International Journal of Public Opinion Research Vol. 2 No. 2
0954-2892/90 $3.00
ATTITUDES TOWARDS
DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA
DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD
Edgardo Catterberg
ABSTRACT
Transitions to democracy are good settings to observe possible changes of beliefs, attitudes and values. This paper analyzes shifts in democratic beliefs during Argentine
political transition towards democracy. Through the analysis of different surveys in the
period 1982-8 diverse patterns concerning two sets of democratic attitudes were
observed. Those dealing with participatory democracy proved to be not only highly supported but also stable throughout the period. On the other hand the libertarian orientations exhibit lower consensus and proved to be much more unstable. They grew at the
beginning of the transition but later a regression to pre-transition levels took place, associated with the increase of socio-economic discontent. Also a relationship between less
libertarian democratic attitudes and lower socio-economic levels was observed.
The findings call into question the socialization effects of democratic institutions
during relatively short periods in a context of economic crisis and rising discontent.
The relationship between a democratic political culture and a democratic regime
is a recurrent theme in the classic political literature. For thinkers like Montesquieu, Rousseau and de Tocqueville, the spreading of democratic values and
beliefs in society as a whole seemed necessary to support attitudes and patterns
of behavior that would uphold the consolidation of democratic institutions. Perhaps the most illustrative example of this view is de Tocqueville's (p. 303)
famous assertion that 'What renders Americans particularly able to bear the rule
of democracy is a set of common practices.'
This view also assumes that in stable democracies these cultural attitudes are,
to a large extent existent prior to democratic institutions or, at least, developed at
the same time. However, the rapid consolidation of new democratic systems
after the Second World War showed that transitional political processes not only
imply the establishment of a new type of regime, but also significant changes in
other spheres of society. This includes the development of democratic cultural
© World Association for Public Opinion Research iggo
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
attitudes arising from new political structures. Cases such as the Federal Republic of Germany or Spain show that the mere act of replacing totalitarian or authoritarian systems by democratic institutions may encourage the emergence of
significant changes in the beliefs of the people. (See Verba, 1965; Conradt, 1980;
Herz, 1982; Lopez Pintor, 1982.) Political transition implies a growing acquaintance with the new regime; as Rustow (1970) maintains, 'the acceptance of these
rules is logically a part of the transition process itself rather than a prerequisite of
that process'. It is on the basis of these contentions that relevant changes in the
population's political attitudes may be expected during the Argentine transition
in the aftermath of the Malvinas War of 1982. The democratic transition in
Argentina was preceded by a cultural heritage whereby political experience with
military governments, characterized by authoritarian procedures, demobilization attempts and discrediting political activity in general—has met with the experience resulting from long populist periods distinguished by the presence of
massive political mobilization and charismatic leadership.
Raul Alfonsin, the first constitutional president of the democratic transition,
expressed his awareness regarding the nature of Argentina's political culture—
which proved to be unfavorable for democracy in the past—and the need to
introduce changes in that culture in order to facilitate and strengthen the emergence of democratic political structures.' The Government of the Radical party
has reinstated the rule of law, the system of public liberties and political participation, in virtue of which a sequence of electoral acts have taken place since
1983: parliamentary elections in 1985; legislative and provincial elections in
1987, and the presidential elections in 1989. At the same time, Alfonsin's
government suffered a number of economic failures that have led to growing discontent in the population and to defeat by the Peronists in the elections of 1987
and 1989. In order to secure the cultural bases of the political system, new democratic structures would have to operate within a context characterized by the
confluence of a cultural legacy scarcely favorable to democracy and growing economic difficulties. The impact of this context may be observed through a sequence of measurements regarding attitudes of support for democracy studied
since the beginning of transition.2
1
Raul Alfonsin, speech delivered at the Plenary Session of Delegates to the National Committee of the
Radical Party, Buenos Aires, Parque None, December 1985.
2
This paper is based upon a set of dita taken from several opinion polls carried out by IPSA, the SIP (Secretariat of Public Information, dependent upon the Presidency of the Nation) and E S T U D I O S .
The purpose and aims of these surveys vary according to time and institutional context, but all of them share
a common theoretical framework and a similar methodological approach, due to the fact that they were all
carried out by the author of the present paper.
Information obtained from surveys carried out by IPSA consists of:
Two surveys in greater urban centers, the first in May-June 1982 (1,700 interviews), the second in May
1983 (1,800 cases).
These two studies employed probabilistic multi-stage sampling procedures.
Information obtained through the SIP consisted of five surveys carried out in large urban centers, in May
DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD
157
T H E T W O I D E A L S OF D E M O C R A C Y
The idea of democracy has historically included two main streams of thought:
one of them, mainly Anglo-Saxon, stresses the libertarian ideal; the other one, of
continental origins, emphasizes the idea of egalitarianism (Sabine, 1952). The
former view, appearing alongside the Puritan Revolution, with demands for
greater religious tolerance, associates freedom with tolerance and the recognition
of political minorities. From that point on, a number of political institutions (like
Parliament and the Judiciary) have developed in order to secure those liberties.
This viewpoint has stressed the separation of Church and State, and has underscored the difference between public and private interests, which has led to a
clearly protective stance, mainly in connection with coercian as wielded from
political power (Sartori, 1962). On the other hand, the egalitarian doctrine has
stressed the notion of citizenship, which regulates the rights and duties of individuals vis-a-vis political power in a uniform manner. The extension of citizenship has basically meant the denial of adscriptive privileges. The concept of
political egalitarianism has reached its greatest institutional expression in universal suffrage.
From a historical perspective, political democracy has combined both traditions, the libertarian and the egalitarian ideals. Extending universal suffrage and
citizenship has been strongly linked to freedom of association, development of
political parties and respect for minorities and their different types of expression.
From a political viewpoint, democracy as a political system is characterized by
those two dimensions, taking into account the philosophical principles already
mentioned. According to Robert Dahl (1972), poliarchies are political regimes in
which competitive politics and inclusiveness are both strongly built in political
devices and institutionalized phenomena.
Beliefs linked to these dimensions have been seen as relevant factors for the
endurance of a democratic system (Griffith et al., 1956; Prothro and Grigg, i960;
Dahl, 1972). People's ideas about democracy are hardly irrelevant to the stability
of a political regime based upon democratic institutions. Undoubtedly, a complex set of routines and norms comes between people's beliefs and the traits of
the political regime, but it is difficult to imagine that an actively anti-democratic
society could coexist with a democratic regime. As Dahl (1972, p. 126) points
out, 'It seems evident that individuals' beliefs influence collective actions, and
1984 (1,984 cases), April 1985 (1,500 cases), August 1985 (1,500 cases), April 1986 and September 1986 (1,800
cases). Data gathered through ESTUDIOS came from three surveys in great urban centers carried out in
April, May, and June 1988 with 2,000 cases in each survey.
Samples corresponding to SIP and ESTUDIOS surveys followed probabilistic procedures for the selection
of square-blocks and the quota system for the age and sex of the respondents.
All surveys mentioned above applied structured questionnaires, and the interviews took place in the respondents' homes.
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
TABLE I
Participative pro-democratic attitudes
May
1982
May
1983
May
1984
April
1985
August April
198s
1986
(percentage)
'The best political system is
one based on periodical
elections'
(agreement)
70
79
83
n.a.
n.«.
'In Argentina only educated
people should be allowed
to vote'
(disagreement)
n.a.
rLa.
77
76
76
Sept.
1986
May
1988
June
1988
84
82
80
79
72
71
n.a.
77
Source: Surveys carried out in greater urban centers by IPSA (1982-3), SIP (1984 through 1986) and E S T U DIOS (1988), see footnote 2.
hence the structure and functioning of institutions and systems'. Dahl (1972,
p. 130) also states that 'to believe in the institutions of polyarchy means to
believe, at the very least, in the legitimacy of both public contestation and participation. In practice, these two dimensions of polyarchy are somewhat independent not only historically, but also as beliefs.'
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ABOUT THE ARGENTINE
CASE
In Argentina a difference in the degree of support bestowed upon participative
and libertarian values is verified, with a greater attachment to the former than to
the latter. The extensive consensus to participative values is clearly reflected in
the fact that three fourths of the population support the universal vote and periodical elections as bases for the political system. These attitudes—which according to our data existed prior to the transition—became stronger in 1983, when an
'opening' in political life took place during the final stages of the military regime
(Table 1).
In contrast to participatory dimensions, libertarian aspects of democracy
receive a lower level of support from society on the whole. Actually, agreement
with indicators such as tolerance of democracy, opposition to a one-party
system, rejection of government control over the press and respect for minorities, hardly exceed on the average 50 per cent of the replies. In these cases, an
increase in pro-democratic attitudes during the 'opening up' of the authoritarian
regime was also verified. However, between 1984 and 1988, a regression to pretransition levels took place—as occurs with acceptance of a multi-party system
or of levels even lower than those observed in pre-transition years, such as
'respect for minorities' and 'democratic tolerance' (Table 2). In short, the popu-
DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD
TABLE 2
159
Libertarian pro-democratic attitudes
May
1982
May
1983
May
1984
April
ig8$
August April
'9*5
/9S6
(percentage)
Sept.
1986
May
1988
June
1988
'Democracy is dangerous
because it may bring
about disorder and
disorganization'
(disagreement)
n.a.
n.a.
69
67
65
67
63
54
52
'Majorities are entitled to
deny the rights of
minorities'
(disagreement)
58
63
81
n.a.
n.a.
51
50
n.a.
n.a.
'The Government has the
right to control the press'
(disagreement)
42
57
48
54
51
57
52
n.a.
n.a.
'The country would be
better off with a oneparty political system'
(disagreement)
58
64
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
67
59
n.a.
60
Source: Surveys carried out by IPSA in greater urban centers by IPSA (1982-3), SIP (1984 through 1986) and
E S T U D I O S (1988), see footnote 2.
lation support for participatory aspects of democracy is not only greater than
support for liberties or freedom, but also proves to be more stable over time.
Analyzing how pro-participative attitudes were socially distributed in recent
years shows how wide support of these dimensions is in every social strata. This
trend has not changed significantly over time. In contrast, when indicators of
pluralism and tolerance are involved there is a clear association between socioeconomic levels and pro-democratic attitudes. Lower sectors of the population
show less consensus than the middle and higher sectors regarding the latter
dimensions of democracy. This association persisted throughout the transition
period without significant changes. However, some indicators of undemocratic
attitudes seem to increase in lower and marginal sectors of the population.
Regarding respect for political minorities, after a wide consensus was observed
in all social sectors at the beginning of the transition, non-libertarian attitudes
gained strength in those strata towards 1986 (Table 3).
When the 'education' factor is introduced and the 'socio-economic level' controlled, 'education' was seen to have a strong effect on the pro- or antidemocratic attitudes of the libertarian dimension. This not only means that the
most educated people within each social stratum are more democratic, but also
that attitudinal differences due to social conditions decline significantly given
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
TABLE 3 Socio-economic level and attitudes towards democracy
Socio-economic level
Lorn
Upper
'The best political system is one based on
periodical elections' (April 1988)
Democratic attitude
Anti-democratic attitude
'Democracy is dangerous because it may
bring about disorder and disorganization
(April 1988)
Democratic attitude
Anti-democratic attitude
'The country would be better off with a oneparty political system' (June 1988)
Democratic attitude
Anti-democratic attitude
Lowstrucunstructured/
marginal
Middle tured
(percentagt)
89
7
80
73
11
11
16
82
68
IS
29
53
43
38
54
85
77
60
13
20
32
39
49
87
Source: Surveys carried out by ESTUDIOS in greater urban centers (1988), see footnote 2.
similar levels of education. The strong association between democratic attitudes
and education level reaches its peak when indicators of tolerance and pluralism
are considered. However, that correlation may also be verified regarding participative attitudes, although in this case it is not as strong as in the first (Table 4).
Evidence gathered from the Argentine case parallels associations described by
Lipset (1963) and Germani (1966) linking anti-libertarian attitudes to a socioeconomic level: according to these authors, those attitudes become more frequent as the socio-economic condition of the population declines. Lipset (1963)
also contends that this correlation is to a large degree linked to 'education', this
factor being generally associated with a lower status. In his book Political Man,
he states that 'the degree of formal education, itself closely correlated with social
and economic status, is highly correlated with undemocratic attitudes' (1963,
p. 101).
Attachment to democratic values is also related to discontent: people expressing a stronger disappointment with the situation tend to exhibit weaker democratic attitudes than those who are satisfied. The link between discontent and
weaker democratic commitments is stronger when 'tolerance' is involved than
DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD
TABLE
l6l
4 Education level and attitudes toward democracy according to socio-
economic level
'Democracy is dangerous because it may bring about disorder and disorganization'
(Agreement - Anti-democratic attitude)
Socio-economic level
Upper
LowMiddle
structured
(percentage)
16
27
32
n.a.
n.a.
47
30
35
37
3°
33
16
18
3i
15
12
n.a.
n.a.
Lowunstructuredj
marginal
42
Educational level
Primary
Incomplete Secondary
Complete Secondary
Incomplete university
Complete university
42
49
39
n.a.
n.a.
'The country would be better off with a one-party political system'
(Agreement - Anti-democratic attitude)
Socio-economic level
Upper
Lowstructured
Middle
{percentage)
Lomunstructuredj
marginal
8
23
3°
45
n.a.
40
25
39
38
34
10
26
8
5
13
25
17
45
49
45
n.a.
n.a.
Educational level
Primary
Incomplete Secondary
Complete Secondary
Incomplete university
Complete university
n.a.
n.a.
Source: Survey carried out by ESTUDIOS in greater urban centers (April 1988), see footnote 2.
when participative attitudes are considered. On the other hand, democratic intolerance seems to be more determined by discontent with the country's situation as a whole than by personal dissatisfaction. This relationship becomes
particularly relevant due to the strong increase of discontent throughout the
transition period (Tables 5 and 6).
The uneven support given to participative and libertarian dimensions clearly
z
H
m
50
Z
3
TABLE 5
'The best political
system is the one
based upon
periodical elections'
' The country's situation
'/ am satisfied wtth my
'/« Argentina life is very
is improving little by little' present standard of living' hard'
'From an economic point
of view, I am able to
manage'
'Fortunately, , / am able to
indulge in small pleasures'
O
c
r
Total
Satisfaction
Discontent
Agreement
80
86
78
84
Disagreement
12
8
13
8
6
9
N.A.
z
The relationship between discontent and participative attitudes
Satisfaction Discontent
(percentage)
Satisfaction
79
84
79
U
10
13
9
13
6
8
7
8
Satisfaction
Discontent
Discontent
Satisfaction
Discontent
O
TJ
C
75
87
75
03
10
14
9
"4
n
6
11
4
11
O
Source: Survey carried out in greater urban centers by E S T U D I O S (April 1988), see footnote 2.
O
z
50
m
73
n
X
opi
2
o
n
7)
TABLE 6 The relationship between discontent and libertarian attitudes
PI
Z
'Democracy is
dangerous because it
may bring about
disorder and
disorganization'
' The country's situation
'I am satisfied mth my
'In Argentina life is very
is improving little by little' present standard of Irving' hard'
'From an economic point
of view, I am able to
manage'
'Fortunately, I am able to
indulge in small pleasures'
~
50
Total
Satisfaction
Discontent
Satisfaction
Discontent
Satisfaction Discontent
(percentage)
Satisfaction
Discontent
Satisfaction
Discontent
Agreement
41
29
46
37
43
34
37
32
49
Disagreement
54
67
50
60
52
61
60
47
46
65
46
5
4
4
3
5
5
3
7
3
5
N.A.
*"
£
Source: Survey carried out in greater urban centers by ESTUDIOS (April 1988), ice footnote 2.
Z
^
H
X
PI
90
—
z
H
o
z
o
a
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
FIGURE I Typology of individuals regarding their
orientation toward democratic dimensions.
Participation
Yes
Yes
No
Democrats
Elitists
5*%
5%
Populists
Authoritarians
35%
8%
Tolerance
No
Source: Survey carried out in greater urban centers by ESTUDIOS
(April 1988), see footnote 2.
shows that in Argentine political culture different types of people may be found
with regard to their attachment to those dimensions of democracy. On the basis
of two statements considered as indicators for the participative and the libertarian dimensions a typology can be constructed and quantified. The participative
dimension is indicated by the agreement or disagreement with a system of periodical elections. The libertarian dimension is indicated by attitudes towards the
statement that 'democracy is dangerous because it brings disorder and disorganization'. Those people who support both dimensions would have attitudes
reflecting a deeper commitment to democracy, at least in the participative and
libertarian traditions. The opposite type, that is to say, those who reject both
dimensions of democracy—would exhibit clearly authoritarian attitudes. The
two 'mixed types' would be represented by people supporting participative but
not libertarian attitudes (termed as 'populists') and individuals supporting
libertarian values but rejecting the participative contents of democracy (called
'elitists').
Analyzing the typology of individuals, the prevalence of 'democrats' among
the population, can be clearly seen (52 per cent), although the 'populist' sector
also has a very significant presence (35 per cent). On the other hand, 'authoritarians' (8 per cent) and 'elitists' (5 per cent) only represent small minorities
(Figure 1). A relationship between socio-economic level and the presence of
'democrats' and 'populists' may be also observed. While on the one hand, a
positive association between 'democrats' and socio-economic level may be
found, on the other hand, a negative correlation may be identified: 'populism'
tends to increase as the socio-economic level of individuals declines. Among the
lower social strata, the proportion of 'populists' exceeds that of 'democrats'
DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD
TABLE
165
7 Typology of political attitudes according to socio-economic level
Social strata
Democrats
Populists
Elitists
Authoritarians
Total
Upper
LowMiddle structured
(percentage)
52
78
66
35
5
8
ii
27
8
3
36
46
5
37
5
7
4
3
Lowunstructuredj
marginal
13
Source: Survey carried out in greater urban centers by E S T U D I O S (April 1988), see footnote 2.
TABLE
8 Typology of political attitudes according to age
Age
Total
Democrats
Populists
Elitists
Authoritarians
18-24
25-34
35S4
(percentage)
52
54
52
35
5
8
31
33
7
8
8
7
53
35
4
8
55 and up
49
42
4
5
Source: Survey carried out in greater urban centers by E S T U D I O S (April 1988),
see footnote 2.
(Table 7). It is also interesting to note the difference between un-specialized and
specialized workers: among the former, the proportion of'popuhsts' exceeds that
of 'democrats'; among the latter, the proportion of 'democrats' increases while
that of 'populists' decreases. Democratic attitudes increase among younger
groups, in the older age groups the trend towards populism becomes more significant. Among the youngest groups, the presence of 'democrats' is much larger
than that of'populists'; among older people (55 years old and up) the tendency
to favor 'democrats' is slight (Table 8).
CONCLUSIONS
The Argentine case exhibits a pattern of highly consensual and permanent dis-
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
positions regarding the participative dimensions of democracy during, and even
prior to the transition period. These attitudes seem to be firmly rooted in Argentine political culture since they have not undergone significant changes, and a
strong attachment to them crosses the different social sectors. In contrast, values
related to tolerance and political pluralism not only receive much less support,
but have also suffered a certain decline throughout the transition, seemingly
associated with the increasing level of discontent. However, this pattern appears
unevenly distributed within the population, with the least support for tolerance
and pluralism coming from the lowest and least educated social strata.
Analyzing the data shows the almost null impact democratic institutionalization had on democratic attitudes, at least during the first five years of constitutional government. These findings clearly call into question the socializing
influence of democratic institutions, at least during relatively brief periods
marked by important economic difficulties.
Argentina seems to maintain certain elements of its past populist culture,
characterized by the prevalence of the participative dimensions of democracy,
dispositions which, as Germani (1966) has pointed out, stemmed to a large
extent, from experiences of direct rather than institutionalized participation. At
the same time, attachment to dimensions linked to pluralism and political tolerance is much lower, with pockets of authoritarianism found among the lowest
and least educated social sectors. In short, Argentine political culture, in connection to democracy, seems to show a mixed pattern, in which democratic attitudes
coexist with populist—rather than authoritarian—tendencies.
This structure may be seen as the result of a number of formal and informal
cultural factors which emphasized participative forms of political behavior under
the tutelage of strong leaderships. The political attitudes mentioned above
reached their maximum expansion during the Peronist regime (1946-55), but
they also developed vigorously during Radical and Conservative periods: their
origins may be traced to 'caudillismo', a political style dominant in Argentina
during the past century. Low attachment to libertarian principles might be
linked to the fact that there were no struggles for religious tolerance in the past,
as was the case in Anglo-Saxon cultures.
If cultures with long-established pluralist and libertarian traditions are
excluded, the emergence of these attitudes demands an extended period of socialization under a democratic political regime. In the case of recently established
democracies where strong expectations and social demands prevail, as well as
populist traditions, this kind of socialization is highly dependent upon the
success of that regime in satisfying those expectations.
Argentina is an example of recurrent successions of populist and authoritarian
regimes. All the available evidence suggests that the populist legacy has proved
stronger and more enduring than the authoritarian heritage—at least as reflected
DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD
167
in the attitudes of the population as a whole and in striking indicators such as
greater populist tendencies among older people. On the other hand, the election
of a charismatic figure like Menem after five and a half years of democratic transition leaves little room for doubt that in the face of economic frustration, the
population's preferences once again strengthened the populist option, at least in
the short term. The old populist presence, left behind half a decade ago due to
the vigor of democratic restoration, seems to revive as the people's economic
frustration grows.3
REFERENCES
Conradt, David P. (1980): 'Changing German political culture'. In: Gabriel A. Almond
and Sidney Verba (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, pp. 212-72.
Dahl, Robert (1972): Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, New Haven, Yale University Press.
Germani, Gino (1966): Politico y Sociedad en un Epoca de Transicion, Buenos Aires,
Paidos.
Griffiths, Ernest S., Plamenatz, John and Pennock, J. Roland (1956): 'Cultural prerequisites to a successfully functioning democracy: a symposium', The American
Political Science Review 50, 101-37.
Herz, John H. (ed.) (1982): From Dictatorship to Democracy, Greenwood Press.
Lipset, Seymour Martin (1963): Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics, New York,
Doubleday E Company, Inc.
Lopez Pintor, Rafael (1982): La Opinidn Publica Espanola: del Franquismo a la Democracia, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas.
Prothro, James W. and Grigg, Charles M. (i960): 'Fundamental principles of democracy: bases of agreement and disagreement', Journal of Politics 22, 276-94.
Rustow, Dankwart A. (1970): 'Transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model',
Comparative Politics 2, 337-63.
Sabine, George H. (1952): 'The two democratic traditions', The Philosophical Review 61,
451-74Sartori, Giovanni (1962): Democratic Theory, Detroit, Wayne State University Press.
Tocqueville, Alexis de (1963): La Democracia en America, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura
Economica.
Verba, Sidney (1965): 'Germany: the remaking of political culture'. In: Lucian W. Pye
and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton,
Princeton University Press, pp. 130-70.
Edgardo Catterberg has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of North
1
It is unclear from Menem's first political moves whether he will follow populist policies, because in reality
he made 1 coalition with the most conservative groups of society. Without a doubt, his electoral configuration
reflects heterogeneous kinds of social groups which characterize populism in electoral terms. Moreover, the
question which is still open is how he will satisfy those lower class sectors which voted for him in May 1989.
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
Carolina. He taught in Bariloche Foundation, FLACSO, The University of Belgrano,
Grinnell College and the University of Buenos Aires. Professionally, he Has been heavily
involved conducting polls during the political transition in Argentina. Currently, he is
senior researcher at the Simon Rodriguez Foundation (Buenos Aires, Argentina) and is a
head of a private polling organization in Buenos Aires.