Compliance Chronicles
Research from the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance
Number 3 December 2006
Investigating allegations of CBW use:
reviving the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism
Jez Littlewood
Canadian Centre for
Treaty Compliance
This study traces the evolution of the United Nations
(UN) Secretary-General’s mechanism for investigating
alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. Instigated
in 1981, the mechanism has been used on 12 occasions,
the last in 1992. Despite atrophying for many years, it has
been receiving renewed attention of late, particularly since
it has become clear that a comprehensive verification
arrangement for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
is unlikely to emerge soon. In addition to the UN Secretariat taking the initiative recently in reinvigorating certain
aspects of the mechanism, the UN General Assembly in
September 2006 somewhat unexpectedly encouraged the
UN Secretary-General to begin his own efforts to update
it. This timely study by Dr Jez Littlewood is intended to
contribute to the work now envisaged on a UN mechanism, which, long neglected, may now take its rightful
place in the international toolbox for combating the
scourge of chemical, biological and toxin weapons.
Dr Jez Littlewood is a Research Fellow at the Mountbatten
Centre for International Studies at the University of
Southampton in the United Kingdom. He is a former
member of the UK armed forces. He has also worked
with the United Nations Department for Disarmament
Affairs, serving from 1999–2000 on the secretariat for the
Ad Hoc Group of states parties to the Biological Weapons
Convention and from 2001–02 on the secretariat for the
convention’s Fifth Review Conference. He has written
extensively on the control of biological weapons, including most recently, The Biological Weapons Convention: A
Failed Revolution, Ashgate Publishers, Aldershot, 2005.
Canadian Centre for
Treaty Compliance
Investigating allegations of CBW use:
reviving the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism
Jez Littlewood
The Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance, based
at the Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs at Carleton University, conducts policyoriented research into the theory and practice of
compliance in respect of international treaties,
resolutions, agreements and arrangements. Its
working assumption is that compliance is the
bedrock of international law and that all states,
from the most powerful to the most disadvantaged,
are obliged to comply with their international legal
obligations. The centre’s research pays particular
attention to the technical and other means by
which compliance is monitored and verified and
the effectiveness and efficiency of institutional
arrangements for encouraging, facilitating, inducing and enforcing compliance. In addition to its
research and publications, the centre also holds
workshops and conferences, engages in various
outreach activities and contributes to teaching and
other scholarly endeavours at Carleton University
and elsewhere.
Published in Ottawa, Canada by the Canadian
Centre for Treaty Compliance
© Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance, 2006
Design and Production: Richard Jones, Exile: Design
& Editorial Services ([email protected])
Compliance Chronicles
Number 3
December 2006
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may
be reproduced, stored, transmitted, or disseminated in any form or by any means without prior
written permission from the Canadian Centre for
Treaty Compliance or the Norman Paterson School
of International Affairs, or as expressly permitted
by law.
All inquiries should be directed to:
Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance
1402A Dunton Tower
Carleton University
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Telephone: (613) 520-2600, ext 2032
Fax: (613) 520-2889
E-mail: [email protected]
Website: http://www.carleton.ca/cctc
The views expressed are those of individual authors
and are not to be taken as representing the views
of the editor, advisory board, the Canadian Centre
for Treaty Compliance or the Norman Paterson
School of International Affairs.
Contents
Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 4
Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6
Chapter 1: Why update the mechanism? .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Does the mechanism still have a role? ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Does the mechanism need updating? ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9
Chapter 2: Origins and evolution of the Secretary-General’s mechanism ................................................................................... 10
First use of the mechanism, 1981–82 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Indochina investigations (1981–82) ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
Afghanistan investigations (1982) ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................
The group’s final report ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Other investigations .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Lessons learned .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
10
10
11
12
12
12
From ad hoc to standing authority for the Secretary-General’s mechanism .................................................................................. 13
Secretary-General’s investigations, 1984–88 ...........................................................................................................................................................................................
Updating the mechanism: 1987–89 ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
Investigations in 1992 .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Principal lessons from investigations between 1980 and 1992 .....................................................................................................................
14
15
19
19
Chapter 3: Revivifying the Secretary-General’s mechanism ............................................................................................................................... 22
Legal aspects ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 22
The CWC ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 22
State and non-state use .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 23
Updating the list of experts available for chemical and biological investigations ...................................................................... 23
A new group of qualified experts ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 24
Operational aspects ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 24
Financial issues ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 26
A standing advisory body of experts .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 27
Contacts beyond the OPCW ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 28
The need for UNGA endorsement ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 28
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 30
Annexes .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 31
Endnotes ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 34
Jez Littlewood
Investigating allegations of CBW use
Foreword
This study by Dr Jez Littlewood is the most complete to date in its recounting of the evolution of
the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s
mechanism for investigating chemical and biological weapons use. Based on extensive research
and interviews, it describes the organic way—
unusual in the arms control and disarmament
field—in which the mechanism arose, was utilized
in varying circumstances, was almost continually
adapted, and then declined. The study was originally intended to spark interest in and explain
how the mechanism might be reinvigorated. The
assumption was that several significant political
and practical obstacles would have to be overcome
before any progress could be made, but that it was
worthwhile to lay out the options and what would
be required in each case.
Just as the original manuscript was being edited,
however, it became clear that movement was afoot.
Consequently, further interviews were carried out
and information gleaned. Remarkably, the path
to reviving the mechanism was suddenly cleared
with the adoption of a Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy by the UN General Assembly in September
2006. This document included encouragement
Compliance Chronicles
Number 3
December 2006
to the UN Secretary-General to proceed with an
update.
Quickly revised to take this new development
into account, Dr Littlewood’s study could not be
more timely. Our hope is that it will contribute to
the work now envisaged on a mechanism, which,
although long neglected, may now take its rightful
place in the international toolbox for combating
the scourge of chemical, biological and toxin
weapons.
The Centre for Treaty Compliance is grateful
to Dr Littlewood for an excellent contribution to
its Compliance Chronicles series and to those
who contributed to his research by providing
frank and thoughtful insights but who must
necessarily remain nameless. The centre is indebted to the Markland Group for funding both
the research and the resulting publication as
part of the Mark­land Program on Armaments
Treaty Compliance.
Trevor Findlay
Associate Professor, NPSIA
Director, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance
December 2006
Acronyms
BWC Biological Weapons Convention
CBW Chemical and biological weapons
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Organization
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
EU European Union
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDDA United Nations Department for Disarma­
ment Affairs
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations
UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
UNSC United Nations Security Council
NGOs Non-governmental organizations
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission
(on Iraq)
OIE World Organization for Animal Health
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons
PRK People’s Republic of Kampuchea
US United States
WHO World Health Organization
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
Jez Littlewood
Investigating allegations of CBW use
Introduction
In September 2006, the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) adopted a Global CounterTerrorism Strategy.1 In the plan of action annexed
to the resolution, United Nations (UN) member
states, somewhat unexpectedly, included encouragement of the Secretary-General to ‘update the
roster of experts and laboratories, as well as the
technical guidelines and procedures, available
to him for the timely and efficient investigation
of alleged use’ of chemical, biological and toxin
weapons.2
This study examines issues that require consider­
ation by UN member states, the Secretary-General,
other international bodies and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in any updating and strength­
ening of the mechanism. Both UNGA and the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have
called on the Secretary-General to conduct such
investigations. Twelve have been performed to
date. The investigation mechanism was last used
in 1992.
Since then there have been considerable develop­
ments in alternative mechanisms for investigating
chemical and biological weapons (CBW) use and
in the practice of such investigations. These include
entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Conven­
tion (CWC) in 1997, the establish­ment of the Organi­
sation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) in 1997, the activities in Iraq of the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the
United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspec­tion Commission (UNMOVIC), and the
1995–2001 negotiations on a legally binding verification protocol to the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC).
Despite being unused since 1992, the SecretaryGeneral’s mechanism remains extant. It might
best be characterized as being in the ‘break glass
in case of emergency’ category: locked away, unused and largely ignored. Political pressure has
Compliance Chronicles
Number 3
December 2006
been building to update and strengthen the mech­
anism for a number of years. Three recent UN
reports—A more secure world, In Larger Freedom
and Uniting against terrorism3—have recommended its fortification. In addition, the June
2006 report of The Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission suggested that the mechanism be
updated at least in respect of biological weapons.4
In November 2001, United States President George
W. Bush committed his administration to establishing ‘an effective United Nations procedure for
investigating suspicious outbreaks of disease or
allegations of biological weapons use’.5
It is now clear that the Secretary-General’s
mechanism will be revived and strengthened.
UN member states have provided the SecretaryGeneral with the authority to update the list of
experts and the technical guidelines and procedures for conducting investigations. This process
might be completed by the end of 2007. The task,
however, will not be simple. Ascertaining the facts
about alleged chemical or biological weapons use
is far from easy. Furthermore, in the past, some
member states have questioned the authority of
the Secretary-General to carry out investigations.
Revivifying the Secretary-General’s investigation
mechanism will require not only action by the
Secretary-General and his staff, but also strong
support from UN member states. It is not simply
a question of how to update the technical guidelines and procedures for any investigation; consideration has to be given to a wide variety of legal,
political and technical issues that may come into
play when an investigation is initiated.
Before further steps are taken to reinforce the
Secretary-General’s mechanism, it is necessary to
ask two basic questions:
First, is there a role for it?
Second, if the mechanism is to be updated and
strengthened, what issues require deliberation
by the Secretary-General?
This study seeks to answer these questions. Chap­
ter 1 assesses the role of the Secretary-General’s
mechanism. Chapter 2 traces its evolution to
identify a number of lessons. Taking such lessons
into account Chapter 3 examines the issues central to revivifying the mechanism.
The study explores a number of topics in order
to inform UN member states and others of the
extent of the task at hand.
Jez Littlewood
Investigating allegations of CBW use
Chapter 1
Why update the mechanism?
Any consideration of reanimating the SecretaryGeneral’s mechanism must take into account two
basic questions. First, with entry into force of the
CWC and the establishment of the OPCW, among
other developments, does the mechanism still
have a role? Second, if it does have a continuing
role, does it need updating?
Does the mechanism still have a role?
The existing investigation mechanism has its origins
in an ad hoc investigation by the UN SecretaryGeneral of alleged use of chemical weapons and
toxins in Indochina and Afghanistan in the late
1970s in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
The latter bans CBW use, but has no investigation
system of its own.
Since the advent of the OPCW in 1997, the gap
that the Secretary-General’s mechanism was intended to bridge has been partially filled in regard
to chemical and toxin weapons use by the CWC,
providing that alleged employment is by, or against,
a CWC state party. Under Part XI of the Verification
Annex of the CWC, the alleged use of chemical or
toxin weapons by a state party or against a state
party is subject to an investigation.
In the event of alleged use by a non-state party
against another non-state party, the OPCW has
no mandate. It is clear from Article X (assistance
and protection against chemical weapons), though,
that use by a non-state party against a state party
permits the OPCW and CWC states parties to
initiate an investigation. Further, Section E of
Part XI of the Verification Annex states that, in
cases of alleged use of chemical weapons by a
non-state party or in territory not controlled by
a state party, the OPCW ‘shall closely cooperate
with’ and ‘[i]f so requested . . . put its resources at
the disposal of the Secretary-General of the United
Compliance Chronicles
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December 2006
Nations’.6 A 2001 agreement between the OPCW
and the UN reinforced this provision.7
Therefore, in combination, the Secretary-General’s
investigation mechanism and the provisions of the
CWC permit an investigation of any alleged use
of chemical or toxin weapons regardless of whether
or not the perpetrator is a CWC state party.
The greater area of concern is biological weapons. The BWC has no standing verification body
akin to the OPCW and its states parties have failed
to agree on such an instrument. Article V of the
convention provides for consultations in response
to implementation problems. This provision has
been used only once, resulting in a consultative
meeting in 1997. Article VI allows any state party
to lodge a complaint with the UNSC about noncompliance by another state party. The UNSC
may then launch an investigation, with which all
parties are enjoined to cooperate. This article
has never been invoked and the UNSC has not
developed a specific mechanism to implement
it, even though a 1995 presidential statement on
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) stated that ‘appropriate measures will be
taken . . . where international treaties provide for
recourse to the Council when their provisions are
violated’.8
The only mechanism currently available to the
UNSC for investigating alleged use of biological
weapons, whether by a state party to the BWC or
not, is the Secretary-General’s. This makes its
revival extremely important. Without an impartial instrument endorsed by the international
community to ascertain facts about suspected
or alleged biological weapons use, redressing a
non-compliance situation and bringing the violator back into compliance are more difficult. In
an adversarial context, states are reluctant to
accept proof presented by other states, either
because it is, or it is perceived to be, one-sided.
Partial investigations are likely to be dismissed as
propaganda, and any scientific evidence presented
by the investigating country viewed as tainted.9
Scientific evidence supporting the allegation (or
refuting it) must be validated and able to stand up
to harsh scientific and political scrutiny. Avoiding
or decreasing the existing level of politicization is
an important aspect of any investigation process.
The answer to the first question is therefore that
there are gaps in the international community’s
ability to investigate chemical, biological or toxin
weapons use that the Secretary-General’s mechanism helps to fill.
Does the mechanism need updating?
There is no doubt that an investigation could be
launched: the Secretary-General has the authority
to initiate one on the basis of information provided
by a UN member state and could assemble an
investigation team drawn from the list of experts
nominated by member states. It is far from clear,
however, whether he could dispatch such a team
quickly and whether it could fulfil its task of ascertaining all of the facts about the allegation in a
timely and efficient manner.
Unused since 1992, the mechanism has, by and
large, been allowed to atrophy. Although the list
of experts has been revised over the past 16 or 17
years, the process has been haphazard until very
recently. There has been no collective training of
potential team members. The mechanism has no
dedicated investigation equipment or resources
at its disposal and would have to rely on that
provided by states or international organizations
such as the OPCW or that borrowed from other
UN bodies such as UNMOVIC. No updating of
the guidelines and procedures for investigations
has occurred. No formal account has been taken
of developments in detection capabilities, inspection protocols and operating methodologies of
investigation teams in other environments. Laboratories have not been tested and calibrated with
each other to ensure accurate identification of
chemical, biological and toxin agents. Moreover,
no direct line of funding is in place to cover the
costs of any investigation.
Hence, in answer to the second question, it is
clear that the mechanism does need updating
and strengthening. Violations of the Geneva Protocol and the BWC may go unverified for want
of a timely, efficient and effective investigation
mechanism.
Jez Littlewood
Investigating allegations of CBW use
Chapter 2
Origins and evolution of the
Secretary-General’s mechanism
10
The origins of the Secretary-General’s mechanism
lie in the allegations of chemical and toxin weapons use in Indochina and Afghanistan in the late
1970s. The US government at that time began
reporting, and providing information purporting
to substantiate, the use of chemical and toxin
weap­ons ‘against the Hmong tribesmen of Laos by
Lao and Vietnamese military forces’, and issuing
more sporadic reports on the use of chemical
weapons by the Vietnamese in Cambodia (then
Kampuchea).10 These became known as the ‘yellow
rain’ allegations due to the colour of the substances
purportedly used in the attacks. The US also
accused the Soviet Union of utilising chemical
weapons in Afghanistan.11 Reports in the Western
media from 1978 onwards, as well as US Congressional hearings in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
increased the pressure for action by the international community.12 British Ambassador David
Summerhayes told the Committee on Disarmament
in Geneva, Switzerland, in August 1980 that ‘the
very least that the international community should
now do is to arrange ad hoc for an impartial investigation of the reports’13 (emphasis in original).
In 1980 UNGA adopted a resolution sponsored
by a group of Western states that called on the
Secretary-General ‘to carry out an impartial investi­
gation to ascertain the facts pertaining to the
reports regarding the alleged use of chemical
weapons’, ‘with the assistance of qualified medical
and technical experts’.14 The resolution authorized
this Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on
Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons (as it became
known) to seek the necessary information from
governments, international organizations and
other sources, and to collect and examine evidence,
including through on-site activities, with the con­
sent of the states concerned.
While Western nations initiated the resolution
and lobbied nonaligned states to gain their support, the Soviet Union and its allies vehemently
Compliance Chronicles
Number 3
December 2006
opposed it. The politics of the Cold War ruled,
‘with the division of the General Assembly vote
emphatically along East–West lines and a clear
disinclination on the part of prominent sectors
of the nonaligned world to become involved’.15
The resolution was adopted, with 78 votes in
favour, 17 against—including Afghanistan, Cuba,
Syria, the Soviet Union and most of its Warsaw
Pact allies, Viet­nam and Yemen—and 36 abstentions, including signifi­cant nonaligned countries.
First use of the mechanism, 1981– 82
Following the adoption of the resolution, in 1981,
the Secretary-General appointed four experts, from
Egypt, Kenya, the Philippines and Peru, to conduct
investigations into the allegations surrounding
Indochina and Afghanistan. The group failed to
complete its mission within the year and Western
states lobbied the Secretary-General to allow it
to continue its work in 1982.16 The results of the
investigations are contained in an interim report
submitted to the Secretary-General in November
1981 and a final report filed in November 1982. The
group conducted a range of activities related to
the claims about Indochina in 1981 and 1982 and
Afghanistan in 1982. These included collating background information, seeking further information
on the allegations from member states, particularly those reporting on the yellow rain incidents,
and gathering information and data from other
sources, such as UN agencies and international
organizations, as well as through on-site activities
where possible.
Indochina investigations (1981–82)
In response to a note verbale of 26 January 1981 from
the Secretary-General to all UN member states
requesting information on the allegations, both
Laos and Vietnam rejected the authority of the
Group of Experts. Vietnam, which had invaded
Cambodia in 1978 and installed a puppet govern­
ment there, declared that it would ‘not engage in
any activities in the framework of the ill-intentioned
resolution 35/144 C’. Laos reaffirmed ‘its unmoving
opposition to resolution 35/144 C and categorically reject[ed] the so-called “Group of Experts”
envisaged in that resolution’.17 Nothing was heard
from the government of the People’s Republic of
Kampuchea (PRK), which had been refused the
right to occupy Cambodia’s seat at the UN at that
time. Despite numerous promises made to the
Group of Experts, efforts to seek permission from
the PRK to conduct on-site activities in Kampuchea
met with continuing procrastination. Unsurprisingly, the group reported in 1981 that, under these
circumstances, it ‘felt unable to undertake any
investigation . . . on the territory of Viet Nam and
Laos’.18 Later, it reported that its efforts to conduct
such activities in Kampuchea had also failed
because after extensive efforts in 1982 it had ‘to
conclude that the matter could not be constructively pursued any further’.19 One analyst summed
up the situation by saying that the Soviet Union
‘went out of its way’ to impede the group’s activities
and its allies prevented an on-site investigation.20
Faced with this blockage, the Group of Experts
first sought to glean as much information on the
allegations as possible from available sources.
Canada and the US had provided the most information in response to the Secretary-General’s
request, so the group conducted further discussions with them. The initial responses from the
Americans and the Canadians ‘underlined the
fact that the previous submissions had included
as much detail as possible’.21 Efforts to gain addi­
tional information from states, including the
submission of a questionnaire to Kampuchea and
the US, and from specialized agencies such as the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), yielded details but no definitive
information.
Unable to visit Kampuchea or Laos, the group
travelled to Thailand, the nearest country to the
alleged use sites. The experts visited two refugee
camps and a refugee processing centre and made
‘every effort to interview the available witnesses’
of the alleged attacks as well as medical personnel.
Samples of materials and supposed munitions
fragments were also provided to the group. In its
interim report, the Group of Experts said that it
was ‘unable to reach final conclusions as to whether
or not chemical warfare agents had been used’.22
Uncertain about the provenance of the samples
it had received and analysed, the group noted
that it could not ‘base its final conclusions on the
results of such analyses’.23
The group visited Thailand again between 25
October and 10 November 1982, but was once
more unable to visit Kampuchea despite efforts
to secure permission from the PRK government.
Interviews were conducted in Thailand with alleged
victims and medical personnel. Blood and urine
samples, a water sample, a serum sample and
samples of physical evidence were collected. The
trip to Thailand was not trouble-free, however;
problems included poor interpretation during
interviews, incomplete access to refugee camps
and border areas, and further questions about the
provenance of the samples provided to the group
as evidence of chemical or toxin weapons use.
These factors, combined with the inability to
conduct on-site activities in Kampuchea and
Laos and non-cooperation from these states and
Vietnam, meant that the Group of Experts was
unable to conclude definitively that chemical
weapons had been employed. It was, though,
able to point to some circumstantial evidence,
including the ‘presence of synthetic substances,
such as polyethelene glycol and lauryl sulphate
in samples of yellow powder from Laos’, which it
described as ‘significant’.24 Thus, while it was impossible to prove or disprove the allegations, some
evidence could not be disregarded.
Afghanistan investigations (1982)
A similar experience occurred with regard to the
allegations about Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion
of the country in 1979 led to the installation of a
puppet government and the commencement of
armed resistance to the occupiers. The Soviets
refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Group
of Experts and declined to permit it to visit Afghanistan. The group, as with Indochina, was forced to
Jez Littlewood
Investigating allegations of CBW use
11
12
restrict its investigation to the closest neighbouring
state, Pakistan. During investigations in Pakistan,
from 9–22 February 1982, it was able to collect and
examine evidence from refugee camps, hospitals
and political organizations at the Afghanistan–
Pakistan border, and efforts were made to interview
alleged victims. But the group also experienced
problems. Cross-examination of alleged victims
and eyewitnesses was hampered by interventions
and promptings by ‘leaders of political refugee
organizations’, the length of time between the
purported attacks and the investigation, and the
fact that many alleged observers had returned to
Afghanistan.25
Despite concerns that some of the allegations
were based on hearsay, the group was able to reach
tentative conclusions. Regarding the attacks on
the Karez underground water canals used for
irrigation, the group was of the opinion that they
‘were not carried out by the use of high explosive
or incendiary weapons, but conform with the use
of some form of harassing agent’.26 It said that ‘the
symptoms reported were similar to what would
be expected from the use of a harassing agent of
the adamsite type in a confined space’.27 The experts were unable to reach any conclusions about
the allegations involving various coloured smokes
and powders, or the hearsay accounts of poisoning of water, food and grains, due to insufficient
evidence.
The group’s final report
The group’s conclusions on Indochina and Afghani­
stan were contained in a single report released in
1982. Without access to all areas in which chemical weapons use was alleged and without the full
cooperation of all UN member states, the Group
of Experts conducted as thorough investigations
as it could to determine as many facts as possible.28
It was notable, however, that it concluded that it
‘could not disregard the circumstantial evidence
suggestive of the possible use of some sort of toxic
chemical substance in some instances’.29 The lack
of on-site access, the differing accounts of refugees
and eyewitnesses, the absence of assurance of the
provenance of samples provided to the group,
conflicting evidence from some of the samples,
Compliance Chronicles
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December 2006
and the length of time between the alleged attacks
and the investigations, all contributed to the
group’s inability to draw definitive conclusions
about whether chemical weapons had been used.30
As other analysts noted, the Group of Experts
was ‘forced to rely heavily on the investigations
of others, cross-checking them as best it could’.31
Other investigations
Investigations into the Indochina and Afghanistan
allegations were also carried out by several states,
including Australia, Canada, France, Thailand,
the UK and the US, as well as independently by a
Belgian toxicologist, Dr Aubin Heyndrickx.32 None
of these provided conclusive evidence to support
or refute the allegations.
With regard to the ‘yellow rain’ allegations in
Indochina, three independent analysts (Julian
Robinson, Jeanne Guillemin and Matthew Mesel­
son) reviewed information available in the public
domain. They concluded that yellow rain ‘turned
out to be the innocuous excrement of honeybees’.33
Increasing scepticism about the evidence used to
support the allegations was embarrassing for the
US and its allies. Support for or opposition to the
claims of chemical weapons use in Indochina and
Afghanistan more often than not took on overtly
political tones, as Robinson, Meselson and Guillemin emphasized. Without complete and validated
scientific proof, allegations may create as many
problems for those states seeking to uphold the
Geneva Protocol as they do for the supposed vio­
lator: indeed the former may suffer greater poli­
tical damage. Consequently, the Geneva Protocol
and other international law pertaining to CBW may
be weakened.34 The failure to prove or disprove
the allegations led one analyst, Elisa Harris, to
conclude later that the process of politi­cizing
allegations by releasing partial information into
the public domain offered lessons in ‘how not to
manage noncompliance questions’ and under­
lined ‘how difficult such questions are to resolve’.35
Lessons learned
The principal lesson learned from these early experiences was that any investigation into allegations
of chemical, biological or toxin weapons use must
be legitimate, effective, impartial, timely and
professional. In the absence of such conditions,
the scientific proof required to substantiate or
rebut allegations cannot be assembled. Evidence
is necessary for two reasons. First, it is needed to
ensure that violators of the Geneva Protocol are
held accountable for their actions and that chemical, biological or toxin weapons use does not
deliver political or security benefits to the perpetrators. Second, evidence is necessary to provide
the maximum amount of confidence in the proving or disproving of allegations, helping to ensure
that frivolous or politically motivated claims are
exposed, thereby denying political or security
advantages to false accusers.
From ad hoc to standing authority for
the Secretary-General’s mechanism
The Secretary-General’s mechanism as it exists
today arose from a 1982 UNGA resolution, sponsored by the same group of Western states that
sought to perpetuate the investigatory powers of
the Secretary-General vis-à-vis the Geneva Protocol. Again, it was far from achieving consensus.
Although 70 states supported the resolution, 31
voted against it, including Afghanistan, Cuba, Syria,
the Soviet Union and many of its Warsaw Pact allies,
and Vietnam, and 18 abstained.
In Resolution 37/98 D of 13 December 1982,
UNGA noted that the Geneva Protocol ‘does not
provide for the establishment of procedures for
investigating reports concerning activities prohibited by the Protocol’.36 Furthermore, it declared
that its continued authority would benefit from
the creation of procedures ‘to make possible the
prompt and impartial investigation of information
concerning possible violations of the provisions
of the Protocol’.37 Consequently, UNGA requested
the Secretary-General to carry out investigations
into ‘activities that may constitute a violation of
the Geneva Protocol or the relevant rules of inter­
national law in order to ascertain the facts’ and
to report the results to all UN member states.
To facilitate this, UNGA asked the SecretaryGeneral to:38
compile as a matter of priority, with the cooper­
ation of member states, lists of qualified experts
whose services could be made available at short
notice to undertake such investigations, and
of laboratories with the capability to perform
testing for the presence of agents and to maintain
such lists;
appoint groups of experts to conduct urgent
investigations of possible violations; to make
the necessary arrangements to collect and
examine evidence, including on-site, with the
cooperation of the countries concerned, and
for the testing of agents as required; and to seek
appropriate assistance and relevant information from all governments and international
organizations, as well as other sources; and
devise, with the assistance of consultant experts,
procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of activities that may violate the Geneva
Protocol or other relevant rules of international
law; and to assemble and organize systematically documentation relating to the identification of signs and symptoms associated with the
use of such agents as a means of aiding investigations and the medical treatment that may be
needed.
Governments, national and international
organi­zations, and scientific and research institu­
tions were requested to cooperate fully with the
Secretary-General in these matters. The SecretaryGeneral was asked to report to UNGA at its 38th
session in 1983 on the implementation of the
resolution.
To fulfil this request the Secretary-General duly
appointed a Group of Consultant Experts, which
convened in May and September 1983. Given the
scope of its task, the group was unable to finalize
its work in time for the 38th session at the end of
the year.39 UNGA requested that the work be com­
pleted by 1984.40 The experts’ 46-page report was
released in October 1984.41
The Group of Consultant Experts made a series
of recommendations for setting up what would
become the Secretary-General’s investigation
mechanism. Its report also proposed procedures
for investigating allegations of chemical, biological and toxin weapons use, for the collection and
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organization of documentation, and for providing
administrative support for implementing and
updating the methodologies identified. The report
also included technical annexes on specific issues
such as the timing of initiation of investigations,
the expertise required to conduct them, laboratory
support for the handling and testing of samples,
equipment requirements, model clauses for exchanges of letters between the Secretary-General
and involved states on logistical, security, trans­
por­tation and laboratory support, and an illustrative questionnaire for interviews during an
investigation.
Secretary-General’s investigations,
1984–88
14
Prior to the completion of the work of the Group of
Consultant Experts, there were extensive reports
of chemical weapons use in the continuing war
between Iran and Iraq. Despite increasing evidence
of the employment of chemical weapons against
Iran in 1982 and 1983, Tehran did not formally
request an investigation until 8 March 1984, one
day after the International Committee of the Red
Cross released a statement in Geneva indicating
its belief that chemical weapons were being utilized in the war.42
The Secretary-General was, however, reportedly
‘under strong political pressure not to act’43 or use
his investigatory mechanism. The Soviet Union
was apparently opposed because it viewed the
instrument as impinging on the prerogatives of the
UNSC to decide when, where, and if, any investi­
gations were to be conducted. Other objec­tions
were guided more by realpolitik. The US, for
instance, hoped Iraq would prevail over Iran and
consequently was prepared to turn a blind eye to
alleged Iraqi transgressions.
Nevertheless, taking what one observer called
‘courageous action’,44 the Secretary-General, Javier
Pérez de Cuéllar, in response to Iran’s formal request of 8 March, launched an investigation. He
did this not under the authorization provided by
Resolution 37/98 D, but because he felt he was ‘duty
bound to ascertain the facts’ given the humanitarian principles embodied in the UN Charter and
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the moral responsibilities vested in the SecretaryGeneral’s office.45
Four experts—from Australia, Spain, Sweden
and Switzerland—were chosen and dispatched to
Iran between 13 and 19 March 1984. They reported
to the Secretary-General on 21 March. Their unanimous conclusion was that chemical weapons, in
the form of mustard gas and the nerve agent, Tabun,
had been used in Iran.46 In 1985, the SecretaryGeneral responded to continued reports of Iraqi
use of chemical weapons by sending a medical
expert to Europe to collect information on the
injuries sustained by Iranians being treated in
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and
the UK.
On 12 February 1986, Iran requested a further
investigation. This time the Secretary-General
met with the UNSC, at his request, on 14 February.
He proposed, and several Council members agreed,
that a further investigation mission be dispatched
as soon as possible.47 The UNSC, on 24 February,
adopted Resolution 582, which deplored the carnage of the war and the ongoing violations of
international humanitarian law and other laws
of war, ‘in particular, the use of chemical weapons’
in violation of the Geneva Protocol.48 Following
adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General
immediately instructed a team to assemble in
Vienna, Austria, and to travel to Iran immediately.
Baghdad rejected his offer to have the team also
go to Iraq to investigate its allegations of chemical
weapon use against it by Iran.
The investigation team visited Iran between 26
February and 3 March 1986 and reported to the
Secretary-General on 6 March. In its conclusion,
the report noted, inter alia, that Iraq had used
chemical weapons against Iranian forces on many
occasions, primarily mustard gas, but also some
instances of a nerve agent. Such employment,
they noted, was ‘in direct contravention of the
1925 Geneva Protocol which has been accepted
by both Iran and Iraq’.49
Further investigations occurred in 1987 at the
initiative of the Secretary-General, including in
Iraq, after Baghdad agreed to accept the repeated
offers of the Secretary-General to investigate its
allegations of chemical weapons use against it
by Iran. An investigatory team visited Iran from
22–29 April and Iraq from 29 April–3 May. The
experts confirmed the use of chemical weapons
against Iran and that Iranian civilians had been
exposed to them.50 It also concluded that Iraqi
military personnel had been exposed to chemical
weapons.
On 30 November 1987, UNGA adopted Resolution
42/37/C,51 reiterating its concerns about reports of
chemical weapons use in the Iran–Iraq war and
declaring that ‘prompt and impartial investigation of reports of possible use of chemical and
bacteriological weapons would further enhance
the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol’.52
In 1988 a further four missions were dispatched
to the Iran–Iraq theatre of conflict. Following alle­
gations of chemical weapons use by Iran and Iraq,
the Secretary-General dispatched a medical specialist (as he had done in 1985) to investigate the
claims. Dr Manuel Dominquez of Spain visited
Iran from 28–31 March and Iraq from 8–11 April and
submitted his report on 14 April 1988. In trans­mit­
ting the report to the UNSC, the Secretary-General
noted the mission’s finding that ‘chemical weapons
have again been used in both the Islamic Republic
of Iran and in Iraq and that there has been an appar­
ent increase in the number of civilian casualties’.53
Further missions to Iran from 1–5 July 1988,54 Iraq
from 9–11 July 198855 and Iran from 12–14 August
198856 all confirmed the use of chemical weapons.
Although the investigations were able to ascer­
tain many facts, and therefore should be considered successful, the teams were also cognizant
of the limitations of the existing procedures. In
particular, the 1–5 July mission to Iran was unable
to confirm the alleged use of nerve agents and
cyanide through chemical analysis in the field—
due, the team hypothesized, to the disappearance
of the agents in the time between the alleged
event and the investigation. This led the investigation team to note that it may ‘be necessary to
review existing machinery for verification by United
Nations teams of the use of chemical weapons to
ensure the timely presence of experts at the site
of alleged attacks’.57
One other incident is also worth flagging: namely
Iraq’s rejection of an investigation in the country
into the attack on Halabja. In 1988, Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons against the Kurdish population
within its borders at Halabja killed between 2,000
and 5,000 people. The then UN Secretary-General,
Pérez de Cuéllar, was asked by 10 states to request
an investigation into the attack. According to
Jonathan Tucker, the Iraqi government refused
the request by claiming that ‘[t]his is a question of
sovereignty . . . and therefore I do not think we
are going to accept that’.58 The refutation underlined the lesson from the initial investigations of
1980–82: the necessity for cooperation from the
state on whose territory the investigation is to
occur. Without such collaboration, an investigation can be prevented.
It is possible for evidence to be collected later.
In the case of Halabja, a non-governmental team
from Middle East Watch and Physicians for Human
Rights gathered some proof in 1992.59 However,
whether that evidence would be able to withstand
scrutiny by a legal panel or various chemical
weapons apologists in an international context
is open to serious question.
Updating the mechanism: 1987– 89
The international community’s torpor over Iraq’s
violations of the Geneva Protocol was eventually
replaced by a sense of profound revulsion. Iraq’s
use of chemical weapons was condemned—both
in national statements such as the US condemnation of March 198460 and in UNSC Resolution
512 of 1986. Action to stem the export of relevant
chemicals and equipment was set in train by the
Brussels Suppliers Group (known since 1985 as
the Australia Group). However, apart from moral
condemnation, Iraq avoided penalization for its
deeds. Chemical weapons could apparently be
employed without serious international consequen­
ces. In September 1988, New York Times columnist
Flora Lewis wrote a scathing commentary on states’
complicity in Iraq’s use of chemical weapons,
noting that ‘[g]overnments seem to have reached
a new level of cynicism’ and that it has been ‘legi­
slators, the press and the public who have spoken
out against Iraq’s actions’. Lewis concluded that
‘other third world belligerents will now be tempted
to use the “poor countries’ nuclear arm,” if the
complicity of the world community with Iraq shows
that can be done with impunity’.61
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16
Other observers pointed out that, despite inaction in the early 1980s, the empowering of the
Secretary-General to investigate alleged use of
such weapons in the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq war repre­
sented a ‘small, but hopefully significant positive
development’.62
In 1987, UNGA renewed its call for states to observe strictly the Geneva Protocol (A/42/37 C) and
its request to the Secretary-General ‘to carry out
investigations . . . concerning the possible use of
chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin
weapons that may constitute a violation of the
1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of
international law in order to ascertain the facts
of the matter, and to report promptly the results
of any such investigation to all Member States’.63
The resolution also asked the Secretary-General
to develop further the technical guidelines and
procedures available to him, including compiling
and maintaining lists of qualified experts and of
laboratories to undertake tests for the presence
of agents. The resolution requested that member
states and relevant international organizations
cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in this
work (and any subsequent investigations), and
that he submit a report on the implementation
of the resolution at the 43rd session of UNGA (1988).
Furthermore, with one eye on the future, the reso­
lution noted that on entry into force of the CWC,
the modalities available to the Secretary-General
for investigating reports of chemical weapons use
would need to be reviewed.
To fulfil this request, the Secretary-General engaged six consultant experts from Bulgaria, Egypt,
France, Sweden, the US and the Soviet Union, who
were charged with preparing a report on the scien­
tific, technical and legal aspects of guidelines and
pro­cedures for investigating the possible utilization of CBW. The experts met during the period 15–
19 August 1988, 6–17 February and 31 July–11 August
1989. The group filed its report on 11 August 1989.64
Like its predecessor, the report was comprehen­
sive and provided a good basis for future investigations. It contained two principal questions:
how to identify or define conditions in such a
way as to make a timely investigation at the
alleged incident site an obligatory consequence
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of a report of alleged or suspected use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons; and
how to achieve the strongest possible commitment by member states to receive an investiga­
tion team pursuant to relevant UN resolutions.
The guidelines and procedures devised by the
experts were recommendations to the SecretaryGeneral. They agreed that an investigation should
occur at the site of alleged use whenever an evalu­
ation of the information provided in the investigation request warranted one. Furthermore, they
stated that, if asked, a member state should permit such an investigation on its territory.
The key recommendations covered three areas:
authority to initiate, and the conduct of, investigations ordered by the Secretary-General;
implementation of the guidelines and procedures for carrying out an investigation; and
follow-up activities necessary to maintain the
effectiveness of the investigation guidelines
and procedures.65
Each of these is considered below.
Authority to initiate, and the conduct of,
investigations ordered by the SecretaryGeneral
The consultant experts concluded that the
Secretary-General should carry out as promptly
as possible investigations into reports brought
to his attention by any member state concerning
the possible use of CBW where it may violate the
Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of custo­
mary international law. The point would be to
ascertain the facts of the matter, and the results
would be swiftly reported to all member states.
The experts did not use the word ‘verification’,
which would imply that the investigation team or
the Secretary-General would make a judgement
as to who was responsible for any confirmed use
of chemical, biological or toxin weapons. Giving
the team or the Secretary-General this authority
would raise concerns among UN member states
about their sovereignty. Rather, the consultant
experts stressed that the team and the SecretaryGeneral should engage simply in fact-finding,
leaving a judgement about who was responsible
to the UNSC and member states. There is in reality a fine line between fact-finding and verification
but in the highly politicized world of the UN, such
hair-splitting was necessary to ensure widespread
acceptance of the mechanism.
The Secretary-General should determine how
to conduct further investigations and in doing
so, he should consult with any member state on
questions related to potential employment of CBW
and investigation of possible or alleged use. The
Secretary-General may conclude that an investigation is not warranted. Equally, he should clarify
with the member state submitting the report ambiguous information and address any instance of
insufficient information within 24–36 hours. As
with previous UNGA decisions, the SecretaryGeneral was not to be precluded from using addi­
tional information on the allegation that may be
brought to his attention by any other member state.
A decision to conduct an investigation should be
taken in the shortest possible time, no later than
24 hours after the receipt of the request, if possible,
and an investigation team should be dis­patched
no more than 48 hours after the decision is taken
to conduct an investigation. Any investigation at
the site of an alleged violation should be carried
out rapidly and in the least intrusive manner.
The experts also recommended that member
states should be called on not to refuse a request
from the Secretary-General for an investigation
and that all member states should grant an investi­
gation team rapid access to the site of the alleged
violation. Although it would be impossible for
the Secretary-General to force on-site activity on
a recalcitrant state, the onus was on all member
states to cooperate with him. The tone was impli­
cit and understated, but equally unmistakable:
refus­ing an on-site investigation request from
the Secretary-General would suggest that such a
state might have used chemical, biological or
toxin weapons, been complicit in such use or be
attempting to protect an ally involved in such use.
Implementation of the guidelines and pro­
cedures for carrying out an investigation
The Secretary-General should have at his disposal
the services of expert consultants, who may be
appointed individually or as a group at the discre­
tion of the Secretary-General. Such consultants
should assist the Secretary-General in assessing
all of the relevant legal, scientific, military, logistical and other questions related to any specific
report of alleged use as well as aiding him in con­
ducting an investigation.
The group devising the recommendations suggested that expert consultants should assist the
Secretary-General continuously in order to develop
the measures required for the smooth conduct
of investigations. Qualified and rostered experts
may be called on to participate in specialized
training either individually or as a team to ensure
the effectiveness of investigations. Likewise, the
designated analytical laboratories may be requested
to participate in inter-laboratory calibration studies to establish the validity and accuracy of their
analytical methods. To facilitate this process, the
laboratories had the option of suggesting metho­
dologies for sample collection, transport or analysis
that they may have developed to improve the
Secretary-General’s capabilities.
The Secretary-General should identify an appro­
priate focal point within the Secretariat to help
secure the administrative and substantive support
and coordination needed to streamline the functioning of the investigation mechanism. All member states and relevant international organizations
should provide assistance to the Secretary-General
to aid preparation for and the conduct of any
investigations. Finally, any member state could
offer specialized training courses to rostered experts in support of their role, including exchange
of information and expertise to facilitate common
understandings and operational procedures.
Follow-up activities necessary to maintain
the effectiveness of the investigation guide­
lines and procedures
The consultant experts did not perceive the estab­
lishment of technical guidelines and procedures
or the Secretary-General’s mechanism as a oneoff task. They recognized that the effectiveness
of the instrument would depend on continued
updating of its technical guidelines and procedures. As a result, they recommended that the
Secretary-General periodically convene a meeting
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18
of his appointed expert consultants to review
the status of the various tasks undertaken. The
Secretary-General should also report episodically
to member states on the state of readiness of the
standing preparatory measures for investigations.
In addition, on entry into force of the CWC, he
should cooperate with the OPCW in carrying out
investigations in accordance with the guidelines
and procedures of the Secretary-General’s investigations mechanism and the relevant CWC provisions.
In a series of technical appendices, the report
identified specific guidelines and procedures for
conducting investigations. It also pinpointed
mechanisms for keeping the guidelines and procedures up to date. It was envisaged that these
would ensure maintenance of the investigation
guidelines and procedures and their relevance
in the future. The guidelines and procedures
addressed the general principles of investigations,
the submission of reports on alleged use, how the
Secretary-General should assess an investigation
request and determine whether an investigation
is warranted, the role and involvement of UN
member states and international organizations,
the role of expert consultants, the requirements
for laboratory support, investigation teams’ equipment needs, standing preparatory measures for
investigations, and the drafting and content of
investigation team reports.
The Secretary-General submitted the report
(A/44/561) to UNGA and it was considered at the
latter’s 45th session (1990). In its resolution of 1990,
UNGA endorsed the group’s proposals without
qualification and noted the continued significance
of the UNSC’s decision to take appropriate action
in the event of future chemical weapons use.66
Two other developments underlined the authority of the Secretary-General to initiate investigations. First, on 26 August 1988, the UNSC passed
Resolution 620, which condemned resolutely the
use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq war in
contravention of the Geneva Protocol, as well as
in defiance of UNSC Resolution 612 (1988). The
UNSC encouraged the Secretary-General ‘to carry
out promptly investigations in response to allegations brought to his attention by any member
state’. Furthermore, it decided ‘to consider imme­
diately, taking into account the investigations of
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the Secretary-General, appropriate and effective
measures in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, should there be any future use
of chemical weapons in violation of international
law, wherever and by whomever committed’.67
The second development was the convening
of a conference of states parties to the Geneva
Protocol, which adopted a Final Declaration on
11 January 1989. Among other things, the parties
reaffirmed ‘their full support for the SecretaryGeneral in carrying out his responsibilities for
investigations in the event of alleged violations
of the Geneva Protocol’.68 Additionally, the parties
expressed their wish for early completion of work
to strengthen the efficiency of existing procedures
and called for the cooperation of all states to facilitate the actions of the Secretary-General.
In all cases, parties to the Geneva Protocol, UN
member states and UNSC members looked to
the conclusion of the CWC as a means to bolster
the prohibition on the use of chemical and toxin
weapons, as well as to the existence of the BWC.
Thus, the Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism was not seen as the ultimate instrument
that the international community would develop
to address the use of chemical, biological and
toxin weapons.
This did not imply, though, that the SecretaryGeneral’s mechanism was envisaged as temporary.
Nowhere in the resolutions of UNGA or the UNSC
was there an implicit or explicit decision that it
would cease to exist or lose its authority on entry
into force of the CWC. There is no ‘sunset clause’
in UNGA or UNSC resolutions. Under the resolu­
tions, the Secretary-General maintains indefinitely
the ability to initiate an investigation. Such authority remains intact today and will continue to do
so unless an explicit decision is taken to the contrary. It is evident from the numerous reports from
2001 and agreement by UN member states in 2006
on a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy that there
is a widespread view that the Secretary-General
retains the power to initiate an investigation into
CBW use.69
The references to the CWC and the future merely
expressed the hope that the CWC would provide
its own procedures for investigating chemical and
toxin weapons use (as well as their production,
development, stockpiling, acquisition and transfer). The lack of a reference to biological weapons
likely stems from two facts: first the existence of
the BWC and the misplaced belief that the biological weapons problem was resolved; and second,
the fact that all of the investigations initiated to
date under the mechanism related to the employ­
ment of chemical or toxin weapons, not biological
weapons.
Investigations in 1992
At the request of Mozambique and Armenia, the
Secretary-General launched a further two investigations in 1992. Mozambique requested an investigation after it alleged that chemical weapons were
used in an attack on its forces during operations
against the Mozambican National Resistance
(RENAMO) in January 1992. Prior to dispatching
the investigation team, the Secretary-General
asked for further information from the government
of Mozambique. In addition, the preliminary
results of previous (non-Secretary-General) investi­
gations by a joint Mozambique–South Africa team,
a Swedish team and UK experts—all conducted
at the request of Mozambique—were sought.70
Although the Secretary-General was concerned
that the delay between the alleged attack and
the initiation of the investigation would reduce
the possibility of reaching a definitive conclusion
about which, if any, chemical warfare agents had
been used, he authorized an investigation.
The investigation team arrived on 23 and 24
March, concluding its activities in Mozambique by
27 March. It submitted its report to the SecretaryGeneral on 1 April 1992. In the report’s conclusion,
the team noted that it could not confirm use of a
chemical agent in the attack, given the absence
of analytical data. While the symptoms described
by the attacked force were similar to that of an
‘atropine-like chemical warfare agent’ (suggesting a weapon acting against parts of the nervous
system), they are also characteristic of heat stress.
Furthermore, an attack comprising only a single
overhead explosion is atypical of chemical weapons use. Chemical weapons attacks would be
expected to involve salvos of artillery or mortar
rounds, or aircraft to deliver the warfare agent.71
An appendix to the report, not widely available
publicly, also hinted at problems in the conduct
of the investigation. There was also some dispute
about the exact location of the incident. Other
problems included the investigation team having
no clearly defined leader and difficulties with
transport to and from the alleged event area.
The investigation in Azerbaijan was conducted
at the request of the government of Armenia, which
sought to refute allegations that Armenian troops
had used chemical weapons against Azerbaijan
in April and May 1992. Again, despite the length
of time between the alleged incident and the
request, the Secretary-General acted under his
own authority and launched an investigation,
announcing his decision to the UNSC during
informal consultations on 19 June 1992. The investigation occurred from 4–8 July 1992. The investigation team visited the reported incident zone in
Azerbaijan and Armenia. In its report, the team
concluded that the events described to it could
also be explained by phenomena other than
chemical weapons use and that the wide dispersal
of the locations of the affected individuals did not
follow any pattern expected in a chemical weapons attack. Consequently, the report concluded
that ‘no evidence of use of chemical weapons was
presented to the team’.72
Principal lessons from investigations
between 1980 and 1992
Investigations into chemical or biological weapons use are rare. The 12 investigations performed
between 1980 and 1992 fall into three clusters:
First, the yellow rain investigations in Indochina
and Afghanistan, which were ad hoc, controversial and, because of factors beyond the control
of the Secretary-General or the investigation
teams, failed to produce conclusive evidence of
chemical or toxin weapons use or conclusive
evidence that such weapons had not been
employed in Afghanistan, Kampuchea or Laos.
Second, the investigations into chemical
weapons use between 1984 and 1988, during the
Iran–Iraq war which followed agreed technical
guidelines and procedures. The development
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of the technical guidelines and procedures for
investigations in 1983 proved their worth in the
ensuing period. Chemical weapons use was
proven beyond doubt by a number of the factfinding investigations and, despite the opposition
of some UN member states to the investigations,
the types of evidence produced set the standard
for proof for the UNSC.
Third, the investigations in Mozambique and
Azerbaijan. The two investigations were unconnected in terms of politics, region and context—
one being a state-to-state dispute, the other a
state/non-state actor conflict—but the investigation process proved its value once more. It is
arguable that had the investigation procedure
not worked in the instance of the Iran–Iraq conflict, neither Mozambique nor Armenia would
have requested that the Secretary-General conduct an investigation. In that sense, the success of
the previous investigations was such that other
UN member states viewed the mechanism as
a viable process that was of value to them. It is
perhaps significant that is was smaller states
that lacked the capability to perform their own
investigations that turned to the SecretaryGeneral for assistance. It is this last cluster that
might turn out to be the most important model,
providing states that lack their own capabilities
with a recognized, impartial, authoritative and
respected investigation process to prove or dis­
prove allegations of use.
Other lessons from past investigations are also
evident. First, of the 12 investigations, nine were
able to reach a definitive conclusion that either
chemical weapons were used, or that there was no
evidence of their employment. Of those that were
unable to reach a definitive conclusion—Kampu­
chea and Vietnam in 1981 and 1982, Afghani­stan in
1982 and Mozambique in 1992—the inability to con­
duct on-site activities in the alleged attack area
and the delays between the purported attack and
the launching of an investigation and/or the arrival
of the investigation team were crucial factors. Of
those three investigations, the ‘yellow rain’ incidents in Indochina are the best documented.73
Second, the investigations launched subsequent
to 1983, after the establishment of technical and
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procedural guidelines, followed a pattern. All of
the investigation reports conformed to an agreed
format, methodology and modalities. In addition,
although the investigation team members were
appointed as individuals they effectively functioned as a team and submitted a single report to
the Secretary-General. This suggests, in the context of the type of investigations carried out, that
the guidelines and procedures developed by the
experts proved their value and permitted different
investigation teams to fulfil their tasks relatively
efficiently and to an acceptable standard.
Third, investigations were initiated in a variety
of ways. The first two investigations flowed from
decisions taken by UNGA in 1980 and 1981. The
inves­tigation in Iran in 1984 was not authorized
under Resolution 37/98 D of 1982, but by the
Secretary-General using his presumed authority
under the prin­ciples of the UN Charter. Later
investigations into the Iran–Iraq war were initiated
by the Secretary-General, sometimes on his own
authority, and sometimes after formal reference
to the UNSC. Even though the Secretary-General
has the power to instigate an investigation follow­
ing a request from a member state, he/she may
do so in future using an assortment of means
based on past practice. Authority is not granted
by the UNSC on an investigation-by-investigation
basis, but rests with the Secretary-General. It is,
however, prudent for the Secretary-General to
consult the UNSC on the possibility of launching
an investigation.
Fourth, the mechanism available to the SecretaryGeneral is not an interim solution. Neither the
report from experts in 1983 nor that of 1989 indicated the need to rescind the authority of the
Secretary-General on entry into force of the CWC.
The technical guidelines and procedures developed in 1983 and 1989 were couched in such a way
as to presage a further review and updating of the
mechanism following entry into force of the CWC.
This review has not occurred to date, but is almost
certain to happen in 2007.
Fifth, both the initial UNGA resolutions and
the reports of the consultant experts in 1983 and
1989 underline that the Secretary-General should
make use of all available information—from
whatever source—in making a decision on the
initiation of an investigation. Information need
not only come from a state, or the state concerned,
but may be provided by NGOs, or be collected
by the UN Secretariat itself, or by other international organizations, such as FAO, Interpol, the
OPCW, the World Health Organization (WHO) or
the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).
This was a significant recommendation by the
experts in the 1980s and is even more so in the
contemporary period. Any attempt to reduce
the scope of infor­mation that may be taken into
account would be detrimental to international
peace and security.
Sixth, it is noteworthy that UN member states
established a separate mechanism to address vio­
lations of the Geneva Protocol. They did not turn
to an existing organization such as the WHO. Suspected use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons
was deemed sufficiently serious to warrant a dedi­
cated, specialized mechanism.
Finally, not all of the recommendations of the
Group of Consultant Experts have been implemented. The training requirements recommended
for experts were not fulfilled, no meetings bringing together all rostered experts have occurred
under the ambit of the guidelines on implementation, and, as noted, the updating envisaged after
entry into force of the CWC did not take place.
Other factors are also worth considering. In the
context of the Cold War, CBW use was predomi-
nantly a state-level concern. Now non-state interest in chemical, biological and toxin weapons
exists. In fact, the investigation in Mozambique
followed an allegation by a state about non-state
use. Thus, precedent indicates that the SecretaryGeneral’s mechanism is applicable to alleged or
suspected state and non-state utilization of such
weapons.
Neither the resolutions nor the guidelines and
procedures specify that alleged employment of
chemical, biological or toxin weapons has to be
perpetrated by a state for it to be investigated.
Furthermore, Security Council Resolution 620
(1988) states that the UNSC will, based on the
reports of the Secretary-General, consider ‘appro­
priate and effective measures . . . should there be
any future use of chemical weapons in violation
of international law, wherever and by whomever
committed’.74
The mechanism is, therefore, valid for both state
and non-state (including terrorist) use of chemical weapons in violation of the Geneva Protocol.
In the current era, the ‘wherever and by whomever
committed’ clause surely applies also to biological and toxin weapons. If the Geneva Protocol and
the use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons
is generally considered prohibited under custom­
ary international law, it would appear possible
that it binds all actors: states, international organizations, non-state actors and individuals.
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21
Chapter 3
Revivifying the Secretary-General’s mechanism
22
Significant changes in the international political
and security environment have occurred since
the 1989 report of the consultant experts updated
the guidelines and procedures for conducting
investigations. On the grounds of elapsed time
alone, the 17-year lacuna since this last updating
indicates that the mechanism should be reviewed.
With the adoption of the Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy, a review of the guidelines and procedures
is now imminent. What, then, are the issues that
require consideration?
Updating the mechanism poses a number of
legal, political, technical, operational and practical questions. There are no easy answers to some
of these: expert legal advice may be needed in
some cases; decisions at the political level must
be taken; financial implications will have to be
examined; and practical difficulties considered.
None of the issues identified presents insurmountable problems, but it would be inaccurate to view
any updating as a simple task.
Legal aspects
A number of legal questions will arise in relation
to updating the mechanism. First, how will the
Secretary-General’s mechanism complement CWC
provisions for investigations of non-compliance
with the CWC? Second, what role is there, if any,
for investigations of use involving non-state actors?
investigations of non-states parties. However, as
shown earlier, use against a CWC state party clearly
does fall within the scope of the CWC, regardless
of whether the perpetrator is a CWC state party.
This throws up a number of questions:
First, can investigations relating to alleged or
suspected use of chemical weapons and involving a CWC state party only be conducted under
the CWC, or might the Secretary-General’s
mechanism also apply?
Second, if the Secretary-General’s mechanism
was used by a CWC state party to request an
investigation of another CWC state party what
impact would this have on the CWC itself?
Third, assuming, as the Group of Consultant
Experts envisaged, that the Secretary-General’s
mechanism was to be updated in light of, and
taking into account, the instruments available
under the CWC, how should investigations of
states not party to the CWC proceed?76
Any updating of the Secretary-General’s mech­
anism has to take into consideration that a professional and permanent organization on chemical
and toxin weapons exists. Indeed, the CWC explicitly recognizes this in its Verification Annex:77
In the case of alleged use of chemical weapons involving
a State not Party to this Convention or in territory not
controlled by a State Party, the Organization shall closely
cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. If so requested, the Organization shall put its
The CWC
resources at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the
The CWC includes procedures for challenge inspec­
tions to resolve questions about non-compliance.
Any request for such an inspection must be within
the scope of the CWC, and thus is only applicable
to CWC states parties.75 The CWC, and the OPCW,
have no authority to undertake inspections or
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United Nations.
It is clear that the Secretary-General does not
intend to ignore the OPCW’s competencies and
experience. A future update of the SecretaryGeneral’s mechanism will address this matter and
put some flesh on the bones of the existing agreement. Certainly, the OPCW will take the lead on
chemical and toxin weapons issues. The fact that
all recent reports and recommendations on the
Secretary-General’s mechanism have referred to
its biological aspects indicates strongly that the
issue of chemical and toxin weapons is widely
viewed as being covered by the CWC and the OPCW.
The appointed experts simply need to deliberate
the implications for the Secretary-General’s mech­
anism. Finally, even with the OPCW and the CWC
in existence, it remains prudent for the international community to have recourse to an investiga­
tion mechanism on chemical and toxin weapons
beyond the OPCW until universal adherence to, and
implementation of, that convention is achieved.
State and non-state use
In a political and security context where the UNSC
has noted that it is ‘gravely concerned by the
threat of terrorism and the risk that non-state
actors . . . may acquire, develop, traffic in or use
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and
their means of delivery’,78 it would be incongruous for any updating of the Secretary-General’s
mechanism not to consider possible use of
chemical, biological or toxin weapons by a nonstate actor. Furthermore, the investigation in
Mozambique related to alleged non-state use of
a chemical weapon.
That the Secretary-General’s mechanism has
the authority and ability to investigate alleged
use by a non-state actor is not, however, the same
as saying that it should be the principal or only
available option. It certainly will never be the
only option available in the view of some states,
such as the US. As the US noted in its statement
to the 2004 BWC Meeting of Experts in Geneva,
the investigation of suspected use of biological
weapons would normally ‘in the first instance be
investigated by national law enforcement and
public health authorities’ and in situations where
countries lack sufficient expertise or resources,
‘assistance could be sought from other countries
or international organizations’.79
For states with the ability to conduct their own
law enforcement-led investigations within their
territories, the US view is logical. It is important
to recognize, though, that not all countries are in
such a position. The Secretary-General’s mechanism is part of the premier international organization, the UN. In the absence of other procedures,
a number of nations are unequipped or unable
to respond nationally to a suspicious or alleged
incident. Such states may require assistance and
the Secretary-General’s mechanism is an option.
Perhaps equally important, requesting help in
such circumstances from the Secretary-General is
politically neutral; a factor that might have impli­
cations in the pursuit of legal and other forms of
action against the perpetrators and their supporters (non-state and possibly state(s)) should such
use be confirmed as deliberate. Any future updating of the mechanism should therefore consider
the repercussions of non-state use of chemical and
biological weapons and the role of the SecretaryGeneral’s mechanism in such instances.
Updating the list of experts available for
chemical and biological investigations
Such an updating was initiated in 2002 by means
of a note verbale requesting nominations of experts
and laboratories, which was sent to all member
states by the United Nations Department for
Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) on behalf of the
Secretary-General. The UNDDA made further
efforts in early 2006 to update the list of experts.
More than 130 experts have now been identified to
the UN—approximately 90 related to biological
weapons and over 40 to chemical weapons issues.
Some consideration has also been given to the form­
ation of investigation teams for specific purposes.
Because of these efforts, increasing concerns
within the Secretariat that it would not be able to
launch an effective, timely investigation should one
be called for, have been allayed. It is recognized
that the procedure is far from perfect—hence
the need to update and strengthen the technical
guidelines and procedures—yet there is now much
greater confidence that if the Secretary-General
received a call for help, the UN would be able to
respond.80 If member states unilaterally adopt a
more proactive approach to the mechanism, as
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Investigating allegations of CBW use
23
the European Union (EU)81 and the US have, it
should be possible to update the list of experts on
a continuing basis.
However, this cheap and simple option only
strengthens the investigation mechanism to a
limited extent. In particular, the guidelines and
procedures for the conduct of investigations would
remain as they did in 1990. This reality has led to
the conclusion that the technical guidelines and
procedures for investigations also require review
and updating in 2007 and periodically thereafter.
A new group of qualified experts
24
One way to do this would be through the appoint­
ment of a new group of qualified experts. This
group will need to consult widely and it would be
prudent for the Secretary-General to permit the
experts between 16 and 20 weeks to prepare and
submit a report.
While updating the mechanism necessitates
scientific expertise, the experts should also have
a political understanding of the context of investigations. Expertise relating to investigations of
use of biological, toxin or chemical weapons is not
restricted to states. It also resides in international
organizations, such as the OPCW, other entities,
such as UNMOVIC, and in the non-governmental
community. Such expertise should be exploited as
much as possible. One complementary or parallel
approach could be to use a non-governmental
group of experts. This method was employed to up­
date the WHO’s report on ‘Public health response
to biological and chemical weapons: WHO guidance’, which originated from a request at the 54th
World Health Assembly.82
In whatever way the Secretary-General decides
to proceed, the recommendations on the technical guidelines and procedures for investigations
will need the support of member states. Governmental, as well as non-governmental, time and
political energy will be required to ensure that
all UN member states accept the updated guidelines and procedures.
A further updating exercise should include an
assessment of past and recent experience of investigations, with the aim of making the guidelines
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and procedures for investigations consistent with
a contemporary ‘best practice’ standard. The
Secretary-General’s experts will also need to discuss with the Director-General of the OPCW how
the capacities of that institution could be placed
at the Secretary-General’s disposal if need arose, as
envisaged in the CWC and in the 2001 agreement
between the UN and the OPCW.83 Furthermore,
the Secretary-General could also discuss arrangements with FAO, the OIE and the WHO. To date,
while not explicitly so, the investigation procedures have focused on chemical, biological and
toxin weapons that may be used against humans.
History, in contrast, indicates that anti-animal
and anti-plant biological warfare programs have
long been in existence. An updated SecretaryGeneral’s mechanism should provide for expertise
and laboratory and equipment capabilities to
investigate attacks on human, animal and plant
targets.
Operational aspects
The two existing reports that developed the procedures and recommendations in 1984 and 1989
serve as a good starting point for analysing the
issues requiring further consideration. In addition,
a new group of experts will need to weigh up
how inspection and investigation procedures for
chemical and biological weapons, and possibly
other areas, have developed over the past 15 years.
This would entail the experts evaluating:
the procedures and mechanisms in the CWC;
the procedures and mechanisms considered by
the Ad Hoc Group of states parties to the BWC
(1995–2001) and the relevant procedures and
mechanisms considered by the Verification
Experts (VEREX) group of states parties to the
BWC between 1992 and 1993;
the procedures and mechanisms developed and
used by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC;
the procedures and mechanisms of the Inter­na­
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for special
investigations, where appropriate;
other procedures, such as the fact-finding mech­
anisms under the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction (the Ottawa Convention) or other
appropriate instruments such as challenge inspec­
tion procedures under the 1990 Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty; and
the development of mechanisms at the national
and international level to address the terrorist
threat.
Collectively, this will include a wide array of
issues, such as: general principles of investigations;
requests for an investigation; assessment and
decision-making procedures for investigation
requests; notification of, and timelines for, investiga­
tions; assignment of investigation team members;
dispatch, transport and arrival of the investigation
team; liaison with the authorities of the state on
whose territory the investigation is to be conducted;
access to the investigation area; security, administration and translation and interpretation; sampling
and analysis procedures; visual observation and
interviewing procedures; medical examinations
of affected humans, animals or plants; availability
of background documentation, including epidemiological information; provisions to extend the
investigation areas or the duration of the investigation; and procedures for the submission of the
final report to the Secretary-General.
Other factors can be added to this list. For
instance, training of investigation team leaders
and members, and continuation training, is a key
lesson from UNMOVIC that cannot be ignored.
Validation of analytical techniques and samples
and maintaining the authenticity of data are also
crucial to contemporary investigations. The US
has identified a comprehensive list of issues that
need to be assessed for investigations of alleged
use of biological weapons.84 It is also developing
a biological weapons ‘attribution handbook’ to
assist data gathering for investigations, which it
might be willing to share with others.85
In addition to the various mechanisms and
procedures developed since 1989, the appointed
experts would need to reflect on scientific and
technological developments pertaining to chemical and biological weapons, including detection
technologies and best practice in sampling and
analysis procedures. Most experience to date is
in the area of chemical weapons, but the experts
should also think about how to distinguish between
natural and unnatural outbreaks of disease as this
is a known problem area. In 2004, at the BWC
Meeting of Experts, Germany thus drew attention
to the utility of a model using various criteria to
establish whether biological warfare agents are
involved in any unusual outbreak of disease.86
Identification is also a problem. Improvements
in detection technology are being rapidly made,
but cross-referencing, double-checking and
achieving unambiguous identification of a chemical, biological or toxin agent would require a
combination of results, most likely from several
different technical means.87
An updated mechanism must be able to take
into account developments in science and technology, best practice in appropriate areas such
as OPCW inspection team practices, and the
implications of technological developments on
investigations.88 Again, continuous training is a
crucial requirement for members of any investigation team in the future. Effective investigation
processes therefore necessitate detailed consider­
ation of issues relating to the supporting elements
needed for an investigation, such as security of
staff, interpretation and translation support,
communication procedures and transport.
The investigation team itself must be able to
function as a team and receive sufficient training to complete its tasks before dispatch to the
investigation area. And it must be perceived as
impartial. If an investigation is marred by inconsistencies, does not follow best practice, or fails
to ensure the custody and security of any samples
or analytical data, the results (and report) of any
investigation may be thrown into doubt. If questions about the authenticity of a particular sample,
or the conduct of an investigation, can be asked,
or alternative explanations offered that cast doubt
on the available scientific or other results, the
investigation, and any response to a violation,
may be seriously undermined. Likewise, if a
state requests an investigation to refute an allegation, as Armenia did in 1992, the outcome of the
investigation must be as conclusive as possible
in order to prove or disprove any allegations. Such
political realities are important: investigations to
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Investigating allegations of CBW use
25
date demonstrate unequivocally that no investigation occurs in a political vacuum. Other efforts
to ascertain the facts associated with suspected
non-compliance with WMD agreements only
reinforce that reality.
The use of professional, full-time investigation
staff in a variety of organizations, notably the IAEA,
the OPCW, UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, means
that it is unlikely that a purely ad hoc approach
to investigations will be acceptable in the future.
Such developments support the exhortations
of the 1989 expert group’s report:
26
expert consultants should develop continuously the measures required for the conduct of
investigations;
the Secretary-General should periodically
convene a meeting of his appointed expert
consultants to review the status of the various
tasks undertaken;
experts ought to participate in specialized train­
ing either individually or as a team to ensure
their effectiveness;
any member state may offer or identify specialized training programs or courses or offer them
to qualified experts;
provision should be made for exchanges of information and expertise to facilitate common
understandings and operational procedures;
designated analytical laboratories should be
called upon to participate in inter-laboratory
calibration studies to establish the validity and
accuracy of their analytical methods;
laboratories may present to the SecretaryGeneral methodologies for sample collection,
transport or analysis that they may have developed to improve capabilities and they should
forward all documentation to the SecretaryGeneral;
the Secretary-General should identify an appropriate focal point within the UN Secretariat to
help secure the administrative and substantive
support and coordination needed to guarantee
the smooth functioning of the investigation
mechanism; and
the Secretary-General should report periodically
to member states on the status and degree of
completion of standing preparatory measures.
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December 2006
In practice, the Secretary-General’s experts were
never brought together for training courses or to
train with each other. UN member states or the
Secretary-General acted on few of the recommen­
dations in the 1989 report. The lack of activity is
understandable in part because of the expectation
(and realization) of a professional secretariat under
the CWC, because of a lack of designated funds
to support such activities, because of the develop­
ments in Iraq related to UNSCOM and UNMOVIC,
and because there has been no pressing need to
conduct such activities since 1992.
Contemporaneously, if the objective is to
create an effective mechanism that can operate
when called upon at short notice—one year, five
years or a decade hence from 2006—the instrument cannot be allowed to atrophy through
inattention as it has over the past decade. Preparatory measures are a prerequisite for a successful
and effective investigation mechanism. They
cannot be ignored and should not be done on
the cheap.
Financial issues
In relative terms, the financial cost of updating
the Secretary-General’s mechanism will be minimal. In 1987, the UN estimated that it would be
less than US$25,000.89 Certainly, the cost will be
greater in 2007, but it will not be excessive. More
significant financial implications may flow from
recommendations of any expert review.
Assessments show that the costs associated
with training experts in the required operating
procedures and protocols of chemical and biological weapons investigations and putting in
place the required network of laboratories are
insignificant. A 2005 estimate indicated that a
month-long training course similar to that completed by UNMOVIC staff would cost US$250,000;
the price of three one-week training courses per
year for experts on a roster would be equivalent
to US$300,000 per annum.90
Analytical laboratory costs during an investiga­
tion are estimated at US$60,000 for each week of
activity.91 The cost of undertaking any inter-laboratory calibration exercises prior to an investigation
is not known. On a positive note, the existence of
such a laboratory network under the CWC92 and
the development of laboratories in a number of
states to counter the threat of chemical and biological terrorism (as well as any national exercises
to calibrate laboratories and analytical capabilities) could mean that the initial development of
such a capability for the UN would not be much
greater than US$100,000. However, the network
of laboratories under the OPCW deals only with
chemicals, not biological agents. Future chemical,
biological or toxin weapons may not be ‘classical’
warfare agents.93 Validating the calibration of
laboratories for the range of possible agents could
be a time consuming exercise requiring year-onyear attention.
Unless a pressing need emerges for such a net­
work of laboratories, the step-by-step approach
of using existing facilities is likely to remain the
model. On that basis, revitalizing the SecretaryGeneral’s mechanism through a comprehensive
study of current methods, training experts in
investigation procedures, refresher and updating
courses for nominated experts, an initial laboratory calibration study and subsequent updates, may
be expected to be in the region of US$1 million.
This figure is well within the means of a UN opera­
ting budget of US$3 billion per year. If the mechanism is updated in the near future, the UN could
absorb the remaining useful assets, experience
and contacts of UNMOVIC, thereby offsetting
certain expenses.
In considering these costs, states must bear
in mind that such training may have capacitybuilding and other advantages for them as well
as the international community. States without
inspectors, investigators and forensic and scientific staff specializing in investigating suspected
chemical, biological and toxin use will have the
opportunity to acquire such expertise. States that
already have such personnel are likely to benefit
from contributing to an international endeavour.
Training under UNMOVIC has demonstrated this
two-way gain. Interpol too, is conducting training
programs that will add to national capabilities for
countering bioterrorism.94
A second point that should be considered as
attenuating further the financial implications of
strengthening the mechanism is that the founda­
tions already exist on which to build. The OPCW
and Interpol are part of that system. Furthermore,
the international community has at its disposal
a body—UNMOVIC—that, as of mid-2005, had
close to 400 trained inspectors on its books. An
estimated 3,000 inspectors were provided to
UNSCOM by member states during 1991–98. As
noted in a previous study, UNMOVIC received
more than 1,500 requests for participation in its
initial training courses, interviewed 800 people
and selected 400 for its tasks.95 Not all existing or
previous UNMOVIC staff have to be placed on a
roster of experts, but the search for chemical,
biological, toxin and other related experts should
not be a difficult venture given the existence of
UNMOVIC, the OPCW, work within individual
states since 11 September 2001, and the efforts of
Interpol in recent years. A core starting list is
already at the disposal of the UN and an updated
and strengthened Secretary-General’s mechanism
should capitalize on the experience and skill of
organizations already in existence.
A standing advisory body of experts
In any updated guidelines and procedures for the
Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism,
there should be formal recognition of the need
for their regular revision. The Secretary-General
will determine timelines for when this should
occur. Under no circumstances, however, should
the mechanism be updated and then permitted
to wither, as it has since 1989–90.
This will require that the Secretary-General pro­
vide the necessary resources. As part of the next
biennial Geneva Protocol resolution—scheduled
to be tabled in UNGA in 2008—member states
could request that the Secretary-General initiate a
process to revise the list of experts and laboratories every two years and the technical guidelines
and procedures every four years. Thus, future
Secretary-General reports could include a note
on the status of the lists of experts and laboratories (in 2010) and on the outcome of a further
review and updating of the technical guidelines
(in 2012), as well as a further report on the lists of
experts and laboratories (in 2014), and so on.
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Investigating allegations of CBW use
27
The best method for periodically updating the
mechanism, as implied in the 1989 report, would
be to create a permanent advisory body of experts.
Its tasks, many of which were identified as necessary in the 1989 report, could include:
28
maintaining an accurate contact database for
the list of experts and points of contact within
governments;
identifying the core teams for particular types
of investigation, such as chemical, biological
or toxin;
helping with the training of experts;
aiding exchanges of information among
experts;
updating the list of training courses offered by
member states;
preserving and periodically revising the list of
analytical laboratories;
keeping an accurate contact list and database
of laboratories;
making arrangements for the transport of
samples without inspection or any other form
of interference by police or customs authorities
during an investigation;
carrying out inter-laboratory calibration studies
at periodic intervals to determine the competence of laboratories, individually and collectively, to identify known agents and other toxic
substances;
ascertaining the acceptable level of competence
needed for the full spectrum of samples that
may be required; and
facilitating contact with, and between, necessary international organizations, such as FAO,
Interpol, the OIE, the OPCW and the WHO,
and any future BWC support structures, for the
collation and sharing of documentation on
chemical, biological and toxin weapons, the
provision of appropriate information on the
health and sanitation of populations, animals
and plants in affected areas, and the supply of
suitable assistance from international organizations and their representatives in the event of
an investigation.
The advisory group could also assist with identifying and providing the equipment required for
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December 2006
an investigation. It could also oversee the collection and classification of documentation on
chemical, biological and toxin weapons, means
of protection, and treatment following use of
such weapons. Such information could serve as
a repository available on request to member
states, expert consultants, qualified experts and
designated laboratories. As the 1989 report noted,
these preparatory activities would be for the
purpose of ‘maximizing the effectiveness of
any investigation that may be required by the
Secretary-General’.96
The advisory group should remain small, meet
only periodically, be serviced and supported by
existing staff in the UNDDA, and maintain contact with the Secretary-General and each other
electronically. Appointments to the group should
be short term, thereby helping to build capacity
in member states.
Contacts beyond the OPCW
The agreement between the UN and the OPCW
on making the latter’s resources available to the
Secretary-General indicates the need for the future
review to include the relationships with other
organizations. For non-state use, there is a law
enforcement and health response nexus that needs
to be considered. A group of experts would have
to consider how the Secretary-General’s investigation team would work with, or alongside, other
international bodies such as FAO, Interpol, the
OIE, the OPCW and the WHO, as well as the states
parties of the BWC, CWC and Geneva Protocol.
Symmetries between these organizations should
be exploited, but the impartiality, simplicity and
timeliness offered by the Secretary-General’s
mech­anism will be a better option in certain circumstances. The Group of Experts will need to
consider these matters in greater depth in 2007.97
The need for UNGA endorsement
While the adoption of the UN Global CounterTerrorism Strategy in 2006 signals that updating of
the Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism
enjoys the support of all UN member states—the
strategy was adopted without a vote—certain states
are clearly more enthusiastic than others about
the instrument. One potential controversy is the
question of whether UNGA will have to endorse
the updated guidelines and technical procedures.
On the one hand, revising the technical guidelines
and procedures will not alter the scope or purpose
of the investigation mechanism. Thus, there is a
strong argument that formal endorsement by
UNGA is not required. On the other hand, without formal UNGA endorsement, a state that has
been asked to receive a fact-finding mission might
see any new guidelines or procedures as illegitimate and reject them.
UNGA endorsement of the new guidelines and
procedures may be politically prudent if for no
other reason than it will expose those states that
are likely to oppose use of the mechanism in the
future. In the meantime, it would seem advisable
that UNGA be kept informed of developments to
ensure maximum political support for strengthening the mechanism.
29
Jez Littlewood
Investigating allegations of CBW use
Conclusion
30
The UN Secretary-General has authorized 12 investigations into the alleged use of chemical and toxin
weapons since 1980. The ability of the SecretaryGeneral to use his own experts in such cases
proved an asset. During its first decade of existence
the mechanism evolved considerably but was
subsequently allowed to atrophy.
An updating of the mechanism and its technical
guidelines and procedures now appears likely in
2007 because of the adoption in 2006 of the UN
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
Both the investigations under the SecretaryGeneral’s mechanism and experience of conducting
investigations into alleged use of such weapons
outside the Secretary-General’s framework indicate
the utility of a neutral and effective investigation
procedure. Scientific and other evidence or data
supporting any allegation (or refuting it) must be
able to stand up to harsh scientific and political
scrutiny. Avoiding, or decreasing, the politicization
of investigations into alleged use of chemical and
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December 2006
biological weapons is an important aspect of any
investigation process.
In an era when the use of chemical, biological
or toxin weapons is seen as a grave threat, the
discrepancy between such threat assessments
and actual ability to investigate possible, suspected and alleged use is incongruous. As the
mechanism stands, violations of the Geneva
Protocol may go unpunished for want of an
effective investigation capability. A basic capability is already in existence and it could be updated
quickly, with minimal effort, and with few financial implications.
Strengthening the Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism will plug a serious loophole
in the procedures available to the international
community. It will provide the Secretary-General,
the UNSC and the international community with
a newly viable mechanism for investigating alleged
use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons wherever and by whomever committed.
Annexes
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare
Opened for signature: 17 June 1925, entered into
force: 8 February 1928
The Undersigned Plenipotentiaries, in the name
of their respective governments:
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids,
materials or devices, has been justly condemned
by the general opinion of the civilised world; and
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been
declared in Treaties to which the majority of
Powers of the world are Parties; and
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law,
binding alike the conscience and the practice of
nations;
Declare:
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they
are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such
use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this
prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods
of warfare and agree to be bound as between them­
selves according to the terms of this declaration.
The High Contracting Parties will exert every
effort to induce other States to accede to the
present Protocol. Such accession will be notified
to the Government of the French Republic, and
by the latter to all signatory and acceding Powers,
and will take effect on the date of the notification
by the Government of the French Republic.
The present Protocol, of which the French and
English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified
as soon as possible. It shall bear today’s date.
The ratifications of the present Protocol shall be
addressed to the Government of the French Repub­
lic, which will at once notify the deposit of such
ratification to each of the signatory and acceding
Powers.
The instruments of ratification and of accession
to the present Protocol will remain deposited in
the archives of the Government of the French
Republic.
The present Protocol will come into force for each
signatory Power as from the date of deposit of its
ratification, and, from that moment, each Power
will be bound as regards other Powers which have
already deposited their ratifications.
In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have
signed the present Protocol.
Done at Geneva in a single copy this seventeenth
day of June, One Thousand Nine Hundred and
Twenty-Five.
Source: The Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament
and Arms Limitation, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/
hsp/Genev-Prot.html, United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 42/37 C (30 November 1987).
United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 42/37C
30 November 1987
The General Assembly,
Recalling the provisions of the Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June
1925, and other relevant rules of customary inter­
national law,
Jez Littlewood
Investigating allegations of CBW use
31
Recalling also the necessity of the adherence by
all States to the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,
Reiterating its concern over reports that chemical
weapons have been used and over indications of
their emergence in an increasing number of
national arsenals, as well as over the growing risk
that they may be used again,
Noting with satisfaction that the Conference on
Disarmament is actively engaged in negotiating a
convention on the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of all chemical
weapons and on their destruction, including
detailed provisions for the on-site verification of
compliance with the convention, and expressing
its support for the early and successful conclusion
of those negotiations,
32
Noting also that prompt and impartial investigation of reports of possible use of chemical and
bacteriological weapons would further enhance
the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
Expressing its appreciation for the work of the
Secretary-General, and noting the procedures
available to him in support of the principles and
objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the
principles and objectives of the 1925 Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, and condemns all actions
that violate this obligation;
2. Urges all States to be guided in their national
policies by the need to curb the spread of chemical weapons;
3. Recognizes the need, upon the entry into force
of a chemical weapons convention, to review the
modalities available to the Secretary-General for
the investigation of reports of the possible use of
chemical weapons;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought
Compliance Chronicles
Number 3
December 2006
to his attention by any Member State concerning
the possible use of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute
a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other
relevant rules of customary international law in
order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to
report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States;
5. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts provided by interested
Member States, to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the
timely and efficient investigation of such reports
of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons;
6. Also requests the Secretary-General, in meeting
the objectives set forth in paragraph 4 above, to
compile and maintain lists of qualified experts
provided by Member States whose services could
be made available at short notice to undertake
such investigations, and of laboratories with the
capability to undertake testing for the presence
of agents the use of which is prohibited;
7. Further requests the Secretary-General, in meeting the objectives of paragraph 4 above:
(a) To appoint experts to undertake investigation
of the reported activities;
(b) Where appropriate, to make the necessary
arrangements for experts to collect and examine
evidence and to undertake such testing as may
be required;
(c) To seek, in any such investigation, assistance
as appropriate from Member States and the rele­
vant international organizations;
8. Requests Member States and the relevant international organizations to co-operate fully with
the Secretary-General in the above-mentioned
work;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a
report to the General Assembly at its forty-third
session on the implementation of the present
resolution.
Source: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/a42r037.htm.
United Nations Security Council
Resolution 620 (1988)
26 August 1988
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at
Geneva on 17 June 1925, and in defiance of its
resolution 612 (1988);
The Security Council,
2. Encourages the Secretary-General to carry out
promptly investigations in response to allegations
brought to his attention by any Member State
concerning the possible use of chemical and
bacteriological (biological) or toxic weapons that
may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol or other relevant rules of customary
international law, in order to ascertain the facts
of the matter, and to report the results;
Recalling its resolution 612 (1988) of 9 May 1988,
Having considered the reports of 20 and 25 July
and of 2 and 19 August 1988 of the missions dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate
allegations of the use of chemical weapons in
the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran
and Iraq,
Deeply dismayed by the missions’ conclusions
that there had been continued use of chemical
weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq and that such use against
Iranians had become more intense and frequent,
Profoundly concerned by the danger of possible
use of chemical weapons in the future;
Bearing in mind the current negotiations in the
Conference on Disarmament on the complete
and effective prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of chemical weapons
and on their destruction,
Determined to intensify its efforts to end all use
of chemical weapons in violation of international
obligations now and in the future,
1. Condemns resolutely the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic
of Iran and Iraq, in violation of obligations under
the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War
3. Calls upon all States to continue to apply, to
establish or to strengthen strict control of the
export of chemical products serving for the production of chemical weapons, in particular to
parties to a conflict, when it is established or when
there is substantial reason to believe that they
have used chemical weapons in violation of international obligations;
4. Decides to consider immediately, taking into
account the investigations of the Secretary-General,
appropriate and effective measures in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, should
there be any future use of chemical weapons in
violation of international law, wherever and whomever committed.
Note: Adopted unanimously at the Council’s 2825th meeting.
Source: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/
NR0/541/47/IMG/NR054147.pdf?OpenElement.
Jez Littlewood
Investigating allegations of CBW use
33
Endnotes
1
2
3
34
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/60/288,
20 September 2006.
The term ‘chemical, biological and toxin weapons’ is used
to underline that the scope of the Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism covers chemical weapons, biological
weapons and toxin weapons. As the authoritative Public
health response to biological and chemical weapons: WHO
guidance (World Health Organization, Geneva, 2004) makes
clear, ‘toxin’ has no commonly accepted meaning in the
scientific literature. It is beyond dispute, though, that toxins
fall within the scope of both the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The BWC covers ‘toxins whatever their
origin or method of production’ under Article I and toxins
are within the scope of the CWC given that they are toxic
and chemical in nature.
United Nations, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, UN, New York, 2004,
p. 46 (para. 141); United Nations General Assembly, In Larger
Freedom, Report of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations for decision by Heads of State and Government in
September 2005, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, p. 29 (para. 104);
United Nations General Assembly, Uniting against terrorism:
recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy,
Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/825, 27 April 2006,
p. 18 (para. 90).
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC),
Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Arms, EO Grafiska, Stockholm, 2006. Available
at http://www.wmd commission.org/.
Strengthening the International Regime against Biological
Weapons, Statement by the President, 1 November 2001,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011101.
html (accessed 27 July 2006).
Chemical Weapons Convention, Verification Annex, Part XI
(Investigations in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons),
Section E, para. 27.
United Nations General Assembly, Agreement concerning
the relationship between the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Resolution
A/Res/55/283, 7 September 2001, and OPCW Conference
of the States Parties, Decision C-VI/DEC.5, 17 May 2001,
http://www.opcw.org.
United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1995/9, 22 February
1995.
Paul G. Cassell, ‘Establishing Violations of International
Law: “Yellow Rain” and the Treaties Regulating Chemical
and Biological Warfare’, Stanford Law Review, vol. 35, 1982–83,
p. 272.
Elisa Harris, ‘Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two Cases of
Soviet Noncompliance?’, International Security, vol. 11, no. 1,
1987, p. 57.
Harris, p. 57.
Compliance Chronicles
Number 3
December 2006
12 See, for example, United States Department of State, Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, Report to
Congress from Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 22
March 1982, Special Report no. 98. Examples of reports in
the media include: ‘Poison gas used by Vietnam in Laos’,
The Times, 27 September 1978; ‘Poisonous Gases Reported
Used on Laos’, International Herald Tribune, 23 October
1978; William Safire, ‘The Yellow Rain in Laos’, International
Herald Tribune, 14 December 1979; William Beecher, ‘Germ
Warfare: Is the Kremlin tearing up the rules book?’, Boston
Globe, 21 March 1980; ‘Germs and gas: the unacceptable face
of fighting’, The Economist, 29 March 1980, pp. 62–63; ‘U.S.
Seeks Chemical Warfare Inquiry Calls for International
Studies in Afghanistan, Southeast Asia’, Los Angeles Times,
25 April 1980; Jack Anderson, ‘Skepticism Clouds Nerve Gas
Charge’, Washington Post, 20 May 1980.
13 United Nations, Statement by Ambassador Summerhayes,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Committee on Disarmament, CD/PV.97, 5 August 1980, Geneva.
14 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 35/144 C,
12 December 1980.
15 Julian Perry Robinson, ‘The changing status of chemical
and biological warfare: recent technical, military and poli­
tical developments’, World Armaments and Disarmament:
SIPRI Yearbook 1982, Taylor and Francis Ltd., London, 1982,
p. 353.
16 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Federal Republic of, Netherlands, Norway, New
Zealand, Spain: draft resolution’, A/C.1/36/L.54, 24 Novem­
ber 1981.
17 United Nations General Assembly, Chemical and Bacterio­
logical (Biological) Weapons Report of the Secretary-General,
A/36/613, 20 November 1981, p. 13.
18 United Nations General Assembly, A/36/613, p. 13.
19 United Nations General Assembly, Chemical and Bacterio­
logical (Biological) Weapons Report of the Secretary-General,
A/37/259, 1 December 1982, p. 11.
20 Julian Perry Robinson, ‘The changing status of chemical
and biological warfare’, p. 353.
21 United Nations General Assembly, A/36/613, p. 21.
22 United Nations General Assembly, A/36/613, p. 34.
23 United Nations General Assembly, A/36/613, p. 35.
24 United Nations General Assembly, A/37/259, p. 49.
25 United Nations General Assembly, A/37/259, p. 28.
26 United Nations General Assembly, A/37/259, p. 33.
27 United Nations General Assembly, A/37/259, p. 33.
28 Julian Perry Robinson, ‘The changing status of chemical
and biological warfare’, p. 353.
29 United Nations General Assembly, A/37/259, pp. 57–58.
See also Julian Perry Robinson, ‘Chemical and biological
warfare: developments in 1982’, World Armaments and
Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1983, Taylor and Francis Ltd.,
New York, 1983, pp. 424–426, which quotes the conclusions
of the 1982 report.
30 United Nations General Assembly, A/36/613 and A/37/259.
31 Julian Perry Robinson, ‘Chemical and biological warfare:
developments in 1982’, p. 397.
32 Elisa Harris, ‘Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two Cases of Soviet
Noncompliance?’, pp. 58–75.
33 Julian Robinson, Jeanne Guillemin and Matthew Meselson,
‘Yellow Rain: the story collapses’, Foreign Policy, issue 68,
fall 1987, p. 116.
34 Robinson, Guillemin and Meselson, pp. 117–118.
35 Elisa Harris, ‘Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two Cases of Soviet
Noncompliance’, p. 95.
36 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 37/98 D,
13 December 1982.
37 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 37/98 D.
38 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 37/98 D.
39 The report of the Secretary-General (A/38/435) included
the interim report of the Group of Consultant Experts
(19 October 1983).
40 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/38/187,
20 December 1983.
41 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons’, Report of the SecretaryGeneral, Document A/39/488, 2 October 1984.
42 Julian Perry Robinson, ‘Chemical and biological warfare;
developments in 1984’, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1985, Taylor and Francis Ltd., London
and Philadelphia, PA, 1985, pp. 171–182.
43 Robinson, p. 182.
44 Robinson, p. 182.
45 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Specialists
appointed by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the use of
chemical weapons, S/16433, 26 March 1984, p. 2.
46 United Nations Security Council, S/16433, pp. 11–12.
47 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations
of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/17911, 12 March 1985, p. 2.
48 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 582, 24 February 1986.
49 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 582, p. 7.
50 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations
of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/18852, 8 May 1987, p. 19.
51 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 42/37 C, 30
November 1987.
52 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 42/37 C.
53 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations
of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/19823, 25 April 1988, p. 3.
54 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations
of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/20060, 20 July 1988.
55 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations
of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/20063, 25 July 1988.
56 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations
of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/20134, 19 August 1988.
57 United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations
of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict between
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq’, Note by the SecretaryGeneral, Document S/20060, 20 July 1988, p. 6.
58 Jonathan B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from
World War I to Al-Qaeda, Pantheon Books, New York, 2006,
p. 284. (The ten states are not identified by Tucker.)
59 Elisabeth Rosenthal, ‘Trial for 80s chemical attacks on Kurds
tests scientists’, International Herald Tribune, 25 June 2006.
60 Jonathan B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from
World War I to Al-Qaeda, p. 258.
61 Flora Lewis, ‘Move to stop Iraq’, The New York Times, 14
September 1988. For further discussion of the context of
chemical weapons use and proliferation in 1980–88, see
Jonathan B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from
World War I to Al-Qaeda, pp. 267–288.
62 S.J. Lundin, ‘Chemical and biological warfare: developments
in 1988’, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1988, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 119.
63 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 42/37 C,
30 November 1987.
64 United Nations, Report of the group of qualified experts
established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution
42/37 C, A/44/561, 4 October 1989.
65 United Nations, A/44/561, p. 11.
66 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 45/57 C,
4 December 1990.
67 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 620, 26 August
1988.
68 S.J. Lundin, ‘Chemical and biological warfare: developments
in 1988’, p. 129.
69 United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/60/288, 20 September 2006.
70 Thomas Stock, ‘Chemical and biological weapons: develop­
ments and proliferation’, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1993, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1993, p. 262. The Swedish investigation, which occurred
between 5 and 11 February 1992, is also referred to in the
report of the Secretary-General’s appointed experts. The
UK investigation is less well known and documentation on
it remains elusive. It appears that the then UK Ambassador
to Mozambique offered assistance to the country while
investigating the incident. Subsequently, a medical expert
from Porton Down, UK, Dr J.P. Thompson, interviewed
affected individuals and those in the vicinity and his report
is understood to have concluded that ‘something like Bz’
may have been used. Nevertheless, the information is not
easy to substantiate and it is not readily available.
71 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate an alleged use
of chemical weapons in Mozambique, S/24065, 12 June 1992.
72 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate reports of the use
of chemical weapons in Azerbaijan, S/24344, 24 July 1992, p. 8.
73 For more detailed discussions on the allegations, see: Elisa
D. Harris, ‘Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two Cases of Soviet
Noncompliance?’, pp. 41–95; Julian Robinson, Jeanne Guillemin and Matthew Meselson, ‘Yellow Rain in Southeast
Asia: The Story Collapses’, in Susan Wright (ed.), Preventing
a Biological Arms Race, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990,
pp. 220–238; Jonathan B. Tucker, ‘The “Yellow Rain” Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 1, spring 2001, pp. 25–42; and
Martin Furmanski and Mark Wheelis, ‘Allegations of Biological
Weap­ons Use’, in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rózsa and Malcolm
Dando (eds.), Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons since 1945,
Har­vard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006, pp. 268–275.
Jez Littlewood
Investigating allegations of CBW use
35
36
74 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 620, 1988.
75 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article IX, para. 8.
76 The OPCW’s push for universality of the CWC is making
good progress and the number of states outside of the con­
vention should continue to diminish. Nevertheless, the
differences in membership of the CWC and the Geneva
Protocol cannot be ignored. As of 31 October 2006, the CWC
had 180 states parties, six signatory states (bound, under
the Vienna Law of Treaties, to refrain from acts that would
defeat the object and purpose of the treaty), and nine nonsignatories. According to the list posted by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Geneva
Protocol had 133 High Contracting Parties.
77 Chemical Weapons Convention, Verification Annex, Part XI.
78 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1540, 28 April
2004.
79 Guy Roberts, Acting Head of Delegation, ‘Remarks to Annual
Meeting of Experts for the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC), July 19–20, 2004’; US Department of State, ‘U.S.
Views on Enhancing International Capabilities to Investigate, Respond to, and Mitigate the Effects of Alleged Use of
Biological Weapons or Suspicious Outbreaks of Disease’, 4
August 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/bw/rmks/2004/
34941.htm (accessed 25 March 2006).
80 During the course of this research (January–September
2006) I discussed the issue of the Secretary-General’s
mechanism with a wide variety of individuals, including
non-governmental experts, former government personnel,
serving government personnel and current and former
members of UNDDA. I am grateful for their input and
advice on this topic.
81 European Union, ‘EU Action Plan on biological and toxin
weapons, complementary to the EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC’, Official Journal of the European Union,
2006/C 57/01, vol. 49, no. 9, March 2006.
82 WHO, ‘Public health response to biological and chemical
weapons: WHO guidance’, Health aspects of chemical and
biological weapons: report of a WHO Group of Consultants,
second edition, WHO, Geneva, 2004, p. 4.
83 United Nations General Assembly, Agreement concerning
the relationship between the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Resolution
A/Res/55/283, 7 September 2001, and OPCW, ‘Conference
of the States Parties Decision’, C-VI/DEC.5, 17 May 2001,
http://www.opcw.org.
84 ‘Presentations submitted by the United States’, Meeting of
the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/MISC.3, United Nations,
Geneva , 6 August 2004, pp. 25–27.
85 Paula A. De Sutter, ‘Identification, Characterization, and
Attribution of Biological Weapons Use’, remarks made at
the Centre for Science and Security Studies, King’s College
London, 12 July 2006, http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rm/
89313.htm.
86 A Procedure for Differentiating Between the Intentional
Release of Biological Warfare Agents and Natural Outbreaks
of Disease: Its Use in Analyzing the Tularemia Outbreak in
Kosovo in 1999 and 2000, working paper submitted by
Germany, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention
Compliance Chronicles
Number 3
December 2006
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weap­
ons and on Their Destruction, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.3,
United Nations, Geneva, 15 July 2004.
87 Rapid Procedures for the Detection of Biological Warfare
Agents and Diagnosis of Related Procedures, working
paper submitted by Germany, Meeting of the States
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,
BWC/MSP/ 2004/MX/WP.4, United Nations, Geneva, 15 July
2004, p. 1.
88 Good examples of some of the issues that need consideration can be found in SIPRI, The United Nations SecretaryGeneral’s mechanism to investigate alleged use of biological
and chemical warfare, briefing paper prepared for the
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2006.
89 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Proposed programme
budget for the Biennium 1988–1989, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) weapons: Report of the Conference
on Disarmament, measures to uphold the authority of the
1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a
chemical weapons convention’, Programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.67/Rev.1 and Corr.1
Statement submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance
with rule 153 of the rules of the procedure of the General
Assembly, A/C.5/42/42, 13 November 1987.
90 Trevor Findlay, ‘A Standing United Nations verification
body: necessary and feasible’, Compliance Chronicles, no. 1,
December 2005, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance,
Ottawa, 2005, pp. 18–19.
91 Findlay, p. 19
92 OPCW, Report of the OPCW on the implementation of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction, Conference of States Parties, C-10/4, 8
November 2005, pp. 10, 32–34.
93 For example, Iraq explored some interesting lines of inquiry
regarding possible chemical and biological weapons. See
Graham S. Pearson, The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2005.
94 See the Interpol website for information on the bioterrorism
program, http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/
default.asp (accessed 7 June 2006)
95 Trevor Findlay, ‘A Standing United Nations verification body:
necessary and feasible’, p. 21.
96 United Nations General Assembly, A/44/561, p. 22.
97 UN staff members have considered such issues. During
the Black ICE exercise in Europe on 7–8 September 2006,
the complex matters of coordination across international
borders, institutions and professional cultures in respect
of investigations of a bioterrorism attack were examined.
In this exercise, a scenario of a smallpox attack was used
to gauge interaction among, and coordination between,
states, international organizations and the different communities of public health, security, transport, and law
enforcement. See Embassy of the United States, Bern, Joint
Press Statement by the United States of America and Switzerland on a Bioterrorism International Coordination Exercise,
http://bern.usembassy.gov/pr_09082006.html (accessed
10 October 2006).