this firm is the need for very clear rules on tariffs and rates and
their regulation. In Mexico these things are written now, but there is a struggle every day
regarding their interpretation. Indonesia negotiations collapsed after hard efforts because
they couldn’t guarantee a regimen that was satisfactory to their firm even though their
investment banker urged them on. This project therefore fell through, already before the
Asian crisis.
105. Another airport investor, a partnership, seeks to manage, operate, and invest and
tries to maintain a controlling interest in its airport projects; it has been able to do so with
varying equity shares: 28%; 42.5%; 51%; and 80+%. Airport inve stments now under
consideration include some in China and in India, where passenger flows are known and
hard currency payments have been traditional in the past.
106. Other new investments currently being considered by a third airport investor
include Kazakhstan, Budapest and Prague. They also think of China as offering a
number of possibilities. But situations with more than 1 million passengers per year are
all eligible for consideration and the firm can provide benefits from its wide experience.
Consideration of new investments has typically cut off anything below about $1.6
million, including assets.
44
107. In assessing airport investments, this firm noted that 50 percent of airport revenue
is not pure aviation revenue, but rather frills such as concessions for parking, food, and
other services. For cargo operations to be attractive, low landing fees are required.
Management fees have to cover costs and a success fee of some fifteen percent.
Risk
108. Senior officials from a rating agency noted that investors take into account the
limitations imposed by sovereign ratings. Their firm rates only three countries in Africa.
Others, some of them even in default, could potentially be rated on special request.
In some cases the question of hard currency accounting may present different risks than
the overall sovereign rating; for example, Bolivia is a highly dollarised economy, which
changes the risk situation there.
109. Project finance is separately rated by their firm, and in many cases can work out
even in horrible risk situations, where countries are unstable, or poorly governed, or
corrupt. Such projects may work especially if they are export projects involving a natural
resource base. Some of the countries that are not rated have been in default since the
nineteen sixties.
110. Among landlocked countries pipeline projects serving Chad are rated especially,
even though the country itself has no sovereign rating. Otherwise the following
landlocked countries are rated: Botswana, Bo livia, Paraguay, Kazakhstan and Mongolia.
Among all the countries rated for sovereign risk in the world, only two are in default,
Paraguay and Argentina.
111. For the equity component of an investment conventional ratings are important to
investors. For a country to attract FDI inflows in general, a publicly traded debt market is
typically required, although Bolivia may be an exception.
112. With respect to the risk of a high-rate-of-return investment in a difficult country
economic situation, investors will need to assess a host of factors, including institutional
risk, legal risk, and many other things that pose a danger. In recent times investments in
water concessions have become problematical because of the high political risk
associated with them.
113. As to sovereign risk, countries have a way of keeping their heads low so as to
miss the radar of direct observations. Latin American countries especially understand
this, a kind of politics of the street.
114. Finally, as to insurance cover for the risk of expropriation and devaluation,
agencies like MIGA or OPIC face the difficulty of long investigation and not timely
payments. The ability to properly evaluate subtle changes in laws and regulations that
can have a great effect on the coverage of these types of insurance is a limitation that
agencies are not structured to deal with effectively.
45
115. Senior officials of a large infrastructure firm note that it has been in Africa for 50
years, and this has shaped its whole investment behavior. They feel that they know
Africa. They are still in Abidjan despite the recent fighting and they expect to stay,
something that smaller investors might be reluctant to do. They can take a long view of
returns on their investment since the negative situatio ns occur almost randomly over the
continent and a large player like they are can absorb such short-term losses and make
them up over time and from other parts of its operations as a whole. Thus risks are
shared over time and on a continent wide basis. The firm is active in 40 countries and is
especially prominent in West Africa. Some of its operations cut across four countries.
With some 450 expatriates, the firm manages an empire of fifteen to 20,000 African
people.
116. An airport investor noted that, as to political risk, they take out such insurance,
but it takes a long time to collect.
117. A railroad investor noted that in their operations they haven’t used MIGA or
OPIC so far. In Bolivia their revenues are all in dollars since their export traffic is mainly
oil and soy both of which are sold in dollars on the international market. Imports are also
paid in hard currency. Since most of their costs are in local currency while 90 to 95
percent of their revenue is in dollars this makes their exc hange risks quite low. In
Mexico all revenues and costs are in pesos, while financing is borrowing in US dollars,
so there’s an exchange risk on borrowing, since 60 percent of their financing is debt and
40 percent equity; since they have invested in Mexico, the sovereign health of the country
has been good, even surprisingly so, so that they have been lucky on exchange rate risk.
But of course the recent recession has brought about slower growth there.
118. An investor and concession advisor notes that the country risk on a London based
risk premium is calculated in percentage terms. Bankers are a pain in that they look at
high equity but leave out debt service payments every month. Countries want a fixed fee
for the political risk, war and natural disaster insurance which can run from eighteen to
24 percent on equity. Investors like to use a twenty percent discount rate in their
calculations, whereas governments have a different view and prefer eight or ten percent.
119. As to what risk cushions there might be, he noted that there is funding for
investigations of risk from various country sources for example TDI in the U.S.
Commerce Department supports such studies.
The Views of an Investment Banker on Risk
120. A senior official in a large investment bank pointed out that institutional private
sector investors are little involved in Africa or elsewhere in the developing world, and in
general not in the landlocked countries. In reality no one will invest in emerging markets
where there are no ratings and there is uncertainty and there are low per capita incomes.
Such investments are unattractive unless guaranteed by a third party; a bank might lend,
but they’d be lending because of the backing.
46
121. Oil and gas finance involves a commodity trading in dollars on international
markets and such projects do command investors.
122. Is noteworthy however that Gasprom, the largest gas producer in the world, itself
has difficulties in getting credits from investors. For example, the pipeline going through
the Ukraine faces legal and political uncertainties. Even though they are very big, they
have an investment rating of only BBB minus.
123. There is very, very little attention and investment by institutional investors in
equity funds or debt for investment in the developing countries, although there are some
specialized funds that attempt to nail down 20, 30 or even 50 percent rates of return
anywhere.
124. The Shell corporation is in Nigeria. There are a range of companies and
corporations that can do developing country investments because overall the amounts are
such a small amount of their portfolio; at the same time they look for high rates of return
such as 30 percent returns in Swaziland. But institutional investors and the markets are
not available for this kind of investment.
125. For investors to be interested in a country, the legal and basic economics have to
be in order and a modicum of a rating has to be in place and then the capital markets can
be tapped for BOO and BOT operators. The financing is obtained and passed on to the
concessionaire. And MIGA or the IFIs may bridge the gap.
126. The institutional private market has developed correct specialized terms for BOO
and BOT which are acceptable to operators. Pretend you’re in a developed country, you
are free to bid and there is little interference from government, say in building a road.
You clear the system for changing terms to make the project work in a developing
country. You make sure that there is a third party advising in the process. And given the
role of the multilateral institutions in providing infrastructure in developing countries—
here they go back to their roots—consider the possibility of there support or guarantees
for your project.
127. His own firm wouldn’ t get involved on the equity or debt side (since most of the
countries are HIPC countries). They are able to play a role when there are guarantees.
For example, Credit Suisse arranged financing for the Chad oil pipeline; it was a
multiphase project taking up to 20 years to complete.
128. In the right developing country set up, a well defined BOO or BOT project can
work well. Again it requires that the legal system and the economic system are adequate.
Chile has done well on roads given its strong framework. An African country failed on
BOT because of corruption and other shortcomings. The strong hand of an outside
adviser would help, he emphasizes. And yes private operating companies for railroad
and roads, etc., are able to get some finance. The institutional private market is very
difficult when it comes to providing debt and equity for developing countries. The IFC
47
and MIGA can be helpful. Route 5 in Chile received such support, and a Spanish
company made a number of bids.
Rates of Return
129. A railroad investor noted that to attract rail operators, payback periods cannot be
more than four or five years; anything longer and you can’t go to a board of directors. 25
percent rate of return is needed; either that or no investment will be made. MaerskBollore seek that on all their investments in Africa. Incidentally, the Board of Sitarail
wants compensation for the complete interruption of that railroad’s operations, he
indicated. In Africa as to the safety of investments the rules are not clear. In fact, in
Sitarail there was no corruption. The investors there may be out sooner or later but will
come back.
The Views of an Investment Banker on Rates of Return
130. The senior official noted that it is important to emphasize the huge disparity
between the returns that are offered by the governments in concessions and what
companies involved want the government to approve; the governments may be thinking
in terms of an 8 % return for the companies, while the companies might be seeking 50 %,
and 20 % might be agreed by the parties.
131. The object should be to get a better conception by developing countries on what
acceptable terms should be. There’s a need to make small countries much more realistic
in this regard. The Chilean projects may have been something like a 15 % return. But in
other countries it might make sense for governments to grab 40 % or 30 % as appropriate,
given the risks in their circumstances.
132. Always put such analyses into perspective. Always pay on time. As to operators
wanting too much, operators have to put in context who has done what in the past and
how this has brought benefits and how this is what the market deserves and demands and
typically gets.
Corruption
133. A large infrastructure and shipping company notes with regard to corruption that
some countries are sound and corruption occurs in only limited areas. In freight
forwarding his firm finds itself in competition with local companies that don’t pay taxes,
and his firm therefore competes in quality of service and pays its taxes, and of course
links its forwarding service to its own network of connections in shipping worldwide.
134. A senior official in a global infrastructure company stated that big companies can
open doors, but they can’t fight governments very easily. His firm had a dispute which it
took to the local high court. The court found for the government; most of the courts are
corrupt and the process takes as much as ten years. There’s hope that in the end the
Country’s Supreme Court, which is not corrupt, might finally render a favorable verdict.
48
135. A railroad investor notes that in general, he seeks to avoid politics. With regard
to corruption his policy is simply, Don’t pay off! In a Latin American country under a
threat of being shut down he simply continued to operate. Under newspaper pressure in a
small European country, with charges of “a scandalously unsafe operation” he simply
ignored the hidden attempt to extort a payment from him, and continued to operate.
136. And yet they see other indirect evidences of possible corruption; for example, in
an African country, all their attempts to divert oil transport away from trucks to probably
cheaper transport on their railroad have been quietly sidetracked without any clearly
stated objection to such a more efficient traffic flow.
137. As to corruption, another railroad investor found purchasing corruption originally
when they moved into a Latin American concession; this was fixed with the firing of a
general manager six months after he took control. Most employees are not corrupt and
are eager to go along with the establishment of a non-corruption culture.
138. He also noted that there are border crossing problems between two Latin
American countries. While the governments are responsible for contraband such as
illegal drugs there is no capacity to enforce this. Thus the railroad is itself under pressure
to enforce such laws. In one case there was a false bill of lading on a shipment of sugar
and 28 cars were impounded for a year when drugs were found instead. In passenger
traffic, difficulties are even greater since contraband is moved in suitcases. More
controls are needed and these are very expensive given that tickets are only $8.00 in the
first place. The problem has such a long history, with people dependent on contraband as
a source of income and often becoming violent if intercepted or denied passage—and
police may be part of the problem as well.
Management, Control and Expertise
139. A large infrastructure investor suggested that refinancing is a good time to see the
real value of a project. In general, outside consultants for traffic studies and legal matters
lead to better results, with investors themselves preparing the studies in their own areas of
technical expertise, such as railroad management and operations.
140. A railroad investor said that in general, they look for expertise from consultants
on particular subjects outside their own internal competences, for example an aluminum
consultant, whereas railroads are their own expertise. On legal matters they normally
look to a local legal firm.
141. In general they try to bid on a disciplined basis and are strict about their goals.
When seeking new investments they want some sort of management control, at least
50/50 economic control—although they have not achieved the latter in one Latin
American investment, they have effectively done so since 49 percent of the investment is
a passive pension fund that is eager to earn proceeds from the operations.
49
ANNEX 1 -- BOXES
BOX 1: Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (PPI)
(Excerpted from the World Bank’s PPI database.)
To track private infrastructure projects and their main features, the World Bank has developed the Private
Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Database. This database records contract and investment information for
infrastructure projects, newly owned or managed by private companies, that reached financial closure after 1984 in
energy (electricity and natural gas), telecommunications, transport, and water.
The PPI database collects information from sponsors/operators, regulators, specialized magazines, and on-line
databases on: project company, services provided, country location, type of contract and contract length, total
project investment (including both the private and the public participation), financial closure date, project size,
private sponsors, and technology/fuel type.
Database Coverage
• Projects that have reached financial closure and directly or indirectly serve the public.
• Projects in energy (electricity and natural gas), telecommunications, transport, and water and sewerage. Small
projects such as windmills and movable assets (buses/airplanes) are excluded.
• Projects developed in low- and middle -income countries, as defined and classified by the World Bank.
Definition of private participation: The private company must assume either operating risk during the operating
period or development and operating risk during the contract period. A foreign state-owned company is considered
a private entity.
Projects that DO NOT meet private participation criteria include: supply and civil work contracts; technical
assistance contracts; subcontracting or contracting out; turnkey contracts.
Definition of Private Sponsor: Project sponsors are the private entities that take market and operation risk of the
project. To be considered a private sponsor in the PPI database, the private entity should own at least a 15% stake in
the infrastructure project, except for cases of highly diversified ownership.
Definition of a project unit: A corporate entity created to operate infrastructure facilities is considered a project.
When two or more physical facilities are operated by the corporate entity, all are considered as one project.
Project Investment
Investments and privatization revenues generally have been recorded on a commitment basis in the year of financial
closure (for which data is typically readily available). Actual disbursement has not been tracked. Where divestitures
and new investments are phased and data were available at financial closure, they are recorded in phases.
The PPI database classifies private infrastructure project in four types:
1. Management and Operation (M&O) Contracts
2. M&O with Major Private Capital Expenditure (Concessions)
3. Greenfield Projects
4. Divestitures
(For further details see: http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ppi/ppi_database.htm).
BOX 2:
Maputo Corridor Development Initiative (MDCI): THE N4 TOLL ROAD
(Excerpted from the World Bank’s Mozambique Corridor website and from the PPI database.)
The Maputo Development Corridor is one of the most ambitious initiatives within the Southern African region,
stretching from near Gauteng (the Johannesburg-Pretoria province) in South Africa, to Maputo in Mozambique.
The vision is to rehabilitate the core infrastructure, i.e., road, port and dredging, electricity and the border post
within the Corridor, through public -private partnerships. The two states established a company called the Maputo
Corridor Company that supports both the public and private sector to achieve the objectives of the MCDI.
The need to upgrade the important road transport route from Witbank, near Pretoria, to Maputo was identified as a
key element of the MCDI. The objective of both Governments to introduce private sector funding of the national
road network has led to the development of the N4 Toll Road Project on a Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) basis.
The Implementing Authority (a joint body set up by both Governments) issued the invitation to tender in March
1996, through the Department of Transport’s Chief Directorate: Roads in South Africa and the ANE (transport
authority) in Mozambique. It required respondents to submit detailed proposals relating to technical, commercial,
financial, empowerment and other aspects of the Project.
Three short-listed consortia submitted initial bids in June 1996. Following a detailed process of evaluation, the
Implementing Authority announced in August 1996 that TRAC had been selected as one of two consortia to enter
into negotiations. Best and final offers were submitted on 13 November 1996. TRAC was announced as the
preferred tenderer and was invited to negotiate the concession contract with the Implementing Authority on 5
December 1996.
On the 5th May 1997, the Concession Contract for the Maputo Corridor Toll Road Project was signed between the
Republic of Mozambique, the Republic of South Africa, the South African Roads Board and Trans African
Concessions (Pty) Ltd (TRAC).
The 30 year Concession Contract is for the design, construction, rehabilitation, financing, operation, maintenance
and future expansion of a portion of National Route 4 from west of Witbank in South Africa to Maputo in
Mozambique as a 503 km toll road, together with the construction of 5 toll plazas and other facilities along the
route. Toll fees vary between the different plazas, and are dependant on the category of vehicle passing through.
The initial tariffs were set jointly by the National Roads Agency, TRAC and its lenders and shareholders to the
project; annual increases are based on CPI. The contract is worth R3bn (1996) over thirty years with a total of
R1.5bn allocated over the initial three and a half years.
TRAC was a joint venture between Bouygues' South African subsidiary Basil Read and the South African civil
works company, Stocks & Stocks. Construction began in January 1998 with the rehabilitation and upgrading of
existing road sections, and the construction of a new 36km section in Mozambique. The entire road was to be
completed in 2001/2. TRAC obtained US$284 million in commercial debt financing for the eastbound section of
the road in December 1997, arranged by Investec Bank and Nedcor. TRAC had a US$90 million RPI-linked bond
due for issue in January 1998. The Development Bank of South Africa provided part of the financing. Total
expected financing was US$426 million: 80% from bonds and 20% from equity. When fully complete, the Maputo
Development Corridor was expected to shorten the distance between Gauteng and Maputo by 150km.
A report by TRAC in March 2003 indicated that an R120-million investment in load control facilities for heavy
vehicles on the N4 toll route has seen overloading on the route drop by over 30%. TRAC said that up to 20% of all
trucks on the route had been guilty of overloading, causing serious damage to the road and posing a danger to other
road users. This figure has dropped significantly since weigh bridges and load control facilities were constructed.
The 17 load control stations—six permanent and 11 temporary—have been in operation since late last year, and
represent a joint venture between TRAC, the Mpumalanga Provincial Authority and the South African National
Roads Agency (SANRA). Load control stations along the route are equipped with apparatus that signals a warning
51
BOX 2: (continued)
if an approaching vehicle appears to be overloaded; vehicles triggering the warning are pulled off the road by
authorities manning the weigh bridges and checked. Vehicles are allowed a 5% discrepancy over legal load limits.
The N4 Toll Road and its five Toll Plazas (T) are shown on the following map:
The N4 Toll Road will also connect to the Bakwena Platinum Toll Highway, a 30 year privatization concession
begun in 2001 involving a 390 kilometer road linking Pretoria to Botswana at Lobatse—and thus ultimately
connecting the Trans Kalahari route from Walvis Bay to the Maputo Development Corridor into Mozambique.
52
BOX 3: The Abidjan-Ouagadougou Railway Concession—SITARAIL
(Based on excerpts from a World Bank/ECA Africa Transport Technical Note
by Brigitta Mitchell and Karim-Jacques Budin, SSATP Note No. 13, June 1998.)
The Abidjan-Ouagadougou railway is a 1,260-km single track metric line constructed between 1905 and 1954
connecting the port of Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire with Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso. From 1960
through 1989, the railway was managed and operated by a bi-national public enterprise, RAN. In 1989, for
political reasons, RAN split into two separate state -owned companies. This separation exacerbated the
inefficiencies in the provision of rail services and led to more shifts of long distance traffic to road transport; the
financial situation deteriorated rapidly.
In July 1992, the Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso decided to reunify and privatize railway
operations under a concession scheme. The World Bank and other donors established a dialogue with the two
governments on the design and the conduct of the concessioning process. Following a call for bids, two offers were
received, and in March 1993 the Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina awarded the railway concession to
SITARAIL, a joint-stock company incorporated in Côte d’Ivoire. A strategic investor, SOFIB—controlled by
SAGA and SDV, the two main freight-forwarders active in the region, in association with an Ivoirian investment
group (SICC), Maersk (an international shipping line), railway engineering consultants SOFRERAIL and
TRANSURB-CONSULT—held 51 percent of SITARAIL’s equity. Other SITARAIL shareholders are the States of
Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso (15 percent each—partly through public corporations) and SITARAIL staff (3
percent). Sixteen percent of the shares were due to be sold to local private investors on the Abidjan Stock
Exchange.
Two state-owned “railway landlord corporations,” SIPF and SOPAFER B were created. They administered railway
infrastructure on behalf of the states, which retain their property. They also hold full ownership of railway
equipment (locomotives, wagons, coaches, etc.) which they lease to SITARAIL.
SITARAIL is technically and financially responsible for (a) the operation of freight and passenger services,
including all equipment maintenance; (b) the maintenance of rail infrastructure and, in part, the renewal and
adaptation of infrastructure; and (c) the current management of the real estate belonging to the railway domain.
For commercial freight and passenger services, SITARAIL has the freedom to set service configuration and tariffs,
in accordance with profitability criteria set by SITARAIL.
The concession agreement reserves the governments’ right to grant access to rail infrastructure to “third party”
operators after a seven-year exclusivity period. Third-party operators would then pay an infrastructure access fee, to
be negotiated between SITARAIL and the operator (or to be decided through arbitration, if the parties cannot agree
on the fee).
The concession is a “rolling concession” with an initial duration of fifteen years. At the end of the first five-year
period, and in five-year intervals thereafter, the concession can be extended by mutual agreement for additional
five-year periods. The concession makes payments in three forms: an annual user fee as a percent of revenues; a
rental fee for rail equipment; and debt service payments to service relevant rail rehabilitation loans made to the
governments or to the private parties.
Infrastructure investment programs are prepared by the concessionaire and submitted for technical and financial
evaluation to the rail landlord corporations. The states mobilize investment debt financing, but SITARAIL bears the
full cost of the debt service through the third component of the concession fee. Investment contracts are prepared
and signed by the railway landlord corporations, who may also implement them. However, at the request of the
donor community financing the initial rehabilitation program, implementation responsibility was transferred fully to
SITARAIL.
53
BOX 3: (continued)
The number of railway staff rehired by SITARAIL at the beginning of the concession (1,815 out of a total
workforce of 3,470) was negotiated during the preparation of the concession agreement. Individual staff were freely
selected by SITARAIL. The governments provided severance payments to redundant staff, in part through
financing provided by the donor community under sectoral and structural adjustment credits.
A monitoring committee comprised of representatives from the two governments, the rail landlord corporations,
and SITARAIL examines all questions related to the execution of the concession agreement. Disputes related to the
concession agreement between the governments and SITARAIL are subject to amicable arbitration. If the
arbitration is not successful, the Ivoirian courts settle disputes.
The first year of the concession saw misunderstandings and conflicts between the railway landlord corporations and
the concessionaire about the ir respective attributions. These conflicts seriously delayed the implementation of the
rehabilitation investment program. If the railway landlord corporations were assigned a major role in the
implementation of future investment programs, as envisaged in the concession agreement, these difficulties would
be likely to increase. In light of this experience, the Bank has advised other countries embarking on railway
concessioning schemes against involving railway landlord corporations in the process.
SITARAIL was widely considered to be a successful well run railway until the outbreak of hostilities in Cotes
d’Ivoire in September 2002 which lead to the complete shutting down of the railway on November 7, 2002.
54
BOX 4:
The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project
(Excerpted from World Bank news releases.)
On July 14, 2003 Chad joined the ranks of the world's oil producers with the first flow of oil from wells in the south
of the country. The $3.7 billion project is a year ahead of schedule, according to Esso Explorations and Production
Chad, Inc., the consortium drilling for oil in the Doba basin. The sponsors are ExxonMobil of the U.S. (the
operator, with 40% of the private equity), Petronas of Malaysia (35%), and ChevronTexaco of the U.S. (25%). The
first oil from the wells is expected to reach international markets via loading facilities off the coast of Cameroon
around the end of 2003. Chad and Cameroon will benefit from oil revenues over a 25-year production period, in
amounts totaling over US$1.8 billion (in royalties, dividends, and taxes) for Chad and over US$500 million (in
transit fees, dividends, and taxes) for Cameroon. By 2004, the pipeline would increase government revenues by 4550 percent per year in Chad, where per capita income is $200 and illiteracy is over 50 percent.
The Project involves: (a) development of Chad’s Doba oil fields; (b) construction of a buried pipeline (1,070 km in
length, and 76 cm in diameter) from Doba to Cameroon’s Atlantic Coast near Kribi, related pumping stations,
ancillary facilities, and infrastructure; and (c) installation of an offshore moored floating storage, offloading vessel
11km out to sea, associated marine pipelines, and related facilities.
The project also entails environmental management plans in Chad and Cameroon, a resettlement and compensation
plan in Chad, and a compensation plan as well as an Indigenous Peoples Plan in Cameroon. In addition, Chad will
carry out, with IDA support, a revenue management program designed to target petroleum revenues to the key
poverty-alleviation sectors: health, education, rural development, infrastructure, water resources, and environment,
in a transparent manner. IDA is also supporting parallel capacity-building projects to assist Chad and Cameroon in
managing the environmental aspects of the project, and strengthen Chad’s capacity to manage project revenues and
the petroleum sector in general.
Total project costs are estimated at about US$3.7 billion; US$1.5 billion for development of the oil fields in Chad
(field facilities) and US$2.2 billion for the pipeline and marine facilities (the export system). The project’s private
sponsors (led by ExxonMobil, the operator, Petronas, and Chevron) are financing about US$3.0 billion or 81% of
the proje ct costs from their own resources including 100% of the field facilities. About US$600 million in debt
financing for the export system has been obtained by the sponsors from export credit agencies and commercial
banks. The World Bank Group is providing US$92.9 million in IBRD loans (US$39.5 million to Chad and US$53.4
million to Cameroon, amounting to about 3% of project costs), for financing the two Governments’ minority
holdings in the joint-venture pipeline companies (TOTCO in Chad and COTCO in Cameroon). The World Bank’s
private sector affiliate, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), is providing an A loan of US$100 million
(US$85.5 million to COTCO and US$14.5 million to TOTCO), about 2.7% of the total debt, and has mobilized
another US$100 million (for COTCO and TOTCO) in commercial lending under a B loan umbrella. Additional
borrowing for the export system has been obtained from U.S. and French export credit agencies. The European
Investment Bank (EIB) is providing US$41.5 million to finance Chad and Cameroon's equity in the two jointventure oil companies, TOTCO and COTCO (US$15 million and US$25.5 million, respectively).
55
BOX 5: The Bolivia-Brazil Natural Gas Pipeline Project
(Excerpted from PPI database and World Bank news release.)
In 1993, the Brazilian oil and gas company Petrobras, signed a natural gas sales agreement (GSA) with
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YFPB) which requires the construction of a 1,950 mile (3138km)
natural gas pipeline from Santa Cruz in Bolivia through Sao Paulo to Porto Alegre in Brazil. The total cost of the
project is estimated at $2,200 million, of which about $1.65 billion was to be spent in Brazil and about $450 million
in Bolivia. The governments of Boliva and Brazil are public sponsors for the 20-year take-or-pay contract for
phased construction of the line. The Brazilian side of the project is 60% owned by Petrobras and 20% by the
consortium BTB which includes BHP, Tenneco Gas, British Gas, and several Brazilian investors. The remaining
20% of the project is owned by a Bolivian consortium in which YPFB owns 60% (or 12% of the Brazilian part of
the project) and Enron Corp. owns the remaining 40% (or 8% of the Brazilian part). On the Bolivian side of the
project, 51% is owned by YPFB and 34% belongs to Enron Corp. The remaining 15% is owned by Petrobras
(11.25% of the Bolivian part of the project) and the BTB consortium (3.75% of the Bolivian part). Sociedade
Privada de Gas (SPG) is the private company representing the partners in the Bolivian-Brazilian gas pipeline.
Petrobras is responsible for overseeing and financing the lion’s share of the project on a turnkey basis. The contract
called for a completion date of 15 December 1998 and Petrobras faced penalties of $100,000 per day if it failed to
meet the dateline. The project has a comprehensive and detailed Environment Management Plan that includes an
Indigenous Peoples Development Program prepared with the participation of all stakeholders.
The IADB granted a US$ 240 million loan, while the IBRD provided a US$ 130 million loan, both in the end of
1997. CAF (the Andean Development Corporation) provided two loans to the concessionaire: US$ 215 million in
the end of 1997 (US$ 100 million to finance the main pipeline in Brazil, US$ 30 million to finance the construction
works in the section between Campinas and Guararema, and US$ 85 million to finance the main pipeline in
Bolivia); and US$ 80 million in 1998 (additional funding for the main pipeline in the Brazilian side). Also in 1998,
the EIB granted a US$ 60 million loan. The project finally reached financial closure in December 1998 and it
started to operate in February 1999.
The gas is being transported from Bolivia to Brazil by two separate national transport companies, Gas
Trasnboliviano SA (GTB) and Transportadora Brasileira Gasoduto Bolivia Brazil SA (TBG). The private sector is
directly involved in the project through British Gas, BHP Petrole um, and El Paso which own 25 percent of the
equity of the Brazilian Company (TBG) that was created to transport the gas. The Bolivian transport company
(GTB) is privately owned with Shell and ENRON as major stockholders.
The World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) signed a US $14.6 million guarantee
contract in 1999 to provide insurance against political risk. In June 2000, BHP sold its shares in the Brazilian
project company (TBG) to TotalFina and Petrobras for a profit of US$ 42 million. In Dec. 2000, the World Bank
approved a US$ 180 million credit guarantee for a placement of notes in the US capital markets by the project
company (TBG). This guarantee covers 100% of the amortizing principal repayment.
56
BOX 6:
Examples of Private Participation Projects for Airports
and Serving Landlocked Developing Countries
(Extracts from PPI Database.)
Zvartnots International Airport—Ar menia
The government of Armenia awarded a 30-year concession contract for the operation of the international airport of
Zvartnots to Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 in September 2001. The final agreement was signed in December 2001.
According to the agreement, the Aeropuertos Argentina committed to invest around $50 million during the first five
years of the concession contract. Investment commitments included the rehabilitation of the runway and
improvement of airport equipment and air safety.
Bolivia Airports Concession
The concession agreement of 1996 runs for 25 years (until 11/21/2021) and includes the operation of three airports
in Bolivia which combined handle 80% of the airports traffic (air-side and land-side operations, maintenance and
management; expansion of passenger terminals, which will cost approximately US$ 100 million). The airports are:
El Alto Airport (La Paz), Jorge Wilstermann Airport (Cochabamba) and Viru Viru Airport (Santa Cruz). The
project company is headed by Airport Group International, whose shares are distributed as follows: Lockheed Air
Terminal—30%; Soros Capital L.P.—30%; GE Capital—30%; remaining shares are held by DFS Group Ltd.,
SunAmerica and United Infrastructure Co. (joint venture of Bechtel and Kiewit). The expected revenues are US$
20 million per year (20.8% will be held by the government as a lease fee).
Djibouti Port
Dubai Port Authority was awarded the contract to expand, rehabilitate and operate the Djibouti Port in June 2000,
and it runs for 20 years. DPA intends to increase the port’s handling capacity from 125,000 to 300,000 with an
investment program of US$ 50 million. The port has 15 berths and facilities to handle container traffic, general
cargo, ro-ro, dry bulk and tankers.
Iquique Port—Chile
Iquique Terminal Internacional ITT, a joint-venture of Sudamericana Agencias Aereas y Maritimas (SAAM) (60%)
and Dragados’ subsidiary Urbaser (40%), was awarded the contract to expand, rehabilitate and operate a terminal at
the Port of Iquique. The contract has a duration of 20 years (extendable for another 10 years), and the sponsors
committed to invest US$ 27 million during the first 5 years of the concession. The facilities have a capacity of 1
million tons, 10,000 square meters of storage place and 14 hectares for the port operations. ITT took over the
operations of the port in July 2000. The company will pay a lease fee of US$ 9.5 per ton.
Constantza Port—Romania
In 1998, EBRD granted the Romanian-Cypriot company Silotrans (a joint venture of Romtrans S.A. and East Point
Holding Ltd) an eight-year syndicated credit amounting to US$ 13 million for the development of a grain terminal
in the Port of Constantza. The credit consists of US$ 8.0 million in an 8 year direct loan and US$5.0 million in an 8
year syndicated loan by Cyprus Popular Bank. The loans will be used for the construction of a sea-port grain
terminal at the port of Constantza (on the west coast of the Black Sea), including bulk storage of 100,000 tons and
facilities for handling road and rail freight, as well as loading and unloading systems for barges and ships.
InterSystems Nebraska Inc. and Christianson Systems, Inc. is to supply the grain handling equipment (US$ 4
million).
57
BOX 7: Contrasts between English Common Law and Non-Anglophone Civil Law:
An Example of a Basic Issue: Do International Instruments Prevail Over Domestic
Legislation?
(Excerpts from “Facilitation of Regional Transport and Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Legal Instruments,”
by Jean Grosdidier de Matons, SSATP Working Paper No. 73, April 2003.)
a. Ranking of Norms in Common Law
English Law and the Incorporation Doctrine. The rule is that international law is part of the law of the land,
meaning by that an absence of a priori preeminence of international law, i.e., treaties. When reviewing statutes at
the light of a treaty, English law makes a distinction between statutes that are intended to bring a treaty or
agreement into effect and other statutes. Where the provisions of a statute implementing a treaty are capable of
more than one meaning, and if one interpretation is compatible with the terms of the treaty while others are not,
legislation under review will be construed so as to avoid a conflict with international law, that is the treaty. But
where the words of an existing statute are unambiguous, there is no choice but to apply them irrespective of any
conflict with international agreements. The treaty, while incorporated to municipal law (the incorporation doctrine)
does not automatically prevail. This is likely to be the rule in Anglophone sub-Sahara Africa.
Given the well-established incorporation doctrine, references to duties under international law are therefore few in
the constitutions of Anglophone States south of the Sahara. Article 40 of the Constitution of Ghana states that:
“Government shall...promote respect for international law, [and] treaty obligations”... adhere to the
principles enshrined in or as the case may be, the aims and ideals of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Charter of the Organization of African Unity, . . . the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African
States and any other international organization of which the Ghana is a member”
This is a broad statement of policy rather than a specific rule of law that courts may use for guidance in interpreting
statutes and treaties. A similar policy statement is to be found in Art. 14 of the 1975 Constitution of Angola
whereby the State considers itself bound by the principles of the UN Charter and of the Charter of the OAU.
US Law and the Last in Time Doctrine . U.S law is even stricter. Early efforts in constitutional history for making
treaties paramount to acts of legislation did not prevail. Treaties and acts of legislation are on the same footing and
in any case the Constitution prevails domestically as the supreme law of the land, even if it places the United States
in violation of international law at international level. In case of direct conflict between a self-executing treaty and
a legislative act or statute of Congress, the last in time prevails (the Last in Time doctrine). At any moment
therefore, the position of a foreign party to a treaty with the United States, exposed to the Last in Time doctrine,
may be very weak.
b. Ranking of norms under civil law
Treaties as Paramount in Civil Law. Civil law States, whose legal tradition has a strong influence on nonAnglophone sub-Saharan Africa, tend to consider international law as paramount to municipal law. According to
the 1958 French Constitution:
1)
treaties duly ratified and published operate as laws within the domestic system, and
2)
the provisions of a particular treaty are superior to those of domestic laws, but only if this situation applies
also as regards the other party or parties to the treaty (rule of reciprocity).
French courts may also declare a statute inapplicable if it conflicts with an earlier treaty, a totally different approach
from that resulting from the Last in Time doctrine, in fact prohibiting the legislature to issue a statute that would
contradict a treaty. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany goes further by stating that the general rules
58
BOX 7: (continued)
of public international law are an integral part of federal law, which goes beyond treaties and includes custom, a
major source of international law. The treaty takes precedence over laws and directly creates rights and duties for
the inhabitants of the German territory. In other terms, treaties are self-executing.
Sub-Saharan Africa. Most constitutions of Francophone African States follow the civil law model, the wording
being:
Treaties and agreements ratified or approved in accordance with statutes on the matter, as soon as they
are published, shall have an authority superior to that of laws, contingent upon the application by the other
party, for such agreement or treaty.
The rule is set forth in the Constitution of Benin (1990, at Art. 147), Burkina Faso (1991, at Art. 151), Cameroon
(1996, at Art. 46), Central Africa Republic (1994, at Art. 69), Chad, (1996, Art. 222). Côte d’Ivoire (2000, Art. 88),
Guinea (1990, Art 77 to 79), Mali (1992, Art. 116), Mauritania (1990, Art. 88), Niger (1996, Art. 121) and Senegal
(2001, Art. 98). Yet it is missing in the Constitutions of Congo (1992), Gabon (1994), Madagascar (1991) as well
as in civil law States such as Cape Verde, Sao Tome et Principe, and Guinea Bissau.
Example. The influence of the civil law doctrine of paramount ranking of treaties is well illustrated by the
instruments concerning the Union économique et monétaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UEMOA-West Africa
Economic and Monetary Union). The 1994 Dakar UEMOA Convention between eight Francophone States (see
para. 353 and sq) stipulates a comprehensive regime, clearly owing much to the European Union system.
(1)
“instruments resulting from the Union or issued by the Union take precedence over any past, present or
future national legislation. Partner States shall take all necessary measures to eliminate contradictions or
overlapping of prior instruments, commitments or conventions entered into or acceded at, with third
parties.” (Article 14 of the Convention).
(2).
“Regulations issued by UMEOA are directly enforceable in Partner States” (Article 43 of the
Convention).
In addition:
(3)
Directives indicate which results ought to be obtained and as such, are binding obligations for Partner
States.
(4)
The implementation of UEMOA decisions by Partner States is compulsory.
In UEMOA only recommendations and opinions are not directly enforceable. All instruments except
recommendations are to be issued with motives. Writs of execution are issued and enforceable in accordance with
domestic rules of civil procedure.
59
BOX 8: Some Possible Elements of a Transit Transport Framework Agreement
Between Landlocked Developing Countries and their Transit Transport
Neighbors in a Particular Sub-Region
(Excerpted from “Central Asia’s Trade Links with the World,” UNDP/UNCTAD Project RER/95/001, Boxes 4 and 11.)
The basic thrust behind the move toward a transit transport framework agreement is the recognition that transit
transport cannot occur efficiently without agreement on a common set of rules among all the countries concerned.
Without such agreement, there is often chaos. Transporters are forced to adjust to totally different practical and
legal requirements in each country they pass through with repeated .and wasteful delays, inspections and formalities
that make transportation a nightmare and result in astronomic costs. It is in everyone’s interest to avoid such
anarchy. The subjects on which agreements are needed are multifold. A framework agreement can set forth the
subjects on which agreements are to be reached, giving priority to items that must be decided first but putting in
place an ongoing mechanism for continuing to improve conditions, and setting a time-frame for meeting higher
standards of safety, security, and infrastructure quality from which all users will ultimately benefit.
Thus a framework agreement might include: (a) provisions for freedom of transit, including non-discrimination
against goods of any origin or destination, avoidance of unnecessary delays and exemption from any charges other
than those to meet the administrative costs of transit; (b) designation of transit transport corridors, including rail,
road, and inland waterways, and including provision of adequate frontier facilities and services (terminals, bordercrossing points. gauge interchange stations, ferry-link ports and navigational aids), and further including measures
to expedite clearance of traffic, to ensure the safety of traffic in transit, to permit transport companies to establish
offices in transit countries and to obtain multiple visa entry; (c) maritime ports and facilities to be provided for use
of transit traffic: (d) general conditions for road transport, including use of appropriate traffic regulations, freedom
to select the best means of transport, requirement for approval of any carriage of internal traffic by a transiting
carrier, permission for carriers to remain in the transit country as long as necessary, provisions regarding road
transport permits, technical requirements for vehicles, provision of fuel and lubricants, mutual recognition of
driving permits and of certificates of roadworthiness. motor vehicle third party insurance provisions, and
requirement of equal treatment of national and transit companies regarding charges and financial obligations; (e)
general conditions for rail transport, including designated interchange stations at borders and arrangements for
technical inspections: (f) general conditions for inland transport, including navigation aids, maximum loads, ship
papers, vessel registration, and certificates of seaworthiness; (g) the contract of carnage of goods in transit,
including consignment notes, passenger tickets, luggage registration, liability of the carrier, liability for delay,
liability for personal injury, liability for loss or damage to luggage. compensation for loss of goods, combined
responsibility of camera, and compensation for injury or death; (h) Customs control, including minimizing controls,
joint inspections, and the establishment of a customs transit system; (i) documentation and procedures, including
limit on number of documents and alignment and harmonization with international standards, (i) miscellaneous
provisions, including special rules on transport of dangerous goods, agreement to establish a “Transit Transport
Coordination Authority (‘ITCA)” with decision authority over disputes and authority to propose amendments to the
agreement, and arrangements for arbitration of disputes.
Northern Corridor Transit Agreement:
Agreement
An Example of a Regional Transit Transport Framework
The experience of five Central and East African countries, served by the port of Mombasa, constituting the
Northern Corridor region, illustrates the potential for viable regional arrangements, and has served as a model in
many other cases. The Governments of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire signed a “Northern Corridor
Transit Agreement” on 19 February 1985, covering, inter-alia right of transit; maritime port facilities; transit routes
and facilities; customs control; documentation and procedures; means of transport; facilities for transit employees;
rates, charges and payment arrangements; and settlement of disputes. An annex to the Agreement covers the
establishment of an authority to coordinate transit transport in the Northern Corridor, the “Transit Transport
Coordination Authority.” Separate protocols provide much more detailed descriptions and agreements concerning:
(a) maritime port facilities; (b) transit routes and facilities; (c) Customs control; (d) documentation and procedures;
(e) transport by rail of goods in transit; (f) transport by road of goods in transit; (g) handling of dangerous goods;
(h) facilities for transit agencies and employees; and (i) third party motor vehicle insurance.
60
BOX 9. The World Bank Group’s Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS)
(Extracts from FIAS web site, www.fias.net).
The FIAS Program provides advice to governments on attracting FDI; it is one of the many practices and programs
located in the Private Sector Advisory Services (PSAS) Department, a global product group jointly operated by the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank. Since its founding in 1985, FIAS has assisted more
than 120 countries—many of them on a continuing basis over the years. Its broad experience has helped it identify
the essential attributes of a sound investment environment. Its staff tailors this knowledge to the circumstances of
client countries to help them reach their potential for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).
FIAS works only at the request of governments, on topics identified by the government and agreed to by both
parties. The Service offers much more than one-way advice and written reports: through interactive workshops and
roundtable meetings that often include business executives and other stakeholders, it helps governments chart
technically and politically practical paths to change. Experience suggests that much can be done to remove
barriers, disincentives, and distortions that may discourage investment or divert it from efficient uses. Creating a
stable, neutral, and efficient environment for business can bring in new investment and improve the productivity of
existing investment(s). Higher levels of investment and productivity are key to stimulating growth in developing
countries and raising living standards.
An advisory project begins with a high-level request from a government, FIAS management's agreement to do the
work, and mutual agreement on the terms of reference. Assignments typically take three to six months to complete.
FIAS may communicate its recommendations in a written report or by other means, such as a workshop. Whatever
the vehicle, FIAS delivers assistance in a timely, practical, and non-bureaucratic style.
The advice that FIAS gives is confidential to its government clients, who are under no compulsion to accept that
advice. This helps establish a relation of trust in which FIAS can provide a frank assessment of a country's strengths
and weaknesses for attracting foreign investment. FIAS has a strong record of putting forth recommendations that
client countries recognize as valuable —and act on. Reforms suggested by FIAS have contributed to the successes
many
of
its
client
countries
have
achieved
in
attracting
more
foreign
investment.
The IFC and the World Bank contribute roughly 35 to 40 percent of the funding needed to cover FIAS's annual
costs. The rest comes through donations from more than a dozen bi- and multilateral sources, and fees paid by the
governments for which FIAS works. Eight common topics covered by FIAS assistance are shown below:
Diagnostics. FIAS undertakes diagnostic studies to identify a country's main policy impediments to productive
foreign direct investment. The issues typically identified include prohibitions on foreign investment in many sectors
or locations; restrictions on the share of foreign ownership in the equity of domestic companies; difficult
administrative approval processes; restrictions on repatriation of dividends and capital; taxes; the character and
functioning of legal systems; and problems foreign firms have in gaining access to land and bringing in technical
and managerial staff.
Legal and Regulatory Environment. In any country, the rules of the game are critical to attracting worthwhile
investments. FIAS can review a country's legal and regulatory environment and recommend measures in such areas
as screening procedures, restrictions on the percentage of shares owned by foreigners, currency convertibility,
access to land, and investment protection under national laws and international conventions.
Administrative Barriers. One important tool FIAS has developed is its analysis of administrative barriers that snarl
and slow both investment and subsequent production. These detailed flowcharts pinpointing problems have helped
governments identify and eliminate counterproductive procedures, and streamline the necessary regulations that
remain. FIAS has included a 'self-assessment' approach to reviewing administrative barriers to investment in client
countries. Under this approach, a counterpart team in the Government will utilize FIAS-developed templates to
collect the basic “institutional” information on administrative procedures for business establishment and operation
in the country, following the existing norms and regulations.
61
BOX 9: (continued)
Investment Incentives. In a competitive world, countries often grant benefits to entice investors. FIAS can analyze
incentives to ensure they are competitive and cost effective.
Investment Promotion. Effective investment promotion can influence investor decisions, and affect the
amount and kind of investments a country receives. Efficient agencies are needed to attract FDI and help manage
investment polic y. FIAS helps countries design promotion institutions, adapting models that have proven effective
elsewhere. It also helps these agencies formulate promotion strategies that identify competitive advantages and
target specific opportunities. Strategies can be conceived on national, regional, or sectoral levels.
Building Linkages. The benefits of FDI are often enhanced by increasing business links with local companies.
FIAS can help governments design programs that foster supply and other relationships between foreign-owned and
domestic companies.
Foreign Direct Investment Data Systems. Governments require accurate data about investment flows—for their
own use, and to provide information to the marketplace. FIAS can help governments design non-intrusive systems
for collecting data on direct investment, including measuring the impact of investments on such key variables as job
creation and export growth.
Multi-Agency Technical Assistance Program. The program aims to design and implement a coordinated effort
among four international agencies (FIAS, UNCTAD, MIGA, and UNIDO) to promote FDI flows into least
developed countries (LDCs) and to maximize the benefits generated by FDI, by strengthening the policy, legal, and
institutional framework for investment and improving investment promotion capabilities in pilot countries. To
assist LDCs attract a larger share of FDI, participating agencies extend a programme of advisory services and
capacity-building activities, targeted to a selected group of LDCs (the init ial pilot countries are Cambodia, Mali,
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda).
(For more general information about FIAS, send an e-mail to [email protected].)
62
BOX 10.
The World Bank Group’s Support for Private Participation in Infrastructure
(Excerpted from World Bank web site.)
The World Bank Group supports Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) in five main ways -- advice, finance,
risk mitigation, sharing knowledge and information, and dispute settlement:
Advice. All members of the World Bank Group offer advisory services to member governments, including to
facilitate PPI. Building sound public policy to stimulate private sector-led development poses major challenges for
all governments, but especially for those in developing countries. To help respond to these challenges, the World
Bank Group in 2000 created Private Sector Advisory Services from the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC)
Corporate Financial Services, the World Bank’s central private sector development staff, and the joint IFC-World
Bank Foreign Investment Advisory Service—fielding a team of nearly 100 staff with substantial experience in
providing pioneering policy and transaction advice to developing country governments. Now working in more than
100 countries, Private Sector Advisory Services provides assistance in three related areas: a) Policy, regulatory, and
institutional reforms to foster a sound investment climate; b) Policy, regulatory, and institutional reforms to
improve public services through private sector involvement; c)Transaction design and implementation assistance
for complex privatizations. For more information, download the Private Sector Advisory Services brochure (PDF
110KB). (See also BOX 14 on FIAS and BOX 11 on PPIAF).
Finance. The World Bank can lend to member governments and other entities that enjoy a government guarantee.
The Bank’s lending activities to help member governments define and implement their PPI agendas has grown
sharply in recently years. The International Finance Corporation can participate directly in private infrastructure
projects through loans or equity, without the need for a government guarantee.
Risk Mitigation. Several members of the World Bank Group, including the Project Finance and Guarantees Group
and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, offer risk mitigation products that can be particularly relevant
to PPI in developing and transforming economies.
Sharing Knowledge and Information. PPI is a new concept in many countries. Member governments have a
growing need for knowledge and information on best practices in many issues associated with PPI. The Bank
Group, increasingly in partnership with other institutions, is responding to this need through the compilation and
dissemination of emerging notions of best practice in various forms, including publications, training, toolkits and
the Rapid Response helpdesk.
Dispute Settlement. Long term contractual and/or regulatory arrangements of the kind that typically underpin
private infrastructure arrangements can sometimes give rise to differences between investors and host governments.
The International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a member of the World Bank Group,
offers specialized dispute settlement services to assist in this area.
63
BOX 11: Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility—PPIAF
(Excerpted from the PPIAF web site)
The Public -Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) is a multidonor technical assistance facility aimed at
helping developing countries improve the quality of their infrastructure through private sector involvement.
Launched in July 1999, PPIAF was developed at the joint initiative of the governments of Japan and the United
Kingdom, working closely with the World Bank. PPIAF is owned and directed by participating donors, which
include bilateral and multilateral development agencies and international financial institutions. PPIAF was built on
the World Bank Group’s Infra-structure Action Program and has been designed to reinforce the actions of all
participating donors. PPIAF is governed by a Program Council comprising representatives of participating
donors and is managed by a small Program Management Unit, which arranges for the delivery of PPIAF-funded
activities by others. PPIAF is thus a funding, coordination and program management mechanism, rather than an
advisory services unit. PPIAF pursues its mission through two main mechanisms:
• Channeling technical assistance to governments in developing countries on strategies and measures to tap the full
potential of private involvement in infrastructure.
• Identifying, disseminating, and promoting best practices on matters related to private involvement in
infrastructure in developing countries.
PPIAF can finance a range of country-specific and multi-country advisory and related activities in the following
areas:
• Framing infrastructure development strategies to take full advantage of the potential for private involvement.
• Building consensus for appropriate policy, regulatory, and institutional reforms.
• Designing and implementing specific policy, regulatory, and institutional reforms.
• Supporting the design and implementation of pioneering projects and transactions.
• Building government capacity in the design and execution of private infrastructure arrangements and in the
regulation of private service providers.
PPIAF assistance can facilitate private involvement in the financing, ownership, operation, rehabilitation,
maintenance, or management of eligible infrastructure services. Eligible infrastructure services comprise roads,
ports, airports, railways, electricity, telecommunications, solid waste, water and sewerage, and gas transmission and
distribution.
64
BOX 12. TRACECA, a European Union Funded Technical Assistance Program
to Develop a Europe, Black Sea, Caspian Sea Transport Corridor to Central Asia.
(Excerpted from the TRACECA web site.)
TRACECA—Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia: The TRACECA Programme was launched at a
conference in Brussels in May 1993 which brought together trade and transport ministers from the original eight
TRACECA countries (five Central Asian republics and three Caucasian republics), where it was agreed to
implement a programme of European Union (EU) funded technical assistance (TA) to develop a transport corridor
on a west - east axis from Europe, across the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Central Asia.
The EU offers this programme as an additional route that would complement other routes. The project corresponds
to the global EU strategy towards these countries and retains the following objectives:
•
•
•
•
To support the political and economic independence of the republics by enhancing their capacity to access
European and World markets through alternative transport routes
To encourage further regional co-operation among the partner states
To increasingly use TRACECA as a catalyst to attract the support of International Financial Institutions
(IFIs) and private investors
To link the TRACECA route with the Tran -European Networks (TENs)
To date the TRACECA programme has financed 39 Technical Assistance projects (57,405,000 EURO) and 14
investment projects for the rehabilitation of infrastructure (52,300,000 EURO).
The leaders of the partner states consider that the TRACECA route is of strategic importance, by assuring them of
an alternative transport link to Europe. TRACECA stimulates competition between and with their previously
exclusive route to the north, and newer alternative routes to the south. Furthermore, it is seen as complementary to
their renewed commercial exchanges with the Far East, evoking the possibility of the ancient Silk Route becoming
once again a major trade corridor.
The TRACECA programme has resulted in closer co-operation and dialogue among government authorities, which
has led to agreements to keep transit fees at competitive levels, and efforts to simplify border crossing formalities.
There have also been agreements to ship large volumes of cargo along the TRACECA corridor, recognising that
this route is the shortest and potentially the fastest and cheapest route from Central Asia to deep-water ports linked
with world markets.
The technical assistance provided through TRACECA has helped to attract large investments from the IFIs, that
include the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) who have made a number of
commitments for capital projects on ports, railways and roads along the TRACECA route totaling over 700 M
EURO, the World Bank (WB) who have made commitments for new capital projects on roads in Armenia and
Georgia totaling over USD 40 million, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) who have committed substantial
funds to road and railway improvements. In addition, EU private investors are engaging in joint ventures with
Caucasian and Central Asian transport companies. The EU is supporting the programme with other EC projects to
further enhance regional co-operation and economic sustainability in the region such as the Southern Ring Air
Routes project and the Oil and Gas Pipeline project (INOGATE).
Several projects have addressed the need to introduce changes in the institutional environment in which the
transport systems operate. In particular two proje cts have been launched to assist in the restructuring of the railways
in all TRACECA countries. These recommended new organizational structures and business plans to enable the
railway enterprises to run, maintain, and modernize their essential asset bases. They continue to influence the ongoing transformations taking place. In general, practically all projects related to modernization of equipment or
infrastructure also address the need for institutional reform. For example, assistance is provided to procure new
equipment or infrastructure services by competitive tendering. This implies separation of pre-existing FSU
monolithic institutions into client and supplier entities. It represents a considerable evolutionary step for the
65
BOX 12: (continued)
transport sector, within the framework of reorientation of national economies towards free market principles.
Whereas much progress has been made already and these principles are generally accepted, considerable work
remains to be done in detailed implementation.
Long distance road activity in TRACECA countries is dominated by Iran and Turkey in the Caucasus and parts of
Central Asia and by Russian and European companies in the north. Only Uzbekistan has any reasonable sized road
fleets with modern high capacity equipment, but these are mainly state owned. Entrepreneurs wishing to enter this
sector cannot obtain adequate financing partially due to ignorance of the procedures and formats for presenting
their credentials. Several TRACECA TA projects have recommended amending legislation to allow for the
expansion of private operators in the domestic market and to move away from a mostly state owned business base.
This should encourage expansion into the international market, and foster increased competition. It is recommended
that there should not be legislation that protects national carriers from competition when engaged in international
work. There may be the need to offer tax incentives to encourage smaller companies to expand and government
encouragement to enable joint ventures to thrive.
The regulations and legislation that exist still reflect the former command economy of the FSU and it will take time
to deregulate the legislation and introduce laws that create an environment that allows development of the transport
infrastructure. TRACECA projects have recommended to gradually phase out all regulatory aspects that limit free
competition in the market and to end support for state owned fleets. Legislation should concentrate on safety and
operational standards.
66
BOX 13:
USTDA Funding for Project Evaluation and Feasibility Studies
(Excerpted from USTDA website)
The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) advances economic development and U.S. commercial
interests in developing and middle income countries. The agency funds various forms of technical assistance,
feasibility studies, training, orientation visits and business workshops that support the development of a modern
infrastructure and a fair and open trading environment.
All USTDA activities are carried out by U.S. firms. [The following is a partial summary of some of the activities
that USTDA funds:]
Definitional Missions and Desk Studies. Before USTDA provides specific grant assistance, it requires
independent evaluation of the proposal. Desk studies complete quick analysis and are conducted in the United
States. By contrast, definitional missions provide a more detailed evaluation and involve traveling to the host
country in question.
Technical Assistance. USTDA funds technical assistance to project sponsors related to the evaluation or
implementation of projects. In some instances, USTDA also offers funding to foreign governments for technical
assistance that supports capacity building initiatives and the implementation of trade agreements that may lead to
increased U.S. exports.
Feasibility Studies. Feasibility studies evaluate the technical, financial, legal, and economic aspects of a
development project in the pre-investment stage. USTDA-funded feasibility studies also advise proje ct sponsors of
specific U.S. equipment and services. This information may lead to U.S. exports.
Relationships with Financing Institutions. USTDA maintains trust funds at four multilateral development banks
(MDBs): the International Finance Corporation, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the InterAmerican Development Bank and its private sector arm, and the Inter-American Investment Corporation. These
funds can be used for technical assistance or feasibility studies. Most are known as "Evergreen Funds." USTDA
maintains a minimum balance that is available for funding project proposals by U.S. firms or to help U.S.
businesses take advantage of time-sensitive projects. Since MDBs finance many of the capital projects in the
developing world, USTDA's close relationship with these institutions, as well as the African Development Bank
and the Asian Development Bank, is advantageous for the U.S. business community. In addition to the valuable
project information that is gained through the MDBs (which USTDA passes on to American firms), working on
bank projects ensures that a potential funding source has been identified.
Cost Sharing and Success Fees. Costs associated with feasibility studies involving private sector projects are
shared between USTDA and the U.S. firm developing the project. Cost sharing may also be requested on certain
public sector projects. In private sector projects, co-production agreements, and other appropriate situations,
USTDA has adopted a policy that requires reimbursement of the agency's investment in the project. This "success
fee" is collected when the project is implemented and the U.S. firm involved in the study obtains a "significant
economic benefit."
67
BOX 14: MIGA’s Political Risk Guarantees
(Excerpted from MIGA website)
MIGA provides investment guarantees against certain non-commercial risks (i.e., political risk insurance) to
eligible foreign investors for qualified investments in developing member countries. MIGA offers coverage against
the following types of political risks:
Transfer Restriction. Protects against losses arising from an investor's inability to convert local currency (capital,
interest, principal, profits, royalties and other remittances) into foreign exchange for transfer outside the host
country. The coverage insures against excessive delays in acquiring foreign exchange caused by host government
action or failure to act, by adverse changes in exchange control laws or regulations, and by deterioration in
conditions governing the conversion and transfer of local currency. Currency devaluation is not covered.
On receipt of the blocked local currency from an investor, MIGA pays compensation in the currency of its Contract
of Guarantee.
Expropriation. Protects against loss of the insured investment as a result of acts by the host government that may
reduce or eliminate ownership of, control over, or rights to the insured investment. In addition to outright
nationalization and confiscation, "creeping" expropriation--a series of acts that, over time, have an expropriatory
effect--is also covered. Coverage is available on a limited basis for partial expropriation (e.g., confiscation of funds
or tangible assets). Bona fide, non-discriminatory measures by the host government in the exercise of legitimate
regulatory authority are not covered. For total expropriation of equity investments, MIGA pays the net book value
of the insured investment. For expropriation of funds, MIGA pays the insured portion of the blocked funds. For
loans and loan guaranties, MIGA insures the outstanding principal and any accrued and unpaid interest.
Compensation will be paid upon assignment of the investor's interest in the expropriated investment (e.g., equity
shares or interest in a loan agreement) to MIGA.
Breach of Contract. Protects against losses arising from the host government's breach or repudiation of a contract
with the investor. In the event of an alleged breach or repudiation, the investor must be able to invoke a dispute
resolution mechanism (e.g., an arbitration) in the underlying contract and obtain an award for damages.
If, after a specified period of time, the investor has not received payment or if the dispute resolution mechanism
fails to function because of actions taken by the host government, MIGA will pay compensation. MIGA may make
a provisional payment pending the outcome of the dispute resolution mechanism.
War and Civil Disturbance. Protects against loss from damage to, or the destruction or disappearance of, tangible
assets caused by politically-motivated acts of war or civil disturbance in the host country, including revolution,
insurrection, coups d'état, sabotage, and terrorism.
Qualified investments: MIGA insures new cross-border investments originating in any MIGA member country,
destined for any other developing member country. New investment contributions associated with the expansion,
modernization, or financial restructuring of existing projects are also eligible, as are acquisitions that involve the
privatization of state-owned enterprises. Other investments may be eligible and are considered on a case-by-case
basis. Types of foreign investments that can be covered include equity, shareholder loans, and shareholder loan
guaranties, provided the loans have a minimum maturity of three years. Loans to unrelated borrowers can be
insured, provided a shareholder investment in the project is insured concurrently or has already been insured. Other
forms of investment, such as technical assistance and management contracts, and franchising and licensing
agreements, may also be eligible for coverage.
Terms: Investors may choose any combination of the four types of coverage. Equity investments can be covered
up to 90 percent, and debt up to 95 percent, with coverages typically available for up to 15 years, and in some
cases, for up to 20. MIGA may insure up to $200 million, and if necessary more can be arranged through
syndication of insurance. Pricing is determined on the basis of both country and project risk, with the effective price
varying depending on the type of investment and industry sector. The investor has the option to cancel a policy
after three years, however MIGA may not cancel the coverage.
68
BOX 15:
World Bank Guarantee Instruments
(Excerpted from the Project Finance and Guarantees Group web site)
The World Bank's Guarantee instrument was formally mainstreamed in 1994 to address the growing need to offer
political risk mitigation products to commercial lenders contemplating financial investment in the infrastructure
sectors of developing countries. The Bank's fundamental objective in offering guarantees is to mobilize private
capital for such projects on a "lender of last resort" basis..
The Bank currently offers commercial lenders a variety of guarantee products, namely: IBRD Guarantees
(including Partial Risk Guarantees, Partial Credit Guarantees, Enclave Guarantees, and Policy Based Guarantees)
and IDA Partial Risk Guarantees. While all guarantees share the characteristic of providing coverage against debt
service defaults arising from sovereign risk events, each guarantee issued is tailored to match the specific needs of
an individual transaction.
IBRD Guarantees. Bank guarantees that are offered by IBRD are called IBRD Guarantees. In most cases these
are for IBRD eligible countries only with the exception of certain foreign exchange earnings projects where an
IBRD guarantee is provided in an IDA country. IBRD guarantees can be both Partial Risk and Partial Credit in
nature. Governments, government-owned entities, and privatized or private sector entities are all eligible to receive
credit enhancement under the Bank's guarantee.
IBRD Partial Risk Guarantees. Partial Risk Guarantees ensure payment in the case of debt service default
resulting from the nonperformance of contractual obligations undertaken by governments or their agencies in
private sector projects. Sovereign contractual obligations vary depending on project, sector and country
circumstances. The principal categories of risks covered by the guarantee are: Breach of Contract; Availability and
Convertibility of Foreign Exchange; Changes in Law; and Expropriation and nationalization.
IBRD Partial Credit Guarantees. Partial Credit Guarantees cover all events of nonpayment for a designated part
of a financing. While historically these guarantees have been used to encourage extension of maturity by covering
a part of a financing, usually the later maturities, different structures could be applied as follows: Principal cover
for a bullet maturity; Single rolling coupon and principal cover for bullet maturity; Rolling zero-coupon; and
Amortizing syndicated loan.
IBRD Enclave Guarantees. IBRD Enclave Guarantees are partial risk guarantees structured for export oriented
foreign exchange generating commercial projects in IDA-only countries. In this regard, IBRD would consider
providing non-accelerable guarantees to such projects provided adequate arrangements are in place to ensure that
the host government will be able to meet its obligations to IBRD with respect to the IBRD's guarantee. The
guarantee will usually cover direct sovereign risks such as expropriation, changes in law, war, and civil strife. The
Bank generally will not guarantee any payment obligations (such as those of an output purchaser), nor will it
guarantee transfer risk. In all cases the scope of risk coverage under the guarantee would be the minimum required
to mobilize financing for a given project.
IBRD Policy Based Guarantees. The Policy Based Guarantees extend the Bank's existing partial credit guarantee
instrument beyond investment projects to sovereign borrowings in support of structural and social policies and
reforms. Policy Based Guarantees are expected to play a catalytic role in helping Bank borrowers with strong
economic and social programs improve their access to private foreign financing. Initially, the Bank will proceed
with a $2 billion pilot program of policy based guarantees to test the instrument and gain experience. Such
guarantees would usually cover a portion of debt service on a borrowing (loans or bonds) by an eligible member
country from private foreign creditors in support of agreed structural, institutional, and social policies and reform.
While the actual structure would be determined on case by case basis, the guarantee could be self-standing or part
of a larger package of IBRD financial support.
69
BOX 15: (continued)
IDA Partial Risk Guarantees. In many IDA-only countries, macroeconomic reforms have led to an improved
business environment suitable for increased private sector participation, especially in sectors undergoing significant
reforms. To ease the transition of those countries which are clearly on the path of reform, IDA offers partial risk
guarantees on a pilot basis to private lenders against country risks that are beyond the control of investors and
where the official agencies and the private market currently offer insufficient insurance coverage.
In terms of project eligibility, IDA guarantees are available in selective cases in IDA-only countries where an IBRD
Enclave guarantee is not applicable. The IDA Guarantee could cover up to 100% of the principal and interest of a
private debt tranche for defaults arising from specified sovereign risks including government breach of contract,
foreign currency convertibility risk, expropriation, and changes in law.
Within the Bank Group, the IFC and MIGA are the preferred sources of support to the private sector. As such,
when private sector projects are brought to the Bank for possible guarantee support Bank staff consult with IFC and
MIGA as soon as possible as to their potential interest in financing the project. IFC supports private sector projects
in several ways: through equity and debt financing, the syndicated B-Loan program, security placement and
underwriting, and advisory services. MIGA provides political risk insurance primarily for equity but it can also
cover debt financing.
Outside the Bank group other multilateral agencies which offer guarantees similar to the Bank's include: The InterAmerican Development Bank; the Asian Development Bank; and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. Some bilateral agencies also can provide guarantees similar to the Bank's such as the Export Import
Bank. The Bank can make guarantees jointly with these agencies. In these instances, Bank staff ensure close
cooperation in all aspects of the operation, both vis-à-vis the private sponsor and lenders, and also with respect to
the host government which may be obliged to provide each institution a counter-guarantee, if required by the
relevant institution.
70
BOX 16:
IFC Financial Products
site.)
(Excerpted from IFC web
IFC offers a wide variety of financial products to private sector projects in developing countries. IFC offers: Loans
for IFC's own account: A-loans; Equity Finance; Quasi-Equity Finance: C-loans; Syndicated Loans: B-loans;
Partial Credit Guarantees; Risk Management Products; and Intermediary Finance.
Loans for IFC's Own Account: A-loans. IFC offers fixed and variable rate loans for its own account to private
sector projects in developing countries. These loans for IFC's own account are called A-loans. Most A-loans are
issued in leading currencies, but local currency loans can also be provided. The loans typically have maturities of 7
to 12 years at origination. Grace periods and repayment schedules are determined on a case-by-case basis in
accordance with the borrower's cash flow needs. If warranted by the project, IFC provides longer-term loans and
longer grace periods. Some loans have been extended to as long as 20 years. IFC operates on a commercial basis. It
invests exclusively in for-profit projects and charges market rates for its products and services.
Loans from IFC finance both greenfield companies and expansion projects in developing countries. The
Corporation also make loans to intermediary banks, leasing companies, and other financial institutions through
credit-lines for further on-lending. The credit lines are often targeted at small and medium enterprises or at specific
sectors. To ensure the partic ipation of other private investors, A-loans are usually limited to 25% of the total
estimated project costs for greenfield projects, or, on an exceptional basis, 35% in small projects. For expansion
projects IFC may provide up to 50% of the project cost, provided its investments do not exceed 25% of the total
capitalization of the project company. Generally, A-loans range from US$1 million to US$100 million. The
Corporation is willing to extend loans that are repaid only from the cash flow of the project, without recourse or
with only limited recourse to the sponsors.
Equity Financing. IFC takes equity stakes in private sector companies and other entities such as financial
institutions, and portfolio and investment funds in developing countries. IFC is a long-term investor and usually
maintains equity investments for a period of 8 to 15 years. When the time comes to sell, IFC prefers to exit by
selling its shares through the domestic stock market in a way that will benefit the enterprise, often in a public
offering.
To ensure the participation of other private investors, the Corporation generally subscribes to between 5% and 15%
of a project's equity. IFC is never the largest shareholder in a project and will normally not hold more than a 35%
stake. IFC's equity investments are based on project needs and anticipated returns. The Corporation does not take
an active role in company management. IFC risks its own capital and does not accept government guarantees.
However, to meet national ownership requirements, IFC shareholdings can be treated as domestic capital or local
shares.
Quasi-Equity Financing: C-loans. IFC offers a full range of quasi-equity products with both debt and equity
characteristics to private sector projects in developing countries. These products are called C-loans. Among other
instruments, the Corporation provides convertible debt and subordinated loan investments, which impose a fixed
repayment schedule. It also offers preferred stock and income note investments, which require a less rigid
repayment schedule. Quasi-equity investments are made available whenever necessary, to ensure that a project is
soundly funded.
Syndicated Loans: The B-loan program. Mobilizing funds for private sector projects in developing countries
from other investors and lenders is one of IFC's most essential functions. The Corporation actively seeks partners
for joint ventures and raises additional finance by encouraging other institutions to make investments in IFC
projects. The cornerstone of IFC's finance mobilization efforts is the loan participation program. The program
arranges syndicated loans from commercial banks, providing additional financing to IFC-financed projects in
developing countries. In the syndicated loans, also
71
BOX 16: (continued)
called B-loans, participating banks provide their own funds and take their own commercial risk, while IFC remains
the lender of record.
Advantages for Participating Banks. The program has been extremely successful and provides a number of
advantages for commercial banks, which receive the same treatment from the project sponsors and host government
as IFC, including immunity from taxation. The participating banks also enjoy the preferred access to foreign
exchange that IFC derives as a multilateral development institution. No IFC loan, including portions taken by
participants, has ever been included in a country's general external debt rescheduling. Because of these factors,
banking regulators in a number of countries grant exemptions from country-risk provisioning requirements for
participation in IFC's B loans.
Advantages for Projects in Developing Countries. This financing mechanism has proved effective in countries
experiencing foreign exchange problems, often helping clients gain access to international capital markets for the
first time. The participation program enables IFC to help finance projects for which it would otherwise have been
impossible to raise loan financing.
Partial Credit Guarantees. IFC offers credit enhancement structures for debt instruments, (bonds or loans) in the
form of partial credit guarantees. These structures allow IFC to use its triple -A credit rating to help clients diversify
their funding sources, extend maturities, and obtain financing in their currency of choice, including local currency.
A partial credit guarantee covers creditors irrespective of the cause of default. However, the amount that IFC pays
out under the guarantee is capped at an agreed upon amount, for example 40 percent of the initial principal, or one
year of debt service. (For an example of how a guarantee capped at an agreed upon amount would pay out in
various scenarios, click here). The guarantee amount may vary over the life of the transaction and may be used to
cover any debt-servicing shortfall that occurs.
Structuring Guarantees. Each guarantee is tailored to meet the needs of both the borrower and the targeted
creditors (investors or lenders). IFC structures the guarantee to reduce the probability of default of the debt
instrument and increase the recovery if default occurs. The guaranteed amount may vary over the life of the debt
instrument, based on the borrower's expected cash flows and creditors' concerns
Risk Management Products and Services. IFC offers a wide variety of risk management products to private
sector projects in developing countries, including, Currency and Interest Rate Products, Risk Management
Facilities. IFC is one of the few organizations prepared to extend long-maturity risk management products to
clients in developing countries. The Corporation's risk management products, or derivatives, are available to clients
solely for hedging purposes. By allowing private sector clients in developing countries to access the international
derivatives markets in order to hedge currency, interest rate, or commodity price exposure, IFC enables companies
to enhance their creditworthiness and improve their profitability.
Investments in Financial Intermediaries. A large chunk of IFC financing is channeled to private sector projects
in developing countries through a wide variety of financial intermediaries. Working through intermediaries allows
IFC to extend its long-term finance to more companies, in particular to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)
and microfinance entrepreneurs. In many regions of the world, small private companies are the principal engines of
economic growth and employment creation. But micro, small and medium sized investments carry high transaction
costs, limiting smaller companies' access to long-term finance. By working with local or specialized financial
institutions, IFC finance can reach these businesses.
72
BOX 17:
Unsolicited Proposals
(Excerpted from Notes of the Private Sector and Infrastructure Network of the World Bank Group, Note 257 by John Hodges,
March 2003, and Note by John Hodges and Tim Irwin, April 2003.)
Governments worldwide have increasingly looked to the private sector to fill the growing gap between the demand
for infrastructure services and their supply. In developing countries infrastructure projects with private participation
increased dramatically in the past decade, attracting more than US$750 billion in committed new investment in
1990–2001. Many governments began awarding infrastructure projects to private firms in large part because of
public funding constraints, but some also recognized that involving the private sector could improve the
performance of infrastructure. In some cases private companies even initia ted the process by suggesting project
concepts through unsolicited proposals, often including detailed construction, operation, maintenance, and
financing plans. Among the many countries whose governments award infrastructure projects with private
participation, a few have laws prohibiting the acceptance of unsolicited proposals. A few others have laws requiring
that unsolicited proposals be thoroughly reviewed and market-tested before being approved. The vast majority of
countries, however, have no formal policies for handling unsolicited proposals.
In theory, permitting unsolicited proposals should encourage the private sector to bring governments beneficial
ideas for project development that might otherwise have been overlooked. In practice, some governments’
experiences with unsolicited proposals have been unfavorable. Many of the world’s most controversial private
infrastructure projects originated as unsolicited proposals, such as the Dabhol Power Plant in India and many
independent power generation plants in Indonesia. In some countries private companies submitting unsolicited
proposals often did so in an attempt to avoid a competitive process to determine the project developer. If
successful, they were then able to finalize project details with the government through exclusive negotiations
behind closed doors.
The many negative experiences with unsolicited proposals for private infrastructure projects may lead some
governments to see blanket refusals as the only way to safeguard against potentia l problems with corruption and
lack of transparency. Naturally, governments should be especially wary of unsolicited proposals requiring
substantial support (such as government guarantees or land grants). Many private companies are well positioned to
recognize potential demand for infrastructure, however, and governments may want to encourage such companies
to submit project ideas. The main challenge for a government then is how to harness and promote private
participation during the conceptualization of a project without losing the transparency and efficiency gains of a well
conceived competitive tender process.
Private proponents often claim that the unique characteristics of their unsolicited proposals dictate the need to sole source and negotiate proje ct details. Typical arguments are that: 1) The project developer has intellectual property
rights to the project concept or to necessary engineering technologies; 2) The project is too small, is too remote, or
involves too much political risk to attract private sector interest; 3) Organizing a public tender may not be cost
efficient for the government or the bidders; and 4) The project will be developed more rapidly through negotiations,
an important factor because of an emergency or widespread shortage. Governments should not accept these
arguments. But most governments still have no formal process for handling unsolicited proposals and this needs to
change. They have three basic options. First, to simply adopt a law prohibiting unsolicited projects—and some
countries have done this. A second option is for governments to buy the concept and then award the project through
a competitive bidding process in which no bidder has a predefined advantage. A third option—and this has been
adopted in such countries as Chile, South Korea and the Philippines – is to offer the original proponent a predefined
advantage in a competitive bidding process.
Under this third option, more and more countries are beginning to use one or a combination of two main
approaches: a bonus system and the Swiss challenge. Under the bonus system the government gives the original
project proponent an advantage in the bidding process that takes the form of a bonus, usually about 10 percent,
credited to the proponent’s bid. Under the Swiss challenge system the government gives challengers an opportunity
to make better offers than the original proponent, then allows the original proponent to counter match.
73
BOX 18:
Potential Benefits of Dry Ports (Inland Clearance Depots – ICDs)
(Excerpted from “Handbook on the Management and Operation of Dry Ports,” UNCTAD, 1991.)
The benefits and potential benefits may be summarized as follows:
(a) In creased trade flows: beneficial to a region or to the country as a whole.
(b) Lower door-to-door freight rates: The consolidation of consignments and the greater use of containerization
can contribute significantly to the introduction of lower through-rates.
(c) Avoidance of clearing and forwarding agents’ fees at sea ports: These fees may be comple tely
avoided where a dry port allows the use of combined transport bills of lading or multi-modal transport documents.
This is so when such documents are issued by a shipping line because the shipping line takes responsibility for the
passage of the goods through the maritime port. Hence the importer or exporter does not need to employ a clearing
and forwarding agent.
(d) Avoidance of storage, demurrage and late documentation fees: With a dry port and combined transport bills of
lading, customs inspection at the maritime ports and at the borders of transit countries should be unnecessary or at
least greatly minimized and many of the usual causes of delay at maritime ports will be removed. Storage costs,
demurrage and late documentation fees will thus not occur.
(e) Possible avoidance of the need to extend the period of marine insurance: The validity of the period of
marine insurance usually extends to 60 days after completion of discharge overside of the goods insured
from the sea-going vessel at the final sea port of destination. With a dry port, delays in excess of 60 days
should not occur, and the payment of any additional premium is thus averted.
(f) Optimal use of road and rail transport: If substitution of existing long-distance road haulage by rail
transport can be encouraged, there may be savings to be gained in transport costs.
(g) Use of national rolling stock Benefits may also be gained when a dry port enables cargo to be
transshipped more readily from foreign-owned to domestic -owned rail wagons, if necessary, such that the
demurrage or hire-rate on foreign wagons is avoided when wagons are returned quickly to the foreign
railway.
(h) Better utilization of capacity: A dry port can reduce empty rail wagon or truck movements by acting as a
consolidation centre for return loads of export cargo.
(i) Greater use of containers:
The establishment of a dry port with container-handling facilities can encourage greater use of containers.
(j) Lower customs staff costs: As dry ports allow customs clearance to be concentrated at a few sites, it may be
possible to effect the same volume of clearance with reduced customs involvement, especially where a dry port is
accessed by two or more gateway ports.
(k) Benefits to sea ports: Apart from lowering congestion, the establishment of dry ports also results in reduced
handling of goods at related maritime ports. There is a reduction in demand for storage space owing to faster
onward transit, saving in both capital costs of providing handling equipment and warehousing as well as in
equipment maintenance costs.
(l) Inventory savings: One of the main purposes of the dry ports is to speed up the movement of cargo and to
increase the predictability of arrival times. Owing to uncertainties in transit times and the way in which exchange
rates fluctuate, purchase prices of exports from land-locked countries tend to incorporate a risk premium to cover
exchange rate fluctuations while the goods are in transit. More reliable delivery and shorter transit time will reduce
74
BOX 18: (continued)
this risk premium. Rapid and reliable transit enables importers or exporters to hold lower stock levels of
commodities, and thus to save on working capital needed.
(m) Benefits of unit trains: Dry ports encourage the operation of unit trains. Shunting costs at the terminals and at
the intermediate marshalling yards can be avoided and higher wagon and locomotive utilization rates achieved.
The introduction of unit trains is most appropriate when freight flows between two points are substantial, fairly
continuous and relatively balanced.
(n) Improved communications: Simple, rapid transfer of documentation and information, fundamental to
efficient cargo transit, may be achieved by linking the introduction of computerized freight tracking or
customs clearance to the provision of a dry port. The benefits are strictly attributable to the introduction
of computerized procedures.
(o) Additional benefits: Benefits which are difficult to quantify, isolate or measure in monetary terms
include the following:
· Dry ports enable greater national control to be exercised over transit operations;
• With reduced paperwork and more accurate documentation, there is less scope for confusion or lost
papers, fewer delays, reduced cargo loss and better flow of information;
• Importers and exporters may recognize the advantages of greater reliability in the transit routes. (This may be
translated into a tangible benefit when importers and exporters switch to the cheaper transit route, or
exporters can avert monetary penalties connected with late delivery, or if lower inventory levels can be
maintained;
• Finer tuning of cargo-delivery schedules;
• The fewer the transit-transport difficulties, the greater the likelihood of gaining entry into overseas markets
with its potential stimulus to other sectors of the economy;
• Creation of a more stable domestic investment climate with reduced transit-transport difficulties for
manufacturers depended on imported cargo or already exporting overseas;
• Simplified procedures associated with a dry port and containerization mean fewer steps and fewer officials
involved in processing the required documentation. With fewer control points, there is less scope for
malpractice. If queries arise in regard to documentation, these can be readily sorted out at a dry port by all
parties represented on the site;
• Introduction of simplified work practices at the maritime ports.
75
BOX 19:
Maintaining Roads: Experience with Output-Based Cont racts in Argentina
(Excerpts from an article by Gerard Liautaud; the full report can be found at http://rru.worldbank.org/).
Creating capacity and incentives for ongoing maintenance of capital investments is a challenge across all
infrastructure sectors, but especially for services that cannot attract cost-covering user fees, such as low-volume
roads. The Argentine government has responded to this challenge in its non concessioned road network by using
output-based contracts with the private sector for rehabilitation and maintenance. The multiyear, lump sum
contracts, funded by the government and the World Bank, specify required road service outputs and use incentivebased payment schedules to ensure the quality of the work. After three years of operation the 60 contracts
(averaging US$10 million) in the first phase [were] working well. By 2002 around 75 percent of Argentina’s
non concessioned roads [were expected to] be operating under output-based contracts.
The contracting is run at the national level by the highways authority. The first step was a nationwide road survey
to estimate traffic, define the minimum (rather than optimum) road standards, define the rehabilitation and
maintenance required, and identify the size and shape of the sub networks for contracting out. Roads with traffic in
the range of 300–3,000 vehicles a day are eligible for output-based contracting. (Roads with traffic exceeding 3,000
vehicles a day are considered concession able.) On the basis of the survey information the government set uniform
national output indicators for the contracts. To help define the indicators, road users (who spend US$10 billion
annually operating vehicles) were surveyed to find out what they consider an acceptable level of service. Contracts
were awarded to the lowest lump sum bidder, and a share of the payments to contractors is based on how well they
perform against these indicators.
In their initial application, the output-based contracts covered maintenance of paved roads, with payout schedules
based on kilometers per month. The next stage covered rehabilitation and maintenance, with contracts requiring
lumpy up-front payments to cover rehabilitation costs. A third stage under consideration [was to] cover new
construction of low-volume roads (less than 250 vehicles a day).
On the basis of the experience with the maintenance contracts, a contract was designed for combined rehabilitation
and maintenance of paved roads. This contract, called contrato de recuperación y mantenimiento (CREMA),
requires the contractor to rehabilitate and then maintain a network of roads for five years for a lump sum amount.
Each contract covers a network comprising contiguous or area-specific road sections ranging in length from 100 to
300 kilometers.The contract specifies the sections that need rehabilitation and the minimum solution required to
ensure a positive net present value for the investment.
In contrast with input-based contracts, under the CREMA payments are made when the contractor achieves a
specified level of service. Performance is assessed during monthly on-site inspections by the government engineer
and the contractor. Throughout the contract period the rehabilitation works must comply with the specified
minimum and maximum standards [as follows: a) Meet or exceed the minimum thickness of overlay; and b) Not
exceed the maximum level of roughness, rut depth, cracking, or raveling.] The compliance with maintenance
standards is inspected visually on a monthly basis [focusing on a few essential items in ensuring compliance with
the specifications: a) Potholes, cracking, and rutting; b) The condition of shoulders, culverts and drains, and the
roadside environment; and c) Guardrails and vertical and horizontal signs.] Penalties for noncompliance are set for
each indicator. For example, a pothole left un-repaired beyond the authorized time limit will cost the contractor
US$400 a day until it is patched. Penalties are deducted from the monthly payments. Road users can also monitor
performance, voicing concerns about the quality of service in a claim book available at the contractor’s site office.
Entries in the claim book are publicized in the local media. Contractors must signpost each network with
information about how they can be contacted. And a representative of the user community is periodically allowed
to participate in monthly inspections.
Ex post financial and economic evaluations showed that the rehabilitation and maintenance funding yields an
economic rate of return of 60 percent (at a 12 percent cost of capital). The contracts will reduce the need for capital
investments by nearly 30 percent: after the five-year implementation period better quality roads will lead to a drop
in ongoing capital and maintenance expenditures from about US$11,300 per kilometer a year to US$8,000.
76
ANNEX II -- TABLES
TABLE 1A:
31 Landlocked Developing Countries: Summary of Population, GDP, Exports, Imports, FDI (Stocks & Flows) and Official Finance Flows
Total and Per Capita Values, by Region
Population
GDP
Exports
Imports Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita
(thousand) ($ million) ($ million) ($ million) GDP ($) Exports($) Imports($)
2000
2000
2001
2001
2000
2001
2001
Stock of Inward FDI
Flow of Inward FDI Official FinanceFlows
Total
Per Capita
Total
Per Capita
Total
Per Capita
($ million)
($)
($ million)
($)
($ million)
($)
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
Africa
5,285
2,192
689
963
1,407
6,391
899
1,697
2,298
1,826
1,794
1,478
6,170
2,911
7,392
2,462
175
39
128
197
462
250
448
740
291
85
702
457
853
1,935
2,277
656
139
148
617
1,299
681
578
657
377
250
850
1,594
1,050
1,428
3,429
190
108
259
178
102
442
150
202
169
236
1,599
265
279
585
1,598
15
6
34
25
7
123
40
65
27
11
759
20
82
153
1,478
57
22
40
78
21
335
51
58
35
33
919
68
101
113
1,734
175
48
118
510
961
2,559
549
580
448
262
338
1,484
2,397
1,090
1,125
15
8
32
65
15
1,257
49
51
41
34
365
64
230
86
57
26
8
80
20
118
58
103
13
9
69
229
72
5
37
2
2
10
0
58
5
9
1
1
75
10
7
0
Total ODF,net
12
385
131
76
189
1,045
61
394
331
211
293
39
766
387
144
8
33
21
20
24
17
30
35
29
19
38
42
33
37
11
8,281
7,521
1,285
936
1,724
2,146
994
1,368
154
170
207
390
5,699
1,389
684
253
647
152
78
28
692
110
83
20
1,914
5,267
18,230
1,304
991
4,404
7,666
392
2,674
8,647
543
804
2,381
3,079
1,010
1,628
6,363
541
785
1,986
3,059
505
655
1,127
265
163
930
308
104
333
535
110
132
503
124
267
202
393
110
129
419
123
714
3,962
12,647
459
166
1,063
768
189
493
782
93
27
224
31
140
227
2,760
40
22
150
71
37
28
171
8
4
32
3
208
212
269
166
157
89
260
55
26
17
34
26
19
10
East and South Asia
Afghanistan
21,765
Bhutan
2,085
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 5,279
Mongolia
2,533
Nepal
23,043
..
487
1,709
969
5,497
92
133
336
366
737
719
180
551
555
1,473
..
234
324
383
239
4
64
64
144
32
33
86
104
219
64
19
4
574
245
116
1
2
109
97
5
2
24
63
19
0
5
25
1
399
59
244
208
385
18
28
46
82
17
Southeast Europe
FYR Macedonia
Moldova, Republic of
2,034
4,295
3,573
1,286
1,187
664
1,851
1,033
1,757
299
584
155
910
241
919
609
452
142
530
150
261
35
257
115
126
27
327,835
112,491
33,480
38,205
343
102
117
42,606
130
5,864
18
8,294
25
Botswana
1,541
Burkina Faso
11,535
Burundi
6,356
Central African Republic 3,717
Chad
7,885
Ethiopia
62,908
Lesotho
2,035
Malawi
11,308
Mali
11,351
Niger
10,832
Rwanda
7,609
Swaziland
925
Uganda
23,300
Zambia
10,421
Zimbabwe
12,627
Latin America
Bolivia
Paraguay
8,329
5,496
Central & West Asia and the Caucasus
Armenia
3,787
Azerbaijan
8,041
Kazakhstan
16,172
Kyrgyzstan
4,921
Tajikistan
6,087
Turkmenistan
4,737
Uzbekistan
24,881
Total, Landlocked DC
TABLE 1B:
31 Landlocked Developing Countries: Summary of Population, GDP, Exports and Imports
Selected Growth Rates, by Region
GDP Growth Rate(%)
(Total real product)
Per capita GDP
Growth Rate (%)
Export Growth Rate
(% per annum)
Import Growth Rate
(% per annum)
1990-1995 1995-2000 1990-1995 1995-2000 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2001 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2001
Africa
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Central African Republic
Chad
Ethiopia
Lesotho
Malawi
Mali
Niger
Rwanda
Swaziland
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
3.8
4.2
-2.6
0.6
0.9
3
3.9
1.6
2.6
0.5
-12.2
2.7
6.8
-1.1
0.9
5.3
5.5
-0.1
2.9
3.5
4.6
3
3.9
4.9
3.6
9.7
3.5
6
2.1
1.9
1
1.5
-4.1
-2
-2
-0.1
1.7
0.5
0.1
-2.9
-6.1
1.1
3.6
-3.8
-1.3
3.6
3.1
-1
0.8
0.3
1.9
1.3
1.4
2.2
0.1
0.3
1.3
3
-0.3
0
2.68
9.3
7.15
6.89
0.43
11.98
22.97
-3.65
3.42
-2.77
-21.71
10.83
25.33
-4.27
5.06
2.84
-2.02
-8.48
-2.36
-4.36
2.87
3.93
-2.72
5.5
-0.73
-0.77
-1.43
-1.35
-5.12
-3.75
-9.21
-17.96
-23
-15.6
2.3
-4.94
13.28
26.47
35.7
2.86
60.4
-17.52
-0.83
10.87
-0.95
-1.88
-5.55
-1.23
6.1
0.03
7.63
5.92
-6.45
2.19
-1.93
-13.07
9.96
37.11
-10.08
5.71
6.15
2.42
-6.25
-4.88
-1.99
2.22
-6.69
2.73
-3.17
-1.05
-1.79
-3.96
6.6
3
-10.82
-7.75
19.21
-5.79
5.97
91.21
-3.26
-6.46
1.55
10.92
1.22
17.13
-7.74
5.11
7.62
0.02
3.9
3.2
3.5
0.7
1.5
0.5
1.1
-1.9
4.31
0.56
0.75
-3.86
4.5
7.65
13.41
15.12
4.49
-8.89
-5.76
4.66
Central & West Asia and the Caucasus
Armenia
_
Azerbaijan
_
Kazakhstan
_
Kyrgyzstan
_
Tajikistan
_
Turkmenistan
_
Uzbekistan
_
5.1
7.3
1.9
5.3
1.1
4
3.5
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
5
6.3
2.5
3.7
-0.1
1.6
1.7
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
-0.88
18.51
7.17
1.63
-1.01
0.44
-1.65
33.17
53.23
-5.25
7.63
3.16
-5
-5.69
3.35
10.03
2.91
-1.52
-2.73
6.87
-4.09
14.51
38.94
25.98
-2.31
16.37
11.24
3.81
East and South Asia
Afghanistan
Bhutan
Lao People's Dem. Rep.
Mongolia
Nepal
7
6.1
3
4.6
..
4.3
3.9
-4.6
2.7
..
4.2
3.6
2.1
2.1
-6.52
6.17
36.43
-4.51
11.2
-4.49
5.48
0.62
-3.54
17.75
-30.87
-5
1.69
-17.35
-8.38
-16.09
3.06
32.53
-13.56
15.07
3.82
10.16
-4.31
7.15
1.65
13.08
0.17
2.94
-9.72
-6.36
_
2.2
-2.5
_
1.81
-11.3
-10
40.7
_
3.89
-4.8
-11.21
32.9
121.28
9.48
126.06
84
10.5
258.2
Latin America
Bolivia
Paraguay
Southeast Europe
FYR Macedonia
Moldova, Republic
Total, Landlocked DC
.. ..
5.9
6.5
-3
5.2
_
3
-2.7
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
TABLE 1C:
Rankings of 31 Landlocked Developing Countries by Population, by Per Capita GDP, FDI and ODF, and by Growth Rates of GDP Per Capita and Exports
Ranked by:
Ranked by:
Population
(thousand)
Per Capita
GDP ($)
2000
2000
Ethiopia
62,908
Uzbekistan
24,881
Uganda
23,300
Nepal
23,043
Afghanistan
21,765
Kazakhstan
16,172
Zimbabwe
12,627
Burkina Faso
11,535
Mali
11,351
Malawi
11,308
Niger
10,832
Zambia
10,421
Bolivia
8,329
Azerbaijan
8,041
Chad
7,885
Rwanda
7,609
Burundi
6,356
Tajikistan
6,087
Paraguay
5,496
Lao People's Dem. Rep.
5,279
Kyrgyzstan
4,921
Turkmenistan
4,737
Moldova, Republic of 4,295
Armenia
3,787
Central African Republic
3,717
Mongolia
2,533
Bhutan
2,085
Lesotho
2,035
FYR Macedonia
2,034
Botswana
1,541
Swaziland
925
Total
327,835
Ranked by: Per Capita
Goods
Exports($)
2001
Botswana
3,429
FYR Macedonia
1,757
Swaziland
1,599
Paraguay
1,368
Kazakhstan
1,127
Bolivia
994
Turkmenistan
930
Azerbaijan
655
Zimbabwe
585
Armenia
505
Lesotho
442
Mongolia
383
Lao People's Dem. Rep.
324
Uzbekistan
308
Moldova, Rep.
299
Zambia
279
Kyrgyzstan
265
Uganda
265
Central African Republic
259
Nepal
239
Rwanda
236
Bhutan
234
Mali
202
Burkina Faso
190
Chad
178
Niger
169
Tajikistan
163
Malawi
150
Burundi
108
Ethiopia
102
Afghanistan
..
Botswana
1,597.7
Swaziland
758.9
FYR Macedonia
583.6
Kazakhstan
534.7
Turkmenistan
502.6
Azerbaijan
332.5
Paraguay
170.3
Moldova, Republic of 154.6
Bolivia
154.3
Zimbabwe
153.2
Mongolia
144.5
Tajikistan
132.1
Uzbekistan
123.7
Lesotho
122.9
Kyrgyzstan
110.3
Armenia
103.5
Zambia
81.9
Mali
65.2
Bhutan
63.8
Lao People's Dem. Rep.
63.6
Malawi
39.6
Central African Republic
34.4
Nepal
32.0
Niger
26.9
Chad
25.0
Uganda
19.6
Burkina Faso
15.2
Rwanda
11.2
Ethiopia
7.3
Burundi
6.1
Afghanistan
4.2
Total
Total
343
Ranked by:
102.1
FDI
Inflows
Per Capita
($)
2001
FYR Macedonia
260.6
Kazakhstan
170.7
Bolivia
77.7
Swaziland
74.6
Lesotho
58.0
Botswana
37.0
Armenia
37.0
Moldova, Republic of
34.9
Turkmenistan
31.7
Azerbaijan
28.2
Paraguay
27.7
Mongolia
24.9
Chad
10.1
Uganda
9.8
Mali
9.1
Kyrgyzstan
8.1
Zambia
6.9
Malawi
5.1
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 4.5
Tajikistan
3.6
Uzbekistan
2.9
Burkina Faso
2.3
Central African Republic 2.2
Niger
1.2
Rwanda
1.2
Nepal
0.8
Zimbabwe
0.4
Ethiopia
0.3
Afghanistan
0.1
Bhutan
0.0
Burundi
0.0
Total
17.9
Ranked by:
Official (ODF)
Finance
Per Capita
($)
2001
FYR Macedonia
Bolivia
Mongolia
Armenia
Lao People's Dem. Rep.
Swaziland
Rwanda
Zambia
Malawi
Kyrgyzstan
Burkina Faso
Uganda
Lesotho
Mali
Bhutan
Moldova, Republic of
Azerbaijan
Tajikistan
Chad
Burundi
Central African Republic
Paraguay
Niger
Turkmenistan
Afghanistan
Nepal
Kazakhstan
Ethiopia
Zimbabwe
Uzbekistan
Botswana
Total
126.2
83.1
82.2
55.0
46.2
41.8
38.5
37.2
34.8
33.8
33.4
32.9
29.8
29.1
28.3
26.8
26.4
25.9
24.0
20.6
20.4
20.1
19.5
18.8
18.3
16.7
16.6
16.6
11.4
10.5
7.8
25.3
Ranked by:
GDP
Per Capita
Growth
Rate (%)
1995-2000
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Bhutan
Kyrgyzstan
Botswana
Lao People's Dem. Rep.
Burkina Faso
Uganda
Kazakhstan
FYR Macedonia
Mali
Mongolia
Nepal
Ethiopia
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
Malawi
Swaziland
Lesotho
Bolivia
Central African Republic
Chad
Rwanda
Niger
Zimbabwe
Tajikistan
Zambia
Burundi
Paraguay
Moldova, Republic of
Afghanistan
6.3
5.0
4.2
3.7
3.6
3.6
3.1
3.0
2.5
2.2
2.2
2.1
2.1
1.9
1.7
1.6
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.1
0.8
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.3
-1.0
-1.9
-2.5
..
Ranked by:
Export
of Goods
Growth
Rate (%)
1995-2000
Azerbaijan
18.5
Nepal
17.8
Kazakhstan
7.2
Mali
5.5
Bhutan
5.5
Lesotho
3.9
Ethiopia
2.9
Botswana
2.8
FYR Macedonia
1.8
Kyrgyzstan
1.6
Bolivia
0.8
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.6
Turkmenistan
0.4
Niger
-0.7
Rwanda
-0.8
Armenia
-0.9
Tajikistan
-1.0
Uganda
-1.4
Swaziland
-1.4
Uzbekistan
-1.7
Burkina Faso
-2.0
Central African Republic -2.4
Malawi
-2.7
Mongolia
-3.5
Zimbabwe
-3.8
Paraguay
-3.9
Chad
-4.4
Afghanistan
-4.5
Zambia
-5.1
Burundi
-8.5
Moldova, Republic of -11.3
TABLE 1D:
41 Transit Countries: Summary of Population, GDP, Exports, Imports, FDI (Stocks & Flows) and Official Finance Flows
Total and Per Capita Values, by Region
Region and Country
Africa
Senegal
Guinea
Côte d'Ivoire
Ghana
Togo
Benin
Nigeria
Cameroon
Congo,Rep.of
Gabon
Sudan
Algeria
Eritrea
Djibouti
Somalia
Kenya
United Republic of Tanzania
Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Mozambique
South Africa
Namibia
Angola
Latin America
Peru
Chile
Argentina
Brazil
Goods
Goods
Per Capita Per Capita
Population
GDP
Exports
Imports Per Capita Goods
Goods
Flow of Inward FDI Official FinanceFlows
Stock of Inward FDI
(thousand) ($ million) ($ million) ($ million) GDP ($) Exports($) Imports($)
Total
Per Capita
Total
Per Capita Total
Per Capita
($ million)
($)
($ million)
($)
($ million)
($)
2000
2000
2001
2001
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
(ODF,net)
9,421
4,371
1,001
1,549
464
106
164
977
104
125
13
411
44
8,154
3,012
849
746
369
104
91
324
40
38
5
260
32
16,013
9,370
4,033
2,472
585
252
154
3,685
230
258
16
80
5
19,306
5,190
1,618
2,986
269
84
155
1,347
70
89
5
642
33
4,527
1,219
400
628
269
88
139
593
131
67
15
46
10
6,272
2,168
407
651
346
65
104
756
121
131
21
273
43
113,862
41,085
20,213
10,906
361
178
96
21,289
187
1,104
10
-235
-2
14,876
8,879
1,996
1,961
597
134
132
1,338
90
75
5
370
25
3,018
3,215
2,135
840
1,065
707
278
915
303
59
20
16
5
1,230
4,932
3,093
1,117
4,009
2,515
908
394
320
200
163
-38
-31
31,095
11,516
2,139
1,652
370
69
53
1,970
63
574
18
171
6
30,291
53,306
20,479
10,068
1,760
676
332
4,637
153
1,196
39
150
5
3,659
608
13
175
166
4
48
176
48
34
9
280
76
632
553
17
306
875
27
484
37
59
3
5
55
87
8,778
..
101
344
..
12
39
***
***
0
0
331
38
30,669
10,357
1,932
3,503
338
63
114
1,045
34
50
2
431
14
35,119
9,027
679
1,582
257
19
45
1,404
40
224
6
1,246
35
50,948
..
416
376
..
8
7
649
13
32
1
250
5
18,292
3,754
688
1,151
205
38
63
1,350
74
255
14
943
52
43,309 125,887
29,284
28,405
2,907
676
656
50,115
1,157
6,653
154
530
12
1,757
3,479
1,245
1,445
1,981
709
822
1,906
1,085
99
56
114
65
13,134
8,828
6,612
3,345
672
503
255
9,096
693
1,119
85
256
19
25,662
15,211
37,032
170,406
53,466
70,545
284,960
595,458
7,092
17,440
26,655
58,223
8,619
17,234
20,311
58,318
2,084
4,638
7,695
3,494
276
1,147
720
342
336
1,133
548
342
11,000
48,441
76,269
219,342
429
3,185
2,060
1,287
1,100
5,508
3,181
22,457
43
362
86
132
794
186
1,783
2,728
31
12
48
16
Central & West Asia and the Caucasus
Iran, Islamic Rep. of
70,330
Turkey
66,668
Georgia
5,262
Russian Federation
145,491
104,904
199,937
3,029
251,106
26,554
27,762
375
103,139
17,246
42,492
831
58,992
1,492
2,999
576
1,726
378
416
71
709
245
637
158
405
2,507
12,601
583
21,795
36
189
111
150
33
3,266
160
2,540
0
49
30
17
122
1,353
328
4,711
2
20
62
32
1,252,948 1,079,948
78,137
31,344
62,806 122,166
13,104
3,183
1,008,937 456,990
141,256
61,638
266,160
15,682
65,113
1,562
43,611
9,660
243,610
14,941
62,058
2,183
49,618
11,097
862
401
1,945
243
453
436
212
201
1,037
119
43
68
194
191
988
167
49
79
395,192
15,923
28,227
1,664
22,319
6,608
315
204
449
127
22
47
46,846
1,300
3,759
113
3,403
385
37
17
60
9
3
3
3,108
1,337
-320
408
1,546
1,935
2
17
-5
31
2
14
3,752
8,449
11,995
36,719
112,646
302
1,903
5,074
11,391
9,142
1,275
4,837
7,223
15,561
27,012
1,197
801
1,509
1,636
10,617
96
180
638
508
862
407
458
909
694
2,546
759
1,484
3,850
7,636
14,059
242
141
484
340
1,325
181
165
689
1,137
1,560
58
16
87
51
147
252
1,268
319
750
n.a
80
120
40
33
n.a
3,111,661 3,326,123
680,606
627,827
1,069
219
202
865,200
278
95,123
31
21,813
7
East and South Asia
China
Viet Nam
Thailand
Cambodia
India
Pakistan
Southeast Europe
Albania
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. of
Bulgaria
Romania
Greece
Total: 41 Transit Countries
3,134
10,552
7,949
22,438
10,610
TABLE 1E:
41 Transit Countries: Summary of Selected Growth Rates for GDP and Exports, by Region
Region and Country
GDP Growth Rate(%)
(Total real product)
Per capita GDP
Growth Rate (%)
Import Growth Rate
(% per annum)
Export Growth Rate
(% per annum)
1990-1995 1995-2000 1990-1995 1995-2000 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2001 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2001
Africa
Senegal
Guinea
Côte d'Ivoire
Ghana
Togo
Benin
Nigeria
Cameroon
Congo,Rep.of
Gabon
Sudan
Algeria
Eritrea
Djibouti
Somalia
Kenya
United Republic of Tanzania
Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Mozambique
South Africa
Namibia
Angola
1.3
3.9
1.3
4.2
-1
4.1
2.3
-2.2
-0.1
2.4
5.3
0
_
-2
-8.1
1.3
1.6
-8
3.2
0.9
4.6
-6.2
5.4
4
3.8
4.4
2.1
5.2
2.5
4.8
0.1
1.4
6.7
3.2
2.6
0.1
..
1.7
3.9
-4.2
8.7
2.2
3.9
5.7
-1.2
0.3
-1.4
1.5
-3
0.7
-0.6
-4.8
-3.1
-0.4
2.8
-2.1
_
-3.4
-8.5
-1.6
-1.8
-11.5
-0.5
-1.1
1.7
-9.3
2.7
1.9
1.6
2.1
-1.3
2.4
-0.3
2.4
-2.8
-1.3
4.5
1.4
-0.1
-2.9
..
-0.6
1.3
-6.5
6.2
0.6
1.8
2.6
5.1
0.8
2.9
17.22
5.28
21.68
-4.08
-5.84
1.67
3.72
11.29
-6.34
_
-11.73
2.98
12.42
11.78
-16.52
3.74
3.25
4.55
-2.04
-0.57
5.89
0.81
-0.57
-1.64
-2.91
5.15
0.25
11.49
0.65
20.7
10.56
-6.52
-1.77
-10.6
-2.62
-4.16
-1.66
13.65
-0.18
-1.87
10.43
8.87
-0.6
3.71
1.28
10.32
3.89
-3.63
9.46
-18.12
-13
18.37
-7
-9.49
37.19
8.45
11.42
2.4
-11.81
89.08
-2.33
-11.07
-15
1.06
1.85
3.75
13.24
-7.59
21.79
2.19
-3.09
2.35
-0.87
13.71
2.37
_
2.71
-0.85
4.91
2.71
-15.77
-1.76
9.56
4.3
3.42
1.19
-0.79
-0.88
11.53
-1.87
-1.65
3.28
4.13
-1.25
3.19
3.07
0.12
-2.6
1.55
4.49
0.12
-0.13
-4.8
11.38
-1.78
0.09
2.13
1.84
7.96
-2.48
0.46
11.21
6.12
25.04
31.05
-6.47
2.61
20.04
4.5
24.51
1.85
2.7
12.8
3.83
7.54
-0.62
-4.34
-10.3
55.98
Latin America
Peru
Chile
Argentina
Brazil
5.5
8.5
6.9
3.3
2.4
4.2
2.7
2
3.7
6.8
5.4
1.7
0.6
2.8
1.4
0.7
11.08
11.93
10.58
8.94
3.17
1.58
3.18
2.39
0.91
-3.96
0.93
5.7
19.68
14.64
36.82
18.32
-2.14
0.33
4.01
0.18
-2.02
-4.82
-19.54
-0.37
Central & West Asia and the Caucasus
Iran, Islamic Rep. of
Turkey
Georgia
Russian Federation
4
3.2
_
_
3.4
3.3
5.5
0.8
2
1.3
_
_
1.7
1.7
5.9
1.1
-0.64
10.41
_
_
4.82
4.26
12.83
1.43
-6.32
4.48
13.52
-2.3
-11.34
8.66
_
_
-1.68
5.15
7.78
-9.59
20.64
-20.57
14.38
20.09
East and South Asia
China
Viet Nam
Thailand
Cambodia
India
Pakistan
12.5
8.3
8.6
5.7
5.4
4.7
8.1
6.6
-0.9
3.5
5.8
2.9
11.3
6.2
7.1
2.2
3.4
2.2
7.2
5.1
-2.2
0.7
4
0.2
18.7
19.48
18.7
49.41
11.45
6.06
10.04
19.66
3.19
11.02
5.28
0.76
6.76
8.53
-5.71
17.7
2.91
7
20.24
27.87
15.51
46.25
8.07
7.01
8.5
9.14
-5.92
4.77
7.81
-2.33
18.18
2.34
0.22
43.17
-3.27
-1.74
Southeast Europe
Albania
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. of
Bulgaria
Romania
Greece
-0.7
_
-2.5
-1.8
0.9
4.3
0.6
-1
-2.4
3.3
0
_
-1.8
-1.3
0.4
4.6
0.6
0.2
-2.2
3
-2.88
_
3.44
8.28
4.65
7.09
-0.06
-6.32
4.34
-2.05
15.56
10.45
5.5
9.88
-14.94
9.57
_
7.5
2.52
0.75
9.84
2.89
-0.13
2.77
1.81
16.86
30.34
11.26
19.2
6.86
TABLE 1F:
Rankings of 41 Transit Countries by Population, by Per Capita GDP, FDI and ODF, and by Growth Rates of GDP Per Capita and Exports
Ranked by:
Population
(thousand)
Ranked by:
Per Capita
GDP ($)
Per Capita
Goods
Exports($)
2000
2000
2001
China
1,252,948
India
1,008,937
Brazil
170,406
Russian Federation 145,491
Pakistan
141,256
Nigeria
113,862
Viet Nam
78,137
Iran,Islamic Rep.
70,330
Turkey
66,668
Thailand
62,806
Dem.Rep.Congo
50,948
South Africa
43,309
Argentina
37,032
Un.Rep.Tanzania
35,119
Sudan
31,095
Kenya
30,669
Algeria
30,291
Peru
25,662
Romania
22,438
Ghana
19,306
Mozambique
18,292
Côte d'Ivoire
16,013
Chile
15,211
Cameroon
14,876
Angola
13,134
Cambodia
13,104
Greece
10,610
Yugoslavia,FedRep
10,552
Senegal
9,421
Somalia
8,778
Guinea
8,154
Bulgaria
7,949
Benin
6,272
Georgia
5,262
Togo
4,527
Eritrea
3,659
Albania
3,134
Congo
3,018
Namibia
1,757
Gabon
1,230
Djibouti
632
Ranked by:
Greece
10,617
Argentina
7,695
Chile
4,638
Gabon
4,009
Brazil
3,494
Turkey
2,999
South Africa
2,907
Peru
2,084
Namibia
1,981
Thailand
1,945
Algeria
1,760
Russian Federation
1,726
Romania
1,636
Bulgaria
1,509
Iran,Islamic Rep.
1,492
Albania
1,197
Congo
1,065
Djibouti
875
China
862
Yugoslavia,FedRep
801
Angola
672
Cameroon
597
Côte d'Ivoire
585
Georgia
576
Senegal
464
India
453
Pakistan
436
Viet Nam
401
Sudan
370
Guinea
369
Nigeria
361
Benin
346
Kenya
338
Ghana
269
Togo
269
Un.Rep.Tanzania
257
Cambodia
243
Mozambique
205
Eritrea
166
Dem.Rep.Congo
..
Somalia
..
Gabon
Chile
Thailand
Greece
Argentina
Russian Federation
Namibia
Congo
Algeria
South Africa
Bulgaria
Romania
Angola
Turkey
Iran,Islamic Rep.
Brazil
Peru
Côte d'Ivoire
China
Viet Nam
Yugoslavia,FedRep
Nigeria
Cameroon
Cambodia
Senegal
Guinea
Albania
Togo
Ghana
Georgia
Sudan
Pakistan
Benin
Kenya
India
Mozambique
Djibouti
Un.Rep.Tanzania
Somalia
Dem.Rep.Congo
Eritrea
2,515
1,147
1,037
862
720
709
709
707
676
676
638
508
503
416
378
342
276
252
212
201
180
178
134
119
106
104
96
88
84
71
69
68
65
63
43
38
27
19
12
8
4
Ranked by:
FDI
Inflows
Per Capita
($)
2001
Chile
Gabon
South Africa
Greece
Brazil
Bulgaria
Argentina
Angola
Thailand
Albania
Namibia
Romania
Turkey
Peru
Algeria
China
Georgia
Benin
Congo
Sudan
Russian Federation
Viet Nam
Côte d'Ivoire
Yugoslavia,FedRep
Togo
Mozambique
Senegal
Nigeria
Eritrea
Cambodia
Un.Rep.Tanzania
Cameroon
Djibouti
Guinea
Ghana
India
Pakistan
Kenya
Dem.Rep.Congo
Iran,Islamic Rep.
Somalia
362.1
162.6
154.1
147.0
131.8
86.7
85.9
85.2
59.9
57.8
56.3
50.7
49.0
42.9
39.5
37.4
30.4
20.9
19.5
18.5
17.5
16.6
16.1
15.6
14.8
13.9
13.3
9.7
9.3
8.6
6.4
5.0
4.7
4.7
4.6
3.4
2.7
1.6
0.6
0.5
0.0
Ranked by: Official (ODF)
Finance
Per Capita
($)
2001
Yugoslavia,FedRep
Djibouti
Albania
Eritrea
Namibia
Georgia
Mozambique
Argentina
Senegal
Benin
Bulgaria
Somalia
Un.Rep.Tanzania
Romania
Ghana
Russian Federation
Guinea
Cambodia
Peru
Cameroon
Turkey
Angola
Viet Nam
Brazil
Kenya
Pakistan
South Africa
Chile
Togo
Sudan
Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Algeria
Dem.Rep.Congo
China
Iran,Islamic Rep.
India
Nigeria
Thailand
Gabon
Greece
120.1
87.2
80.5
76.5
64.9
62.3
51.5
48.2
43.7
43.4
40.1
37.7
35.5
33.4
33.2
32.4
31.9
31.1
30.9
24.9
20.3
19.5
17.1
16.0
14.1
13.7
12.2
12.2
10.2
5.5
5.3
5.0
5.0
4.9
2.5
1.7
1.5
-2.1
-5.1
-30.9
n.a
Ranked by:
GDP
Per Capita
Growth
Rate (%)
1995-2000
Mozambique
China
Sudan
Viet Nam
India
Angola
Georgia
Senegal
Benin
Cameroon
Ghana
Albania
Chile
Guinea
Namibia
Un.Rep.Tanzania
Côte d'Ivoire
Cambodia
Iran,Islamic Rep.
Greece
Turkey
Algeria
Pakistan
Argentina
Eritrea
Nigeria
Peru
Togo
Brazil
Kenya
Gabon
Russian Federation
Yugoslavia,FedRep
South Africa
Congo
Djibouti
Thailand
Bulgaria
Romania
Dem.Rep.Congo
Somalia
8.7
8.1
6.7
6.6
5.8
5.7
5.5
5.4
5.2
4.8
4.4
4.3
4.2
4.0
3.9
3.9
3.8
3.5
3.4
3.3
3.3
3.2
2.9
2.7
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.1
2.0
1.7
1.4
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.1
0.1
-0.9
-1.0
-2.4
-4.2
..
Ranked by:
Export
of Goods
Growth
Rate (%)
1995-2000
Sudan
Viet Nam
Mozambique
Georgia
Congo
Cambodia
Algeria
Angola
China
Albania
Guinea
India
Nigeria
Iran,Islamic Rep.
Romania
Turkey
Thailand
Argentina
Peru
Brazil
Chile
Russian Federation
Côte d'Ivoire
Pakistan
Gabon
Cameroon
Yugoslavia,FedRep
South Africa
Ghana
Senegal
Togo
Dem.Rep.Congo
Djibouti
Namibia
Greece
Kenya
Benin
Un.Rep.Tanzania
Bulgaria
Eritrea
Somalia
20.7
19.7
13.7
12.8
11.5
11.0
10.6
10.4
10.0
7.1
5.9
5.3
5.2
4.8
4.3
4.3
3.2
3.2
3.2
2.4
1.6
1.4
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.3
-0.1
-0.2
-0.6
-0.6
-1.6
-1.7
-1.8
-1.9
-2.1
-2.6
-2.9
-4.2
-6.3
-6.5
-10.6
TABLE 1G:
Landlocked and Transit Countries Ranked by EXPORTS PER CAPITA
31 Landlocked Developing Countries:
Ranked by: Per Capita
Goods
Exports($)
41 Transit Neighbor Countries:
Ranked by:
Per Capita
Goods
Exports($)
2001
Botswana
Swaziland
FYR Macedonia
Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan
Paraguay
Moldova, Republic of
Bolivia
Zimbabwe
Mongolia
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Lesotho
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia
Zambia
Mali
Bhutan
Lao People's Dem. Rep.
Malawi
Central African Republic
Nepal
Niger
Chad
Uganda
Burkina Faso
Rwanda
Ethiopia
Burundi
Afghanistan
Total
1,598
759
584
535
503
333
170
155
154
153
144
132
124
123
110
104
82
65
64
64
40
34
32
27
25
20
15
11
7
6
4
102
2001
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
Gabon
Chile
Thailand
Greece
Argentina
Russian Federation
Namibia
Congo
Algeria
South Africa
Bulgaria
Romania
Angola
Turkey
Iran,Islamic Rep.
Brazil
Peru
Côte d'Ivoire
China
Viet Nam
Yugoslavia,FedRep
Nigeria
Cameroon
Cambodia
Senegal
Guinea
Albania
Togo
Ghana
Georgia
Sudan
Pakistan
Benin
Kenya
India
Mozambique
Djibouti
Un.Rep.Tanzania
Somalia
Dem.Rep.Congo
Eritrea
Total
2,515
1,147
1,037
862
720
709
709
707
676
676
638
508
503
416
378
342
276
252
212
201
180
178
134
119
106
104
96
88
84
71
69
68
65
63
43
38
27
19
12
8
4
220
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
(LDC)
TABLE 2A: Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments, Total Investments (Private plus Public):
31 LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, in million US dollars, by sector and sub-sector
12 Year Totals, 1990-2001
Sector
All Sectors
Electricity Natural Gas Telecom
Transport
of which:___________________________
Airport
Port
Rail
Road
Water
Africa
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Botswana
80
0
Burkina Faso
41.2
5.6
Burundi
16.1
0
CAR
1.8
0
Chad
11.6
0
Ethiopia
Lesotho
33.5
0
Malawi
38.5
0
Mali
697.4
697.4
Niger
18
0
Rwanda
15.6
0
Swaziland
12
0
Uganda
208.9
0
Zambia
337.8
289.4
Zimbabwe
734
600
Region Total
2246.4
1592.4
Latin America
2 Bolivia
2896.2
507
2 Paraguay
310.5
0
Region Total
3206.7
507
Central and West Asia and the Caucasus
3 Armenia
492
0
3 Azerbaijan
388.6
230
3 Kazakhstan
4044.46
1520.86
3 Kyrgyz
94
0
3 Tajikistan
1
0
3 Turkmenistan
3 Uzbekistan
359.9
0
Region Total 5379.96
1750.86
East and South Asia
4 Afghanistan
4 Bhutan
4 Laos
710.6
535.5
4 Mongolia
28.8
0
4 Nepal
303.8
268.6
Region Total
1043.2
804.1
Southeast Europe
5 FYR Macedonia 607.3
0
5 Moldova
169.9
25.3
Region Total
777.2
25.3
LL Total
12653.46
4679.66
0
0
0
0
0
80
35.6
16.1
1.1
11.6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
33.5
32.5
0
18
15.6
12
208.9
48.4
46
559.3
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
88
94
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
70
76
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.7
813.6
0
813.6
730.4
252.5
982.9
163.2
58
221.2
116.6
0
116.6
0
0
0
46.6
0
46.6
0
58
58
682
0
682
0
0
604.09
0
0
442
158.6
1879.5
94
1
50
0
0
0
0
50
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
40
0
0
0
604.09
359.9
2935
0
50
0
50
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
40
0
0
0
0
175.1
28.8
35.2
239.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
60
60
1477.69
607.3
84.6
691.9
5408.2
0
0
0
365.2
0
0
0
166.6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
122.6
0
0
0
76
0
0
0
722.7
TABLE 2B: Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments, Private Portion of Total Investments:
31 LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, in million US dollars, by sector and sub-sector
12 Year Totals, 1990-2001
Sector
All Sectors % Private Electricity Natural GasTelecom
Transport of which:_____________________________ Water
Airport
Port
Rail
Road
Africa
Botswana
80
100
Burkina Faso
40
96
Burundi
16
100
CAR
2
100
Chad
12
100
Ethiopia
Lesotho
34
100
Malawi
31
81
Mali
418
60
Niger
18
100
Rwanda
8
50
Swaziland
4
30
Uganda
192
92
Zambia
280
83
Zimbabwe
423
58
Region Total
1,557
69
Latin America
Bolivia
2,568
89
Paraguay
311
100
Region Total
2,878
90
Central and West Asia and the Caucasus
Armenia
443
90
Azerbaijan
286
74
Kazakhstan
2,772
69
Kyrgyz
12
13
Tajikistan
1
90
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
238
66
Region Total
3,752
70
East and South Asia
Afghanistan
Bhutan
Laos
390
55
Mongolia
29
100
Nepal
300
99
Region Total
718
69
Southeast Europe
FYR Macedonia 316
52
Moldova
132
78
Region Total
449
58
LL Total
% Private
9,354
74
74
80
36
16
1
12
4
0
0
0
0
34
25
6
18
8
4
192
48
46
519
77
83
730
253
983
140
58
198
117
398
79
889
12
1
45
45
6
418
232
300
954
0
482
533
482
533
0
207
1,238
605
1,445
605
238
1,617
265
567
0
88
29
35
152
25
25
30
30
3,473
74
1,168
79
302
0
0
117
63
69
14
14
24
0
24
0
682
58
58
682
0
40
45
45
0
0
0
40
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
316
77
393
0
0
0
0
0
0
3,663
68
327
89
162
97
0
0
93
76
72
95
722
100
TABLE 2C: Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments, Total Investments (Private plus Public):
39 TRANSIT-NEIGHBOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, in million US dollars, by sector and sub-sector
12 Year Totals, 1990-2001
Sector
All Sectors
Electricity
Natural Gas
Telecom
Transport ___________________________
Airport
Port
Water
Rail
Road
Africa
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Cameroon
Congo
C.d'Ivoire
DR Congo
Djibouti
Eritria
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Senegal
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Region Total
2,300
68
90
462
435
1,385
229
50
0
531
157
332
500
27
1,194
535
0
11,838
6
870
5
21,013
0
0
0
70
325
333
0
0
0
60
36
172
0
5
225
124
0
31
0
496
0
1,877
2,300
0
0
0
0
38
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
0
0
0
2,354
0
68
90
266
110
827
229
0
0
461
120
107
29
22
969
407
0
9,611
6
351
5
13,678
0
0
0
126
0
187
0
50
0
10
0
53
470
0
0
0
0
1,968
0
23
0
2,888
0
0
0
31
0
28
0
0
0
0
0
21
0
0
0
0
0
203
0
12
0
295
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
50
0
10
0
32
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
99
0
0
0
95
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
100
0
0
0
0
0
159
0
0
0
0
0
0
470
0
0
0
0
1,765
0
0
0
2,394
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
4
0
213
0
0
0
217
72,598
126,536
19,475
12,123
230,732
16,081
38,267
7,043
4,025
65,416
9,082
4,004
1,675
0
14,761
23,748
60,486
1,340
7,793
93,367
15,449
20,875
5,463
249
42,036
3,668
0
293
108
4,069
735
1,596
847
26
3,204
5,334
6,038
90
62
11,524
5,712
13,241
4,233
53
23,239
8,238
2,905
3,954
56
15,153
101
28
11,140
17,018
28,287
36
0
2,070
7,285
9,391
0
0
1,311
0
1,311
65
28
7,135
8,066
15,294
0
0
515
725
1,240
0
0
413
390
803
0
0
103
335
437
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
108
942
1,050
455
50,044
25,530
7,130
21,154
743
105,057
123
19,068
12,240
5,937
8,016
436
45,819
0
1,156
230
0
1,025
0
2,411
147
5,970
11,234
775
8,493
0
26,619
185
23,133
1,609
418
3,120
95
28,561
185
1,579
125
0
16
15
1,919
0
2,879
1,032
418
107
80
4,517
0
2,070
0
0
2,140
0
4,210
0
16,605
452
0
857
0
17,914
0
717
216
0
501
213
1,647
165
612
3,480
1,930
6,187
0
0
100
0
100
0
0
0
0
0
165
460
2,331
1,930
4,886
0
0
23
0
23
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23
0
23
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
152
1,025
0
1,177
391,275
122,603
20,837
153,844
74,748
7,087
8,281
15,834
43,547
19,244
Latin America
2
2
2
2
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Peru
Region Total
Central and West Asia and the Caucasus
3 Georgia
3 Iran
3 Russia
3 Turkey
Region Total
East and South Asia
4 Cambodia
4 China
4 India
4 Pakistan
4 Thailand
4 Vietnam
Region Total
Southeast Europe
5 Albania
5 Bulgaria
5 Romania
5 Yugoslavia
Region Total
TR Total
TABLE 2D: Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments, Total Investments (Private plus Public):
31 LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, in million US dollars, total all sectors
Annual Totals, 1990-2001
12 Year
Country
Sector
Afghanistan All Sectors
Armenia
All Sectors
Azerbaijan
All Sectors
Bhutan
All Sectors
Bolivia
All Sectors
Botswana
All Sectors
Burkina Faso All Sectors
Burundi
All Sectors
CAR
All Sectors
Chad
All Sectors
Ethiopia
All Sectors
FYR Macedonia
All Sectors
Kazakhstan All Sectors
Kyrgyz
All Sectors
Laos
All Sectors
Lesotho
All Sectors
Malawi
All Sectors
Mali
All Sectors
Moldova
All Sectors
Mongolia
All Sectors
Nepal
All Sectors
Niger
All Sectors
Paraguay
All Sectors
Rwanda
All Sectors
Swaziland
All Sectors
Tajikistan
All Sectors
Turkmenistan All Sectors
Uganda
All Sectors
Uzbekistan
All Sectors
Zambia
All Sectors
Zimbabwe
All Sectors
LL Total
All Sectors
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1998
2000
492
388.6
525.7
323.3
69
27.4
15.6
8.2
2
4.8
4.8
2896.2
80
41.2
16.1
1.8
11.6
106
177.5
450
607.3
106
8
1.4
0.5
2
6.7
3.2
19.1
8.6
34.8
2.9
109.8
3.7
5.7
2.8
4.7
697.3
25.3
9
54.1
13.1
145
15
10.5
12
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
4.6
20.1
4.9
20
0.2
0.5
34.4
71.7
38.1
47.1
21.8
716
2392.5
9
21.2
968.9
1738.7
1
254.6
692.6
740.6
80
5.6
0.5
1.1
30
1075.07
6
627.5
10
2099.89
88
57
0.1
131.4
3.4
14.9
14.9
98.2
14.9
14.9
70.5
0.2
4.4
4.4
2.5
20.7
Total 90-01
50
247
270.4
0.7
2001
45.6
20
442
34
1999
27
14
20
1997
5.9
15.4
18
212.8
307.4
4.4
231
2341.87
4.4
126.4
279
3418.79
12.3
17
4.7
607.3
4044.46
94
710.6
33.5
38.5
697.4
169.9
28.8
303.8
18
310.5
15.6
12
1
208.9
359.9
6.8
337.8
734
1230.5 12653.46
TABLE 2E: Private Participation in Infrastructure Investments, Total Investments (Private plus Public):
39 TRANSIT-NEIGHBOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, in million US dollars, total all sectors
Annual Totals, 1990-2001
12 Year
Country
Sector
Albania
All Sectors
Algeria
All Sectors
Angola
All Sectors
Argentina All Sectors
Benin
All Sectors
Brazil
All Sectors
Bulgaria All Sectors
Cambodia All Sectors
Cameroon All Sectors
Chile
All Sectors
China
All Sectors
Congo
All Sectors
C.d'Ivoire All Sectors
DR Congo All Sectors
Djibouti
All Sectors
Eritria
All Sectors
Georgia All Sectors
Ghana
All Sectors
Guinea
All Sectors
India
All Sectors
Iran
All Sectors
Kenya
All Sectors
Mozambique
All Sectors
Namibia All Sectors
Nigeria
All Sectors
Pakistan All Sectors
Peru
All Sectors
Romania All Sectors
Russia
All Sectors
Senegal All Sectors
Somalia All Sectors
South AfricaAll Sectors
Sudan
All Sectors
Tanzania All Sectors
Thailand All Sectors
Togo
All Sectors
Turkey
All Sectors
Vietnam All Sectors
Yuguslavia All Sectors
TR Total All Sectors
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
102
3,326
2,937
6,927
13
646
173
1,922
82
2,438
10,235
21
18
31
258
3,369
40
5,186
6,486
5,644
6,657
9,030
7,597
543
17
1,458
27
122
7,911
27
8
24,458
42
160
45,527
42
14
595
3,177
1,436
1,358
5
38
1,519
8,268
325
38
3,560
12,914
43
694
1,250
4,601
15,821
67
8
108
4,066
3,602
8
373
18
70
12
20
137
614
25
1,051
537
10
5
81
1,376
5
10
424
20
2,911
23
70
11
10
47
5,068
48
30
25
2
8
2,174
53
10
18
20
10
20
14
692
906
68
5,112
27
20
38
5
44
982
1,011
650
6,412
11,201
16,073
2,134
2,093
2,099
1,680
1,457
465
542
534
8
1,444
28
4,388
74
10
1,876
17,885
23,494
4
4,333
90
19,521
157
28
60
1,525
3,503
35
75
21
50
60
34
10
4,012
3,729
187
20
22
Total 90-01
63
68
2,062
9,968
215
85
264
2,654
2,472
20
160
3,864
22
304
1,219
345
3,447
219
4
28
38
975
1,030
1,600
52
943
478
797
121
1
49
26
952
1,394
1,539
76
448
6
10
3,478
2,104
1,209
3,282
1,860
1,766
164
2,904
27
714
40
1,036
556
2,255
2,455
220
35
40,828
494
180
1,080
66,154
1,449
39
160
70,680
38
584
5
1,541
121
310
44,182
8,215
20
197
154
48,848
29,649
2,384
3,019
227
1,342
4
19
1,076
60
1,232
397
64
165
2,300
68
72,598
90
126,536
612
455
462
19,475
50,044
435
1,385
229
50
0
101
531
157
25,530
28
332
500
27
1,194
7,130
12,123
3,480
11,140
535
0
11,838
6
870
21,154
5
17,018
743
1,930
389,731
Table 3A:
Development Assistance for All Physical Infrastructure and for the Transport Sector (and its major components)
Gross Commitments in US Dollars (millions) to 31 Individual Landlocked Countries, by Region, 12 year total for 1990 to 2001
Total All Sources in DAC Purpose Reporting System (I.e., Bilateral and Multilateral sources of ODA and OOF)
Region &
Recipient
Years
Country
(12 year
total)
(1)
(2)
Total
of which:
Commitments
Transport
for PhysicalSector
Infrastructure
(all types) code:210
LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES:
Africa
Botswana 1990-2001Tot
326
130
Burkina Faso
1990-2001Tot 1,030
349
1990-2001Tot
251
98
Burundi
Central African
1990-2001Tot
Republic
457
339
Chad
1990-2001Tot
628
363
Ethiopia 1990-2001Tot 1,981
1,178
Lesotho
1990-2001Tot
520
108
1990-2001Tot
896
365
Malawi
Mali
1990-2001Tot
848
345
1990-2001Tot
365
90
Niger
Rwanda 1990-2001Tot
407
201
Swaziland 1990-2001Tot
246
180
1990-2001Tot 1,830
641
Uganda
Zambia
1990-2001Tot 1,195
525
Zimbabwe 1990-2001Tot 1,350
428
Region Total
12,331
5,339
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
of which:
For comparison:
TrnspPolicyRoad
Rail
Water
Air
Total GrossODA net
& Administrtv.
Transport Transport Transport Transport Commitments
DisbursManagement
(incl. Ports)
(all purposes)
ments (All
code:21010code21020 code21030 code21040 code21050 code: 999 Purposes)
(10)
(11)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
(12)
(13)
Oil and GasElectrical
Gas Telecommu-Water
Population
GNP
Per Capita
(including Transmis./ Distribution nications Supply & (thousands)($ million)
GNP
pipelines) Distribution
Sanitation
2001
2001
($)
code:32262code23040 code23050 code22020 code14099
2001
1
11
0
89
132
9
0
2
66
32
53
67
85
12
12
571
119
321
97
246
215
1,099
107
335
264
58
143
112
457
451
289
4,313
4
10
0
0
3
1
0
17
9
0
0
1
32
44
99
221
0
4
0
1
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
16
6
2
0
2
13
69
0
1
5
0
1
0
67
18
26
211
782
3,893
1,463
1,216
2,167
8,699
1,048
4,944
4,477
2,450
3,315
568
8,790
9,146
5,467
58,425
1,045
4,584
1,924
1,654
2,443
9,398
1,067
4,881
4,770
3,447
4,133
427
7,983
8,003
4,300
60,058
-23
-29
-32
-19
6
120
150
-92
32
-259
19
-3
-228
-651
485
-524
0
0
0
0
64
74
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
0
168
39
103
2
3
2
248
106
217
70
4
59
9
254
147
174
1,438
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
23
13
21
8
107
3
17
23
0
15
11
8
21
389
662
117
445
93
54
114
238
257
221
247
225
84
32
413
312
232
3,082
1,616
11,553
6,939
3,771
7,917
65,817
2,062
10,527
11,095
11,193
8,706
1,069
22,792
10,283
12,821
188,161
688
648
1,337
56
352
409
554
296
850
16
0
16
3
0
3
59
0
59
8,474
2,944
11,417
7,239
1,117
8,356
-2
292
290
70
0
70
134
217
351
29
0
29
22
41
63
411
272
683
8,516
5,636
14,152
7,750 910.0517
6,954 1233.854
14,704 1039.005
Central & West Asia and the Caucasus
Armenia 1990-2001Tot
324
73
Azerbaijan 1990-2001Tot
506
58
Kyrgystan 1990-2001Tot
391
272
Kazakhstan1990-2001Tot 1,156
857
Tajikistan 1990-2001Tot
65
24
Turkmenistan
1990-2001Tot
106
71
Uzbekistan 1990-2001Tot
920
513
Region Total
3,468
1,868
40
3
22
40
0
34
29
168
31
40
196
533
20
0
58
878
0
0
0
114
0
37
196
347
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
4
2
15
55
169
4
0
226
471
1,733
1,295
1,876
3,630
800
262
1,888
11,483
1,612
1,131
1,765
1,223
763
265
1,094
7,855
85
346
53
2,115
85
597
811
4,091
0
21
0
127
0
1
0
149
168
34
5
142
68
0
0
417
0
40
0
1
0
0
0
42
n.a.
n.a.
18
0
2
n.a.
263
283
53
77
21
85
4
32
135
407
3,810
8,115
4,968
14,826
6,224
5,294
25,101
68,338
2,064
5,337
1,466
21,421
1,012
5,000
11,058
47,358
541.7323
657.671
295.0886
1444.827
162.5964
944.4654
440.5402
692.9966
East and South Asia
Afghanistan1990-2001Tot
Bhutan
1990-2001Tot
Lao PDR 1990-2001Tot
Mongolia 1990-2001Tot
Nepal
1990-2001Tot
Region Total
43
156
1,300
822
2,107
4,428
1
49
805
336
577
1,767
0
0
70
88
34
193
0
48
678
92
452
1,271
0
0
0
102
0
103
0
0
0
10
0
10
0
0
57
43
89
189
1,409
501
2,635
1,911
4,383
10,838
2,424
773
2,792
1,917
4,681
12,588
0
0
8
14
61
84
0
0
0
0
3
3
0
40
82
23
417
562
0
0
0
0
0
0
n.a.
52
75
64
151
341
7
16
135
31
470
659
27,248
829
5,404
2,423
23,585
59,489
n.a
548
1,664
1,031
5,756
8,999
n.a
661.0374
307.9201
425.5056
244.0534
151.2717
Southeast Europe
F.Y.R.Macedonia
1990-2001Tot
Moldova 1990-2001Tot
Region Total
218
22
240
75
0
75
66
0
66
7
0
7
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,387
857
2,244
1,203
607
1,810
2
243
245
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
n.a.
3
64
1
65
2,044
4,273
6,317
3,391 1659.002
1,522
356.19
4,913 777.7426
Total, Landlocked
1990-2001Tot
DC
23,241
10,386
1,407
7,319
688
32
931
94,408
90,666
4,186
391
2,768
71
1,351
4,896
336,457
121,342 360.6464
Latin America
Bolivia
1990-2001Tot
Paraguay 1990-2001Tot
Region Total
1,484
1,291
2,775
5,525
2,310
679
976
1,595
6,315
1,006
1,789
2,277
1,913
1,683
1,283
5,697
3,509
8,811
45,368
3418.936
199.9481
97.85272
258.8173
201.4652
95.94786
487.8758
169.944
205.2276
170.9104
193.315
1200.187
249.9561
341.2428
687.2319
241.1127
Table 3B:
Development Assistance for All Physical Infrastructure and for the Transport Sector (and its major components)
Gross Commitments in US Dollars (millions) to 39 Individual Transit Countries, by Region, 12 year total for 1990 to 2001
Total All Sources in DAC Purpose Reporting System (I.e., Bilateral and Multilateral sources of ODA and OOF)
Region &
Recipient
Country
(1)
(2)
Total
of which:
Commitments
Transport
for Physical Sector
Infrastructure
(all types) code:210
TRANSIT COUNTRIES:
Africa
Algeria
1990-2001Tot 1,562
552
Angola
1990-2001Tot
787
82
Benin
1990-2001Tot
762
443
Cameroon 1990-2001Tot 1,058
698
Congo, Dem.
1990-2001Tot
Rep.
285
120
Congo, Rep.1990-2001Tot
of
115
88
Cote d`Ivoire1990-2001Tot 1,169
534
Djibouti
1990-2001Tot
234
126
Eritrea
1990-2001Tot
129
35
Ghana
1990-2001Tot 3,000
1,494
Guinea
1990-2001Tot
767
264
Kenya
1990-2001Tot 2,011
908
Mozambique
1990-2001Tot 2,899
1,255
Namibia
1990-2001Tot
542
181
Nigeria
1990-2001Tot 1,959
178
Senegal
1990-2001Tot 1,329
393
Somalia
1990-2001Tot
124
27
South Africa1990-2001Tot
824
518
Sudan
1990-2001Tot
115
31
Tanzania, United
1990-2001Tot
Rep.
3,512
1,643
Togo
1990-2001Tot
286
104
Region Total
23,470
9,673
Years
(12 year
total)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
of which:
For comparison:
TrnspPolicyRoad
Rail
Water
Air
Total Gross ODA net
& Administrtv.
Transport Transport Transport Transport Commitments
DisbursManagement
(incl. Ports)
(all purposes)
ments (All
code:21010code21020 code21030 code21040 code21050 code: 999 Purposes)
(10)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Oil and Gas Electrical
Gas
Telecommu-Water
Population
GNP
Per Capita
(including Transmis./ Distribution nications Supply & (thousands) ($ million)
GNP
pipelines) Distribution
Sanitation
2001
2001
($)
code:32262code23040 code23050 code22020 code14099
2001
45
5
53
27
5
10
270
2
0
192
1
123
405
8
2
245
4
1
2
221
0
1,622
223
73
362
502
61
54
191
71
27
1,142
239
621
605
127
167
105
22
191
22
1,052
76
5,932
78
2
23
93
33
22
33
0
0
104
9
12
77
36
0
34
0
48
3
258
0
865
149
0
4
57
0
2
6
53
6
32
2
19
162
10
0
5
1
276
0
107
17
909
58
1
1
15
21
0
25
0
2
24
14
133
6
0
8
5
1
2
4
3
10
331
8,862
4,190
2,566
7,345
2,269
1,676
9,345
676
1,361
8,453
3,277
7,592
12,609
1,519
6,337
5,676
1,082
4,569
1,940
12,392
1,240
104,976
3,330
3,701
2,888
5,690
2,968
2,015
8,281
1,170
1,309
7,477
3,594
7,426
11,742
1,821
2,467
6,478
3,224
3,719
3,765
11,895
1,615
96,574
7,780
262
35
1,059
645
465
151
-2
0
143
-7
-951
749
17
-261
43
-2
1,211
3
-159
-22
11,160
199
150
0
54
0
62
23
0
3
1
2
15
1
0
218
1
0
10
0
0
0
739
1
403
137
129
2
10
193
0
38
603
78
57
549
13
337
69
21
0
6
507
68
3,220
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
366
0
374
13
201
26
43
95
0
1
5
2
44
32
88
128
23
367
20
1
30
12
218
9
1,357
721
89
157
119
49
7
243
72
36
602
242
354
528
128
1,130
600
57
140
53
445
61
5,833
30,894
13,513
6,437
15,198
52,360
3,104
16,410
645
4,205
19,708
7,580
30,736
18,072
1,793
129,881
9,770
9,089
43,240
31,688
34,451
4,654
483,428
51,320
7,863
2,249
8,094
n.a.
2,096
9,782
589
821
5,107
2,784
10,276
3,212
3,193
38,082
4,542
n.a
112,673
10,795
9,076
1,235
283,789
1661.164
581.8841
349.3864
532.5701
n.a.
675.2577
596.0999
913.1783
195.2438
259.1333
367.2823
334.3311
177.7335
1780.814
293.2069
464.8925
n.a
2605.759
340.6652
263.4466
265.3631
587.0347
664
6,016
773
1,778
9,231
178
2,907
248
751
4,084
475
2,286
310
850
3,922
0
606
143
24
773
3
215
72
153
442
7
0
0
0
8
30,408
38,002
4,343
16,528
89,282
1,767
2,068
1,417
5,049
10,302
15,335
13,602
-2,315
7,425
34,047
29
310
0
8
347
89
663
0
428
1,180
164
94
0
0
258
133
46
0
1
181
1,180
1,971
103
1,232
4,486
37,479
172,564
15,397
26,088
251,528
259,625
482,762
61,402
52,751
856,540
6927.213
2797.582
3987.92
2022.041
3405.347
Central & West Asia and the Caucasus
Georgia
1990-2001Tot
372
58
1990-2001Tot
622
0
Iran
Russia
1990-2001Tot 2,771
1,550
Turkey
1990-2001Tot 4,816
1,494
Region Total
8,580
3,102
17
0
391
40
448
40
0
1,053
1,004
2,097
0
0
1
444
446
0
0
100
0
101
1
0
4
5
10
1,679
4,060
39,853
15,319
60,911
1,657
1,442
16,125
4,641
23,865
201
2,482
38,234
-943
39,974
10
0
501
68
579
34
1
51
927
1,013
0
0
3
37
40
0
n.a.
3
4
7
6
145
185
2,273
2,609
5,020
64,658
144,838
66,231
280,747
3,158
120,835
300,158
146,058
570,209
629.0837
1868.833
2072.371
2205.282
2031.042
136
12,267
3,374
4,966 1,271,901 1,139,848
3,630 1,033,390
474,556
800
141,451
57,454
1,101
61,239
113,365
1,290
79,527
32,903
11,923 2,599,775 1,821,500
275.0469
896.1767
459.2226
406.176
1851.19
413.7337
700.6376
Latin America
Argentina 1990-2001Tot 4,424
Brazil
1990-2001Tot 11,488
Chile
1990-2001Tot 1,011
1990-2001Tot 3,862
Peru
Region Total
20,785
East and South Asia
Cambodia 1990-2001Tot
China
1990-2001Tot
India
1990-2001Tot
Pakistan 1990-2001Tot
Thailand 1990-2001Tot
Vietnam
1990-2001Tot
Region Total
831
40,592
23,306
8,306
12,031
8,571
93,637
432
21,294
5,338
1,533
6,886
3,735
39,218
31
1,156
99
194
117
313
1,910
310
7,309
3,899
883
3,246
2,687
18,334
2
8,147
654
318
2,591
203
11,914
67
2,737
671
114
72
513
4,174
22
1,424
15
21
761
19
2,263
3,054
71,213
54,463
21,136
26,085
15,617
191,568
3,320
29,556
21,352
11,816
8,166
9,908
84,118
46
20,150
6,960
4,291
11,407
855
43,709
0
512
680
54
0
0
1,246
174
2,042
4,212
1,568
3,510
1,062
12,569
0
319
640
0
521
0
1,480
40
1,769
118
378
360
115
2,781
Southeast Europe
Albania
1990-2001Tot
Bulgaria
1990-2001Tot
Romania 1990-2001Tot
Yugoslavia 1990-2001Tot
Region Total
513
551
904
205
2,173
166
306
669
73
1,213
28
8
18
60
113
55
30
220
9
314
14
158
331
3
507
34
110
98
0
243
35
0
1
1
37
2,038
2,475
4,285
4,000
12,798
2,991
2,401
3,658
3,412
12,462
264
2,426
4,193
-6
6,877
0
1
176
0
177
206
0
0
14
220
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
30
0
39
Total,Transit1990-2001Tot
Countries
148,646
62,438
8,178
30,599
14,504
5,868
2,648
459,535
227,321
135,767
3,088
18,202
2,152
4,365
160
111
29
38
338
3,441
8,124
22,397
10,645
44,607
4,262
12,236
39,380
n.a
55,878
1238.593
1506.155
1758.271
n.a
1252.673
25,190 3,660,085 3,587,916 980.2822
Table 4:
Development Assistance for All Physical Infrastructure and for the Transport Sector (and its major components)
Gross Commitments in US Dollars (millions) to 31 Individual Landlocked and 39 Transit Countries, by Region, Annual Averages 1990-93, 1994-97, 1998-01
Total All Sources in DAC Purpose Reporting System (I.e., Bilateral and Multilateral sources of ODA and OOF)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Recipient
Year
Total
of which:
of which:
For comparison:
Country
Commitments Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net OOF net Oil and Gas Population GNP
for Physical
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport Transport Transport Commitments DisbursDisburs(including
(thousands) ($ million)
Infrastructure
Management
(incl. Ports)
(all purposes) ments (All ments (All pipelines)
(all types)
code:210 code:21010
code21020 code21030 code21040 code21050 code: 999
Purposes) Purposes) code:32262
Totals, 31 Landlocked and 39 Transit Countries
Total, 31
Landlocked
Developing
Countries
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
23,241
1,641
2,042
2,127
1,507
2,263
10,386
699
846
1,052
817
919
1,407
87
119
147
286
152
7,319
527
512
791
490
660
688
31
85
56
33
105
32
5
3
0
0
1
931
48
127
58
8
1
94,408
6,557
7,730
9,315
10,741
8,823
90,666
7,287
8,026
7,353
7,302
7,920
4,186
286
384
376
187
158
391
15
63
19
69
0
246,922
301,219
326,712
329,859
336,457
1,349,324
91,580
126,428
119,324
116,768
121,342
Total, 39
Transit
Countries
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
148,646
11,870
14,016
11,275
10,821
11,020
62,438
4,142
5,823
5,645
5,259
5,442
8,178
462
649
934
539
470
30,599
1,903
2,629
3,117
3,404
3,329
14,504
1,128
1,518
980
912
1,136
5,868
501
673
293
169
135
2,648
146
275
241
234
371
459,535
33,526
42,087
39,271
37,052
37,022
227,321
19,454
19,063
18,313
17,860
18,688
135,767
9,733
12,943
11,266
4,047
9,107
3,088
338
316
118
275
13
3,165,434
3,397,147
3,588,707
3,613,224
3,660,085
36,500,569
2,191,156
3,386,602
3,547,385
3,599,275
3,587,916
1 (LL). West and Central Africa: 5 Landlocked Developing Countries
Mali
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
848
49
109
53
43
28
345
10
40
36
24
1
66
0
16
0
0
0
264
9
24
34
24
1
9
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
1
0
0
0
0
4,477
305
383
432
496
445
4,770
411
437
345
363
333
32
2
10
-5
-7
-7
0
0
0
0
0
0
8,841
9,894
10,713
10,840
11,095
29,154
2,570
2,305
2,414
2,307
2,277
Burkina Faso 1990-2001Tot
(ldc)
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,030
87
55
116
77
140
349
26
29
32
1
35
11
1
1
0
1
0
321
24
24
32
1
35
10
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
3,893
283
298
392
374
449
4,584
391
396
359
329
364
-29
-1
-4
-3
-5
-3
0
0
0
0
0
0
9,406
10,290
11,139
11,274
11,553
29,413
2,709
2,269
2,375
2,173
2,310
Niger
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
365
23
27
40
49
72
90
4
9
9
33
3
32
0
7
1
3
0
58
4
2
9
30
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,450
171
183
259
291
305
3,447
348
295
219
193
236
-259
7
-42
-30
-24
-38
0
0
0
0
0
0
8,070
9,256
10,662
10,832
11,193
24,181
2,312
1,791
1,942
1,808
1,913
Chad
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
628
65
23
69
140
32
363
35
16
40
111
3
132
9
4
20
73
2
215
23
11
20
38
1
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
3
0
0
0
0
2,167
158
158
226
359
186
2,443
242
225
143
103
150
6
0
0
2
-1
9
64
0
0
16
63
0
5,875
6,690
7,595
7,694
7,917
15,855
1,181
1,230
1,553
1,398
1,595
Recipient
Country
Year
(1)
Total
Commitments
for Physical
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
of which:
of which:
For comparison:
Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport Transport Transport Commitments Disburs-
(10)
OOF net
Disburs-
(11)
(12)
(13)
Oil and Gas Population GNP
(including
(thousands) ($ million)
Infrastructure
(all types)
code:210
Management
code:21010
(incl. Ports)
(all purposes)
code21020 code21030 code21040 code21050 code: 999
ments (All ments (All pipelines)
Purposes) Purposes) code:32262
1 (LL). West and Central Africa: 5 Landlocked Developing Countries (continued)
Central Afr.Rep1990-2001Tot
(ldc)
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
457
40
45
29
29
11
339
28
37
20
28
11
89
16
0
7
6
0
246
12
36
13
22
11
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1,216
122
87
95
110
70
1,654
183
146
85
70
61
-19
-2
-2
-1
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3,096
3,314
3,659
3,717
3,771
12,950
1,231
1,008
999
952
976
1 (TR). West and Central Africa: 11 Transit Countries
Senegal
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,329
76
102
155
79
223
393
30
9
59
70
33
245
18
3
41
70
0
105
5
3
19
0
33
34
6
3
0
0
0
5
1
0
0
0
0
5
1
0
0
0
0
5,676
447
409
563
590
436
6,478
613
551
455
415
396
43
23
-8
-4
-8
-9
1
0
0
0
0
0
7,704
8,521
9,407
9,530
9,770
57,656
5,537
4,358
4,519
4,286
4,542
Guinea
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
767
99
57
36
15
41
264
44
6
15
6
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
239
41
5
14
1
0
9
2
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
14
1
1
1
5
0
3,277
312
246
262
151
388
3,594
354
325
220
139
224
-7
4
10
-16
-10
-19
2
1
0
0
0
0
5,993
6,673
7,333
7,415
7,580
38,084
2,776
3,614
3,131
2,932
2,784
Cote d`Ivoire
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,169
94
104
95
37
16
534
14
39
80
25
0
270
0
0
68
21
0
191
12
28
8
0
0
33
0
7
1
0
0
6
0
0
2
4
0
25
2
2
2
0
0
9,345
901
871
564
366
157
8,281
694
915
461
378
242
151
228
-77
-114
-86
-100
23
0
0
6
0
0
12,799
13,920
15,787
16,013
16,410
111,647
8,582
8,875
10,454
9,838
9,782
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
3,000
222
279
249
99
306
1,494
108
92
173
44
240
192
47
0
1
0
0
1,142
42
75
168
39
232
104
10
15
1
0
0
32
3
1
4
4
8
24
6
0
0
0
0
8,453
683
618
812
658
860
7,477
599
638
633
599
638
143
24
36
-24
-23
-10
1
0
0
0
0
0
15,588
17,306
19,062
19,306
19,708
74,072
6,114
6,198
6,206
4,831
5,107
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
286
30
28
14
8
2
104
7
15
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
76
2
13
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
2
2
0
0
0
10
2
0
0
0
0
1,240
117
118
75
51
37
1,615
184
139
81
76
48
-22
-4
-3
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3,763
4,169
4,507
4,527
4,654
16,190
1,486
1,262
1,301
1,192
1,235
Ghana
Togo
(ldc)
Recipient
Country
Year
(1)
Total
Commitments
for Physical
Infrastructure
(all types)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
of which:
of which:
Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport
Management
code:210 code:21010
code21020 code21030
1 (TR). West and Central Africa: 11 Transit Countries (continued)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
For comparison:
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net
Transport Transport Commitments Disburs(incl. Ports)
(all purposes) ments (All
code21040 code21050 code: 999
Purposes)
(10)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Oil and Gas Population GNP
(including
(thousands) ($ million)
pipelines)
code:32262
Benin
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
762
61
64
66
79
33
443
22
41
48
50
26
53
0
10
3
0
0
362
19
26
45
49
26
23
2
3
0
0
0
4
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2,566
195
213
233
269
172
2,888
256
238
228
239
263
35
13
-1
-3
-11
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
4,934
5,555
6,192
6,272
6,437
24,516
1,948
1,929
2,252
2,150
2,249
Nigeria
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,959
394
52
43
56
115
178
44
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
167
42
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
2
0
0
0
0
6,337
1,074
148
362
656
585
2,467
261
190
166
166
158
-261
631
-213
-483
-576
-550
218
55
0
0
0
0
105,822
112,884
125,377
126,910
129,881
363,994
28,700
28,377
33,922
36,727
38,082
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,058
112
66
87
40
122
698
83
30
61
26
58
27
0
3
4
4
11
502
62
10
54
21
47
93
16
6
2
0
0
57
4
8
2
0
0
15
0
4
0
0
0
7,345
590
601
645
449
608
5,690
549
507
367
308
373
1,059
192
67
6
-64
-42
54
0
0
13
53
0
12,202
13,418
14,734
14,876
15,198
106,584
10,563
7,750
8,333
8,285
8,094
Congo, Rep.of 1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
115
18
9
1
1
2
88
13
8
1
0
2
10
2
0
0
0
0
54
6
7
0
0
2
22
4
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,676
117
204
98
48
96
2,015
143
289
71
27
68
465
51
88
-23
-15
-58
62
0
16
0
0
0
2,376
2,634
2,960
3,018
3,104
24,304
2,422
1,733
1,921
2,232
2,096
Sudan
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
115
24
1
3
3
5
31
7
1
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
22
6
0
0
0
0
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
1
0
0
0
1,940
186
92
207
234
168
3,765
546
204
191
211
149
3
0
5
-4
-9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
25,901
26,942
30,424
31,095
31,688
99,630
8,072
7,193
9,643
10,253
10,795
Algeria
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,562
102
107
181
129
230
552
76
51
12
31
15
45
2
0
9
29
9
223
12
42
1
0
5
78
19
0
1
2
0
149
28
9
0
0
0
58
14
0
0
0
0
8,862
757
1,091
368
320
406
3,330
321
311
200
154
177
7,780
507
1,479
-42
-240
40
199
50
0
0
0
0
25,962
28,276
30,188
30,400
30,894
564,626
50,817
42,193
48,147
50,606
51,320
Cameroon
Recipient
Country
Year
(1)
Total
Commitments
for Physical
Infrastructure
(all types)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
of which:
of which:
Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport
Management
code:210 code:21010
code21020 code21030
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
For comparison:
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net
Transport Transport Commitments Disburs(incl. Ports)
(all purposes) ments (All
code21040 code21050 code: 999
Purposes)
(10)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Oil and Gas Population GNP
(including
(thousands) ($ million)
pipelines)
code:32262
2 (LL). East Africa: 4 Landlocked Developing Countries
Ethiopia
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1,981
113
1,178
65
9
1
1,099
54
1
0
0
0
69
10
8,699
644
9,398
865
120
16
74
0
51,948
77,713
7,066
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
130
252
46
236
39
191
30
91
0
1
0
1
31
189
30
90
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
598
933
928
988
771
714
637
999
22
-8
-19
-19
19
0
0
0
57,320
63,541
64,298
65,817
5,974
6,389
6,331
6,315
Uganda
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,830
118
143
197
139
391
641
41
54
65
54
66
85
2
19
0
0
0
457
25
25
64
54
66
32
5
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
67
9
8
0
0
0
8,790
625
551
1,022
1,687
981
7,983
591
703
701
824
790
-228
-12
-26
-19
-41
-11
0
0
0
0
0
0
17,472
19,457
21,880
22,210
22,792
55,799
2,201
5,496
6,254
6,156
5,697
Rwanda
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
407
68
25
8
9
7
201
37
13
0
0
0
53
2
11
0
0
0
143
34
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
3,315
229
265
334
456
255
4,133
311
427
295
268
273
19
0
0
4
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
7,292
6,813
8,407
8,508
8,706
20,224
1,908
1,298
1,851
1,776
1,683
Burundi
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
251
55
4
4
1
1
98
24
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
97
24
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,463
181
73
112
133
119
1,924
253
136
92
89
128
-32
-3
-3
-2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5,727
6,271
6,743
6,807
6,939
11,138
1,096
960
729
664
679
2 (TR). East Africa: 6 Transit Countries
Eritrea
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
129
1
19
12
21
4
35
0
8
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
27
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
1
1
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
1,361
38
125
177
325
203
1,309
13
132
183
164
272
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
1
0
0
0
848
3,625
4,043
4,097
4,205
7,147
257
736
794
725
821
Djibouti
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
234
32
19
7
19
7
126
17
10
5
18
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
71
10
4
4
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
53
7
6
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
676
67
44
58
73
48
1,170
132
98
62
61
46
-2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
521
620
633
632
645
5,119
234
489
558
569
589
Recipient
Country
Year
(1)
Total
Commitments
for Physical
Infrastructure
(all types)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
of which:
of which:
Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport
Management
code:210 code:21010
code21020 code21030
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
For comparison:
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net
Transport Transport Commitments Disburs(incl. Ports)
(all purposes) ments (All
code21040 code21050 code: 999
Purposes)
(10)
(11)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
(12)
(13)
Oil and Gas Population GNP
(including
(thousands) ($ million)
pipelines)
code:32262
2 (TR). East Africa: 6 Transit Countries (continued)
Somalia
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
124
27
1
2
3
3
27
6
1
1
1
0
4
1
0
0
0
0
22
5
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1,082
131
64
76
69
101
3,224
497
207
103
90
137
-2
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7,944
8,941
8,854
8,778
9,089
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Kenya
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
2,011
178
199
126
105
143
908
91
66
70
9
93
123
1
29
1
0
0
621
60
33
63
8
93
12
1
1
1
0
0
19
2
0
3
0
0
133
27
4
2
0
0
7,592
853
497
548
977
465
7,426
839
591
427
470
450
-951
-46
-115
-77
-60
-26
15
0
0
4
15
0
24,849
27,309
29,759
30,092
30,736
107,442
7,546
8,775
10,540
10,224
10,276
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
3,512
440
201
237
244
436
1,643
202
101
108
169
117
221
4
44
8
16
0
1,052
123
49
91
149
108
258
51
5
9
0
8
107
24
2
0
1
0
3
0
0
1
3
0
12,392
1,239
669
1,191
1,281
1,634
11,895
1,089
867
1,017
970
1,186
-159
-16
-27
3
25
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
26,249
30,059
33,300
33,696
34,451
66,327
2,889
4,948
8,746
8,985
9,076
Congo,Dem.Rep.
1990-2001Tot
(ldc)
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
285
55
12
5
2
12
120
21
7
2
0
8
5
1
0
0
0
0
61
9
5
2
0
7
33
6
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
21
5
0
0
0
0
2,269
293
130
144
166
234
2,968
444
146
152
156
206
645
153
14
-6
-3
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
38,801
44,579
50,276
50,948
52,360
50,159
6,092
5,203
1,245
n.a.
n.a.
Tanzania
(ldc)
3 (LL). Southern Africa: 6 Landlocked Developing Countries
Malawi
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
896
85
75
64
26
41
365
30
21
40
5
15
2
0
0
0
0
0
335
27
16
40
5
15
17
0
4
0
0
0
8
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
4,944
358
381
497
596
275
4,881
395
402
423
431
394
-92
-8
-12
-3
-3
-6
0
0
0
0
0
0
9,161
9,886
10,368
10,311
10,527
22,057
1,877
1,874
1,763
1,666
1,789
Zambia
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,195
79
105
114
111
58
525
32
55
45
42
26
12
2
0
1
0
2
451
24
52
37
10
23
44
3
1
7
27
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
1
2
1
5
0
9,146
957
613
716
1,070
361
8,003
797
661
542
752
475
-651
-50
-67
-46
-127
-6
30
0
8
0
0
0
8,527
9,091
9,980
10,089
10,283
35,169
2,405
3,237
3,151
3,094
3,509
Recipient
Country
Year
(1)
Total
Commitments
for Physical
Infrastructure
(all types)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
of which:
of which:
Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport
Management
code:210 code:21010
code21020 code21030
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
For comparison:
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net
Transport Transport Commitments Disburs(incl. Ports)
(all purposes) ments (All
code21040 code21050 code: 999
Purposes)
(10)
(11)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
(12)
(13)
Oil and Gas Population GNP
(including
(thousands) ($ million)
pipelines)
code:32262
3 (LL). Southern Africa: 6 Landlocked Developing Countries (continued)
Zimbabwe
Botswana
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,350
150
159
28
4
6
428
62
36
9
0
0
12
3
0
0
0
0
289
44
20
9
0
0
99
10
15
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
26
5
1
0
0
0
5,467
693
429
245
178
111
4,300
446
403
226
206
157
485
138
9
-26
-36
-34
0
0
0
0
0
0
10,212
11,125
12,382
12,627
12,821
78,130
5,661
7,055
6,816
6,961
8,811
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
326
59
22
1
130
31
1
0
1
0
0
0
119
28
1
0
4
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
1
0
0
782
107
60
28
1,045
122
85
54
-23
17
-17
-5
0
0
0
0
1,317
1,475
1,592
53,589
3,403
4,626
5,369
2000
2001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
34
30
28
25
2
-17
0
0
1,602
1,616
5,693
5,525
Lesotho
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
520
73
27
29
6
6
108
5
12
11
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
107
5
12
11
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,048
123
57
83
54
77
1,067
119
101
47
40
50
150
20
21
-3
10
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,844
1,975
2,041
2,035
2,062
14,024
1,115
1,260
1,131
1,147
1,006
Swaziland
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
246
27
16
18
4
50
180
20
9
16
1
46
67
17
0
0
0
0
112
3
9
15
0
46
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
568
48
47
47
28
110
427
45
38
23
11
25
-3
-9
5
3
4
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
837
916
1,031
1,045
1,069
13,981
914
1,226
1,356
1,435
1,283
3 (TR). Southern Africa: 4 Transit Countries
Mozambique
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
2,899
206
190
329
360
310
1,255
101
93
121
86
189
405
21
48
33
1
21
605
38
33
80
85
169
77
16
3
1
0
0
162
25
8
7
0
0
6
1
1
0
0
0
12,609
1,092
903
1,157
1,439
1,095
11,742
1,070
975
890
828
927
749
12
55
121
129
9
1
0
0
0
0
0
15,433
16,149
17,507
17,691
18,072
27,465
1,207
2,111
3,549
3,582
3,212
South Africa
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
824
17
142
47
13
61
518
0
105
24
1
47
1
0
0
0
0
0
191
0
36
11
0
46
48
0
0
12
1
0
276
0
69
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
1
4,569
144
505
493
565
478
3,719
67
377
486
481
419
1,211
0
178
125
63
83
10
0
0
2
0
2
484,253
38,031
40,645
42,388
42,801
43,240
1,337,624
80,852
129,706
123,849
124,684
112,673
Recipient
Country
Year
(1)
Total
Commitments
for Physical
Infrastructure
(all types)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
of which:
of which:
Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport
Management
code:210 code:21010
code21020 code21030
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
For comparison:
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net
Transport Transport Commitments Disburs(incl. Ports)
(all purposes) ments (All
code21040 code21050 code: 999
Purposes)
(10)
(11)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
(12)
(13)
Oil and Gas Population GNP
(including
(thousands) ($ million)
pipelines)
code:32262
3 (TR). Southern Africa: 4 Transit Countries (continued)
Namibia
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
542
40
50
46
17
82
181
8
20
17
14
37
8
1
1
1
1
1
127
7
17
7
13
0
36
0
0
9
0
36
10
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,519
142
112
126
104
144
1,821
143
164
149
145
103
17
1
0
3
3
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
19,258
1,518
1,564
1,733
1,757
1,793
36,461
2,404
3,307
3,404
3,468
3,193
Angola
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
787
136
32
29
30
35
82
14
1
5
10
2
5
1
0
1
2
1
73
13
0
4
8
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
4,190
323
478
247
272
248
3,701
253
371
302
262
259
262
12
96
-43
-46
-12
150
26
12
0
0
0
135,950
10,084
11,049
12,854
13,134
13,513
44,055
1,627
3,726
5,662
7,063
7,863
4 (LL). Central Asia and the Caucasus: 8 Landlocked Developing Countries
Afghanistan
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
43
7
1
3
3
6
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,409
74
86
191
121
416
2,424
233
174
198
119
387
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
238,357
9,763
23,647
26,180
26,550
27,248
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Tajikistan
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
65
0
1
15
0
60
24
0
1
5
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
0
0
5
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
1
0
0
0
800
6
55
138
85
208
763
9
74
108
90
136
85
16
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
64,835
4,162
5,880
6,166
6,170
6,224
18,219
1,506
1,995
1,055
937
1,012
Kyrgystan
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
391
0
51
46
25
51
272
0
32
36
22
30
22
0
0
6
22
0
196
0
19
30
0
30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
55
0
14
0
0
0
1,876
30
207
232
241
212
1,765
34
197
211
196
175
53
9
6
-2
0
-8
0
0
0
0
0
0
51,186
3,361
4,550
4,886
4,915
4,968
23,286
2,109
2,340
1,373
1,290
1,466
Kazakhstan
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,156
0
93
196
179
121
857
0
88
126
154
80
40
0
10
0
0
0
533
0
57
76
153
52
114
0
21
7
0
28
0
0
0
0
0
0
169
0
0
42
0
0
3,630
2
498
408
253
252
1,223
35
92
179
185
141
2,115
17
327
185
36
56
127
0
31
0
1
0
175,492
12,677
16,272
14,924
14,869
14,826
221,063
14,078
22,020
19,168
17,067
21,421
(12)
(13)
Recipient
Country
Year
(1)
Total
Commitments
for Physical
Infrastructure
(all types)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
of which:
of which:
Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport
Management
code:210 code:21010
code21020 code21030
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
For comparison:
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net
Transport Transport Commitments Disburs(incl. Ports)
(all purposes) ments (All
code21040 code21050 code: 999
Purposes)
(10)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
(11)
Oil and Gas Population GNP
(including
(thousands) ($ million)
pipelines)
code:32262
4 (LL). Central Asia and the Caucasus: 8 Landlocked Developing Countries (continued)
Uzbekistan
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
920
0
122
107
31
72
513
0
64
64
29
70
29
0
0
7
29
0
58
0
2
13
0
0
196
0
14
35
0
70
3
0
1
0
0
0
226
0
47
10
0
0
1,888
0
226
245
147
307
1,094
31
82
160
184
150
811
33
42
128
124
180
0
0
0
0
0
0
254,604
16,065
23,010
24,576
24,752
25,101
183,153
10,657
21,095
14,037
13,510
11,058
Turkmenistan 1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
106
0
26
0
0
0
71
0
18
0
0
0
34
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
37
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
262
3
51
12
14
12
265
10
21
36
30
69
597
30
16
103
158
40
1
0
0
0
0
0
50,362
2,971
4,543
5,077
5,199
5,294
40,790
2,716
3,626
3,856
4,227
5,000
Azerbaijan
506
0
24
102
21
58
0
4
11
0
3
0
0
1
0
40
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
0
4
0
0
1,295
0
111
212
144
1,131
28
110
145
132
346
6
41
40
42
21
0
5
0
0
84,332
5,478
7,591
8,014
8,049
44,237
2,636
3,684
4,740
4,924
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
Armenia
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
46
43
3
40
0
0
0
126
204
9
0
8,115
5,337
324
0
26
55
48
21
73
0
8
10
40
0
40
0
0
10
40
0
31
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1,733
1
203
229
207
251
1,612
32
190
181
210
195
85
15
4
2
2
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
37,685
1,852
3,767
3,802
3,803
3,810
19,530
1,109
1,830
1,944
1,932
2,064
4 (TR). Central Asia and the Caucasus: 5 Transit Countries
Pakistan
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
8,306
1,094
824
159
358
52
1,533
266
104
13
1
36
194
46
0
2
1
3
883
160
50
11
0
33
318
34
46
0
0
0
114
23
6
0
0
0
21
3
2
0
0
0
21,136
2,097
1,644
1,544
1,437
2,388
11,816
968
896
1,091
759
1,883
4,291
537
365
171
111
26
54
13
0
0
0
0
1,527,761
117,926
127,539
136,476
138,080
141,451
670,109
48,059
60,168
59,301
59,605
57,454
Iran
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
622
101
0
54
215
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4,060
196
689
130
366
55
1,442
88
147
125
116
96
2,482
29
686
-95
-712
539
0
0
0
0
0
0
738,486
59,481
61,882
63,258
63,664
64,658
1,175,349
94,637
93,393
105,808
101,396
120,835
Recipient
Country
Year
(1)
Total
Commitments
for Physical
Infrastructure
(all types)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
of which:
of which:
Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport
Management
code:210 code:21010
code21020 code21030
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
For comparison:
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net
Transport Transport Commitments Disburs(incl. Ports)
(all purposes) ments (All
code21040 code21050 code: 999
Purposes)
(10)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Oil and Gas Population GNP
(including
(thousands) ($ million)
pipelines)
code:32262
4 (TR). Central Asia and the Caucasus: 5 Transit Countries (continued)
Turkey
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
4,816
529
326
349
46
215
1,494
132
130
112
45
35
40
1
0
9
0
34
1,004
124
63
64
0
0
444
5
67
39
45
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
1
0
0
0
0
15,319
1,197
575
2,058
2,218
2,705
4,641
867
169
124
318
163
-943
-338
-289
390
798
1,077
68
0
17
0
0
0
736,026
57,911
61,288
64,809
65,293
66,231
1,947,815
133,330
169,099
184,525
200,888
146,058
Georgia
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
372
0
33
60
41
59
58
0
3
11
40
3
17
0
3
1
0
3
40
0
0
10
40
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1,679
1
173
246
212
263
1,657
33
188
193
162
247
201
26
21
3
2
2
10
0
0
3
0
10
53,052
2,718
5,417
5,128
5,024
5,020
34,911
1,576
3,969
3,183
3,034
3,158
Russia
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
2,771
2
343
348
373
332
1,550
0
271
116
0
61
391
0
82
15
0
60
1,053
0
163
100
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
100
0
25
0
0
0
4
0
1
0
0
1
39,853
1,501
5,329
3,133
5,191
1,312
16,125
1,293
1,345
1,393
1,549
1,075
38,234
1,992
4,201
3,365
2,094
3,548
501
0
125
0
0
0
1,620,088
111,249
147,897
145,876
145,556
144,838
3,381,754
216,624
378,511
250,303
248,808
300,158
5 (LL). East and South Asia: 4 Landlocked Developing Countries
Mongolia
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
822
31
104
70
65
147
336
16
45
22
34
55
88
0
13
9
0
34
92
0
13
10
27
14
102
7
15
3
5
7
10
3
0
0
0
0
43
6
4
1
2
0
1,911
108
190
180
217
262
1,917
76
196
208
213
208
14
10
-6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
28,368
2,225
2,478
2,389
2,398
2,423
9,102
416
892
968
955
1,031
Lao PDR
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,300
94
131
100
89
122
805
56
82
63
58
108
70
3
0
15
30
0
678
52
69
49
28
108
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
57
1
14
0
0
0
2,635
168
265
226
210
297
2,792
152
276
269
275
234
8
0
0
2
-1
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
57,471
4,363
4,801
5,204
5,279
5,404
16,494
907
1,721
1,495
1,671
1,664
Bhutan
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
156
12
12
15
22
22
49
0
3
9
10
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
48
0
3
9
10
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
501
36
36
54
57
49
773
74
64
55
48
58
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7,291
323
706
794
805
829
4,050
255
291
467
498
548
Recipient
Country
Year
(1)
Total
Commitments
for Physical
Infrastructure
(all types)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
of which:
of which:
Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport
Management
code:210 code:21010
code21020 code21030
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
For comparison:
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net
Transport Transport Commitments Disburs(incl. Ports)
(all purposes) ments (All
code21040 code21050 code: 999
Purposes)
(10)
(11)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
(12)
(13)
Oil and Gas Population GNP
(including
(thousands) ($ million)
pipelines)
code:32262
5 (LL). East and South Asia: 4 Landlocked Developing Countries (continued)
Nepal
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
2,107
134
206
186
138
336
577
31
58
55
30
92
34
4
0
4
3
8
452
23
42
48
28
83
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
89
4
16
3
0
0
4,383
315
397
383
301
576
4,681
410
397
364
371
375
61
1
6
8
10
-2
3
1
0
0
0
0
256,498
19,701
21,429
22,995
23,043
23,585
54,031
3,563
4,548
5,396
5,687
5,756
512 14,491,515
54 1,156,906
67 1,208,439
6 1,257,535
25 1,262,461
0 1,271,901
8,714,026
423,428
728,034
1,027,045
1,065,283
1,139,848
5 (TR). East and South Asia: 5 Transit Countries
China
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
40,592
2,609
4,205
3,334
3,043
2,877
21,294
1,331
1,997
1,995
1,675
1,954
1,156
40
5
245
105
101
7,309
291
555
982
1,090
686
8,147
754
837
445
433
706
2,737
172
380
133
0
100
1,424
75
171
110
47
361
71,213
5,210
7,504
5,089
4,753
4,168
29,556
2,578
2,825
1,986
1,711
1,445
20,150
1,221
2,943
874
-533
1,347
Vietnam
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
8,571
104
971
1,068
1,041
1,008
3,735
45
340
549
733
429
313
1
7
70
135
0
2,687
42
237
393
441
363
203
0
33
18
0
54
513
0
64
64
154
8
19
1
0
4
3
4
15,617
315
1,726
1,863
1,582
2,095
9,908
286
794
1,397
1,671
1,354
855
23
178
13
-135
-35
0
0
0
0
0
0
883,756
68,596
74,322
78,021
78,523
79,527
228,289
5,675
21,367
30,031
31,349
32,903
Thailand
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
12,031
1,217
1,151
6,886
521
664
117
21
0
3,246
393
362
2,591
90
203
72
18
0
761
0
74
26,085
1,619
2,699
8,166
676
711
11,407
231
1,096
0
0
0
705,393
56,710
59,137
1,488,091
100,104
156,686
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
640
869
54
536
778
34
8
0
0
57
181
34
354
425
0
0
0
0
117
172
0
2,203
966
158
654
633
275
1,525
-1,845
-802
0
0
0
60,502
60,728
61,239
115,233
120,363
113,365
Cambodia
(ldc)
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
831
23
100
85
22
114
432
13
48
47
17
34
31
6
1
1
0
0
310
7
35
35
17
34
2
0
0
0
0
0
67
0
8
9
0
0
22
0
4
2
0
0
3,054
113
329
321
404
360
3,320
121
372
337
371
390
46
3
7
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
116,512
6,927
10,315
11,886
12,022
12,267
29,906
1,501
2,883
3,093
3,173
3,374
India
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
23,306
2,398
2,053
1,375
2,211
2,355
5,338
347
399
588
1,081
1,247
99
1
24
0
0
0
3,899
149
259
567
1,077
1,189
654
77
71
15
2
57
671
120
42
6
1
0
15
0
3
0
1
0
54,463
5,191
4,902
3,522
4,200
4,380
21,352
1,945
1,864
1,530
1,417
1,662
6,960
1,147
431
162
-117
-274
680 11,271,447
132
873,499
0
937,737
38 1,006,626
0 1,015,924
0 1,033,390
4,321,505
279,230
354,917
446,230
453,179
474,556
Recipient
Country
Year
(1)
Total
Commitments
for Physical
Infrastructure
(all types)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
of which:
of which:
Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport
Management
code:210 code:21010
code21020 code21030
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
For comparison:
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net
Transport Transport Commitments Disburs(incl. Ports)
(all purposes) ments (All
code21040 code21050 code: 999
Purposes)
(10)
(11)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
(12)
(13)
Oil and Gas Population GNP
(including
(thousands) ($ million)
pipelines)
code:32262
6 (LL). South East Europe: 2 Landlocked Developing Countries
FYRMacedonia1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
Moldova
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
218
0
10
44
38
50
75
0
6
13
10
7
66
0
6
11
10
0
7
0
0
2
0
7
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,387
0
126
221
247
213
1,203
1
88
212
240
241
2
0
-4
5
1
-11
0
0
0
0
0
0
18,357
515
2,049
2,026
2,031
2,044
27,069
950
2,328
3,489
3,528
3,391
22
0
3
2
1
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
857
0
112
102
96
106
607
10
53
89
109
106
243
9
39
12
-2
-5
0
0
0
0
0
0
43,214
2,185
4,333
4,286
4,282
4,273
26,136
2,273
2,804
1,458
1,362
1,522
6 (TR). South East Europe: 4 Transit Countries
Albania
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
513
6
61
61
103
60
166
5
19
18
14
18
28
5
0
2
9
0
55
0
10
3
0
0
14
0
1
3
2
0
34
0
0
9
2
16
35
0
8
1
1
2
2,038
66
140
303
282
199
2,991
257
173
318
299
256
264
61
6
0
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
39,689
3,269
3,260
3,394
3,411
3,441
26,558
612
2,280
3,747
3,859
4,262
Yugoslavia
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
205
0
0
51
35
157
73
0
0
18
6
67
60
0
0
15
0
59
9
0
0
2
4
6
3
0
0
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
4,000
0
25
975
715
2,613
3,412
0
78
775
1,065
1,253
-6
0
-1
-1
-2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
129,644
11,225
10,554
10,632
10,637
10,645
9,802
n.a.
n.a.
2,451
n.a.
n.a.
Bulgaria
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
551
0
80
57
12
94
306
0
24
53
10
90
8
0
0
2
7
0
30
0
0
7
2
27
158
0
24
16
0
63
110
0
0
28
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,475
134
186
298
279
317
2,401
146
165
288
309
342
2,426
352
154
101
43
-92
1
0
0
0
0
0
92,446
6,544
8,378
8,189
8,167
8,124
110,450
5,250
10,345
12,019
11,674
12,236
Romania
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
904
0
115
110
22
217
669
0
68
99
17
212
18
0
0
4
17
0
220
0
38
18
0
0
331
0
30
53
0
211
98
0
0
25
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
4,285
243
467
361
157
525
3,658
241
220
454
430
642
4,193
549
293
207
325
-29
176
0
44
0
0
0
272,380
23,001
22,646
22,448
22,435
22,397
330,169
12,757
31,647
38,138
36,612
39,380
(12)
(13)
Recipient
Country
Year
(1)
Total
Commitments
for Physical
Infrastructure
(all types)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
of which:
of which:
Transport Transp. Policy Road
Rail
Sector
& Administrtv. Transport Transport
Management
code:210 code:21010
code21020 code21030
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
For comparison:
Water
Air
Total Gross
ODA net
Transport Transport Commitments Disburs(incl. Ports)
(all purposes) ments (All
code21040 code21050 code: 999
Purposes)
(10)
(11)
OOF net
Disbursments (All
Purposes)
Oil and Gas Population GNP
(including
(thousands) ($ million)
pipelines)
code:32262
7 (LL). Latin America: 2 Landlocked Developing Countries
Bolivia
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,484
188
105
79
96
19
688
104
24
43
31
1
56
0
0
14
2
0
554
95
14
29
29
0
16
4
0
0
0
0
3
0
1
0
0
0
59
6
9
0
0
0
8,474
631
738
750
959
625
7,239
533
682
595
475
721
-2
67
-20
-48
-57
-35
70
14
1
3
5
0
91,596
7,164
7,502
8,233
8,329
8,516
78,146
4,908
6,561
8,068
8,065
7,750
Paraguay
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,291
82
157
84
68
107
648
42
41
79
67
100
352
26
21
42
67
100
296
17
20
37
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,944
180
247
309
649
148
1,117
103
103
74
81
61
292
-43
32
83
120
50
0
0
0
0
0
0
59,249
4,495
4,890
5,428
5,496
5,636
90,641
5,850
9,089
7,722
7,554
6,954
7 (TR). Latin America: 4 Transit Countries
Peru
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
3,862
76
598
292
341
58
1,778
61
256
128
1
50
751
53
60
75
0
0
850
2
158
52
0
50
24
6
0
0
1
0
153
0
38
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16,528
966
1,816
1,350
1,337
793
5,049
479
347
437
388
443
7,425
539
773
544
689
376
8
0
2
0
0
0
286,314
22,265
23,869
25,445
25,661
26,088
566,403
31,861
57,166
52,575
51,969
52,751
Chile
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
1,011
199
45
9
1
5
773
154
39
1
0
1
248
61
0
1
0
0
310
47
30
0
0
0
143
27
8
0
0
0
72
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4,343
708
121
256
30
500
1,417
130
155
69
47
56
-2,315
133
-702
-10
-228
92
0
0
0
0
0
0
171,632
13,481
14,315
15,112
15,212
15,397
657,632
34,805
62,987
66,617
68,142
61,402
Argentina
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
4,424
378
664
3
178
0
475
1
0
0
3
0
7
2
30,408
1,774
1,767
231
15,335
1,104
29
7
418,997
33,011
2,887,187
161,851
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
Brazil
1990-2001Tot
1990-93 Av
1994-97 Av
1998-01 Av
2000
2001
253
475
94
117
27
136
94
0
26
18
74
0
0
118
20
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,628
3,200
670
2,553
126
86
50
143
1,184
1,545
631
1,473
0
0
0
1
34,934
36,804
37,032
37,479
283,650
276,296
277,583
259,625
11,488
772
1,124
976
633
1,060
6,016
355
731
418
190
305
2,907
128
304
295
45
165
2,286
174
275
122
143
140
606
0
151
0
0
0
215
54
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
38,002
2,494
2,994
4,012
3,193
3,076
2,068
48
256
212
228
224
13,602
338
12
3,050
3,859
2,547
310
0
33
45
180
0
1,932,136
153,399
160,382
169,253
170,406
172,564
6,757,511
409,739
697,021
582,618
569,726
482,762
TABLE 5: Commitments of Official Development Finance for the Transport Sector in 31 Landlocked Developing Countries, by Individual Project and Donor, 1998-2001
LLDCs Listed by Region
Source: OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System
Commit.
Year
Donor Name
Agency
Recipient Name
Commitment Grant
Date
Element
Amount
US$(000)
First
Repay
Date
Final
Repay
Date
Interest
Expected Expected
Starting
Completion
Date
Date
Short Description
West and Central Africa:
1999
1998
1998
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2001
1998
1998
2000
2001
1999
2001
France
France
EC
Netherlands
Spain
France
France
EC
Spain
France
France
Portugal
Portugal
United States
United States
MAE
AFD
EDF
MFA
AG
AFD
MAE
EDF
MISC
AFD
AFD
ICP
ICP
TDA
TDA
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
12/31/1999
1/9/1998
1/12/1998
1/7/1999
12/31/1999
1/9/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
1/2/1998
1/2/1998
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
12/31/1999
12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
62
100
100
100
100
100
25
14,917
95,068
7
14
9,400
8
14,745
2
5,933
1,695
51
13
288
145
2000
2001
1998
1999
1999
2000
2000
2001
2001
1998
France
EC
EC
EC
UNDP
Belgium
EC
Germany
AfDF
Belgium
AFD
EDF
EDF
EDF
BURKINA FASO
BURKINA FASO
BURKINA FASO
BURKINA FASO
BURKINA FASO
BURKINA FASO
BURKINA FASO
BURKINA FASO
BURKINA FASO
BURKINA FASO
1/12/2000
12/31/2001
1/12/1998
12/31/1999
12/31/1999
1/12/2000
12/31/2000
2/27/2001
11/14/2001
1/12/1998
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
87
100
922
39
49,211
43,687
104
160
369
6,868
28,008
276
2000
2000
2001
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
Italy
Switzerland
Italy
Canada
EC
EC
EC
EC
EC
EC
EC
AfDF
EC
DGCS
DDC
DGCS
CIDA
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
NIGER
NIGER
NIGER
NIGER
NIGER
NIGER
NIGER
NIGER
NIGER
NIGER
NIGER
NIGER
NIGER
9/21/2000
1/12/2000
1/1/2001
2/12/1998
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
12/31/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
5/18/2001
12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
83
100
236
2,458
223
337
235
45
537
64
74
18,892
11,520
1,757 5/18/2011 5/18/2051
672
URBAN AND EXTRA-URBAN TRANSPORT SYSTEMS
01.01.1997 1/12/2003 ROUTES RURALES GAYA
URBAN AND EXTRA-URBAN TRANSPORT SYSTEMS
9-Nov-98
APP.REFECTION INFRAS. ROUTIERE
ETUDE ROUTE FILINGUE-TAHOUA + IMPACT
PROJET ROUTE NIAMEY-DOSSO
ETUDE TECHN. POUR REHAB. ROUTE
TRANSPORT: EXPERTISE SUR L'ETAT DE PONTS
ETUDE DE PRE-FAISABILITE DES ROUTES
REHABILITATION DE LA ROUTE DE NIAMEY
REHABILITATION DE LA ROUTE NIAMEY
0.75
ETUDE DU PROGRAMME ROUTIER
TRANSPORTS :ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE AU MINISTERE
1998
1999
2000
2000
2001
2001
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
1999
2000
2001
Switzerland
Switzerland
France
IDA
Switzerland
EC
Portugal
EC
EC
EC
Germany
EC
EC
EC
AfDF
EC
EC
EC
EC
EC
France
France
France
DDC
DDC
AFD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
11/1/1998
2/1/1999
1/7/2000
10/26/2000
1/8/2001
12/31/2001
1/6/1998
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
1/12/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/1999
4/27/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
12/31/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
100
100
100
80
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
83
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
690
2,635
5,714
67,000 2/15/2011 8/15/2040
524
1,706
20
43
36,349
503
4,358
639
64
69
15,825 4/27/2010 4/27/2050
3,898
1,625
328
16,266
669
204
209
30
10/1/1998 10/1/2000 TRANSPORT : DVPT RURAL MELFI
1/1/1999 10/1/2001 PISTES RURALES: POLITIQUES DE TRANSPORT
7/1/2000 1/7/2005 FINANCT. TRANSPORT/OUVRAGES
0.75
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM SUPPORT PROJECT
1/10/1996 1/1/2002 PISTES RURALES DOUKOUR
TRANSPORT : APPUI TECHNICO-INSTITUTIONNEL
STUDY ABOUT A ROAD PROJECT
AMENAGEMENT DU PONT DE CHAGOUA
ROUTE: INTEGRAT. ECO REGION. AFR.
ROUTE MOUNDOU-DOBA - ETUDES DE FAIS.
1/1/1900 1/6/1901 ROAD CONSTRUCTION, GUELEN GDENG BONGOR
TRANSPORT:ENTRETIEN PISTES RURALES
TABLE RONDE TRANSPORTS ROUTIERS
AT POUR L'ORG. TABLE RONDE TRANSPORT ROUTE
0.75
PROJET D'AMENAGEMENT DE LA ROUTE MASSAGU
ROUTE KELO - MOUNDOU
ROUTE KELO - MOUNDOU
ROUTE KELO - MOUNDOU
ROUTE KELO - MOUNDOU
ROUTE DOBA-SAHR ETUDES TECHNIQUES
TRANSPORTS AERIENS
AIR TRANSPORT
APPUI AUX TRANSPORTS AERIENS
DGIC
EDF
KFW
AGCD
EDF
DDC
EDF
GP
EDF
EDF
EDF
KFW
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
MAE
MAE
MAE
1-Sep-98
1/6/1999
9/1/2000
1/4/2006 1/10/2019
1/5/2022 1/11/2051
1.5 01-Feb-98
01-Feb-98
01.01.00
POLITIQUE DES TRANSPORTS
1/9/2003 CONSTRUCTION ROUTE
PROJET SECTORIEL DES TRANSPORTS
1/12/1999 RÉFECTION DE LA ROUTE MAKANDIA
ROAD TRANSPORT
1/9/2005 REVETEMENT ROUTE KAYES AMENAGEMENT ROUTE
ROAD TRANSPORT
ROUTES : APPUI AU PROJET SECTORIEL DES TRANSPORTS
ROAD TRANSPORT
1/2/2003 VOLET FERROVIAIRE PROG. SECTOR
1/2/2003 VOLET FERROVIAIRE PROG. SECTOR
12/1/2000 RÉHABILITATION D'UN NAVIRE DE CROISIÈRE FLUVIALE - NIGER 2000
REPARATION DU BATEAU FLUVIAL "TOMBOCTU"
AIR TRANSPORT
BAMAKO-SENOU AIRPORT EXPANSION
12/1/2000 1/12/2005 FONDS ETUDES SECTORIEL TRANSPORT
AT SYSTEME LOGICIELS INFORMATIQUES
ROUTES: PG PASEC-T & ENTRET.PERIOD.
TRANSP. ROUTIER: APPUI AU PRGM SECTORIEL
REFECTION DE LA ROUTE BOULSA - TOUGOURI
ROUTES LIPTAKO GOURMA (ETUDE)
ETUDE ENTRETIEN PERIODIQUE ROUTE
04.01.2001 1/11/2004 REHABILITATION NATIONAL ROAD 16 FROM PK 91 UNTIL FRONTIER WITH TOGO
0.75
PROGRAMME ROUTIER
REHABILITATION MOTEURS LOCOMOTIVES
Commit.
Year
Donor Name
Agency
Recipient Name
Commitment Grant
Date
Element
Amount
US$(000)
1998
2000
2000
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2000
2001
2000
2001
EC
EC
EC
Japan
EC
Japan
Japan
EC
Germany
Germany
Japan
Japan
France
Japan
France
France
France
France
EDF
EDF
EDF
MOFA
EDF
MOFA
MOFA
EDF
KFW
GTZ
MOFA
MOFA
AFD
MOFA
MAE
MAE
MAE
MAE
CENTRAL AFR. REP. 1/12/1998
CENTRAL AFR. REP.12/31/2000
CENTRAL AFR. REP.12/31/2000
CENTRAL AFR. REP. 12/8/1998
CENTRAL AFR. REP. 1/12/1998
CENTRAL AFR. REP. 6/6/1999
CENTRAL AFR. REP.12/21/1999
CENTRAL AFR. REP.12/31/1999
CENTRAL AFR. REP. 3/31/2000
CENTRAL AFR. REP.12/31/2000
CENTRAL AFR. REP. 5/25/2000
CENTRAL AFR. REP. 3/7/2000
CENTRAL AFR. REP. 1/3/2001
CENTRAL AFR. REP. 7/20/2001
CENTRAL AFR. REP.12/31/2000
CENTRAL AFR. REP.12/31/2001
CENTRAL AFR. REP.12/31/2000
CENTRAL AFR. REP.12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
20,944
922
4,608
9,679
50
10,123
202
288
4,241
10
8,210
9,165
2,687
7,893
314
229
314
229
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
100
83
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
80
80
100
100
100
100
100
82
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
4
4,612
20
15
108
2
22
100
8
9
5
11
260
74
100
9
69
23
7
24
22,735
41
3
6
1,014
9,710
309,200
25,095
67,107
27,961
134,213
3,902
36,488
5,085
6
106
425
12
59
28
18
37
101
139
24
First
Repay
Date
1/1/1900
Final
Repay
Date
Interest
Expected Expected
Starting
Completion
Date
Date
Short Description
APPUI PGM SECTORIEL DES TRANSPORTS
REHABILITATION ROUTE BOUAR GARO
APPUI AU PROGRAMME SECTORIEL DES TRANSPORTS
NATIONAL ROADS CONSTRUCTION PROJECT
AUDIT DU FONDS ROUTIER
CONSTRUCT BITUMEN ON NATIONAL ROADS
RECONSTRUCTION OF BRIDGE:NATL ROAD 1
ROUTES:AT APPUI INSTITUTIONNEL
1/5/2000 1/4/2003 LIM-BRIDGE REHABILITATION
ROAD TRANSPORT
RECONSTRUCTION OF BRIDGE ON NATIONAL ROUTE1
CONSTRUCTION FOR BITUMEN ON NATIONAL ROADS
1/3/2001 1/12/2004 CONSTRUCTION DE 2 OUVRAGES D'ART
PROJECT OF CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL ROUTE NO3
WATER TRANSPORT
TRANSPORTS
EDUC./TRNG IN TRANSPORT & STORAGE
TRANSPORTS
1/1/1900
East Africa:
1998
1998
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
Sweden
Sida
AfDF
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Italy
DGCS
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Germany
KFW
Netherlands
MFA
Netherlands
MFA
Netherlands
MFA
United KingdomDFID
Japan
MOFA
IDA
AfDF
EC
EDF
EC
EDF
EC
EDF
United KingdomDFID
Japan
MOFA
Belgium
MF
Italy
DGCS
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
1/1/1998
12/16/1998
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
2/8/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
1/6/1998
1/7/1998
1/7/1998
1/7/1998
12/31/1998
7/9/1998
1/15/1998
6/17/1998
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
1/6/1999
7/7/1999
11/7/2000
3/14/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
1/1/1900 1/1/1900
12/16/200812/16/2048
5/15/200811/15/2037
6/17/2008 6/17/2038
11/7/2010 11/7/2030
01.01.1998 1/9/1999 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADM. MGMT: RURAL ROADS
TRANSPORT SECTOR STUDIES
TRANSPORT: EQUIPMENT
TRANSPORT: ASSET PURCHASE & MAINTENANCE
TRANSPORT: OFFICE CONSTRUCTION
TRANSPORT: ASSET PURCHASE
DEBREWORK-COMBOLCHA ROAD
VEHICLE PURCHASE
CONSTRUCTION
TRANSPORT TRAINING
TRANSPORT POLICY / ADMIN. : ASSET PURCHASE
GUBRE LUKE ROAD CONSTRUCTION
VEHICLE MAINTENANCE
TRANSPORT POLICY : PROGRAMME RESEARCH
PILOT DISTRICTS STUDY
TRANSPORT : DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES
TRANSPORT : OFFICE CONSTRUCTION
ROAD TRANSPORT / ASSET PURCHASE & MAINTENANCE
TRANSPORT POLICY/ADMIN. : GENERAL EXPENSES
TRANSPORT : OFFICE CONSTRUCTION
TRANSPORT : OFFICE CONSTRUCTION
TRANSPORT, TRADE & TOURISM
TRANSPORT POLICY/ADMIN. : PROCUREMENT PROJECT
1/10/1998 1/12/2001 ADDIS ABABA TO GINCHI ROAD UPGRADE
1/12/1998 1/9/1999 ROAD TRANSPORT
1/3/1998 1/12/1998 GOTU WAYU RIVER BRIDGE
1/6/1998 1/4/1999 CHAKARBA RIVER PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE
10/1/1998 1/3/1999 GAMBELLA BRIDGES
TRUNK ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT
0.75
ROAD SEC. DEV. PROG.
0.75
ROAD PROJECT
ADDIS ABABA - JIMA ROAD REHABILITAT.
ADDIS ABABA - JIMA ROAD REHABILITAT.
ADDIS ABABA - WOLDIYA ROAD REHAB.
1/10/1999 1/9/2001 DISTRICT MAINT. ORGANISATIO: ROAD TRANSPORT
REHABILITATION OF TRUNK ROAD
0
FINANCEMENT DE LA LIVRAISON DE BUS
DEBREWORK-COMBOLCHA ROAD
RURAL ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
GAMBELLA BRIDGES
ROAD TRANSPORT: OFFICE CONSTRUCTION
ROAD CONSTRUCTION
FOOT BRIDGES AND PATHS
ROAD TRANSPORT: ASSET PURCHASE & MAINTENANCE
DHARAMESSA BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
GAMATO BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
BILATE BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
ROAD TRANSPORT: GRAVELLING
0.75
Commit.
Year
Donor Name
Agency
Recipient Name
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
1999
1998
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
EC
Germany
Germany
Netherlands
Sweden
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Japan
AfDF
EC
EC
United States
France
France
UNDP
Norway
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Norway
Ireland
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
EDF
KFW
GTZ
MFA
Sida
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
MOFA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
6/29/2001
12/31/2001
11/21/2001
1/1/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
8/6/2001
10/10/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/1999
12/31/1998
12/31/1999
12/31/1999
1/1/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
1/1/2001
12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
87
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
60
205
32
12
28
15
15
90
167
126
132
118
77
10
38
5
23,039
12,883
1,654
10,650
29
94
47
48
33
78
18
2
73
43
1
285
60
63
30
9
24
79
59
59
84
87
28
9,728
52,591
663
636
83
46
8
172
47
3
33
3
434
11
1998
1998
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
Belgium
Sweden
UNDP
Denmark
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Belgium
Ireland
Ireland
AGCD
Sida
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
12/31/1999
1/1/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
6/30/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
331
59
21
289
10
1
17
27
5
EDF
EDF
TDA
MAE
MAE
MFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
NORAD
DFA
DANIDA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DGIC
DFA
DFA
Commitment Grant
Date
Element
Amount
US$(000)
First
Repay
Date
Final
Repay
Date
1/3/2022
1/9/2051
1/1/1900
1/1/1900
Interest
Expected Expected
Starting
Completion
Date
Date
Short Description
ROAD TRANSPORT: GRAVELLING AND REHABILITATION
DAYE-ALO-CHIRE ROAD
ROAD TRANSPORT: NGO LOCAL FUNDING
ROAD TRANSPORT: RESHAPING
ROAD MAINTENANCE
COMMUNITY ROAD MAINTENANCE
TOWN ROAD
ABEJE ROAD CONSTRUCTION
MEHALAMBA ROAD CONSTRUCTION
BUI ROAD CONSTRUCTION
TORA ROAD CONSTRUCTION
GUNDHIRE ROAD CONSTRUCTION
KIBET ROAD CONSTRUCTION
AREDAGEBEYA ROAD
WABI BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
FOOT BRIDGES CONSTRUCTION
ROAD TRANSPORT: ASSET PURCHASE
KOMBOLCHA/MILLE ROAD REHABILITATION & UPGRADING
06/30/200104/30/2004UPGRADING OF ROAD GINCHI-AMBO & BRIDGES/CULVERTS OF ROAD AMBO-GEDO
ROAD TRANSPORT
07-19-200107/31/2003ROAD TRANSPORT
01.01.2001 1/9/2002 BLUE NILE ROAD & BRIDGE
MEHALAMBA ROAD CONSTRUCITON
BUI ROAD CONSTRUCTION
TORA ROAD CONSTRUCTION
GUNDHIRE ROAD CONSTRUCTION
KIBET ROAD CONSTRUCTION
WABI BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
FOOT BRIDGES CONSTRUCTION
MIDIREKEBDE GUGDA ROAD CONSTRUCTION
GUBRE LUKE ROAD CONSTRUCTION
ROAD TRANSPORT : NGO LOCAL FUNDING ETHIOPIA
DAYE-ALO-CHIRE ROAD
BILATE BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
GAMATO BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
FOOT BRIDGES AND PATHS
TOWN ROAD
ROAD TRANSPORT / ASSET PURCHASE & MAINTENANCE
MAINTENANCE & REHABILITATION
HAWAJA MECHA ROAD
LEKU-GORCHE ROAD
SELAM-ABERA-DARRA ROAD
RURAL ROAD CONSTRUCTION
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT
PROJECT FOR REHABILITATION OF TRUNK ROAD
0.75
BUTAJIRA - HOSSAINA -SODO ROAD PROJECT
PRE-FEASIBILITY STUDY OF THE GONDAR
ROAD TRANSPORT
WATER TRANSPORT
TRANSPORTS AERIENS
TRANSPORTS AERIENS
STRENGTH ADDIS ABABA AIRPORT PROJECT
01.01.1999 1/12/1999 EDUCATION/TRAINING IN TRANSPORT & STORAGE
TRANSPORT: TRAINING
TRANSPORT: CAPACITY BUILDING
TRANSPORT: TRAINING
01.01.2002 1/12/2006 EDUC./TRNG IN TRANSPORT & STORAGE
EDUC. /TRAINING IN TRANSPORT STORAGE : CAPACITY BUILDING
TRANSPORT COORDINATION UNIT
12.01.1998 1/8/1999 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADM. MGMT: INFRASTRUCTURE
TRANSPORT POLICY AND PLANNING
1/1/2000 12/31/2000TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - TRANSPORT AND STORAGE
TRANSPORT: ADMINISTRATION
TRANSPORT: PLANNING
TRANSPORT
06-30-2001
TRANSPORT COORDINATION UNIT
CONSTRUCTION OF SCHOOLS
TRANSPORT POLICY : DISTRICT ENGINEER'S OFFICE
Commit.
Year
Donor Name
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
1999
1999
1999
1999
2001
2001
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Germany
KFW
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
Japan
MOFA
EC
EDF
EC
EDF
Germany
KFW
United KingdomDFID
IDA
EC
EDF
EC
EDF
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
AfDF
EC
EDF
EC
EDF
United KingdomDFID
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Ireland
DFA
Spain
MISC
IDA
EC
EDF
Germany
KFW
Germany
KFW
Belgium
AGCD
Norway
NORAD
United States TDA
United States TDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
1/3/1998
1/5/1998
12/31/1998
11/24/1998
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
9/1/1999
1/11/1999
6/29/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
9/13/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
3/7/2001
12/31/2001
1/1/1999
9/1/1999
1/12/1999
1/1/1999
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
80
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
83
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
80
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
1999
1999
1998
United KingdomDFID
EC
EDF
Belgium
AGCD
RWANDA
RWANDA
RWANDA
1/4/1999
12/31/1999
1/12/1998
100
100
100
32
426
-
1/1/2001
1/1/1999
12/31/1998
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
100
100
100
100
100
60
162
6
89
89
Agency
1998-2001 No Projects:
Recipient Name
Commitment Grant
Date
Element
Amount
US$(000)
First
Repay
Date
Final
Repay
Date
6
11
3
5
9
27,566
1,607
36
5,623
12
89
5,448
162
90,980
1/9/2009 1/3/2039
1,225
1,492
38
182
12
2
106
25
2
1
147
19,781 9/13/2010 9/13/2050
33,730
8
1,152
27
3
13
5
95
60
59
7
9
1
12
64,520 9/15/2011 3/15/2041
71
1,634
4,323
17
11
3
288
Interest
Expected Expected
Starting
Completion
Date
Date
Short Description
01.07.1998 1/6/2001
1/6/1998 1/11/1998
6/1/1998 1/11/1998
3/1/1998 12/1/2002
1/10/1999 1/10/2001
0.75
0.75
0.75
04.01.1996 1/6/2000
2/1/2000 1/1/2004
01.01.1999 1/12/1999
1/6/1999
TRANSPORT POLICY : CAST YARD IMPROVEMENT
TRANSPORT POLICY : CONSTRUCTION OF WORKS OFFICES
TRANSPORT POLICY : PLANNING
AGRICULTURAL INPUTS : ADMINISTRATION
TRAINING AND MOBILISATION
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
TRANSPORT POLICY/ADMIN.: SUPPORT OFFICE & STUDIES
MAINTENANCE/STRENGTM. ROAD NETWORK
MAIN ROAD NETWORK:EMERGENCY ASSIST.
MAIN ROAD NETWORK: UGANDA
IMPROVEMT OF TRUNK ROADS IN KAMPALA
ROAD:COMPAR. STUDY BETWEEN THE N & S
ROAD: STRENGTH. NORTHERN CORRIDOR
ROAD NETWORK MAINTEN./STRENGTHENING
INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT: ROAD TRANSPORT
ROADS DEVT PROGRAM
FEASIBILITY STUDY KAMPALA BY-PASS
FEASIBILITY STUDY N. CORRIDOR ROAD
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
ROAD TRANSPORT: CONSTRUCTION TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT
ROAD TRANSPORT: MONITORING AND SUPERVISION
ACTUAL ROAD WORKS
ROAD TRANSPORT: CONSTRUCTION OF WORKS YARD
ROAD TRANSPORT: IMPROVING OPERATION
CONSULTANCY ON FEEDER ROADS
REHABILITATION OF FEEDER ROADS
ROADS MAINTENANCE AND UPGRADING PROJECT
STRENGTHENING OF NORTHERN CORRIDOR ROAD
ROAD TRANSPORT: COMPARATIVES STUDY BETWEEN THE N & S
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
REHABILITATION OF ROADS
ROAD TRANSPORT : ADMINISTRATION
ECONOMIC POLICY / PLAN : VALLEY TANKS, CRASHES AND DIPS
ROAD TRANSPORT : EXTENSION SERVICES, TRAINING
ROAD TRANSPORT : MARKET, INFORMATION STRATEGY
AGRICULTURAL INPUTS : ADMINISTRATION
ROAD TRANSPORT : CONSTRUCTION OF WORKS YARD
ROAD TOOLS AND EQUIPMENTS
EDUCATION FACILITIES/TRAINING : ROAD WORKS
HEALTH POLICY/ADMIN. : OFFICE AND PROGRAM SUPPORT
REHABILITATION OF FEEDER ROADS
ROAD TRANSPORT : CONSTRUCT DIST.WORKS OFFICES
ROAD TRANSPORT : PROD OF CULVERTS & INSTALLATION
ROAD TRANSPORT : EQUIPMENT
ROAD TRANSPORT : TRAINING
ROAD TRANSPORT
ROAD DEVELOPMENT
TA TO ROAD AGENCY FORMATION UNIT - ROAD SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
LOCOMOTIVES REHAB.,UGANDA RAILWAYS
RAILWAY FREIGHT WAGONS GEN. OVERHAUL
INLAND WATER TRANSPORT
AIR TRANSPORT
ENTEBBE AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT
ENTEBBE AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT
1/5/2001 VEHICLE KIGALI: ROAD TRANSPORT
TRANSP. ROUTIER: ETUDE TECHNIQUE POUR REHABILITATION
AEROPORT DE KIGALI FONCTIONNEMENT
BURUNDI
Southern Africa:
2001
1999
1998
1998
1998
Denmark
MFA
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
EC
EDF
EC
EDF
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
1/1/2001 12/31/2001TECHNICAL COOPERATION : TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS
1/3/1999 1/7/1999 HAULAGE COSTS STUDY
11/1/1998 1/11/1998 RURAL PUBLIC WORKS
CHIKWAWA-BANGULA ROAD-DESIGN & PREP.
ROAD: PREPAR. OF TENDER/REHAB./IMP.
Amount
US$(000)
Final
Repay
Date
Expected Expected
Starting
Completion
Date
Date
Short Description
Donor Name
Agency
Recipient Name
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
EC
EC
Germany
Germany
Japan
Japan
IDA
AfDF
EC
EC
EC
EC
EC
EC
EC
EDF
EDF
KFW
GTZ
MOFA
MOFA
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
MALAWI
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
1/5/1999
12/31/1999
1/1/1999
6/3/1999
10/6/1999
12/15/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
100
80
83
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
88
37,468
6,537
1,090
500
11,756
30,000 1/12/2009 1/6/2039
18,512 12/15/200912/15/2049
19,180
15,983
4,608
2,807
124
1,586
10,707
ROAD: FEAS. STUDY: RURAL FEEDER
KARONGA-CHILUMBA-CHIWETA ROAD
06.01.1999 1/4/2001 ROAD MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME II
UNIT TO TEACH BITUMEN STREET MAINTENANCE
RECONSTRUCTION OF MANGOCHI BRIDGE
TRANSPORT: BRIDGE RECONSTRUCTION
0.75
ROAD MAINTENANCE & REHABILITATION
0.75
KARONGA-CHITIPA ROAD
ROAD REHABILITATION & CONSTRUCTION
ROAD TRANSPORT: PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME
LIMBE-THYOLO-MULOZA ROAD PROJECT
LAKESHORE ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT
LAKESHORE ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT
LAKESHORE ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT
LAKESHORE ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
2000
2001
2001
2001
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2000
1998
2000
2000
Italy
DGCS
Sweden
Sida
Italy
DGCS
Norway
NORAD
Norway
NORAD
Italy
DGCS
Denmark
DANIDA
Norway
NORAD
Norway
NORAD
Germany
KFW
Netherlands
MFA
United KingdomDFID
EC
EDF
EC
EDF
Denmark
DANIDA
Germany
KFW
Netherlands
MFA
Norway
NORAD
Norway
NORAD
Norway
NORAD
Japan
MOFA
Japan
MOFA
EC
EDF
Norway
NORAD
Japan
MOFA
EC
EDF
Norway
NORAD
Norway
NORAD
Norway
NORAD
Norway
NORAD
Japan
MOFA
IDA
Belgium
AGCD
Belgium
MF
EC
EDF
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
12/31/1998
1/3/1998
11/22/1999
3/21/1999
2/25/1999
8/30/2000
7/3/2001
1/1/2001
1/1/2001
1/5/1998
1/7/1998
2/23/1998
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
1/6/1999
1/12/1999
1/7/1999
6/9/1999
4/23/1999
3/12/1999
3/3/1999
5/5/1999
12/31/1999
9/15/2000
6/30/2000
12/31/2000
5/14/2001
4/23/2001
11/14/2001
11/14/2001
8/23/2001
11/16/2000
1/12/1998
7/18/2000
12/31/2000
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
78
100
82
100
5
277
1/1/1900 1/1/1900
1
2
11
2,398
30
21
1,137
252
23
2,125
27,402
2,794
35,409
10
6
834
1,924
316
12,976
27,704
88
10,019
15
53
99
1,760
400
20,889
27,000
1/4/2011 1/10/2035
4
4,700 7/18/2010 7/18/2030
369
TRANSPORT:LUSAKA RADAR SYSTEM
03.01.1998 1/12/2000 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADM. MGMT: SUGAR CANE REC. FOR DEVELOPMENT
TRANSPORT:LUSAKA RADAR SYSTEM
01.01.1999 1/12/1999 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
01.01.1999 1/12/1999 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
TRANSPORT: LUSAKA RADAR SYSTEM
1/3/2001 03/31/2002TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE
01.01.2001 1/12/2001 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
01.01.2001 1/12/2001 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
1/6/1998 1/9/1998 MANYINGA-MWINI LUNGA ROAD
1/1/1997 1/12/1999 LABOUR INTENSIVE ROAD REHAB.
ROAD:TRAINING WORKSHOP
TECHNICAL ASSIST. TO ROADS
REHAB. OF THE MONZE-ZIMBA ROAD
08/31/99 12/31/1999MAINTAIN AND PROTECT PARTS OF THE LUSAKA-MONGU ROAD
1/3/1900 1/8/1903 ROAD REHABILITATION (LIVINGSTONE SESHEKE KATIMA)
1/11/1999 1/1/2000 ROAD TRANSPORT
01.01.1999 1/12/1999 ROAD TRANSPORT
01.01.1999 1/12/1999 SUPPORT TO ROAD SECTOR
01.01.1999 1/12/1999 SUPPORT TO ROAD SECTOR
CONSTRUCTION OF THE CHIRUNDU BRIDGE
CHIRUNDU BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
ROAD TRANSP: REHABILITATION
12.31.200012/31/2000ROAD TRANSPORT: FINANCING REVIEW AND WORKSHOP
IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF LUSAKA CITY ROADS
PROJECT FORMULATION "ESSENTIAL ROAD"
01.01.2000 1/12/2001 AXLE LOAD CONTROL
01.01.2000 1/12/2001 ROAD TRANSPORT: MUNALI HILLS
01.01.2001 1/12/2001 SUPPORT TO ROAD SECTOR
01.01.2001 1/12/2002 EMERGENCY REPAIR CHIPATA-MFUWE ROAD
PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF LUSAKA CITY ROADS
0.75
RAILWAYS RESTRUCTURING PROJECT
REHABILIT. LUSAKA AIRPORT
0
ÉQUIPEMENT D'URGENCE ET DE SÉCURITÉ À L'AÉROPORT DE LUSAKA
FEASIBILITY STUDY LIVINGSTONE AIRPORT
2000
2001
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
1998
1998
2000
2000
Denmark
DANIDA
Sweden
Sida
Japan
MOFA
Denmark
DANIDA
Denmark
DANIDA
Japan
MOFA
Japan
MOFA
AfDB
United KingdomDFID
Belgium
AGCD
France
NATEXIS
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
1/1/2000
1/1/2001
5/7/1998
1/1/1999
1/6/1999
3/3/1999
6/11/1999
3/3/1999
12/31/2000
1/12/1998
1/4/1998
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
66
100
100
79
100
100
200
9
4,270
285
688
316
12,976
15,787
12
37
848
7
62
1/1/2000 12/31/2000TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - TRANSPORT AND STORAGE
01.01.2001 1/6/2001 AUDIT TRANSPORT
SUPPLY OF ROAD PARING EQUIPMENT
12/31/2009ROAD PROGRAMME PREPARATION
06/30/99 12/31/1999CREATE BASIS FOR REHABILITATION OF HARARE NYAMAPANDA ROAD
CONSTRUCTION OF THE CHIRUNDU BRIDGE
CHIRUNDU BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
0
BUCHWA - RUTENGA ROAD PROJECT
ROAD TRANSPORT
REHABILITATION KARIBA FAST BOATS
0.25
RADAR METEOROLOGIQUE,AF
AIR TRANSPORT
AIR TRANSPORT
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
EDF
Commitment Grant
Date
Element
First
Repay
Date
Commit.
Year
3/3/2004
3/3/2019
1/2/2006 1/12/2029
Interest
Expected Expected
Starting
Completion
Date
Date
Short Description
1999
2000
1999
2000
2000
Sweden
Sida
Sweden
Sida
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
United States TDA
BOTSWANA
BOTSWANA
BOTSWANA
BOTSWANA
BOTSWANA
1/11/1999
1/1/2000
1/12/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
100
100
100
100
100
2
151
49
45
157
1998
2000
2000
2000
1998
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
Sweden
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
EC
EC
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
LESOTHO
1/6/1998
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
1/12/1998
12/31/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
6
83
24
16
89
40,170
63
275
25
62
180
106
67
9
6
917
299
377
171
1999
2000
2001
2001
2001
2000
AfDB
EC
Japan
Japan
AfDB
Italy
SWAZILAND
SWAZILAND
SWAZILAND
SWAZILAND
SWAZILAND
SWAZILAND
10/20/1999
12/31/2000
1/29/2001
1/29/2001
10/10/2001
1/19/2000
66
100
64
80
67
93
15,378
46
29,761
6,551
9,487
784
10/20/200410/20/2019
0
2/20/2011 2/20/2031
2/20/2011 2/20/2041
1/2/2007 1/8/2021
9/23/2027 9/23/2040
2.2
0.75
0
0.25
5/4/1999
9/27/1999
11/29/2000
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
1/7/1999
3/6/1999
12/31/2000
7/2/2000
6/20/2000
12/31/2001
12/31/1999
12/31/2000
1/12/1998
1/12/1998
1/12/1999
1/12/2000
14
87
17
100
100
100
80
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
1,500
52,000
1,500
3
328
109
88,000
28
390
28,673
315
88
5
3
7
319
16
5/12/2000 5/6/2001
9/27/2039 9/27/2039
11/29/2002 5/29/2003
1
1
1
8/15/2009 2/15/2039
0.75
AG
MOFA
MOFA
MISC
TDA
TDA
AGCD
AGCD
AGCD
DGIC
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
OECF
OECF
TDA
PARAGUAY
PARAGUAY
PARAGUAY
PARAGUAY
PARAGUAY
PARAGUAY
6/3/2000
6/3/2000
3/17/2001
8/10/1998
8/10/1998
12/31/2001
3
19
29
54
57
100
65,100
6/3/2000 3/30/2002
1,900
6/3/2000 6/3/2020
100,000 3/17/2007 3/17/2021
132,131 8/20/2005 8/20/2023
16,287 8/20/2005 8/20/2023
3
6.37
6.37
5.58
2.7
2.3
1/4/2001
1/7/2000
100
100
2/26/2001
73
19,902 6/15/200912/15/2032
8/22/2000
10/26/1998
10/26/1998
80
67
80
22,000 12/15/2010 6/15/2040
38,014 10/20/200810/20/2028
2,093 10/20/200810/20/2038
Sida
DFA
DFA
DFA
EDF
EDF
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
DFA
EDF
JBIC
JBIC
MC
Recipient Name
Amount
US$(000)
Final
Repay
Date
Donor Name
Agency
Commitment Grant
Date
Element
First
Repay
Date
Commit.
Year
Interest
1/11/1999 1/5/2000 PLAN TRAFFIC SAFETY
01.01.2000 1/3/2001 TRANSPORT POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MGMT : INFRASTRUCTURE
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
TRAINING: RADAR DATA PROCESSING
1/1/1900
1/1/1900
06.01.1998 1/7/1998 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADM. MGMT: AUDIT
TRANSPORT: PHUTHA MALEFILOANA
TRANSPORT: INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENT
FOOTBRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
FEAS. STUDY ON ROAD SAFETY IMPROVEMT
ROAD TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE PRGM
ROAD TRANSPORT: WHITEHILL TEBELLONG
ROAD TRANSPORT: PHUTHA MALEFILOANA
ROAD TRANSPORT: NEW PROJECTS
ROAD TRANSPORT: PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
ROAD CONSTRUCTION
FOOTBRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
ROAD TRANSPORT: PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
ROAD TRANSPORT: NGO LOCAL FUNDING
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
WATER SUPPLY LARGE SYSTEMS : LABOUR BASED ROAD CONSTRUCTION
RURAL FOOTBRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
CROSS-DRAINAGE STRUCTURES
ROAD TRANSPORT : CAPACITY BUILDING
TWO INTERNATIONAL ROADS PROJECT
ROAD: MAPHOBENI LOW LEVEL BRIDGE
1/6/2002 06/30/2005ROAD CONSTRUCTION
1/6/2002 06/30/2005ROAD CONSTRUCTION
2 ROADS PROJECT
REHABILITATION OF GOPA RAILWAYS
Latin America:
1999
1999
2000
2001
2001
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2001
1999
2000
1998
1998
1999
2000
IDB Sp F
IDB Sp F
IDB Sp F
United States
United States
Netherlands
IDA
Spain
Japan
Japan
Spain
United States
United States
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
2000
2000
2001
1998
1998
2001
IDB
IDB
IDB
Japan
Japan
United States
TDA
TDA
MFA
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSPORT: MODERNIZATION
TRANSPORT: MODERNIZATION
1/9/1999 1/12/1999 ROAD TRANSPORT
ABAPO-CAMIRI HIGHWAY
ROAD TRANSPORT
IMPROVEMENT OF ROAD NORTH-WEST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SANTA CRUZ
CONSTRUCTION OF ROAD NORTH-WEST OF SANTA CRUZ
ROAD TRANSPORT
RAIL TRANSPORT
AIQUILLE-SANTA CRUZ RAILROAD INTERCONNECTION
AMELIORATION NAVIG. RIVIERES ICHILO
CONSTRUCTION PORT GUAYARAMERIN
CONSTRUCTION PORT GUAYARAMERIN SURVEILLANCE
TRANSPORT PAR VOIE D'EAU : CONSTRUCTION PORT GUAYARAMERIN SURVEILLANCE
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSPORTATION: WESTERN INTEGRATION CORRIDORS PROGRAMME
1/8/1999 08/31/2002TO SUPPORT ROAD IMPROVEMENT WORKS
1/8/1999 08/31/2002TO SUPPORT ROAD IMPROVEMENT WORKS
ASUNCION AIRPORT CONCESSION
Central Asia and the Caucasus:
2001
2000
Switzerland
Netherlands
2001
AsDF
2000
1998
1998
IDA
Japan
Japan
DDC
MFA
AFGHANISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
OECF
OECF
KYRGYZ REP.
KYRGYZ REP.
KYRGYZ REP.
119
209
1/7/2001 1/6/2003 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
1/1/2000 1/12/2000 ROAD TRANSPORT: UN APPEAL
1
0.75
1.8 6.1.99
0.75 6.1.99
ROAD REHABILITATION
URBAN TRANSPORTATION/MAINTENANCE
12/31/2001REHAB. OF THE BISHKEK-OSH ROAD
12/31/2001REHAB. OF THE BISHKEK-OSH ROAD
Commit.
Year
Donor Name
1998
2001
2001
2000
AsDF
IDA
AsDF
Canada
1999
2000
2000
2001
1999
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2000
2001
1998
1998
1999
2000
2001
IBRD
Japan
Japan
AsDB
United States
United States
United States
France
Spain
United States
United States
United States
Japan
Japan
United States
United States
United States
2000
1999
1998
2001
1998
1999
2000
2001
IBRD
AsD B
AsD B
AsDB
Germany
Japan
United States
United States
Commitment Grant
Date
Element
Amount
US$(000)
First
Repay
Date
Final
Repay
Date
Agency
Recipient Name
CIDA
KYRGYZ REP.
KYRGYZ REP.
KYRGYZ REP.
KYRGYZ REP.
12/23/1998
3/27/2001
5/31/2001
12/31/2000
78
80
72
100
KAZAKHSTAN
KAZAKHSTAN
KAZAKHSTAN
KAZAKHSTAN
TDA
KAZAKHSTAN
TDA
KAZAKHSTAN
TDA
KAZAKHSTAN
NATEXIS KAZAKHSTAN
ICO
KAZAKHSTAN
TDA
KAZAKHSTAN
TDA
KAZAKHSTAN
TDA
KAZAKHSTAN
OECF
KAZAKHSTAN
OECF
KAZAKHSTAN
TDA
KAZAKHSTAN
TDA
KAZAKHSTAN
TDA
KAZAKHSTAN
9/2/1999
12/21/2000
12/21/2000
4/6/2001
12/31/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
3/21/2001
10/4/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
12/24/1998
12/24/1998
12/31/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
21
64
80
21
100
100
100
100
54
100
100
100
64
80
100
100
100
100,000
139,981
13,442
52,000
194
125
80
409
27,400
11
25
346
158,174
10,825
19
110
3
9/15/2004 3/15/2019
12/20/201012/20/2030
12/20/201012/20/2040
4/15/200510/15/2024
11/5/2000
3/18/1999
9/12/1998
5/17/2001
1/12/1998
12/14/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
32
24
24
22
80
64
100
100
29,000
50,000
70,000
70,000
12,504
25,206
3
485
10/15/2005 4/15/2020
6/15/200312/15/2022
3/15/2004 9/15/2023
3/15/2006 9/15/2025
1/6/2009 1/12/2038
12/20/200912/20/2029
9/2/2001
12/6/2001
12/31/1999
100
78
100
3,062
40,000 1/12/2011
9
JBIC
JBIC
KFW
OECF
TDA
TDA
1998-2001 No Projects:
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
51,015 1/15/2009 7/15/2038
25,000 7/15/2011 1/15/2041
4,878 4/15/200910/15/2032
187
9/7/2009
9/7/2021
12/20/200812/20/2028
12/20/200812/20/2038
Expected Expected
Starting
Completion
Date
Date
Short Description
Interest
1
0.75
1
SECOND ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT
ROAD MAINTENANCE
ALMATY-BISHKEK REGIONAL ROAD REHABILITATION
12.20.199903/30/2001AIR TRANSPORT SAFETY & SECURITY
6.77
2.2
0.75
6.7
ROAD TRANSPORT RESTRUCTION
1/7/2001 07/31/2005IMPROVE ROAD TRANSPORTATION: ROAD NETWORK REHABILITATION
1/7/2001 07/31/2005IMPROVE ROAD TRANSPORTATION: ROAD NETWORK REHABILITATION
ALMATY-BISHKEK REGIONAL ROAD REHABILITATION
RAIL TRANSPORT
RAILWAYS RESTRUCTURING
RAILWAYS
ETUDES SCES VOYAGEURS ASTANA-ALMATY
2.5 9/7/2001 9/7/2004 SUPPLY OF TWO PASSENGERS TRAINS
RAIL TRANSPORT: EBRD RAILWAYS RESTRUCTURING
AKTAU PORT DEVELOPMENT
WATER TRANSPORT: AKTAU PORT DEVELOPMENT – OIL EXPORT ROUTES
2.2 8.1.99
12/31/2001TO IMPROVE FACILITIES OF AIRPORT
0.75 8.1.99
12/31/2001TO IMPROVE FACILITIES OF AIRPORT
AIR TRANSPORT
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
ATYRAU AIRPORT UPGRADE
5.08
URBAN TRANSPORTATION
6.31
ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT
6.42
RAILWAY REHABILITATION PROJECT
6.7
RAILWAY MODERNIZATION
0.75 01.01.99 1/12/2002 AIRPORT TERMINAL TASHKENT
2.2 1/2/2000 03/31/2002FACILITIES OF AIRPORTS IMPROVEMENT
AIRWAYS ROUTE ASSESSMENT
UZBEKISTAN AIRWAYS ROUTE ASSESSMENT
TURKMENISTAN
2001
2001
1999
Japan
IDA
UNDP
MOFA
AZERBAIJAN
AZERBAIJAN
AZERBAIJAN
2000
1998
1998
1998
1999
2001
IDA
France
France
France
UNDP
France
ARMENIA
MAE
ARMENIA
NATEXIS ARMENIA
MAE
ARMENIA
ARMENIA
MAE
ARMENIA
8/6/2000
12/31/1998
1/4/1998
12/31/1998
12/31/1999
12/31/2001
79
100
100
100
100
100
40,000 1/12/2010
9
1,017
7
25
Sida
MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA
1/10/2000
3/22/2001
9/11/2000
1/24/2000
4/6/2001
9/11/2000
4/6/2001
12/31/1999
12/31/1999
1/6/2000
100
80
100
73
100
100
100
100
100
100
317
34,000 6/15/201112/15/2040
2,829
24,180 3/15/2008 9/15/2031
13,523
4,917
7,152
16
30
2,025
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
9/22/1998
12/31/1999
1/1/2000
3/21/2000
1/7/1998
5/15/1998
1/1/1999
7/9/1999
5/24/2000
5/23/2000
12/25/2000
1/1/2001
1/2/2001
1/1/2001
5/23/2001
80
100
100
73
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
75
100
27,800 11/15/2008 5/15/2038
31
26
30,390 6/15/200812/15/2031
2,842
43,720
254
11,326
1,885
25,009
1,039
13,542
1,161
9,673 12/31/201012/31/2020
26,551
6/1/2036
0.75
1/6/2035
0.75
PROJECT FOR TRUNK ROUTE REHABILITATION
HIGHWAY
NAKHCHIVAN AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT PLAN
TRANSPORT
TRANSPORTS FERROVIAIRES
CONTROLE TRAFIC AERIEN
TRANSPORTS AERIENS
ZVARTNOTZ AIRCARGO TERMINAL
RÉSEAUX D'INFRASTRUCTURES - ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE / FORMATION
East and South Asia:
2000
2001
2000
2000
2001
2000
2001
1999
1999
2000
Sweden
IDA
Japan
AsDF
Japan
Japan
Japan
UNDP
UNDP
Sweden
1998
1999
2000
2000
1998
1998
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
IDA
Australia
Australia
AsDF
Germany
Japan
Sweden
Japan
Germany
Japan
Japan
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Japan
MOFA
MOFA
MOFA
MOFA
Sida
AusAID
AusAID
KFW
MOFA
Sida
MOFA
KFW
MOFA
MOFA
Sida
Sida
Sida
MOFA
10.01.2000 1/4/2002 ROAD MAINTENANCE
TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT
IMPROVEMENT OF ROADS IN ULAANBAATAR
1
SECOND ROAD DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF ROAD IN ULAANBAATAR
REHABILITATION OF RAILWAY FACILITIES
PROJECT FOR REHABILITATION OF RAILWAY FACILITIES
ASSISTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION
FLIGHT SAFETY EVALUATION-MIAT
06.01.2000 1/4/2003 CIVIL AVIATION
0.75
0.75
1
1/1/1999
12.01.1994
01.01.2001
02.01.2001
0 01.01.2001
TRANSPORTATION
1/1/2000 TRANSPORT: VIC. GOVT-ROAD SAFETY ADVICE
ROAD SAFETY ADVICE
TRANSPORT: GREATER MEKONG SUBREGION/EAST WEST CORRIDOR PROJECT
NATIONAL ROAD NO.6 REHABILITATION
NATIONAL ROAD BRIDGES RECONSTRUCTION
1/12/2001 ROAD TRANSPORT
IMPROVEMENT OF NATIONAL ROAD
1/4/2001 REHABILITATION OF NATIONAL ROAD
IMPROVEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ROAD ROUTE 9
IMPROVEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ROAD ROUTE 9
1/6/2005 ROAD PROJECT
1/12/2005 ROAD
1/12/2005 ROAD
PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ROAD ROUTE 9
Expected Expected
Starting
Completion
Date
Date
Short Description
Agency
Recipient Name
2001
2001
2001
1998
1999
Japan
Japan
AsDF
France
United States
JBIC
JBIC
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
12/27/2001
12/27/2001
2/16/2001
1/4/1998
12/31/1999
74
80
73
100
100
31,078 12/20/201112/20/2031
1,934 12/20/201112/20/2041
24,522
1/6/2009 1/12/2032
542
3
2001
2001
1998
1999
2000
2001
2001
Denmark
Switzerland
Switzerland
IDA
AsDF
Japan
Japan
MFA
DDC
DDC
BHUTAN
BHUTAN
BHUTAN
BHUTAN
BHUTAN
BHUTAN
BHUTAN
1/1/2001
1/6/2001
12/1/1998
12/21/1999
6/11/2000
11/1/2001
8/5/2001
100
100
100
80
73
100
100
10
242
1,959
11,600 6/15/201012/15/2039
9,640 2/15/2009 8/15/2032
403
14,099
1999
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
1998
1998
1999
2000
2001
IDA
Switzerland
DDC
Switzerland
DDC
Switzerland
DDC
Switzerland
DDC
Switzerland
DDC
Germany
KFW
Switzerland
DDC
Switzerland
DDC
Switzerland
DDC
Switzerland
DDC
United KingdomDFID
Japan
MOFA
IDA
UNDP
Germany
KFW
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
Japan
MOFA
Japan
MOFA
Switzerland
DDC
Switzerland
DDC
United KingdomDFID
United KingdomDFID
Japan
MOFA
Japan
MOFA
Japan
MOFA
France
MAE
Canada
CIDA
Japan
MOFA
France
MAE
France
MAE
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
5/14/1999
1/3/2000
1/7/2000
1/2/2000
1/6/2001
1/12/2001
2/17/1998
4/1/1998
10/1/1998
6/1/1998
12/1/1998
12/31/1998
7/6/1999
11/23/1999
12/31/1999
11/30/2000
1/3/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
10/1/2000
6/21/2000
1/11/2001
1/12/2001
1/1/2001
12/31/2001
2/15/2001
3/7/2001
8/17/2001
12/31/1998
12/31/1998
8/10/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
80
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
80
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
5,000 1/10/2009 1/4/2039
588
2,074
164
7,990
258
1,819
126
483
2,414
3,173
1,988
17,656
54,500 3/15/2010 9/15/2039
37
942
61
981
79
908
212
886
227
686
22,625
474
1,080
35,586
10,174
189
8,551
27,300
14
67
11,168
8
20
0.75
1/7/1998
1/7/1999
9/2/1999
1/7/2000
7/25/2000
1/3/2001
12/31/2000
1/30/2001
12/31/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
100
100
32
100
78
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
19
676
32,000 6/15/200412/15/2018
474
9,300 1/10/2010 1/4/2035
7
200
6,642
1,335
192
28
3
1
206
3
1/12/1998 1/12/1998 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
1/3/1999 1/2/2002 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
TRANSPORT
1/3/1999 1/2/2002 TRANSPORT: CIVIL SOCIETY
0.75
TRANSPORTATION : TRADE & TRANSPORTATION FACILITY IN SERVICES EUROPE
1/3/2001 1/3/2001 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
TOLL ROAD PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF ROAD MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT
RAIL TRANSPORT
RAILWAYS
RAILROAD DESIGN SOFTWARE
RAILROAD SAFETY EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONS
RAILWAYS
AIRPORT UPGRADE/REHABILITATION BUSINESS PLAN
AIRPORT UPGRADE/REHABILITATION BUSINESS PLAN
1/9/2001
12/31/1998
100
100
MOFA
MOFA
Amount
US$(000)
Final
Repay
Date
Donor Name
AFD
TDA
Commitment Grant
Date
Element
First
Repay
Date
Commit.
Year
Interest
1
0.75
1
0.75
1
1/3/2003 02/28/2006INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT LINK FORMATION
1/3/2003 02/28/2006INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT LINK FORMATION
RURAL ACCESS ROADS
01-Apr-98 1/4/2003 TRANSP:FORM. 2 PILOTES,4 MECANICIENS
AIR TRANSPORT
1/1/2001 12/31/2001TECHNICAL COOPERATION : TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS
1/4/1986 1/6/2020 TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
ROAD TRANSPORT
RURAL ACCESS ROADS
ROAD IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
PROJECT FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF BRIDGES
PROJECT FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF BRIDGES
10.01.2001
04.01.1989
01.01.2000
1/7/2001
1/1/1996
1/12/1997
1/1/1993
1/1/1996
7/1/1998
1/12/2004
1/6/2002
1/12/2001
1/6/2006
1/6/2020
1/8/1999
2/1/1998
1/7/2000
12/1/1998
7/1/2002
0.75
12.01.1997 1/6/2002
1/3/2000 1/2/2002
1/1/1996
1/1/1996
1/3/2001
1/7/2003
1/7/2003
1/2/2007
01.01.1989 1/3/1993
TRANSPORT: RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE
DISTRICT ROADS
HIGHWAY REHABILITATION PROJECT
COORDINATION UNIT: TRANSPORT POLICY & ADM. MGMT
TRAIL BRIDGE SUB-SECTOR PROJECT
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
ROAD UPGRADE
ROAD TRANSPORT
ARNIKO HIGTHWAY PROJECT
ROUTES : MAINTENANCE DIVISIONS
ARNIKO HIGHWAY PROJECT
RURAL ACCESS PROGRAM: ROAD TRANSPORT
CONSTRUCTION OF SINDHULI ROAD
ROAD MAINTENANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
TA FOR FEEDER ROADS
UPGRADE OF MALEKU-DHADING BESI ROAD
SUPPORT TO DOR GEO-ENVIRONMENTAL UNIT: ROAD TRANSPORT
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
RURAL ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
RURAL ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
ROAD MAINTENANCE & REHABILITATION
RURAL ACCESS PROGRAM: ROAD TRANSPORT
CONSTRUCTION OF SINDHULI ROAD
CONSTRUCTION OF SINDHULI ROAD
ARNIKO HIGHWAY REHABILITATION PROJECT
ARNIKO HIGHWAY REHABILITATION PROJECT
ROAD: RURAL ACCESS PROGRAMME
RURAL ACCESS PROGRAM: ROAD TRANSPORT
IMPROVEMENT OF INTERSECTIONS IN KATHMANDU CITY
PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF INTERSECTIONS IN KATHMANDU CITY
PROJECT FOR CONSTRUCTION OF SINDZULI ROAD
TRANSPORTS AERIENS
AIRPORTS
AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT:TRIBHUVAN
EDUC./TRNG IN TRANSPORT & STORAGE
COOPÉRATION AVEC L'INSTITUT AÉRONAUTIQUE ET SPATIAL
Southeast Europe:
1998
1999
1999
2000
2000
2001
2000
2001
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
Netherlands
Netherlands
IBRD
Netherlands
IDA
Switzerland
United States
Japan
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
MFA
MFA
DDC
TDA
MOFA
TDA
TDA
TDA
TDA
TDA
TDA
TDA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
2001
1998
Sweden
France
Sida
MAE
MOLDOVA
MOLDOVA
MFA
311
3
5.14
09.01.2001 1/6/2004 ROAD MANAGMENT
MECANIQUE ET MATERIELS DE TRANSPORT
TABLE 6:
Airport Traffic in Landlocked Developing Countries
Airports Ranked by Air Freight Tonnage Loaded, and Compared with Recent Trends and with Aid and Private Airport Investments in 1990-2001
Airport Location:
Country
Passengers
City
Year
Description
Embarked Disembarked
Freight (metric tons)
Total
Loaded
(exports)
Unloaded
(imports)
Total
Freight
Freight
Loaded as Loaded
% of Total in grams
Freight
Per Capita
22 Airports in 18 LLDCs with Data on Freight Exports and Imports, Ranked by Freight Tonnage Loaded in Latest Year:
UGANDA
ENTEBBE
2001 Total international (1+2)
1995 Total international (1+2)
91-96 $66.579 million Aid
173,313
126,872
170,409
127,463
343,722
254,335
22,791
8,448
14,332
11,323
37,123
19,771
61
43
978
363
ETHIOPIA
ADDIS ABABA
2001 Total international (1+2)
1995 Total international (1+2)
91-01 $69.364 million Aid
434,860
317,932
413,747
324,512
848,607
642,444
12,261
14,335
13,952
19,291
26,213 *
33,625
47
43
195
228
UZBEKISTAN
TASHKENT
2000 Total international (1+2)
1997 Total international (1+2)
95-97 $188.217 million Aid
623,782
541,244
1,165,026
597,768
9,433
10,947
13,412
19,964
22,845
30,911
41
35
379
440
NEPAL
KATHMANDU
2001
1995
1995
1993
90-97
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
Total international (1+2) 461,282 *
Tot commercl(1+2+4)
704,710 *
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
$77.850 million Aid
15,866 A
12,948
13,851 *
19,188 A
n.a.
58
60
n.a.
n.a.
326
360
n.a.
2002
2001
2000
95-01
2001
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
Total international (1+2) 372,712
346,601
Total international (1+2) 247,452 *
221,028 *
$1.953 million Aid
$50 million private participation concession
7,397
10,355
11,368 *
n.a.
39
45
n.a.
1,060
1,345
ARMENIA
YEREVAN
KYRGYZSTAN
BISHKEK
2001 Total international (1+2)
1996 Total international (1+2)
96-97 $54.412 million Aid
KAZAKHSTAN
ALMATY
1996 Total international (1+2)
1995 Total international (1+2)
97 $0.066 million Aid
112,565
59,085
406,980 *
652,724 *
100,346
53,140
1,849,766
868,262
1,357,434
1,137,673
A
*
*
A
7,501 *
8,288 *
5,447 *
5,563 *
826,170 A
719,313
468,480 *
4,013
5,092 *
6,342
6,277 *
212,911
112,225
1,456
595
6,443
942
7,900 *
1,537
18
39
296
121
1,235
3,349
16,003 +
4,584
n.a.
27
n.a.
76
484,557 +
276,364
PARAGUAY
ASUNCION
1999 Total international (1+2)
1996 Total international (1+2)
(No Aid Projects)
201,969
242,599
176,460
233,084
378,429
475,683
1,141
1,537
4,973
4,730
6,114
6,267
19
25
208
280
MONGOLIA
ULAN BATOR
2001 Total international (1+2)
1999 Total international (1+2)
93-95 $41.155 million Aid
94,072
70,536
83,511
63,132
177,583
133,668
973
987
1,557
1,086
2,530
2,073
38
48
384
390
TABLE 6: Page 2:
Freight
Freight
Airport Location:
Passengers
Description
Country
City
Year
UZBEKISTAN
SAMARKAND
2000 Total international (1+2)
15,597
12,767
28,364
BOLIVIA
SANTA CRUZ
2001 Total international (1+2)
145,480
145,480 *
290,960 *
BOLIVIA
LA PAZ
2001 Total international (1+2) 143,911
143,911 *
287,822 *
765 *
1,664 *
2,429
94 $35.959 million Aid
96 $116.6 miliion private participation concession covering all 3 airports, mainly passenger terminals.
MALAWI
LILONGWE
2001
2000
1995
96
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
$0.821 million Aid
Embarked Disembarked
Freight (metric tons)
62,656
60,140
58,919
58,691
234,007
211,195
216,758
213,185
27,953
30,079
31,800
35,100
41,961
35,175
Total
114,000 +
121,575
118,831
21
99
31
92
2,500 +
3,828
2,370
n.a.
18
31
n.a.
61
66
2,293
4,464
9,609 +
29
60
n.a.
326
1,320
n.a.
n.a.
10
26
n.a.
54
136
83,000 +
84,043
72,037
342
426
1,449
1,952
1,100 +
1,792
2,378
n.a.
19
18
n.a.
32
39
318
510
717
307
1,083
1,649
1,226
1,520
1,401
2,159
1,943
1,826
23
24
37
17
74
119
167
71
240
1,813
3,079
4,599
2,560 A
3,319 *
6,413
n.a.
7
28
n.a.
38
285
90
105
255
216
345
321
26
33
8
9
Total commercial air transport (1+2+4)
Total commercial (1+2+4) 42,082
Total commercial air transport
36,862
(1+2+4)
$0.260 million Aid
MOLDOVA, REP. OF KISHINEV
2001
2000
1998
1997
98
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
$0.003 million Aid
132,525
126,198
131,741
142,505
140,273
128,036
133,003
138,983
BURUNDI
2002 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
2001 Total international (1+2)
24,967
1995 Total international (1+2)
32,943
(No Aid Projects)
26,848
30,470
75,807 A
51,815
63,413
29,190
16,211
53,426
31,355
Passengers
3,992 *
2,300 +
4,270 *
4,214
2000
1998
1995
95
TABLE 6: Page 3:
Airport Location:
3,168 *
3,842
3,139
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
$13.483 million Aid
24,236
15,144
35
427
1,075
2000
1997
1996
90-01
2000 Total international (1+2)
1995 Total international (1+2)
96 $0.821 million Aid
94
17,000 +
59,753
65,179
N'DJAMENA
BLANTYRE
919
1,630
1,779
CHAD
MALAWI
52
663
2,685
2001 Total international (1+2)
1997 Total international (1+2)
1995 Total international (1+2)
2000 $0.209 million Aid
BUJUMBURA
824 *
Total
3,136
1,630
SKOPJE
NIAMEY
867
Unloaded
(imports)
692
741
FYR MACEDONIA
NIGER
Loaded
(exports)
Loaded as Loaded
% of Total in grams
Freight
Per Capita
450,765
424,380
580,918 +
272,798
254,234
264,744
281,488
Freight (metric tons)
Freight
Loaded as
% of Total
Freight
Loaded
in grams
Country
City
Year
Description
LAO P.DEM.REP.
VIENTIANE
2001
1998
1995
92-96
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
$56.170 million Aid
Embarked Disembarked
Total
Loaded
(exports)
Unloaded
(imports)
Total
Freight
70,682 *
58,280 *
68,152 *
56,724 *
190,000 +
138,834 *
115,004 *
87 *
31 *
663 *
111 *
700 +
751 *
142 *
65,236 *
83 *
112 *
28
537
SWAZILAND
MANZINI
1995 Total international (1+2)
94 $0.048 million Aid
31,744 *
33,492 *
FYR MACEDONIA
OHRID
2001 Total international (1+2)
1996 Total international (1+2)
26,429
50,743
23,722
50,448
50,151
101,191
8
198
Per Capita
n.a.
12
22
n.a.
16
6
195
43
90
36
736
22
27
4
97
7 Other LLDC Airports with Data Only on Total Freight (Loaded + Unloaded):
ZIMBABWE
HARARE
2002 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
2001 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
1999 Tot commercl(1+2+4)
638,343 *
629,549 A
790,001 A
637,412 *
1995 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
37,416 A
29,436 A
1,275,755 *
1,144,475 A
13,060 A
90-95 $24.807 million Aid
ZAMBIA
LUSAKA
2002
2001
1995
1990
90-96
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
$13.045 million Aid
RWANDA
KIGALI
2002 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
2001 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
1995 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
90-97 $0.722 million Aid
BURKINA FASO
OUAGADOUGOU 2002
2001
1997
1990
96
MALI
BAMAKO
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
$2.443 million Aid
2002 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
2001 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
1997 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
93-01 $3.980 million Aid
TABLE 6: Page 4:
Airport Location:
Country
392,285
433,521
304,252
589,667
Year
Description
15,625
24,935
7,075
14,393
5,818 A
6,671 A
7,997 A
193,283
208,055
278,126
201,023
4,437
4,918
7,327
9,694
A
A
A
A
336,508 A
363,889 A
363,352 A
Embarked Disembarked
A
A
A
A
113,336 A
112,509 A
83,834 A
Passengers
City
A
A
A
A
1,391 A
4,534 A
5,515 A
Freight (metric tons)
Total
A
A
A
A
Loaded
Unloaded
Total
Freight
Freight
Loaded as Loaded
% of Total in grams
Freight
Per Capita
(exports)
CENTRAL AFR. REP. BANGUI
2002
2001
1995
1990
90-01
KAZAKHSTAN
2002 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
2001 Total: Loaded and Unloaded
ASTANA
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
Total: Loaded and Unloaded
$2.590 million Aid
45,681
56,038
71,405
78,614
(imports)
A
A
A
A
340,907 A
299,177 A
4 Other LLDC Airports with Data Only on Passenger Traffic:
BOTSWANA
GABORONE
2001 Total international (1+2)
1995 Total international (1+2)
91-00 $5.867 million Aid
87,828
62,900
86,897
62,315
174,725
125,215
BOLIVIA
COCHABAMBA
2001 Total international (1+2)
92 $16.234 million Aid
54,300
54,300 *
108,600 *
BOTSWANA
MAUN
2001 Total international (1+2)
1995 Total international (1+2)
18,827
10,548
17,995
9,314
36,822
19,862
LESOTHO
MASERU
2001
2000
1997
1995
92
13,515
10,205
15,026
14,988
12,071
15,615
29,000 +
28,503
22,276
30,641
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
Total international (1+2)
$0.172 million Aid
5 LLDCs with Airport Traffic Unreported:
AFGHANISTAN
(No Traffic Data Avail.)
(No Aid Projects)
AZERBAIJAN
(No Traffic Data Avail.)
$14.719 million Aid
BHUTAN
(No Traffic Data Avail.)
$0.410 million Aid
92
TAJIKISTAN
(No Traffic Data Avail.)
$4.105 million Aid
95
TURKMENISTAN
(No Traffic Data Avail.)
95-01
(No Aid Projects)
Notes:
Source: ICAO Air Transport Reporting Form I, except as otherwise noted.
(1+2) = scheduled + non-scheduled international flights; (+4) = +domestic scheduled and non-scheduled flights.
*
estimated data.
+ data from other sources.
A = data from Airports Council International (ACI).
Data on Aid to Airports is from Table 7 of this report, and that on Private Participation Investments in Airports is from the PPI database.
1,295
1,613
3,057
5,317
A
A
A
A
1,309 A
1,331 A
TABLE 7: Commitments of Official Development Finance for the Airport Sector in 31 Landlocked Developing Countries, by Individual Project and Donor, 1990-2001
Source: OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System
Commit.
Year
Donor Name Agency
Recipient Name
Commitment Grant
Date
Element
AFGHANISTAN
(NO PROJECTS)
1995
1995
1998
1998
1999
2001
France
Netherlands
France
France
UNDP
France
NATEXIS
M.F.A.
NATEXIS
MAE
MAE
ARMENIA
ARMENIA
ARMENIA
ARMENIA
ARMENIA
ARMENIA
1996
1997
Germany
Germany
KFW
KFW
AZERBAIJAN
AZERBAIJAN
1992
Australia
AusAID
Amount
US$(000)
1/8/1995
1/7/1995
1/4/1998
12/31/1998
12/31/1999
12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
100
1/11/1996
1/7/1997
81
80
BHUTAN
1/4/1992
100
410
BURUNDI
(NO PROJECTS)
1/6/1992
1/6/1992
1/7/1992
1/3/1992
1/10/1994
1/1/1994
1/9/1994
1/12/1995
100
100
65
70
100
100
100
100
3,074
856
16,234
2,353
901
1,272
34,687
56
1/1/1991
1/1/1992
12/31/1993
12/31/2000
100
100
100
100
5,184
472
54
157
1991
1992
1993
2000
United Kingdom
DFID
France
NATEXIS
EC
EDF
United States TDA
BOTSWANA
BOTSWANA
BOTSWANA
BOTSWANA
1996
France
AFD
BURKINA FASO
1/4/1996
51
2,443
2000
2001
1990
1994
1995
1995
1995
France
France
EC
EC
France
France
CEC (EDF)
MAE
MAE
EDF
EDF
AFD
AFD
EDF
CENTRAL AFR. REP.
12/31/2000
CENTRAL AFR. REP.
12/31/2001
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.12/31/1990
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.12/31/1994
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.
1/4/1995
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. 1/11/1995
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.12/31/1995
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
314
229
61
42
942
1,002
-
1990
1991
1991
1993
1994
1999
2000
2001
France
France
France
France
EC
France
France
France
FAC
AFD
FAC
FAC
EDF
MAE
MAE
MAE
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
CHAD
1/1/1990
1/10/1991
1/7/1991
1/2/1993
12/31/1994
12/31/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
6,886
3,546
2,260
265
83
204
209
30
1991
1996
1996
1998
TABLE 7:
Commit.
AfDB
Netherlands MFA
AfDF
France
MAE
(continued) page 2
1/3/1991
7/1/1996
1/10/1996
12/31/1998
12
100
83
100
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
Commitment Grant
Expected Expected
Starting
Completion
Date
Date
Short Description
Interest
11/1/1995
6,646
1/6/2008 1/6/2036
8,073 1/12/2007 1/12/2037
Italy
Italy
Italy
Spain
France
Japan
Japan
Italy
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
BOLIVIA
Final
Repay
Date
902
2
1,017
7
25
1992
1992
1992
1992
1994
1994
1994
1995
DGCS
DGCS
MC
ICO
NATEXIS
MOFA
MOFA
D.G.C.S
First
Repay
Date
1
1
3/1/1996
CONTROLE DU TRAFIC AERIEN
1/11/1995 AIR TRANSPORT
CONTROLE TRAFIC AERIEN
TRANSPORTS AERIENS
ZVARTNOTZ AIRCARGO TERMINAL
RÉSEAUX D'INFRASTRUCTURES - ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE / FORMATION
1/12/1997 EMERGENCY AID AIRPORT BAKU
BAKU AIRPORT
AIR NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT, AF
1/7/2003
1/3/2002
1/1/2013
1/9/2018
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL/RADIO SYSTEM
FLIGHT CONTROLLERS /TECHNICIANS TR.
AIRPORT EXTENSION, COCHAMBA
ELECTRIC AIRPORT EQUIPMENT, AF
AIR TRANSPORT SURVEY
AIRPORT MODERNISATION, LA PAZ
EL ALTO AIRPORT MODERNISATION
AIRPORT GUIDANCE SYSTEMS
2
1
FLIGHT INFORMATION PROJECT
AIRPORT EQUIPMENT, GABORONE
EVALUATION OF KASANE AIRPORT PROJECT
TRAINING: RADAR DATA PROCESSING
1/4/2003 1/10/2011
40,338
1/7/1996 1/1/2011
228
28,041 1/10/2006 1/10/2046
46
First
Final
Amount
Repay
Repay
2
5/1/1996
5/1/1995
12/1/1995
1196
8
1/5/2001 INFRASTRUCTURES AEROPORTUAIRES
EDUC./TRNG IN TRANSPORT & STORAGE
TRANSPORTS
ET TRANSP AERIEN DE FRET
REALISATION PRISES VUE VILLE BAMBARI
1/5/2000 TRAVAUX URGENCE FLOTTE ACCF
1/12/2000 REFECT. CHAUS. AEROP. DE BERBERAT
AIR TRANSPORT
AIRPORTS
CHAD SECONDARY AIRPORT
FAYA LARGEAU AIRPORT
N'DJAMENA AIRPORT SECURITY
ETUDE DE FAISABILITE REHABILITATION
TRANSPORTS AERIENS
AIR TRANSPORT
APPUI AUX TRANSPORTS AERIENS
ETHIOP. AIRLINES INFRASTRUCTURE DEV
5/1/1997 AIR TRANSPORT
1
MODERNISATION AEROPORT ADDIS ABEBA
TRANSPORTS AERIENS
Expected Expected
Starting
Completion
1/11/1996
Year
Donor Name Agency
Recipient Name
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
Norway
France
UNDP
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Norway
Ireland
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
1/1/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
1/1/2001
12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
47
8
172
3
33
3
434
11
2000
2000
United States TDA
United States TDA
FYRMACEDONIA
FYRMACEDONIA
12/31/2000
12/31/2000
100
100
206
3
1997
Canada
CIDA
KAZAKHSTAN
1/1/1997
100
66
1996
1996
1997
Japan
Japan
France
OECF
KYRGYZ REP.
OECF
KYRGYZ REP.
NATEXIS KYRGYZ REP.
1/6/1996
1/6/1996
1/5/1997
59
63
43
45,818
4,311
4,283
1992
1994
1995
1996
France
AsDF
Japan
Japan
AFD
MOFA
MOFA
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
LAOS
1/11/1992
1/2/1994
1/6/1995
5/28/1996
100
72
100
100
2,135
10,575
17,991
25,469
1992
Sweden
SIDA
LESOTHO
1/7/1992
100
172
1996
France
NATEXIS MALAWI
1/7/1996
100
821
1993
1993
1996
1999
2001
France
AFD
France
AFD
France
AFD
United States TDA
United States TDA
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
MALI
1/1/1993
1/3/1993
1/5/1996
12/31/1999
12/31/2001
100
100
100
100
100
3,116
177
254
288
145
1998
France
MAE
MOLDOVA
12/31/1998
100
3
1993
1995
AsDF
AsDF
AsDF
MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA
1/12/1993
1/11/1995
78
72
25,745
1/5/2004 1/11/2033
15,410 1/12/1999 1/7/2035
1990
1990
1990
1991
1991
1993
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
1995
1996
1997
1997
1997
France
France
Australia
Australia
Australia
Canada
Australia
Australia
Canada
Japan
Japan
Canada
Canada
France
France
AsDF
NATEXIS
NATEXIS
AusAID
AusAID
AusAID
CIDA
AusAID
AusAID
CIDA
MOFA
MOFA
CIDA
CIDA
NATEXIS
NATEXIS
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
NEPAL
1/4/1990
1/4/1990
1/2/1990
1/3/1991
1/3/1991
1/3/1993
1/11/1993
1/3/1993
1/11/1994
1/1/1994
1/7/1994
1/11/1995
1/11/1996
1/2/1997
1/2/1997
1/6/1997
100
76
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
72
72
1,901
3,516 1/12/2000 1/12/2023
894
87
87
3,780
1,358
3,026
6
1,037
33,787
28
32
428
2,227
1/2/2004 1/3/2030
25,656 12/31/20013/15/2037
1995
France
F.A.C.
NIGER
1/12/1995
100
MFA
MAE
DFA
DFA
DFA
NORAD
DFA
TABLE 7: (continued) page 3
Commit.
Year
Donor Name Agency
Recipient Name
Date
Element
Commitment Grant
Date
Element
US$(000)
Date
Date
Interest
Date
Short Description
01.01.1999 1/12/1999 EDUCATION/TRAINING IN TRANSPORT & STORAGE
TRANSPORTS AERIENS
STRENGTH ADDIS ABABA AIRPORT PROJECT
TRANSPORT: TRAINING
TRANSPORT: CAPACITY BUILDING
TRANSPORT: TRAINING
01.01.2002 1/12/2006 EDUC./TRNG IN TRANSPORT & STORAGE
EDUC. /TRAINING IN TRANSPORT STORAGE : CAPACITY BUILDING
AIRPORT UPGRADE/REHABILITATION BUSINESS PLAN
AIRPORT UPGRADE/REHABILITATION BUSINESS PLAN
12.09.1997
1/6/2006
1/6/2006
1/5/2003
1/6/2026
1/6/2026
1/8/2013
3
2
3
1/6/1998
1/8/2033
1
1/1/1998
1/1/1998
AIR TRANSPORT
1/12/1999 IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
1/12/1999 IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
RENOVATION CENTRE DE CONTROLE AEROP
AIRPORT EQUIPMENT
AIRPORTS IMPROVEMENT
VIENTIANE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
RENOVATION OF VIENTIANE AIRPORT
07.01.89
1/12/1996 AIR TRANSPORT
EQUIP.POUR NAVIGATION AERIENNE
293
493
6/1/1996
AIR TRANSPORT
AIRPORT REHABILITATION, BAMAKO
1/6/2001 AMENAGEMENT AEROPORT DE BAMAKO
AIR TRANSPORT
BAMAKO-SENOU AIRPORT EXPANSION
MECANIQUE ET MATERIELS DE TRANSPORT
1
1
1
AIRPORT PROJECT - ULAANBAATAR
NATIONAL AIR NAVIGATION DEV.
1293
1293
9090
691
1-Jan-89
1
1
260
Amount
US$(000)
Date
AIRPORT EQUIPMENT
AIRPORT EQUIPMENT
AIRPORT FACILITIES, KATHMANDU
KATHMANDU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AIRPORTS
AIR TRANSPORT
LANDING SYSTEM, KATHMANDU AIRPORT
AIR NAVIGATION AIDS SUPPLY, AF
NEPALGUNJ AIRPORT UPGRADING
AIRPORT MODERNISATION, KATHMANDU
KATHMANDU AIRPORT MODERNISATION
1/3/1993 AIRPORT SECURITY
1/3/1993 AIRPORT SECURITY
REMISE NIVEAU EQPTS AEROPORTUAIRES
EQPTS AEROPORTS DOMESTIQUES
INTERNTL AIRPORT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
SURETE DE L'AEROPORT INTERN DE MIAME
First
Repay
Date
Final
Repay
Date
Interest
Expected Expected
Starting
Completion
Date
Date
Short Description
PARAGUAY
1990
1994
1995
1996
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
France
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
FAC
AGCD
AGCD
AGCD
MFA
MFA
MFA
MFA
MFA
RWANDA
RWANDA
RWANDA
RWANDA
RWANDA
RWANDA
RWANDA
RWANDA
RWANDA
1994
EC
EDF
SWAZILAND
1995
Netherlands M.F.A.
1991
1991
1991
1994
1994
1995
1996
Spain
Spain
Spain
Denmark
Denmark
France
France
ICO
ICO
ICO
DANIDA
DANIDA
NATEXIS
NATEXIS
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
UGANDA
1995
1995
1995
1996
1996
1997
Germany
Germany
Germany
Japan
Japan
Germany
KFW
KFW
KFW
OECF
OECF
KFW
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
EC
Belgium
EC
DGCS
DGCS
DGCS
DGCS
EDF
AGCD
EDF
1990
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1995
1995
United Kingdom
DFID
France
NATEXIS
France
NATEXIS
United Kingdom
DFID
United Kingdom
DFID
United Kingdom
DFID
France
NATEXIS
France
NATEXIS
Sweden
SIDA
United Kingdom
DFID
United Kingdom
DFID
France
NATEXIS
Germany
KFW
(NO PROJECTS)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
275
59
4
1
75
52
85
81
90
100
48
100
4,105
1/4/1991
1/4/1991
1/4/1991
1/4/1994
1/3/1994
1/1/1995
1/3/1996
52
52
52
100
100
100
100
26,422
7,000
1,250
464
25,945
5,009
489
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
1/6/1995
1/6/1995
1/9/1995
12/17/1996
12/17/1996
12/1/1997
100
84
83
59
62
81
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA
1/6/1990
1/6/1991
1/6/1992
1/6/1993
12/31/1994
12/1/1995
1/4/1996
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
900
2,596
2,032
400
131
5
6,981
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
1/11/1990
1/2/1991
1/2/1991
1/1/1991
1/29/1991
6/2/1991
1/2/1993
1/2/1993
1/8/1993
1/2/1993
4/3/1993
1/3/1995
1/6/1995
100
100
72
100
100
100
71
71
100
100
100
82
65
2,597
620
1,461 1/12/2001 1/12/2024
4,373
527
573
1,236 1/12/2003 1/12/2025
1,261 1/12/2003 1/12/2025
1,390
6,456
1,081
1,503
1/6/2005 1/12/2027
1,729
1/6/2005 1/6/2025
TAJIKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
1/7/1990
1/12/1994
12/1/1995
1/12/1996
1/7/1997
1/7/1997
1/7/1997
1/7/1997
1/7/1997
12/31/1994
1/7/1995
1/11/1996
1/11/1996
1/11/1996
1/11/1996
1/11/1996
11/1/1996
11/1/1996
11/1/1996
11/1/1996
11/1/1996
AIR TRANSPORT
AEROPORT DE KIGALI
AIR TRANSPORT
AEROPORT DE KIGALI
AIR TRANSPORT
AIR TRANSPORT
AIR TRANSPORT
AIR TRANSPORT
AIR TRANSPORT
STUDY MATSAPHA AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT.
10/1/1995
1/12/1995 REPAIR RUNWAY DUSHANBE AIRPORT
(NO PROJECTS)
1/4/1998
1/4/1998
1/4/1998
1/4/2011
1/4/2011
1/4/2011
209
21,621
1/8/2020 1/8/2027
12,554
1/1/2019 1/1/2026
130,221 12/20/20066/20/2026
12,482 12/20/20066/20/2026
11,130
6/1/2008 12/1/2037
3
3
3
ENTEBBE AIRPORT
ENTEBBE AIRPORT
ENTEBBE AIRPORT
AIRPORT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
ENTEBBE AIRPORT RUNWAYS REHABILIT.
AIRPORT EQMT REHABILITATION
REHAB.TOUR CONTROLE AEROPORT ENTEBBE
1294
1296
795
1
795
1
795
3 1/1/1997 04/30/1999
2 1/1/1997 04/30/1999
1 01.12.1997
1/3/1998
TASHKENT AIRPORT EMERGENCY RELIEF
TASHKENT AIRPORT EMERGENCY RELIEF
TASHKENT AIRPORT REHAB.
AIR TRANSPORT
AIR TRANSPORT
TASHKENT AIRPORT RUNWAYS REHAB.
LUSAKA AIRPORT
GUIDANCE SYSTEMS
RADAR SYSTEM, LUSAKA AIRPORT
CIVIL AVIATION STAFF TRAINING
RESURFACING MAIN RUNWAY LUSAKA AIRPO
AIR TRANSPORT
REHAB. IMPVT.LUSAKA INTERNAT AIRPORT
2
2
2
08.01.93
0
2
195
HARARE AIRPORT RADAR, AF
HARARE AIRPORT EXTENSION SURVEY, AF
HARARE AIRPORT EXTENSION SURVEY, AF
AIRFIELD CRASH TENDERS, AF
AIR TRANSPORT
AIR TRANSPORT
AIRPORT EQUIPMENT, AF
AIR TRANSPORT MASTER PLAN, AF
1/12/1996 AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL RADAR SYST., AF
AIR TRANSPORT
NIGHT LANDING SYSTEM, AF
CIVIL AVIATION EQUIPMENT/TRAINING