THE NORTHERN IRELAND
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM :
THE 1929 REAPPORTIONMENT
ROBERT D. OSBORNE
School of Sociology & Social Policy
Ulster Polytechnic
ABSTRACT
Electoral geography is a growing branch of research in human geography. The study of the spatial organisation of elections constitutes
one of the main strands in this field. In this paper the transition in
1929 from a proportional representation (single transferable vote)
system to a plurality electoral system for Northern Ireland parliamentary
elections is the focus of attention. The motives for the alteration and
the method of reapportionment are assessed and the new spatial framework tested for malapportionment and gerrymandering. Finally, the
politico-geographic consequences of the reapportionment are examined.
Electoral geography has become an area of increasing research activity in
human geography. A number of distinct strands in this burgeoning field can
be distinguished1. One such strand has developed around the spatial organisation of elections, particularly the spatial framework of constituencies and
wards. Geographical interest in the location of electoral boundaries can be
traced back to Sauer2. More recently, a number of researchers have focused
on the distortion produced by electoral systems in terms of the proportion of
votes received and seats won. Two spatial influences have been identified:
the location of constituency boundaries and the spatial distribution of voters3.
The assessment of bias has been recorded with particular reference to the
plurality system ('first-past-the-post') and its operation in Britain* and New
Zealand5. A critique of the operation of the United Kingdom Boundary
Commission has also been developed6. The discussion has been widened
further to consider the extent to which electoral systems frustrate concepts of
political justice7.
Although an electoral system functions as an integrated whole, it can, for
the purposes of analysis, be broken down into a number of constituent
components: (1) franchise regulations — such as age or property qualifications; (2) balloting — the form for registering a vote, for example the single
x-vote or the multiple ranking of choices; (3) districting; (4) the electoral
formula. In this paper the districting and electoral formula components are of
primary concern. Districting, of particular interest to geographers, has two
main components : (a) the division of a political area into units, usually
geographical, for the purposes of representation; (b) the magnitude of the
district, which can be denned as the number of seats assigned by the electoral
law to a district. The electoral formula articulates the translation of votes
42
NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
43
gained into seats won in each electoral district. The construction of an
electoral formula revolves around the problem of how many votes constitute
a legitimate claim on a seat. The districting and electoral formula components
of an electoral system are closely linked, with the form of electoral formula
chosen often determining the appropriate scale of districting.
In Northern Ireland, elections and electoral systems have long been
surrounded by allegations of manipulation and malpractice. Following the
partition of Ireland by the Government of Ireland Act (1920) three levels of
political authority were created in Northern Ireland — local government,
regional parliament (Stormont) and Westminster parliament — each based
upon mass elections and each with its own electoral system. Allegations
concerning the manipulation of the local government electoral system have
been given substance by the Cameron Commission8 and Elliott9 and some
attention has been given to the Westminster system10. As yet, however,
there has been no major assessment of the intervening tier of political authority, that is, the regional parliamentary electoral system. The purpose of this
paper is to examine the causes and consequences of the change from a proportional representation electoral system to a plurality system for elections
to the regional parliament which took place in 1929. This change in electoral
formula and theassociated alterations to the electoral framework is of particular
significance as it provoked much opposition from non-Unionist groups and
has long been alleged to be gerrymandered11. It is the aim of this paper to
assess the motivations prompting the electoral change, to examine the reapportionment undertaken and to consider some of the ramifications of the
transition from a proportional to a plurality system.
The Government of Ireland Act provided that the initial elections to the
regional parliament were to be conducted by means of proportional representation (single transferable vote) using the existing (slightly modified) Westminster constituencies, as multi-number districts returning forty-eight
members (plus four from the non-territorial constituency of the Queen's
University of Belfast). The electoral system was guaranteed for three years
after which the Northern Ireland parliament was empowered to alter all
components of the electoral system providing that in any new system the
number of members should not be altered and that due regard be given to the
population of constituencies other than the university constituency. It was
anticipated that the Unionist government would take the earliest opportunity
to change to a plurality system. This expectation was based on the opposition
to P.R. (S.T.V.) voiced by Unionist MPs at Westminster who had a strong
desire to retain the 'British system'. The arguments used by the Unionists
against the P.R. (S.T.V.) system were: (1) Most electors were opposed to
proportional representation because it was complicated and open to 'manipulation' by agents. (2) It was not generally understood. (3) It involved high
costs for candidates. (4) The system produced 'freakish' results. No evidence
was presented to back these claims. The urgency of the Unionists, however,
was assuaged by the comforting results of the first Northern Ireland general
election held in 1921 (a majority of twenty-eight seats over other parties in a
fifty-two seat legislature). The results of the 1925 election were less comforting; rigid polarisation of behaviour in evidence in the 1921 election seems to
have relaxed somewhat, encouraging Independent and Labour candidates to
stand. The returns of 1925 showed a loss of eight seats by the Unionists to
Independents and Labour while the anti-partition groups retained twelve
seats. Overall, the Unionist majority over other parties fell to twelve seats.
44
OSBORNE
This result was regarded if not as a defeat at least as a dangerous trend.
The result saw a renewal of the calls for the abolition of P.R. (S.T.V.) by
some Unionists. More perceptive Unionists may also have noticed a development in electoral behaviour which was potentially more ominous for the
Unionists. In South Antrim and West Belfast, for example. Nationalist
votes at the terminal stage12 showed a tendency to transfer to Labour and
Independent Unionists rather than to become non-transferable as had happened in 1921. Such transfers enabled Independent Unionists and Labour
candidates to be elected ahead of Unionist candidates. Clearly, if Nationalist
voters became prepared to cross the divide and give support to Independents
and others the outright majority of the Unionists could have been endangered.
In the aftermath of the election then, two new arguments were advanced
by the Unionist lobby in their call for the abolition of P.R. (S.T.V.). These
were : (1) Strong government was required and not one dependent on bargaining which P.R. was likely to produce. (2) Minority rights were better protected under the plurality system. The Prime Minister, Lord Craigavon,
said that what was wanted was, ' . . . a simple old fashioned system where men
are for the Union on the one hand or against it and want to go into a Dublin
parliament on the other'13.
Quite clearly while a factor in Unionist opposition to P.R. (S.T.V.) was its
'un-Britishness' a more pragmatic motivation for abolition was the threat
that the P.R. (S.T.V.) system might provide the vehicle for Independents
and others to gain a bargaining position through the erosion of the Unionist
outright majority. Independents and Labour candidates were seeking support
on a broad variety of socio-economic issues; the Unionists sought to base
their appeal and strength on the polarisation between pro- and anti-partition
viewpoints. P.R. (S.T.V.) threatened to benefit the former rather than the
latter.
The abolition of P.R. (S.T.V.) took place through the Methods of Voting
and Redistribution of Seats (Northern Ireland) Act (1929) which established
the plurality system and created forty-eight territorial constituencies. This
new system and the spatial pattern of constituencies formed the framework
for elections for the forty years to 196914. The redistribution of constituencies
accompanying the 1929 Act was not undertaken by any independent boundary
commission or similar body so there exists no clear outline of operating
criteria used. In fact the redistribution seems to have been undertaken
personally by Craigavon15.
The basic frame for the redistribution appears to be that of the existing
Westminster constituencies which had served as multi-member districts for
the 1921 and 1925 elections. There were two exceptions: (i) the separation
of Fermanagh and Tyrone (previously a joint eight-seat constituency);
(ii) the treating of Belfast as a single unit. The redistribution was governed
by the stipulation in the Government of Ireland Act concerning the population
of constituencies. The data source used in this respect was the 1926 Northern
Ireland population census. The total population for Northern Ireland, taken
from the census, was 1,256,651. With a total of forty-eight territorial seats
the electoral quota was 26,178. On this basis the redistribution was accomplished as shown in Table 1.
NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
45
TABLE i
THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS BY AREA IN
Area
Antrim
Population
191,642
Population Quota
191,642
26,178
Armagh
110,070
110,070
26,178
Down
209,228
57,984
4 + 5.358
209,228
26,178
Fermanagh
7 + 8,397
57.984
132,792
2 + 5,628
132,792
26,178
Londonderry
139,693
139.693
26,178
Belfast
415*151
26,178
1921
7
7
4
4
8
8
}
8
5
5
16
16
7 + 25,982
(8 - 196)
26,178
Tyrone
1929
5 + 1,902
5 + 8,803
5J
15 + 22,481
(16 - 3,697)
The allocation of seats conformed to the pre-existing multi-member
allocation of the Government of Ireland Act. In population terms, however,
Belfast, Down and Fermanagh were over-represented. The slight overrepresentation of Belfast and Down was not particularly significant as the
two areas would have been first in line for the allocation of an additional seat.
The allocation of a third seat to Fermanagh when both Antrim and Londonderry were next in line for further seats was more questionable. Craigavon
clearly indicated why this had been done : 'The duty that fell to me was to
see how, when these two counties that were combined, Fermanagh and
Tyrone, were separated again, they would give fair representation of four
members to this side of the House and four members to that side'16. The
use of 'fair' was beguiling as the distribution of the additional seat to Fermanagh was designed to achieve a partisan distribution rather than provide a
rational distribution of seats on a population basis. Two clearly denned and
essentially opposite bases for redistricting — either on the basis of population
equality principles or to meet a partisan distribution — were thus confused.
The next step in the redistribution was the allocation of the seats in each
area. Craigavon and his colleagues chose to set about this task by calculating
a new quota for each area in order to arrive at a target for constituency size
rather than using the overall Northern Ireland quota of 26,175. This method,
OSBORNE
46
CONSTITUENCIES- 1121 - H I S
Figure I. The pattern of constituencies for regional parliamentary elections 1929I965-
given the lack of population parity at the higher spatial level, was bound to
increase constituency population inequalities. Moreover, although Belfast
had been treated as a single unit for the initial seat allocation, the distribution
of seats within Belfast seems to have been enacted in terms of the existing
configuration of Westminster constituencies; this produced marked disparities
in the seat allocations within the city as shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS IN BELFAST IN 1929
Constituency
Quota
Allocation
Belfast East
3 + I5,78i
4
Belfast North
3 + 23,076
4
Belfast South
3 + 13.177
4
Belfast West
3 + 25,806
4
The pattern of the forty-eight new constituencies can be seen in Figure 1.
The overall basis of the redistricting can be criticised in a number of respects: first, the decision to adhere to the existing seat allocations of the
NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
47
Westminster constituencies rather than derive an allocation based on the
principle of equality of population per seat; second, the confusion of two
clearly defined and opposite bases for redistricting, i.e. population equality
or maximising a desired distribution; finally, the decision to distribute the
seats within each base area in terms of a quota derived from that area.
A more direct critical assessment, however, can be made by examining
the redistricting for malapportionment and gerrymandering. Malapportionment involves the creation of constituencies of markedly different sizes in
terms of either population or electorate. Malapportionment is held to be
'bad' as it implies that the value of a vote is less in a larger constituency than
in a smaller one. The nearer that constituencies can be made to equal each
other in electorate/population size the greater is the equality of vote value.
The upsurge of interest in the districting problem in the U.S.A., Australia
and Great Britain has led to the development of a number of techniques
which can be applied to test statistically for malapportionment and which
facilitate comparative analysis. Alker and Russett have suggested two tests
as particularly useful for measuring inequality in population distribution.
These are the Lorenz curve and the associated Gini Index and the Inverse
Coefficient of Variation (I.C.V.)17. These indices have been calculated for
the populations of the new constituencies (1926 population census) and the
electorates at the first election of 1929. They have been calculated for the
forty-eight constituencies in the first instance and then for Belfast (Table 3).
TABLE 3
GINI AND I.C.V. INDICES FOR CONSTITUENCY ELECTORATES
AND POPULATIONS
Northern Ireland
Index
Belfast
1926
1929
1926
1929
Population
Electorate
Population
Electorate
Gini
.11
•07
.10
.09
I.C.V.
.89
.88
•85
.85
In Table 4 comparative figures are given (I.C.V.) for three of the U.K.
regional areas including Boundary Commission recommendations. From
this evidence, the 1929 redistricting in Northern Ireland does not show
any evidence of malapportionment with a Gini score of 0.11 and I.C.V.
score of 0.89. The figures are similar when calculated for constituency
electorates. If these Northern Ireland figures are compared with the U.K.
figures the absence of malapportionment seems to be confirmed. For example,
in relation to Wales (thirty-six constituencies) the Northern Ireland I.C.V.
of 0.88 (electorate) compares favourably with a score of 0.82 achieved with
both 1965 and 1968 Boundary Commission proposals. Perhaps, however,
the absence of large-scale malapportionment in the 1929 redistribution masks
the extent to which constituency parity was not achieved. The comparison
with Wales, for example, may be over-favourable to Northern Ireland in that
in Northern Ireland a completely new framework for territorial constituencies
48
OSBORNE
was being devised whereas in Wales an existing framework was under adjustment and certain criteria-constraints prevented a more equal apportionment
being achieved. Certainly when the figures for Belfast are separated out they
seem to indicate that a less equal apportionment was achieved than when the
province as a whole is considered. However, overall it must be concluded
that there is no evidence of large scale malapportionment associated with the
1929 redistricting. Qualifications must be recorded, however, in that disparities in population size have been noted and that these can be attributed
to several decisions made by Craigavon and his colleagues.
TABLE 4
I.C.V. SCORES FOR BRITISH REGIONS IN 1965 AND 1968
(INCLUDING BOUNDARY COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS)
1968
1965
Region
Actual
Recommended
Actual
Recommended
England
.84 .
.88
.82
.87
Scotland
.81
.84
.78
.84
Wales
.82
.82
.82
.82
U.K.
.82
.86
.80
.85
If the spatial framework established in 1929 cannot be described as malapportioned it still remains to be examined for gerrymandering. Essentially
there are three means of achieving a gerrymander. In the first method opposition votes can be wasted by designing constituencies where they poll not
more than 49 per cent of the vote. In such cases opposition electoral strongholds can be divided between a number of constituencies so as to maintain a
consistent voting minority. The second method is by enclosing opposition
votes in as few constituencies as possible. These constituencies are won with
massive majorities while the other party wins more seats with narrow majorities. The third method consists of gathering together scattered areas of
support in curiously shaped constituencies so that seats may be won. It is
apparent that these methods are not always easily identified and careful
scrutiny is a priority. Taylor18 has argued that a non-partisan cartographical
division of areas is mythical and so following this logic it might be argued that
gerrymandering is unimportant as it merely represents another source of
bias. Gerrymandering, however, implies a motivation on the part of the
constituency cartographer which may well be politically more significant than
the results it actually achieves as it demonstrates a degree of cynicism in the
political system which is bound to have repercussions in the political community as a whole.
A full analysis, covering gerrymandering, of the spatial framework of the
1929 reorganisation can be found in Osborne.19 Three main areas of concern
emerged from this examination. The first concerns the allocation of a third
seat to Fermanagh. This award was made notwithstanding the prior claims
of Antrim and Londonderry (Table 1). Craigavon's desire to maintain a
NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
PERCENTAGE
ROMAN
CATHOLICS
BY
D.E.D., Co.FERMANAGH
49
(1911 CENSUS)
N. IRELAND QUOTA (Popubtion) Cwwtituancy
Population
36,17«
Elector*«
HIM
1 Î.5 6 3
Enniakillwi
L<tna*k«a
1 9,3 0 7
13.33?
11.6 6t
South
1 P.l 1 2
11,4 12
KEY
*
County boundary
-
Conatitutrtcy boundary
-
D . E . D . botindary
% Roman Catholic*
Figure 2. Constituencies and the distribution of Roman Catholics in Co. Fermanagh
(1911 Irish census).
partisan seat distribution has been shown to underlie this decision. The
allocation of seats for Tyrone was reasonable — five quotas and five seats.
The partisan distribution of these seats was acknowledged to be three
Nationalists and two Unionists. So, given that Craigavon wished to preserve
the 1921 and 1925 distribution of seats in the then combined FermanaghTyrone constituency of four Unionists and four Nationalists the task was to
ensure that the three Fermanagh constituencies produced two Unionists
and one Nationalist. How this was achieved can be seen in Figure 2. Here the
county of Fermanagh is displayed with the three constituency boundaries.
Also shown are the District Electoral Divisions (D.E.Ds) which are shaded
to depict the percentage Roman Catholic in each area, derived from the 1911
Irish census20. From this map it can be seen that the Fermanagh South
constituency was created by linking the majority Catholic D.E.Ds along the
southern border. The constituencies of Lisnaskea and Enniskillen were then
created by splitting the remainder of the county in half on a north-south
axis and dividing the remaining areas with a Catholic majority between the
two, rendering them a minority in each. Subsequently Fermanagh South
was held by the Nationalists in the period 1929-1969 and Enniskillen and
Lisnaskea by the Unionists. Indeed, the patterns became so well known
locally that only in 1949 were all three seats contested by the Unionists and
Nationalists. As can be seen from Table 5 the two Unionist seats contained
a substantial opposition vote. This pattern fits one of the gerrymander
'models' outlined above, with Nationalist votes gathered in Fermanagh South
and the remainder 'wasted' in seats where they polled highly but were never
50
0SB0RNE
sufficient to win the seat. In fact both parties recognised the situation with all
three seats normally returned unopposed.
TABLE 5
CONSTITUENCY RESULTS FOR FERMANAGH IN 1949
Constituency
% Unionist
% Nationalist
Fermanagh South
28.0
Enniskillen
54-7
45-3
85.7
57-3
42.7
87.2
Lisnaskea
72.0
% Turnout
86.6
Source: S. Elliott, Northern Ireland parliamentary election results 1921-1972,
Chichester, 1973.
In this way, by using detailed local information as a basis for partisan electoral
cartography, Craigavon was able to produce his desired seat distribution in a
county where Catholics formed 56% of the total population and 53% of the
population of voting age.
The second major area for examination was Antrim where the Nationalists
were vociferous in their dislike of the configuration of constituencies. The
allegation here was that whereas in the 1921 and 1925 elections a Nationalist
had been returned this was unlikely to happen with the new distribution.
Once again the basic framework for examining this situation is the religious
distribution in the county. In Table 6 the numbers and proportions of
Catholics are shown for the various urban and rural districts (1926 census).
These figures demonstrate that critically, Ballycastle, the only urban district
with a Catholic majority, was the smallest of the eight urban districts in
County Antrim. The largest numbers of Catholics in urban districts were
found in Ballymena, Larne and Lisburn where they in fact formed small
minorities. Again in the rural districts, the highest percentage of Catholics
was in Ballycastle which however was the smallest rural district in population
terms. The Ballycastle urban and rural districts together formed the only
majority Catholic area in Antrim. It was far too small, however, to form a
constituency in its own right (population 11,433; Antrim quota 27,378;
smallest constituency in Northern Ireland 18,000). Nationalists were adamant in their insistence that they were being deprived of a seat and pointed
to Craigavon's wish to preserve the pre-1929 partisan seat distribution in
Fermanagh-Tyrone — why could this not apply to Antrim? Clearly, the
only way this could be done was either to create a very small constituency
around Ballycastle or to link other small majority Catholic areas, thereby
relaxing the contiguity-of-areas principle. These ideas were rejected by the
Craigavon administration21.
The third main area of assessment for gerrymandering is County Armagh.
The distribution of Catholics is once more the critical base from which to
examine for gerrymandering. In Figure 3 the percentages of Catholics are
shown for D.E.Ds from the 1911 Irish census. From this map it can be seen
that Catholics are clustered in the southern third of the county with only a
few small groups of D.E.Ds where Catholics are a majority outside this area.
NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
TABLE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF ROMAN CATHOLICS IN Co. ANTRIM
(1926 Northern Ireland Population Census)
Total Population
Catholics
% Catholic
Ballycastle
1,986
1,135
57.2
Ballyclare
3,362
294
8.7
Ballymena
11,873
2,154
18.1
Ballymoney
3,168
723
22.8
Carrickfergus
4.749
691
14.6
Lame
9,714
2,248
23.1
Lisburn
12406
2,194
Portrush
2,953
449
Urban Districts
17.7
15.2
Rural Districts
25.112
4 8
17.1
Ballycastle
9.447
4,452
47.1
Ballymena
33.257
5,606
16.9
Ballymoney
20,305
3,978
19.6
Belfast
13.857
3,134
22.6
Larne
22,089
3>548
16.1
Lisburn
17,355
3,73°
21.5
Antrim
Given this distribution the orientation of constituency boundaries is clearly
critical in deciding the ultimate partisan allocation of the four single-member
constituencies. The shape of Armagh is generally rectangular and with this
shape there are at least two distinct ways of dividing the area into four. One
is by means of a series of broadly parallel east-west lines as the 1929 distribution was accomplished and the other is by quartering the area by means of à
north-south line crossed by an east-west line. Choosing the former allows
the majority Catholic area to be contained mostly in one unit. By choosing
the latter it is at least feasible that the Catholic areas would form a majority
in the two southern quarters. The patterns of representation for the two
elections prior to the 1929 redistricting show that for both 1921 and 1925
the Unionists won two seats and anti-partitionists also two. From 1929
onwards the partisan distribution was Unionist three seats and anti-partition
groups one seat. On this evidence there appears to be a strong case supporting the view that the Armagh constituency boundaries were gerrymandered.
However a closer scrutiny of the voting returns in the 1921 and 1925 elections
suggests that in this case the assertion must be qualified. In 1921 the fourth
OSBORNE
52-
PERCENTAGE
ROMAN
CATHOLICS
BY
D.E.D., Co. ARMAGH
(1)11
CENSUS)
N.IRELANC> QUOTA (Population)- 2S.I7«
Population
Electoral*
North
26,3 21
1 ö.3 6 a
Cantr.
Mid
37,86»
3 6.8 0 0
16.72»
16,3 61
Cenatituancy
KEY
County boundary
.
Conatituancy boundary
D E C boundary
Roman Catholic«
•
«15
LU]
36-4»
SO-44
5533
»15
Figure 3. Constituencies and the distribution of Roman Catholics in Co. Armagh
(1911 Irish census).
Armagh seat was won by a Nationalist/Republican candidate who failed to
attain the quota and in 1925 the third and fourth seats were taken by antipartition candidates without the votes of the runner-up being redistributed.
Even if these votes had been redistributed, they would have been insufficient
to enable the last elected to attain the quota. Added to this is the fact that
with" the Unionists only nominating two candidates many of their surplus
votes became non-transferable after election was achieved. In 1925, for
example, the number of non-transferable votes from the two Unionists
amounted to more than an additional quota, which may have produced a
further seat for the Unionists, given a further candidate.
Thus, in relation to the Armagh constituency boundaries the case for
gerrymandering is not conclusive. While anti-partition representation for
the county was reduced by one the pre-1929 representation may have been
flattering to the Nationalists through the poor nomination tactics of the
Unionists.
In these examples the importance of two spatial components, the spatial
distribution of votes and the configuration of constituencies, can be seen to
have been of crucial importance. The effects resulting from the different
levels of vote aggregation imposed by different electoral .formulae (P.R.
(S.T.V.) and plurality) can be established. In the case of Antrim for example,
the scale of aggregation (linked with arguments concerning electoral quotas
and the number of available seats) determined the non-representation of the
politically distinctive social group concentrated around Ballycastle which
NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
53
was too small to secure representation and so for Stormont elections became
submerged under the majority grouping.
Overall, the 1929 redistribution was accomplished without evidence of
malapportionment. Gerrymandering was undoubtedly a feature of the
Fermanagh seat distribution and may also have been involved in Armagh.
However, on the basis of this evidence it is hardly possible to call the 1929
redistribution a general exercise in gerrymandering22. Also, given the 'myth
of non-partisan cartography' it becomes clear that the degree of partisan
redistricting shown here provides rather slender evidence and scarcely matches
the volume of Nationalist opposition which followed in its wake23. Nevertheless, the existence of some gerrymandering at this level coupled with the
evidence from local government redistribution was unlikely to increase
Nationalist commitment to the new system.
The final part of this assessment of the 1929 changes concerns the electoral
formula component of the electoral system. Some of the implications of the
transition from a P.R. (S.T.V.) to a plurality formula have been seen already.
One further aspect which requires assessment is the measurement of the
'bias' in the system. If one of the foundations of representative democracy
is the relationship between votes and seats2*, then the extent to which an
electoral system distorts the translation of votes and seats is of concern.
Loosemore and Hanby25 have outlined an index suitable for an assessment of
distortion. Using this index the scores are shown for the 1921-1938 elections
in Table 7. It is readily apparent that distortion in the votes-seats relationship
increased markedly with the transition from P.R. (S.T.V.) to plurality.
TABLE 7
DISTORTION IN THE VOTES-SEATS RELATIONSHIP,
NORTHERN IRELAND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1921-1938
Election
Distortion score
1921
.101
1925
.083
1929
.301
1933
.302
1938
.293
This index, however, does not take account of the influence of uncontested
seats which play a considerable role in Northern Ireland's electoral history
(see below). Although distortion increased quite dramatically following the
adoption of a plurality system, it is important to consider which groups
benefited and which lost through this increase. In Table 8 an indication of
the distribution of gain and loss is shown for the major groupings. In 1925,
the two smaller groupings, the N.I.L.P. and the Independent Unionists,
benefited while the Nationalistsand Unionists failed to gain seats in proportion
to their votes.
54
OSBORNE
TABLE 8
PARTY GAIN AND LOSS IN THE VOTES-SEATS RELATIONSHIP,
NORTHERN IRELAND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1925-1938
(Calculated from figures given in Elliott, op. cit., 1973)
PanyjGrouping
1925
1929
1933
1938
Unionist
—
+
+
+
Independent Unionist
+
—
—
—
NILP
+
—
+
—
Nationalist
—
+
+
+
In the next three elections using the new system, however, the pattern of
gain and loss is reversed with the larger parties, the Nationalists and Unionists, profiting. This distribution of bias in the votes-seats relationship with
the larger parties benefiting at the expense of smaller parties is the pattern
found in most countries having a plurality electoral system. The political
implications and consequences of this alteration of the electoral system can
now be briefly considered.
The Unionist motivation for change clearly lay with the desire to eliminate
the smaller parties and independents and to sidetrack attempts to focus
attention on broad socio-economic issues. It can be suggested, therefore,
that the 1929 redistribution was accomplished with partisan ends in mind
but the target was not so much the opposition Nationalist parties as the
minority parties and independents who threatened to gain from the P.R.
(S.T.V.) system and seriously erode the Unionist party's outright majority.
The Nationalist party consistently profited in terms of seats won in relation
to the proportion of votes gained and their representation showed only a loss
of one or two seats over the earlier totals. After 1929, splinter parties failed
to win the seats their overall totals warranted. They suffered from increased
logistical problems because of the rise in territorial constituencies from nine
to forty-eight.
While the 1929 redistricting cannot be characterised as malapportioned or
the spatial framework of constituencies as subject to wholesale gerrymandering, the manipulation of the electoral system had more serious implications.
The reduction in thé spatial scale of electoral districts coralled electors into
neat areas of Nationalist or Unionist dominance which became tacitly accepted
as such. This acceptance of areas of partisan dominance was reflected in the
large numbers of uncontested seats which only once fell below 40% of the
forty-eight territorial constituencies in the nine general elections in the 19291965 period.
Electoral competition was often generated only by the activities of individuals and the smaller parties who sporadically challenged the hegemonies
of the main parties. This intervention showed little spatial or temporal
continuity other than in several Belfast constituencies. Apart from representing a parody of electoral competition in a democratic system, the firm demarca-
NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
55
tion and stability of the areas showing governing party loyalty provided the
spatial context for decisions concerning the allocation of public resources and
investment. In the post-war period, decisions concerning the siting of the
province's second university at Coleraine, the location of the new city of
Craigavon and the spatial pattern of growth centres for regional development
were increasingly criticised as being made with this pattern of support in
mind26.
However, this is judging the new 1929 electoral system beyond the 'fairness' of the actual framework devised and it is clear that the Northern Ireland
government would not be unique in making vote-catching locational decisions.
Aside from this however, the politico-geographical implications of the 1929
reorganisation were far reaching. The establishment of a plurality system
and its spatial framework performed exactly the task desired by Craigavon.
By reducing the spatial scale and increasing the number of electoral districts
the smaller parties, who sought to offer socio-economic issues to the electorate,
were inhibited from making a geographically widespread appeal and by
structuring electoral choice to a single no-compromise x-vote the potential
for cross-voting was removed. The new electoral system thus provided a
structural prop to the communal divisions of Northern Ireland and produced
an electoral pattern which neatly fulfilled the requirement to show 'where
men are for the Union on the one hand or against it and want to go into a
Dublin parliament on the other'.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1
I . R. McPhail, 'Recent trends in electoral geography', Proceedings Sixth New
Zealand Geographical Conference, Christchurch, 1970, 7-12. M. Busteed, Geography
and voting behaviour, London, 1975. P. J. Taylor, 'Political geography'. Progress in
human geography, 2, 1978, 153-162.
2
C. Sauer, 'Geography and the gerrymander', American Political Science Review,
12, 1918, 403-426.
3
P. J. Taylor, 'Some implications of the spatial organization of elections'. Transactions, Institute of British Geographers, 60, 1973, 121-136.
4
G. Gudgin and P. J. Taylor, 'Electoral bias and the distribution of party voters',
Transactions, Institute of British Geographers, 63, 1974, 53-74.
5
R. J. Johnston, 'Spatial structure, plurality systems and electoral bias', Canadian
Geographer, 20, 1976, 310-328.
6
G. Rowley, 'Elections and population changes', Area, 3, 1970, 13-18. G. Rowley,
'The redistribution of parliamentary seats in the United Kingdom: themes and
opinions', Area, 7, 1976, 16-21.
7
R. J. Johnston, 'Parliamentary seat redistribution: more opinions on the same
theme', Area, 8, 1976, 30-34.
8
Disturbances in Northern Ireland. Report of the commission appointed by the Governor
of Northern Ireland (Cameron Commission), HMSO, 1969.
9
S. Elliott, The Northern Ireland electoral system since 1920, Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Queen's University, Belfast, 1971.
10
R. D. Osborne, 'Northern Ireland: representation at Westminster and the
Boundary Commission', Ir. Geog., 10, 1976, 115-120.
11
This spatial framework no longer exists having been replaced by the twelve
Westminster constituencies assigned multi-member magnitude for elections to any
regional political authority under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act (1973).
12
An essential element of P.R. (S.T.V.) is the transfer of vote values. These can
be classified into two types. The first is the interim transfer which takes place when
there are still members of the transferring candidate's party available to receive transfers. The second is the terminal transfer which takes place when there are no members
of the candidate's party available to receive vote values, all having been either elected
or eliminated.
56
OSBORNE
13
House of Commons Debates (NI), 25.10.27, 2275.
The university constituency was abolished following the recommendations of an
Interim Boundary Commission (1967) which created four new territorial constituencies.
One general election was fought on this framework in 1969.
15
'I have taken great pains over it. I have taken months in order to ensure . . .'
(House of Commons Debates (NI), 10, 26.3.29, 1450).
16
House of Commons Debates, (NI) 10, 26.3.29, 1450.
17
H. R. Alker and B. Russett, 'On measuring inequality', Behavioural Science, 9,
1964, 207-218. The Gini Index indicates the difference between the ideal and actual
relationship with lower Gini scores indicating more equal apportionment. The Inverse
Coefficient of Variation produces a standardised measure of the variance inverted
so that it ranges between o and 1. Low values indicate malapportionment and a value
of 1 indicates perfect apportionment.
18
P. J. Taylor, 'Some implications of the spatial organization of elections', Trans14
actions,
Institute of British Geographers, 60, 1973, 121-136.
19
R. D. Osborne, The political system, voting patterns and voting behaviour in
Northern Ireland, 1921-1974, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, Belfast,
1977.
20
The 1911 population census was the last Irish census to publish information for
religious affiliation at this scale. Percentages are shown rather than exact totals, as
the D.E.D. boundaries were altered between the census and the establishment of
constituency boundaries in 1929.
21
Even if Antrim had been allocated the additional seat awarded to Fermanagh it
would still have been difficult to create a constituency around Ballycastle in terms of
population size. If, however, the aim had been to preserve the earlier pattern of
representation, as in Fermanagh, such difficulties would not have been insurmountable.
22
Taking the simple comparison of constituency electorate size between Unionist
and Nationalist seats (in rural areas) shows the average Unionist seat with 16,547
electors compared to 15,406 for the Nationalist constituencies in 1929.
23
Labour activists were quite aware of the likely impact on their representation after
reapportionment and sternly opposed the change from P.R. (S.T.V.). When Nationalists argued for relaxing the contiguity-of-areas principle in Antrim, Labour immediately demanded a seat allocation for the working class in Belfast.
24
J. G . M a r c h , 'Party legislative representation as a function o f election results',
Public Opinion Quarterly, 2 1 , 1957, 521-542.
25
J . Loosemore a n d V . J . H a n b y , ' T h e theoretical limits of m a x i m u m distortion:
s o m e analytic expressions for electoral systems', British Journal of Political Science, 1 , 1 9
1971, 467-477.
26
See t h e debates of these issues i n t h e Northern Ireland House of Commons Debates,
volumes 5 5 - 6 1 , covering t h e 1964-1965 period.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank Dr Neville Douglas, Department of Geography,
Queen's University, Belfast, for his helpful comments on an initial draft of this paper
and Merle Osborne for assisting with the drawing of the maps.