Explaining State Variation in Interparty Ideological Differences
Author(s): Joel Paddock
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 3, (Sep., 1998), pp. 765-780
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088048
Accessed: 14/07/2008 17:52
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
http://www.jstor.org
Explaining State Variation in
Interparty Ideological
Differences
MISSOURI
STATE
UNIVERSITY
JOEL PADDOCK, SOUTHWEST
This article uses two measures of state party ideology-a 1994 survey
of state party committee members and a content analysis of state party
platformsbetween 1990 and 1996-to determinevariationbetween states
in interpartyideological differences.These interpartyideological differences are compared to David Mayhew'sscale measuring the historical
presence of traditionalpartyorganizationsin the Americanstates. As hypothesized, there is a strong tendency for states with histories of traditional party organizationto have less ideologically polarized partiesthan
those states without such traditions.This association holds up when we
control for state-level measuresof education, income, mass polarization,
electoralcompetition, and partycontrol. Stateenvironmentsthat historically encouraged or discouragedthe formationof traditionalparty organizations help explain variation in patterns of party activism in the
contemporaryera.
Over the past several decades scholars have noted growing ideological
differences-some say ideological polarization-between Democratic and Republican party activists (Costain 1980; Kirkpatrick1976; Lunch 1987; Miller
andJennings 1986; Paddock 1992; Poole and Rosenthal 1984; Reichley 1985;
Stone, Rapoport, and Abramowitz 1994). The emergence of more ideologically distinct parties is related, in part, to the demise of what Mayhew (1986)
calls "traditionalparty organizations":hierarchically structured local parties
based on an incentive system of material, rather than purposive, benefits.
Such organizations were major components of an historically non-ideological
and decentralized political system, where pragmatic state and local party activists engaged in "a conflict without principles, a struggle between the ins
and outs which never becomes fanatical and creates no deep cleavage in the
PoliticalResearchQuarterly,Vol. 51, No. 3 (September 1998): pp. 765-780
765
PoliticalResearchQuarterly
country" (Duverger 1964: 418; Hartz 1955; Key 1958). This system, many
argue, has been replaced by one where national parties, "organized around
ideological goals," are more likely to pursue "ideas, causes, and the moralization of public policy" than "jobs, contracts, and advantages for supporters"
(Lunch 1987: 224).
While much has been written about growing ideological differences between the national parties, we know less about how state party systems differ
in terms of ideological conflict. Before the modem era in American politics,
distinct interparty ideological differences were associated only with certain
states. For example, Fenton (1966) distinguishes between the "job-oriented
states"of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, and the "issue-oriented states"of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. The former are associated with the "oldstyle,"
pragmatic parties, while the latter are representative of the more ideologically
distinct "new style" parties (Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 1993: 115; Sorauf
and Beck 1988). Elazar (1972) makes similar comparisons between states in
which the "individualistic" and "moralistic"subcultures predominate. The
individualistic states tend to have the pragmatic, non-ideological parties associated with an earlier era in American politics. The moralistic states tend to
have issue-oriented, amateur-dominatedorganizations, where clear interparty
ideological distinctions are more likely
In more recent years scholars have continued to note variation between
states in the extent of interparty conflict (Dye 1984; Garand 1985; Jennings
1979). Most of these studies focus on policy differentiation and use data that
predate the ideological polarization that, according to Stone, Rapoport, and
Abramowitz (1994), occurred during the 1980s. Erikson, Wright, and Mclver
(1993) develop an elaborate measure of state-level interparty ideological differences based on elite (elected officials and party activists), and mass (party
identifiers in the electorate) attitudes. From these measures, they develop party
polarization scores that demonstrate a considerable amount of variation between states in interparty ideological differences. They conclude that state
party ideologies are, in part, a reflection of state opinion, which itself is related to the state'spolitical culture: "the expectations and values that citizens
(but mainly elites) share as they conduct the business of governing" (Erikson,
Wright, and Mclver 1993: 150).
An extensive literatureassociates political culture with differencesbetween
states in a variety of areas. The most commonly used framework for such
works was initially developed by Elazar(1972), and empiricallyoperationalized
by Sharkansky (1969). This literature demonstrates a relationship between
state political culture and a variety of political phenomena (see, for example,
Fitzpatrickand Hero 1988;Joslyn 1980; King 1994; Wirt 1991). Sharkansky's
linear operationalization of Elazar'smodel, however, does not appear to be
766
in Interparty
ExplainingStateVariation
IdeologicalDifferences
useful in examining variation between states in interpartyideological conflict.
This is partly because of the difficulty in applying the traditionalistic subculture to such a framework. As noted earlier,Elazar'smoralistic subculture emphasizes programmatic, issue-oriented parties, while the individualistic
subculture is associated with pragmatic, job-oriented parties. The former is
dominant in states in which one would expect clear interparty ideological
differences, while the latter is dominant in states where one might expect less
ideologically distinct parties. However, the traditionalisticsubculture does not
necessarily fit at the opposite end of a linear continuum from the moralistic
subculture on this dimension. Elazar contends that political systems within
the traditionalistic subculture "tend to have loose one-party systems if they
have political parties at all" (Elazar 1972: 99). This aspect of the traditionalistic subculture no longer seems relevant in light of the emergence of a competitive two-party system in most southern states (see Lamis 1990).
A classification scheme of political culture that is more likely to be associated with interstate variation in interpartyideological differences is Mayhew's
(1986) categorization of states on the basis of the historical presence of what
he calls "traditionalparty organizations"(TPOs). Mayhew adopts a five-point
scale to measure the historical presence in the states of local party organizations that (1) had "substantial autonomy"; (2) lasted a long time; (3) had a
hierarchical internal structure; (4) regularly attempted "to bring about the
nomination of candidates for a wide range of offices";and (5) relied on "material incentives" rather than "purposive incentives in engaging people to do
organization work or to supply organization support" (Mayhew 1986: 1920). States with higher scores (4 or 5) were historically dominated by such
organizations (e.g.,Tammany Hall in New York, or the Pendergast Organization in Missouri). States with lower scores (1 and 2) were rarely,if ever, influenced by such parties. Mayhew contends that although TPOs have long since
faded from the American political landscape, they nonetheless were linked
with political cultures or environments that are still associated with differences between states on a number of variables. For example, he demonstrates
a link between the historical presence of TPOs and the relative size of state
government (1986: 257-307).
Because TPOs are based on an incentive structure of material, rather than
purposive, benefits, Mayhew'sscale may be associated with variation between
states in the degree of interpartyideological differences. Mayhew hypothesizes
that "Americanenvironments supporting traditional party organization"will
rank "relativelylow in issue content in their electoral processes" (1986: 244).
Environments dominated by material incentives, he contends, are less likely
to attract issue-oriented party activists and "politicians who build issue followings" (1986: 245). Likewise, one could hypothesize that states with
767
PoliticalResearch
Quarterly
histories of TPOs (which are almost all predominately individualistic states in
Elazar'sframework) would be less ideologically polarized than other states.
Such states are more likely to have a political culture or environment more
oriented toward pragmatic parties seeking the ideological middle ground to
maximize their public support and increase the likelihood of winning the
spoils of victory. In states with little or no history of TPOs one would expect
greater interparty ideological differences. In the absence of a tradition of extensive material incentives in politics, party activists are more likely to be
motivated by the desire to express a cause or ideology.
The possible causal relationship between Mayhew'sclassification scheme
and interparty ideological differences, however, is less evident. If one considers the TPO scale as a classification of state political cultures, or in Mayhew's
words, "environments,"then one might hypothesize that these environments
are associated with contemporary patterns of party activism that account for
interstate variation in interparty ideological differences. A political environment with no historical presence of TPOs might encourage the participation
of amateur and purist activists in both parties and perhaps lead to relatively
large interparty ideological differences. A political environment with a strong
historical presence of TPOs would be more likely to encourage professional
and pragmatic activists in both parties, which would more likely lead to relatively small interparty ideological differences. Mayhew writes: "Bydefinition
'material'incentives dominate 'purposive' incentives in the upkeep of traditional organizations, generating workers and supporters unlikely by nature to
want to raise, dwell on, or direct attention to issues" (1986: 245). On the
other hand, such state-level political environments might be associated with
patterns of party activism that, historically, may have encouraged or discouraged the formation of TPOs. Contemporary interparty ideological differences
may be evidence of a state political environment that historically made it relatively easy or difficult for TPOs to form. Hence, if a relationship indeed exists
between a state'sTPO score and its degree of interpartyideological difference,
it is perhaps a simultaneous relationship. TPOs might be associated with a
political environment that discourages relatively large interparty ideological
divisions in the contemporary era, while relatively large interpartyideological
differences might be associated with an environment that historically discouraged the formation of TPOs.
This article uses data from the 1990s to compare states on the basis of
interparty ideological differences. Are some state party systems more ideologically distinct than others? If so, is Mayhew's TPO scale associated with
varying levels of interparty ideological differences? I hypothesize that states
with traditions of pragmatic, patronage-based party organizations have less
ideologically distinct parties than states without such traditions. One might
768
in Interparty
ExplainingStateVariation
IdeologicalDifferences
argue that this hypothesis borders on being tautological. Contemporary patterns of interparty ideological differences are hypothesized to be related to
political environments that historically either discouraged or encouraged an
emphasis on issues and ideology. It is not clear, however, whether the environments that fostered TPOs decades ago persist in the contemporary era and
continue to be associated with a particularpattern of party activism. I address
this issue by comparing states on the basis of the ideological orientations of (1)
Democratic and Republican state party committee members, and (2) state
party platforms. Mayhew's TPO scale and five other variables that may be
associated with state party ideology (state-level measures of income, education, mass polarization, electoral competition, and party control) are used to
help explain the variance in state interparty ideological differences.
METHODOLOGY
Two measures were developed to determine the ideological orientations
of state parties: a survey of the attitudes of state party committee members,
and a content analysis of recent state party platforms. The survey of state
party committee members was carried out in 1994 and included 1670 surveys from twenty states: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, NewJersey, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. States were selected so as to maximize variation by region, political
subculture, party competition, and TPO scale. However, because the entire
universe of state committees was not surveyed, the results of this study must
be treated with some caution. The return rate was 53 percent for the Republicans and 51 percent for the Democrats. The Republican return rate varied
from 39 percent in Mississippi to 65 percent in Oregon. The Democratic return rate varied from 35 percent in West Virginia to 61 percent in Oregon.
To measure the extent of interpartyideological differencesthe survey asked
respondents to place themselves on a five-point scale from "stronglyfavor"(1)
to "stronglyoppose" (5) for the following issues: (1) "Awoman's legal right to
choose whether to have an abortion";(2) "Homosexuals serving in the U.S.
military";(3) "Governmentsponsored national health insurance";(4) "Increased
government regulation to protect the environment"; (5) "Affirmativeaction
programs to increase minority representation in jobs and education"; (6) "Increased government aid to the poor"; (7) "Increasedgovernment aid to the
elderly"; (8) "Elimination of the death penalty"; (9) "Raisingtaxes to reduce
the budget deficit";(10) "Reducingthe size of the national military";and (11)
"Theabolition of state right-to-work laws."Mean scores (on a five-point scale)
were calculated for each issue. An overall mean ideology score was calculated
using all eleven issues.
769
PoliticalResearch
Quarterly
State party platforms provide an additional measure of a state party'sideology. While such documents clearly do not reflect the ideological orientation
of the entire party,they provide a sense of what the party stands for, and are a
somewhat accurate gauge of what the party'snominees will do if elected to
office (Fishel 1985; Pomper 1974). Because some state parties never draft
state platforms, and others draft them only periodically, it is not possible to
obtain a complete set of state platforms for a particularperiod. Platformswere
obtained for both parties from thirty-eight states for the period 1990-1996.
Platform statements were classified based on the categories employed by
Ginsberg (1972), and slightly modified by Paddock (1992). The unit of analysis was the paragraph. Each paragraphwas scored on the basis of a five-point
ideological scale (see appendix). Intercoder reliability scores were calculated
using a random sample of 15 percent of the platforms. The percentage of
agreement between the major coder and a coder who replicated coding 15
percent of the platforms averaged .90 for all the categories. An overall state
party ideology score was calculated by taking the mean of the scores for all the
paragraphs in a particular platform.
These two measures of state party ideology correlated strongly (r = .75;
<
for the eighteen states that were both included in the survey of state
.001)
p
committee members and had party platforms for both parties. Because of the
larger number of states with platforms, the platform measure probably more
fully captures the diversity of American state party systems than the survey.
However, even the platform measure does not include such heavily populated
states as Michigan, New York,and Pennsylvania. The states used in this analysis represent considerable regional, cultural, and political diversity Nevertheless, the fact that only two-fifths of the states are included in the survey and
party platforms were not obtained from twelve states forces us to be somewhat tentative in our conclusions.
FINDINGS
Table 1 summarizes the mean ideology scores for the eleven survey questions for Democratic and Republican committee members. The table also compares the interparty ideological differences (the Republican mean ideology
score minus the Democratic mean ideology score) with Mayhew'sscale. Table
1 shows clear ideological distinctions between Democrats and Republicans.
In all twenty states the mean Republican ideology is above three and the mean
Democratic ideology is below three. However, there is considerable crossstate variation in the degree of interparty ideological differences. Committee
members in such states as Washington, Texas, and Oregon more closely resemble the ideological polarization occurring at the national level than their
counterparts in such states as Connecticut, Delaware, and New Jersey.
770
ExplainingStateVariationin InterpartyIdeological Differences
TABLE
1
INTERPARTY
IDEOLOGICAL
DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN
PARTY
STATE
COMMITTEE
MEMBERS
IN
TWENTY
STATES
State
TPO
Mean
Mean
Interparty
Score
Democratic
Republican
Ideological
Difference
Ideology
Ideology
1
1.97
4.24
2.27
Washington
1
2.02
3.97
1.95
Oregon
1
2.19
3.98
1.79
Wyoming
Iowa
1
1.97
3.72
1.75
1
Kansas
2.29
4.01
1.72
1
2.42
4.13
1.71
Mississippi
South Carolina 1
2.18
3.87
1.69
1
Maine
2.00
3.61
1.61
1
Colorado
2.40
3.88
1.48
South Dakota 1
2.54
3.92
1.38
Texas
2
2.14
4.30
2.16
2
Tennessee
2.36
4.02
1.66
Missouri
4
2.56
3.97
1.41
West Virginia 4
2.57
1.29
3.86
Ohio
4
2.21
3.64
1.22
Delaware
4
2.46
1.07
3.53
Indiana
5
2.40
3.79
1.39
Illinois
5
2.21
3.38
1.17
Connecticut
5
2.48
3.55
1.07
New Jersey
5
2.41
3.30
.89
Table 1 also shows the expected association between Mayhew'sTPO scale
and interparty ideological differences. The states without histories of TPOs
have much greater ideological differences between their committee members
than the states with traditions of TPOs. The correlation (Pearson'sr) between
a state'sTPO rating and its interpartyideological difference was strong and in
the expected direction (r = -.73; p < .001). Higher levels of interparty ideological differences were associated with lower TPO scores.'
model of poA simple correlationwas also calculatedbetween the Elazar-Sharkansky
litical culture and interpartyideological differences.As expected, the model was not
associated with interstate differences on this dimension. The correlation between
Sharkansky'slinear operationalizationof Elazar'smodel and interpartyideological differences was not statisticallysignificant (r = -.07; p > .05). While some of Elazar'spredominately moralistic states (e.g., Washington and Oregon) and individualistic states
(e.g., NewJersey and Connecticut)had the expected levels of interpartydifferences,the
predominatelytraditionalisticstates (e.g., Texas,Mississippi,and South Carolina)were
771
PoliticalResearch
Quarterly
Table 2 summarizes the mean ideology scores for the Democratic and
Republican platforms in thirty-eight states. The table also compares the interparty ideological differencesfor the platformswith Mayhew'sTPO scale. Democraticand Republicanplatformsclearlydifferin most states. With one exception
(the Rhode Island Republicans), the mean Republican ideology is at or above
three and the mean Democratic ideology below three for all the states. As in
Table 1, however, there is considerable interstate variation in partisan differences. The platforms in states such as Washington, Texas, and Oregon reflect
the ideological polarization that some see emerging at the national level. In
states such as Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Ohio, however, the platforms
reflect the traditionally non-ideological American party system, where only
minor differences distinguish two pragmatic parties seeking the ideological
middle ground. Table 2 also shows that Mayhew'sTPO scale is associated with
the expected level of interparty differences. The correlation between a state's
TPO scale and its interparty ideological differences was -.58 (p < .001).2
My argument to this point has been that relatively low levels of state-level
interparty ideological differences are associated with state political environments that supported the historical presence of TPOs. While Mayhew'sscale
is associated with cross-state variation in interparty ideological differences, it
is not clear what factors in the environments that fostered TPOs might be
linked with differences in state party systems. If we control for other variables, does the association between TPO scores and interpartyideological differences remain?It is necessary to construct a multivariatemodel that examines
the association between various state-level variables and the extent of interparty ideological differences.
Two variables that might be associated with cross-state variation in interparty ideological differences are income and education. One might speculate
that states with higher levels of income and education might be more likely to
encourage purist and amateur party activists motivated primarily by purposive incentives. Higher income and educational levels in a state might create
an environment in which activists are more likely to be in a position to serve
"higherorder"needs (i.e., expressing a cause or ideology) rather than seeking
the material rewards (i.e., patronage positions) of electoral victory. Programmatic, reform-oriented, "amateur"activism is sometimes associated with
2
not at the opposite end of the continuum from the moralistic states. This does not
challenge the utility of the Elazar-Sharkanskymodel. It simply suggests that on this
particulardimension the continuum is not particularlyuseful.
As with the measure of state committee members, the correlationbetween the ElazarSharkanskyscale and interpartyideological differenceswas not statisticallysignificant
(r= -.38; p > .05).
772
ExplainingStateVariationin InterpartyIdeological Differences
TABLE
2
INTERPARTY
IDEOLOGICALDIFFERENCESBASED ON PARTYPLATFORMSIN THIRTYEIGHT
STATES
State
Washington
Oregon
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Iowa
Alaska
California
Colorado
Oklahoma
Maine
Hawaii
Nevada
Montana
Idaho
Massachusetts
North Carolina
Nebraska
Florida
Vermont
Wyoming
Mississippi
Utah
North Dakota
South Carolina
Kansas
South Dakota
New Hampshire
Texas
New Mexico
Arkansas
Missouri
West Virginia
Ohio
Illinois
Indiana
New Jersey
Connecticut
Rhode Island
TPO
Score
Mean
Democratic
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
1.99
2.21
1.99
2.10
2.17
2.48
2.44
2.57
2.71
2.08
2.44
2.48
2.39
2.50
2.29
2.43
2.43
2.48
2.38
2.71
2.76
2.90
2.56
2.80
2.54
2.58
2.69
2.52
2.69
2.94
2.61
2.60
2.70
2.61
2.81
2.69
2.96
2.57
Mean
Republican
Ideology
3.95
3.94
3.65
3.75
3.81
3.94
3.88
3.94
4.01
3.36
3.69
3.70
3.60
3.69
3.46
3.49
3.44
3.47
3.37
3.65
3.65
3.75
3.33
3.50
3.00
3.04
3.14
3.83
3.86
3.48
3.50
3.39
3.15
3.47
3.30
3.07
3.23
2.74
773
Interparty
Ideological
1.96
1.73
1.66
1.65
1.64
1.46
1.44
1.37
1.30
1.28
1.25
1.22
1.21
1.19
1.17
1.06
1.01
.99
.99
.94
.89
.85
.77
.70
.46
.46
.45
1.31
1.17
.54
.89
.79
.45
.86
.49
.38
.27
.17
PoliticalResearch
Quarterly
relativelyprosperousand, particularly,well-educated individuals (Wilson 1962;
Kirkpatrick 1976). To operationalize these variables, 1996 state-level census
data measuring'per-capita income (Income) and the percentage of college
graduates (Education) were gathered for each of the twenty survey states and
thirty-eight platform states.
Another variable that might be related to the association between TPO
scores and interparty ideological differences is public opinion. Environments
that supported TPOs may be less ideologically polarized at the mass level, and
hence encourage ideological moderation among party activists. Settings where
mass ideological differences are relatively small might be less likely to have
issue-oriented parties and more likely to have pragmatic,job-oriented parties
contesting the ideological "middle ground." Environments where mass ideological differences are more pronounced may be more likely to have issueoriented party organizations.To operationalizethis variable,a measure of "mass
polarization"was taken from Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993). This measure is based on CBS-NewYorkTimessurveys of Democratic and Republican
identifiers. Mean Democratic and Republican ideology scores were calculated
for each state. Erikson, Wright, and McIver refer to the difference in these
means as the "index of mass polarization"(1993: 12-42).
For decades, scholars have suggested that party competition and party
control of state government may be related, in various ways, to state-level
policy and party organizational differences (Barrilleaux 1986; Bibby and
Holbrook 1996; Dye 1984; Fenton 1966; Key 1949; Sharkanskyand Hofferbert
1969). For example, Dye (1984), in a study of cross-state differences in welfare policy, contends that competitive state party systems are more likely to
have policy relevantdifferencesbetween the partiesthan non-competitive party
systems. State welfare spending is more likely to be related to partisan control
of government in competitive states than in non-competitive states. Though
Dye's focus is on differences between Democrats and Republicans on welfare
policy, these differences might extend to other issues, and might be related to
cross-state variation in interpartyideological differences. Higher levels of party
competition might be related to greater interparty ideological differences. I
operationalize the party-competition variablewith two measures of state-level
party competition. The first, developed by Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993),
focuses on electoral competition. This measure (ElectoralCompetition) is based
on district-level state legislative election results from 1982 to 1986. Higher
values are indicative of states that are more electorally competitive. The second, initially developed by Ranney (1976) and updated by Bibbyand Holbrook
(1996), focuses on party control of state government. This measure (Party
Control) is based on the proportion and duration of success of the parties in
gubernatorial and state legislative elections between 1989 and 1994 (Bibby
774
ExplainingStateVariationin InterpartyIdeological Differences
and Holbrook 1996: 104-105). Higher values represent states in which Democrats tend to control state government.
These state-level measures of income, education, mass polarization, electoral competition, party control, and TPO scores are the independent variables in Table 3. The dependent variables are the two different measures of
interparty ideological differences. The regression findings are summarized in
Table 3.
Our hypothesis that TPO scores would have a negative relationship with
interpartyideological differences is supported in Table 3. After controlling for
income, education, mass polarization, electoral competition, and party control, lower TPO scores significantly correlate with higher levels of interparty
ideological differences.3 This correlation applies to both measures of the deTABLE
3
IN INTERPARTY
DIFFERENCES
IDEOLOGICAL
EXPLAINING
STATEVARIATION
Variable
Basedon Survey
IdeologicalDifferences
DependentVariable-Interparty
of StatePartyCommitteeMembers
t
Parameter
Standard
Error
Estimate
Intercept
Income
Education
Mass Polarization
ElectoralCompetition
PartyControl
TPO Score
0.622
0.063
0.040
0.010
0.006
0.049
0.060
1.062
0.023
-0.033
0.019
-0.002
0.103
-0.197
1.706
0.719
-0.823
2.037
-0.335
2.119
-3.278**
N 20 F = 6.33** Adjusted R-Squared= .627
**p < .01
Basedon StatePartyPlatforms
IdeologicalDifferences
DependentVariable-Interparty
t
Standard
Parameter
Variable
Estimate
Error
Intercept
Income
Education
Mass Polarization
ElectoralCompetition
PartyControl
TPO Score
N =38
3
F= 7.24***
0.490
0.030
0.024
-0.429
0.168
-1.060
0.024
0.009
2.582*
0.010
0.140
-0.205
0.005
0.041
0.040
-0.210
0.005
-0.026
Adjusted R-Squared= .517
1.944
3.379**
-5.024***
***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05
A stepwise regressionwas also run which consideredvarious combinationsof the independent variables whose significance level were .50 or lower. Step one used the
775
PoliticalResearch
Quarterly
pendent variable. On the platform measure, significant correlations also existed for the mass polarization and party control variables. These two variables fell just short of being significant at the .05 level for the survey measure.
When controlling for the other independent variables, higher levels of interparty platform differences were associated with greater levels of mass polarization and Democratic control of state governments. The latter finding was
not necessarily expected. While most states (thirty-one) in the Ranney party
control index are classified as "two party competitive," the states that had
higher levels of Democratic party control of state government tended to have
higher levels of interparty platform differences.
For both measures of party ideology the independent variables explained
a relatively large percentage (63 percent in the survey measure and 52 percent
in the platform measure) of the variation in the dependent variable. A separate stepwise regression was also run for each measure of party ideology. This
procedure found the one-variable regressionwith the highest R-squaredvalue,
then the two-variable regression with the highest R-squared value, until all
the independent variables with a significance level of .50 or lower were employed. The TPO variable, by far, had the highest R-squared values in both
models. Without the other independent variables, the TPO R-squared value
was .33 for the platform measure and .59 for the survey measure. The TPO
variable, however, measures only the historical presence of TPOs in the states.
It does not tell us precisely what factors in state political environments explain the differing levels of interparty ideological differences. Clearly, more
work needs to be done comparing state environments and subcultures.
CONCLUSION
Although TPOs have been replaced by the modern "service-vendor"party,
the environments that fostered such organizations seem to shape political processes in the 1990s. Based upon the two measures of state party ideology
employed in this study, Mayhew'sTPO scale is clearly associated with interstate variation in partisan ideological conflict. State party systems vary widely
in the degree of interparty ideological differences. There is a strong tendency,
withthedependentvariable,step
independentvariablethathadthehighestcorrelation
two added the variablewith the next highest correlation,and this continued until all
the independent variableswith a significancelevel of .50 or lower were used. For each
measure of the dependent variable,and all combinations of the independent variables,
the statisticalsignificanceof the TPOvariablewas less than .001. Electoralcompetition
and income were excluded from the stepwise regressionof the survey measurebecause
they did not meet the .50 significance level. Income was excluded from the stepwise
regressionof the platformmeasure for the same reason.
776
in Interparty
ExplainingStateVariation
IdeologicalDifferences
however, for states with histories of TPOs to have less ideologically polarized parties than those states without such traditions. The causal relationship between these two variables, however, is unclear. It would seem that
the state political environments that historically fostered TPOs are also
associated with differences in contemporary party activism. Future research
needs more fully to address what factors in those environments account
for different incentive structures, party organizational traditions, and patterns of party activism.
APPENDIX
A five-point ideological scale employed by Paddock (1992) was used to
code each paragraphin the platforms. To maintain consistency with the ideological scale used in the survey of party activists, the scale was reversed. Scores
of 1 and 2 therefore, were liberal policy statements in a particular category,
while scores of 4 and 5 were conservative policy statements. The following is
a brief summary of the ideological scale for each category. A score of 3 is a
neutral policy statement for each category.
(1) Capitalism-The aggregation of wealth and control over the distribution
of wealth by the private sector.
Scores of 1 and 2 indicate an orientation toward public sector action to
control the private sector's aggregation of wealth.
Scores of 4 and 5 indicate commitment to the values of free enterprise as
a means of distributing benefits and burdens, and hostility to government
intervention in the economy.
(2) Redistribution-The reallocationof advantagesin favorof the disadvantaged.
1 and 2 indicate advocacyof public sector action to redistributeadvantages.
4 and 5 indicateopposition to governmentpolicies redistributingadvantages.
(3) Internal Sovereignty-The exercise of the power and increase of the role
of the national government vis-a-vis the states and localities.
1 and 2 indicate support for a largerrole for the national government visa-vis the states and localities.
4 and 5 indicate opposition to federal intervention in state and local affairs (a states' rights orientation)
(4) Labor-Workers, organized labor, and policies regulating unions and the
workplace.
1 and 2 indicate a positive orientation toward organized labor and policies they support.
4 and 5 indicate a negative orientation toward organized labor, and opposition to policies supported by unions (e.g., workers'compensation, worker
777
PoliticalResearch
Quarterly
safety laws) and/or support for labor policies opposed by unions (e.g.,
right-to-work laws).
(5) Universalism-Equality of rights and privileges for domestic minorities
and women.
1 and 2 indicate support for policies promoting equality for minorities
and/or women.
4 and 5 indicate general opposition to public policies requiring private
and/or public agencies to alter their behavior for the purpose of promoting equal rights for minorities and/or women.
(6) Social Issues-The use of the coercive power of the state to regulate private behavior based upon the desire to uphold traditional standards or
promote social order.
1 and 2 indicate the promotion of free expression and social experimentation and opposition to using state powers to limit non-economic
freedoms.
4 and 5 indicate support for preserving traditional values, standards of
behavior, and social order through the use of the state'spower.
(7) Foreign/Defense-Actions concerning relations with foreign objects and
national security policy.
1 and 2 indicate advocacy of the use of diplomacy, as opposed to military
force, to achieve American objectives in the world.
4 and 5 indicate advocacy of the use of military force or the threat of
military force, rather than diplomacy, to achieve American objectives in
the world.
REFERENCES
Barrilleaux,Charles. 1986. "ADynamic Model of PartisanCompetition in the
American States."AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience30: 822-140.
Bibby,John E, and Thomas M. Holbrook. 1996. "Partiesand Elections." In
Virginia Gray and HerbertJacob, eds., Politicsin the AmericanStates, 6th
ed., pp 78-121. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly
Costain, Anne N. 1980. "Changes in the Role of Ideology in American National Nominating Conventions and Among Party Identifiers." Western
PoliticalQuarterly33: 73-86.
Duverger, Maurice. 1964. PoliticalParties.New York:Wiley.
Dye, Thomas R. 1984. "Partyand Policy in the States."Journal of Politics46:
1097-1116.
Elazar,Daniel J. 1972. AmericanFederalism:A ViewFromtheStates.New York:
Crowell.
778
in Interparty
ExplainingStateVariation
IdeologicalDifferences
Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John P Mclver. 1993. Statehouse
Democracy.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fitzpatrick,Jody L., and Rodney E. Hero. 1988. "PoliticalCulture and Political Characteristicsof the American States: A Consideration of Some Old
and New Questions." WesternPoliticalQuarterly41: 145-53.
Fenton, John H. 1966. MidwestPolitics.New York:Holt, Rinehartand Winston.
Fishel, Jeff. 1985. Presidentsand Promises.Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly.
Fitzpatrick,Jody L., and Rodney E. Hero. 1988. "PoliticalCulture and Political Characteristicsof the American States: A Consideration of Some Old
and New Questions." WesternPoliticalQuarterly41: 145-53.
Garand,James C. 1985. "PartisanChange and Shifting Expenditures Priorities in the American States, 1945-1978." AmericanPolitics Quarterly13:
355-91.
Ginsberg, Benjamin. 1972. "CriticalElections and the Substance of PartyConflict, 1844-1968." MidwestJournalof PoliticalScience 16: 603-26.
Hartz, Louis. 1955. TheLiberalTraditionin America.New York:HarcourtBrace.
Holbrook, Thomas M., and Emily Van Dunk. 1993. "ElectoralCompetition in
the American States."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview87: 955-62.
Jennings, Edward. 1979. "Competition, Constituencies, and Welfare Policies
in the American States."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview73: 414-29.
Joslyn, RichardA. 1980. "Manifestationsof Elazar'sSubcultures: State Public
Opinion and the Content of Political Campaign Advertising."Publius 10
(Spring): 37-58.
Key,V O., Jr. 1949. SouthernPoliticsin State and Nation. New York:Knopf.
.1958. Politics,Parties,and PressureGroups,4th ed. New York:Crowell.
King, James D. 1994. "PoliticalCulture, RegistrationLaws, and VoterTurnout
Among the American States."Publius24 (Fall): 115-27.
Kirkpatrick,Jeane. 1976. The New PresidentialElite: Men and Womenin National Politics.New York:Russell Sage.
Lamis, Alexander. 1990. The TwoParty South. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Lunch, William M. 1987. The Nationalizationof AmericanPolitics. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Mayhew, David. 1986. Placing Parties in American Politics. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
A LongituMiller,WarrenE., and M. KentJennings. 1986. Partiesin Transition:
dinal Studyof Party Elitesand Party Supporters.New York:Russell Sage.
Paddock, Joel. 1992. "InterpartyIdeological Differences in 11 State Parties,
1956-1980." WesternPoliticalQuarterly45: 751-60.
Pomper, Gerald. 1974. Electionsin America.New York:Dodd, Mead.
779
PoliticalResearchQuarterly
Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1984. "The Polarization of American
Politics."Journalof Politics46: 1061-79.
Ranney, Austin. 1976. "Partiesin State Politics." In Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, eds., Politicsin theAmericanStates,3d ed. Boston: Little,Brown.
Reichley,James. 1985. "TheRise of National Parties."In John Chubb and Paul
Peterson, eds., TheNew Directionin AmericanPolitics,pp. 175-200. Washington, DC: Brookings.
Sharkansky, Ira. 1969. "The Utility of Elazar'sPolitical Culture: A Research
Note." Polity 11 (Fall): 66-83.
Sharkansky,Ira, and Richard I. Hofferbert. 1969. "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy" AmericanPoliticalScienceReview63:
867-79.
Sorauf, Frank J. and Paul A. Beck. 1988. Party Politics in America, 6th ed.
Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.
Stone, Walter J., Ronald B. Rapoport and Alan 1. Abramowitz. 1994. "Party
Polarization: The Reagan Revolution and Beyond." In L. Sandy Maisel,
ed., The Parties Respond:Changesin AmericanParties and Campaigns,pp
69-99. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Wilson, James Q. 1962. The AmateurDemocrat. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wirt, Frederick M. 1991. "'Soft'Concepts and 'Hard'Data:A ResearchReview
of Elazar'sPolitical Culture."Publius 21 (Spring): 1- 13.
Received:June 23, 1997
Accepted: March3, 1998
780