SECURING THE NATION:
THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
JULY 2006
1
SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
CONTENTS
4
Foreword
5
Executive Summary
7
Policy Recommendations
8
Section 1: The Need to Tackle Crime in the Home
10
Section 2: What Should a Basic Standard of Security Look like?
13
Section 3: Do the Social and Economic Benefits of a Basic Standard Stack Up?
15
The Social Benefits of Part S
18
The Economic Benefits of Part S
20
Section 4: How Should a Basic Standard be Enacted?
23
Annex A: Cost-Benefit Analysis Assumptions
25
Annex B: Costing a Minimum Standard of Security
29
References
3
SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
FOREWORD
The case for safer homes couldn’t be more compelling – crime and fear of crime
are key concerns of the population, and around 1.6 million people suffered a
domestic burglary in the last year.
People deserve to feel safe in their homes, and improving home security in newly
built and refurbished homes can radically reduce burglary and property theft, creating
safer neighbourhoods and communities for everyone.
My attention was first drawn to secure building design when local police officers told
me of a particular new housing estate in Greater Manchester which had been plagued
by break-ins through dodgy patio windows. The police, fed up with attending crime
scenes there week after week, asked the developer to make simple design changes.
He not only refused, but then started to build a second estate with the same faulty
windows, and the break-ins started there too.
My Sustainable and Secure Buildings Act (2004) could stop such basic security faults
from being built into new and refurbished homes and significantly improve household
safety. But in the two years since my Act was passed, the Government has not taken
any of the steps necessary for putting it into action.
We take it for granted that Building Regulations should make our homes and offices
fire-proof. Why aren’t they required to be crime-proof too?
Two years ago Ministers were keen and enthusiastic to do just that, now they are
dragging their feet.
I very much welcome this report by the Association of British Insurers, and hope that
it will persuade the Government to start to include security considerations in Building
Regulations, thereby providing families and individuals with safer homes and more
sustainable communities.
Andrew Stunell
MP for Hazel Grove
5
SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The need to tackle domestic burglary: the economic and social impacts of burglary
An estimated 655,000 households – 1.6 million people – experienced at least one
domestic burglary in the last 12 months. Annually, domestic burglaries cost the
individual and the economy £2.9bn and arson a further £2.4bn. In 2005 insurers
paid out £2.9m per day to victims of domestic and commercial burglaries, and arson.
Domestic burglary also has a high social cost. It has a disproportionate impact on the
most vulnerable in society, who also have the least home security protection and the
least ability to bear the financial impacts of a burglary.
Towards risk-based, proportionate regulation
Households without any security devices (such as deadlocks, window locks, security
lights, CCTV and burglar alarms) are more than four times as likely to be burgled than
those with. There is a role for proportionate crime reduction measures to be designed
into homes at the very first stages of development and during refurbishment, rather
than added as an optional extra after the fact.
Building Regulations on security should be developed now so that current opportunities –
a relatively benign economic cycle and a push for growth in housing (the London Plan
alone identifies the need for 345,000 new homes to be built in London by 2016) –
are not lost.
The Sustainable and Secure Buildings Act 2004 offers a unique opportunity to address
the heavy ongoing costs of crime through developing and implementing a new Part S
on minimum standards of security to Building Regulations.
An established and well-regarded base – the Association of Chief Police Officers’
initiative Secured By Design (SBD) – already exists from which regulation and supporting
guidance should be developed. In particular, SBD’s physical security measures on
external doors and windows (the most used points of entry by burglars) provide an
appropriate basis for regulation and already provide cross-compliance with existing
regulation (such as Part L on energy conservation).
In addition to setting a minimum standard for security, Building Regulations can
ensure a proportionate response to differing and changing crime risks by requiring a
risk assessment and by developing guidance to, and a technical specification of, higher
standards. This would also encourage the consideration of the Government’s planning
system advice in ‘Safer Places’.
The benefits of regulation
Clearly a careful balance needs to be found between the costs and benefits
of any new regulation. Regulation should be designed to achieve desired
objectives in a common sense way that avoids unnecessary technical risks
and costs. The case for statutory target hardening to an SBD benchmark
is compelling:
In the first year alone, almost 400,000
households would benefit from the new
measures, generating net savings of over
£215m. Within 20 years the policy would
have saved the economy over £3.2bn, after
compliance costs.
In addition to these economic benefits there are social benefits. For example, reducing
social exclusion, creating sustainable communities, reducing fear of crime and other
types of crime. Those who suffer the greatest burden of burglary and have the least
control over the security of their homes – ethnic minority communities, single parents
and households on low incomes in both tenanted and owner-occupied property – will
be reached by a minimum standard.
Beyond the security of homes
Up to 90% of major fires in schools are thought to be arson and approximately 25%
of commercial retail and manufacturing premises become victims of burglary. Reviewing
these statistics, and the scope for savings and benefits that can be realised through
security regulations for the home, should prompt an exploration of the case for
regulation in non-domestic settings.
7
SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
Policy Recommendations
1 The Government should implement a
Part S on security to the Building
Regulations, as enabled by the
Sustainable and Secure Buildings Act
2004, to apply to new build and
refurbished properties.
2 The Government’s development of
Part S should have particular regard to:
• Increasing the attack resistance of
homes through target hardening.
An Approved Document should set out
basic requirements drawing on Secured
By Design standards.
3 The Government should consider the
case for regulations covering the
security of schools and developing a
schools-specific Approved Document
to recognise the different risks
encountered in this setting.
4 The Government should consider
the case for regulations covering the
security of other public estate and
commercial premises and encourage
local authorities to take early action
where there is an identified crime
problem.
5 For its part, the insurance industry
• Specifying a risk-based requirement for
increased security measures in highcrime areas, which also explicitly link the
role of planning in reducing crime risk.
• Ensuring cross-compliance with Part L
of the Building Regulations on energy
conservation, so that all replacement
windows and doors should be to an
enhanced security standard that takes
account of resistance to attack.
will continue to meet the needs of
customers affected by domestic
burglary. The industry will continue
to explore ways to improve access to
insurance for groups most at risk of
burglary. However, this will be most
easily achieved where burglary risk is
managed effectively.
Section 1: The Need to Tackle Crime in the Home
Domestic burglary today: the scope of the problem
What are the costs of burglary?
In 2004/05 an estimated 1.4 million
burglaries occurred in England and Wales,
approximately half of which were
domestic burglaries1. Approximately
655,000 households – 1.6 million people
– have experienced at least one domestic
burglary in the last 12 months,
representing a total social and economic
cost of £2.9bn2.
The Home Office value the cost of the
average burglary, in social and economic
cost terms, at nearly £3,300 – a
calculation which not only takes into
account the economic costs to the
individual and wider economy (e.g. value
of the property stolen and criminal justice
costs), but also the emotional impact to
victims of burglary.
In 2005 insurers paid out £334m to
victims of domestic burglaries, £141m
for commercial theft and approximately
£575m for arson – equivalent to
£2.9m per day4. Yet Home Office research
estimates that only about half (54%)
of domestic burglaries are insured, leaving
a ‘protection gap’ that falls on business
and individuals5.
Although trends in crime statistics show
the incidence of burglary to be decreasing
(the rate of domestic burglary fell by 20%
between 2003/04 and 2004/056), the
average total cost of domestic burglary to
the economy has increased – from £2,600
per case in 2000 to £3,267 per case in
2003/047. This may in part be due to an
increase in the value of a household’s
property over the same period. Insurers
estimate that the value of property within
a home increases in real terms by around
4% annually8. The average cost of a
burglary claim is £1,0409, almost identical
to the £1,033 average cost of property
stolen and damaged during burglaries as
reported by the Home Office10.
Who is most at risk of being a victim
of burglary?
Domestic burglary affects those living in
deprived and declining areas most. Compared
to the average household (see figure 1)11:
Table 1: Average social and economic cost of a domestic burglary
Type of Cost
Costs in anticipation
Costs as a consequence
Item
Cost per burglary £
Defensive expenditure
221
Insurance Administration
177
Physical and emotional impact
646
Value of property stolen
846
Property damaged / destroyed
187
Victim services
11
Lost output
64
Costs in response
Criminal Justice costs3
1,137
Less
Property recovered
22
Average cost
£3,267
Source: Home Office: The Social and Economic Costs of Crime against Individuals and Households 2003/04, 2005.
• Inner city households are 70%
more likely to be burgled;
• Young households (head aged
16-24 years) are 163% more likely
to be burgled;
• Single parent households are 148%
more likely to be burgled; and
• Poor households (incomes of less
than £5,000) are 63% more likely
to be burgled.
Domestic burglary tomorrow:
possible future trends
Although currently the rate of domestic
burglary has hit a historic low, social and
economic factors may result in changes
in future years.
The impact of changes in the
economic cycle
Rates of domestic burglary track the
economy closely. As figure 2 shows the
1 Home Office figures put the total number of domestic
burglaries in 2004/05 at 756,000. In 2004/05 the police
recorded more than 320,000 domestic burglaries and
360,000 non-domestic burglaries, and note the
difference between recorded and actual burglary to be
double. Source: Home Office, Crime in England and
Wales 2004/05, 2005; and www.crimereduction.gov.uk.
2 Home Office figures show 2.7% of households
experienced at least one domestic burglary in the
previous 12 months. Office for National Statistics put
the number of households in 2005 at 24.2 million,
comprising an average 2.4 people. Office for National
Statistics, Social Trends 36, 2006 edition and Home
Office, Crime in England and Wales 2004/05, 2005;
Home Office: The Social and Economic Costs of Crime
against Individuals and Households 2003/04, 2005.
3 Includes the costs associated with: police activity;
prosecution; the Magistrates’ and Crown Courts; jury
service; legal aid; non-legal aid defense; the probation
and prison service; criminal justice system overhead; and
criminal injuries compensation.
4 ABI statistics 2005.
5 Home Office, Burglary of Domestic Dwellings: Findings
from the British Crime Survey, 2000.
6 Home Office, Crime in England and Wales 2004/05, 2005.
7 Home Office: The Social and Economic Costs of Crime
against Individuals and Households 2003/04, 2005.
8 ABI calculation based on Earnings Survey.
9 ABI statistics 2005.
10 Home Office: The Social and Economic Costs of Crime
against Individuals and Households 2003/04, 2005.
11 Home Office; Burglary of Domestic Dwellings: Findings
from the British Crime Survey, 2000.
SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
highest rate of burglary over the past
20 years was seen in 1992, at the lowest
point in the economic cycle. Current
rates of burglary are low, coming at
a time of sustained low unemployment
and a growing economy.
The impact of changes in demographics
Demographic changes mean that by
2011 there will be a projected 3.8 million
young men aged 16 to 24 in the UK – a
6% increase on 2004 population figures for
this cohort. As young men perpetrate most
property crime, the Home Office estimates
that for every 1% increase in their number,
burglary and theft also increase by about
1%12. Thus even if unemployment rates
among young men remain as now, the
number of domestic theft claims could
potentially rise by 6% by 2011.
Figure 1: Households most at risk of burglary
2.7
Average for England and Wales
Flat/Maisonette
3.9
Private renters
4.1
Household income less than £5,000
4.4
Living for less than a year at address
4.5
Urban prosperity ACORN group
4.6
Household reference person unemployed
4.7
High perceived physical disorder
in local area
6.0
6.7
Single parent
7.1
Household reference person 16-24
No home security measures
14.7
0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
Source: Home Office, Crime in England and Wales 2004/05, 2005.
These indicators have been borne
out by experience. Figure 3 illustrates
the close relationship between insurers’
experience of theft claims and
unemployment amongst males aged
16 to 24 years.
Figure 2: Trends in domestic burglary and economic
performance, 1991 – 2004/05
250
700
600
200
500
150
400
300
100
200
50
100
0
Q1 1993
0
Q1 1995
Q1 1997
Q1 1999
Q1 2001
Q1 2003
Q1 2005
No of domestic theft claims
Unemployed males aged 16-24
Source: Home Office, Crime in England and Wales 2004/05, 2005 and Office for National Statistics.
Figure 3: Unemployed males aged 16 to 24 and theft claims 1993 – 2005
000s
2000
12.0
1800
11.0
10.0
1600
9.0
1400
8.0
1200
7.0
1000
6.0
800
5.0
4.0
600
3.0
If the future economic outlook worsens,
as the cohort of young men aged 16 to
24 grows, domestic burglary rates could
increase significantly.
400
2.0
200
1.0
0
0.0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998/ 1999/ 2000/ 2001/ 2002/ 2003/ 2004/
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
No. of domestic burglaries BCS
Unemployed rate
12 Home Office, Trends in Crime Revisited, Home Office
Research Study 195, 1999.
No. of theft claims (000s)
There are three key links between youth
unemployment and crime:
• Many property thefts are opportunistic
– low unemployment leaves fewer
people with time and opportunity
to commit crime.
• Young and unskilled men are most
prone to unemployment – these are
the same people most likely
to commit crime once unemployed.
• Employment reduces the benefit and
increases the cost to the individual
of committing a crime – employed
people have more money and those
with jobs have more to lose from
receiving a criminal conviction, even
with a non-custodial sentence,
as this will often lead to termination of
their employment.
Unemployment (000s)
9
Source: Association of British Insurers and Office for National Statistics
%
Section 2: What Should a Basic Standard of Security
Look Like?
The ABI recommends that Building
Regulations should be used as the key
tool for introducing a basic minimum
level of security. The basis for these
regulations should be the proven target
hardening elements of the Association
of Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO) Secured
By Design (SBD) scheme13 and should
be compatible with fire safety. The
scheme seeks to ‘design out crime’
through the introduction of appropriate
target hardening and design features that
facilitate natural surveillance and create
a sense of ownership and responsibility
for every part of a development.
A basis for a basic minimum standard – target hardening within SBD
Target hardening of homes makes it
more difficult for a burglar to gain
entry and so a less attractive target
to a potential burglar. Since target
hardening focuses on the physical
security of a building it is the element of
crime prevention that it most amenable
to be drafted into Building Regulations.
SBD’s aim is to achieve a good standard
of security for both buildings and the
private and public spaces around them.
It encompasses:
• Physical security – using effective target
hardening rather than creating a fortress;
• Surveillance – using natural surveillance,
such as ‘eyes on the street’;
• Spatial planning – using territoriality
and ‘ownership’ over spaces through
the delineation of public and private
space; and
• Effective management and maintenance
of sites.
CASE STUDY:
West Yorkshire
Reported crime rates on two West Yorkshire
estates reduced by 67% and 54% post SBD
refurbishment. New-build estates reported
26% fewer crime events per home as compared
to non-SBD estates and burglary offences were
twice as high within the non-SBD sample.
Source: Home Office, An Evaluation of Secured by Design in West Yorkshire, 2000.
13 See: www.securedbydesign.com
11 SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
CASE STUDY:
Glasgow Housing Association
Glasgow Housing Association’s action of
installing SBD 11,500 doors and 7,500 windows
into homes reaped significant benefits. Homes
with SBD showed a 75% reduction in burglary
and, in those areas where SBD was installed
(where not all houses were fitted with SBD
doors and windows), burglary reduced by 63%
as compared to an increase of 6% in non-SBD
areas. In the evaluation sample area no burglar
accessed a property via a door, highlighting the
effect of target hardening.
Source: Glasgow Housing Association: Evaluation of Secured by Design Installations in GHA Communities, 2005.
The physical security element of SBD
focuses on external doors and windows
(the most used points of entry by
burglars), requiring them to withstand
reasonable levels of attack. It is these
elements of SBD that should be codified
within Building Regulations. The general
specification that should be included in
the accompanying Approved Document
comprises:
External doors and their surrounds
(including internal doors connecting
garages/conservatories to the
home) that:
• Comply with British Standards that
require doors to be resistant to a
15 minute manual attack;
• Have locking systems, such as
multi-point deadlocks that meet
British Standards;
• Have a door chain and viewer fitted;
• Have anti-lift devices on sliding patio
doors; and
• Are fitted with an entry phone and
electronic lock release when the door
is a common entrance.
Ground floor/easily accessible
windows that:
• Use enhanced British Standards
on security and key operated locks.
Lighting that:
• Is designed to illuminate all external
doors and vulnerable areas, such as
a rear garden.
In addition wiring should also be in place
to allow for the subsequent installation
of an intruder alarm and, where homes
have a common entrance, CCTV cameras.
CASE STUDY:
Gwent
A two-year study by Gwent Police into
recorded crime data in areas covered by
six housing associations provided details
on 9,173 properties in Gwent (representing
4% of the total housing stock). 81.7% of
the properties were non-SBD and 18.3%
were SBD. Cross referencing these properties
with recorded crime data revealed that SBD
properties suffered at least 40% less burglaries
and vehicle-related crime and 25% less
criminal damage than the non-SBD properties.
Source: Brown, Jon, An Evaluation of the Secured by Design Initiative in Gwent, South Wales , 1999 (unpublished).
Beyond a minimum standard – an enhanced level of Building Regulation
A higher mandatory level of security could
be disproportionate and not cost effective
for homes in low-crime areas. However,
Building Regulations should require a risk
assessment in order to determine whether
there is a case to go further than the basic
level. This will ensure a proportionate
response to the risk and, with the addition
of guidance and a technical specification
of additional measures in the Approved
Document, will encourage more
uniformity and set a benchmark.
Guidance on achieving higher levels of
security should be set out in the Approved
Document and comprise, for example:
• Compliance with British Standards
requiring greater resistance of doors
and windows to attack, such as
resistance to a 30 minute manual attack;
• Greater use of CCTV;
• Window bars;
• Alley gating; and
• The installation of burglar alarms
as standard.
13 SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
Section 3: Do the Social and Economic Benefits
of a Basic Standard Stack Up?
Reducing Risk Effectively
Motivations for burglary
In determining what measures will
be effective in eliminating burglaries
it is necessary to understand the main
motivations of the offender.
A study into travelling habits and crime
showed that a large proportion of offenders
are opportunistic, need quick money
and so look for easy targets. Indeed, as
table 2 shows, nearly a third of burglaries
were committed because an easy
opportunity was presented to the offender,
offering the prospect of financial gain.
Evidence also shows that, in addition to
being opportunistic, offenders tend to
be poor travellers, usually operating within
a limited distance of their own homes –
less than two miles for burglars14.
This is reflected in the statistics on which
homes are targeted. Households without
security devices are most at risk of
burglary since they offer the easiest
opportunities. These households are
five times more likely to be burgled
than the average household15.
Table 2: Reasons for deciding to offend (index of offences)
Reason
All offences %
Burglary %
Easy target/good opportunity
45
31
Needed money
73
100
Bored
18
0
Drunk/drugged up
45
40
Influence of mates
17
11
Fun
32
0
Other
17
11
Don’t know
0
0
Note: Percentages add up to over 100 because of multiple answers.
Source: Home Office, The ‘Road to Nowhere’: The Evidence for Travelling Criminals, 2000.
14 Home Office, The ‘Road to Nowhere’: The Evidence for Travelling Criminals, 2000.
15 All statistics in this section from the Home Office: Crime in England and Wales 2004/05, 2005.
Target hardening
Target hardening deters offenders by
making it more difficult to gain entry
to a house. But target hardening alone
will not prevent all burglary. Motivational
factors, such as unemployment and drug or
alcohol dependency, also need to be
addressed. Clearly, however, limiting the
opportunities for crime will reduce crime
and its impact on those who suffer crime.
Of course, this goes hand-in-hand with
educating occupants on the need to
properly use the security devices available
to them. But given target hardening focuses
on the physical aspects of a building it is
the area most suitable to be developed as a
minimum standard of security for the new
Part S to the Building Regulations.
Deadlocks and window locks reduce the
risks considerably – 58% and 33% of
households with deadlocks and window
locks, respectively, are more likely to
experience an attempt at burglary rather
than actual burglary with entry. Burglar
alarms, security lights or window grilles
have further effects16. Cost effective target
hardening should therefore focus on these
areas. A more secure door or window
makes a home harder to break into and
the home a less attractive target. The
more effort, time and noise involved, the
more chance that the burglar will not
even attempt entry.
Offenders most commonly enter via a
door (over two-thirds) or a window (onethird). Unlocked doors and windows offer
easy opportunities, but the majority of
offences involve forcing or breaking locked
doors or closed/locked windows that do
not meet SBD standards:
Table 3: Method of entry in burglaries with entry (1998 and 2000 British Crime Survey)
Percentages
Detached or semi-detached
Terraced
Flats
Door
71
66
76
Forced lock
21
19
29
Broke/cut door panel
13
13
12
Door not locked
20
18
13
False pretences
6
7
4
Had door key
5
6
7
Pushed past person opening door
6
5
5
Other method
5
5
10
Window
37
36
23
Forced window lock/catch
17
16
9
Broke/cut glass
12
12
8
Window open/could be pushed open
8
7
6
Other method
1
2
1
Source: Home Office Briefing note 5/01, 2001.
Increasing the risk?
It is often argued that improving security
in one area will displace or diffuse
burglary to other areas – that is, by
introducing security measures in one
area, burglars will merely move elsewhere
or commit a different type of crime.
However this has not been borne out
by the evidence. A review of 55 studies
on crime prevention measures across the
world concluded that 22 studies found
no displacement and whilst 33 found
some form of displacement, crucially,
this occurred only in relation to particular
types of crimes, such as drug dealing.
No evidence of displacement was found
in relation to domestic burglary17.
Due to the limited range that burglars
are willing to travel, any displacement/
diffusion that may occur must be
limited in scope, and in any case may
be neutralised by what is known as the
‘halo’ effect18 – where the benefits of
increased security within one
development extends further than the
boundary of that development into
neighbouring areas. Indeed six of the
55 studies in the above review suggested
crime prevention measures had produced
beneficial effects in adjacent areas.
16 56%, 44% and 100% of households with burglar alarms,
security lights and window grilles, respectively, are more
likely to experience an attempt at burglary rather than
burglary with entry.
17 See Town, S, Crime Displacement: The Perception,
problems, evidence and supporting theory, Bradford
District Architectural Liaison Office, 2001; and Australian
Institute of Criminology, Burglary and the Myth of
Displacement, 2004.
18 For example, a project focusing on the Royds area of
Bradford, which saw the introduction of security features
above those required by Secured by Design, showed that
not only was crime reduced in the previously high crime
Royds area, but also in the surrounding private housing.
A further study in Yorkshire suggests that introducing
security features created a diffusion of benefits as
opposed to displacement of crime. See: Home Office, An
Evaluation of Secured By Design in West Yorkshire, 2000.
15 SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
The Social Benefits of Part S
The cost benefit analysis of a statutory
minimum standard for security includes
environmental, social and community
issues, which amplify the economic
benefits.
Reaching those most in need
Burglary affects people to differing degrees
and some groups are at more risk than
others. Personal circumstances, such as
having a low income, being a single parent
or being from an ethnic minority group,
increase the risk of suffering a break-in.
Type of home (e.g. flat, maisonette) and
household tenure (e.g. owner-occupier,
socially or privately renting) also result in
a greater likelihood of a break-in.
Yet poor households are also least likely
to have home contents insurance leaving
them more exposed to the financial
impacts of burglary. Currently 45% and
58% of UK households in the two lowest
income deciles, respectively, have contents
insurance, as compared with 77% of UK
households as a whole19. The situation
(see table 4) is even worse for households
headed by an unemployed person, who
are twice as likely to be uninsured (42% as
compared to 82% across all households).
Also, around 15% of poor homeowners
(around twice the average rate) have no
buildings insurance, leaving them exposed
to the full costs of any damage20.
Consequently only 54% of burglaries are
estimated to be covered by insurance21.
The effects of poverty are compounded
in that more than half of those without
home contents insurance have either
no security or a single security device.
This illustrates the inter-dependency of
security and insurance22. Not only do
insurers encourage the uptake of security
by requiring measures in high crime areas
but, by definition, those unprotected by
security will find themselves excluded
from financial protection. Homeowners
may choose this outcome but tenants
may not be in a position to install security.
A vicious circle develops – those who
are at the highest risk of burglary:
• Live in the most deprived areas;
• Have lower incomes;
• Are least likely to have or afford security
measures; and
• Are least likely to have insurance.
By introducing a base level of security
through Building Regulations, those who
are at most risk of being burgled, least
able to defend their properties and are
most affected by burglary financially,
will become protected by security
measures they would not otherwise have.
Table 4: Households least likely to have home contents insurance
Percentages with home contents insurance
19 ONS Expenditure and Food Survey 2004/05.
20 ONS Expenditure and Food Survey 2004/05.
21 Home Office, Burglary of Domestic Dwellings: Findings
from the British Crime Survey, 2000.
22 Home Office, Burglary of Domestic Dwellings: Findings
from the British Crime Survey, 2000.
Household structure and socio-economic characteristics
%
Head of household:
One adult living alone with children
49
Aged between 16 and 24
47
Unemployed
42
Afro-Caribbean
53
Asian
67
Home rented from council/housing association
51
Home rented privately
62
ACORN* classification of area
%
Multi-ethnic, low-income
41
Council estates, greatest hardship
51
Council estates, better-off homes
66
Better-off executives, inner city areas
63
All households
82
* ACORN: A Classification of Residential Neighbourhoods.
Creating sustainable communities
Statutory minimum standards of security would deliver real gains for those
segments of the community who are most affected by burglary and least
equipped to deal with its effects. These are exactly the communities that are
the focus of much of the Government’s sustainable communities and social
exclusion agenda23.
Communities that experience high levels of crime are clearly not sustainable –
people will simply not want to live there. As stated by the Government in
‘Safer Places’24:
‘Safety and security are essential to
successful, sustainable communities.
Not only are such places well-designed,
attractive environments to live and work in,
but they are also places where freedom from
crime, and from the fear of crime, improves
the quality of life.’
The message is clear – safety and security are central elements for the creation of
sustainable communities. By reducing crime and the fear of crime, people can live
better lives.
23 See for example: A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal, Social Exclusion Unit, ODPM, 2001 and New Deal for
Communities http://www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/page.asp?id=617.
24 Home Office, Safer Places. The Planning System and Crime Prevention, 2004.
17 SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
Wider impacts
Target hardening provides wider benefits
such as reducing other forms of crime, like
arson and malicious damage, reducing fear
of crime, and even reducing heating bills.
Reducing the incidence of arson and
malicious damage
Criminals look for an easy target. When
homes are secure, well-lit and recorded
on CCTV, they become less of a target for
criminal damage and arson. Overall arson
costs the wider economy £2.4 bn
annually25. Enhanced security makes
committing a crime more difficult and
increases the likelihood of the offender
being caught.
Reducing fear of crime
In an evaluation of SBD installation
in Glasgow Housing Association
communities, participants reported that
they felt ‘100% safer’ in their homes since
the installations and more confident
about leaving their homes empty26.
Benefits of a reduced fear of crime apply
to all communities and patterns of fear of
crime do not necessarily follow patterns
of risk of victimisation. For example, while
people living in London are at an average
risk of being a victim of violence, a higher
proportion of people in London than any
other region have a high level of worry
about violent crime27. Although creating a
minimum standard of security and target
hardening would have most impact in
reducing financial costs in higher crime
areas, households in lower crime areas
will benefit from reduced fear and hence
the social costs associated with crime.
As communities and crime trends are
dynamic and current geographical patterns
may not be reflected in future, a base
level of security should be applied across
the board and not just in high crime areas.
The fit with other objectives
Part L of the Building Regulations
addresses energy conservation.
Security and insulation requirements
can be met by a single product that
combines, for example, sealed and
laminated glass units and locks. Residents
who took part in a survey by Glasgow
Housing Association after the installation
of SBD windows and doors made the
following observations28:
‘MY HOME IS WARMER’
‘NO DAMP’
‘I USED TO PAY £25 PER WEEK FOR GAS NOW I PAY £10, THE
SAME FOR ELECTRIC’
‘I USED TO USE 3 CALOR GAS HEATERS. NOW I CAN LEAVE A
SMALL WINDOW OPEN AND STILL FEEL WARMER AT NIGHT’
25 ODPM, The Economic Cost of Fire: Estimates for 2004, April 2006.
26 Glasgow Housing Association, Evaluation of Secured by Design in GHA Communities, 2005.
27 Home Office: Crime in England and Wales 2004/05, 2005.
28 Glasgow Housing Association, Evaluation of Secured by Design in GHA Communities, 2005.
with the annual rate of refurbishment of
the housing stock at 1%32. A discount
rate of 3.5% applies from 2005.
The Economic Benefits of Part S
Good regulation is risk-based and
proportionate, delivering social, economic
and environmental benefits.
The analysis does not take account of
measures applied voluntarily to
replacement doors and windows elsewhere,
inspired by the new Building Regulations.
To establish the economic case for a
minimum standard of home security,
the ABI conducted a cost-benefit analysis
to determine the economic impacts of
such a policy. This takes a long-term view
of the economic case for a minimum
standard, examining the costs and
benefits of regulation of all new build
and refurbished properties over a 20-year
life of the policy.
Types and costs of target hardening
The average cost of SBD target hardening is
£630 per home. The analysis takes account
of different types of newly built homes,
including detached and terraced housing,
and apartments, each of which require a
different number and type of security
features. The schedule of additions for
security measures are drawn from SBD and
include security for doors and windows,
lighting, intruder alarm spurs and CCTV
entry systems (the latter for apartment
buildings only). Windows are specified to
meet Part L requirements for insulation.
All costs are estimated by quantity
surveyors and take account of bulk
purchase discounts available to volume
house builders. It is worth noting that it
has been argued that as the use of security
products becomes more widespread the
The analysis
The analysis30 applies to a regulatory
initiative of target hardening newly built
homes and refurbishments from 2007
in England and Wales.
Current housing stock is assumed to be
22.9 million properties with 166,155 new
builds taking place in 200431. The rate of
annual new builds as a proportion of the
housing stock is assumed to be 0.72%,
cost of individual items may decrease due
to increased competition in the market.
The average cost of a burglary
The average household cost of burglary
is estimated at £3,300 based on Home
Office figures.
Burglary rates and the economic benefit
of reducing burglary
There are a number of factors that affect
burglary rates, including demographics
and the economic cycle. A historical view
suggests burglary rates are unlikely to
remain at today’s low levels. Given the
£3,300 average cost of a burglary,
variations in burglary rates are tested at
3%, 5% and 7% (reflecting the current
and historic 2.7%-6.7% range):
Overall findings are reported based
on an annual household benefit of the
SBD measures at a 5% burglary rate/
50% reduction in burglary rate. The
per household net present value benefit
of the measures is calculated by
projecting the annual household
benefit over 20 years and discounting
to present value.
Table 5: Annual benefits to households of target hardening measures
by effectiveness measures and likelihood of burglary
Annual Chance of being burgled
Reduction due to SBD
3%
5%
7%
25%
£24.75
£41.25
£57.75
50%
£49.50
£82.50
£115.50
75%
£74.25
£123.75
£173.25
The ABI believes the economic case is compelling: In the first year alone,
almost 400,000 households (new build homes and refurbishments) would
benefit from the new measures, generating net savings of over £215m.
Within just 20 years the policy would have saved the economy over £3.2bn29.
29 Measured as the total net present value benefits of the policy over 20 years.
30 See Annex A for a full description of the assumptions used in the analysis.
31 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
32 Figure taken from column 437 Hansard 30 January 2004.
19 SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
Results
Implementing target-hardening measures
costing £630 per home would yield
benefits of over £1,170 per household
– a net saving of £540. In the first year
of implementation the present value
benefit to households would be in excess
of £465m – a saving of £215m in total.
Over 20 years the policy would generate
more than £3.2bn33 of savings to the
economy as a whole.
Benefits to householders
Assuming a common level of benefits from
introducing security measures, the savings
accrued for different housing types are:
Table 6: Costs and benefits of target hardening by housing type
Housing type
Cost of implementation £
Benefit £
Saving £
4 bedroom detached house
650
1173
523
3 bedroom semi detached house
580
1173
593
2 bedroom terrace house
480
1173
693
3 bedroom bungalow
730
1173
443
2 bedroom ground floor apartment
710
1173
463
Average
630
1173
543
Average household benefits are nearly
double the average cost of introducing
the measures. This analysis estimates
conservative returns due to cautious
assumptions of the effectiveness of
target hardening and future burglary rates.
The effect on an individual household
will vary depending on location and the
situation of the householders. Households
currently suffering high rates of crime or
fear of crime will benefit to a greater degree.
Long-term benefits to the wider
economy
Over 20 years significant benefits and
savings accrue to the wider economy.
The cost benefit analysis shows that
implementing security measures would
result in £7bn in benefits (in real terms)
to the economy over 20 years of the
policy, or net savings of £3.2bn for £3.8bn
investment in basic security measures.
33 Measured as the total net present value benefits of the
policy over 20 years.
Section 4: How Should a Basic Standard be Enacted?
Development of regulation: an
opportunity not to be missed
Voluntary Code or
Mandatory Regulation?
The Sustainable and Secure Buildings
Act 200434 aims to enable Building
Regulations to address aspects of
security as a means of ensuring
sustainability35. The Act imports
within the scope of regulations:
• Furthering the protection or
enhancement of the environment;
• Facilitating sustainable development;
and
• Furthering the prevention or
detection of crime.
The Government has recently consulted on
a Code for Sustainable Homes, a voluntary
initiative that sought to promote sustainable
practices within the building industry by
requiring building development to use:
• Energy resources more efficiently;
• Water resources more efficiently;
• Material resources more efficiently; and
• Practices and materials designed to
safeguard occupants’ health and well-being.
The Act provides a unique opportunity
to ensure sensible, proportionate
crime reduction is incorporated from
the outset of the development process,
and not added as an optional extra after
the fact. Clearly a careful balance needs
to be found between the costs and
benefits of any new regulation.
Regulation should be designed to
achieve desired objectives in a common
sense way that avoids unnecessary
technical risks and costs.
The relatively benign economic cycle
and the push for housing means the
time is right to begin the development
process for Building Regulations and
accompanying guidance, which can
typically take 18 months to two years
to conclude and come into effect.
The London Plan alone identifies the
need for 345,000 new homes by
201636. A failure to act now would
be a lost opportunity.
The ABI believes voluntary adoption of
the Code will not result in the benefits
previously outlined. The effectiveness
of the Code relies on consumer demand
to stimulate uptake. However consumer
demand may not be enough to effect
compliance, particularly since many of
the households most affected by burglary
have little influence over housing
standards since they are either tenants
(social or private sector) or in run-down
owner-occupied property. Developers
would only include security features in
response to demand for and value
attributed to secure premises leading
to enhanced property values. SBD uptake
is generally high amongst social housing
developments as a result of public policy
decisions37, but low within the private
sector. However, social housing (local
authority and registered social landlords)
accounts for just one in ten new builds
and nearly a third of poor households
live in privately rented accommodation38.
Compulsion at the base level would ensure
that those most at risk of crime are guaranteed
an effective core standard of security.
34 The Building Act 1984 enables Building Regulations to be
made. The scope and purpose of Building Regulations
was initially to protect the health and safety of people in
or around buildings. With the introduction of Part L for
the conservation of fuel and power and Part M including
a consideration of means of access for the disabled, the
scope is now much wider. The Sustainable and Secure
Buildings Act acknowledges this wider role for the
Building Regulation by enabling regulations to be
created to address issues of sustainability and security.
35 House of Commons Hansard 30 January 2004.
36 Greater London Authority, The London Plan, 2004.
37 See for example Manchester(www.securedbydesign.com
/focus/issues%5CSbD_Focus_Issue_6.pdf), Peckham
(www.southwarkalliance.org.uk/areas/neighbourhoodplan
s.htm), Peabody Trust (Peabody Trust Design handbook
www.peabody.org.uk), the Welsh experience (Cozens,
Pascoe and Hillier: Critically Reviewing the Theory and
Practice of Secured by Design for Residential New Build
in Britain 2004) and the Northern Ireland experience
(www.dsdni.gov.uk/index/housing/registered_housing_ass
ociations/ha_guide/hag.pt3).
38 ODPM and ONS, Housing Statistics 2005, 2005. Poor
households are defined as households with gross income
(reference person and partner) of less than £10,000 a year.
21 SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
The link with the planning system
The Crime and Disorder Act 199839
imposes on local authority planning
departments a requirement to consider
sustainable development, crime and
disorder as part of the planning process.
Crime prevention considerations should
be given weight where the potential crime
risk is expected to be high and/or the
consequences for the community,
vulnerable groups and individuals serious.
Whilst Building Regulations are best
equipped to focus on target hardening
and the planning system best equipped to
address environmental and spatial elements
of crime prevention, it is imperative that
both have a joined up approach to
preventing crime and ensuring security.
A joined up approach should be achieved
by requiring developers to undertake a
crime risk assessment at the pre-planning
stage. This should trigger action by the
planning authority which, if necessary,
can enforce the switch to the enhanced
level of security Building Regulations.
This process would complement the advice
from Government in ‘Safer Places’40:
• At the pre-application stage – local
authorities set out those instances
where it would recommend an applicant
to engage in pre-application discussions
with the police, and talk through aspects
of their proposals with the local
community and the planning authority.
• At the planning application stage – local
authorities agree thresholds with the
police on when their advice should be
sought, including on whether a specific
crime risk assessment is required. Triggers
could include location (such as town
centre or adjacent to a known crime
hot spot), types (such as pubs and clubs)
and size (such as number of new homes).
• At the planning decision – local planning
authorities consider whether proposed
development could be amended or
planning conditions imposed that would
contribute to the prevention of crime
and disorder.
39 Section 17(1) Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
40 Home Office, Safer Places. The Planning System and Crime Prevention, 2004.
Beyond homes
Schools
The Government has envisaged that any
Building Regulations on security will apply
only to homes. Yet the Sustainable and
Secure Buildings Act has extended the
scope of Building Regulations to cover
schools and public buildings.
As schools suffer a high rate of crime,
most notably arson, burglary and
vandalism, the Government should
consider whether the specific security
needs of schools should be included within
Building Regulations. Up to 90% of major
fires in schools are thought to be arson,
costing up to £76m each year, with an
estimated 90,000-100,000 pupils affected
by large school fires per year41. Statutory
standards of security for schools would
reduce arson and the impact of arson in
schools. Specific guidance, similar to that
contained within Building Bulletin 100:
Designing and Managing Against the Risk
of Fire in Schools, which supports Part B
of the Building Regulations (Fire Safety),
would also fall within the scope of the Act.
Commercial Premises
The Home Office estimates that
around 25% of retail and manufacturing
premises become victims of burglary42.
Whilst 90% of these businesses have
protective door and window measures,
25% installed measures as a result of
previous victimisation. Similarly a large
proportion of businesses taking part in
some form of cooperative crime
prevention activity do so as a result of
previous victimisation (35% and 23%
respectively for retailers and
manufacturers).
These statistics indicate a case for
local authorities taking early action
and working with business when there
is an identified crime problem, especially
given some emphasis for new
developments, such as the developments
in the Thames Gateway, to incorporate
mixed use (business and housing)
areas43. The case for regulations covering
the security of commercial premises
should be explored.
41 Arson Prevention Bureau statistics 2005.
42 Home Office, Crime Against Retail and Manufacturing Premises: Findings from the 2002 Commercial Victimisation Survey, 2004.
43 Thames Gateway London Partnership, Thames Gateway Crime and Design Project: Theme Guide for Designing Safer Communities,
June 2005.
23 SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
Annex A: Cost-Benefit Analysis Assumptions
Scope
The analysis applies SBD target hardening to new buildings and refurbishments from
2007. It does not take account of the effect of applying additional security standards to
replacement doors and windows, as there is a paucity of data to support an effective
cost benefit analysis on a wider basis.
Burglary rates
There are a number of factors that have an effect upon burglary rates, including
demographics and the economic cycle. As a whole, historical data suggests that burglary
rates are unlikely to remain as low as they are today. The analysis takes account of
variation in burglary rates, ranging from 2.7% to 6.7%, and uses burglary prevalence
rates of 3%, 5% and 7%. Findings are reported on the basis of a 5% burglary rate.
The cost of burglary
The average cost of burglary is estimated at £3,300 based on 2003/04 Home
Office figures.
Types and costs of target hardening
Building surveyors (Davis Langdon) undertook a costing exercise of adding SBD
measures focused on resistance to attack to different new build housing types (taking
into account that windows must already meet the requirements of Part L of the
Building Regulations). Annex B contains a full description of the costing exercise.
Each housing type requires a differing number and type of security features. The
schedule of additions for security is outlined in Annex B and is based on SBD (including
security for doors and windows, lighting, intruder alarm spurs and CCTV entry systems
for apartments).
Table 7: Costs of security by housing type
Housing Type
Cost £
4 bedroom detached house
650
3 bedroom semi detached house
580
2 bedroom terrace house
480
3 bedroom bungalow
730
2 bedroom ground floor apartment
710
Average
630
The most expensive home for additional security is the 3 bedroom bungalow at
£730 per household; the cheapest is the 3 bedroom semi-detached house at £580
per household. Given this variance the analysis assumes target hardening can be
incorporated at an average cost of £630 per home over and above standard
construction costs44.
The analysis excludes maintenance costs as these would be included for the standard
installations included within a home. The additional cost of installation has also been
excluded (these are considered minimal given standard installations take place
during construction).
It is worth noting that as the use of security products becomes more widespread the
cost of individual items may decrease due to increased competition in the market and
economies of scale.
44 Given the respective proportions of 3 bedroom semi-detached houses and 3 bedroom bungalows in the housing stock, the
ABI suspects that the analysis overestimates the cost of target hardening.
Effectiveness of target hardening
A number of evaluations have been undertaken to establish the effectiveness of SBD
target hardening. These have shown that the introduction of security measures can
reduce the rate of burglary by between 26% and 75%:
Table 8: The effectiveness of SBD – Evaluation data from four studies
Study
Number of properties
Reduction in burglary
Glasgow Housing Association45
11,500 SBD doors and
7,500 SBD windows.
75% reduction – 4 burglaries in
2004 as opposed to 16 in 2003.
West Yorkshire (New Build)46
25 SBD and 25 Non-SBD estates
comprising 660 and 522 homes
respectively.
50% fewer burglaries in SBD estates
and 42% less vehicle crime.
West Yorkshire (Refurbishment)47
2 estates.
67% and 54 % respectively
less burglary.
Gwent Police Study48
9,173 properties – 18.3% were SBD
and 81.7% non-SBD.
40% fewer burglaries and vehicle related
crime and 25% less criminal damage.
Given this variance the analysis uses rates of 25%, 50% and 75% and findings are
reported on the basis of a 50% reduction in burglary.
The analysis uses the combination of these rates and a combination of burglary
prevalence rates to obtain annual benefits per household of introducing security features:
Table 9: Annual benefits to households of target hardening measures
by effectiveness measures and likelihood of burglary
Annual Chance of being burgled
Reduction due to SBD
3%
5%
7%
25%
£24.75
£41.25
£57.75
50%
£49.50
£82.50
£115.50
75%
£74.25
£123.75
£173.25
Other assumptions
In addition to the assumptions outlined above the analysis assumes:
• A housing stock in England and Wales of 22.9 million properties and the 166,155
new builds in 200449. The rate of annual new builds as a proportion of the housing
stock is 0.72%;
• An annual rate of refurbishment of the housing stock in England and Wales of 1%50;
• Buildings are demolished at an annual rate of 0.1%51;
• The average cost of domestic burglary is £3,30052;
• The discount rate is 3.5% (beginning in 2005)53; and
• The life span of additional security features of 20 years.
45 Glasgow Housing Association: Evaluation of Secured by Design Installations in GHA Communities, 2005.
46 Home Office, An Evaluation of Secured by Design in West Yorkshire, 2000.
47 Home Office, An Evaluation of Secured by Design in West Yorkshire, 2000.
48 An Evaluation of the Secured by Design Initiative in Gwent, South Wales (unpublished).
49 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
50 Figure taken from column 437 Hansard 30 January 2004.
51 Figure taken from United Kingdom Parliament Select Committee on Science and Technology.
52 Home Office, The Economic and Social Cost of Crime against Individuals and Households 2003/04.
53 See the social time preference rate in HM Treasury, Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central
Government, 2003.
25 SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
Annex B: Costing a Minimum Standard for Security
Summary
Government research carried out in 2000 on the cost of achieving Secured by Design
(SBD) standards on housing association projects produced figures ranging from £90 to
£1,290 for a 3 bedroom property54. The average cost was £440.
The ABI commissioned the quantity surveyors Davis Langdon to produce up-to-date
costing for installing the target hardening features of SBD into new private
developments by volume house builders. Particular products are not singled out for
endorsement but are used as illustrative examples of products that meet SBD standards.
The research examined the impact that improvements to doors, windows, patio doors,
CCTV and intruder alarms have on building costs and were broken down to reflect the
quantity of doors/windows that a particular home has. The research reviewed the
following housing types:
• 4 bedroom detached house
• 3 bedroom semi-detached house
• 2 bedroom terraced house
• 3 bedroom bungalow
• 2 bedroom ground floor apartment
The breakdown of the quantity of doors and windows for each home appears in the
schedule of additions.
The report shows that the cost of uplifting security measures falls into the range of
£480 – £730 per home. The two most expensive housing types to upgrade are the 3
bedroom bungalow and the 2 bedroom ground floor apartment. This information was
used to conduct the cost benefit analysis for introducing SBD into Building Regulations.
Method
• Wherever possible suppliers on the SBD recommended list were approached as were
suppliers typically used by housing developers.
• The number of features (such as doors and windows) was calculated for each housing
type and the extra cost of SBD was multiplied by the number of features to obtain the
total cost.
• Back doors have been calculated at the same rate as the front door.
• No allowance has been made for an additional door into a conservatory as it as been
assumed that the majority of new build residential properties do not have a
conservatory.
• Only 4 bedroom detached and 3 bedroom semi-detached houses have been assumed
to have doors leading into the house from a garage.
• The number of windows specified relate to the ground floor only, reflecting the
requirement that only accessible windows require extra security provisions. No
allowance has been made for first floor windows.
• Costs stated are average costs for products.
54 Home Office, An Evaluation of Secured by Design in West Yorkshire, 2000.
Specification of SBD standard55
Doors
• Doors and surrounds should be resistant to attack (a standard currently met by PAS 24).
• If glazed panels adjacent to doors form an integral part of the doorframe then they
should also be tested as part of the door resistance to attack (as under PAS 24).
Alternatively, where they are manufactured separately from the doorframe, the panels
should be to the same standard as accessible windows.
• Locks or locking mechanisms installed within doorsets should be of a security
standard equivalent to:
• A cylinder certified to BS EN 1303 grade 3, incorporating an additional anti-drill
resistance requirement.
• A lock certified to BS 3621:1998.
• All glazing in and adjacent to doors should be laminated (outer pane) and securely
fixed (Current standards to a minimum thickness of 6.4mm).
• A door chain or opening limiter should be installed.
• A door viewer should be fitted (not required with unobscured glazing, which SBD
requires to be between 1200mm and 1500mm).
• All external doorsets not designated as the main access/egress route should meet the
same physical standard as front door.
• Internal doors connecting the garage to the home should be the same physical
standard as front door.
• Where a conservatory is installed there should be a door separating it from the home.
The door should meet the same physical standard as the front door.
Sliding Patio Doors
• A multi-point deadlocking system with three or more hook bolts or similar should be
fitted and the lock cylinders should incorporate anti-drill resistance (The current
standard BS EN 1303 Grade 3 meets the SBD requirements).
• An anti-lift device should be fitted and the frame should not be easily demountable
by access to screws or similar connections.
Communal Entrance Doors
• Doors should be the same physical specification as for front doors, with automatic
closing, fitted with an automatic deadlocking lock, and an internal thumb turn, knob,
or handle. External entry should be by latch withdrawal by use of the key, not by lever.
• Flat Entrance Doors Served off a Shared Corridor or Stairway should be to the same
physical specification as a front door.
Windows
• Ground floor windows and those easily accessible above ground floor should be of an
enhanced security specification (BS7950: 2004 ‘Specification for enhanced security
performance of casement and tilt/turn windows for domestic applications’ is a current
standard that meets this requirement).
• Windows installed should meet the performance standards for relevant materials (The
current standards which demonstrate compliance are: BS 4873 (Aluminium), BS 7412
(PVC-U), BS 644 (Timber) or the BWF Timber Window Accreditation Scheme (TWAS)
and BS 6510 (Steel)).
• Ground floor windows and those that are easily accessible to entry should have key
operated locks.
• Glazing should be laminated to current standards of 6.4mm minimum thickness.
55 See SBD New Homes Design Guide www.securedbydesign.com/pdfs/sbd_new_homes.pdf
27 SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
CCTV/ID Systems
• Where there are more than eight households using a common entrance a CCTV
camera and wiring should be incorporated.
• Where four or more flats are served by a common entrance the doors should be fitted
with an access control system with an electronic lock release and entry phone linked
to the flats.
Lighting
• Lighting should be designed to illuminate all external doors and vulnerable areas, such
as rear garden, and be controlled by passive infrared detectors.
Intruder Alarms
• A 13amp non-switched fused spur should be installed.
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
An additional £100 allowed for meeting SBD requirements.
No additional cost required.
£40 for additional ironmongery.
£70 for 1770x1200 timber windows and £40 for 1200x1200 timber windows.
Allowance of £150 for CCTV and entry systems.
£35 allowed for each lighting point.
No additional cost required.
Schedule of Additions by Product Type
Type
Note: Particular products are not highlighted for endorsement, but are used as illustrative examples of products that meet SBD standards.
Description
Comments
Premdor Stormproof hardwood external doorsets £320. Stormproof
Secure to achieve SBD criteria £430, an extra over of £110.
Figures were obtained from Premdor and LS Leaderflush. These are all
inclusive costs for a single external 926 x 2040 door including the
door leaf, frame, ironmongery and thresholds. Options were obtained
for solid and half glazed with clear glazing. An addition of £100 was
allowed to meet the SBD requirements.
Doors
Ordinary
LS Leaderflush Base £350 and ironmongery £60, total cost £410.
Blockade range to achieve SBD criteria £443, an extra of £33.
Sliding patio
1500 x 2100mm high standard PVC-u patio doors fixed in a brickwork
opening, with a 4-point locking system and anti-lift devices £950/each.
Aluminium doors with 4 point locking system and anti-lift devices in
brickwork opening and hardwood frame £680 each.
Communal entrance
Automatic deadlocking locks £65, usually £40 for deadlock.
From the specifications given from a variety of manufacturers
including Jen Weld and Premdor, patio doors generally come with 4point locking systems and anti lift devices. It has been assumed that
no additional upgrading will be required to meet the SBD level.
List prices obtained from Yale. It has been assumed that the
communal flat will come with a door closer and no additional cost
has been included for this. The extra cost for the communal entrance
ironmongery was £65.
Latch withdrawal by key not lever furniture £30, usually £15.
Key with thumb turn cylinder not a major price impact.
Windows
Jeld-Wen, softwood windows, list price:
1200x1200, 1 opening light £295, £350 with enhanced secured design.
1770x1200, 1 opening light £445, £540 with enhanced secured design.
Jeld-Wen, on the list of approved suppliers for the SBD. Softwood
windows, provided list prices for normal developer standard
softwood windows and those meeting Secure by Design. For the
1770 x 1200 window an extra £95 was allowed, £55 extra for the
1200 x 1200 windows.
CCTV/ID systems
£250+ for a CCTV system, if based on design for 8 flats then this
allows £31.25 per flat.
For audio entry systems allow £120/unit. Based upon phones,
stainless steel plate at entrance, access control system with electronic
lock release.
Based upon a block of 8 flats. Costs of CCTV systems assessed by
Davis Langdon. Costs for entry phone system provided by Interphone
Security. This amounted to an extra cost of £150 per flat.
Lighting
Allow £35/nr for a light, up to £200 including cabling.
Costs provided by Chubb Security. No allowance made for cabling as
electrical spurs assumed to be provided in base condition.
Generally the house builder provides an electrical spur and tail for
further installation by the owner. Cost of £500 is generally allowed
for the installation of an alarm (not included)
As spurs usually provided, no extra allowance needed.
Intruder alarm
Schedule of Additions by Housing Type
Doors
Patio
Communal
Entrance
Windows
CCTV &
Entry System
Lighting
Intruder
Alarms Spur
4 bed detached house
2 + 1 from garage
to house
1
No
4 (3 x1770 x 1200,
1 x 1200x1200)
No
2
1
3 bed semi detached house
2 + 1 from garage
to house
1
No
3 (All 1770 x 1200)
No
2
1
2 bed terrace house
2
1
No
3 (All 1770 x 1200)
No
2
1
3 bed bungalow
2
1
No
7 (6 x 1770x1200,
1x 1200x1200)
No
2
1
2 bed ground floor apartment
1
0
1
6 (5 x 1770x1200,
1x 1200x1200)
Yes
1
1
Schedule of Costs
The schedule of costs reflect suitable volume discounts from the list prices.
4 Bed detached house
Doors56
Patio57
Communal
Entrance58
Windows59
CCTV &
Entry System60
Lighting61
Intruder Alarms62
Extra Total
+£300
No extra cost
No
+£280
No
+£70
No extra cost
+£650
3 Bed semi detached house
+£300
No extra cost
No
+£210
No
+£70
No extra cost
+£580
2 bed terrace house
+£200
No extra cost
No
+£210
No
+£70
No extra cost
+£480
3 bed bungalow
+£200
No extra cost
No
+£460
No
+£70
No extra cost
+£730
2 bed ground floor apartment
+£100
No extra cost
+£35
+£390
+£150
+£35
No extra cost
+£710
29 SECURING THE NATION: THE CASE FOR SAFER HOMES
References
ABI Statistical Bulletin June 2004: http://www.abi.org.uk/Display/File/Child/237/Gen_Ins_MonthlyJune_v2.pdf
Australian Institute of Criminology, Burglary and the Myth of Displacement, 2004.
Brown, Jon, An Evaluation of the Secured by Design Initiative in Gwent, South Wales , 1999 (unpublished).
Cozens, Pascoe and Hillier, Critically Reviewing the Theory and Practice of Secured by Design for Residential New Build in Britain 2004.
Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
Glasgow Housing Association, Evaluation of Secured by Design in GHA Communities, 2005.
Greater London Authority, The London Plan, 2004.
HM Treasury, Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government, 2003.
Home Office, Modelling and Predicting Crime Trends in England and Wales: Home Office Research Study 198, 1999.
Home Office, An Evaluation of Secured By Design in West Yorkshire, 2000.
Home Office, Burglary of Domestic Dwellings: Findings from the British Crime Survey, 2000.
Home Office, The ‘Road to Nowhere’: The Evidence for Travelling Criminals, 2000.
Home Office, Crime Against Retail and Manufacturing Premises: Findings from the 2002 Commercial Victimisation Survey, 2004.
Home Office, Crime in England and Wales 2003/04, 2004.
Home Office, Crime in England and Wales 2004/05, 2005.
Home Office, Safer Places. The Planning System and Crime Prevention, 2004.
Home Office, The Social and Economic Costs of Crime against Individuals and Households 2003/04, 2005.
Home Office, Crime in England and Wales 2004/05, 2005.
House of Commons, Hansard, 30 January 2004.
Office of Deputy Prime Minister, The Economic Cost of Fire: Estimates for 2004, April 2006.
Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Office for National Statistics, Housing Statistics 2005, 2005.
Office for National Statistics, Expenditure and Food Survey 2004/05, 2005.
Office for National Statistics, Social Trends 36, 2006 edition.
Sustainable and Secure Buildings Act 2004.
Thames Gateway London Partnership, Thames Gateway Crime and Design Project: Theme Guide for Designing Safer Communities, June 2005.
Town, S. Crime Displacement: The Perception, problems, evidence and supporting theory, Bradford District Architectural Liaison Office, 2001.
For more information, contact:
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London EC2V 7HQ
020 7600 3333
www.abi.org.uk