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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
Filed on Behalf of: Claimants
Witness: Caroline Macy Elkins
Witness Statement: 2
Exhibits: 1
Date: 1 April 2011
Claim No: HQ09X02666
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
NDIKU MUTUA AND 4 OTHERS
-
and -
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
WITNESS STATEMENT OF CAROLINE MACY ELKINS
I, CAROLINE MACY ELKINS, of Harvard University, 1730 Cambridge Street,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138, United States of America, will say as follows:
The “Hanslope” Disclosure
1. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has produced some 300 boxes
of files related to the Mau Mau Emergency, including those related to the
British colonial government’s policies of detention, the participation of the
British military in screening and interrogation and the use of torture in the
camps. These files were undisclosed during the ten years of research that I
undertook on the subject of detention camps in Kenya during the Mau Mau
Emergency. These files are referenced here as “The Hanslope Disclosure”.
2. A team of researchers from Oxford University has had an opportunity to
review a small set of the files from the extensive Hanslope Disclosure, and
the small amount of documentation reviewed thus far strengthens further
my view, as expressed in my first witness statement and in my book, Imperial
Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya, that the Colonial
Office knew of the tortures in the detention camps of Kenya, and developed,
in concert with the government in Kenya, an increasingly systematized
method of torture and brutality in these detention camps.
3. The files include extensive references to the use of torture, including, but not
limited to that practiced in the Mwea Camps. There are repeated references
to broken legs, arms, perforated eardrums, and deaths as a result of the
beatings and tortures in the camps and screening centers.
4. I have conducted a very preliminary review of the files contained in the
Hanslope Disclosure and conclude that the evidence contained therein is
extensive and further supports the Claimants allegations.
5. Having conducted ten years of research specifically on the topic of detention
camps and villages in Kenya during the Mau Mau Emergency, I am of the
opinion that the contents of these files are extraordinary. For example, had I
had access to these files I would have likely saved years of research time. In
effect, I had to piece together the puzzle of evidence that remained; the files
contained in the 300 boxes fill in and expand upon the evidence that I have
collected in an expansive manner that I previously thought not possible.
6. Importantly, those files now being reviewed are not contradictory to my
views of the camps, or those expressed in my writings. Instead, they only
strengthen the evidence that there was systematized torture in the detention
camps, and the widespread extent of this torture.
7. The Hanslope Disclosure recently produced by the FCO need to be reviewed
in full, and in a systematic manner that conforms to historical methodology.
a. I have significant concern that the boxes currently being reviewed by
the lawyers with the assistance of one briefing note and without
sufficient understanding of the nature of the archival material they
are examining.
b. A team of expert historians on this topic must be afforded the
opportunity to review, systematically and with knowledge of the
period, these documents to determine the relevancy of the files, their
contents, and their significance to the claimants’ allegations.
c. There are numerous details of the period of Mau Mau, including but
not limited to the names of specific camps, colonial or military
officials, un-gazetted screening centers, and the like, that non-experts
would not know and therefore would overlook in any exercise
oriented towards culling and/or reviewing documents. It is important
to note that significant evidence is often buried in complex documents
which on their face do not appear relevant to the issues.
d. Based upon the notes I have seen of the few files reviewed by the
Oxford University team, as well as my own very brief review of a
selection of these files, there are conceivably thousands of relevant
documents, if not more, substantiating the allegations of the
claimants.
It would take many months to adequately review and
analyze this documentation.
Mr Inglett’s Witness Statement
8. I have reviewed the witness statement of Mr. Edward Inglett. Mr. Inglett is
not an expert on the history of Kenya or Mau Mau, and understandably his
statement is limited in its scope of knowledge.
a. Mr. Inglett refers to documents reviewed in the National Archives,
Kew (NA) and the Kenya National Archives, Nairobi (KNA). The scope
of his review did not include such crucial archives as the Rhodes
House Library, Oxford, which contains myriad documents, including
the Young Papers, relevant to, and supportive of, the Claimants’
allegations.
b. Those archives that Mr. Inglett did review contain multiple documents
relevant to, and supportive of, the Claimants’ allegations. These
documents are outlined in my first witness statement.
c. There are multiple witnesses still alive with knowledge of the claims
put forward by the claimants. A selection of these witnesses have
been set out in my first statement. These include, but are not limited
to, Sir Frank Kitson and Ian Buist. Mr. Inglett states, however, that “all
those who could speak to the decisions at a high government level
and/or in relation to command decisions made by the ‘British Army’
are, or are very likely to be, dead, given the passage of time.” I am not
aware what research has been done by the FCO with regard to this
assertion, but it is not one I agree with. Many of the central witnesses
to the events of the Kenya Emergency are alive and well.
d. Mr. Inglett’s witness statement is therefore limited in its scope, which
is understandable, given his recent charge. In effect, Mr. Inglett was
asked to come to conclusions that took me, after ten years of archival
and oral research, to reach.
The Defendant’s Skeleton Argument
9. I have had the opportunity to read the Defendant’s skeleton argument. The
argument presented is highly selective in its use of publically available
information, and is reflective of a narrative that was potentially plausible
some five years ago, but which, as a result of recent and original research, is
no longer tenable in the scholarly arena. In effect, the simultaneous
publication of Imperial Reckoning and Professor David Anderson’s Histories
of the Hanged in 2005 has been met with broad consensus in the academic
realm insofar as the British colonial government deployed extensive violence
and torture, increasingly systematized over time, in an effort to defeat Mau
Mau. British colonial-imposed violence was predominantly located in the
detention camp Pipeline, screening centers (both gazetted and un-gazetted,
as noted below), Emergency villages, and Home Guard Posts. In effect, the
argument, as deployed here by the Defendant is one that follows a narrative
deployed by the British colonial government at the time of the Emergency.
That is, that any brutalities perpetrated by British colonial official (e.g.
security forces, members of the administration, and the like) were the result
of so-called “bad apples.”
10. Defendant’s Skeleton Argument, paragraphs 482 and 483, suggests that the
my work and that of Mr. Anderson could have been produced earlier, as
“much relevant documentation has always been in the public domain in
London or in Nairobi.” The Defendant then goes on to cite the short work of
Anthony Clayton as evidence of publically available secondary literature on
this topic. Yet, the Defendant’s own Skeleton Argument is an example of why
a comprehensive account of the system of detention, screening and
villagization, along with the related system of extra-judicial hangings, was
not available until 2005, and why any shorter accounts, such as that
contained within the Defendant’s Skeleton Argument, were and continue to
be incomplete, at best, or misrepresentative of the existing documentation, at
worst.
11. Research time, resources, and political circumstances have, together, played
a significant role in preventing any comprehensive account of the systems of
detention, villagization, and related screening operations during the Mau
Mau Emergency. The Defendant’s own actions have contributed to the length
of time it has taken for a comprehensive account of the British colonial
government’s deployment of systematized brutality during the Mau Mau
Emergency.
There was large-scale document destruction at the time of
decolonization. As a result, writing a comprehensive account of the system of
detention and related villagization required a decade of sustained and
comprehensive research in archives in Britain and Kenya. For example, there
is no single document, or even a set of document files, that reveal how many
camps there were in the Pipeline, their names, their function, their staffing,
and the like.
12. Public discussions of the brutalities in the camps at the time of the
Emergency, and later brief accounts, such as Anthony Clayton’s, gave
indication that such brutalities existed, but there was nothing that provided
the over-arching institutions and structures that facilitated and perpetuated
a set of policies, also previously undisclosed, that emanated from the highest
levels of British colonial governance both in London and Nairobi. Without a
comprehensive understanding of the system, the brutalities during the Mau
Mau Emergency were consistently dismissed as one-offs, rather than a
systematic policy that involved tremendous efforts at cover-up at the highest
level of colonial governance.
13. To reconstruct the system of detention and villagization during the Mau Mau
Emergency required a massive amount of research time, as well as resources.
Such resources are not readily available, and it is not surprising that it took
years for scholars such as myself to obtain the funding to undertake research
endeavors on this topic.
14. Up until the late 1990s, research efforts on this topic in Kenya were
hampered by the policies of the Daniel T. arap Moi regime. I was personally
threatened during my research efforts in the late 1990s in Kenya, and was
encouraged to curtail my work.
Former British colonial officials also
undertook significant efforts to undermine my work both in Kenya and in
Britain.
15. The Defendant’s failure to produce the Hanslope Disclosure had profound
implications on the abilities of historians, such as myself, to write a
comprehensive account of systematized brutality. Again, without this
disclosure, a decade was required to reconstruct events. This reconstruction
was vital to challenging the previously-held view that the brutalities in the
detention camps and villages were on-offs, and not the result of a
comprehensive system authorized at the highest levels in London and
Nairobi.
16. The Defendant’s Skeleton Argument is a reflection of a piece of historical
writing that results from a cursory and partial reading of the “much relevant
documentation [that] has always been in the public domain in London or in
Nairobi.” This is in some ways understandable as the Defendant’s Skeleton
Argument was not informed by the ten years of sustained research necessary
to have a comprehensive understanding of the fragmentary files that do exist.
17. The Defendant has hand-selected documents that support a now, de-bunked
view that the British colonial brutalities perpetrated during the Mau Mau
Emergency were the result of one-offs, rather than any kind of systematic
effort authorized at the highest levels of British colonial governance. A
comprehensive and sustained reading of the documents publically available
does not support the Defendant’s Skeleton Argument.
18. Moreover, with the Hanslope Disclosure seriously undermines the
contentions made in the Defendant’s own Skeleton Argument. The limited
amount of time that I, and other historians, have had to review the Hanslope
Disclosure have yielded multiple files and documents that consistently
support that evidence which was set out for the first time in Imperial
Reckoning in Histories of the Hanged.
19. The recently released Hanslope Disclosure, and the files that the Claimants’
team has been able to review in a very limited amount of time, do not
support the incomplete and one-sided narrative offered by the Defendant in
its Skeleton Argument.
Inaccuracies in the Defendant’s Skeleton Argument
20. There are multiple parts of the Defendant’s Skeleton Argument that reflect an
unfamiliarity with, or partial understanding of, the documents existing in the
public domain.
21. Screening. The Defendant’s Skeleton Argument suggests that there was a
regulated system for screening, whereby there were specific rules governing
administrative oversight of screening as well as the performance of actual
screening duties. In reality, the process of screening that unfolded often did
not always follow the operational guidelines, such as they existed.
Documents and oral evidence support this deviation of practice from policy.
a. Many Screening Centers were unofficial, which was contrary to
Emergency Regulations, and which allowed for operations to take
place outside of the ambit of stated policy. As of December 1954,
there were 15 declared Screening Centers under Regulation 3(3),
whereas there were over 150 Screening Camps unofficially in
operation.
The Government at this time sought, through the
Ministries of Defence and African Affairs, to reduce the numbers of
unauthorized screening camps to a minimum.1
b. These unofficial Screening Camps were located in Home Guard Posts,
among other places. This subjected is dealt with in various
documents, including “An Extract of a Meeting held at Government
House on 23rd December, 1954.” In this Extract, the meeting reflects
discussion on “Places for Interrogation of Suspects, Surrendered
Terrorists, etc.”2
c. Importantly, the Government conflates Screening with Interrogations.
In effect, reflecting that there was not, in practice, a distinction
between screening for classification of detainees and interrogation for
operational information.3
d. Screening in Works Camps. In paragraph 230 of the Defedant’s
Skeleton Statement the statement is made that the responsibility of
screening rested with the Ministry of African Affairs. However, in
footnote 15 to paragraph 230, the citation to this statement fully
reads, “Minister of African Affairs is basically responsible for
KNA, MAA/7/206/1, “Screening Camps and Centres,” December 1954; and KNA, MAA/7/206/1, “Screening
Centres,” December 1954.
2 KNA, MAA/7/206/10, “An Extract of a Meeting held at Government House on 23 rd December, 1954.”
3 KNA, MAA/7/206/10, “An Extract of a Meeting held at Government House on 23 rd December, 1954.”
1
screening at the Works Camps…(emphasis added).” Extensive
documentation from the Department of Community Development and
its Commissioner, Thomas Askwith, points to the fact that, in practice,
there was no standardized screening process, that Askwith up until
February 1957 circulated multiple memoranda attempting to
systematize screening, and that multiple ministries, including the
Ministry for Community Development and Rehabilitation, the Ministry
for Defence, and the Ministry for African Affairs, continued to share
joint responsibility for screening in the detention camps.4
e. To suggest, therefore, that there was a standardized policy for
screening that was executed in practice would be to misrepresent the
documents available in the public domain.
22. Participation of the British Army in Screening and Interrogation.
The
Defendant’s Skeleton Statement, paragraph 229, claims that there is no
substantial evidence showing British Army involvement in screening “other
than the most cursory inspection of passes and the like.” It also suggests in
paragraph 234 that there is no evidence to suggest that MIOs were attached
to the camps. In addition, they deny that the British Army participated in the
In November 1954, for example, Thomas Askwith attempted to introduce a standardized screening form and record keeping
system. Such uniformities never evolved. See KNA, AB 2/44/1, Commissioner for Community Development and Rehabilitation,
Memorandum, “Screening Forms,” 12 November 1954. Later in February 1957, Askwith was still circulating memos in an
attempt to systematize screening operations. See KNA, AB 2/23, Circular, “Procedure for taking Detainees Statements,” 13
February 1957. Others within the Community Development and Rehabilitation Department also commented on the problem of
regularizing screening. For example, see KNA, AB 17/14/101, Minute to file from J.M. Normand to Ohanga and Askwith, 17
April 1955 whereby Norman discusses the continued division of screening responsibility between the Ministry for Community
Development and Rehabilitation, the Ministry for Defence, and the Ministry for African Affairs.
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work of the MMIC [233] or that the MIOS and Special Branch jointly toured
camps in order to screen and interrogate detainees.
23. In the brief time I have had to review the Hanslope Disclosure, the
documents suggest that the Defendant’s claims as outlined in paragraph 229
and 234 are incorrect. I shall here refer to the witness statement of Dr. Huw
Bennett who ably outlines the precise documents that, with the minimal of
time, he has specifically identified that place the Army and its MIOs and FIAs
in an active role in the screening of Mau Mau suspects and with an active role
in the camps.
It is important to note that this documentary evidence
supports the extensive oral evidence from multiple sources that I collected
over the course of my ten years of research. The witnesses I have
interviewed, including former senior British colonial officers, gave testimony
of the British Army actively participating in screening, or interrogation in
screening centers, villages and detention camps.
24. In addition, I interviewed detainees who themselves spoke of the presence of
“Johnnies” and “Ng’ombe” during their screening both within and outside of
the detention camps, including the screening that took place in the MMIC. In
effect, from the oral testimony from former detainees, as well as from some
former British colonial officers, the “Johnnies” and “Ng’ombe” were part and
parcel of the screening ordeals, both within and outside of the camps.
25. The term “Johnnies” was a nickname that the detainees collectively bestowed
up members of the British army. The term “Ng’ombe” specifically referred to
those members of the British Army who were part of the Kenya Regiment
(i.e. it referenced the “cow” symbol of the KR uniform). Oral evidence also
supports the fact that “Johnnies” were present in the railway transfers of
detainees from Langata Camp to Manyani Camp. I referred to some of this
evidence in Imperial Reckoning where I discuss “Johnnies” and their abuse of
detainees in the railway cars going to Manyani Camp, and in their presence
upon the disembarkation at Manyani Camp.5 This evidence, along with Mr.
Bennett’s, contradicts the Defendant’s claims, including those in paragraphs
236 and 237.
26. In addition to the Screening Centres, the ungazetted Screening Center, and
the Detention Camps, there also existed “Temporary Places of Detention.”
The Defendant’s Skeleton Statement does not discuss these locations, though
they were also integral in the broader screening and detainee processing
practice. The documents referenced by Mr. Bennett from the Hanslope
Disclosure as well as oral evidence that I collected both point to the fact that
detainees were screened in numerous places by numerous individuals,
administrative and military alike. The “Temporary Places of Detention” were
Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya
(New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 134-35.
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another such site for screening, and one that is absent from the Defendant’s
Skeleton Statement.6
27. The Defendant denies there is any evidence that the British Army jointly
staffed and the MMIC. In addition to the oral evidence I have been given as to
the British Army intimate involvement with this institution, I refer the Court
to a specific document. Appendix ‘A’ to War/C.561 Security of Nairobi,
Selective Pick-up of K.E.M. Domestics, Report by the Nairobi Extra-Provincial
District Emergency Committee, Security Forces:
“6c) DMI work hand in glove with Special Branch
d) A weekly meeting is held at which Special Branch, MMIC, DMIO and DO
Closer Administration consolidate their information
e) Representatives of all branches attend a daily meeting in the area
Operations Room where items of operational intelligence of immediate value
are presented.
f) All branches use the MMIC library for references and research.”7
28. The Defendant’s have chosen not to interview numerous witnesses that I
identified in my previous witness statement. In part, the Defendant’s
justification was due to the fact that such witnesses were remote and/or that
they would not have appropriate knowledge. However, there are numerous
witnesses who are still alive and living in close proximity to London. These
include Mr. Terence Gavaghan and Mr. John Cowan; both men played
significant roles in the detention camp system, and would have knowledge of
For example, KNA, MA/7/206/36, Memoradum from Cusack, Minister for Internal Security and Defence,
“Temporary Place of Detention,” 10 April 1955.
7 WO 276/90, 06 April 1955
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various aspects of the Claimants’ case including, but not limited to, the role of
the military in screening and detention operations. Other potential witnesses
are alive and easily accessible in Kenya, as I found in my own work. This
includes, but is not limited to, Francis Erskine.
29. In summary, I came to the clear conclusion, based upon ten years of research,
that the British Army was involved with the screening, or interrogation, of
Mau Mau detainees.
a. Witnesses,
including
former
British
colonial
officers
and
detainees/villagers, gave testimony of the British Army being actively
involved with screening, or interrogation in screening centers, villages
and detention camps.
b. Written accounts of the British Army, including Kitson’s Gangs and
Countergangs, offers evidence of the British Army interrogating Mau
Mau suspects. These interrogations would have been conducted by
MIOs and FIAs, among others.
c. By the end of 1955, I have come to the conclusion that nearly all Mau
Mau suspects, save the few thousand still remaining in the forests,
were subject to some form of detention, either in the Pipeline of
detention camps or in the Emergency villages where they conducted
screenings and interrogations in concert with Special Branch. To
conduct their continued interrogations, the MIOs and FIAs would have
had to locate the majority of their suspects in the detention camps
and/or villages after 1955.
d. Even prior to 1955, due to the ongoing villagization policies, most
Mau Mau suspects were subject to some form of detention, and would
therefore have been located in areas of detention at the time of
interrogation.
e. Numerous documents suggest that intelligence, including that gained
from the “passive wing,” were crucial in the combined efforts of the
British Military and the Special Branch, which was under the
operational control of British Military.
30. Investigations - In paragraph 250 the Defendant states that proper
investigations were carried out in all accusations of abuse. This statement is
untrue.
a. That the British Colonial Government did carry out a handful of
investigations does not, in any way reflect, the number of cases of
known abuse that the Government did not investigate.
b. This includes, but is not limited to, the large number of anonymous
letters from detainees, who opted for anonymity for fear of reprisals
from colonial authorities. This fear of reprisals is well documented in
my first witness statement, whereupon I also detail the great extent to
which the Colonial Office was aware of these reprisals. Kenya policy
forbade investigates when reports of abuse were made anonymously,
despite the full awareness of reprisals when detainees revealed their
names.
31. Paragraph 269 of the Defendant’s Skeleton Statement states that there were
“repeated prosecutions of and/or disciplinary measures taken against
members of the Security Forces and employees and/or agents of the Colonial
Administration who staffed camps, together with inquiries launched at
regular intervals into allegations of ill-treatment by such individuals.” This is
a misleading statement and is significant the Defendant fails to give any
context or explanation with regard to these “investigations”:
i. Of the examples of investigations/prosecutions that the
Defendant lists in paragraph 269, those of Griffiths, Hayward,
and Glenday do not pertain directly to detention camps, but
rather to screening operations.
Prof Anderson is able to
explain why, in fact, these do not amount to a pattern of
impartial investigations and rigorous prosecutions. In fact the
opposite was the truth.
ii. The reference to the Heaton Report is significant insofar as Mr.
Heaton, as the Defendant suggests, “was recorded as not
having come across any case of rough handling.” At the time
that Mr. Heaton made the record the Colonial Office had
extensive knowledge of brutalities in the detention camps of
Kenya, and the Kenya Government had extensive files of actual
letters from detainees smuggled out of the camps detailing
multiple abuses, which would include, but were not limited to
“rough handling.” I detail these points in my first witness
statement.
iii. The reference to the inquiry at Mageta Island was due to a
strike on the part of the detainees, not to abuses.
iv. There is profound significance to the 1957 prosecution at
Gathigiriri Camp, as this camp was part of the Mwea Camp
system where the dilution technique was practiced. Despite
this death, the British colonial government moved forward
with the expansion of the dilution technique and the Hanslope
Disclosure reveals that multiple brutalities continued in the
Mwea Camps long after the Gathigiriri death and as there is no
indication of any prosecutions subsequent to that related to
the
Gathigiriri
death,
such abuses continued without
independent investigation, let alone prosecution. I refer to a
selection of the important documents which I have identified in
the course of the review marked ‘CME 1’.
v. The administrative inquiry into the death at Aguthi Camp,
October 1958. The Defendant’s presentation of this incident is
misleading insofar as the Colonial Office was compelled to
investigate this incident, despite knowledge of it, because
Barbara Castle, MP, pursued the case and made repeated calls
for an investigation. Moreover, the same techniques in practice
at Aguthi Camp at this time – that is the dilution technique –
were the same techniques that gave rise to multiple instances
of brutalities in the Mwea Camps. The Colonial Office and
Kenya Government both had knowledge of this, though the
extent of this knowledge has recently been greatly expanded
by the Hanslope Disclosure (to be discussed in further detail
below).
vi. The Hola Inquiry. In brief, what is so striking about the Hola
Inquiry is the limit of accountability, and the degree to which
Hola was held to be an isolated incident, despite the fact that
colonial officials at the highest level in London and Nairobi had
significant evidence to the contrary.
vii. The Jack Report is significant insofar as there are disclosures of
abuses in the camps, though the inquiry did not lead to
prosecutions.
32. What is striking is that from the aforementioned instances is that these are
the only significant investigations and/or prosecutions. The fact is that the
Colonial Administration, with the knowledge and sanction of the Colonial
Office, resisted investigations, inquires and prosecutions into allegations of
detainee abuse, only undertook them when under considerable public
pressure and then interfered with any process which was in any way
independent. Moreover, the investigations themselves were significantly
flawed, a point which Professor David Anderson raises in his second witness
statement. Had the rule of law functioned effectively, without executive
interference, it is highly likely that the widespread and systematic use of
torture would have come to an end.
33. Time and again, there were demands for an independent inquiry into the
detention camps in Kenya, and consistently colonial official in London and
Nairobi took deliberate steps to avoid such an independent inquiry. I address
this point in detail in my first witness statement.
34. Attempts to curb indiscipline - The Defendant states in Paragraph 267 that
that “both General Erskine and Governor Baring sought on a consistent basis
to curb indiscipline on the part of both of the Security Forces and those
employees and/or agents of the Administration who staffed the camps.”
What is noteworthy is that this indiscipline did not stop, despite Erskine and
Baring’s statements.
In effect, making such statements were ineffective
because they were not backed up by a rigorous system of investigations and
prosecutions, and both the General and Governor were aware of this, as was
the Colonial Office. I outline the consistent brutalities that took place and the
widespread knowledge of these brutalities at the highest levels of British
colonial governance in my first witness statement.
35. The evidence of Sir Arthur Young, the Commissioner of Police in Kenya from
February 1954 to January 1955, who resigned because of Baring’s repeated
unwillingness to pursue prosecutions against members of the British colonial
administration and security forces with regard to brutalities they
perpetrated against Mau Mau suspects and detainees is one example.
36. Young repeatedly demanded “impartial status” for the police, insisting that it
was essential to Kenya’s law enforcement. Baring refused to grant police
impartial status for investigations into colonial-perpetrated brutalities, and
enforcement of the law against Britain’s security forces and administration.
Baring repeatedly interfered with police investigations.
Young made
multiple statements regarding the violence and brutality in Kenya, and the
Governor’s unwillingness to intervene. For example, he wrote:
“I felt it my unpleasant duty to pursue with Baring my apprehensions that
members of the civilian security forces were uncontrolled and were
committing crimes of violence and brutality upon their alleged enemies,
which were unjustified and abhorrent.”8
“I addressed an official report to H.E. [His Excellency] expressing my
apprehensions in writing, with the belief that supporting evidence would
soon be forthcoming. I also requested that he should take an initiative in
administrative action which would indicate his own repugnance of brutality
committed by security forced and do what he could to bring this to an end. I
received no acknowledgment of this appreciation, far less an answer to it, in
spite of a number of reminders.”9
8
9
RH, Mss. Afr. 486, Sir Arthur Young papers, box 5, file 1, Arthur Young, “Introduction to Sir Arthur Young,” 18.
RH, Mss. Afr. 486, Sir Arthur Young papers, box 5, file 1, Arthur Young, “Introduction to Sir Arthur Young,” 14.
37. In this letter, Young detailed the reasons for his “anxiety at the continuance
of the rule of rear rather than that of impartial justice.”10 Young resigned
over this matter when the Governor would not act on his recommendations.
Importantly, Young was calling for independent investigations into the
crimes being committed by British colonial administrators and members of
the security forces. Similar calls for independent investigations took place
following Young’s resignation, and became more widespread and sustained
in the period leading up to Hola in March 1959, including the motion
introduced by Members of Parliament, as outlined in my first witness
statement.
38. Despite knowing their tact of asking for an end to brutalities was not working
and, in fact, the level of brutality only increased over the course of the
Emergency, as the recent Hanslope Disclosure supports, Erskine, Baring and
Lennox Boyd never sought another course of action. In fact, nearly all of their
public declarations to end the brutalities took place in the early part of the
Emergency, that is during 1953. These declarations were made prior to the
overwhelming amount of documentary and witness evidence available with
regard to the brutalities perpetrated by members of the British colonial
administration and security forces.
RH, Mss. Afr. 486, Sir Arthur Young papers, box 5, file 3, 84-89, letter from Arthur Young to Governor Baring, 14 December
1954.
10
39. Despite Young’s resignation and the consistent evidence of increased
brutalities being perpetrated in Kenya against Mau Mau suspects and
detainees as evidenced in my first witness statement and as supported by the
recent Hanslope Disclosures, there was no increase in calls for an end to the
brutalities, there continued to be limited, internal investigations, as well as
sustained efforts thwarting investigations, including but not limited to those
connected with anonymous allegations made by detainees.
The Dilution Technique
40. Baring and the Colonial Office made deliberate efforts to render the
detention camp Pipeline more systematically brutal over time.
This is
evidenced by the systematic violence of the dilution technique, which
culminated in the Cowan Plan, as evidenced in my first witness statement.
The dilution technique as practiced in the Mwea Camps was known to
involve brutalities, as clearly noted by the Attorney General in a document
that the Colonial Office files. This is also cited in my first witness statement.
41. The Kenya Government and the Colonial Office approved of the dilution
technique, despite knowing that a detainee had been killed in Gathigiriri
Camp as a result of the dilution technique. This death is cited in Defendant’s
Skeleton Statement, paragraph 269(g).
42. The recent Hanslope Disclosures provide an impressive array of
documentation on the Mwea Camps, which outline clearly the consistent
level of brutalities and crimes committed by British colonial officials using
the dilution technique. These brutalities were committed after the death at
Gathigiriri Camp and after the approval of the dilution technique by the
Colonial Office. Given the limited time that I have had to review the Hanslope
Disclosures, it is striking that the documents on the Mwea Camps and the
dilution technique reveal a level of brutality that expands greatly upon my
previous knowledge of gross irregularities in the camps.
Villagization
43. The Defendant claims in its Skeleton Argument that there is no evidence of
assaults perpetrated by the British Army in the Emergency villages. In my
own research and in that conducted by filmmakers, including the BBC,
African and European eye witnesses to the execution and enforcement of
villagization policy witnesses refer consistently to the presence of the British
Army in the burning and forced removals of villagers, during the forced labor
campaigns, and during the abuses that took place within the villages, in the
Home Guard Posts, and in the forced labor lines. These members of the
British Army are consistently referred to by their nicknames of “Johnnies” or
“Ng’ombe.”11
11
For example, see Imperial Reckoning, 246, 247, 248, 254, 269.
44. I have read the case papers and agree that the allegations which the
Claimants make are supported by the documentary and witness evidence
that I analyzed after ten years of research.
45. I have read the case papers and agree that the allegations which the
Claimants make are supported by the documentary and witness evidence
that I analyzed after ten years of research.
STATEMENT OF TRUTH
This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I am aware that it
will be placed before the Court.
Signed:
___________________________________________Date: 1 April 2011___________________________
Professor Caroline Macy Elkins