THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL
INSTITUTIONS ON POLICYMAKING:
A RESEARCH PROPOSAL Paper presented at the ECPR 35 th Joint Sessions of Workshops (Helsinki) Mariely López­Santana Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellow European University Institute (after January 2008 George Mason University) [email protected] Co­author: Carolina G. de Miguel Moyer Ph.D. Candidate Political Science Department University of Michigan [email protected]
1 1. INTRODUCTION Polities’ main purpose is to provide and deliver public goods and services through crafting, deciding, and implementing policies. This multi­step and multi­layered process, better known as ‘policymaking,’ is often divided among different type of actors, such as governmental bodies, agencies, and levels of government. In turn, these various actors are responsible for different tasks, including legislating and implementing, within and across policy domains (Braun, Bullinger and Wälti 2002). Given the important benefits that polities derive from dividing tasks and powers between different actors, how can states minimize the problems that arise as a consequence of these divisions? This is issue motivates this paper. We limit our definition of the policymaking process to two phases: ‘legislating’ and ‘implementing.’ 12 More specifically, we focus on those policy areas in which ‘legislating’ is the responsibility of the central government and ‘implementing’ corresponds to a lower unit of government (e.g., region, Land, autonomous community, state). 3 The reason to divide these two phases between levels of government is often functional (e.g., need of expertise), but can also be representational (e.g., checks and balances, representation of minorities). However, despite the many beneficial aspects of this division of labor, it can also have its disadvantages in terms of coordination, speed, efficiency, effectiveness, and/or control. 4 As Sundquist (1969), Jennings (1994), and Hooghe and Marks (2003) point out, dividing the policymaking process across levels of government can generate problems of coordination. Given these circumstances it is important to ask, under what conditions can polities overcome these problems? The main claim in this paper is that despite the frequent division of power in the policymaking process, polities possess a series of institutions that have the ability to bridge levels of government and, thus, have the potential to affect the degree of 1 In this paper, we rely heavily on Braun’s (2000:29) differentiation between the ‘Right­to­Decide’ (decision on what will be done: policy formulation and decision­making) and the ‘Right­to­Act’ (how it will be done: policy implementation). As Keman (2000) argues, the ‘right­to­decide’ and the ‘right­to­act’ can be organized differently in any democratic polity, independently from its federal and unitary status. 2 We acknowledge that the policymaking process includes several stages, such as problem definition, agenda­setting, policy formulation, policy adaptation, implementation and evaluation. Nonetheless, given our theoretical interest we focus on the aforementioned items. 3 This leaves out other ways of organizing the policymaking process such as shared legislative power between levels of government, shared implementation between levels of government, or only one level of government legislating and implementing on a particular policy area. 4 For example, refer to OECD (1999).
2 coordination between these levels. We call these institutions ‘intergovernmental institutions’ (IIs) because we argue that they are key to understand how governments relate to one another. Some of these institutions might have been created with the specific goal of promoting cooperation between levels of government (i.e., committees and conferences) and resolving conflicts, but some perform other functions which may affect (directly or indirectly) the way levels of governments relate to one another (i.e., the second chamber, the structure of the party systems). Based on the specific focus of this paper in the links between ‘legislating’ and ‘implementing,’ one can ask: under what conditions can these institutions bridge levels of government and promote the development of intergovernmental relations to, ultimately, implement policies efficiently? And, what is the impact of these institutions in the policymaking process? It is important to clarify that this paper represents the first step of a long­term research project. More specifically, this piece seeks to put on the table and link several bodies of work that are related to the issue of the relationship between intergovernmental institutions, policymaking, and public policy. At this point, we are mainly trying to reflect on these issues by making sense of the extensive set of arguments developed by the literature. Moreover, based on this review, we put forward a set of theoretical propositions that will guide this research project. To illustrate the points here presented, we refer to the policy area of employment policy—one in which there is a discernable demarcation between the acts of ‘legislating’ (by the central level) and ‘implementing’ (by sub national entities). Finally, since this paper is a sort of ‘research proposal,’ we conclude with a set of questions that we attempt to tackle in later extensions of this project. 2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AS A SUBJECT OF INTEREST Before developing the main ideas of this section, we must define the central object of interest and the main intervening variable in our line of argument: intergovernmental institutions (IIs). For the purpose of this project, we define IIs as the formal spaces where public and private representatives of the national and sub national levels interact and collaborate on issues and/or policies. Through consultation, collaboration, and
3 cooperation, in these spaces the involved actors might develop practical and/or ‘pseudo­ legal’ (when they are binding) responses to problems related to legislation and/or implementation. Having a place where representatives of different levels of governments can come together might help these actors to share information and intention that might help coordinate their practices and courses of actions with the purpose of implementing policies and programs in an effective and efficient way. In this way, one important consequence of IIs is that they can reduce the risks of policy contradictions and duplications. In addition, these spaces might generate new incentives for actors to cooperate even if their preferences and interests are initially opposed; thus, they might represent a scenario for conflict resolution. 5 In sum, IIs can influence the behavior of levels of government by changing people’s expectations about the consequences of their actions, by changing their preferences over outcomes in some fundamental way, or by limiting or expanding their choices (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004). In this paper, we direct our focus to one type of IIs: intergovernmental conferences (see Appendix 1), although we are also interested in how the role of political parties or the Second Chamber might interact with the work done in intergovernmental conferences to promote cooperation and solve conflict between levels of governments. Understanding the role of intergovernmental institutions is particularly relevant in some federal systems given that intergovernmental relations remain the inevitable basis for unity, as national and regional interests are often pitted against each other (Hueghlin and Fenna 2006). However, their relevance is not only limited to these particularly conflictive settings; in fact, IIs become extremely pertinent when we take into account that multiple scenarios across political systems, including both federal and unitary countries, are dependent on the existence of intergovernmental institutions that can bridge the processes of policy formulation, decision­making, and implementation. 6 For example, in most parliamentary federations, intergovernmental conferences organized by 5 When referring to the institutional design in federations, there are several models of IIs (Simeon). First, we can refer to parliamentary federations where intergovernmental relations take place between the executives of the levels of government. Thus, they emphasize “inter­state” federalism. Second, in Presidential/Congressional systems the major factors affecting intergovernmental relations are placed within Congress and in its relationship with the President. In this system, the emphasis is on “intra­state” federalism. 6 With ongoing processes of devolution and decentralization, the distinctions between federal and unitary systems are often not that clear. For instance, see Osaghae (1990).
4 the executive branch are key institutions since it is where policymaking often takes place. 7 Other important scenarios include, but are not limited to, the following cases (which are not mutually exclusive): 1) When there is no (or weak) overlap between legislative and executive branches 2) When there are weak interconnections between the central level and sub national agencies 3) When one level has the ‘Right­to­Decide’ and another has the ‘Right­to­Act’ ­­ In federations, when two levels of government act side by side (concurrency) 4) When the central government rejects ‘traditional,’ unilateral, and top­down styles of decision­making and implementation (including processes of devolution and decentralization) 8 5) When circumstances change rapidly and there is a need for quick governmental responses 6) When there are conflictive preferences between levels of government. Based on these ideas, IIs should be valuable institutions for both federal and unitary countries as in both types of systems there is an interdependence of action between central and local governments­­ the central level depends on sub national or local actors to implement policies, and in the same way the latter are dependent on national governments to direct them and/or fund their programs (Braun 2000; Keman 2000). 9 In theory, IIs should enhance the policymaking process and reduce ‘implementation deficits’ as central and sub national levels can communicate and coordinate, for example, when drafting policies. In this way, IIs can help to diminish or solve the problems that arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetrical information that are characteristic of implementation processes. 7 In most federations, the bulk of intergovernmental affairs are carried out within the executive branch. In the case of federations, this has been labeled as “executive federalism” (Watts 2006). 8 Examples of these cases are the horizontal nature of Belgian federalism (see Maarten and Tombeur 2000; Bursens 2002; Kovziridze 2002 2004; Swenden 2006) and the change to ‘new federalism’ (late 1980s and early 1990s) in Australia (Chapell 2001). 9 For an interesting discussion about the conceptual dichotomy­­ ‘federation/unitary state’­­ refer to Keman (2000).
5 Moreover, these scenarios should provide a ‘voice’ to lower tier governments in decision­making and policy formulation processes, something that is not necessarily guaranteed in unitary and federal systems. 10 For instance, in unitary systems lower levels do not have formal representation in legislatures at the central level; and in federations Second Chambers can be relatively weak 11 when it comes to representing the preferences (e.g., weak veto powers) of those sub national actors who are responsible for implementation (Swenden 2006). 12 This is especially true for Member States of the EU as the sub national units of these states are no often involved in decision­making processes at the national or the supranational levels (Börzel 2002). The study of IIs, intergovernmental relations, and policymaking are not new topics. Still, there are limited studies explicitly linking IIs, public policy and policy outcomes. 13 Moreover, as in any other areas in which scholars strive to understand the particularities of specific scenarios, many have conducted case studies which, ideally, would serve as basis to cross­national generalization. Using a cross­national approach, we aim to move back to a higher level of abstraction to understand the implications of IIs on policymaking and policy outcomes across political systems, a topic which tends to be overlooked by scholars (Swenden 2006). Finally, our study is not limited to federations, but we also include in our framework different types of unitary systems. 3. WHAT OTHERS HAVE SAID ABOUT INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS Scholars working on how divisions of powers and competencies are distributed across levels of government have spent much time classifying different types of political systems. The underlying theme behind these studies is ‘the nature of the relationship 10 For example, Braun (2000) argues that ‘voice’ might have different institutionalized forms; for example, in higher chambers and intergovernmental relations. 11 For example, in Spain and Italy the Senate is extremely weak, in France there is no general body for state­regional linkages. In Canada, Senators are appointed by the federal government. Thus, they do not play a significant role in mediating between levels of government (Simeon). In Australia, the Senate is more a partisan body (Simeon). 12 As Börzel (2002) has argued that this problem is even more salient for members of the European Union as sub­national levels of governments have not had much ‘say’ at the national and supranational levels in the creation of supranational policies and have had to ‘pay’ the costs of implementing these policies. 13 Many of these studies look at fiscal federalism and taxes, rather than looking at the scenarios where levels of government solve their problems. On this issue and the case of the United States, for example, see Krane (1993).
6 between central and sub national levels of government.’ The main claim that these authors have put on the table, which has been further emphasized by the recent revival of studies of federalism, is that not all systems are: 1) static, and/or 2) homogenous. Therefore, they urge us to distinguish between different types of institutional configurations across time and across political systems. For example, Elazar (1993:191) states, “[i]t is well known that no federal systems are identical; each has achieved its own equilibrium in division and sharing of powers.” More recently, scholars, such as Keating (1998), Braun (2000), and Keman (2000), have also made similar claims for unitary states. Students of domestic divisions of power and competencies, mainly those studying federalism, have developed a set of ‘ideal’ types, to capture in a dichotomous way the nature of the division of chores and competencies, such as: fused vs. dual or split hierarchies; administrative vs. legislative federalism; executive vs. administrative federalism; cooperative vs. dual/competitive federalism; power sharing vs. power separation; and divided vs. integrated systems. These studies are grounded in the understanding that several factors drive and explain the differences across political systems, including constitutional, functional/structural, and cultural factors. The following section reviews the literature on these issues. One way of understanding differences between systems is by exploring the role of different levels of government in the process of ‘legislating’ and ‘implementing,’ and the institutional connections between these two tasks. When referring to unitary systems, some scholars have differentiated between fused hierarchy and dual/split hierarchy systems (Braun 2000). Under the former model, which has been highly influenced by the Napoleonic prefect system, there is a formal recognition of certain discretion of local action, but under strict central control. In these systems there is a fusion of chores and competencies between different territorial levels. This means that under fused hierarchy there is need for cooperation between levels of government to develop intergovernmental relations and, ultimately, implement central policies. In contrast, under the latter model (e.g., Nordic countries, Ireland, New Zealand), the central government lacks the ‘arm at the local level,’ and it delegates the ‘Right­to­Act’ to regional and/or local
7 administrations. 14 Therefore, there is no representation of the central level at the local level. To study the particularities of federal systems, scholars have often referred to the dichotomy administrative vs. legislative federalism to depict the division of functions between governments and the division of governmental structures. More specifically, this category captures whether the level of government that is responsible for creating legislation (Right­to­Decide) is also responsible for implementing and executing policy (Right­to­Act). Under administrative federalism, policy roles are divided between levels of governments, and regional implementation of federal law is the rule, rather than the exception (Swenden 2006). In this way, the ‘Right­to­Decide’ is mainly allocated at the central level, whereas the sub national levels have the ‘Right­to­Act.’ Germany is an example of such type of system as the national level tends to created ‘framework laws’ which are implemented by the Länder. 15 Given the separation of powers and chores, in this type of systems, IIs are key institutions to overcome coordination problems and implement policy efficiently. By contrast, legislative federalism entails that the responsibility and authority to legislate, implement, and administer a given policy area is taken fully by one level of government; thus, each level is sovereign within its own policy field (Hueghlin and Fenna 2006; Swenden 2006). 16 The United States, Canada, and Australia are often cited as examples of legislative federalism. Some scholars, mostly those studying the United States, have tended to equate legislative federalism with dual federalism (vis­à­vis joint decision­making). 17 Under this model, the federal state and states’ governments operate independently in their separate spheres of power. Citing Richard Leach (1970), Rosenthal and Hoefler (1989:3) 14 When exploring different types of regionalization and decentralization, Keating (1998, chapter 5) differentiates between several types of regional governing organizations. 15 German Basic Law not only assigns legislative responsibility to the center, but also spells out how regions are involved in the process of implementation. In German this is called, Verwaltungföderalismus (Swenden 2006). 16 When talking about judicial review in federations, Halberstam (forthcoming) differentiates about vertical and horizontal federalism. In the former systems, the central level acts through the component states, and they share many powers. Thus, this category is similar to administrative federalism. In contrast, in the latter systems, the governments of the central and the component states (i.e., judicial federalism) have the ability to control a policy domain. 17 To categorize Australia, Wilkins and Saunders (200?, see Meekinson) use the label ‘co­ordinate federalism’ (which is the same as dual federalism).
8 define dual federalism as, “the national and state governments form two separate centers of power, from each of which the other is barred and between which is something like a jurisdictional no­man’s land into which both are barred from entering. Each government in its own sphere is sovereign, and there is an essential equality between them.” Similarly, to refer to the functional division of labor in federal systems, Braun, Bullinger, and Wälti (2002) have categorized Canada as a case where power is separated (power separation vs. power sharing) given that both the federal and the sub national levels have constitutionally guaranteed jurisdictional authority in a large number of policy areas and there are limited opportunities for each level of government to influence each other’s policy options. In this type of systems, intergovernmental institutions must respect “the overriding principle of accountability of executives to their respective legislatures” (Simeon 200?: 92). Nonetheless, some have argued that strict divisions of power between levels of government are often overstated as in many countries the central level often wants to have a grip on what the sub national levels do. One of the reasons is to reduce policy divergence and policy duplications. For instance, Osaghae (1990) and Hueghlin and Fenna (2006) argue that in many countries there has been a shift from legislative to administrative federalism. In Germany, for example, the national government expanded its power by increasingly listing a set of concurrent powers in the name of national unity and equity. Similarly, some have negated the existence of dual federalism by criticizing the idea that the process of policymaking can take place within separate levels of government (without any interaction between them), especially in the modern era (Boeckelman 1996). Along these lines, students of US federalism emphasized that the ‘legalistic’ approach to policymaking is not accurate as it misses out on the ‘political aspect’ of policymaking (Kincaid 1990; Zimmerman 2001). For example, in his ground breaking work on US federalism, Daniel Elazar (1964) calls attention to the existence of negotiations between policymakers and the development intergovernmental relations to point out that, in contrast to what scholars of dual federalism suggested, there are many mechanisms by which the central and the regional governments continuously exchange information and experiences (formally and informally) to collaborate and coordinate (even when a policy
9 area is a exclusive competency of one level of government). 18 Thus, these authors challenge the notions that: 1) policymaking occurs under strict separation, and 2) levels of government are eternally clashing over policy that is dominated by the national level. These types of intergovernmental dynamics have been labeled as cooperative federalism. As hinted above, the aforementioned concept emphasizes that different levels of government are interdependent to solve common problems. This line of work has often emphasized the behavioral, relational, and pragmatic aspect of the decision­making and implementation, instead of ‘rigid’ institutional structures (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). For instance, Kincaid (1990:141) contends that cooperative federalism could be seen as “a pragmatic middle ground between reform and reaction that would not destroy the states but will still lower their resilience from constitutionally coordinated policies to more congenial laboratories of democracies and administrators of national policy.” Thus, cooperative federalism points at the mechanisms, institutions (such as IIs), and the ability of ‘national­sub national’ intergovernmental problem solving and conflict resolution. Some authors have further emphasized the ‘congenial’ aspect of decision­making in some states by arguing that some systems are more based on consensus­seeking and cooperation (vis­à­vis conflict) than others. Recently, students of federalism have started to emphasize the concepts of ‘hierarchy’ and ‘interdependence’ to explain why we see different types of outcomes across systems (Börzel 2001; Kovziridze 2002; Swenden 2006; López­Santana 2006). 19 For instance, by studying Germany and Spain, Börzel (1999) differentiates between cooperative federalism and competitive regionalism. Based on her argument Germany, as well as Austria, are countries in which the behavior of the 18 Some authors have emphasized that after the 1950s (mainly during the years of the Civil Rights Movement and the Great Society) in the US there was a shift from dual federalism to cooperative federalism. Within this literature, this move usually entails a shift towards centralization. For example, see Rosenthal and Hoefler (1989), Kincaid (1990), and Agranoff (2001). By using a legalistic approach, Halberstam and Hills argue that since 1942 (after Wickard and Filburn) the US Constitution has not reserved much exclusive jurisdictions to state governments to legislate without federal interference (160). Others have taken a radical stance by arguing that dual federalism is a myth (Fritscheler and Segal 1972). 19 Kovziridze (2002:131) defines these concepts in the following way: “Hierarchy represents a vertically organized multi­level structure of dependence of lower levels on upper ones, which is characterized by a highly asymmetrical distribution of resources, and in which the levels are linked with each other through control and supervision from above. Interdependence is a structure of vertical or horizontal mutual dependence within which the entities are dependent on the exchange of symmetrically or asymmetrically distributed resources of each other in order to achieve final goals.”
10 regions towards the central state is based on a collective understanding of multilateral bargaining. 20 Therefore, in this type of system, consensus­seeking and joint­decision making tends to be the rule. 21 She argues, for example, that in Germany Court rulings are an exception, as conflict resolution relies on intergovernmental negotiations and agreements. In contrast, the author contends, in Spain, Italy and Belgium the collective understanding of the sub national levels about the behavior to the central state is based on competition and confrontation, rather than on cooperation and the development of intergovernmental relations. This understanding of intergovernmental relations is a behavioral account, grounded in collective ‘cultural’ differences. Börzel (2002) argues that German cooperative federalism has its roots in collective shared ideas and values, which can be traced back to the Holy Roman Empire. Others authors, such as Elazar (1966) and Rosenthal and Hoefler (1989), have emphasized the politico­cultural aspect by pointing at ‘the people’ and ‘civil society’ as key factors to explain and understand the existence and maintenance of cooperative federalism. 22 Finally, among those have emphasized the importance of intergovernmental relations, there is an understanding that these dynamics are very fluid and different from country to country (Meekison 200?). Among those clear varying patterns of IIs and intergovernmental relations (e.g., degree of formalization and institutionalization, balance between executive and legislative intergovernmentalism), some have paid special attention to the balance of power between levels of government. More specifically, these authors have differentiated between systems in which: 1) there is a clear hierarchy of superior and inferior governments, and 2) both entities tend to be considered equal to each other (i.e., a model of partnership) (Kovziridze 2002; Swenden 2006; López­ Santana 2006; Simeon 200?). Thus, this type of analysis pays special attention to the ‘nature of intergovernmental relations’ in states. 20 For an account of cooperative federalism in Germany and the United States, refer to Halberstam and Hills (2002). 21 For example, Scharpf (1988) is mainly describing this issue when he talks about the ‘joint­decision trap’ in Germany. 22 For instance, Elazar (1993:192) argues that the cooperative model stands in contrast to the hierarchical model, “in which the state stands above middle­and lower­level governments (or most frequently, "authorities," with the term "government" confined to the state alone as the expression of sovereign power in the civil society), and the people, who are, in effect, underneath the pyramid.”
11 As hinted by the literature on the shift from ‘separation to interdependence,’ popularized by the ‘layer and marble cake’ metaphor, capturing where and how intergovernmental relations take place has increasingly become a key underlying topic for scholars of federalism, regionalization, devolution, and decentralization. 23 This shift to ‘interdependence’ has pushed governments to ‘add­on’ intergovernmental mechanisms and institutions (Simeon 200?). Nonetheless, scholars have tended to avoid cross­ national and systematic discussions of these institutions and their connections to policymaking, the content of policy, and policy change. 24 The goal in this project is to establish these connections. By theorizing about intergovernmental relations, we adopt a middle­of­the­road approach between a purely behavioral view and a rigid institutionalist approach (see above). On the one hand, we challenge the notion that countries can be characterized as ‘cooperative’ or ‘competitive’ in their intergovernmental relations as if these were long­term cultural patterns that apply to all policy domains and IIs in a country across time. 25 On the other hand, we also refuse the idea that it is all about formal institutions and that these define the interests of actors at each moment of time, independent of any cultural differences. We take a position that is closer to the institutionalist approach, but we pay attention to the practices that might emerge from the incentives generated by certain institutional structures. We also argue that the effect of these institutions on intergovernmental relations and policymaking might vary across policy domains depending on the nature of the policy and the actors involved at each moment. 4. DO INTERGOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS MAKE A DIFFERENCE? HOW AND WHY?: SOME THEORETICAL SPECULATIONS “Coordination problems originate in the unwillingness or inability of policy makers to develop policy in a rationally comprehensive manner” (Jennings 1994: 53). Jennings’s point is directly applicable to the consequences of the gaps between ‘legislating’ and ‘implementing.’ This problem is more acute when policymaking is divided across levels 23 Some, such as Simeon, have argued that overlapping and interdependence defines modern times. Börzel (1999 2001) and Swenden (2006) are the exception. 25 Along these lines, Kincaid (200?, see Meekinson) argues that intergovernmental relations in the US can be at one cooperative, conflictual, competitive, collusive, and coercive.
24 12 of governments than when it is concentrated on one level of government. This is because two different governments can have different information or understandings on what the common goal is, or can even have different goals and, thus, different preferences about what needs to be done. In addition, when power is formally diffused across levels of government, sub national entities might be hesitant to simply ‘absorb’ central policies; therefore, implementation is not automatic task, but a political one. Coordination in the first scenario might be easier to overcome than in the second one (an asymmetry in information seems easier to solve than a difference in interests or preferences), but in any case we argue that certain institutions can help bridge these gaps between actors, even when two levels of government have a divergence of preferences regarding a policy goal. Intergovernmental conferences allow for the possibility of interaction, bargaining and negotiation between levels of government governments. Thus, cooperation it is not only a ‘national­sub national’ matter, but it can also involve the development of intra­ governmental (‘sub national­sub national’) relations. As Jennings (1994: 53) says, “it is crucial to move away from the conception that coordination occurs only when there is central direction. It can also be a product of interaction, bargaining and negotiation among autonomous organizations.” The mere existence of these intergovernmental conferences can help overcome communication or informational asymmetries and, thus, promote coordination. The question is whether IIs can solve coordination problems derived from a divergence of interests between the actors involved. Among other factors, it depends on the character of these intergovernmental conferences and the actors involved (Swenden 2006; Meekison 200?), as well as on the role of other intergovernmental institutions (e.g., role of Second Chamber, political parties, the party system). The following paragraphs try to unpack the potential influence of these institutions in policymaking. More specifically, we look at two dimensions: speed of implementation and policy divergence. Before moving into this section, it is important to note that although minimal coordination is necessary to produce good policy (and, thus, the concern of our paper in figuring out when that is possible), it is also the case that perfect coordination is not always desirable and that divergence in implementation (if not speed in implementation) might be a positive thing. In this way, we do not want to make
13 a normative argument about whether coordination is good or bad, but rather explore the influence of IIs and their links to policymaking. How and why? One of the key questions when examining IIs is how these institutions might affect policymaking, policy change, and the content of policy. In this section, we are interested in pointing at a set of scenarios (dependent variables) where IIs might make a difference. Furthermore, we will generate a set of testable hypotheses about how IIs can influence these cases. These hypotheses will guide future extensions of this project. As stated in the introduction, the paper uses the case of employment policy as an example to illustrate the claims and hypotheses here presented. The case of employment policy is an excellent scenario to study the influence of IIs on policymaking, policy change and the content of policy as in most countries there is a clear demarcation between the ‘Right­to­Decide’ and the ‘Right­to­Act’ (the same is true for education policy and training policies—policy areas that frequently go hand in hand with employment policies). In this case, in unitary as well as in federal systems, the ‘Right­to­ Decide’ mostly remains at the central level and sub national entities are responsible for implementing policies within the limits of the framework established by the national government (see, for example, Battaglini and Giraud 2003, Obinger, Leibfried and Castles 2005). With ongoing processes of devolution and decentralization of employment policies in both types of systems the need to establish efficient connections between levels of government has become evident (OECD 1999). Below we will touch on these issues. Speed of implementation In theory, we would expect for intergovernmental conferences to affect the ‘speed of implementation’ (defined as the lapse of time between a law is created at the national level and then it is converted into sub national practices/organizations). Nonetheless, these institutions could have both positive and negative effects on ‘how fast’ policies are implemented by sub national entities.
14 One type of argument is grounded in the assumption that intergovernmental conferences promote ‘national­sub national coordination,’ as well as ‘sub national­sub national coordination.’ More specifically, if: 1) the central level uses this type of institution to guide the sub national units as to how to implement policies, and/or 2) sub national entities can exchange ideas and practices as how to implement these policies in this space (Walker 1969; Grey 1973), we will expect for implementation to be faster when these conditions are met. For example, if governments use these spaces to provide active guidance on how to implement framework laws on reforming employment benefits and systems, it could be argued that sub national actors will have a better idea about how to go about implementation. Consequently, given the spaces and opportunities provided by intergovernmental conferences, they can act more rapidly and with more precision than if they did not actively interact with their peers in the intergovernmental conferences. To explain the speed of implementation, we should not only take into account the dichotomy ‘presence/absence’ of intergovernmental conferences as the existence of these institutions does not necessarily guarantee their effectiveness at promoting coordination. For this reason, in order to speed up the process of implementation, intergovernmental conferences should not only be present, but they should also support the development of intergovernmental relations. As Börzel argues (1999: 84), “[t]he participation in the formulation and decision­making stage offers the possibility to allocate implementation costs between two levels.” In this way, concrete way to rephrase the former hypotheses is: in countries where levels of government actively use intergovernmental conferences to coordinate their actions (i.e., link legislations with implementation), we would expect for implementation to be faster than in countries where these relationships are weak (or absent). Alternatively, in countries where intergovernmental conferences are absent or weak, implementation might take longer than in countries where intergovernmental relations are institutionalized through intergovernmental conferences and actively developed. The former hypotheses are not only applicable to domestic politics, but in the case of the European Union (EU), they are also appropriate to speculate about cross­national rates of compliance with EU mandates. Since transposition is frequently done through
15 administrative channels, thus it is not necessarily a ‘legislative activity’ dominated by Parliaments (Steunenberg 2007), it could be argued that in Member States where intergovernmental conferences promote the development of intergovernmental relations, transposition should not take as long as in countries where these institutions are absent or weakly developed. 26 The idea is that IIs can provide an active ‘say’ (voice) to sub national entities in the process of implementation of supranational mandates—an atypical scenario given that sub national units (with the exception of the German Länder and the Belgian Regions) do not tend to be present in decision­making processes at the supranational or the national level (Börzel 2002). 27 Nevertheless, the aforementioned arguments could be assessed from another perspective which points at the potential negative influence of intergovernmental conferences on the speed of implementation. More specifically, the former expectations of intergovernmental conferences are grounded in the understanding that these institutions do promote cooperation and the development of intergovernmental relations. In addition, they are based in a model in which sub national units are mainly managers of policies created by the national level. Alternatively, even if sub national units are not key actors in policy formulation and decision­making processes, they can be ‘veto’ actors when it comes to working out the details of how national framework law is implemented. In systems where ‘joint­decision making’ tends to be the rule (e.g., Germany, Belgium), sub national levels are veto actors as they have the capacity to obstruct the policymaking process and, thus, potentially bloc policy change. Based on the former points, it could be hypothesized that in countries where ‘joint­decision making’ tends to be the rule, intergovernmental conferences can slow down (or block) processes of implementation if there is a clash of preferences and interests between the national and the sub national levels because it provides a space for 26 A high percentage of transposition in the national policy arena occurs through the executive not through the legislative branch (Steunenberg 2007). And in cases in which the legislative branch was involved it was through the creation of framework laws, which often give governments or ministries with broad policy­making power. In this way, ‘transposition’ is often taking place in IIs. 27 Börzel (2002) argues that sub national units have to ‘pay’(implement) the costs of implementing the supranational project, without having a ‘say’ in decision­making processes at the national or the supranational levels.
16 sub national actors to act (express) on their preferences.. 28 In these scenarios, sub national entities might not accept the national level pushing its preferred policies to them as they are mainly responsible for putting in practice these policies. For instance, in this type of system, if the central level passes a law on the reform of employment services and benefits, and sub national entities do not agree with them (because, for example, the reforms are too costly, unpopular, or uncertain), it is very likely that implementation will be a lengthy (or an unlikely) process. In this way, the presence of intergovernmental conferences does not necessarily promote cooperation between levels of government, but to a forum for active confrontation between them, which consequently can lead to ‘gridlock.’ As Watts (2006:342) argues, “In such federations as Australia, Canada, Germny, and India frequent meetings of officials, ministers, and first ministers are particularly important providing institutional processes for consultation, negotiation, cooperation, and on occasion joint projects. On the other hand, sometimes these meetings are also the arena for intergovernmental confrontation and conflict.” We can apply this proposition to the ‘three­level game’ of the EU. In the process of implementing supranational mandates, intergovernmental conferences may provide a forum for sub national entities to bloc policymaking. Consequently, in these scenarios, the existence of these IIs might delay the transposition of EU mandates and their implementation. For instance, some have argued (Kerremas 2000) that Belgium’s compliance problems and ‘implementation deficits’ are explained by the fact that the Regions in this country are veto actors. Thus, the national level cannot impose a set of supranational policies onto the Belgian federated entities (López­Santana 2006). Alternatively, in some countries, national levels might choose to control the process of transposition and the creation of basic rules for implementation; consequently, this might speed up the process of implementation of EU mandates as sub national levels do not have an active opportunity to bloc the process. These hypotheses point the possibility that the direction of the effect of IIs on the speed of implementation is partly dependent on how sub­national levels are organized and how much power they have. In some systems (probably in unitary systems since sub 28 When referring to policy change, Swenden (2006: 211) argues that “where intergovernmental relations are frequent and provide the regions with a collective or individual veto right, the risk of policy gridlock is high and the capacity for policy change is relatively small.”
17 national actors should not be veto actors) IIs are more likely to speed up implementation, than in other others (where sub national actors are veto actors). Thus, in these scenarios, ‘IIs’ is an intervening variable, not the main driving factor. Implementation deficits and policy variation Many authors have pointed to the fact that weak connections between processes of decision­making and implementation have often led sub units to implementation deficits or sub national levels implementing different types of policies across the territory. 29 In the latter case, if these policy variations do not diverge greatly from the policy’s original purpose, they could be beneficial as they can allow for experimentation, innovation, and a ‘race to the top’ (Hayek 1945; Kollman, Miller, and Page 2000; Mossenberg and Hale 2002). Nonetheless, implementation disparities across sub units can pose a serious threat to the unity of a polity as governments are supposed to treat their citizens in the same way, independently from where they are located. For instance, based on the principles of social protection, welfare clients should have the same type of unemployment benefits across jurisdictions. Hence, it is not uncommon for sub national units to neglect issues of social equity by implementing different types of programs and benefits for the unemployed and the inactive population across units. States often have different levels of unemployment benefits and training programs for the inactive population. For example, Obinger, Castles, and Leibfried (2005: 2) state, “in federal polities, citizens within the same federal state will enjoy and experience different benefits and burdens.” This, in turn, can trigger hostilities, ‘race to the bottom’ and clients ‘voting with their feet’ (Peterson 1995). Intergovernmental conferences where intergovernmental relations are actively promoted can reduce this problem as: 1) the central level can guide, direct and monitor the sub national units as to what are the ‘limits’ of a policy area, and 2) sub national policymakers can learn about the peers about the type of policies that they (will) implement. In this way, regions might be left with less capacity for autonomous action. Thus, the existence of intergovernmental conferences in a state can reduce 29 For example, refer to Börzel (2002); Braun, Bullinger and Wättli (2002); Battaglini and Giraud (2003); Trechsel (2005); Swenden (2006).
18 implementation deficits and policy variations. In contrast, in states where intergovernmental conferences are non existent (or weak), implementation deficits and policy variation across sub units might be a common phenomenon. WHAT IS NEXT? SOME ISSUES ON THE TABLE As stated in the first section, the goal of this paper is to put on the table a set of issues about IIs and intergovernmental relations to help us think about their implications for policymaking and policy change. Since this is the first step of a long term research project, we would like to conclude this paper by putting on the table a set of questions (directed to the discussant and the readers of this paper). The main goal of these questions is to get some suggestions about how to convert the theoretical propositions here presented into empirics. In addition, with the goal of fully taking advantage of your comments, we put forward some possible ways on how to test our propositions. Propositions: 1) Are there any other ways in which IIs can affect policymaking and the content of policy? 2) Is “coordinated action” adequately captured by speed and heterogeneity of policy implementation? Data and measurements: 1) Are there any data available that allow us to test our propositions? 2) If not, how can we measure? a. Speed of implementation (a possibility could be using data on transposition of EU mandates) b. Policy variation c. Another possibility: policy duplication Some other issues: 1) What is the best way to gather data on intergovernmental institutions? Concern: many of these institutions are informal in nature which makes the task of gathering data more complicated
19 Appendix 1—Some Cross­National Intergovernmental Institutions 30 COUNTRY NAME Landeshauptmänner Austria Landesamdirektoren Landesreferenten Spain Conferencias Sectoriales Belgium Intergovernmental Concertation Committee Interministerial Conferences Coordinating Committee UK Joint Ministerial Committee Germany 31 Prime Ministers Conference or Conference of Ministers­ Presidents Consultative Council TYPE Interministerial conferences Level of civil servants Between regions (all of them) High­ranking officials and executive representatives of the central and regional governments Top­level: Compromises federal Prime Minister, 6 federal ministers, and 6 ministers representing the Communities and the Regions (equal number Wallons and Flemish) Joins the prime­ministers of the federal and the federated levels competent for the policy field or issue involved. Other competent ministers and experts are allowed to go to these conferences An intergovernmental discussion forum, serves a space for meeting and exchange between representatives of different levels of government Brings together the relevant ministers of the central and each of the devolved authorities to discuss matters of common interest Brings together the Federal Chancellor and the regional Premiers At the Bundesrat. It is composed of 16 plenipotentiaries representing Land interests (vis­à­vis the Federation) Switzerland Expert Committees 30 31 From, Watts (1999), Meekinson (200?), Dumont et al. (2006), and Swenden (2006), Swenden (2006) differentiates between Switzerland and Germany and the rest as these countries have ‘representative second chambers.’
20 Australia Canada Council of Australian Governments The Leaders’ Forums Ministerial Councils Intergovernmental Committees and Taskforces Framework for Improving Social Unions for Canadians Ministerial Councils First Ministers’ Conference Annual Premiers’ Conference Meetings of Officials Oversee collaborative processes. Brings together the Prime Minister, the State Premiers, the Chief Ministers, and the President of the Local Government Association. One of its main goals is to increase cooperation among governments in the national interest Only State premiers and Territory chief ministers Less formal than the other institutions To foster federal­provincial cooperation, collaboration, and information­sharing; includes dispute­resolution mechanisms Meetings of ministers, sometimes federal­provincial­territorial, sometimes provincial­ territorial A gathering of provincial premiers and Prime Ministers An association of provinces and territories, supported by civil servants More informal than the other institutions
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