Draft paper -- Please do not quote without permission from the author
The Bureaucratic Politics Model and Poliheuristic Theory
Dr Klaus Brummer
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
Institute for Political Science
Kochstr. 4
91054 Erlangen
Germany
Phone: +49 – 9131 – 85 22 004
Email: [email protected]
Paper prepared for
British International Studies Association (BISA)
Annual Conference 2009
14-16 December 2009
Leicester, UK
Abstract
This paper aims at enhancing the explanatory power of the bureaucratic politics model (BPM)
and contributing to the discussion on theoretical integration in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA).
It commences with a brief outline of the model’s three core propositions (stand-sit
proposition, bargaining proposition, resultants proposition). The paper moves on to discuss
the BPM’s major deficiencies. They relate to a lack of clarity concerning the formation of the
actors’ policy preferences and a limited specification of the conditions under which
unintended compromise solutions, that is, resultants, occur. The paper puts forward
suggestions as to how to overcome those shortcomings. Concerning the formation of the
actors’ policy preferences, the paper argues that the BPM’s stand-sit proposition could be
integrated into the framework of poliheuristic theory in the form of a “noncompensatory
bureaucratic loss aversion variable.” This variable leads to the elimination of options that are
unacceptable for the actor’s organization (in addition to the ones that are unacceptable for the
actor due to political concerns as already suggested by poliheuristic theory). As to resultants,
the paper specifies the conditions under which results are more likely than resultants.
However, the paper argues those conditions seldom materialize. Therefore, resultants are the
likely outcomes of bargaining processes among bureaucratic actors with diverging policy
preferences and different power potentials. Future research might want to systematically
account for the impact of domestic (e.g., coalition governments) and international (e.g.,
multilateral security institutions) constraints on the decision-making processes along the lines
of the revised BPM.
Introduction
Ever since the publication of Graham Allison’s “Essence of Decision” and Morton Halperin’s
“Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy” in the first half of the 1970s, the bureaucratic
politics model (BPM)1 has been one of the most frequently applied frameworks in Foreign
Policy Analysis (FPA).2 At the same time, it is safe to say that the model has also been among
the most heavily contested concepts in the field.3 At first glance, the parsimony of the BPM is
truly appealing. The model focuses on bargaining processes between bureaucratic actors
within government. Actors are driven by the interests of their respective organizations.
Decisions result from the interaction of the actors’ competing policy preferences.
At its core, the BPM puts forward three propositions. One relates to the sources of the actors’
policy preferences (stand-sit proposition), another to the type of interaction among the actors
during the decision-making processes (bargaining proposition), and still another to the
character of decisions that are eventually adopted (resultant proposition). However, as will be
discussed in greater detail below, the BPM is not true to itself. Its core propositions are
plagued by ambiguity. Most importantly, the BPM neither specifies the interplay between
structural/bureaucratic influences and agent-specific motivations on the formation of actors’
policy preferences nor the conditions under which resultants (instead of results) arise as
outcomes of the decision-making process.
This paper aims at augmenting the explanatory power of the BPM by clarifying its core
propositions. It proceeds as follows. The first section outlines the BPM’s three core
propositions.4 Building on the criticism that the model has received, the second section puts
forward suggestions as to how the BPM’s core propositions could be specified. In the
concluding section, the paper points to domestic and international constraints that might
impede the impact of bureaucratic politics on decision-making and that therefore should also
be incorporated in an analytical framework that centers on the BPM.
1. Core Propositions of the Bureaucratic Politics Model
The first core proposition of the BPM is neatly summarized in the well-known aphorism
“Where you stand depends on where you sit” (Allison and Zelikow ²1999: 307).5 Hence, an
actor’s bureaucratic position strongly impacts his6 policy preferences. The “mission” of the
bureaucratic actors is to pursue and realize the interests of their organization. In the second
edition of “Essence of Decision,” Allison explicated what exactly the aphorism meant in his
understanding – and what it did not. Allison argued that the word “depend” does not indicate
a deterministic relationship between an actor’s bureaucratic position and his policy stance.
Rather, it “merely” suggests that an actor’s position strongly affects his preferences. As a
result, an actor’s stance can be more or less reliably inferred from his position. The “long
1
Although Allison also refers to the BPM as “governmental politics model,” this paper sticks to the original
term, which is also the one most commonly used in the literature.
2
Allison (1971); Allison and Zelikow (²1999); Halperin (1974); also Allison and Halperin (1972). The model
was applied, for instance, in Valenta (1980); Smith (1985); Holland (1999); Jäger and Oppermann (2006);
Fuhrmann and Early (2008).
3
See, for instance, Holsti (1972); Krasner (1972); Art (1973); Ball (1974); Freedman (1976); Caldwell (1977);
Steiner (1977); Smith (1980, 1989); Rosati (1981); Hollis and Smith (1986); Bendor and Hammond (1992);
Welch (1992); Rhodes (1994); Kaarbo (1998); Bernstein (2000).
4
Rosati (1981: 236-238) proposes four partially different core propositions.
5
The aphorism is also known as “Miles’s Law,” a senior civil servant who, according to Welch (1992: 120), was
the first to formulate it.
6
For the sake of readability, “his” refers to both male and female actors.
2
version” of the aphorism now reads “where one stands is influenced, most often influenced
strongly, by where one sits. Knowledge of the organizational seat at the table yields
significant clues about a likely stand” (Allison and Zelikow ²1999: 307).7
This qualification to the stand-sit proposition means that factors other than the bureaucratic
position are also seen as exerting at least some influence on the formation of the actors’ policy
preferences. This seems particularly true regarding agent-specific factors. Indeed, Allison and
Zelikow (²1999: 298) argue that “each person comes to his or her position with baggage in
tow. The bags include sensitivities to certain issues, commitments to various projects, and
personal standing with and debts to groups in society… [P]eculiarities of human beings
remain an irreducible part of the mix.” In a similar vein, Halperin (1974: 16) emphasizes the
importance of “personal experiences, intellectual baggage, and psychological needs” – in
addition to the actor’s bureaucratic position. Hence, although bureaucratic imperatives have
substantial influence on an actor’s policy stance, individual policy preferences have to be
taken into account as well. The implication of this “human factor” is that if individual X
follows individual Y in a certain bureaucratic position, it does not necessarily mean that X
also advances the same policy preferences as Y did. However, as discussed in greater detail
below, the BPM remains silent about how bureaucratic and individual factors interact with
respect to the preference formation of actors.
Turning to its second core proposition, the BPM argues that the competing preferences of
bureaucratic actors clash in political bargaining processes. It is “the pulling and hauling that is
politics” (Allison and Zelikow ²1999: 255) that leads to government decisions. Bureaucratic
actors seek to maintain or even increase the influence of their organization, to realize the
organization’s mission, and to safeguard the organization’s capabilities to pursue its mission
(Halperin 1974: 24-62). Differences in interests between organizations lead to conflicting
problem perceptions among bureaucratic actors. What is more, even if actors share a common
understanding of the policy issue in question, it is very likely that their subsequent
suggestions concerning the appropriate ways and means to tackle the issue diverge (Holland
1999: 221). Either way, following from differences in organizational interests, conflicting
policy preferences among actors are all but inevitable:
Both by character and in practice, most players ‘represent’ a department or agency along with the interests
and constituencies their organization serves. Because their preferences and beliefs are related to the different
organizations they represent, their analyses yield conflicting recommendations (Allison and Zelikow ²1999:
256).
Bureaucratic actors that are involved in the bargaining processes not only differ concerning
their policy preferences but also with respect to power. Generally speaking, power is
understood as “effective influence on government decisions and actions” (Allison and
Zelikow ²1999: 300).8 It comprises three elements: advantages of actors in bargaining
processes, an actor’s will and ability to use those advantages, and the perception of the other
players involved in the process of those aforementioned points. Power is distributed unevenly
between the actors. Hence, an actor’s power is relative, since it is always measured against the
power of other actors. There are several sources for bargaining advantages of actors. They
include “formal authority and responsibility (stemming from positions)” (Allison and Zelikow
²1999: 300). In other words, power is inherent in bureaucratic positions and hence in
structure. The position determines what an actor can do and must do. It could privilege or
discriminate against an actor.
7
Already in 1972, in a joint article with Morton Halperin, Allison qualifies the stand-sit proposition. Allison and
Halperin (1972: 44) argued that “priorities and perceptions are shaped by positions (emphasis added).”
8
See Kaarbo (1998: 74-77) for a critical engagement with the BPM’s/Allison’s concept of power.
3
However, an actor’s impact on results, and hence his power in bargaining processes, is not
exclusively determined by structural factors, that is, by the power that flows from his
bureaucratic position. Again, actor-related factors come to the fore (Allison and Zelikow
²1999: 300). They include an actor’s expertise and his ability to control the flow of
information. Both aspects enable actors to define problems or options for action. Another
quality that enhances an actor’s power is his access to other actors with bargaining
advantages, provided he has also the ability to persuade those actors of his own policy stance.9
The inclusion of an individual dimension of power, in addition to structural sources of power,
is important. If power was anchored exclusively in bureaucratic structures, then the
representative of one institution, that is, the representative of the institution with the most
structural power, would prevail in each and every bargaining process. This would be the case
independent from the respective representatives of the institutions involved in the process.
Other institutions would see their policy preferences realized only if their structural power had
been augmented beforehand. By contrast, if the individual capabilities of the institutions’
representatives are also taken into account, the potential outcomes of the bargaining processes
open up considerably. It is not pre-determined from the outset whose preferences will prevail.
Hence, independent from structural changes, institutions that are less powerful in structural
terms but that do have outstanding representatives may also succeed in bargaining processes.
Put differently, it is not a given that X is equally likely to prevail or fail in the bargaining
processes with other key actors like his predecessor Y did (as a purely structural argument
would suggest).
The third core proposition concerns the nature of the outcomes of the bargaining processes
among bureaucratic actors. Here, the BPM argues that those outcomes are best described as
“resultants” (Allison and Zelikow ²1999: 294). Resultants are unintended compromise
solutions that no actor originally pursued as a solution for the problem under scrutiny.10
Depending on their structural and individual power, all actors contribute to a small or large
extent to the compromises. Such solutions appear to be the “logical” outcome, since the actors
involved in the bargaining processes not only advance competing policy preferences but
usually are also not powerful enough to impose their will (and hence the one of their
organization) on the other actors. Overall, this means that the decisions of a government are
not the result of a rational decision-making process but of “compromise, conflict, and
confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence” (Allison and Zelikow
²1999: 295).
2. Revising the Bureaucratic Politics Model
The three core propositions of the BPM as described above have been called into question
from various angles. The stand-sit proposition has met criticism because of the unclear
interaction of structural/bureaucratic and agent-specific factors on the formation of the actors’
policy preferences. The idea of decision-making as bargaining processes between competing
actors from different organizations has been questioned because of its overly competitive
interpreation of politics. Closely interlinked to the aforementioned point has been criticism of
the BPM’s stipulation of unintended compromise solutions as the usual outcome of decision9
Of course, access to other actors could have either individual (e.g., personal bonds) or structural (e.g., ex-officio
membership in committees) causes.
10
Despite the “irrational” outcome of the bargaining processes, the actors themselves do act rationally when
trying to realize their policy preferences (see Welch 1992: 118; Rhodes 1994: 1-2). However, as stated above,
they usually lack the power to achieve this end.
4
making processes, since this would neglect rational outcomes resulting from less competitive
decision-making processes. The following paragraphs discuss in turn the criticism that the
stand-sit proposition (2.1) and the bargaining and resultant propositions (2.2) have received
and put forward suggestions as to how the propositions’ deficiencies might be overcome.
2.1 The Formation of Actors’ Policy Preferences
At the heart of the BPM lies the stand-sit proposition, that is, the ability to infer an actor’s
policy preferences from his bureaucratic position. As mentioned above, this connection is not
supposed to be deterministic in a sense that the bureaucratic position is the only factor that
influences the actors’ preferences. Rather, the bureaucratic position is one of several
determinants, albeit a crucial one. In addition to the bureaucratic position, the model
introduces agent-specific factors as having an impact on the actors’ stances. However, the
BPM is not clear about how structural and agent-specific factors interact on the formation of
the actors’ preferences.
The criticism that the stand-sit proposition has received for that reason can be grouped into
two categories: “empirical criticism” and “conceptual criticism.” The empirical criticism takes
the discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis in Allison’s “Essence of Decision” as its starting
point. The objection is that the policy positions of some actors (their stand) cannot be
explained by their bureaucratic positions (their sit) (e.g., Ball 1974: 77). Whether this
criticism holds true for the Cuban Missile Crisis is secondary to this paper’s discussion. What
has to be taken into account, though, are cues put forward in the discussion of the Cuban
Missile Crisis with respect to certain groups of bureaucratic actors for whom the stand-sit
proposition supposedly cannot hold true.
According to Krasner, there are actors that cannot be assigned to certain bureaucratic
institutions. As a result, they also do not pursue a certain bureaucratic interest. “Decisionmakers (…) often do not stand where they sit. Sometimes, they are not sitting anywhere”
(Krasner 1972: 165). Krasner refers to actors, such as former secretaries, who are brought into
decision-making processes on an ad-hoc basis. One could reply, however, that former
secretaries might very well have the interest of “their” former ministry in mind when giving
advice to acting decision-makers. A second group of actors – actors that Krasner refers to as
not having bureaucratic interests of their own – consists of those whose loyalties rest
primarily, or even solely, with the top decision-maker, in the case of the U.S. president. Such
a stance could be due to relational ties (e.g., John F. Kennedy and Robert Kennedy) or the
result of a person being appointed by the president, leading to a sense of gratitude and/or
dependence. In his discussion of the decision-making process in the context of the American
hostage rescue mission in Iran in 1980, Smith (1985: 17-18) refers to the latter group as
“presidential supporters.” Clearly, relational ties between a nation’s top decision-makers are
rare exceptions. Presidential supporters, in turn, might very well have a bureaucratic position
to defend, namely the one of the president. Following Smith, presidential supporters strive for
maintaining or augmenting the president’s reputation and ability to act. Hence, bureaucratic
interests could also be identified for this group. In short, the empirical criticism, according to
which several groups of actors do not have bureaucratic interests, seems not fully convincing.
5
Figure 1: The Formation of the Actors’ Policy Preferences According to the BPM
Agent’s
bureaucratic
position
organizational
interests (“sit”)
strong influence
Agent’s policy
preference
(“stand”)
some influence
Agent’s individual
preferences and
interests
peculiarities of
individual actors
connection between structural and agentbased influences on the formation of
actors’ policy preferences not specified
The “conceptual criticism” on the stand-sit proposition is more instructive. It centers on the
mentioned opening of the BPM for non-structural/ non-bureaucratic explanatory variables.
This opening is perceived as overloading the model. By including agent-specific factors as
potential explanations for an actor’s policy preferences, the clearly-defined stand-sit
proposition has gotten frayed (see figure 1). For instance, Bernstein (2000: 140) argues that
the BPM
tossed into the mix for the governmental ‘players’ a medley of other causal factors, reaching well beyond
the standing/sitting connection, to explain their behavior: their personalities, backgrounds, personal
loyalties, and other matters. Thus, the seeming near-parsimony (…) dissolved (…) into a grab bag of
influences (…). If an individual’s representing a particular bureaucracy (standing/sitting) was not key, what
influence was crucial in explaining an actor’s willingness to compromise in particular ways but not in
others, and to create certain alliances but not others in the pulling and hauling?
In a similar vein, Bendor and Hammond (1992: 318) complain that the model “incorporates so
many variables that it is an analytical kitchen sink. Nothing of any possible relevance appears
to be excluded (…). [A] model that includes everything explains nothing.” Welch (1992: 121)
even gets the impression that “at points Allison seems actively to deny any theoretical
relationship between a player’s position and his or her preferences or perceptions.” What
those authors rightly point out is that the influence of bureaucracy, and hence of structure, was
reduced as a result of the qualification of the stand-sit proposition. At the same time, it
remains unclear when and to what extent the influence of the bureaucracy comes into play.
Ultimately, one could even ponder over whether bureaucracy exerts any impact at all on the
actors’ policy preferences.
The problem with the fundamental criticism of the stand-sit propositions discussed so far is
that it leaves open the question as to how one can grasp the influence of bureaucratic
structures on actors. Two answers can be found in the literature. One might be labeled
“simplification,” the other “specification.” The former makes the case for the severing of the
connection between bureaucratic structures and agency. To explain foreign policy decisions,
the focus should rest on either structures or agency. However, as only agents can make
decisions but not structures,11 simplification is more or less synonymous with dismissing
bureaucratic structures altogether as an explanatory variable in favor of a focus on agents. For
instance, Art (1972: 472-473) complains that the BPM is not clear about the circumstances
and policy issues in which the bureaucratic position is supposed to strongly influence, if not
11
See the discussion of the agent-structure problem below.
6
determine, an actor’s policy stance. Moreover, he points out that the stand-sit proposition has
received several qualifications, above all by the incorporation of the actors’ individual
characteristics. The way forward proposed by Art (1972: 470, 473-476) is to dismiss the
impact of bureaucratic structures and focus instead on agents, above all on their mind-sets.
Jervis (1976: 26-28) makes a similar point. He argues that the generalizations inferred from
the BPM with respect to expected policy outcomes must not take into account the values and
beliefs of individual actors. Otherwise, the impact of bureaucratic structures – which Jervis
fundamentally calls into question – gets lost.
Conversely, “specification” calls for a more clear-cut elaboration of the connection between
agents and structures. The work of Hollis and Smith points in this direction. Like Art, Hollis
and Smith (1986: 270) hold the opinion that the individual actors involved in the decisionmaking processes play a much larger role than the BPM gives them credit for. Accordingly,
their aim is to strengthen the role of persons and personality within the BPM. In addition, they
want to overcome the notion of actors as being “mouthpieces or puppets of the bureaucracies
that send them into the fray” (Hollis and Smith 1986: 273). Contrary to Art, however, Hollis
and Smith do not advocate the renouncement of structural factors in favor of individual ones.
Instead, they call for an integration of structure and agency (Hollis and Smith 1986: 285). In
their opinion, an actor’s bureaucratic position influences the actor’s preferences and interests
but it does not determine them. In this sense, the actor’s preferences are no longer seen as
being exogenously given (by the bureaucratic structures). Rather, the endogenous formation
of preferences is also possible. Against this backdrop, they reformulate the stand-sit aphorism
to “[w]here you stand would depend both on where you sit and on how you think” (Hollis and
Smith 1986: 273).
Following Hollis and Smith, both bureaucratic/structural and individual/agency-based factors
are important and must therefore be taken into consideration. Stern and Verbeek make a
similar point. They argue that the reduction of the stand-sit proposition to solely structural
aspects is a fundamental misconception about the BPM. A more accurate understanding of the
proposition “entails the recognition that factors other than organizational affiliation have an
impact on officials’ preference formation” (Stern and Verbeek 1998: 206).
In short, an actor’s policy preference cannot fully be explained by referring to his bureaucratic
position alone. Agent-specific factors also play a role. At the same time, an actor’s preference
cannot fully be explained by referring solely to his individual perceptions, mind-set, etc.
Bureaucratic factors also impact the actor’s policy stance. Therefore, an explanation of actors’
policy preferences must account for both structural influences and agent-specific motivations.
Two questions arise from the aforementioned: first, how to grasp agent-specific motivations?
Second, how to integrate agent-specific motivations and structural influences on the formation
of actors’ preferences? Poliheuristic theory (e.g., Mintz 2003, 2004) gives cues with respect to
the first question. The theory integrates elements of cognitive and rational choice theories of
decision-making. It conceptualizes decision-making as a two-stage process. During the first
stage, the cognitive elements dominate. Actors use heuristics that help them simplify complex
policy questions. The theory assumes that leaders overvalue losses. Hence, they are driven by
the desire to avoid them. Actors reduce the set of options available to them by applying a
“noncompensatory principle.” The principle stresses that potential benefits of a choice could
not compensate for potential losses. Therefore, actors eliminate options that would yield
unacceptable returns, that is, considerable domestic political costs or losses. There are several
ways as to how this “noncompensatory political loss aversion variable” (Mintz 2004: 9) could
be operationalized (e.g., threat to leader’s political power; drop in popularity; prospects of
electoral defeat; intra-party rivalry; external challenge to the regime). During the second
7
stage, the rational elements of the theory come to the fore. Once all politically unacceptable
choices are eliminated, actors choose “their” option by making recourse to analytic
processing. The selection criteria are risk-minimization and benefit-maximization. Mintz
(2004: 6-7) summarizes the gist of poliheuristic theory as follows:
Poliheuristic theory postulates that when making decisions, policy makers employ a two-stage decision
process consisting of (a) rejecting alternatives that are unacceptable to the policy maker on a critical
dimension or dimensions and (b) selecting and alternative from the subset of remaining alternatives while
maximizing benefits and minimizing risks.
Hence, poliheuristic theory highlights that both cognitive and rational factors have to be taken
into account if one seeks to understand the formation of actors’ policy preferences. The theory
also shows how cognitive and rational factors are interconnected. However, turning to the
second question that was raised above, the theory does not account for structural influences,
and hence for the core of the stand-sit proposition. Yet, a structural dimension could be
introduced into the poliheuristic theory framework by adding a “noncompensatory
bureaucratic loss aversion variable.” Accordingly, during the first stage, actors not only
eliminate options that might be politically costly to them.12 In addition, they eliminate options
that seem unacceptable to their organization. Operationalizations of this variable include a
loss of the organization’s political influence, a decrease in budget and/or personnel, a possible
lowering of morale, or a challenge to the organization’s autonomy or essence (see Hudson
2007: 76-80).
Integrating the insights of the BPM and poliheuristic theory not only contributes to
overcoming the former’s problems in accounting in a systematic fashion for both structural
and actor-specific influences concerning the formation of actors’ policy preferences. What is
more, it also enhances the applicability of poliheuristic theory, since it seems that the theory
runs into difficulties if applied to parliamentary systems. Indeed, poliheuristic theory’s claim
to be a decision-making theory appears accurate primarily (or maybe only) if there is just one
crucial decision-maker who is “calling the shots”, such as the president in the case of the
United States. Conversely, in parliamentary systems of government the decision of one
governmental actor (even if it is the decision of the head of government) is rarely identical
with the ultimate decision of the government as a whole. Thus, in parliamentary systems it
might be more accurate to conceive of poliheuristic theory as a viable tool to identify the
policy preferences of key actors which are involved the decision-making process on the issue
under scrutiny. Obviously, after having identified the preferences of the key actors (by using
poliheuristic theory in its original form or expanded version as presented above) one needs to
explain how the more often than not competing preferences of the individual governmental
actors13 are aggregated into the collective decision of the government. Here, the BPM’s
second and third core propositions concerning bargaining processes among governmental
actors that lead to unintended compromise solutions seem to fit quite nicely.
In sum, building on the work of Hollis and Smith, who argue for a stronger emphasis to be
placed on agents and their idiosyncrasies, and poliheuristic theory, which shows the
interaction of cognitive and rational factors, the formation of actors’ preferences is
conceptualized as a two-stage process. During the first stage, options that are unacceptable to
the actor from both a political and a bureaucratic/organizational viewpoint are eliminated.
12
The political emphasis of poliheuristic theory (e.g., DeRouen 2003: 12-13) also fits nicely with the BPM’s
focus on politics (Kaarbo 1998: 71-72) during the bargaining processes.
13
Certain characteristics of parliamentary systems, such as coalition governments and the allocation of “mirror
departments” (such as foreign affairs and defense) to different coalition partners, appear conducive for the
emergence of competing policy preferences within the executive.
8
During the second stage, actors choose rationally their preferred option from the remaining
alternatives. Their selection is guided by two aims: risk minimization and benefit
maximization. Hence, the bureaucratic position (the “sit”) does not determine an actor’s
policy stance (the “stand”). However, the bureaucratic position exerts a significant (selective)
influence on the formation of the actors’ policy preferences. Figure 2 shows the model of
preference formation that integrates poliheuristic theory and the BPM’s stand-sit proposition.
Figure 2: A Two-Stage Process of the Formation of Policy Preferences
Stage 1: Cognitive dimension
Stage 2: Rational dimension
actors’ values and perceptions
actors’ intentions and goals
heuristic shortcuts dominate
analytic processing dominates
leads to elimination of
leads to the selection of “the”
policy option to be pursued;
selection based on riskminimization and benefitmaximization
unacceptable options:
* noncompensatory political
loss aversion: elimination of
options that are politically
not acceptable for the actors
Actor’s policy
preference
(“stand”)
* noncompensatory
bureaucratic loss aversion:
elimination of options that
are not acceptable for the
actors’ organization (the
actors’ “sit”)
2.2 Decision-Making Processes and Their Outcomes
Before turning to the decision-making process, a brief excursion to the debate on the agencystructure problem is in order. The debate shows how structure and agency are interconnected.
It starts from the assumption that human agents and social structures cannot exist separately
from each other. This is why a separate analysis of structure and agents is impossible.
Structures are assigned an enabling as well as a constraining effect on agents insofar as they
“open up certain possibilities of action at the same time as they restrict or deny others”
(Giddens 1984: 173-174). It must be emphasized, though, that structures do not impose a
certain behavior on actors. What they do is to establish a certain framework. How actors fill
this framework with life is up to them. Referring to the state as structure, Wight (2006: 189)
argues that “[i]f the state has agency it can only be accessed through the agency of
individuals.” The proposition that it is individuals who do the acting and not structures holds
true for structures other than the state as well, including bureaucracies. What is more, agents
and agents’ decisions feed back on structures (as well as on the agents themselves), thereby
possibly altering the structures. The paper will return to this point below.
What follows from the debate on the agency-structure problem is the necessity to analyze
both structures and agents in the course of the decision-making processes. Hence, this calls
for the development of analytical concepts that take both agents and structures into account
(Wight 2006: 293). The BPM does just that, since the bargaining processes among key actors
is strongly influenced by structural factors as well as the actors’ individual skills. After actors
have formed their policy preferences (as outlined above), interagency decision-making – and
hence the “pulling and hauling” – commences. The BPM conceptualizes the interaction of
actors as a bargaining process. The actors that are involved in the process differ not only with
respect to their policy preferences but also with respect to power. There are two sources for
the latter: one is structural, the other agent-specific. Concerning structure, differences result
9
from an unequal distribution of power among the ministries. The discussion of the agentstructure problem showed that bureaucratic structures not only constrain actors but also
enable them by generating options in the interaction with other actors. Indeed, structure is one
of the major sources of actors’ power. Concerning agents, differences in the actors’
proficiencies and skills augment or decrease their leverage in the bargaining processes.
However, with no actor being sufficiently powerful enough to impose his will on the others,
bargaining processes frequently end with a “resultant,” that is, an unintended compromise
solution that no actor had pursued as his policy preference. Allison and Halperin (1972: 7071) remark that “[i]n most cases, the policy and action decisions were compromises (emphasis
added).”
Both the competitive (bargaining) notion of politics that characterizes the interaction among
the actors during the decision-making processes and the idea of unintended compromise
solutions, as the usual outcomes of those processes, were called into question by Freedman.
Freedman (1976: 436-437) argues that Allison based his models on a false dichotomy
between logic on the one hand and politics on the other hand (“logic/ politics dichotomy”).
Indeed, he contends that it is this false dichotomy that made the distinction between the
rational actor model (RAM) and the BPM possible in the first place. According to Freedman,
“logic” is connected with the RAM, in which shared values and rational decision-making
dominate the policymaking process. Conversely, “politics” represents the core of the BPM
and points to conflicting values and clashing interests. Hence, logic and politics are presented
as mutually exclusive avenues of policymaking. Freedman contests this dichotomy. He argues
that both logic and politics, and hence both rational and political components, are present in
policymaking processes. In his point of view, they are “two ends of a continuum. At one end
all is rationality; at the other all is politics” (Freedman 1976: 441). Accordingly, the
distinction of the policymaking process as either rational or political is wrong. Policymaking,
or politics in general, is not synonymous with competition and conflict (Freedman 1976: 445).
What is more, since the BPM’s notion of politics is incorrect, its proposition concerning the
outcomes of policymaking (or decision-making) processes must be equally faulty. Put
differently, if policymaking processes are not only about bargaining and competition but also
allow for rational action based on shared values, then the outcomes of those processes are not
necessarily unintended compromise solutions, that is, resultants.
Freedman’s criticism could be countered insofar as the BPM does not preclude results as
outcomes of policymaking (or decision-making) processes. As mentioned above, Allison and
Halperin expect resultants to emerge “in most cases.” Hence, in other (and fewer) cases,
decision-making leads to (rational) results. In short, the BPM is open to both resultants and
results. In this sense, Stern and Verbeek (1998: 207) argue that the explanatory power of the
BPM is not limited to resultants. Rather, due to the model’s focus on the interaction of agents
from different organizations, it is also useful when trying to account for decision-making
processes in which one actor prevails. However, the model’s lopsided application primarily to
the political system of the United States has obscured this strength of the BPM, according to
Stern and Verbeek (1998: 207).
Art (1973) criticizes another aspect of the BPM’s resultants proposition, namely the latter’s
allegedly unintended character. He posits that compromise solutions might very well be
consistent with the intentions of the actors. Indeed, Art argues that actors already enter
bargaining processes with the expectation of compromises as their outcome. More often than
not, the distribution of power between the actors involved in the process leaves no other
option. Although actors differ in power, usually none is powerful enough to simply impose
his will on the others. Therefore, if a solution is to be reached at all, the price for arriving
there is compromise. Since actors are aware of this necessity from the outset, they incorporate
10
the need for compromise solutions in their initial bargaining positions. Art (1973: 471)
summarizes his argument as follows:
In our system, the cost of consensus is compromise; but the participants know that before they begin their
policy battles. (…) The point, then, is that the compromise that results from the pulling and hauling was
deliberately intended by the participants. The exact nature of the compromise that results may be unintended
or unforeseen, but not the initial intent to achieve some sort of a compromise (emphasis in the original).
In this paper, “politics” and the character of the results of the bargaining processes among
bureaucratic actors are conceptualized as follows. In line with Freedman, “politics” is not
synonymous with clashing interests. Rational policymaking is possible. Therefore, the
outcomes of the decision-making processes are not necessarily unintended compromise
solutions. Hence, not only resultants but also results (understood as the realization of one
actor’s – or all actors’ – initial policy preference) are possible outcomes of the decisionmaking process.
Results seem possible under several circumstances. First, one actor is so powerful that he
simply imposes his will on the other actors involved in the bargaining process. Although
individual skills are important, a strong structural power base that emanates from the actor’s
bureaucratic position is a necessary condition in this context. Second, the actors’ policy
preferences are congruent. Given the impact of structure on the preference formation of
actors, this would presuppose that the preferences/aims of the ministries are also more or less
identical. However, since ministries not only look at a policy issue from different angles but
also are first and foremost interested in maintaining or augmenting their power (usually to the
detriment of the others), the likelihood of this option appears limited. Third, the demands that
the different structures impose on the actors are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, actors
could make use of their discretion (within the boundaries set by the political and bureaucratic
constraints in stage one of the policy preference formation process) and carve out a solution
that corresponds to the preferences of all actors, and hence ministries, involved. This demands
openness on the part of the individual actors for “arguing,” that is, openness to being
persuaded by the better argument, even if this runs counter to one’s own beliefs. As Thomas
Risse (2000: 9) puts it:
In arguing mode, actors try to convince each other to change their causal or principled beliefs in order to
reach a reasoned consensus about validity claims. And (…) they are themselves prepared to be persuaded.
Successful arguing means that the ‘better argument’ carries the day, while one’s (material) bargaining power
becomes less relevant.
Yet the scope for arguing within bargaining processes as devised by the BPM (and
particularly the revised stand-sit proposition) seems limited. During those processes, actors
could make use of their discretion to adapt their preferences within the range of choices as set
by stage one of the policy preference formation process. However, if an actor leaves the range
of choices established by political and organizational imperatives, this would impose high
costs either for his political career or for his organization (which, in turn, would very likely
also impact the actor’s political prospects). This is why rational actors are unlikely to venture
such a move. Overall, then, arguing might lead to minor adjustments of policy preferences but
not to fundamental changes.14
In short, results are possible. However, they are not very likely, since the preconditions
necessary for them to emerge as an outcome of the decision-making process are difficult to
14
Since the idea of arguing implies much deeper changes, this is surely a very narrow notion of the concept.
11
materialize. Hence, following Freedman, decision-making (or policymaking) processes are
located in a continuum whose one end is “pure” rationality (where actors share values and
results are the outcomes of the process) and whose other end is “pure” politics (where actors
fight for influence/power and resultants are the outcomes). Since the actors involved in the
decision-making process are bureaucrats with different policy preferences and power
potential, most processes should be located far closer to the “political end” of the continuum.
Therefore, the outcomes of those processes are far more likely to be resultants. This holds
particularly true for non-presidential political systems with coalition governments (Stern and
Verbeek 1998: 207).
Resultant or result: Bureaucratic bargaining develops into a decision (as the output of the
decision-making/bargaining process).15 The decision sees its practical implementation in
foreign policy actions. Actions, in turn, trigger outcomes, and it is those outcomes that feed
back on structures and agents (figure 3). As the debate on the agent-structure problem pointed
out, those feedback processes could cause changes in the bureaucratic structure, for instance
with respect to competences or budgets. Since the feedback not only affects structures but also
agents (Brighi and Hill 2008: 120), changes in the agents’ perceptions and values or their
goals and intentions are also possible. The expectation is that changes on part of the agents are
more likely than on part of the more stable structure. In any case, changes in structure and/or
agents will affect the policy preferences that actors will pursue in subsequent bargaining
processes on the same (or at least similar) issue. Hence, they will also affect future foreign
policy decisions.16
Figure 3: Feedback Process
Decision-making
process
Bargaining among
bureaucratic actors that are
involved in the action-channel
with competing policy
preferences (“stands”) and
different power potentials
Decision
result or resultant (as
outcome of the
bargaining/ decisionmaking process)
Foreign Policy
Action and
Outcome
implementation of decision
and outcome of the decision
Feedback
(on structure and actors, and hence also on the policy preferences that
actors bring to the bargaining processes)
15
Bargaining processes might also end with a decision for inaction or with no decision at all. Although there is
no subsequent “practical” implementation in form of actual foreign-policy actions, such (non-)decisions also
generate an outcome that feedback on structure and agents.
16
The dynamic component, which results from the incorporation of the factors time and policy outcomes, can be
found in a model put forward by Carlsnaes (2008: 97-98). See also Brighi and Hill (2008: 118-126).
12
3. Conclusion
The primary aim of this paper was to augment the explanatory power of the BPM by
clarifying the model’s three core propositions. The first proposition – the stand-sit proposition
– concerns the formation of the bureaucratic actors’ policy preferences. The proposition
highlights the strong impact of bureaucratic imperatives on actors’ policy stances. At the same
time, the BPM is open to agent-specific motivations as well. However, the model is silent on
how structural and agent-specific factors are interrelated. The paper sought to overcome this
deficit by introducing a “noncompensatory bureaucratic loss aversion variable” into the
framework of poliheuristic theory. This way, structural/bureaucratic as well as agent-specific
factors (as well as cognitive and rational elements) are combined in a concept on the
formation of actors’ preferences. This integrative effort is in line with Hudson (2007: 165),
who proposes integrated frameworks for FPA in general, and Kaarbo (1998: 72), who argues
for a combination of the insights of bureaucratic politics with other, more recent perspectives.
Poliheuristic theory surely falls into that category.
Core propositions two and three relate to the character of the decision-making process and the
latter’s outcome respectively. The decision-making process is conceptualized as a political
bargaining process among bureaucratic actors (bargaining proposition), and the outcomes of
those processes are perceived as resultants, that is, unintended compromise solutions
(resultant propositions). Taking up Freedman’s criticism of the BPM, this paper sees the
decision-making process as being pursued on a continuum. At one end is full rationality; at
the other is pure politics. The paper shows under what conditions the emergence of results
based on rational decision-making processes are likely. However, given differences in
preferences and power among the bureaucratic actors that are involved in the decision-making
process, the latter is significantly more likely to be characterized by bargaining that, in turn,
leads to resultants.
After having put forward suggestions as to how the BPM’s core propositions could be
specified, the next step would be to systematically account for domestic and international
constraints that might impact decision-making processes that evolve along the lines described
above. Domestic constraints might include the influence of coalition governments,
parliaments, parties, the media, and public opinion. One hypothesis would be that
parliamentary systems are particularly conducive for bureaucratic politics. For instance, the
role of prime minister is considerably weaker compared to that of the U.S. president. What is
more, prime ministers more often than not head multiparty coalition governments, with the
latter impacting the government’s decision-making in various respects (e.g., Kaarbo 1996;
Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). Already those few points suggest that decision-making in
parliamentary systems with coalition governments is very likely to be located rather closely at
the political end of Freedman’s continuum between logic and politics. This, in turn, means
that resultants (instead of results) – and hence one of the hallmarks of the BPM – are likely
outcomes of decision-making.
International constraints, in turn, include a country’s membership in international institutions.
One hypothesis would be that a country’s integration in multilateral security institutions
reduces the impact of bureaucratic politics on a country’s decision-making with respect to the
deployment of armed forces. Decision-making in such contexts, for instance in the European
Union (EU), usually comprises two phases. Phase one is about whether or not a mission
should be deployed at all. For member states of the multilateral institution, this means that
they have to decide in advance on a position that is to be pursued during multilateral
bargaining processes. Specific details of the mission are usually not agreed in this first phase.
In phase two, a country has to decide on its actual contribution to a mission. Another round of
13
bureaucratic politics within each participating state begins. In short, there are two rounds of
bureaucratic politics: first on the decision on the mission as such, and then on the actual
contribution to the mission. Hence, there are two occasions in which ministries could clash.
For instance, a foreign ministry could be strongly interested in conducting an international
peacekeeping mission (e.g., for diplomatic or humanitarian reasons), including a significant
contribution of the country to the mission. Conversely, a ministry of defense could argue
against both the mission as such and a strong participation in the mission in particular, for
instance due to overstretch or a lack of capabilities. Nonetheless, bureaucratic politics could
be less salience in such situations, since a country might be heavily constrained in its decision
on whether or not to participate in a mission (phase one) due to peer pressure from fellow
member states of the security institution. Consequently, the impact of bureaucratic politics
might be stronger in phase two, when ministries wrestle about the actual contribution to a
mission.
Taking up another point of criticism of the BPM, the impact of those potential domestic and
international constraints on the BPM could be formulated for political systems other than the
American one. Indeed, the model is patently U.S.-centered, since it was developed with the
U.S. (presidential) system of government in mind and also mostly applied to the U.S. system.
However, the BPM is claimed as having a much broader explanatory power. The dynamics
that the BPM reveals are supposed to be discernable in other systems of government as well.17
Put differently, the BPM claims explanatory power also for non-presidential systems of
government. Allison and Halperin (1972: 43) express their hope that the BPM “is sufficiently
general to apply to the behavior of most modern governments in industrialized nations.” It is
high time to test systematically whether this is actually the case.
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