Brazilian Institutional changes 1891-1967
Larissa Rodrigues Vacari de Arruda
Larissa Rodrigues Vacari de Arruda, 28, from Campo Grande - Mato Grosso do Sul (Brazil), is a
graduate who received her Bachelor’s degree in Sociology and Politics (Social Science) at the São Paulo's
Foundation School of Sociology and Politics - FESPSP. In 2013, she earned a Master’s degree in Political
Science at Federal University of Sao Carlos-UFSCar. She wrote her Master Thesis on political elites in
Brazil, and currently is Visiting PhD Researcher at King`s College London and PhD candidate at
Federal University of Sao Carlos- UFSCar, Brazil. Her interests include Political Elites, Regionalism,
Federalism, Brazilian Political and Social Thought, Brazil's Political History.
Abstract
Brazil had plenty of institutional change in twenty century, an Oligarchy Republic, two Dictatorships, and
two more democrat periods in 1934-1937 and 1945-1964, finally, Democratization in 1980s. This
paper objective is to analyse the institutional changes within the Brazilian regimes between 1891 to 1967,
and our research question is which type of institutional change Brazilian Constitutions reveals in the period
of 1891 to 1967? For this, Historical Institutionalism is theory approach utilized and we compare five
Constitutions as regards organization of Executive, Legislative and Judiciary; federalism; and representative
system. Furthermore, we argue that Brazilian politics had some characteristics that difficult Democracy
implementation such as Union controlled states and municipalities, Executive strongly conducting
Legislative, and restriction of opposition. Those features not only related with Military Dictatorship, in fact,
those traits are present for long time in Brazilian politics.
Keywords
Institutional change, Historical Institutionalism,
Representative system, Powers organization.
Brazilian
politics,
Federalism,
1. Introduction
The 20th century in the Brazilian political history was tumultuous and unstable in a
difficult trajectory to the Democracy consolidation. First, with proclamation of Republic in
18891, which was an oligarchical and undemocratic period; after, the Vargas Era (19301945), with a civilian Dictatorship, the Estado Novo (New State, 1937-1945), had two
Constitutions, a more open one in 1934 and an authoritarian in 1937; next, Brazil had a
brief democratic regime in 1945 to 1964 with new rules established in the Constitution of
1946; posteriorly, a coup d’état in 1964 inaugurated a Military Dictatorship and its
emblematic Constitution in 1967. Finally, through the democratization in 1980s, Brazil
seemed overcome those issues.
As it be noted, in the periodization of 1891 to 1967, Brazil passed by many
institutional changes. This paper objective is to analyse those institutional changes over
periods and our theoretical premise is that political actors had adapted to the constant
changes; therefore, our research questions is which type of institutional change Brazilian
Constitutions reveals in the period of 1891 to 1967? For analyse those changes we used as
theoretical framework historical institutionalism by which it can illustrate a path of
permanencies among those regimes as well institutional changes. In general, few researches
utilized this methodology to compare those regimes, and when they used history is often to
highlight social connections or, analyse institutional change between two regimes. Beyond
this, the importance of this research is to offer another interpretation of Brazilian politics
through to clarify political patterns, which help to understanding the path of Democracy
construction as well as its difficult of implementation in Brazil.
This paper is organized as follows. First, the literature review and theoretical
framework utilized. Second, in the section Methodology, the conceptualization and
operationalization of research, and we shall clarify the basic definitions, variables, and
hypothesis. Moreover, we define the method of historical institutionalism research. Finally,
in the next section Brazilian Constitutions and institutional change, we define and analyse
the data. Furthermore, we shall argue that Brazilian politics had some characteristics that
difficult Democracy implementation such as Union controlling of states and municipalities,
strong Executive conducting Legislative, personal politics and charismatics presidents, and
As known, Latin America was mainly colonized by Spain and Portugal. After Independence, Spanish
America divided and became Republics. In contrary, Portuguese America maintained united in a Monarchy
(1822) until 1889 when Brazil became a Republic.
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restriction of opposition. Those features not only relate with Military Dictatorship or the
Estado Novo, in fact, those traits are present for long time in Brazilian politics.
2. Literature review and Theoretical framework
Brazilian researchers used often the historical framework to understand its society;
however, those studies focus on social interpretations of Brazil instead the history
integrated the analysis as substantial part of explanation, and institutional change were not
usually considered. The classical example are two books: Casa Grande & Senzala (The
Masters and the Slaves) published in 1933 by Gilberto Freyre; and Raizes do Brasil (Roots of
Brazil) published in 1936 by Sergio Buarque de Hollanda. Both authors offers a new
interpretation of Brazilian society trough history and explore the Portuguese heritage as
well the Colonial past. Freyre conclude that Brazil had a positive side of mixture of races in
a moment when racist interpretation was supported. Hollanda, through ideal type homem
cordial (cordial man) define Brazilian as people that have personal and passionate
motivation of behaviour.
Although this perspective was seminal in the Brazilian Social Sciences, a second
approach used history to clarify political patterns and institutional changes. Two classical
books are Coronelismo: the municipality and representative government in Brazil first
published in 1945 by Victor Nunes Leal; and States and Party system - 1930 a 1964
published in 1976 by Maria C. Campello de Souza. Leal dialogued with two approach; first,
he brilliant theorized on Coronelismo, which was a political phenomenon in Brazilian
society; secondly, he explored institutional frameworks in Brazilians municipalities since
colonial times until 1945. Campello, who utilized only the second perspective, explained
the political party system formation over the period 1930-1964, and demonstrated how the
institutions from dictatorship 1937-1945 continued in the democracy in 1945-1964.
Another significant book, affiliate to second approach, is The barons of the federation by
Fernando Abrucio. The author analyses the federalism in Brazil since First Republic (18891930) until Democratization in 1988, and demonstrates how the governors strengthened
against federal power over the period of democratization.
As mentioned, this paper utilize historical institutionalism as theoretical framework.
The historical perspective analysis is especially interesting for political scientists (Sartori,
1981), because through history political scientist can exposes casual process and
interpretative pattern. According to Heinz (2011), history contributes to elucidate State
dynamics and its internal configuration, to understand the movement, identities and profile
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from political elites. For Codato (2010), political scientists should come back to history to
pursue political structures not analysed yet. Although many studies about political actors
are available, often biographies or memories without structure which actors are insert.
Because of that, Codato argues that is important considering political institutions. For this,
`… diachronic represents a political dimension indispensable to focus on institutional
anatomy’ (Marenco, 2008). Two of masterful examples of this contribution are Coercion,
Capital and European States by Charles Tilly; and States and Social Revolutions: a
Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China by Theda Skocpol. Tilly analyses the
formation of European national states exposing patterns and State formation theory; and
Skocpol, from a structural perspective, investigates internal and external causes for social
revolution erupted in the three countries. Furthermore, Skocpol adds that comparative
analysis should focus on ‘valid associations of potential causes’, and the researcher can
make connection of case relating of phenomenon or/and distinguish cases that could
explicate the phenomenon.
For this, the theoretical framework utilized is Historical Institutionalism that allow
to understand the institutional change over the periods. Historical institutionalism is an
approach to studying politics considering the ways in which institutions structure and shape
political behaviour and outcomes (Steinmo, 2008). “Institutionalists are scholars who took
special emphasis on the role institutions structuring behaviour” and the most common
definition of institutions is they are rules (Steinmo, 2008, p.10). According to Douglas
North (2011, p.3), ‘institutions are rules of the game in a society’ which means institutions
are behaviour norms, conventions and codes of conduct that shape the human interaction.
Therefore, institutions ‘reduce uncertainty’ and the individual not have to wonder about
everyday choices once they have structured options offered by institutions. About history,
North points out that history matters not only future and present are connected by past,
but because ‘today`s and tomorrow`s choice are shaped by the past. And the past can only
be made intelligible as a story of institutional evolution’ (North, 2011, p. VII). Thus,
‘institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to
understanding historical change” (North, 2011, p.3).
By this definition, historical institutionalists seek overall patterns, permanencies
or/and ruptures. “So historical institutionalists aim to make those patterns visible and trace
their causal impacts” (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). Additionally, the Historical
Institutionalism is an approach for comparing the institutional changes over the periods
(Hall and Taylor, 2003), (Crouch, 2005), (Steinmo, 2008). To scholars of the Historical
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Institutionalism, the history is not a chain the independents facts because it exists causal
process between periods. Indeed, "past events influence the present situation and the
history matters" (Fernandes, 2002, p.83). In other words, if a country chose to no longer
follow a certain route, will face high risks and barriers to go another direction. Due the fact
that institutions conditioned interactions and involve stability, which means institutions do
not change easily. According to the majority of scholarly from sociological institutionalists,
theorists of rational-choice, and historical institutionalists (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009),
institution implies persistence.
3. Methodology
Given the fact of consolidated institutions offer little possibilities for change,
because of alterations are costly for individuals; institutionalism theorists had spent less
attention in analyse the institutional change (Crouch, 2005). Nevertheless, it can be seen
lots of alterations in the world, especially in Brazilian case over 20th century – Oligarchical
Republic (1889-1930), Vargas Era (1930-1945), Democracy (1945-1965), Military
Dictatorship (1964-1988) and Democratization. Therefore, even though there institutional
constraints against changes, they happen.
Some authors concerned about this issue. From an economical angle, North points
out that the agent of change is the individual entrepreneur, and change involves
modifications in the ‘rules, norms, and enforcement that constitute the institutional
framework” (North, 2011, p. 83). On the other hand, stability is defined as limitations
imposed by institutions in a hierarchical arrangement that each level is more difficult to
modify than the previous one; formal and informal rules take place in this configuration.
In the same effort to analyse the institutional chance, Margaret Levi (1991) makes a
significant contribution to the subject. She also admits that to change an institution is
costly; moreover, institutions are made by individuals, and in turn, these institutions
constrain the choices of these same individuals and future generations. The most important
Levi`s definition is institutions implies distribution of powers, because institutions contain
and create power. Hence, who exercise the power have conditions to maintain institutional
arrangements and transform undesirable institutions arrangements. Therefore, according to
Levi, institutional change is alteration in the rules or in the ways of its implementation.
Given that her definition of formal institutions as social constructed rules that reflect
distributions of power, formal institutional change when alteration of distribution of power
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occur; and disobey is a tool that people subdue can use against powerful people, since
obedience is important to institutional stability.
An interesting model of institutional change is offer by Mahoney and Thelen
(2009), focusing on gradual change. In contrast with studies which concern rapid
transformations, for instance revolutions (Skopcol, 2015); Mahoy and Thelen (2009, p.2)
are interested in constitutions, systems and arrangements that ‘shift in more subtle ways
across time’. Before the authors present the model of institutional changes, political
context, and agents behind such change; they state that institutional change results ‘when
problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors to implement
existing rules in new ways” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009, p.4). In fact, the institutions
contain within them likelihoods of transformation which enable power distribution
alterations.
Political context and kind of institution determines the type of institutional change.
Streeck and Thelen (2005) define four model of institutional change: displacement,
layering, drift, and conversion. 1) Displacement – occurs when the rules are replaced for
new ones. Could be a rapid chance such as by revolutions or gradually substitution of rules.
2) Layering - is an introduction of new rules in the same time of old rule when old and new
rules are connected. In contrast with displacement, layering does not provide a completely
new change. Those amendments, additions, and revisions are small; however, over periods
can promote a great change. 3) Drift – when environment changes encourage alterations in
the rules. 4) Conversion – occurs when rules maintain exactly the same but rule
interpretation change.
From this above expose, this paper focus on formal rules changes through different
Brazilian Constitutions. Until nowadays, Brazil had seven Constitutions. After
Independence in 1822, the Monarchy established the first Constitution in 1824; with
proclamation of Republic in 1889 came the second Constitution in 1891; due the fact of
Revolution in 1930 when Getulio Vargas assumed government, a new Constitution in
1934, and also the civilian Dictatorship of Vargas in 1937 imposed the fourth Constitution
in the same year. After the democratization a new Constitution in 1946 was made; in 1964
the military coup also imposed the sixth Constitution of 1967; finally, with democratization
the last Constitution in 1988. Because the topic of this paper is institutional change in 20th
century, we will analyse the majority of Constitutions in this century which means:
Constitution of 1891, the most durable one with thirty-nine years; Constitution of 1934;
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Constitution of 1937; Constitution of 1946; and Constitution of 1967. The last
Constitution not integrated because of the scope limitations of paper.
Given the fact that Constitutions are extensive, particularly Brazilians Constitutions,
we chose three variables in our data. First variable is organization of Powers Legislative,
Executive and Judiciary, which means I seek for attributions and competences from each
Power in the five Constitutions. Second variable is federalism, in other words, how power
and competences are distributed by municipal, state and federal spheres. Third variable is
representative system by which electoral rule change over periods.
By historical institutionalism we understand that institutions constrain choices and
preferences of individuals, and also institutional change impose limitations in the political
actor`s action. The hypothesis is institutional change in Brazil basically occurred by model
of displacement (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). Thus, historical institutionalism is
methodology choose because this framework offer support to understanding changes and
permanence over periods; although its weakness is not take account of ideas, culture and
social values, however, historical institutionalism continued be the best approach to
accomplish paper objective`s.
4. Brazilians Constitutions and institutional change
This section aims clarifies the institutional change in the formal rules, specifically in
five Constitutions over different regimes. For this, first we will explain shortly each
historical context of Constitution as well the three variables considered, which organization
of power, federalism, and representative system. Finally, we will compare the three
variables among the five constitutions, as well we will classify according to Levi (1991),
Skocpol (2015), Mahoney and Thelen (2009) the cases of institutional change.
4.1- Constitution of 1891
After Independence in 1822, particularly when Dom Pedro I resigned and returned
to Portugal, finally the power was organized in Brazil (Fernandes, 1975) and states elites
achieved the national power (Faoro, 2008). However, since Dom Pedro II assumed in
1840, the regional elites had accepted monarch interference in states which displeased
those groups who claim commanded politics in their own states. The Monarchy lost
support of many groups such as military, Catholic Church; and when slavery was abolished
in 1888 without compensations, the slaveholders withdrew too. Then, a bloodless military
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overthrow of the Empire in 1889. Afterward, Brazil became a Republic federalist with same
electoral rules of Monarchy, the law Saraiva of 1881.
a) Power organization
The distribution of competences among the three powers Legislative, Executive
and Judiciary was contradictory in the Constitution of 1891. First, in the article 15 explain
that the three powers were national sovereignty bodies and they were harmonic and
independent. Nevertheless, when the Constitution define the attributions of Legislative
Power, which was a bicameral with Senate and Chamber of Deputies, it established that
Legislative Power needed the sanction of president of Republic. Beyond the law, in the real
world, president Campos Salles created the Política dos Governadores or ‘Politics of
Governors’, as regards power distribution always prevail the president of Republic, the
Legislative Power did not rule either administer because who drove and clarified is
Executive Power (Cardoso, 2006). The Judiciary Power was controlled by local elites (Leal,
1975) and in the states only who local power allowed was condemned. In others words, the
most absolute impunity in the municipalities as known as ‘bread for his (local boss) friends,
a stick for his enemies’ (Leal, 1977, p.14).
b) Federalism
In opposition to Monarchy, the Constitution of 1891 established great powers for
states and the Union was weak. In comparison with Argentina and Mexico, Brazilian
Constitution was the most decentralized, for example, Brazilians states could get loans
abroad and had their state own military forces acting as police; states like Sao Paulo and
Rio Grande do Sul had more power than federal forces. By Constitution of 1891, the
Union could have interfered in states only in specific cases; nonetheless, the practice was
the federal government only intervened in the weak states. From the point of view of
municipalities, Constitution ensured autonomy in peculiar interest, however, never was
defined which peculiar interest was (Leal, 1975). In the practice, the municipalities did not
have both financial and electoral autonomy.
The federalist form enabled two systems exist over whole period, the Politics of
Governors and Coronelismo. As mentioned above, beyond limitations of Legislative
Power, Politics of Governors also consisted in a support and alliances system, wherein
political opposition was almost eliminated. Therefore, only allies assumed elective office,
even though opposition had won election. Although there were several constrains for
opposition not seek public office, if foes of state current situation won an election, they
were forbidden take the public office. All support and reciprocity system among Union and
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states also existed among states and their municipalities, namely Coronelismo. In the cities,
the coronel (colonel or local chief) offered to state government the votes that he controlled
from his dependents. Under the regime of 1891, Brazil was rural country and the majority
of the population lived in farms and small towns. Some cities emerged from farms, and in
these farms, the colonel had workers and did favours for people, and in return required
their votes. The colonel provide the only help for the rural people, meanwhile it did not
existed any public policies for this population. Ergo, the colonel controlled the rural votes
and offer it for state government. In exchange, the state government allowed that colonel
truly owned the municipality. In the city, the colonel chose the individuals for every public
office, in others words, in period of scarce resources the colonel was the only way to access
the publics occupations, like teacher and others in a public administration. In addition, the
colonel used the police for personal issues, such as persecute his political enemies. The
state government overlook the colonel acts whereas colonel spurred on deputy and senator
victories.
c) Representative system
Indeed, Politics of Governors and Coronelismo did not enable representative
system behave as desirable because opposition could not compete. Nonetheless, the most
limitation to Democracy in this period was the fact that Republic did not change the
monarchy law of 1881 about elections. By Saraiva law only literate men could vote, while
majority of Brazilians were illiterate, hence overwhelming majority was excluded of right to
vote. Moreover, also not allowed to vote women, homeless, lower rank military and some
religious.
In summary, during the First Republic the Constitution of 1891 established
independence of Powers, but Legislative depended of president. Thus, the power
organization was Executive Power conducting Legislative and Judiciary, as in the
municipalities Judiciary Power obeyed the coronel. The federalism was the most
decentralized when the states had more power and attributions than Union, and
municipalities had followed states. Finally, the representative system struggled with
limitations to opposition and few people participated.
4.2- Constitution of 1934
As shown, First Republic was very excluding as only small groups controlled
political power. Due this fact, Republic gained lots of opponents such as middle class of
big cities, military, and the states elites that not ruled. The state of Sao Paulo and Minas
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Gerais had an agreement by which in every presidential election one state launched
candidate with support of the other; in 1930 the president was from Sao Paulo and the
candidate to next election should be from Minas Gerais with support of Sao Paulo,
nevertheless, Sao Paulo decided launched another candidate from the state. In reaction,
Minas Gerais with help state Rio Grande do Sul make the Revolution of 1930 and put
down the First Republic. The provisory government had Getulio Vargas in command, and
the old oligarchies and new establishment had issues that reflected in the Constitution of
1934. The period of 1930s was significant to construction of Brazilian national state once
in First Republic the majority of organizations were from states, for example, political
parties, and every state had their specific form of organization instead a national public
health and education system.
a) Power organization
Enormous changes in the form of power organization happen since 1930, especially
in the Judiciary Power. This power increase significantly with creation of Electoral Justice,
which was responsible for execution of elections, and Labour Justice. The Legislative
Power also changed, by Constitution of 1934, exercised by the Deputy Camber with
collaboration of Senate. Moreover, the exclusive competences of Legislative required
presidential sanction; therefore, Brazil had continued Executive Power with more
attributions and competences. Otherwise, novel ideas were the inspiration by
corporativism, consequently, the professional deputies who was indirectly elected by
professional associations.
b) Federalism
Similarly, the organization among Union, states and municipalities also changed.
Since 1930s, portions of Brazil considered not capable of provide itself and with less than
300 thousand inhabitants were transformed in Federal territories, which means that they
lost their autonomy and federal power had control2. In contrast with First Republic, the
Union accumulated lots of attributions and competences such as electoral legislation of
Union, states and municipalities; subsoil wealth; furthermore, the Constitution enabled
more possibilities to interfere on states including to organize their financial situation, but
the supreme court had to allow the intervention.
The municipalities had better situation since Constitution permitted tax exclusive
for municipalities; however, also state was allowed supervision of their municipalities.
The state of Acre was transformed in federal territory, and posteriorly others portions became federal
territories such as Igucu, Ponta Pora, Roraima and Amapa.
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Moreover, municipal councilman and major could be elected; nonetheless, states could
have pointed major in the capital and cities considered strategical.
c) Representative system
Electoral rules changed since 1934 when more people were enabled to participate
of representative system. For the first time women could vote, but the illiterate, that is
majority of population, continued prohibited to vote; in addition, men and women who
had a job was obligated to vote. Likewise, a great improvement was the creation of
Electoral Justice; before the personal power of coronel-controlled election, and Electoral
Justice organized and declared the winner of whole country that boosted the transparency
of elections.
Similarly to the First Republic, the Deputy Camber represented people and Senate
represent states. Deputy Camber had universal suffrage, proportional system, equal and
directly. In contrast, the vote became secret, and there were representatives of professional
association indirectly elected. The number of deputies depend on number of population in
the states that could be until twenty; the territories only had two deputies and not senators.
In conclusion, Executive Power continued with more attributions and competence,
and Legislative had the peculiar professional represents. Differently from First Republic,
Union increased power and municipalities had slightly good situation. Certainly, a foremost
difference was the representative system that include more people and improve with
Electoral Justice.
4.3- Constitution of 1937
After Constitution of 1934, National Congress elected Getulio Vargas as president
and the next election would occur in 1938. The candidates and whole country were
preparing for election; however, using a supposed ‘communist treat’ to Brazil, Vargas
planed a coup and dictatorship since 1936 with some politicians, and seventeen of twenty
states supported unanimously the coup. Thus, in November of 1937 Vargas presented the
new Constitution of the civilian Dictatorship, as known as Estado Novo. The population
approved Vargas` government because for the first time they received social rights,
although political and civilian rights not took place in that moment, which marked the
Brazilian citizenship (Carvalho, 2009).
a) Power organization
In this period, Vargas wanted build a strong central government and social welfare
state for urban workers (Skidmore, 2009). The Executive Power concentred most powers
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and competences such as borders of national territory, defence, armed forces, police,
security of borders, national education, federal finances, all forms of communications, all
transportation, and others. The Legislative Power was exercised by National Parliament
with collaboration of National Economy Council, and the parliament continued bicameral
but the Constitution change their names, Deputy Chamber and Federal Council. Although
the Constitution established how relations with three powers would be, it also gave to
president the right to close parliament and Vargas did close. In fact, the president was
‘supreme authority’ which power to indicate the next candidate to presidency, close Deputy
Camber, pointed members of National Council, not convoked the parliament, and also
could declare emergency state which permitted censorship, interruption of gather right and
government could search in particular domicile.
b) Federalism
In the Constitution the federative form continued; nonetheless, in the practice
Union concentrated all powers and states and municipalities lost revenue and attributions.
In each state was implemented a system of interventorias, basically, all municipalities were
controlled by an interventor and each state was controlled by Vargas. In addition, states
that for three years did not collected sufficient tax for its public services could transformed
in federal territories.
c) Representative system
National Congress was closed and Estado Novo was the only period in Brazilian
history when no elections happened. In the states, Vargas pointed interventor, which was a
non-elected governor, and in each municipality the interventor pointed a major.
4.4- Constitution of 1946
The civilian dictatorship ended in 1945, due to many reasons, for instance, Brazilian
contradiction in the World War II – that was defending Democracy with the Allies against
the Axis at the same time that had a dictator ruling country (SKIDMORE, 2010) -, Vargas
was removed from the presidency by a military coup. Finally, the democratization in 1945
brought others institutional changes. Democracy of 1945 to 1964 was an unsteady period
that only two presidents achieved to finish their mandate; general Eurico G. Dutra was
elected in the first honest election of 1945 and completed his mandate; in 1950 Vargas was
elected and a complex situation culminated with his suicide in 1954; to next period
Juscelino Kubitschek was elected and skilfully he completed his mandate; the next
president elect was Janio Quadros that resigned in 1960 and left a big problem because the
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vice-president elected was Joao Gourlart, former minister of Vargas and was not approved
by the military. The hardly situation ended with the Military coup and end of Democracy in
1964.
a) Power organization
In contrast with Dictatorship of 1937, democrat Constitution of 1946 established
more power to Legislative that continue bicameral, namely Deputy Camber and Senate,
each state minimally had seven deputies and territories only one. Even though Executive
continued had strongly competences, Legislative gained attributions and could limit
president actions. In fact, between 1945 and 1964, Legislative and Executive Powers were
struggled frequently.
Given the international moment of Cold War and a Brazilian fear of Communism
this Constitution allowed many controversial points, for example, many possibilities of
federal intervention in states. Another interesting concern is re-election, perhaps because
deputies and senator had fear for a possible return of Vargas, which happened.
b) Federalism
Brazil remained a Federation, named United States of Brazil since 1891, then with
Constitution of 1946 sought a more equilibrate federalism. States, territories and Federal
District that was federal capital formed the Union. Its attributions and competences were
more distributed, but states and municipalities gained others also. To municipalities was
attributed a revenue and was established when states could intervened in their cities;
however, Constitution also determined that municipalities had assistance by states, in
practice means a possibility of autonomy limitation.
c) Representative system
Finally, elections returned in Brazil in the three levels. All men and women were
obligated to vote; however, illiteracy, homeless, who did not speak Portuguese (excluding
the native inhabitants, as many different ethnics did not spoke the national language), and
lower militaries. Municipalities could elect their councilman and mayor; nonetheless,
Constitution allowed governors to appoint the capital’s mayors, the same situation in some
cities declared ‘exceptional national importance to security’ by National Security Council.
Other important characteristic, for the first-time Brazil had national parties as well the
election was competitive; although Communist Party was considered illegal.
Essentially, democratic background was improved. Executive Power continued
strongly, but Legislative could restrict the Executive. The Union divided its attributions and
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competences with states and municipalities in a more equilibrated federalism. Furthermore,
the return of elections and competition made representative system feasible.
4.5- Constitution of 1967
In 1964, the Military coup change rules once again. Differently from others Latin
American military dictatorships, ‘Brazilian officers had a strong legalist streak and they
wanted legitimacy” (SKIDMORE, 1999, p.160). This concern could be seen in the
Constitution of dictatorship, in which the differences are slight from others four; in fact,
Military Regime introduced authoritarian mechanism through seventeenth Institutional
Acts (IA) and Constitution of 67 legally confirmed the fourth IA. The period and
Constitution are controversial, although undoubtedly was an authoritarian regime; because
of the legal concern by militaries, Military Regime claim legally being a Democracy.
a) Power organization
The first peculiar fact about Military Regime is that Legislative Power did not was
closed in whole period. However, military constrained the opposition, especially when
candidates supported by government did not win. For example, the senador biônico or bionic
senators, were indirectly elected by an electoral council, it was way that military ensured to
have majority on Senate. The attributions of Legislative Power slightly differ from 1946;
the foremost difference is about Executive, president was indirectly elected. Although
article 6 states that Legislative, Executive and Judiciary power were independent, Executive
power subdued Legislative and established constraints to his autonomy.
b) Federalism
Brazil continued be a Federation in the Constitution; however, Union increased
considerably its attributions and competences. Article 8 about competence of Union is
extremely big3, and the states attributions most seem like restrictions than rights. In the
same situation, municipalities lost revenue and competences.
c) Representative system
Constitution of 1967 did not change the obligation of vote and who could vote. An
immense modification is the president was indirectly elected for a council formed by
National Congress and for deputies pointed by states Assemblies with confirmation of
governors. Furthermore, elections happened in Executive and Legislative in all three levels,
municipal, federal, and in sometimes state level.
The article have seventeenth section by which the VII [a to d], the XV [a to d], and the XVII [a to v] and 1
and 2§).
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Constitution of 1967 did not alter electoral rules, however, the institutional acts I,
II, III, and others amendments to Constitution made. The military coup was in 31th March
and in April the first Institutional Act established indirect election to presidency,
suspension of Constitution of 1946, and suspended political rights of individual considered
threat by the military4. In 1965 election to governors occurred and the military were
concerned because in five states the opposition attached to ex–president João Goulart
won, as result, in the same year, the IA - II abolished all parties and established only two
parties: National Renewal Alliance, to support from government; and Brazilian Democratic
Movement, opposition to military rule. Moreover, president could intervene on states and
close National Congress without authorization from any judicial or political body. In 1966,
IA- III allowed indirectly elections to governors and they appointed the major from states
capitals. However, National Congress were directly elected.
In summarize, Military Regime (1964-1988) was a difficult period with many
limitations to civilian and political rights. Although the Constitution apparently seems like
others, seventeenth institutional acts imposed many restrictions to Brazilians. Executive
restricted Legislative; Union increased power over states and municipalities; finally, even
though elections happened, they were not competitive and opposition was constrained.
4.6- Brazilian Constitutions
It is worth highlight the Legislative Power in Brazil, even though since Colonization
councilman were elected, was continually subjugated by Executive. Once during seventyseven years of Monarchy, imperator interfered on states and Legislative. In the First
Republic, Legislative was absolutely subdue by Executive whom controlled elections to
Chamber of Deputies and Senate. Like Constitution of 1981, by Constitution of 1934
Legislative needed of sanction of president; differently, in 1934 Legislative was exercised by
Chamber of Deputies with collaboration of Senate, another difference was the professional
representation that only occurred in this period. This Constitution also had improvement
of Electoral and Labour Justice, since election were not competence of private power,
coroneis; and population had social rights. Posteriorly, in 1937 the most restrict period
when Legislative was closed. With democratization Legislative gained competences and
possibility of exercise veto player on Executive, which results in struggle between powers.
With coup of 1964, Executive continued elect by population; however, opposition and
4 Hundred two names was considered threat national stability: ex- presidents João Goulart, Jânio Quadros.
The leader of Communist party, Luís Carlos Prestes, and two social scientist Celso Furtado e Darcy Ribeiro.
4
15
government candidates did not competed in the same situation. Military government
created a sort of limitations in order to controlled political system. The whole institutional
changes in power organization can be seen in table 1.
Table 1- Executive, Legislative, Judiciary Power Organization
Law
1891
1934
1937
1946
1967
-Powers
-National
-National
- Executive with
- Executive
independent
Congress: Parliament:
attributions, but
restricted
-Legislative
Deputy
Deputy Council Legislative could
needed
Council
and National
restrained
sanction of
aided by
Council
Executive.
President
Senate
Struggle between
-
two Powers
Legislative
Judiciary:
Labour
and
Electoral
Justice
Sum
Legislative
Legislativ
Executive
More equilibrium Legislative
mari
subdue
e subdue
strong,
between
Legislative
Legislative and
closed
Executive
ze
subdue
Source: author
As regards federalism form, although the five Constitutions claimed being
Federalist, the practice was different. During First Republic federalism was heavily
unbalanced in which some states had more power than Union. The constitution of 1934
made by two conflicting forces, as result, federalist form continued; however, Union gained
many competences and municipalities situation improved with their own revenue and
possibility of election. By authoritarian Constitution of 1937, federalism form was
maintained, nevertheless, in practice federalism was abolished (Abrucio, 1998) due to the
fact of local forces were understood as dangerous to Nation. For exemplify, Vargas
publicly burned states flags to show that only National interests matters. With
democratization, more balance federalism when states and municipalities had more
16
autonomy. According to Leal (1975), two moments municipalities had more autonomy
with revenue and election of their represents, in 1934 and 1946; nonetheless, always states
could interfere and reduced their powers. By Constitution of 1967, once again a
dictatorship established great power to Union and limited state and municipalities
competences and rights, as it can see in table 2.
Table 2- Federalism: Union, States and Municipalities
Law
Summarize
1891
1934
1937
1946
1967
Federative
Federative
Federative
Federative
Federative
form
form
form
form
form
Disequilibrium State had less No federalism
Equilibrated
Union
Federalism
Federalism
power,
States
power, Union
had and
more power
more
autonomy
municipalities
restricted
gained
competences
Source: author
The Brazilian representative system in 20th century was a history of increasingly
popular participation, by Constitution of 1891 only 5,7% of population could vote (Love,
1982). In whole century only by Constitution of 1937 gave a legal possibility to elections
not occur; in the other periods elections happened, more open during 1934 and 1946, and
more restricted in First Republic and Military Dictatorship. The two authoritarian
governments of 1937 and 1967 imputed restrictions for states; for example, since 1965 with
IA-II governors was indirectly elect. Only with democratic Constitution of 1988 women,
men, and illiterate could vote. As can see in table 3.
Table 3- Representative system
Law
1891
1934
1937
1946
1967
Same of
-Men and
No
- Men and
-Men and women
Saraiva
women who
elections
women are
are obligated to
Law of
had job were
obligated to
vote
1881
obligated to
vote
- Only two
vote
- National
parties allowed
-secret vote
parties
- President and
17
-
governors
Competitive
indirectly elected
elections
- Lots of
constraint to
position
Summarize Majority
exclude
More open,
Whole
More open,
- Elections
but majority
population
but a
happened with
exclude
exclude
significant
lot limitations
because
part was
- Illiteracy and
illiteracy did
exclude
who not speak
not vote
because
Portuguese did
illiteracy and
not vote
who not
speak
Portuguese
did not vote
Source: author
Considering the institutional change in those formal rules expose, our hypothesis is
that Brazilian institutional change occurred by displacement is confirm. According to
Mahoney and Thelen (2009), displacement is a type of institutional change that occur when
completely removal of rules for new ones. Institutional change by Revolutions that was
rapid change according to Skopcol (2009), it is not regularly in Brazil because that change
happened in political and social system, and social problems like concentration of land
never had modification. In fact, Brazilian institutional change could be understand as
displacement in all Constitutions, and within periods occurred conversion, that is a capacity
of individual explore institutional contradiction’s; and layering, which is when little changes
accumulated and provoked a massive modification. An example of layering was after
Military coup, the institutional acts were amendments that change whole Constitution of
1946 until new one established. The other forms of institutional change, drift (Mayhoney
and Thelen, 2009) and according to Levi (1991), involves civil society acting and in a
country with strongly protagonist of State is difficult find in the periodization exposed.
5. Conclusions
18
Although more than forty years of decentralization by Constitution of 1891, in 20th
century Brazil had centralization trend, especially after Vargas Era (1930-1945) and
confirmed by Military Dictatorship (1964-1988). Federalism was extreme in the First
Republic, did not exist in the two dictatorship when Union controlled states and
municipalities; and it was more equilibrate in 1934-1937 and 1945-1964 when states and
municipalities could elected their represents and had their own revenue.
An Executive Power with more competences and conducing Legislative Power was
the pattern in whole periodization, First Republic, Vargas Era, Democracy and Military
Regime. The difference occurred in 1934-1937 and 1945-1964, when Legislative had more
attributions and veto player, especially in 1946. With a strongly Executive Power, Brazil
often had a personal politics made by a charismatic president, such as Vargas known as
‘father of poor’, Juscelino Kubitschek and Joao Goulart.
Another characteristics were restriction of opposition, in others words, candidates
supported by currently government had better condition than opposition candidates.
Although all candidates suffered with this government politics, particularly the left wing
was restrict, for example, for long time in this periodization Communist Party was
considered illegal. The fear of left always caused restrictions and support to dictatorships in
1937 and 1964. However, strong Executive, Union with more competence and restriction
of opposition were not only exclusive of Military Regime, in fact, it was constantly utilized
in the First Republic, Dictatorship of Vargas and even used in Democracy of 1945-1964.
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