MILAN MUN 2016
Tackling the expansion of
terrorist groups in the
Sub-Saharan Africa
Political Committee
Introduction:
Africa is a continent of extreme importance for the growing global economy. It is a provider of a large
number of strategic raw materials and can become a huge market for products and investments. The main
traditional economic powers of the Western world want to strengthen their grip on the continent. The
U.S.A. increase their military presence (AFRICOM). New protagonists of the world economy like China and
India expand their presence and could become competitors for the traditional powers.
Regional players as the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and of the Persian Gulf want to expand their
political and religious influence.
The fact to be one of the most important provider of raw materials to the world does not automatically
mean a growth of wealth, of peace and equal rights for all the citizens of the Black Continent.
Extremist political groups resort to terrorism insinuating themselves into the enormous contradictions
emerging.
COUNTRIES INVOLVED
Sub-Saharan Africa is, geographically, the area of the continent of Africa that lies south of the Sahara
Desert. Politically, it consists of all African countries that are fully or partially located south of the Sahara
(excluding Sudan, even though Sudan is located in the Eastern portion of the Sahara desert). It contrasts
with North Africa, which is considered a part of the Arab world. Somalia, Djibouti, Comoros, and Mauritania
are geographically part of Sub-Saharan Africa, but also part of the Arab world.1
The sub-Saharan Africa region includes a diverse set of forty-nine states at varying levels of economic and
political development. The region faces numerous non-state actor threats and is home to some of the
world's most porous and unregulated borders, through which large volumes of drugs, small arms, and other
contraband flow with relative impunity.
1
en.wikipedia.org/Sub-Saharan_Africa
What are the reasons of radical expansion?
According to public opinion polls in the past decade, Muslims who trend toward radical
ideas have identified domestic and foreign factors as drivers of their radicalism. The
domestic issues included unemployment, poverty, poor economic conditions,
hopelessness, regime repression and corruption, injustice, inequality, and massive
violations of human rights including against women and minorities.
The fact that there have been changes in the regional distribution of resources by the
central governments can fuel the conflicts.
Foreign factors include perceived anti-Islamic policies by the US and other Western powers,
continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and the suppression of Palestinian human
rights and freedoms, the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, drone strikes that result in
civilian deaths, as well as western lukewarm support of democratic uprisings and coddling
of dictatorial regimes.
TERRORIST GROUPS
Many states in sub-Saharan Africa continue to face security threats from extremists, armed militias, and
international terrorist organizations. In East Africa, the most acute threat emanates from the Somali-based
terrorist organization al-Shabaab, which has demonstrated a capacity to strike beyond Somalia into
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, and has threatened attacks in Djibouti and Burundi. According to the
Terrorism Risk Index developed by the global risk advisory firm Maplecroft, Somalia is now the most at-risk
state from terrorist attacks. In 2012, this threat compelled neighboring states to take action, delivering
major blows to al-Shabaab by securing the organization's strongholds in Mogadishu and Kismayo. Other
extremist groups in East Africa include the Janjaweed, Sudan Liberation Army (SLA); the Lord's Resistance
Army in Northern Uganda, and others in Ethiopia.
Since the 1990s, Al-Qaeda has operated in the region, engaging in activities in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,
Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Kenya has been the most frequent target of Al-Qaeda attacks, and the
organization "almost certainly continues to maintain cells in Kenya." In the Sahara region itself, Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to pose a significant threat, having been forced from its traditional
base of operations along Algeria's Mediterranean coast to the Sahel region that spans Mauritania, Mali,
Chad, Niger, Senegal, and Burkina Faso. Notably, the AQIM has made significant gains in Mali, capturing,
along with other Islamist groups, the sparsely populated northern region of the state in early 2012.
Following the government's request for military assistance in January 2013, a French-led intervention has
thwarted further Islamist territorial gains and recaptured key Islamist strongholds in Mali. France is still
engaging in military operations, in tandem with Malian forces and United Nations peacekeepers. Some
experts contend AQIM is the "primary transnational terror threat in North Africa," as it is believed to have
played a role in the September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Libya, as well as in a number of
attempted attacks in Western Europe.
In West Africa, Nigeria also faces a growing number of terrorist threats, experiencing "a tremendous rise in
insurgent-related incidents in the country." The Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram, which seeks to
establish an Islamic Nigerian state, claimed responsibility for many of these attacks. The group fractured
into Boko Haram and Ansaru in 2012; both are designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the U.S.
Department of State.
The terrorist threat in Southern Africa appears less severe than in others parts of the continent. While
South Africa possesses many advantages over other African states in its capacity to combat terrorism, the
state is nonetheless "attractive to terrorists because of its superior transportation links, its infrastructure,
its international linkages, and its relative freedom of movement," as well as the "value and apparent
availability of South African passports."2
2
www.nti.org/analysis/reports/sub-saharan-africa-1540-reporting
Sub-Saharan Africa hosts two groups that are formally affiliated with al‑Qaida: al‑Qaida in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) from Algeria and al‑Shabab in Somalia. Structurally, the links between these al‑Qaidaaffiliated groups and the central organisation are difficult to establish, and many observers believe them to
be tenuous. Internal discontent over the question of affiliation with al‑Qaida—and the pursuit of a global,
jihadi agenda—has been much clearer, resulting in deep rifts and the fragmentation of both al‑Shabab and
AQIM. The AQIM splinter group, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), defined itself
explicitly in terms of a regional West African—as opposed to globalised—agenda when it split from AQIM in
mid‑2011 (both now operate in Mali). The splitting of Somalia-based Hizbul Islam from al‑Shabab in
September 2012 was fuelled by similar ideological differences.
A notable feature of Islamist militancy's role in Sub-Saharan Africa has been the ability of some groups to
take control of large expanses of territory, including towns and cities, in which they can implement their
radical ideologies. Large swathes of Somalia have been in effect administered by al‑Shabab since 2007, and
northern Mali was controlled for most of 2012 by Ansar Dine, MUJAO and AQIM. Nonetheless, these
groups have increasingly embraced an asymmetric warfare strategy against their much larger and betterequipped governmental and international adversaries, as in purely military terms Islamist militancy in Africa
does not constitute a major threat. Al‑Shabab is thought to command about 5,000 fighters, the various
militant groups in Mali probably less than a thousand each and Boko Haram perhaps a few hundred.
Most of al‑Shabab's activities are undeniably within Somalia, where the group continues to control large
areas in central and southern regions—and enforces a strict interpretation of Islamic sharia law—but has
been driven out of the Somali capital, Mogadishu, in 2011 and the southern port of Kismayu in 2012. Much
of the group's Islamist militancy is connected to Somali nationalism: al‑Shabab's attacks outside Somalia
have focused on countries contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom). These
include a double suicide bombing in Uganda's capital, Kampala, which killed 76 people watching the
football World Cup final on television in July 2010 (Uganda has contributed troops to Amisom since 2007)
and numerous attacks in northern Kenya and in Nairobi, since Kenyan troops invaded Somalia in October
2011 and thereafter joined the Amisom force. The Westgate shopping centre siege in September was the
worst terrorist attack in Nairobi since 1998, when an al‑Qaida bomb at the US embassy killed more than
200 people.
A principal focus on localised, domestic affairs also characterises most Islamist militia groups in West Africa.
Boko Haram has carried out bombings and assassinations of civilians and regional government leaders in
Nigeria's northern states with increasing frequency and intensity since 2009. In northern Mali, Ansar Dine
has sought to impose sharia law among the civilian population, capturing the city of Gao alongside MUJAO
fighters in March 2012. Although MUJAO's stated goal is the spread of jihad across a larger part of West
Africa, the group has employed the tactic of kidnapping Westerners for ransom to raise funds.
The threats to peace and security are predominantly domestic and regional
Islamist violence is a rising concern for both policymakers and general populations in Africa and on
the wider international scene. Islamist militancy in parts of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa
certainly poses a growing threat to regional stability, although characterisation of this
phenomenon as part of a unified, global threat to Western interests is misleading. African Islamist
militancy is interlinked with broader ideological currents, and all groups pursue the establishment
of an Islamic political order to achieve a quest for religious purity, but it is clear that local
concerns—especially economic factors including poverty and a lack of development—have been
more important drivers of violence. Furthermore, Islamist militants in Africa typically do not
possess great military power. The nature of their threats to domestic and regional security is
diverse: groups are structurally and politically different, and most are situated within a discrete
national context. There is a threat to Western interests, but often this arises as a result of a search
for greater recognition by groups generally more occupied with furthering local grievances. 3
Here is an interesting analysis of the situation in Nigeria and some possible solutions:
https://lobelog.com/nigerian-terrorism-causes-and-solutions/
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
The UN Security Council (UNSC) has strengthened the international legal foundation for counterterrorism
efforts by issuing numerous binding resolutions. To oversee the implementation of the bedrock
counterterrorism resolutions created after September 11, the UNSC established the Counterterrorism
Committee (CTC), and later the CTC Executive Directorate (CTED). The CTC, composed of all fifteen UNSC
members, is tasked with assessing states' efforts to implement relevant resolutions, evaluating gaps in
state capacity, and facilitating donor coordination for technical and financial counterterrorism assistance.
The CTED works to strengthen and better coordinate implementation of UNSC resolutions, as well as to
conduct country assessments and facilitate technical assistance from donor countries. Both bodies,
however, have uneven support across the UN membership. Some countries, notably those from the global
South, have considered the CTC illegitimate, given its direct mandate from the UNSC, not to mention out of
touch with countries it is responsible for assisting and with donor countries that are not on the Security
Council. Moreover, many UN member states simply give low priority to the counterterrorism agenda.
Accordingly, countries, particularly in Africa, have not met their obligations to report to the CTC or
otherwise take major steps to implement UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373.
Another UN Security Council body, the 1540 Committee, oversees the implementation of UNSCR 1540,
which legally obligates member states to prevent nonstate actors from acquiring weapons of mass
destruction. The 1540 Committee is assisted by an expert group that examines member state
implementation of the resolution.
Over the last decade terrorist groups evolved to rely less on a centrally led network and adopted a more
horizontal, nebulous, bottom up structure, increasing the difficulty of tracking and preventing terrorist acts.
Pursuant to UNSCR 1267, the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee and Monitoring Team were
created to implement and enforce this and subsequent resolutions. The committee kept a consolidated
list of individuals and entities subject to sanctions, until 2011, when the UNSC voted to separate the alQaeda and Taliban lists. However, some critics argue that the list's "name and shame" tactic has had
negligible impact given the lack of regular updates and the expansion of the list, making it an inflexible
mechanism in the face of the diffusion of al-Qaeda's hierarchy. Others have pointed to the lack of
provisions for legal due process. A resolution adopted in June 2011 allows for an ombudsman to receive
3
www.country.eiu.com/Country=Comoros&topic=Politics
delisting requests, a positive development that, nonetheless, does little to compensate for the lack of an
effective appeals mechanism.
Except for the UNSC's role in resolutions imposing sanctions, nobody is responsible for ensuring that
member states meet their commitments under UN terrorism conventions or resolutions. Although the CTC
and CTED monitor states' progress in implementing bedrock UNSC resolutions, they have no mandate to
penalize countries and have never referred a case to the UNSC.
In an effort to increase the legitimacy and add coherence to the UN's efforts, the UN General Assembly
unanimously adopted in 2006 the Global Counterterrorism Strategy(GCT). Although the GCT provides an
important normative and operational foundation for counterterrorism work at the UN, a report (PDF) by
the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation released ahead of the 2010 review conference notes
that the strategy's potential to "provide for collaborative, holistic counterterrorism efforts is either
unknown or largely overlooked beyond New York, Geneva, and Vienna." That is, it has earned little
attention or traction even among most UN member states.
The main onus of implementing the GCT is with member states, but its institutional operation is supported
by the Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF)—a partnership of bodies created by UN
secretary-general Kofi Annan in 2005, which now includes more than thirty UN entities plus INTERPOL, to
streamline and coordinate counterterrorism efforts within the UN. In addition, the CTITF has nine working
groups that focus on specific elements of the UN counterterrorism work, such as countering terrorist use of
the Internet and integrating human rights concerns. Because the CTITF is composed of representatives
from different agencies within the UN system, each agency's mandates and priorities often take
precedence, undermining the goals and effectiveness of the task force. Therefore, despite being created to
help coordinate, coherence remains elusive.
A number of regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU), African Union, and the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations, have delivered formal statements outlining their shared commitment to
counterterrorism. Although the EU has followed up on its statements with a robust counterterrorism
framework, incorporating law enforcement and judicial apparatuses like the EU judicial cooperation unit,
EUROJUST and the EU's police force, EUROPOL, other regional institutions lack capacity, funding, and
political will to aggressively pursue counterterrorism strategies. Additionally, these organizations too often
work in isolation from UN programs.4
At the multilateral level, operational assistance is undertaken by UN bodies such as the World Customs
Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, and International Maritime Organization, which
provide technical advice and training to improve border controls and port and airport security. INTERPOL
and the UN Security Council also promote coordination and information sharing among national law
enforcement agencies.
4
www.cfr.org/terrorism/global-regime-terrorism
Possible solutions:
Youth Empowerment and Poverty Reduction. The rising number of unemployed youths in West Africa
demands that concrete measures be put in place to empower the youths. This could be through
employment generation and vocational training. Governments in Africa need to create enabling
environment for the private sector to thrive in order to generate more jobs for the youths. Youths need to
be empowered through skill acquisition programmes, especially Information and Communication based. It
is also necessary to engage them in sporting actives by establishing sporting facilities in these countries.
Good Governance. Good governance is needed to off set governance failure in West Africa. There is the
need to ensure that all member states of adhere strictly to the Protocol on Democracy and Good
governance. This will minimize corruption and enthrone transparency and accountability. Good Governance
will also deliver democratic dividends to the people and reduce frustration and aggression that lead to
involvement in terrorism and criminality.
Enhanced Coordination and Collaboration. There is the need for enhanced coordination and collaboration
among states in order to defeat terrorism in Africa. In this regard Police Chiefs, Intelligence Community,
civil society and Chiefs of Defense Staff need to strengthen their collaboration and coordination in
combating terrorism in the region. Capacity Building. There is the need for capacity building for security
forces to rise up to the challenge. It is important to properly train security forces in preventing and
management of TOCs and terrorism. This could be through seminars, workshops, courses, simulation and
military manoeveurs around border areas and the West African Savana which Al-Qaeda has take as safe
havens.
The international community and partners such as the US, UK, France, China and Japan need to set up
efforts to bulding African capacity to fight TOCs and terrorism.
SOURCES AND USEFUL LINKS
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sub-Saharan_Africa
https://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/sub-saharan-africa-1540-reporting
https://www.country.eiu.com/Country=Comoros&topic=Politics
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/global-regime-terrorism/p25729#p3
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm
https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2015_RP05_sbg_web.pdf
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-partnering-counter-terrorism-africa