In Pursuit of Post-Apocalyptic Glory: Towards
Understanding the Logic of Militant Groups in South Asia
Hassan Bashir
Texas A&M University at Qatar
Hamza Bin Jehangir
Texas A&M University at Qatar
Abstract: Since 911, we have seen a renewed and sharp increase in the scholarly interest,
especially in the West, to understand the phenomenon of non-state religious militancy. A
common but implicit theme in this new wave of scholarship is the attempt to either establish or
discredit the link between Islam as a religious ideology and the tendency for preferring violence
to peaceful means for achieving political objectives. In this paper we argue that religious and
secular non-state militant groups are fundamentally different not only in terms of ideology but
also in terms of the way they operationalize their broader strategies. We argue that the basis for
group ideology in case of a religious non-state militant group is not linked to a realizable
political objective; instead it is imagined as being divinely sanctioned. This is due to the belief
that the reward that each individual militant in the group will get for taking part in this divine
open-ended war is pushed to the afterworld where a deity at a personal level would honor the
individual militants. In this sense, the group members live in an alienated state from the societies
in which they are physically present and thus are in pursuit of a utopian ideal. This ideal and the
motivations to which it gives life are only understandable if one takes into account the essentially
apocalyptic nature of the thought of religious militant organizations in Islam. We support our
arguments through an in-depth analysis of the evolution of militant organizations from secular to
militant in South Asia in general and in Pakistan in particular.
Introduction
Since the attacks on World Trade Center, there has been a renewed and sharp increase in
the scholarly interest to understand the phenomenon of terrorism in its many variations. A
common but implicit theme in this new wave of scholarship is the attempt to either establish or
discredit the link between Islam as a religious ideology and the tendency for preferring violence
to peaceful means for achieving political objectives. While this concern is understandable, it
nevertheless is also extremely naïve’ and journalistic, as it erroneously assumes that Islam is a
monolithic phenomenon experienced and interpreted identically by all Muslims. As first half of
this paper argues, Muslim terrorists share more in common with terrorists belonging to other
religious traditions than they do with their co-religionists. However, this must not be taken as
implying, that all terrorists are alike; for to do so would be repeating the same mistake of treating
terrorists as a monolithic category, which they are not. While terrorists have a common
preference for violent means they do not share common ends, therefore for the purpose of
analysis once a group is identified as a terrorist entity, it must be classified according to its
aspired ends. It is within this classification based on ends rather than means in which all
terrorists must be viewed.
In the above context, this paper proceeds in four main sections. First, it provides a brief
discussion of definitional issues and resultant broad typologies of terrorism, placing current
heightened scholarly interest in the subject in its modern context. Second, the paper presents a
simple model of a terrorist organization and a conceptual framework. The model highlights the
differences in the place that ideology occupies within the overall structure of a religious and a
secular terrorist organization. The conceptual framework for analysis on the other hand, utilizes
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the non-compensatory principle from the two-stage Poliheuristic Model of decision-making.
(Mintz, 2004) Third, it presents a case study of militant groups within Pakistan with an aim to
illustrate the soundness of the claims in the previous section. The Fourth and final section
presents conclusions that can be drawn from the case study.
Modern Terrorism: Definitional Issues, Evolution and Typologies
According to an analysis there are over one hundred separate definitions of terrorism
(Schmid and Jongman 1988, McCormick 2003). It is not within the scope of this paper to try to
resolve or even discuss the nature of this disagreement; therefore instead of giving a specific
definition it is preferable here to list some fundamental aspects of terrorism. Three main aspects
of terrorism are that it is always political in nature i.e. it always aims at precipitating political
change via violent acts. The political nature is highlighted by the fact that terrorists commit acts
under the rubric of some sort of justice, which they feel, h been denied to the constituency that
they represent. Second, terrorism is distinguished from other forms of political violence by its
non-state character. Third, terrorism involves deliberate and surprise targeting of innocent
civilians (Frey & Morris, 1991).
David Rapoport argues that terrorism occurs in consecutive and overlapping waves
(2001). The first wave occurred with the spread of concepts such as universal suffrage and
popular empowerment, which resulted in the breakdown of empires and search for a new
political order towards the end of the 19th century. The second phase of terrorism is linked to the
idea of national self-determination; it started at the end of the First World War and consisted of
rapid de-colonization. The third wave began with the US intervention in Vietnam, which excited
the imaginations of revolutionaries in every part of the globe. The first three waves can be
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loosely lumped into a single category of secular terrorism. The fourth and final wave of terrorism
matured with the September 11 attacks, which he calls the ‘Jihad Era’. This wave began with the
Iranian Revolution of 1979 and gained strength during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The
fourth wave can be termed as sacred terrorism. (Cronin, 2003; Rapoport 2001).
In recent years several scholars have increasingly focused on the characteristics of
modern religious terrorist groups, according to these scholars this latest form is potentially more
harmful than its predecessors (Hoffman, 1998 & 1999; McCormick, 2003; Khashsan, 1997;
Cronin 2003). Cronin provides a brief summary of the views held by these authors; according to
her, following are the major reasons, which justify their claims. First, these terrorists see the
world in terms of good and evil due to which everyone who disagrees with their vision of good is
a potential enemy. Second, the actions of such groups are carried out with the aim of pleasing a
deity. Therefore these groups do not have to gain favor with a particular earthly constituency.
Third, religiously motivated terrorists adopt violence because they want to replace the secular
law-based society with their version of a society based on religious commandments. According
to Pedhazur some organizations adopt an apocalyptic philosophy or a death culture in which
ending one’s life for the cause holds the status of a purifying mechanism for the self. In terms of
tactics such a philosophy could be the main cause of carrying out suicide attacks (Pedhazur,
2005).
The Models
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Environment
Support
Violence
Maintenanc
e
Figure 1: Model of a Secular Militant Organization
A militant group can be viewed through three tiers of analysis, the environmental, the system and
the subsystem. The environmental level consists of the prevalent political order both at the level
of the state and the international/ regional system. It is due to the underlying power relations
within this political order that a particular constituency may perceive itself as being
marginalized. Therefore creating the justification to resort to violence as the only available
political expression.
The second level, that of the system provides information about how militant groups
work as a whole. This level explains the interplay between various sub-systems and the
relationship between the group and its constituency for which it is fighting a proxy war with the
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oppressive system at the environmental level. The third level of analysis is that of the subsystem, which involves taking into account how specialized units of a militant group cooperate
with each other to make the group functional. Three main sub-systems or specialized units in a
militant organization are the support sub-system, the maintenance sub-system, the violence
producing sub-system and the cognitive sub-system. The support sub-system entails recruitment
and training and propaganda activities. The maintenance sub-system involves the internal
organizational structure of the group and monitoring of the ideological purity of the group’s
members. The third sub-system of violence production specializes in translating high command’s
directives regarding violence campaigns into actual violent acts.
From the standpoint of this paper, the cognitive subsystem performs the most important
function. In case of a secular militant organization the cognitive sub-system represents the
learning cycle for the group. It assesses the impact of violence on the environment and its own
constituency and does course correction accordingly. For example if a violence campaign and
affects the group’s constituency negatively, the group may decide to withhold further violence.
In this learning loop, constituency holds the central position in group’s strategic decision
making. It is the mechanism through which group’s decision makers test the assumption based
on which they plan campaigns. This process highlights the fact that in case of secular militant
organizations, the immediate constituency keeps a tacit check on the ways in which violence
maybe used by the group. In terms of the Poliheuristic Model of decision making therefore,
negatively affecting the constituency’s interest is a non-compensatory option for secular militant
organizations. However contrary to above, in case of religiously motivated militant organizations
the function of the cognitive sub-system is fundamentally different because of the absence of a
real constituency. These groups have the constant potential and need to reorient and reinvent
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themselves because of a lack of a physical constituency, which they must satisfy. As a result
violence in such cases is not a means to an end, but an end in itself and can be directed towards
anyone who disagrees with group ideology.
Environment
Support
Violence
Maintenanc
Figure 2:Model of Religious Militant Organization
The faith-based ideal of religious groups cannot be falsified through empirical means,
and the mindset that it helps create is one in which violence is a sacred duty executed in direct
response to the theological imperative. In a sense militants in such groups are totally alienated
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from real world and feel responsible only to God or his agent i.e. groups religious figure.
According to Hoffman, fundamental difference in perception and resultant conduct of violence
between sacred and secular militants is that, for religious groups the future is divinely decreed.
The inevitability of their victory is thus taken for granted. (Bruce Hoffman, 1997).
Messages similar to above are also clear form Bin Laden videotapes, which have
regularly surfaced in recent years. The place that violence occupies in such reasoning is not only
one that leads to the divinely ordained ultimate reality; instead it is one that constantly reinforces
on that group that it must keep fighting, and that if it did not do so, it would be at the risk of
annoying the deity through its agent on earth. What is even more dangerous and makes the
violence indiscriminate and wholesale is that the reward that each individual militant in the
group will get for taking part in this divine open-ended war is pushed to the afterworld. Finally,
if a religious militant group or its members were to stop the violence they either must relegate
themselves to being less committed religiously and thereby cease to exist as militants. In light of
the Poliheuristic model, for a religious militant group, abandoning violence is a noncompensatory option, as it would result in the death of the group.
Exploring Religious Militancy in South Asia: A Comparative Case Study
In this section the claims made above are tested in light of the South Asian experience
with religious militancy. The choice of South Asia is justified given its geographical position, its
centrality to the U.S led war on terror, the transnational nature of militant groups present here
and especially because of the September 11th terrorist attacks. In particular, Pakistan’s 57 year
struggle over the dispute territory of Kashmir, three wars with India and the Pakistani military’s
paradoxical stand over backing the current war on terror as well as supporting non state
insurgency in Kashmir further enrich the scope of analysis.
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According to Global Terrorism Database (GTD), only 3 out of the total 28 militant
organizations in Pakistan have secular objectives. (Global Terrorism Database, 2013) In addition
Karachi, which is the biggest Pakistani city, has over the past two decades has seen major ethnic
violence between the secular propagated by the Mutahdia Qaumi Movement (MQM). MQM was
originally created to increase the stake of the Urban Urdu-speaking population of the province,
which had migrated from India to Pakistan in 1947. It is perhaps a classic case in terms of the
model presented above for a secular militant organization as it catered to a specific constituency
and launched selective violent campaigns in Karachi. However in 1988 when the country
returned to a democratic form of government MQM gained a sizeable number of seats in the
provincial legislature and since then the violence perpetrated by the group has decreased. MQM
has effectively transformed its organizational setup from a secular militant organization to that of
a regular political party.
In contrast, a comparison of Pakistani militant groups shows a sharp rise in the number of
religious and anti-US groups in the past decade or so. This confirms Rapoport’s analysis
regarding the fourth wave of terrorism, which is led by Jihadi organizations. However from the
standpoint of the models presented above two things are especially noteworthy. First is the
inclusive nature of religious groups themselves and second the sharp rise in violence along with
the rise in religious militancy in the last decade. It is interesting to note here that from 1958 till
1980 there were only 5 militant groups in the country out of which 4 were secular. From 1980 to
1990 the number of groups came to 11, adding 6 new groups to the existing 5. (Global Terrorism
Database, 2013) This rise in groups coincides with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. From
1990 to end 1999 there were 6 more groups added, all with a religious ideology with US and
Pakistani State backing to fight the Soviets. (Global Terrorism Database, 2013) By looking at
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group ideology it appears that within this broader agenda during this period the Pakistani military
started its own proxy war in Kashmir by supporting religio-national militant groups in the region.
(AbouZahab, 2004). Statistics also show that from 2000 till 2005 six new groups were added to
the total tally of militant groups operating in Pakistan. Interestingly all of these groups appear
after the September 11 attacks and the resultant war on terrorism initiated. From the Pakistani
perspective a significant element of this new inclusion of groups is that almost 100% of these
groups have a religious, anti US ideology. (Global Terrorism Database, 2013) In terms of the
models above these are formed after the Pakistani state banned several other religious groups
formed during the earlier period for supporting the Pakistan’s agenda in Kashmir and
Afghanistan. In addition during this time the Musharraf government launched an initiative to
reform the Mudrassahs, house arrested known group leaders and implemented checks over the
communication and conventional fund raising practices of the militant organizations. It seems as
the groups lost the traditional sub-systems they regrouped to continue violence through alternate
means. Tactically it is also the same time at which suicide bombings and other previously
unknown forms of violence began to take hold in the country.
With over 3000 civilians dead due to major terrorist attacks in 2012 and coupled with the
rise in the number of the religiously motivated militant organizations in Pakistan suggest that
these groups are less hesitant when using violence against the civilian populace. (South Asian
Terrorism Portal, 2013) It is also indicative of the fact that these groups have no physical
constituency and the need to conduct violent acts, for them, is prior to any other considerations.
In Poliheuristic two-stage method this situation can be read as one in which during the first stage,
abandoning violence is automatically considered non-compensatory, once this is decided the
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group rationalizes between available possibilities and chooses the one which gives it maximum
advantage in terms of media exposure as well as spreading terror within a target audience.
Conclusions
The analysis of the Pakistani and South Asian experience with religious militancy above,
reveals several important characteristics of modern terrorism. First and foremost it illustrates that
religious and secular terrorisms are fundamentally different not only in terms of ideology but
also in terms of the way they come into operation. Violence produced by a secular militant group
has the tendency to succumb to the pressures exerted by the demands of the constituency, which
it represents or claims to represent. Religious militants on the other hand face no such pressures;
their belief in the divine sanction of the terror they produce, allows them to be more
indiscriminate and wholesale in conducting violence.
The primacy of producing violence also allows a religious militant group to be more
flexible in terms of membership, tactics and target selection. This flexibility originates from the
religious militant group’s ability to not only improve its tactical strategy for violence but also by
reforming its ideological goals which support that violence. Thus in case of Islamic militancy in
South Asia the call for Jihad until early 1990s asked for killing members of a rival sect or the
Soviets in Afghanistan and the Hindus in Kashmir and India. With the rise of the Taliban in
Afghanistan the agenda was expanded to Pushtun nationalism and anti Shia Islam in addition to
the previous targets even though these had become less significant. With introduction of Al
Qaeda in the picture the agenda further expanded, this time to include the US-led global system
or an anti-west ideology as a main target. After the September 11 attacks and Pakistan’s decision
to join the war on terror the Pakistani state and other Islamic countries, which supported the US,
also became valid targets for Islamic militants.
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The noteworthy factor here is that during the final period of this story i.e. from 2001 –
2005 most significant advances were made in disabling the sub-systems, which supported the
militant organizations. These advances were not only made through conventional law enforcing
tools but also through the US initiated Operation Enduring Freedom which uprooted the Taliban
regime and Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan. Furthermore the Pakistani military for the first time
showed the political will to discourage cross border infiltration in Kashmir and normalize
relations with India thus opening a previously untried non-violent solution to the Kashmir issue.
With such pressures the logical impact should have been a reduction in terrorist incidents. On the
contrary, this is the period in which the number of terrorist attacks rose significantly in the
region, in all four countries considered here.
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