Federal Supreme Court rendered landmark decision regarding significance of restraints
of competition
Bulletin June 29, 2016
1|3
Federal Supreme Court rendered landmark decision regarding significance of restraints of competition
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirms the per sesignificance in principle of price-fixing, quantity-limiting
and market-allocating agreements as well as their direct
sanctionability
On June 28, 2016, after public deliberation in proceeding 2C_180/2014, the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court rejected a complaint of Colgate-Palmolive
Europe Sàrl (formerly Gaba International Corp.) in
connection with a sanction of CHF 4.8 m imposed
by the Competition Commission (COMCO). The
Federal Supreme Court held that a ban on passive
sales, which was agreed on with a licensee, constituted a significant restraint of competition which
can be sanctioned directly.
In 1982, Gaba International Corp. granted Gebro
Pharma LLC the license to produce and distribute
Elmex tooth paste in Austria. The COMCO took
the view that the license contract included a market-allocating agreement which prohibited Gebro
Pharma LLC from exporting directly and indirectly
from Austria to other countries. It qualified the respective clause as a ban on passive sales pursuant to Article 5(4) Cartel Act which prevented parallel imports of Elmex tooth paste from Austria to
Switzerland. In 2009, the COMCO imposed a
sanction of CHF 4.8 m, which was confirmed by
the Swiss Federal Administrative Court in 2013.
In a long-awaited landmark decision, the Federal
Supreme Court has now introduced a per sesignificance of price-fixing, quantity-limiting and
market-allocating agreements pursuant to Article 5(3) and (4) Cartel Act in case a certain, unspecified de minimis-threshold is exceeded. This
signifies a paradigm shift. From now on, every
agreement of this kind (above the de minimisthreshold) is unlawful unless the company succeeds in proving economic efficiency. Furthermore,
the Federal Supreme Court declared agreements
of this kind as directly sanctionable.
Federal Supreme Court rendered landmark decision regarding significance of restraints
of competition
Bulletin June 29, 2016
Significance in principle of agreements pursuant to Article 5(3) and (4) Cartel Act
Regarding the first fundamental issue, the Federal
Supreme Court held that price-fixing, quantitylimiting and market-allocating agreements pursuant to Article 5(3) and (4) Cartel Act, in case the
presumption of elimination of effective competition
can be rebutted, in principle qualified as significant
pursuant to Article 5(1) Cartel Act. The court noted
that these agreements constituted significant restraints of competition solely because of their type
and quality and regardless of their actual effects on
the relevant market. The court found that quantitative elements such as market shares were of no
importance, respectively only inasmuch as they
should be considered to exclude de minimis-cases,
which should not be treated by COMCO at all.
However, the court did not further specify these de
minimis-cases. It stated that a decision based on
rigid market share percentages was not appropriate as one should conduct an immateriality assessment in every individual case.
The majority of the justices came to this conclusion
by applying the Federal Supreme Court's method
of interpretation of law, the pluralism of methods.
They asserted that the wording of the law did not
require a substantial or a material, but only a significant restraint of competition, which was why the
threshold had to be low. They went on that namely
the legislative materials as well as the ratio legis of
institutional and individual protection spoke for the
mere use of the significance criteria to exclude de
minimis-cases in order to simplify administrative
work. According to the majority's view, it was the
legislative intent behind Article 5(3) and (4) Cartel
Act to declare these kinds of agreements as particularly harmful, for which reason they had to be
qualified – a maiore ad minus – as significant, irrespective of quantitative criteria. Also, the majority
found that this interpretation corresponded well
with EU provisions and thus created legal certainty.
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In contrast, a minority of justices asserted that
COMCO used to evaluate both quantitative and
qualitative criteria and that the Federal Administrative Court's case law in this respect was inconsistent. Also, the Federal Supreme Court had previously confirmed the evaluation of both elements
1
in the book price fixing case. The minority's view
was that the constitution and the Cartel Act did first
and foremost require an effect on competition,
whereas the intent behind and the purpose of an
agreement was less important. The minority stated
that an agreement which restricts competition was
simply irrelevant for the functioning of competition
if the relevant market share was low and that because the constitution required harmful effects on
competition the majority's interpretation was
wrong.
Direct sanctionability of significant agreements
pursuant to Article 5(3) and (4) Cartel Act
Regarding the second fundamental issue, the
Federal Supreme Court came to the conclusion
that price-fixing, quantity-limiting and marketallocating agreements pursuant to Article 5(3) and
(4) Cartel Act, in cases in which the presumption of
elimination of effective competition can be rebutted
and which therefore in principle qualify as per sesignificant in the sense of Article 5(1) Cartel Act,
can be directly sanctioned pursuant to Article 49a
Cartel Act. The court noted that in this regard the
2
report was clear and did therefore not leave any
room for an opposing opinion. The court went on
that only agreements which were unlawful pursuant to Article 5(1) Cartel Act and which did not
contain price-fixing, quantity-limiting and marketallocating agreements were out of scope of direct
sanctions. It was the court's view that Article 49a
Cartel Act did not require agreements that in fact
eliminate effective competition but price-fixing,
quantity-limiting and market-allocating agreements
pursuant to Article 5(3) and (4) Cartel Act which
1
Federal Supreme Court 129 II 18 E. 5.2.2 S. 25.
Report (i.e. the explanatory comments of the Federal Council to the bill)
Cartel Act, dated November 7, 2001, p. 2037.
2
Federal Supreme Court rendered landmark decision regarding significance of restraints
of competition
Bulletin June 29, 2016
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could not be justified based on grounds of economic efficiency. The court noted that the principle
of nulla poena sine lege was not violated as no
new type of criminal offence was introduced. The
court conceded, however, that the fact of a mere
significant restraint of competition instead of the
complete elimination of effective competition had
to be taken into account in the course of the calculation of a sanction.
If you have any queries related to this Bulletin, please
Conclusions
Stefan A. Bindschedler
MLaw, LL.M.
[email protected]
T +41 43 222 15 27
The new case law of the Federal Supreme Court
confirms the extensive application of the Cartel Act
by the COMCO and does not allow for evaluation
of quantitative criteria in connection with pricefixing, quantity-limiting and market-allocating
agreements pursuant to Article 5(3) and (4) Cartel
Act, in cases in which the presumption of elimination of effective competition can be rebutted. Such
agreements qualify in principle as significant in the
sense of Article 5(1) Cartel Act from the outset
because of qualitative reasons. Only de minimiscases, in which the market share will likely be in
the low single digits but which still have to be assessed on a case by case basis, are excluded
from the per se-significance.
As a result, from now on, companies will face the
difficulty of proving positively reasons for economic
efficiency in case an agreement in question qualifies as a price-fixing, quantity-limiting and marketallocating agreement pursuant to Article 5(3) and
(4) Cartel Act, and in case the presumption of elimination of effective competition can be rebutted. In
effect, this amounts to a shift in the burden of proof
to the disadvantage of affected companies.
refer to your contact person at Homburger or to:
Marcel Dietrich
Dr. iur., LL.M., Attorney-at-Law
[email protected]
T +41 43 222 10 00
Martin Thomann
lic. iur., LL.M., Attorney-at-Law
[email protected]
T +41 43 222 15 52
Homburger AG
Prime Tower
Hardstrasse 201 | CH-8005 Zurich
P.O. Box 314 | CH-8037 Zurich
T +41 43 222 10 00
F +41 43 222 15 00
www.homburger.ch
Legal Note
This Homburger Bulletin expresses general views of the authors at
the date of the Bulletin, without considering the facts and circumstances of any particular person or transaction. It does not constitute legal advice. This Bulletin may not be relied upon by any person for any purpose, and any liability for the accuracy, correctness
or fairness of the contents of this Homburger Bulletin is explicitly
excluded.