THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE:
SOVIET VIEWS
EMILIO JAKSETIC*
INTRODUCTION
Limiting the exploration and use of outer space to peaceful purposes is a
basic principle of the law of outer space. This concept is embodied in such
fundamental documents as the United Nations General Assembly's Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space' and the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty). 2 This article
examines the views of Soviet jurists and other writers on the concept of
* Law Clerk, District of Columbia Court of Appeals. B.S., 1973, Georgetown University; J.D., 1979,
George Washington University. This article was written and accepted for publication when the author was
Research Assistant, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University.
1. G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15), U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963). The preamble of U.N.
Resolution 1962 (XVIII) recognizes "the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes," id., and expresses the desire for "broad international
cooperation in the scientific as well as in the legal aspects of exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes," id. Clause 4 of the Resolution states that "[t]he activities of States in the exploration and use of
outer space shall be carried on in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international
cooperation and understanding." Id. Clause 6 states, in part, "[i]f a State has reason to believe that an outer
space activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals would cause potentially harmful interference
with activities of other States in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it shall undertake
appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment." Id.
2. Jan. 21, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective October 10, 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty]. Article III of the treaty incorporates the essential language of
Clause 4 of G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15), U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963), while Article IX
incorporates, inter alia, the essential language of Clause 6 of G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
15), U.N. Doe. A/5515 (1963). Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty provides:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects
carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The
moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for
peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the
testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall
be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful
purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful
exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
Jan. 21, 1967, art. IV, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. For a historical background to
the development of the Outer Space Treaty, see Dembling, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 1, 1-52 (N. Jasentuiliyana and R. Lee eds. 1979); Dembling & Arons, The
Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR LAW & COM. 419 (1967).
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[Vol. 28:483
peaceful uses of outer space to see how these views relate to various positions
the Soviet Union has taken on specific aspects of this area of international
law 3. This approach is taken because "[tihe cause of analysis is not served by
an approach which measures the operation of a foreign legal system by
another system's set of values." 4 Rather, analysis is better served by developing a genuine understanding of the Soviet pattern of thinking and the basic
assumptions upon which this pattern is based. This approach is especially
important in the present context because of the idiosyncratic nature of Soviet
views on international relations and international law.
According to one Soviet jurist, the terminology of contemporary international law is a product of "the interaction of legal cultures of different times,
eras and socio-economic formations" 5 and, therefore, reflects the values of the
ruling classes of the nation-states. Because of the class nature of international
law, "outwardly synonymous terms can be and are used both in progressive
and reactionary senses." '6 This Soviet approach strongly suggests that terms
such as "peaceful uses of outer space" may be given a meaning or significance
by the Soviets that does not necessarily correspond to that of other nations,
especially Western ones. Such a difference in perception is not novel in the
realm of international law. Because the Soviet Union is a major space power,
however, it is important to understand how Soviet jurists and commentators
use and interpret the concept of peaceful uses of outer space within the
framework of contemporary international law.
I.
SOVIET VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE
A. THE IDEOLOGICAL NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE
Soviet writers express the view that space law is a branch of general
international law, asserting that the actions of states in outer space should be
3. This article is based on an extensive review of Soviet writings on space law available in English
translation. Such a review cannot reveal the extent to which the ideas and principles contained in these
writings are subject to modification in the dynamic processes of international relations and diplomatic
negotiation. The general uniformity and consistency of the views expressed by various Soviet writers
nevertheless suggests that these writers represent basic Soviet viewpoints on international law and the law
of outer space.
4. B. RAMUNDO, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM-A PRIMER, 1, 2 (1971).
5. Lazarev, International Law Terminology and Influence Thereon of the October Revolution, 1968
SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 158, 159 (1969). Lazarev stresses the importance of the Russian Revolution to the
redefinition of international law terms along progressive lines. Id.
6. Id. See also Tunkin, InternationalLaw and Ideological Struggle, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), November
1971, at 25, 27. Tunkin argues that socialist and bourgeois ideology results in different interpretations of
the same language. For example, Tunkin states that bourgeois "'justice' does not conflict with man's
exploitation of man for profit," which is "injustice" according to Soviet ideology. Id. Despite agreements
on norms of international law, this failure to agree on basic definitions makes the actual interpretation of
treaties uncertain.
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OUTER SPACE
conducted according to "generally-recognised principles of international
law." 7 Accordingly, the Soviets apply all universally accepted rules of
international law to outer space. 8 Thus, an examination of views of Soviet
jurists on the nature of international law is useful in order to place Soviet
positions concerning space law in perspective.
Law is determined by the dominant class9 and, because international law is
a specific branch of law, the norms of international law, like those of domestic
law, are determined by the will of the ruling classes. 10 Accordingly, Soviet
7. Zhukov, American Plans for the Use of Outer Space with Aggressive Purposes and the Security of
States, 1961 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 202, 203 (1962). As authority for this position, Zhukov cites
International Co-operation in the Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doe. A/5100 (1961), which states that international law and the principles
of the U.N. Charter apply to outer space.
Dekanozov takes the position, however, that the legal status of outer space is "not founded only on the
main principles of international law," but also is shaped by principles and rules peculiar to the nature of
outer space. Dekanozov, Relationship Between the Status of Outer Space and the Statuses of Areas
Withdrawn From State Sovereignty. INTERNATIONAl INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION,
PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SIXTEENTH
COLLOQUIUM OF THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 9 (1974) [hereinafter volumes in this series cited as [[Session Number] COLLOQUIUM].
Kolosov alleges that many jurists in capitalist nations initially resisted the application of general
principles of international law to outer space in the hope that outer space could be used by "reactionary
circles" for "aggression [against] and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states." Kolosov,
Space and International Law INT'L AFF. (Moscow), August 1977, at 54, 58. See also Vereschetin,
Perspectives of the Uses of OuterSpace for Applied Purposesand State Sovereignty, 19 COLLOQUIUM, supra,
at 103, 106 (1977). Id.
The generally recognized principles of international law include formal international agreements and
generally accepted norms of international behavior. According to the Soviets these principles must
conform to jus cogens. Alexide, Problem of Jus Cogens in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 1969 SOVIET
Y.B. INT'i L. 145, 146 (1970). Jus cogens refers to the basic principles of human conduct that Soviet jurists
argue are universally accepted by nations. Id.
8. Referring to the early absence of agreed upon rules or principles of outer space law, Korovin
suggested the adoption of precedents from existing international law and "national and international
experience." Korovin, InternationalStatus of Cosmic Space, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), January 1959, at 53,
58.
Kolosov expresses the view that the rapid development of space law reaffirms the "vitality [and]
universality of . . . most important principles of general international law." Kolosov, Interrelation
Between Rules and Principles of InternationalOuter Space Law and General Rules and Principles of
International La, 16 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 45, 47 (1974). Kulebiakin stresses the central
importance of respect for state sovereignty to international law, insisting that it is an indispensable
principle in any legal regime for outer space. Kulebiakin, Some Legal Problems of the PracticalUse of Space
Technology, 20 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 322, 325 (1978). For the Soviets, the sources of space law are
the same as those of international law. Space law is merely a new branch of international law. Zhukov, The
United Nations-A Centreof Co-operationof States for the Elaboration of Rules of InternationalSpace Law,
1973 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 132 (1975); Kulebyakin, The Moon and International La, INT'L AFF
(Moscow), September 1971, at 54.
9. Alextdze, Problem of Jus Congens in Contemporary International Law, 1969 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L.
145, 147 (1970). Kapchenko, Scientific Principlesof Soviet Foreign Policy, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), October
1977, at 81, 83. See generally B. RAMUNDO, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
Bull DING OF COMMUNISM 5-8, 22-28 (1967). Ramundo asserts that the Soviets view international law as
a means of promoting the building of Communism by providing legal rationales for Soviet foreign policy.
Nevertheless, while insisting that its foreign policy is international in nature, the Soviet Union has not
hesitated to act in its own national interest. Id. at 7-9, 87-107.
10. G. ARBATOV, THE WAR OF IDEAS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 33 (1973).
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foreign policy has a class character. l In the words of one Soviet writer,
"Soviet foreign policy is revolutionary in the true sense of the word both in its
class nature and ideological basis as well as in its objectives."' 12 In short, the
Soviet view of the nature of international law is a corollary of MarxismLeninism.
Soviet writers have argued that the "class substance" of international law
has changed since the Russian Revolution in 191713 because the Russian
Revolution transformed international law from an instrument of oppression
to "a means of struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism and national
liberation."' 14 Indeed, they feel that "it has fallen to the lot of socialism to
carry out a real revolution and usher in a radical restructuring of the entire
system of international relations."' 5 Nevertheless, in the view of the Soviets,
although the Russian Revolution brought about major changes in international relations and international law, it still is necessary to reject reactionary
principles of international law 16 and to ensure that no compromise occurs in
the development of international law terms. These concerns must be carefully
adhered to because clearly understandable terms are important "for the
ensurance of the success of socialism in ideological struggle."' 17 The Soviets
believe that the historically inevitable struggle between capitalism and
communism can only end in the victory of the latter,1 8 and, therefore, that it is
Velyaminov, On the Notion of a Norm of InternationalLaw, 1971 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 140, 141 (1973).
According to Arbatov, "[i]nternational relations have always been class relations," G. ARBATOV, supra at
33, and the contradictions between capitalism and socialism constitute the pivotal point of the
contemporary struggle in international relations. Arbatov asserts that, prior to the division of the world
into two sociopolitical systems, relations between states were determined by the struggle between socially
similar classes. International relations have since evolved, according to Arbatov, into a clash between two
opposing classes, the bourgeois and the working class. Id. at 33-35.
11. Molchanov, Soviet Foreign Policy as a Factor Promoting the Revolutionary Transformation of the
World, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), December 1972, at 3. Molchanov points out that "Soviet foreign policy has a
clearly-pronounced class . . . character" which has as its task the development of "favourable peaceful
conditions for the building of communism in the U.S.S.R." Id. at 3,4.
In Nikolayev's words, Soviet foreign policy "meets the class interests of the working people and helps to
create favourable international conditions for communist construction." Nikolayev, Soviet Foreign Policy:
Basic Ideological Principles,INT'L AFF. (Moscow), November 1973, at 63. Furthermore, "[t]he ideological
foundation of a state's foreign policy is the definite system of principles and views of the ruling class of that
state." Id. at 64. See generally B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 5-42.
12. Molchanov, supra note 11, at 6.
13. Tunkin, InternationalIdeas of the Great October Socialist Revolution, 1966-67 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L
L. 25, 27 (1968). In the Soviet view, the Russian Revolution of 1917 inaugurated a new socioeconomic era.
Id. See G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 10.
According to Tunkin, the Russian Revolution produced three basic principles of international law: (1)
socialist internationalism among socialist states, (2) equality and self-determination of nations, including
former colonies, and (3) peaceful coexistence. Tunkin, supra at 25. Cf Lazarev, supra note 5, at 159.
14. Tunkin, supra note 13, at 27; see Nikolayev, supra note 11, at 64-65.
15. Kapchehko, supra note 9, at 84.
16. Ussenko, The Principle of Democratic Peace is the Most General Basis of Contemporary International Law, 1973 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L. L. 38, 39 (1975).
17. Lazarev, supra note 5, at 158.
18. G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 274-75, 297.
1979]
OUTER SPACE
inevitable that international relations and international law will eventually be
reorganized along socialist lines.' 9 Because, for the Soviets, "outwardly
synonymous terms can be and are used both in progressive and reactionary
senses," 20 one has to consider what meaning the Soviets attribute to the
concept of the peaceful uses of outer space.
A major tenet of Soviet jurisprudence is that contemporary international
law is an instrument for achieving peaceful coexistence; 21 that is, the modern
task of international law is to ensure the peaceful coexistence of states with
differing social systems. 22 Soviet writers assert that the principle of peaceful
coexistence is generally accepted in international law today. 23 Yet, it is
The essence of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence is that it envisages the parallel
existence not simply of different states, but of states belonging to opposite social systems.
Hence the relations between these systems cannot be confined to conventional diplomatic
relations, important as they are in themselves. The existence of the two systems has another
aspect, namely, that each of them embodies the rule of a class - the capitalist class in one
case, and the working class in the other, and that an uncompromising struggle, forming the
basic content of our epoch, rages between them . . . .As the Marxists-Leninists see it, this
struggle can only end with the triumph of Communism.
Id. at 274-75.
In the modem world an unprecedented battle rages for the minds of men. It is not only taking
place in individual countries but permeates all international relations and is a significant
element of the struggle between the two social systems. This is one of the salient features of
the epoch of mankind's transition from capitalism to socialism. As any change of the
socioeconomic system, socialism's emergence is governed by the objective laws of historical
development. The speed of this transition depends in many ways on the course of the
ideological struggle.
Id. at 297.
19. Id. at 35. See B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 16-17. Soviet jurists argue that the struggle between
capitalism and socialism necessitates the acceptance of peaceful coexistence as a general principle of
international law. G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 265, 273. With the success of world socialism, the
principles of peaceful coexistence will be replaced by principles of socialist internationalism which will
constitute the basis of socialist international law. B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 32-34.
20, Lazarev, supra note 5, at 159. Cf Tunkin, supra note 6, at 27.
21. In 1969, Leonid Brezhnev "declared that one of the major foreign policy objectives of the socialist
countries was to ensure the 'peaceful coexistence of states irrespective of their social system.* " G.
ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 263-64. See G. Tunkin, supra note 6, at 30; cf.Nikolaev, supra note 1I,at 63.
22. G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 274-75; Tunkin, supra note 6, at 30. Arbatov includes the following
as objectives of peaceful coexistence: "create firm guarantees of peace, improve the entire system of
international relations, and consolidate in these relations genuinely democratic principles." G. ARBATOV,
supra note 10, at 273. The Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence is radically different from that held by
many Americans. See text accompanying notes 23-32 infra.
23. Sanakoyev, Foreign Policy and the IdeologicalStruggle Today, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), May 1974, at
70; Korovin, The United Nations Charterand Peaceful Coexistence, 1960 SoviET Y.B. INT'L L. 52, 53
(1961). Korovin expands upon this view by asserting that the concept of peaceful coexistence is also
incorporated in the U.N. Charter. Id. In support of this contention, Arbatov points out that the Basic
Principles of Relations Between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, 66 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 898 (1972), recognize that the two countries would operate henceforth on a basis of peaceful
coexistence. G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 265. Soviet writers also assert that United Nations Resolution
1721, 16 U.N. GAOR (Supp. No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961), adopts the concept as well. Korovin,
Peaceful Co-operation in Space, INT'L AFF. (Moscow) March 1962, at 62-63. The text of the UN.
resolution does not support this assertion unless one accepts the Soviet view that "the principles of peaceful
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
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important to distinguish the Soviet perception of peaceful coexistence from
that of many Americans. It is apparent the Soviets have something in mind
other than a pluralism of nation-states with differing social systems. Since
peaceful coexistence is based on the "fundamental laws of development in this
epoch," 24 the acceptance of this principle does not indicate the Soviet
renunciation of class struggle; rather, peaceful coexistence is a specific form of
the class struggle that is fundamental to the Marxist-Leninist view of
history. 25 "Being a form of class struggle, peaceful coexistence organically
includes a struggle between socialist and capitalist states in the field of
ideology." 26 Soviet writers openly acknowledge the "fighting" nature of their
views of international law. International relations are viewed as an arena of
confrontation between the forces of socialism and imperialism. 27 In this
confrontation, peaceful coexistence is the preferred means for achieving the
goals of communism and advancing and extending revolutionary and national
28
liberation movements.
For the Soviets, however, the class struggle and ideological conflict
inherent in peaceful coexistence does not preclude international agreements
coexistence are embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and have, therefore, become generally
accepted principles of international law." B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 13.
For a very different view of peaceful coexistence, see DECLINE OF THE WEST? GEORGE KENNAN AND
His CRITICS (M. Herz ed. 1978); DETENTE OR DEBACLE: COMMON SENSE IN U.S.-SovIET RELATIONS
(F. Neal ed. 1979); M. GEHLEN, THE POLITICS OF COEXISTENCE: SOVIET METHODS AND MOTIVES
(1967); H. KISSINGER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 141-76 (3d ed. 1977); B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9.
24. Sovetov, Contemporary International Relations and the Struggle of Ideas, INT'L AFF. (Moscow),
October 1973, at 58, 59-60; see G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 274-75.
25. G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 255-57, 261-62; Kapchenko, supra note 9, at 88-89; Molchanov,
supra note 11, at 4. According to Arbatov, after the 1917 Revolution, Soviet theorists debated whether to
impose socialism on other countries by force, or to encourage world revolution by peaceful means. The
latter approach, espoused by Lenin, was adopted. Lenin argued that those espousing Marxism should not
try to instigate revolutions, but should allow them to occur naturally. The Soviet objective was to set an
example that would encourage the development of revolution in all countries. G. ARBATOV, supra note 10,
at 255-57, 261-62. The Soviets believe the historical forces favoring the proletariat will eventually bring
about world revolution without Soviet involvement. Id. at 257. See also Kapchenko, Scientific Principlesof
Soviet Foreign Policy, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), October 1977, at 88-89.
26. Zakharov, InternationalCooperationand the Battle of Ideas, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), January 1976,
at 86. See also G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 255; Molchanov, supra note 11, at 4; Ziborov & Reshetov,
Ideological Struggle at the Present Stage, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), October 1977, at 92, 98-99.
27. "Present-day international relations constitute the arena of a tense and increasingly aggravating
confrontation of the forces of socialism and progress against imperialism and reaction." Molchanov, supra
note 11, at 3.
The existence of the two systems has another aspect, namely, that each of them embodies the
rule of a class-the capitalist in one case, and the working class in the other, and that an
uncompromising struggle, forming the basic content of our epoch, rages between them. The
struggle between these classes began long before the first Communist Party came into being,
and it was not called to life by Marx.
G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 274-76. See also Tunkin, supra note 6, at 25. Tunkin states that "socialist
ideology and bourgois ideology are irreconcilable and that there can be no agreements or compromises in
the ideological struggle." Id.
28. Kapchenko, supra note 9, at 86. See generally B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 111-50 and note 25
supra.
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489
between capitalist and socialist nations. The rules of international law
concern norms governing the behavior of nations, not agreement on ideological questions. 29 Thus, the ideological struggle inherent in peaceful coexistence
is compatible with international agreements between states with differing
social systems because contradictions of ideology do not preclude common
norms of international law.3 0 Soviet writers therefore believe it is consistent
for the Soviet Union to compromise in international relations to avoid
thermonuclear war, 31 while rejecting compromise in settling ideological
32
differences.
Given these Soviet views on ideological struggle within the context of
peaceful coexistence, it is not surprising to find Soviet writers stating that
space law is "asserting itself in an atmosphere marked by a sharp struggle
between the two opposing ideologies, '33 and that "the struggle around the
terms of space law is explained by profound ideological differences. ' 34 One
Soviet commentator has divided the history of space exploration into three
main stages: (1) a period of ideological differences over the status of outer
space and the legitimacy of various types of activities in space, (2) increasing
international cooperation, and (3) the linking of space law and activities in
35
outer space with detente.
While the Soviets acknowledge that peaceful coexistence permits international cooperation in space, 36 the peculiar nature of the Soviet concepts of
29. Tunkin, supra note 6, at 26-27.
30. G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 280; Tunkin, InternationalLaw and Ideological Struggle, INT'L
AFF. (Moscow), November 1971, at 25, 26; Ussenko, supra note 16, at 39. Soviet writers assert that
international cooperation is increasing under the conditions of peaceful coexistence, but they also maintain
that ideological struggle is intensifying. Zakharov, supra note 26, at 85-87. Cf. Volkonogrov, The
IdeologicalStruggle in Conditionsof Detente, 29 CURRENT DIG. OF THE SOVIET PRESS 5 (March 2, 1977).
For the Soviets, detente does not eliminate political struggle, it only becomes more diverse and acute.
Ziborov & Reshtov, supra note 26, at 98-99. This ideological struggle is not seen as the cause, but rather as
the result of the social and political contradictions of the modem world. G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 37;
Sovetov, supra note 24, at 60; Zakharov, supra note 26, at 88. So long as antagonistic classes exist,
ideological struggle is inevitable. G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 274-76; Korovin, supra note 23, at 56.
3 1. G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 273, 275; Sanakoyev, Foreign Policy and IdeologicalStruggle Today,
INT'L AFF. (Moscow), May 1974, at 70. See generally B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 111-40.
32. Korovin, supra note 23, at 54. "International compromise is desirable in interstate relations ....
It is inacceptable in the settlement of ideological differences." Id.
Being a form of class struggle, peaceful coexistence organically includes a struggle between
socialist and capitalist states, in the field of ideology. The character of this confrontation is
determined by the irreconcilability of the socialist and bourgeois philosophies. While in
politics and economics peaceful coexistence spells out the possibility and in some cases, the
need for compromises, agreement and cooperation, in ideology there is no room for this.
Zakharov, supra note 26, at 86-87. "The approach of the socialist countries and of the Communists to
peaceful coexistence includes an uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology. . . . There neither
is nor can be room for compromise between the bourgeois and the proletarian world outlook." G.
ARBATOV, supra 10, at 296. Cf Tunkin, supra note 6, at 25-27.
33. Kulebiakin, supra note 8, at 54.
34. Lazarev, supra note 5, at 161.
35. Kolosov, supra note 7, at 54.
36. Sedov, InternationalCooperation In Space Exploration, INT'L AFF. (Moscow) November 1973, at
16, 17; Kolosov, supra note 7, at 55.
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peaceful coexistence and detente must be kept in mind. Cooperative efforts in
space between the Soviet Union and United States, such as the 1975 ApolloSoyuz mission, have been praised in the Soviet news media,37 yet the rhetoric
of "uncompromising ideological struggle" under peaceful coexistence has
proceded unabated. Americans, therefore, should not assume that Soviet
perceptions of the nature and significance of United States-Soviet Union
cooperation in outer space are identical to their own views of these events.
Indeed, an effective understanding of space law requires one to keep in mind
the central differences between Soviet and American ideology.
B. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
In addition to understanding Soviet ideology on international law, it is
necessary to consider how the Soviets view the role of nation-states in
international law. The Soviets traditionally have advocated the view that the
only proper parties to international law are nation-states. One jurist stated
that "[r]ules of international law which are formulated in the course of
struggle and cooperation of states with different social systems and result
from agreement (compromise) among them can be elaborated only by states.
The activity of formulating rules is an inherent right of sovereign states."3
Soviet writers have generally found that only nation-states may legally
conduct activities in outer space. 39
The Soviet Union traditionally has stressed the importance of state
sovereignty, asserting that recognition of sovereign prerogatives of the nationstate is essential to international law. 40 Since the principle of respect for state
37. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
II SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-75 at 50-53 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SOVIET SPACE
PROGRAMS].
38. Kamenetskaya, The Role of InternationalOrganizations in the Formation of InternationalSpace
Law, 16 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 42 (1974). Cf Osakwe, Soviet "Pactomania" and Critical
Negativism in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 10 L. IN E. EUROPE 291, 293 (1975). See generally. B.
RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 73-86. Ramundo suggests that the rationale for this policy is the Soviet
Union's desire not to detract from sovereign prerogatives of nations or to encourage world government.
39. Piradov & Rybakov, First Space Treaty, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), March 1967, at 21, 25 (1967);
Zhukov, PracticalProblemsof Space Law, INT'L AFF.(Moscow), May 1963, at 27, 29 (1963). More recent
statements, however, indicate a possible shift in this position. Some Soviet jurists have taken positions that
would permit limited expansion of the concept of juridical entities in international law to include some
international organizations. B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 80-82. At least one writer has asserted that
international intergovernmental organizations involved in space activities (e.g., Interkosmos) may be
deemed juridical subjects of international law. Vereschetin, The "Intercosmos" Programme in the Light of
Main Principlesof Space Law, 15 COLLOQUIUM 233, 237 (1973). It is interesting to note, however, that
despite Vereschetin's 1973 view that Intercosmos could be a proper party to an international agreement, in
1977 he asserted that only nation-states may legally conduct business in outer space. Vereschetin, supra
note 7, at 103. It is unclear whether these views on the judicial status of intergovernmental organizations in
international law are aberrational or whether they signal the beginning of a shift in Soviet thinking on the
subject. Given the traditional emphasis Soviet jurists have placed on the central role of nation-states in
international relations, including activities in outer space, such a shift in Soviet thinking seems unlikely.
40. See generally, B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 87-107.
1979]
OUTER SPACE
sovereignty is imperative in international law, it also must be "strictly
observed" in outer space. 4t Indeed, since respect for state sovereignty is an
indispensable prerequisite for cooperation in outer space, only those decisions
that take into account the legitimate interests of all the states involved or
affected, according to the Soviets, will enjoy international recognition and
promote successful cooperation. 42 International law should not be used as an
excuse to negate state sovereignty. 43 Even in the absence of international
cooperation, activities in space should be conducted in a manner that avoids
infringing upon the interest of the other states44 because the freedom to use
and explore outer space cannot serve as a pretext for the violation of sovereign
rights on earth.45 These Soviet premises are relevant to the Soviet Union's
positions on remote sensing and direct broadcasting satellites.
A corollary of the Soviet view on the primacy of state sovereignty is the
notion that the single source of all international law norms is agreement by
nation-states. 46 This position leads to a general Soviet refusal to recognize
custom as a formal source of international law and to a Soviet emphasis on the
need to develop international law through treaty agreements. 47 Since the
41. Kulebiakin, Some Legal Problemsof the PracticalUse of Space Technology, 20 COLLOQUIUM, supra
note 7, at 322, 325 (1978).
42. Id. Nikolayev, International Co-operation for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, INT'L AFF.
(Moscow), May 1960, at 76, 80; Korovin, Outer Space Must Become a Zone of Real Peace, INT'L AFF.
(Moscow), September 1963, at 92, 93.
43. See B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 39.
44. Dudakov, InternationalLegal Problemson the Use of Geostationary Orbit, 19 COLLOQUIUM, supra
note 7, at 406, 407-08 (1977) (citing art. I ofthe Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 21, 1967, art. I, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205). While unobjectionable on its face, the notion of respect for the
interests of other nations assumes a special meaning within the Soviet theory of peaceful coexistence, a
meaning which permits the Soviet Union to utilize national sovereignty "both as a shield to protect the
Soviet Union from interference by capitalist states and as a weapon in its struggle with such states." B.
RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 87-107.
45. Vereschetin, Perspectives on the Uses of Outer Space for Applied Purposes and State Sovereignty, 19
COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 103, 104 (1977).
46. Velyaminov, supra note 10, at 141. Cf. B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 43-50. As indicated by
Ramundo, this position allows the Soviet Union to refuse to be bound by international law norms to which
it has not consented. Furthermore, it provides the Soviet Union with a de facto "veto" over those norms
not possessing a "progressive" content. Id. at 49-50. This limits the formal source of international law to
treaties and principles to which nations have expressly consented. See generally Erickson, Soviet Theory of
the Legal Nature of Customary International Law, 7 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 148, 156-62 (1975);
Osakwe, supra note 38, at 297-99.
47. Korovin, supra note 23, at 61-62; Cf. Zhukov, supra note 7, at 204. See generally B. RAMUNDO,
supra note 9, at 43-71; Osakwe, supra note 38. The use of custom as a source of international law has been
advocated by numerous legal commentators, Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law,
1974-1975 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1-10 (1977), accepted by various nations, id., and relied upon by the
International Court of Justice in a number of cases, see, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1974] I.C.J. 4;
The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10. Nations other than the Soviet Union also reject custom as a
source of international law in the absence of consent by the affected nation-states. Akehurst, supra at 1-10.
Even among those who accept the doctrine there is disagreement over its nature, scope, and limitations. Id.
An extensive discussion of custom as a source of international law is beyond the scope of this article. For a
more detailed consideration of the matter, see generally id. at 1-53. Soviet jurists generally reject the use of
custom as a source of international law. B. RAMUNDO, supra note 9, at 60-64. But see Erickson, supra note
46.
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sources of space law are the same as the sources of international law, 48 this
49
Soviet position is applicable to the law of outer space.
Given the importance Soviet jurists place on (1) the need to reject
"reactionary principles" of international law, (2) the rejection of compromise
with capitalism on the ideological level, and (3) the importance of state
sovereignty, it is not surprising that they have adopted a position on the
sources of international law that has the effect of giving the Soviet Union a de
facto veto over the proposed international law norms that it finds objectionable. Furthermore, the Soviet Union can be expected to resist space law
proposals that it deems inconsistent with its notions of contemporary
international law ane peaceful coexistence. The Soviets can be expected to
pursue their goal of establishing a "progressive" law of outer space, including
a "progressive" concept of the peaceful uses of outer space.
Because of their emphasis on treaty agreements as the source of international law, Soviet jurists stress the importance of existing agreements in the
area of space law. The Soviets believe that the Outer Space Treaty;5 0 the
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the
Return of Objects Launched in Outer Space; 51 and the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 52 provide the
basic international legal framework for space activities. The Outer Space
Treaty53 is of prime importance.54 Furthermore, the importance of the United
Nations Charter within the Soviet perception of peaceful coexistence 55 leads
Soviet jurists to assert that activities in space must conform to the Charter's
aims and principles. 56 One limitation on the value of existing agreements in
48. Zhukov, supra note 8, at 132.
49. Kamenetskaya, supra note 38, at 42; Kolosov, supra note 8, at 46; Korovin, supra note 23, at 61-62;
Zhukov, supra note 39, at 29. Interestingly, some Soviet jurists have expressed views that appear to conflict
with this basic position. For example, one writer has indicated that, with time, custom might play a role in
consolidating rules of space law. Zhukov, supra note 8, at 132. Kolossov expressed the unusual view (for a
Soviet writer) that the prohibition against national appropriation contained in the Outer Space Treaty, Jan.
21, 1967, art. IV, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, is a generally recognized principle
of international law independent of the treaty itself and that this principle has been established "as an
international habit." Kolossov, Sovereignty in Outer Space Law, 19 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 411
(1977). It is not clear if these views represent a change in Soviet policy or if they are merely aberrational.
50. Jan. 21, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
51. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599 (providing for assistance by
parties in event of accidents, distress, or unintended landing affecting the territory of nonlaunching party).
52. Effective Oct. 9, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762. This treaty establishes settlement and
negotiation procedures for placing liability on and collecting damages from the party launching an object
that causes damage in another party's territory, in the air, or in outer space. Id.
53. Jan. 21, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
54. Kolosov, supra note 7, at 56; Dudakov, The Outer Space Treaty and Subsequent Scientific
Development of International Space Law, 17 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 107 (1975).
55. See note 23 & accompanying text supra.
56. Zhukov, Space Espionage Plans and InternationalLaw, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), October 1960, at 53,
56; Korovin, Peaceful Cooperation in Space, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), March 1962 at 61. Interestingly, the
Soviets feel nations are bound only by the U.N. Charter and not by the U.N. resolutions. United Nations
1979]
OUTER SPACE
space law is that they require formal negotiations for adaptation to new
patterns of activity that are caused by advances in space exploration. 57 While
this desire for elaboration of principles of space law is consistent with the
general Soviet emphasis on codifying international law, 58 a system of formal
codification may retard the timely adaptation of international law to new
situations.
The reliance by the Soviets on formal agreements between nations is of
great importance throughout the discussions that follow. The Soviet view of
each specific issue regarding peaceful uses of outer space is significantly
affected by the Soviet policy of being bound only by formally codified treaties
entered into by, and only by, sovereign nation-states. The result of this policy
is a structured, formal framework in which rules of space law are shaped.
II.
GENERAL SOVIET VIEWS ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE
According to the Soviets, the peaceful uses of space exclude any activity of
a military nature.59 It is not an easy matter, however, to define "activity of a
military nature." Initially the Soviets linked the idea of peaceful uses of outer
space with the need for general and complete disarmament on Earth. 60 Yet
today this position has changed because of political considerations. 61
Some Soviet jurists have drawn a distinction between the neutralization of
outer space and the demilitarization of space, the former meaning the
exclusion of space from the sphere of armed hostilities (e.g., combat personnel
in space) and the latter meaning the exclusion from space of any activity that
pursues military purposes or objectives in peacetime (e.g., reconnaisance
satellites). 62 Another distinction has been made between acts of war and acts
that create "mistrust, ill will, and similar cold war consequences." 63
resolution%on outer space are viewed only as preliminary stages in the formulation of international norms
of space law and they achieve full juridical force only upon ratification by nations. Kamenetskaya, supra
note 38, at 43. Cf. Zhukov, supra note 7, at 204.
57 Kulebyakin, supra note 8, at 55. Cf Kulebyakin, supra note 8, at 324, 326; Rudev, Legal Aspects of
Manned Space Stations in Earth Orbit, 16 COLLOQUIuM, supra note 7, at 239 (1974); Vasilevskaia, The
Development of the Moon: Some Prospectsfor Regulation by Law, 10 SoviET L. & Gov'T 362, 364 (1972).
58. See generally Osakwe, supra note 38.
59. Zhukov, supra note 39, at 28-29. The United States and Soviet Union, at least initially, disagreed on
this very basic issue. The United States maintains that nonaggressive military uses of space, such as
reconnaissance, are peaceful and, thus, permitted under international law. G. G'AL, SPACE LAW 164-67
(l9Q),
60. Korovin, supra note 8, at 57-58; Korovin, On the Neutralization and Demilitarization of Outer
Space, INT'i_
Ar-:. (Moscow), December 1959, at 82 (1959); Nikolayev, supra note 42, at 76-77; Korovin,
supra note 23, at 62; Zhukov, supra note 7, at 205-07; Zhukov supra note 56, at 56.
61. See notes 62-85 infra.
62. Zhukov, supra note 56, at 55. The distinction drawn here refers specifically to the United States
program of developing reconnaissance satellites. The Soviets consider the collection of intelligence data by
these satellites to be a military activity. Id. at 55-56.
63. Korovin, supra note 8. at 56.
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One Soviet writer's view on how to distinguish between activities in space
that are for military purposes and those that are for peaceful purposes is
revealing:
Indeed, it is not always possible to draw a line of distinction
between the exploration of outer space for military and peaceful
purposes, because a rocket-carrier can equally place in orbit around
the earth a spy satellite, intended for reconnoit[e]ring ground
objectives, and a weather-mapping satellite or a civilian telecommunications satellite. That is why everything depends on who
determines the programme for space explorations and what the
aims of these explorations are. 64
Despite the subjective quality of this approach, the Soviets insist it is
objective. As pointed out earlier, Soviet jurists argue that the same terms can
be used in "progressive" and "reactionary" senses. It is a small step from this
view to the characterization of activities in space as peaceful or military in
nature as a function of the "progressive" or "reactionary" nature of the state
conducting the activities.
In contrast, one Western commentator has argued that the distinction
between peaceful and military purposes is artificial and that it should be
abandoned in favor of an analysis that focuses on whether particular types of
activities in space should be allowed or prohibited, regardless of which state is
conducting them. 65 This approach is unlikely to be accepted, however,
because Soviet jurists have long attributed aggressive, militaristic motives to
American activities in outer space. Since the beginning of the space age,
Soviet writers have contended that: (1) the Cold War is the midwife of the
United States space research, 66 (2) the West seeks to use space for its
aggressive purposes, 67 (3) the American exploration of space "is subordinated
to plans for its military utilization, ' 68 (4) the United States plans to use the
moon for military purposes, 69 (5) United States communications satellites will
be used for purposes of Cold War propaganda, 70 (6) American cooperation
64. Larionov, The Doctrine of Military Domination in Outer Space, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), October
1964, at 25, 28. Larionov asserts that most United States space launchings are oriented toward military
objectives such as reconnaissance, missile defense alarm systems, and guidance devices. Id. at 28-29.
65. Gorove, Arms Control Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty: A Scrutinizing Reappraisal, 3 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 114, 119-20 (1973).
66. Space Exploration and International Relations, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), June 1961, at 57, 59. The
Soviets contend that the United States has sought to assert dominance over outer space in order to bolster
its prestige in the ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. The Soviets believe that the United States
space program is intended to promote an aggressive foreign policy. Id.
67. Korovin, supra note 8, at 59.
68. Zhukov, supra note 7, at 202. See also Milstein, The U.S.A. Plans Military Use of OuterSpace, INTL
Ai'i. (Moscow), May 1959, at 44; Larionov, supra note 64.
69. Zhukov, The Moon, Politics, and Law, INT'L AFP. (Moscow), September 1966, at 32, 34. This article
was indicative of Soviet fears that the United States Apollo moon program was military in nature and had.
as one of its goals, the use of the moon for military purposes. Id. Even after the Apollo XI lunar landing in
July 1969, the Soviets continued to express such fears. See Kulebyakin, supra note 8, at 55.
70. G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 31; Cheprov, Monopolies Reach Out for Outer Space, INT'L AFF.
1979]
OUTER SPACE
with other nations in space activities is designed to further militaristic goals of
the Pentagon, produce profit for United States monopolists, and allow for the
dumping of obsolete United States space equipment on other nations. 71 Not
surprisingly, the Soviets attribute only the noblest motives to their own
activities in outer space. 72 While the Soviets' view of their own activity has
continued, there has been a recent absence of Soviet criticism of the United
73
States space program as being military in nature.
A perusal of Soviet writings reveals apparent inconsistencies in the views of
which activities in space are peaceful. Some examples are:
(1) "The peaceful uses of outer space" means that all activities in space
must be of a nonmilitary nature; that is, space should be completely
74
and totally demilitarized.
(2) The Outer Space Treaty 75 provides for complete demilitarization of
the Moon and other celestial bodies, but only partial demilitariza76
tion of outer space.
(3) The principle of the peaceful uses of outer space does not preclude
retaliation against an aggressor made via outer space or the use of
77
space in accordance with Article 51 of the U. N. Charter.
(4) The use of satellites for military surveillance is aggressive because it
threatens the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the
78
nation-state under surveillance.
(Moscow), December 1963, at 35, 39-40. Although they espouse a willingness to engage in an ideological
struggle with capitalist nations, the Soviets regard political propaganda transmitted by the West as
"subversive activity tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of other countries." G. ARBATOV,
supra note 10, at 282.
71. Sibiryakov, Real Aims of U.S. Space "Cooperation," INT'L AFF. (Moscow), February 1966, at 62.
Cf. Shkolenko, Explorationof Space and InternationalCooperation, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), February 1973,
at 33.
72. See SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, supra note 37, at 35-36. The Soviets have consistently identified the
purposes of their space program with the search for world peace and achieving the good of mankind. They
also stress their technical successes in space exploration while downgrading United States space activities.
For example, more value was placed on the unmanned Soviet lunar probe, Lunokod I, than Apollo XIV.
Id. at 36-40.
73. Id. at 32-33. This is probably due at least in part to the Soviets' inability to deny their own technical
achievements which include activities that the Soviets criticized when engaged in only by the United States.
The Soviets' ability to conduct satellite reconnaissance activities, in conjunction with their approval of it as
a check of SALT I, entered into force, October 23, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. 7504, restricts their
ability to criticize similar activites by the United States.
74. Zhukov, On the Question of Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful Use of Outer Space" Contained in
the Space Treaty, 11 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 36 (1969); Hopkins, Legal Implications of Remote
Sensing of Earth Resources by Satellite, 78 MIL. L. REV. 57, 85-86 (Fall 1977). See also note 59 &
accompanying text supra.
75. Jan. 21, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
76. Vereshetin, Basic Principles of Space Law, 1966-67 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 125 (1968). See Outer
Space Treaty, Jan. 21, 1967, art. IV, para. 2, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
77. Zhukov, supra note 7, at 204. See also G'AL, supra note 59, at 183-85. Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter states in pertinent part: "Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
• U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
78. Hopkins, supra note 74, at 88. Hopkins adds that the United States view is that such activities are
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(5) Satellites may be used to ensure compliance with certain treaties-e.g., the 1972 Soviet-American treaty on limiting antiballistic
missiles. 79
There are also discrepancies between Soviet theory and practice regarding
the concept of peaceful uses of space. For example, despite their characterization of satellite surveillance as aggressive, the Soviets use reconnaissance
satellites. 80 Despite their arguments for total demilitarization of outer space,
the Soviets have engaged in research on "killer satellite" capabilities. 8' Soviet
views and practice regarding military activities in relation to the concept of
peaceful uses of outer space have not been consistent.
Another aspect of the Soviet concept of peaceful uses of outer space is
revealed by the distinctions drawn by some Soviet jurists between the freedom
of outer space and the freedom to use outer space, and between the research
or exploration of outer space and the use of outer space. According to one
author, research of outer space "is directed toward broadening and extending
our knowledge of outer space," while the "applied use of space means the aim
is the achievement of economic, social and other results directly connected
with improvement of the life conditions of people on the Earth". 82 Another
writer has distinguished between the exploration of celestial bodies and the
peaceful because collection of intelligence data allows for a more informed, rational judgment with regard
to military actions, thereby contributing to worldwide stability. Id. See also G'AL, supra note 59, at 169.
79. Kolosov, supra note 7, at 57. The proposed SALT II treaty would permit the United States and the
Soviet Union to verify compliance with its provisions by means of satellite surveillance. See, e.g., The Key
SALT Issue, NEWSWEEK, April 23, 1979, at 46. Article XV states that "each party shall use national
technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law." SALT II, 79 DEP'T STATE BULL. 23 (1979).
80. Soraghan, Reconnaissance Satellites: Legal Characterizationand Possible Utilizationfor Peacekeeping, 13, MCGILL L.J. 458, 475-76 (1967); Expansion Marks Soviet Drive in Space, 106 Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH. 63, 66 (March 21, 1977). See also STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENTS: SIPRI YEARBOOK 1977, at 123-30 (1977).
81. Zedalis & Wade, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the OuterSpace Treaty of 1967, 8 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
454, 455 (1978). The Soviets are allegedly working on the production of a directed energy weapon capable
of destroying satellites in space. Id. at 455. Deployment of such a weapon may violate the Outer Space
Treaty's prohibitions against placing in orbit "around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or
any kind of weapons of mass destruction, install[ing] such weapons on celestial bodies, or station[ing] such
weapons in outer space in any other manner." Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 21, 1967, art. IV, para. 1, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
In April 1979, the United States Government indicated that the Soviet Union had ceased its antisatellite
testing for almost a year. Wilson, Soviets Ceased Antisatellite Testing 11 Months Ago, Wash. Post, Apr. 21,
1979, § A, at 1, col. 4. Furthermore, the Soviet Union and the United States have been engaged in talks
since 1978 concerned with limiting the development and testing of antisatellite weaponry. Id.; Burt, U.S.
Seeks to Curb "Killer Satellites," N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 4. See generally Burt, New Killer
Satellites Make "Sky-War" Possible, N. Y. Times, June 11, 1978, § 4, at 3, col. 1; Covault, U.S. Pushes
Antisatellite Effort, 109 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH. 14 (July 17, 1978); Shipler, Soviet Said to Agree on
Space Arms Talks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1978, § I, at 5, col. 1 See also STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: SIPRI YEARBOOK 1978, at
108-14.
82. Kulebiakin, supra note 41, at 323. The applied use of space technology includes the use ofsatellites
for communications, remote sensing of the Earth, meteorological observations, and navigational assistance.
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OUTER SPACE
use of their resources, a distinction embodied in the language of the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967.83 While nations may exercise a wide degree of freedom
in scientific research and exploration of space, their freedom to use outer
space is expressly limited by the ban on national appropriation and the
principle of the equality of all states in international law. 84 This approach is
consistent with the Soviet view that the need for a legal regime in space
requires states to assume firm obligations regarding activities they can and
cannot conduct in space.8 5 In short, the Soviets reject any approach that
would amount to a laissez-faire attitude toward the law of outer space or to
protection of the rights of national sovereignty in outer space.
Yet another aspect of the Soviet perception of peaceful uses of outer space
is the need and desirability of cooperation in space research for peaceful
purposes. 86 One Soviet commentator stated that cooperation is the second
main principle governing activities in outer space (respect for state sovereignty being the first main principle).8 7 Another espoused the view that the idea of
cooperation among states in space occupies a central place in the Outer Space
Treaty.8 8 From the Soviet perspective, only those decisions that take into
account the legitimate interests of all states involved will promote successful
cooperation in outer space.8 9 Indeed, international cooperation in space is
portrayed as the results of efforts by socialist countries and "progressive
forces" to combat attempts by capitalist countries to use outer space for
interests hostile to mankind. 90
Within this context, Soviet attitudes toward American efforts at cooperation in space have varied with time. The United States has been accused of
seeking cooperation on unequal terms in violation of the principle of the
83. Vassilevskaya, Notions of "Exploration" and "Use" of Natural Resources of Celestial Bodies, 20
COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 473, 473-74 (1978). Exploration entails scientific research in outer space,
whereas use means the development and exploitation of natural resources. Article I of the Outer Space
Treaty provides: (1) states have equality in the exploration and use of outer space and freedom of scientific
investigation; (2) states can make no claim of sovereignty over celestial bodies in outer space. Jan. 21, 1967,
art. I, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
84. Kolossov, Sovereignty in Outer Space Law, 19 COLLOQUIUM 411, 412-13 (1977).
85. Zolotov, Space Rights and Obligations, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), July 1963, at 92, 93; The Cosmos
Must Be a Peace Zone, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), December 1963, at 41, 42-43. Cf Kulebiakin, supra note 8,
at 324.
86. Zhukov, supra note 69, at 34; Sevastyanov & Ursul, Cosmonautics and Social Development, 11
INT'L AFE. (Moscow), November 1977, at 70, 76-77. Vasilevskaia, supra note 57, at 373-74.
87. Kulebiakin, supra note 41, at 325. See also Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 21, 1967, art. I, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; id. art. IX (which provides that states will follow the principle of
cooperation and mutual assistance).
88. Kamenetskaya, CooperationAmong States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space--One of the
Basic Principlesof InternationalOuterSpace Law, 19 COLLOQUIUM 299, 301 (1977). Kamenetskaya argues
that most of the Outer Space Treaty, Jan 21, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205,
including articles I, III, V, IX and X, supports the principle of cooperation in the exploration and use of
outer space.
89. Nikolayev, supra note 42, at 80. Cf. Korovin, supra note 42, at 93.
90. Shkolenko, supra note 71, at 33.
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equality of nations. 91 Space cooperation by the United States has been
characterized as "militaristic" and intended to benefit American
"monopolists." Yet, Soviet commentators and the Soviet news media have
praised and supported U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation resulting from the 1972
Moscow agreements, 92 especially cooperation relating to the Apollo-Soyuz
mission of 1975. 93 This praise of the Apollo-Soyuz mission is in sharp contrast
with past Soviet criticism of the United States space program. In general,
Soviet approval and criticism of American activities in space ebbs and flows
according to the immediate state of relations between the two countries.
III.
SOVIET VIEWS ON PARTICULAR ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE
Satellite Reconnaissance. Early Soviet writings on satellite activity criticized the United States for conducting space espionage by satellite, accusing
the United States of using civilian meteorological satellites for espionage
purposes. 94 According to these writers, Soviet opposition to American
satellite reconnaissance is based on Soviet opposition to "everything that runs
counter to the interests of peace and helps prepare for aggressive war," 95 and
on the fact that such reconnaissance is espionage, and is therefore incompatible with generally recognized principles of international law. 96 Soviet writers
gloss over the fact that their characterization of satellite surveillance as "space
espionage" does not comport with traditional definitions of espionage. They
ignore the fact that-even if such satellite surveillance constituted espio97
nage-espionage is a violation of national, not international, law.
Interestingly, recent Soviet writings have lacked references to and criticisms of American "space espionage. ' 98 At least one writer has expressed the
view that the 1972 Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of antiballistic
missile systems 99 recognizes the use of inspection by satellites to ensure
91. Stashev, Outer Space: Cooperation or Diktat? INT'L AFF. (Moscow), September 1964, at 91. Stashev
argues that the United States "took measures to bar the United Nations and the International
Telecommunications Union from deciding concrete questions of establishing and operating a communications system and, behind the back of these organizations, reached understanding with . . . its allies (on
dividing profits] from the operation of the system between the big monopolies." Id. See also Aldoshin,
Outer Space Must Be a Peace Zone, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), December 1968, at 38-39.
92. Treaty on the Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, May
24, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 867, T.I.A.S. No. 7347.
93. Sedov, supra note 36; SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, supra note 37, at 50-53.
94. E.g., Zhukov, supra note 56, at 55.
95. Id. at 57.
96. Id. at 55; Zhukov, supra note 39, at 29.
97. Hopkins, supra note 74, at 91-92; Soraghan, supra note 80, at 469-73. These authors argue that
satellite surveillance activities are not illegal under international law. The Hague Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, § II, ch. II, art. 29, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539,
could arguably cover these activities. The Convention defines espionage as the acquisition of information
by clandestine acts with the intent of transferring that information to an enemy. Id.
98. Soraghan, supra note 80, at 473-74, 489-93.
99. Cited in Report of the Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellite on the Work of its
Third Session, 28 U.N. GAOR 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/125 (1974).
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observance of obligations under the treaty.100 Apparently, circumstances have
caused a shift in the Soviet position concerning reconnaissance satellites.
Alternatively, the Soviets may not have changed their official views on the
matter, but merely may have become more discreet on the subject.
Remote Sensing.10 1The Soviets are not opposed per se to remote sensing of
the Earth from outer space. One Soviet writer has stated that the purpose of
the Soviet position on remote sensing is not to prohibit it altogether, "but
rather to prevent any possible misuse of the collected data concerning the
natural resources of a foreign state or any use of that data to the detriment of
the sovereign rights and interests of the state concerned." 0 2 Thus, where the
target of remote sensing is the territory of the sensing state or regions outside
the national jurisdiction of any state, e.g., the high seas or Antarctica, remote
sensing may be conducted freely and the information that is obtained may be
utilized without restriction. 10 3 On the other hand, when the surveillance is
conducted over the territory of another sovereign state, the Soviets believe in
the inherent right of a sovereign to place restrictions on the dissemination of
the information obtained. 0 4
The Soviet position on remote sensing is based on three premises of
international law and the law of outer space. First, all space vehicles used for
applied purposes are earth oriented. They are not intended for the exploration
of outer space as such, but rather for solving purely terrestrial problems.105
100. Kolosov, supra note 7, at 57.
101. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has defined remote sensing as
"a methodology to assist in characterizing the nature and condition of the natural resources, natural
features and phenomena, and the environment of the Earth by means of observations and measurements
from space platforms." Report of the Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites on the
Work of its Third Session, 28 U.N. GAOR, Annex IV, at 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/133 (1974), quoted in
Vlasic, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from OuterSpace, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW
337 (N. Jasentuliyana & R. Lee eds. 1979). The practical applications of remote sensing have been
summarized as follows:
Remote sensing photographic techniques are employed in a variety of fields including
agriculture, forestry, hydrology, oceanography and mineral exploration. They permit the
observation of such cyclic natural phenomena as hurricanes and forest fires. They allow the
exposure and observation of natural and artificial topographical phenomena such as
mountains, shorelines, industrial and urban concentrations, and permit the composite
mapping of the features of natural and cultural landscapes. These techniques can thus be
applied to a wide spectrum of uses. They can potentially serve, inter alia, to detect symptoms
of crop disease, to assist in predicting future crop yields, to locate fishing grounds and major
geological structures, some of which may be associated with ore deposits and potential oilbearing structures.
Dalfen, The InternationalLegislative Process: Direct Broadcastingand Remote Earth Sensing by Satellite
Compared, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 186, 190 (1972).
102. Zhukov, International Law Problems Related to the Exploration of Earth Resources from Outer
Space, 19 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 108, 112 (1977).
103. Id. at I11.
104. See text accompanying notes 106-12 infra.
105. Bordunov, Some Legal Problemsof Remote Sensing of Earthfrom OuterSpace, 20 COLLOQUIUM,
supra note 7, at 496 (1978); Vereschetin, supra note 7, at 103. See generally Galloway, Direct Broadcast
Satellites and Space Law, 3 J. SPACE L. 3, 5-9 (Spring-Fall 1975); Hopkins, supra note 74, at 69.
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Second, national sovereignty encompasses the sovereignty of states over their
own natural resources.1 06 This sovereignty includes the right to dispose of
data concerning a state's natural resources, including data obtained by remote
sensing from outer space. 107 Third, the principle of respect for state sovereignty is central to international law and is incorporated into the law of outer
08
space.1
Accordingly, the Soviets conclude that remote sensing must be conducted
with due respect for national sovereignty, including the sovereign right of
states over their own natural resources.1 09 Since the information about
another nation's natural resources may be used to exert "economic pressure
threatening the foundations of the state's economic life and its sovereignty," 110 abuse of thai information endangers national sovereignty."' The
sensing state, therefore, has the obligation to transmit information concerning
natural resources to the sensed state on mutually acceptable terms, and the
information obtained by remote sensing should not be revealed to third
12
parties without the consent of the state whose territory was sensed.
Soviet jurists have noted that the absence of norms dealing specifically with
remote sensing does not mean there is a legal vacuum in the area." 3 Arguing
that existing norms and principles of space law cannot adequately resolve the
legal problems posed by remote sensing, 114 the Soviets, along with other
106. Bordanov, Practical Use of Space Vehicles in the Light of the Principle of State Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources, 16 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 103, 103-04 (1974); Bordunov, Use of Space
Technology to Explore for Natural Resources, 14 SoVIET L. & GOV'T 98, 101 (1975).
107. Zhukov, supra note 102, at 109-10.
108. See notes 40-49 & accompanying text supra.
109. Bordunov, supra note 106, at 101-02.
110. Id.
111. Vereschetin, supra note 7, at 105; Bordunov, supra note 105, at 497-98.
112. Zhukov, supra note 102, at 110; Bordunov, supra note 105. Bordunov suggests that there may be
some exceptions to this rule. For example, meteorological and oceanographic information obtained by
remote sensing satellites may be freely disseminated without prior consent since these kinds of information
do not affect national sovereignty. Id. at 497. See Stowe, The Development of InternationalLaw Relating to
Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, 5 J. SPACE L. 101, 106 (Spring-Fall 1977):
The United States, among others, has consistently taken the position that open data
dissemination to all interested parties is in fact more likely to enhance than to diminish the
ability of States to control their natural resources. As a practical matter the adoption of a
restricted dissemination policy would probably establish a privileged class of countries,
technologically advanced enough to have their own remote sensing programs and therefore
capable of obtaining worldwide or broad regional data directly, and a class consisting of most
other countries which could obtain only limited portions of the available data possessed by
others. Further, restricting data dissemination in order to protect local control over natural
resources would seem to be an unnecessary and counterproductive legal overkill, particularly
in light of the fact that neither the dissemination nor the analysis of the data could affect that
control. Only at the point that someone attempts to apply that information to implement an
actual plan for development or exploitation of particular natural resources is the question of
State control affected.
Id. (citation omitted).
113. Bordunov, supra note 106, at 100-01.
114. Id. Bordunov, supra note 105, at 496.
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nations, have advocated the need for a specific legal regime to cover remote
sensing.'" 5 Unfortunately, agreement on the need for such legal principles has
not yet translated itself into an agreement on the legal principles that will
govern the area.
In contrast to the Soviet position on remote sensing, the United States
position is that remote sensing is not barred by any provision of international
law, that it does not require prior consent of the nonsensing countries, and
that it does not constitute interference with the sovereignty of sensed nations
6 The contrast between the Soviet and American
over their natural resources. 11
perspectives on remote sensing results from fundamental differences in the
basic premises upon which each nation bases its analysis. Agreement between
the Soviet Union and the United States on principles governing remote
sensing, therefore, seems unlikely in the near future.
Direct broadcastingsatellites.117 The Soviet position on direct broadcasting
satellites parallels its stand on remote sensing. The Soviet argument may be
summarized as follows:
(1) All space vehicles used for applied purposes are earth oriented.
Rather than being used for the exploration of outer space, they are
intended to solve purely terrestrial problems." 8
(2) Each state has the right, as a sovereign, to regulate its own
telecommunications and broadcasting services.""
(3) The concept of the "free flow of information"'12 0 is not a generally
recognized principle of international law and, therefore, has no
legal force or effect. 12 1 Since the Soviets refuse to accept the "free
115. See, e.g., Soviet-French Draft Treaty on Remote Sensing, 28 U.N. GAOR, Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/133 (1974) cited in Zhukov, supra note 102, at 110-12
and Bordunov, supra note 106, at 99-100.
116. See generally Stowe, supra note 112, at 101-09 (1977). For a discussion of Latin American views
on remote sensing, see S. GOROVE, STUDIES IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 187-96
(1977). For a Canadian jurist's discussion of remote sensing, see Dalfen, supra note 101.
117. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) defines a broadcasting satellite service, i.e.
direct broadcasting satellite, as "a radiocommunication service in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended for direct reception by the general public." ITU Radio Regulation
No. 84AP, Spa 2, quoted in Gottlieb & Dalfen, Direct Satellite Broadcasting: A Case Study in the
Development of the Law of Space Communications, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 283 (N. Jasentuilayana &
R. Lee eds. 1979). Gottlieb and Dalfen provide a general discussion of United Nations handling of the
matter of direct broadcasting satellites. Id.
118. Vereschetin, supra note 7, at 103; Bordunov, supra note 105, at 496. See also text accompanying
note 105 supra.
11q. Kolossov, Legal Consequences of Spill-Over Resulting From Satellite Direct Broadcasting, 15
COl LOQUIUM 73 (1973). Kolossov asserts that the sovereign right of nations to regulate the content of
their own broadcasting programs does not include the right to interfere with the internal affairs of other
nations. Id. See also Dudakov, Legal Aspects of Direct Television Broadcasting, 16 Colloquium 65 (1974).
120. See e.g. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, supra note 37, at 190-91. In the view of Western
commentators, this concept includes the right of all people "to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." Id. at 190.
121. Dudakov, supra note 119, at 68. Dudakov argues that direct broadcasting may adversely effect the
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flow of information" concept, they believe that there is insufficient
agreement to raise that concept to the status of a recognized
principle of international law. This refusal stems from a belief that
recognition of this concept would adversely affect the sovereign
rights of nations.
(4) The fact that territorial sovereignty does not extend into space
cannot justify violation of sovereignty on Earth by direct broad22
casting. 1
(5) Direct broadcasting without the consent of the target state constitutes interference with its internal affairs in violation of its
23
sovereignty. 1
(6) Requiring the state's prior consent to broadcasts intended for its
population is the key to the legal regulation of direct broadcasting
by satellite.
124
The Soviet position on direct broadcasting is placed in better perspective if
viewed against the premises that United States communications satellites will
be used for Cold War propaganda 125 and that peaceful coexistence does not
mean the lessening of ideological struggle. 26 Although the Soviets frequently
refer to ideological struggle within the framework of peaceful coexistence,
their writings and actions indicate a general unwillingness to expose their
nation to the consequences of such ideological competition. For example,
while the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Agreement 127 in 1975, it has
repeatedly asserted that the provisions concerning circulation and exchange
of information and news among the signatory states do not sanction
cultural, religious, and social customs of a nation by transmitting information antagonistic to the target
state. Id. This possibility, Dudakov feels, supports the view that control over broadcasting is an inherent
right of a sovereign nation. Id. See also G. ARBATOV, supra note 10, at 292.
122. Zhukov, InternationalLaw Problemsof Direct Television Broadcastsfrom Satellites, 19 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, 115, 118 (1977). Zhukov notes that direct broadcasting is conducted for the purpose of
creating some desired effect on Earth. Id.
123. Kolosov, supra note 7, at 60-61. Kolosov, supra note 8, at 47-48; Zhukov, supra note 122, at 117.
The United States has rejected unequivocally such prior consent on the grounds it constitutes "government
censorship of program content and interference with the free flow of information and ideas." Galloway,
supra note 105, at 12. The United States has pointed out the need to resolve several issues: (I) the
reconciliation of a state veto over television broadcasts with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U. N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), which provides for the right to receive
freely information and ideas through the media; (2) the effect selective censorship would have on satellite
broadcasting; (3) the implications of broadcasting "spillover," transmissions that inadvertently reach areas
that are not targeted for reception. Id.
124. Zhukov, supra note 122, at 116.
125. Cheprov, supra note 70, at 39-40. Cheprov expresses the concern that American corporations
involved in satellite cummunications might invoke freedom of the press as a justification for engaging in
"slanderous and war-mongering" statements. Id. at 40. He also expresses the Soviet fear that the United
States Government might disclaim responsibility for actions of private corporations. See also G. ARBATOV,
supra note 10, at 31.
126. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
127. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Helsinki 1975, 73 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 323 (1975), 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIAL 1293 (1975).
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interference in the internal affairs of the respective nations. 128 The Soviets
have an expansive view of what constitutes "interference" in the internal
affairs of a nation. This view is broad and flexible enough to permit them to
invoke the principle of state sovereignty selectively, using the principle as a
bar to any flow of information or news that is deemed undesirable.
The United States position on direct broadcasting satellites provides a
sharp contrast to that of the Soviets. The United States consistently and
forcefully has espoused the view that the free and open exchange of ideas and
information, a principle embodied in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, 29 precludes the notion of prior consent and governmental
censorship of the content of direct broadcasting programs. 130 Since the Soviet
Union and the United States base their respective positions concerning direct
broadcasting satellites on radically different premises, agreement on the legal
regime for direct broadcasting seems as unlikely here as it does in the area of
remote sensing.
Natural resources in outer space. Although Soviet jurists agree that the
Moon and other celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation,
they distinguish between the principle of nonappropriation of celestial bodies
and the exploitation of natural resources. Arguing that nonappropriation does
not preclude the use of natural resources found in space, they draw an
analogy with the compatibility of nonappropriation of the high seas with the
freedom to use its resources. 13' Indeed, one Soviet writer has stated that the
use of valuable resources discovered on the Moon and on other planets "will
be an important factor on the way to prosperity and progress of the
32
society."
128. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DETENTE: ISSUES SERIES No. 1, at 26-30 (1977). The
Soviets argue that when the Helsinki Agreement, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES, CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE: FINAL ACT,
HELSINKI 1975 (publication No. 8826) (1975), is read as a whole, those provisions concerning human
rights cannot be given precedence over the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other
nations. Id.
129. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948).
130. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, supra note 37, at 195-96. Galloway, supra note 105, at 10-12. There is
no general agreement on what constitutes prior consent. "To some nations it mean[s] prior consent to
launching an operational system; to others it mean[s] a general overview of broadcasting; and to still others,
prior consent mean[s] government censorship of the content of each individual program.- Id. at 12. The
Soviet views on regulating the content of direct broadcasting programs are shared, in part, by various Third
World nations. See, e.g., Cocca, The Supreme Interests of Mankind Vis-a-Vis the Emergence of Direct
Broadcast. 2 J. SPACE L. 83 (1974); Dalfen, supra note 101.
131. Dekanozov, Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon and the Legal Status of its Natural Resources, 20
COLLOQUIUM 197 (1978); Dekanozov, Juridical Nature of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, 17 COLLOQUIUM 200, 205-06 (1975). Dekanozov notes that the principle of nonappropriation of the High Seas does not prohibit nations from exploiting marine resources. Id. By analogy,
Dekanozov asserts, the principle of nonappropriation of outer space embodied in the Outer Space Treaty,
Jan. 21, 1967, art. I, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, does not preclude nations from
exploiting natural resources in outer space. Dekanozov, supra at 200, 205-06.
132. Vassilevskaya, supra note 83, at 473.
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The freedom to use natural resources found in space, however, is limited.
The Soviets argue that there is a need to prevent "irrational or rapacious
utilization or even complete destruction" of resources on the Moon, 133 and
that these resources should be protected from "plunder" by Western
monopolists.1 34 Furthermore, the exploitation of resources in outer space
entails duties toward future generations. 35 Implicit in these positions on the
use of natural resources in outer space are the notions of (1) the equality of all
states in international law, including the law of outer space, (2) respect for
state sovereignty and due regard for the interests of other states while
conducting activities in space, and (3) suspicion of the motives of American
efforts in outer space.
While advocating the view that the exploitation of natural resources in
space must take into account the interest of other nations, the Soviets
explicitly have rejected the position taken by some Third World nations that
space and its resources are the "common heritage of mankind." 136 Although it
supports the Third World positions regarding direct broadcasting and remote
sensing satellites, 137 the Soviet Union has refused to accept the concept of "the
common heritage of mankind." Soviet writers argue that the concept is novel
to international law and devoid of juridical meaning 38 and have proposed the
133. Vasilevskaia, supra note 57, at 365-66; Vassilevskaya, Drawing Up a Draft Treaty on the Moon-A
Further Contribution to the Progressive Development of InternationalSpace Law, 19 COLLOQUIUM, supra
note 7, 99, 99-100 (1977). Vassilevskaya speaks of the need to use the natural resources of the Moon and
planets prudently since they, like those on Earth, may be irreplaceable. Id.
134. Kulebyakin, supra note 8, at 56. See also SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, supra note 37, at 175.
Kulebyakin indicates that the Soviet Union fears that "Western monopolists" will appropriate the natural
resources of the Moon unless a legal regime for the Moon is established. Id. Kulebyakin's position in 1971
seems inconsistent with that of Dekanozov expressed in 1975 and 1978. See note 131 supra.
135. Vassilevskaya, Legal Regulation of Activities on the Moon for the Cause of Peace and Progress, 15
COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 178, 179-80 (1973). Vassilevskaya notes that this principle is embodied in
article III of the Soviet Draft Treaty, cited in Dekanozov, Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon and the Legal
Status of Its Natural Resources, 20 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 197 (1978).
136. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, supra note 37, at 177-78. The concept of "the common heritage of
mankind" has been advanced by various Third World nations as the basis for a claim that "the natural
resources [minerals and others] on the moon and other celestial bodies belong to the whole [of] mankind
and they are for their benefit and utility as their own property. . . .Every natural stuff found on the moon
and other celestial bodies will be considered as part of mankind's patrimony." Rusconi, Regime of the
Property of the Natural Resources on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 12 COLLOQUIUM supra note 7, at
185, 186, 188 (1970). See also Cocca, The Principleof the "Common Heritage of All Mankind" as Applied to
Natural Resourcesfrom Outer Space and Celestial Bodies, 16 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 172 (1974).
For a general discussion of the concept, see S. GOROVE, supra note 116, at 65-78.
137. Cf SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, supra note 37, at 184-97.
138. Kolosov, supra note 7, at 60. The Soviets reject the juridical validity of the concept on the ground
that "mankind as a whole is not a subject of international relations that could have rights and undertake
duties." Id. In addition, Kolosov cites article II of the Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 21, 1967, art. II, 18 U.ST.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, for the proposition that the Moon and other celestial bodies
may not be appropriated for the benefit of any nation, nor for the benefit of mankind as a whole, Id.
Furthermore, the Soviets fear that proponents of the "common heritage of mankind" concept propose the
creation of a supranational body to regulate the exploitation of natural resources in space, a result that
would violate state sovereignty. Id.
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alternative view that space is an "international area for common use.' 1 39
Apparently, the Soviets are seeking a middle ground between the Third
World position and what the Soviets perceive as the American desire to
exploit outer space commercially. The Soviet Union is not eager to permit
what it sees as laissez-faire capitalist exploitation of the natural resources of
outer space. Yet the Soviet Union's refusal to accept the Third World's
position on natural resources demonstrates its desire to permit the use of
resources in outer space for nationalistic ends.
CONCLUSION
The Soviet perception of space law and the peaceful uses of outer space is
idiosyncratic. This results from the ideological nature of Soviet views on
international law. While linguistic and cultural differences make differences
of opinion and different shadings of meaning inevitable in international law,
the ideological basis for Soviet thinking on international law, including space
law, adds another facet to the problem. Americans must avoid the assumption
that the Soviets reason as we do when approaching the same problem or issue.
The polemical tone of most Soviet writings on international law and the
law of outer space poses difficulties for any interpretation of Soviet thinking
on particular issues. For example, it is difficult to determine to what extent
Soviet writings on space law are political puffery intended to be expendable in
practical diplomatic negotiations and to what extent they are based on
ideological premises not subject to compromise. The consistent invocation of
Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology indicates that the writings should be taken
at face value. Otherwise, one risks serious error by dismissing the ideological
components as superfluous rhetorical devises.
Because the Soviet view of the peaceful uses of outer space has developed
within the larger framework of a Marxist-Leninist analysis of international
law, it should be considered within this context rather than as a self-sufficient
concept. The Soviet belief that space law needs further development in light of
advances in space exploration indicates that the concept of peaceful uses of
outer space, for the Soviets, is not a static one, but rather a dynamic principle
that will evolve over time. In the future, it will adapt to changes in Soviet
ideological thinking and changes in international affairs.
Given the Soviet penchant for systematizing their conceptual framework of
international law, including space law, the Soviet conception of the peaceful
uses of outer space will continue to be intergrated into any Soviet analysis of
particular issues of space law. Considering the framework within which this
139. Dekanozov, Some Questions of Juridical Nature of Areas (Spaces) Withdrawn from State
Sovereignty, 1973 SoVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 214, 215 (1975); Dekanozov, Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon
and the Legal Status of Its Natural Resources, 20 COLLOQUIUM, supra note 7, at 199 (1978). This concept
includes the Soviet interpretations of allowable use and appropriation. See note 131 supra.
506
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concept has developed, such integration will always have a distinctly Soviet
flavor.