Two-Level Games of International
Environmental NGOs in China
Michael M. Gunter, Jr. & Ariane C. Rosen*
Acknowledging profound environmental and social consequences tied to
three decades of rapid economic growth, Beijing increasingly encourages
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to assist in relatively noncontroversial development-related fields, such as environmental protection.
Attention to this emerging Chinese civil society is growing, especially
literature with a focus on local or indigenous Chinese NGOs and the
unique breed of government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) within China.
Little work, though, exists when it comes to analyzing the role of
international environmental NGOs within China. This is a noted deficiency,
particularly considering Robert Putnam’s two-level games where forces at
both the domestic and international level shape government policy. Within
this context, our analysis examines international NGOs but argues they are
most effective when they target not the Chinese state but rather the general
public—especially domestic NGOs.
INTRODUCTION
Spectacular economic growth over the last three decades, on the order
of double-digit annual GDP increases,1 fundamentally defines China today.
Beginning in 1978 with Deng Xiaoping’s monumental reforms, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) led a remarkable transition from a planned to
essentially a market economy, one that offers a better life to a growing
*
Dr. Gunter is a Cornell Distinguished Professor at Rollins College in Winter Park, FL,
USA, where he also directs the Rollins International Relations Program. He is author of
Building the Next Ark: How NGOs Work to Protect Biodiversity (2004/2006) with
Dartmouth College and University Press of New England and specializes on issues of
sustainable development and NGOs. Ms. Rosen is a Master of Philosophy student in
international relations at the University of Cambridge. They acknowledge the generosity
of a number of individuals from Blue Moon Fund, China Environment Forum,
Environmental Defense Fund, Green Oasis, International Fund for China’s Environment,
Jane Goodall Institute’s Roots & Shoots, Natural Resources Defense Council, Pacific
Environment, The Nature Conservancy, University of Louisville’s Center for Asian
Studies, and World Wildlife Fund for making this project possible. Special thanks also to
Jennifer Turner, Timothy Hildebrant, Kirill Bumin and anonymous reviewers at Policy
Review as well as Thom Moore and a startup grant from the Rollins Summer Research
Program.
1
Robert Fogel, “Why China’s Economy Will Grow to $123 Trillion by 2040,” Foreign
Policy, January/February (2010).
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271
Chinese middle class and has effectively quelled political discontent
following the 1989 student democracy movement. With these rapid
economic advances, however, also come profound environmental and
social consequences and the fear of future societal discontent. Beijing
publicly acknowledges complications and contradictions tied to growth—
national infant mortality is an impressive 27 percent lower than that of New
York City, 2 but 36.3 percent of the population lives on less than $2 per
day. 3 Perhaps even more eye-opening, particularly within the Chinese
leadership, are estimates that roughly 8 to 12 percent of GDP annually is
lost due to environmental pollution and degradation.4
Within this context and the noted “small state, big society”5 philosophy
developing since 1978, Beijing increasingly encourages non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to assist in relatively non-controversial
development-related fields such as birth control, educational support,
poverty alleviation, and, the focus of this work, environmental protection.
Such a development cannot be understated. The government welcomes
additional financial and technical resources from NGOs as well as the
enhanced international reputation that comes from interactions with
international NGOs. In its efforts to remain in power, the CCP has allowed
both practical and ideological concessions—and an emerging Chinese civil
society has benefited.
For hundreds of years the Chinese were inwardly focused. Up until the
20th century the “Middle Kingdom” largely had little regard for
international affairs. With its rapid growth in the global economy today,
however, China can no longer ignore those around it. Only by taking a
larger role on the world stage can China serve its interests. Membership in
the World Trade Organization in 2001, as well as welcoming the United
Nations and World Bank to projects such as the 2005 Renewable Energy
Scale-Up Program (CRESP), the 2008 Eco-Farming Project, and the 2009
NanGuang Railway Project,6 are explicit recognitions of this reality.
Kenneth Waltz’s explanation of the “second image” as domestic
structures shaping foreign policy interests 7 and Robert Putnam’s theory of
2
Nicholas D. Kristof, “Bullets Over Beijing,” The New York Times, June 4, 2009.
The World Bank, 2008 World Development Indicators: Poverty Data (Washington DC:
The World Bank, 2008), 11.
4
Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s
Future (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 19.
5
Xiaohua Liu, NGOs in China: An Overview (National City, CA: International
Community Foundation, 2002), 1, accessed June 2, 2009, http://www.icfdn.org/index.php.
6
“Active Projects (China),” The World Bank, accessed December 16, 2011,
http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=318983&pagePK=141143&piP
K=141103&theSitePK=318950.
7
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959).
3
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two-level games played between domestic and international interests8
further help explain Chinese thinking, particularly the extent to which
domestic economic interests spurred stronger stances on the international
political stage. But as Putnam and others have noted, these domesticinternational linkage arrows point both ways and the second image is
easily, if not predominantly, reversed.9 Indeed, “the international system is
not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of
them.”10 International interests, from enticing economic investment
opportunities presented by the second largest economy in the world to
global threats such as climate change traced increasingly to the world’s
leading greenhouse gas emitter,11 also shape domestic politics in China.
In short, development in China attracts attention across the globe and
explains why more and more international environmental NGOs target the
country. Yet while the Chinese government welcomes this foreign
expertise, money, and man-power, it is simultaneously wary of too much
influence from democracy-minded Westerners. The People’s Republic of
China (PRC) remains extremely cautious and continually controls its
political space and social communication, regularly blocking such basic
Internet organizing tools as Twitter, Flickr, and Hotmail. It is thus a very
different atmosphere for international NGOs that seek to gain a foothold in
China. One of the most telling representations of this difference is the very
term “non-governmental organization,” which means by definition what it
is not—not the government. In China, this term is officially avoided due to
its overt political overtones, as seen from its Mandarin translation to “antigovernmental organization.”12 Social organizations, as they are legally
known, are not permitted to work against the government as an alternative
power source as is conventional in a western context but are instead
required to collaborate with the government. Semantics aside, unofficially
the term NGO continues to be used regularly in China and remains the
phrasing focal point of this work.13
8
Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,”
International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427–60.
9
Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic
Politics,” International Organization 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1978): 881–912.
10
Ibid., 911.
11
David Barboza, “China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy,” The New York
Times, August 15, 2010. China passed Japan in 2010 to become the second largest
economy in the world and in 2006 passed the United States as the largest greenhouse gas
emitter. However, per capita income in China remains far behind the United States.
12
Renee Yuen-Jan Hsia and Lynn T. White III, “Working Amid Corporatism and
Confusion: Foreign NGOs in China,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 31
(2002): 331.
13
In fact, the term NGO has been used in practice at least since the lead up to the 1995 UN
conference on women in Beijing, yet another example of international influence on the
domestic. Jude Howell, “Prospects for NGOs in China,” Development in Practice 5, no. 1
(Feb. 1995): 5–6.
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Beginning with the first domestic NGO, Friends of Nature in 1994,14
the academic literature is rich with data about the links between state and
indigenous organizations.15 Relations between the government and
international NGOs are less studied. Moreover, there are not only scant
academic studies of international NGOs in China, but also very little
knowledge sharing by NGOs that have been successful.16 Our analysis fills
this gap by first outlining the role international NGOs play in addressing
environmental issues within China and then offering recommendations on
how international environmental NGOs can be most effective.
This work now turns to a literature review that provides a brief
overview of NGO scholarship generally and then identifies three main
schools of thought regarding NGOs operating in China as well as a short
synopsis of China’s NGO regulatory history. Our argument acknowledges
the utility in bottom-up versus top-down analyses combined with differing
stages of development, particularly the question of NGO autonomy, but
contends that the most useful approaches for the Chinese case discard a
state-centric lens and focus instead on broader socio-cultural targets,
namely the Chinese people themselves.
Building upon this scholarship, our analysis then focuses on a largely
neglected component of the developing Chinese civil society: international
environmental NGOs. Looking first at two famous anti-dam campaigns,
one where environmental NGOs were successful and one where they failed,
we integrate a series of over two dozen interviews with NGO, foundation,
and think tank personnel. Our findings, incorporating Putnam’s seminal
two-level games argument, point to a crucial yet understated role for
international environmental NGOs in China and offer specific
recommendations for these groups to avoid trial and error tactics of the past
in negotiating the complex Chinese political and legal terrain. Finally, we
suggest general implications of these findings for the Chinese state and
suggest avenues for further research concerning policy issues, climate
change in particular.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN CHINA
With 450,000 registered social organizations and an estimated three
million more unregistered social organizations, 17 NGOs in China deserve
attention by virtue of their numbers alone. Growing at a rate of eight to ten
14
Koon-Kwai Wong, “Greening of the Chinese Mind: Environmentalism with Chinese
Characteristics,” Asia-Pacific Review 12, no. 2 (2005): 49.
15
Jude Howell, “NGO-State Relations in Post-Mao China,” in NGOs, States and Donors:
Too Close for Comfort?, eds. David Hulme and Michael Edwards (London: MacMillan
Press, 1997).
16
Hsia and White, “Working Amid Corporatism,” 346.
17
Fu Jing, “Better Use of NGOs Predicted,” China Daily, May 14, 2011,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-05/14/content_12509762.htm.
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percent annually, 18 they will likely capture even further consideration in the
years to come. This is particularly notable in the environmental sector,
where increasingly a transnational environmental movement operates both
locally and globally. 19
Yet for an NGO to effectively operate in China, it must first understand
how Chinese civil society differs from the traditional Western model. As
noted by well-known Chinese scholar Xiaoguan Kang, “The government’s
rule in managing the NGOs has always been ‘offer us more help and cause
us less trouble.’ NGOs need to be both exploited and reined in.”20 Kang’s
statement suggests that the conventional Western conceptualization of
NGOs is severely compromised in China. While the relationship between
NGOs and the government is decidedly different than in the West, it is
worth noting that NGOs in China are not merely extensions of the
government. Even when including government-organized NGOs
(GONGOs) in this mix, NGOs represent more of a partnership, albeit an
unequal one. This means some NGOs do have a degree of influence on
both central and local governments.21
Looking to a growing body of scholarship provides three key schools of
thought regarding civil society in China. The Western or democratization
school follows a traditional Western model and its focus on autonomy from
government.22 The corporatist or co-optation school emphasizes China’s
restrictive legal framework and NGO dependence on government.23
Finally, China’s “third way” combines these two schools to argue that
NGOs can collaborate with government without being co-opted by it.
Ironically, this might be even more revolutionary an approach in the long
run.24
B. WESTERN OR DEMOCRATIZATION APPROACHES
The democratization school defines civil society and NGOs
traditionally. Civil society is “the realm of organized social life that is open,
voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous
18
Ibid.
See, e.g., Gerald Chan, Pak K. Lee, and Lai-Ha Chan, “China’s Environmental
Governance: The Domestic-International Nexus,” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2008):
291–314. The authors focus on linkages between domestic and international environmental
governance.
20
Xiaoguan Kang, “On Chinese Government Control of NGOs,” China Digital Times,
December 15, 2008, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/12/kang-xiaoguang-on-chinesegovernment-control-of-ngos/.
21
Jennifer Turner (China Environment Forum), telephone interview, July 24, 2009.
22
J. Fisher, Nongovernments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World
(West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1998).
23
Quisha Ma, “The Governance of NGOs in China since 1978: How Much Autonomy?,”
The Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2002): 305–28.
24
Koon-Kwai Wong, “Greening of the Chinese Mind: Environmentalism with Chinese
Characteristics,” Asia-Pacific Review 12, no. 2 (2005).
19
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from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.”25 NGOs
are groups that pursue their individual agendas completely separate from
any state control or influence. Some focus on one main issue while others
tackle more diverse issue areas. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF), for
example, focuses on endangered species protection,26 while Greenpeace
tackles a wide range of environmental concerns—everything from whaling
and overfishing to genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), global
warming, and nuclear power.27
According to this school of thought, NGOs are able to work outside the
governmental structure and pursue their own goals and interests, regardless
of whether they align with those of the state. They do this using techniques
including education, governmental lobbying, and direct action and
activism. NGOs can “act as both allies and adversaries to states, forming
networks that advocate policy changes and define ethical standards.”28
Some argue that NGOs “nearly always act in counterpoint with
governmental actors.”29 These autonomous organizations are able to work
for political change, speak out against the government, and advocate for
social reform. Western thinkers traditionally view this role of civil society
as a huge step in the movement towards democracy. 30
The intellectual roots of the democratization school date to Alexis de
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. In it he describes characteristics of
American society that contribute to democracy, for example, “the most
democratic country on earth is the one whose people have lately perfected
the art of pursuing their common desires in common.”31 He argues that
these civil associations go hand in hand with political ones. 32 More
recently, Putnam revisits de Tocqueville’s arguments in his case study of
modern Italy, its civic traditions, and democracy. He concludes that “those
25
Shui-Yan Tang and Xueyong Zhan, “Civic Environmental NGOs, Civil Society, and
Democratization in China,” Journal of Development Studies 44, no. 3 (March 2008): 429.
26
“What We Do: Overview,” World Wildlife Fund, accessed April 20, 2012,
http://www.worldwildlife.org/what/index.html.
27
“What We Do,” Greenpeace, accessed April 20, 2012; http://www.greenpeace.org/usa
/en/campaigns/.
28
Michael M. Gunter, Jr., “Nongovernmental Organizations,” Encyclopedia of
Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, eds. J. Baird Callicott and Robert Frodeman, vol. 2,
(Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference, 2008), 95.
29
Ann Marie Clark, “Non-Governmental Organizations and Their Influence on
International Society,” Journal of International Affairs 48, no. 2 (1995): 507.
30
Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks
in International Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
31
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (New York: Saunders and Otley, 1838),
reprinted as translated by Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Library of America, 2004),
596.
32
Ibid., 604.
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concerned with democracy and development in the South [of Italy] should
be building a more civic community.”33
De Tocqueville and Putnam’s analyses on the importance of civil
society to successful democracies also apply to countries more closely
related to China. After the Soviet Union instituted its glasnost, or
“openness” policy, civic associations increased in both the USSR and its
satellite states. 34 While these associations were not originally political, they
offered a valuable training ground for democracy in Eastern Europe and
beyond—one that contributed to the “color revolutions” in states like
Georgia and Ukraine.35 Outrage over an undemocratic election, nurtured by
years of civil society growth that “reinforced democratic values and
deepened the public’s understanding of free and fair electoral
procedures,”36 led to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. According to David
Yang Da-Hua, the case of the Soviet Union is likely a sign of things to
come in China. He argues that, “from a historical perspective, the Chinese
experience is in fact typical of the post-totalitarian Communist regime.”37
Still, whether or not the democratization approach applies to civil
society in China is hotly contested, especially since China’s civil society
development differs from the pattern established by Eastern Europe. China
is different from the Soviet Union due to its enormous governmentsponsored economic growth that is reducing calls for political change as
well as the central government’s own fear of repeating Soviet Russia’s
mistakes.38 The leadership’s review of historical revolutions against
autocratic regimes, especially the color revolutions, resulted in their strict
policies and oversight of Chinese civil society and foreign influences. 39
The strong control and oversight of the autocratic Chinese government
prevents a completely autonomous civil society in the fully Western sense,
with groups restricted from speaking out against the government and
calling for policy changes. The civil society-state relationship is instead
seen as “two poles of an internally connected continuum,”40 where interests
and actions completely intertwine. Some scholars contend that this greatly
33
Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 185.
34
Peter Ho, “Greening Without Conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs and Civil Society in
China,” Development and Change 32 (2001): 893–921; Sarah E. Mendelson and John K.
Glen, eds., The Power and Limit of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in
Eastern Europe and Eurasia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
35
David Yang Da-hua, “Civil Society as an Analytical Lens for Contemporary China,”
China: An International Journal 2, no. 1 (March 2004): 10–11.
36
Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005):
43.
37
Da-hua, “Civil Society,” 8.
38
Lei Xie, Environmental Activism in China (London: Routledge, 2009).
39
Xiaoqing Lu and Drew Thompson, “China’s Evolving Civil Society: From Environment
to Health,” China Environment Series 8 (2006): 29.
40
Da-hua, “Civil Society,” 5.
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reduces the credibility of NGOs in terms of civil society, leaving NGOs
“completely co-opted within the formal governing institutions.”41 Such
critics find it difficult to picture civil society helping China progress
democratically.
Complete autonomy and political activism, however, are not the only
qualities seen as helping democratization. Any form of social or voluntary
organization can serve as a democracy training ground. By inspiring
increased activism and participation amongst the Chinese people and by
self-organizing toward shared goals, social organizations can impart the
principles of democracy. At the same time, civil society also reduces state
power simply by existing. There are now areas in China where people are
taking action and the government is not. Democratization scholars argue
this is a move in the direction of democracy. 42
C. CORPORATIST OR CO-OPTATION APPROACHES
The official Chinese approach to civil society follows the co-optation
school. With its restrictive laws and overall autocratic rule, China “claims
control over every social organization, on the premise that it is the ultimate
guardian of the people and their good.”43 The Chinese government does
this with GONGOs, such as the China Wildlife Conservation Association
and the Center for Environmental Education and Communication, as well
as popular NGOs like Friends of Nature and Global Village of Beijing.44
GONGOs are formed by government or Communist Party
organizations. They are under direct control of these groups and are “seen
as organic parts of the government structure connected by a variety of
financial, personnel, and operational ties.”45 The government creates
GONGOs to enhance and expand upon the efforts of government
organizations and to work towards the accomplishment of a shared set of
goals. They have several specific functions. Firstly, they take the pressure
off of the central government to address certain concerns, such as
environmental protection.46 China recognizes that it needs help to enhance
energy efficiency, increase the drinkable water supply, and protect
endangered species. Secondly, because GONGOs are not technically
government organs, they improve China’s global image and encourage
funding from international organizations refusing to work directly with the
government.47 Thirdly, GONGOs employ members of the central
41
Tang and Zhan, “Civic Environmental NGOs,” 439.
Da-hua, “Civil Society,” 11.
43
Hsia and White, “Working Amid Corporatism,” 332.
44
S.H Whiting, “The Politics of NGO Development in China,” Voluntas, International
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 2, no. 2 (1991): 16–48.
45
Fengshi Wu, “New Partners or Old Brothers? GONGOs in Transnational Environmental
Advocacy in China,” China Environment Series 5 (2002): 47.
46
Ibid., 48.
47
Ibid., 50–51.
42
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government who lost their jobs during China’s economic reforms. 48
Together, all these functions position GONGOs as an economically
beneficial choice for the Chinese government.
This close relationship with government organizations has both benefits
and drawbacks. Closeness to the bureaucratic structure gives GONGO
leadership a better understanding of how the government system works and
what steps are needed to be successful. Their well-connected membership
also gives them priority treatment during funding and resource
allocations.49 Despite these many benefits, GONGOs are under the control
of their parent organizations and thus their activities and goals must align
accordingly. The tightness of this relationship has led many scholars to
question whether GONGOs can be considered non-governmental at all.50
That said, government control extends to popular NGOs as well. These
NGOs, created by individuals separate from government or party
organization,51 appear at first glance to be analogous to the Western
conception of NGOs. Several notable laws, however, place even these
popular organizations under government control. Explanations of the four
most significant of these laws are below in Table 1. The earliest significant
legislation related to NGOs was in 1950 and was prohibitively limiting.52
The regulations were then altered in 1989 in response to economic reform
and changes in the NGO environment in China.53 The most recent
regulations dealing with popular organizations are the Regulations for
Registration and Management of Social Organizations updated in 1998.54
These regulations create a double registration, double oversight, and double
accountability system. Social organizations must first find a government
sponsor organization that deals with the same issues as the NGO. 55 They
then have to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. 56
48
Ibid., 47.
Vivienne Shue, “State Power and Social Organization in China,” State Power and Social
Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, eds. Joel S. Migdal, Atul
Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 65–88.
50
Jean-Philippe Beja, “The Changing Aspects of Civil Society in China,” Social Research
73, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 53–74.
51
Qiusha Ma, “Defining Chinese Nongovernmental Organizations,” Voluntas:
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 13, no. 2 (June 2002):
113–30.
52
Ibid, 119.
53
Renee Yuen-Jan Hsia and Lynn T. White III, “Working Amid Corporatism and
Confusion: Foreign NGOs in China,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 31
(2002): 337.
54
“Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Organisations: People’s
Republic of China State Council Order No. 250,” China Development Brief,
http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/298.
55
Timothy Hildebrandt, telephone interview, July 28, 2009.
56
Renee Yuen-Jan Hsia and Lynn T. White III, “Working Amid Corporatism and
Confusion: Foreign NGOs in China,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 31
(2002): 339.
49
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279
Table 1: Laws and Regulations57
Year
Law
1950
Interim Procedures on
the Registration of
Social Organizations
1989
Regulations on the
Registration and
Administration of
Social Organizations
1998
Regulations on the
Registration and
Administration of
Social Organizations
(revised) 58
1998
Provisional Regulations
on the Registration and
Management of Popular
Non-enterprise Work
Units 59
Key Points
 First PRC legal document on NGOs
 Nationalized many non-governmental associations and organizations, i.e.
private hospitals, schools, charities
 Virtually removed any and all NGO space in China
 Response to economic reform and changing NGO sector
 Types of social organizations include:
o Scholarly/scientific organizations
o Professional associations
o Trade/industrial associations
o United organizations
o Grant making institutions
 Double-tiered registration and management framework
 Large number of private non-profits not included in classification
 Social organizations defined as “voluntary groups formed by Chinese
citizens in order to realize a shared objective according to their rules and to
develop non-profit making activities”
 Criteria for establishment as a social organization
o Over 50 individual members (or 30 unit members)
o Standardized name and organizational structure
o Permanent location
o Full-time staff
o Funding: national—100,000 Yuan; local—30,000 Yuan
o Ability to bear civil liabilities independently
 Dual management system
o Registration and administration department
o Relevant government or party sponsor (professional leading unit)
 Non-competition principle, i.e. only one of a certain type of organization can
operate in a region
 Not allowed to operate outside of where registered
 Must submit an annual report to sponsor
 Popular non-enterprise work units defined as “organizations carrying out
social service activities of a non-profit nature, run by enterprise and
institutions work units, social groups and other social forces, and also
individual citizens using non-state assets”
 Less rigorous than that for social organizations, i.e. no member, staff, or
funding requirements
To register, an NGO needs more than just a sponsoring “mother-inlaw” organization to oversee their actions and ensure they engage in only
government supported activities. An NGO must also meet minimum
financial and membership numbers and have an appropriate office and
staff. Further, the social organizations technically cannot operate in any
57
Andreas Edele, “Non-Governmental Organizations in China,” Report Prepared for
Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, Geneva, Switzerland, May 2005:
1–55.
58
Peoples Republic of China State Council Order No. 250, Published by the State Council
at the 8th ordinary session on 25 September 1998. (Translations by China Development
Brief, “Regulations for registration and management of Social Organizations, June 11,
2009: http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com.)
59
The State Council of the Peoples’ Republic of China, Order No. 251, “The Provisional
regulations for the registration and management of popular non-enterprise work units”
(translation by China Development Brief, June 11, 2009: http://www.chinadevelopmentbri
ef.com).
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region that already has a similar organization registered.60 All together
these regulations enable the central government to limit the size, scope,
power, and influence of social organizations.
Becoming registered is an extremely difficult and rigorous process,
especially since many government organizations are reluctant to take on the
responsibilities and potential liabilities of becoming a sponsor organization.
Many organizations remain unregistered as a result.61 In theory this
provides the organization with more autonomy, but unregistered
organizations are considered illegal and are limited in many ways. Not only
are these unregistered NGOs constantly at risk of being shut down by the
government, but “even the basics of operation—opening bank accounts,
employing personnel, obtaining tax benefits, entering into cooperative
arrangements, and establishing contracts enforceable in PRC courts”62 are
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Without these basics a
social organization is severely limited. Without a bank account, for
example, donations cannot be made directly to the NGO, severely reducing
the number of organizations and people willing to provide funds. These
difficulties are yet another way the Chinese government maintains control
over social organizations, even those claiming to be autonomous.
As Renee Yuen-Jan Hsia and Lynn T. White II assert, registration
difficulties are designed to ensure that NGOs are permitted to exist in
China solely as “a marriage of convenience rather than a catalyst for citizen
resistance.”63 The Chinese Communist government remembers Tiananmen
vividly and is concerned that politically oriented organizations will form,
potentially leading to another large-scale democracy movement. The
government is also worried that these organizations can become avenues
for Western and democratic influence in China. Any threatening political
acts by NGOs in one area of civil society (such as the environment), Lu and
Thompson contend, would likely have ramifications for all of civil
society. 64
All told, these regulatory efforts seek two main objectives. The first is
to restrict civil society’s actions to “link[ing] citizens to the state” as
Jonathan Schwartz explains.65 The second, perhaps best articulated by Lu
and Thompson, is to control civil society’s rate of growth so that it adjusts
based on the government’s goals and needs.66 In other words, NGOs are co-
60
Ibid.
Jennifer Turner (China Environment Forum), telephone interview, July 17, 2009.
62
Matthew Erie et al., “Setting Up International Nonprofit Organizations in China,” The
China Business Review, May/June (2009).
63
Hsia and White, “Working Amid Corporatism,” 337.
64
Lu and Thompson, “China’s Evolving Civil Society,” 36.
65
Jonathan Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” Pacific Affairs
77, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 42, 45.
66
Lu and Thompson, “China’s Evolving Civil Society,” 34.
61
2012]
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281
opted by the authoritarian state and simply do its bidding. Their purpose is
to advance only government-approved agendas.
D. CHINA’S THIRD WAY
Despite key contributions, neither the democratization nor co-optation
schools of thought completely describe how NGOs truly operate in the
Middle Kingdom. The reality in China is that NGOs have varying levels of
autonomy, different types of relationships with the government, and a
diverse range of goals and projects. While some NGOs fit the typical
assumptions, with many GONGOs acting as puppets to the government and
popular organizations attempting to maintain their individual identities, a
number actually manage to gain various levels of autonomy. Unlike what
the co-optation school suggests, a GONGO is not necessarily completely
government controlled. A GONGO can be given free reign and strong
support precisely because the organization that created the GONGO sees it
as an extension of the government itself. Some GONGOs are becoming
more financially and administratively independent as a result of this
thinking.67 As Fengshi Wu argues, this independence allows them to pursue
their own goals, even some well beyond the government’s original
intentions.68
Several factors are key determinates of autonomy here. NGOs can
utilize important qualities such as “better bureaucratic connections, higher
status and superior knowledge of the way the state machinery operates” to
find ways around government regulations and controls.69 These qualities
are more prevalent in GONGOs and popular organizations with influential
leaders (such as former government officials) than in popularly organized
groups. Furthermore, unlike GONGOs, a popular organization may be
constrained by the registration process and operational difficulties to such a
degree that its original identity and goals are limited or lost. Without a
strong culture of giving in China, many NGOs struggle with finances, often
times relying on funds from a few dedicated members and the leaders
themselves. 70 Pressure from the government also limits cooperation and
large scale organizations or activities. 71
Along these lines, two final factors dominate the literature to date. The
first is the aforementioned “mother-in-law” organization to which an NGO
is paired. The government supervisory organization has the ability to use its
oversight to extremely limit and control the NGO’s activities, or it can
67
Wu, “New Partners or Old Brothers?,” 47.
Ibid., 53.
69
Yiyi Lu, “The Autonomy of Chinese NGOs: A New Perspective,” China: An
International Journal 5, no. 2 (Sept. 2007): 190.
70
Tang and Zhan, “Civic Environmental NGOs,” 431.
71
Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China,” 39.
68
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choose to take a very supportive and hands-off approach.72 The final factor,
financial independence, is even more important. The more an NGO must
report to its governing or supervisory organization for money, the more
accountable to the organization it becomes.
In summary, the most common approach taken by NGOs is to
cooperate with the government organizations initially and take advantage
of their connections and expertise and then, once they have a handle on
how to operate successfully, increasingly carve out their own identities. 73
Indeed, autonomy for NGOs as a whole appears to be moving in a positive
direction. Xiaoua Liu claims “the trend is clear that China’s NGOs are
becoming increasingly independent with the deepening of China’s
reforms.”74 This can be seen especially in the unofficial role of some NGOs
as “watchdog” organizations, enforcing national laws and policy at the
local level.75
China’s “third way” effectively combines elements from both the
democratization and co-optation schools to create a more accurate picture
of China’s civil society. The literature to date, however, focuses primarily
on indigenous NGOs. It fails to adequately analyze how international
NGOs contribute to China’s civil society framework. With the increasing
flow of international NGOs into China, this is a notable shortcoming. As
such, our analysis now turns to this category of international NGOs to
better define their specific operation space and limitations.
II. THREE GORGES AND NU RIVER ANTI-DAM CAMPAIGNS
Two campaigns in particular demonstrate the role of international
environmental NGOs in China. Both are well-known anti-dam campaigns,
but the 1989–1992 campaign against Three Gorges Dam ended in failure
while the opposition to the Nu River dam projects from 2003–2004 was a
comparative success. 76 Many factors contributed here, including the work
of international NGOs, and the significance of such contributions is of great
interest. Yet this work does not suggest international NGO activity served
as the crucial causal agent explaining success or failure in these cases. It
72
M. Pei, “Chinese Civic Associations: An Empirical Analysis,” Modern China, 24:3
(July 1998): 285–318.
73
Lu, “The Autonomy of Chinese NGOs,” 182. According to a case study of the China
Youth Development Foundation (CYDF), an extremely successful and largely autonomous
GONGO, one of the interviewees “advised Chinese NGOs to make good use of
government resources at the beginning, then to pay more attention to ‘developing their
individualities’ later.” Ibid.
74
Liu, NGOs in China, 4.
75
Jiang Ru and Leonard Ortolano, “Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental
NGOs in China,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit
Organizations 20, no. 2 (June 2009): 157.
76
Lei Xie and Hein-Anton van der Heijden, “Environmental Movements and Political
Opportunities: The Case of China,” Social Movement Studies 9, no. 1 (January 2010): 60.
2012]
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283
does assert that the evidence suggests valuable lessons on how international
NGOs should not act if they wish to be effective.
The main purpose of both Three Gorges and the Nu River dams was to
provide enough hydroelectric power to keep up with the increasing need for
electricity tied to China’s rapid economic growth.77 Each project had more
than domestic consequences, as their rivers are not solely contained within
China. And of course, as with all large-scale damming, significant
ecological damage and massive relocations of populations (in these cases
upwards of one million people) would result.78
The Anti-Three Gorges Dam Campaign occurred at an extremely
sensitive point in China’s history. It began just after the 1989 Tiananmen
Square crackdown and subsequent negative international response. When
Dai Qing edited and published a book of essays criticizing the Three
Gorges Dam, her collection was quickly banned and in 1990 she was
jailed.79 All media, social, or other anti-dam actions were strongly
suppressed.
The domestic base of the campaign remained extremely small, largely
as a result of the strict post-Tiananmen restrictions on NGOs.80 A handful
of scientists, journalists and other individuals, such as Dai Qing, made up
the Chinese movement. The voice of this vocal domestic group was joined
by a major international campaign criticizing the Three Gorges Dam.
International NGOs ardently protested the ecological damage this dam
would cause as well as the social and cultural costs of mass relocation and
lost historical sites.81
More than poor timing led to the failure of the Anti-Three Gorges Dam
Campaign. One of the key flaws of this campaign was the degree to which
it was internationalized, independent of indigenous groups. International
NGOs acted as outsiders criticizing this national Chinese project and thus
the Chinese government. The efforts of U.S. NGOs in particular led the
United States government to end its affiliated support of the dam project, 82
which further politicized the Anti-Three Gorges Dam Campaign and forced
the Chinese government to react defensively. After all, the Three Gorges
Dam had become a point of national pride, a major engineering
accomplishment for the Chinese people, and a monument for China.83
77
Ibid.
“Great Wall across the Yangtze,” directed by Ellen Perry (New York: PBS, 2000),
http://www.pbs.org/itvs/greatwall/index.html.
79
Ibid.
80
Lie Xie and Hein-Anton Van der Heijden, “Environmental Movements and Political
Opportunities: The Case of China,” Social Movement Studies, 9, 1 (2010), 60–61.
81
S. Elizabeth Birnbaum and Yu Xiubo, “Special Report: NGO Strategies to Promote
River Protection and Restoration,” China Environment Series (2006): 187.
82
“Great Wall across the Yangtze.”
83
Ibid.
78
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In short, the Three Gorges case suggests that public international
campaigns against the Chinese government are largely unsuccessful and
met swiftly with anger and repression by the government. Acting locally
and treading lightly when it comes to sensitive political issues offers much
higher chances of effectiveness for an international NGO wishing to
influence policymaking in China. The Anti-Three Gorges Dam Campaign
failed in these two important aspects.
Interestingly, another anti-dam campaign, the Anti-Nu River Dam
Campaign, benefitted from this example. The Anti-Nu River Campaign
took place at a much more favorable time in China’s history. The new
Chinese leadership was more focused on environmental protection and
more open to listening to public opinion.84 Chinese domestic civil society,
especially in the environmental arena, had also grown extensively since the
1990s,85 and the main thrust of the Anti-Nu River Dam campaign was
domestic. In fact, grassroots and national Chinese NGOs worked together
in a coordinated campaign integrating media campaigns and scientific
research.86 This campaign also took a less overtly political route,
emphasizing that construction companies had failed to properly undergo
the necessary environmental impact assessments (EIAs) required by law,
even directly working with China’s State Environmental Protection
Administration.87
International NGOs partnered with and supported local NGOs in these
efforts. Notably, Global Greengrants funding supported Green Earth
Volunteers in their efforts to raise public awareness about the
environmental damages of the Nu River Dam. They also supported Green
Watershed, which organized a tour of the Nu River for a group of Chinese
journalists and created a website with their photos, interviews, and
stories.88 Further, U.S.-based International Rivers Network actively
partnered with Green Watershed, emphasizing collaboration and the raising
of awareness through publications and other media sources.89
84
Timothy Hildebrandt, “The Political Economy of Social Organization Registration in
China,” The China Quarterly 208 (2011): 968–87.
85
Lei Xie, “China’s Environmental Activism in the Age of Globalization,” Asian Politics
& Policy 3, no. 2 (April 2011): 207–24.
86
Birnbaum and Xiubo, “NGO Strategies,” 190.
87
Ibid.
88
Global Greengrants Fund, “China: Proposed Dam Project Suspended—For Now,”
September 8, 2005, http://www.greengrants.org/2005/09/08/china-proposed-dam-projectsuspended-for-now/.
89
Katherine Morton, “The Emergence of NGOs in China and their Transnational
Linkages: Implications for Domestic Reform,” Australian Journal of International Affairs
59, no. 4 (Dec. 2005): 519–32; “How We Work,” International Rivers Network, accessed
April 20, 2012, http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/1568.
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III. INTERNATIONAL NGO RECOMMENDATIONS
Building on these brief cases, are there more specific recommendations
that international NGOs can employ to enhance their effectiveness in
China? Are there general best practices that these organizations can adopt?
What are the lessons one can draw from the experiences of those
international NGOs in China to date? This analysis now addresses these
questions and integrates a series of over two dozen interviews conducted
both in-person and by telephone from June 2009 to August 2009 and again
in August 2010. NGOs interviewed represent diversity in terms of mission
focus, organizational size, registration status, and financial structure. This
sample includes staff from both Chinese and U.S. offices of six well-known
international NGOs90 as well as several local grassroots Chinese NGOs,
Washington D.C. think tanks, national Chinese foundations, and civil
society scholars. Questions throughout were open-ended but expressly
targeted the government-mandated registration process, grassroots
partnerships, funding difficulties, and recommendations for specific future
initiatives.
Utilizing Putnam’s two-level games argument, we contend a key
understated role for international environmental NGOs exists in China, then
offer specific recommendations for these groups to avoid mere trial and
error tactics of the past in negotiating the complex Chinese political and
legal terrain. In short, we address three basic concerns: What are the main
obstacles to international NGOs forming and operating in China? How are
these obstacles different than those in the United States? And how can
international NGOs in China adjust accordingly?
This work suggests that international NGOs further complicate
Putnam’s bargaining process by playing at multiple tables—just as states
do. Development of Putnam’s win-sets encompasses, of course, not only
competition amongst domestic cleavages but also exploitation of those very
cleavages by the national leadership at the international bargaining table,
both in negotiation and ratification phases. This is precisely what
international environmental NGOs operating in China seek to influence:
both domestic and international Chinese environmental policy.
As noted above, a half-dozen international environmental NGOs served
as the focal point, all headquartered in the United States but with operations
in China. Each has had different experiences to date, ranging from how
long they have operated in China, their specific environmental areas of
interest, their partners in China, their registration status, and their
90
These include Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Jane Goodall Institute’s Roots &
Shoots, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), The Nature Conservancy (TNC),
World Conservation Society (WCS), and Pacific Environment. All focus on environmental
issues such as pollution, ozone depletion, wildlife protection, and environmental education
and are headquartered in the United States but with permanent branches in Shanghai,
Beijing, or both.
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fundraising sources. Table 2 below outlines key characteristics of the six
NGOs studied.
Table 2: Characteristics of Selected International NGOs in China
Organization
Primary Focus
US
China
China
China
Area
Headquarters Headquarters Staff Size Budget
JGI- Roots and
Shoots Shanghai
Environmental
Education
Alexandria,
VA
China branches
are
autonomous
JGI- Roots and
Shoots Beijing
Environmental
Education
Alexandria,
VA
China branches
are
autonomous
Environmental
Defense Fund
Sulfur dioxide
control and
New York, NY
Green
Commuting
Beijing
12
6
In
China
Since
$400,000
1999
$100,000
1999
$41.5
10 (plus 3
million*
Shanghai
(Climate
staff)
budget)
1997/8
Registration
Status
Registered 2004
with the
Committee for
Promoting
Cultural and
Ethical Progress
Registered 2005
as a local
business
Not registered
Kunming office
1997
registered with
$4.5
(Beijing- the Provincial
million
2003) Policy Research
Center
Arlington, VA
Kunming,
Yunnan
Province
60-65
New York, NY
Beijing
27
$1 million
1910
Not registered
Natural Resources
Climate change New York, NY
Defense Council
Beijing
25
$500,000†
1996
Registered as a
business (taxexempt)
$2
million*
(Entire
Pacific
Rim
budget)
1995†
Not registered
The Nature
Conservancy
Biodiversity/
conservation
Wildlife
Conservation
Society
Biodiversity/
conservation
Pacific
Environment
Grassroots
organization
San Francisco,
support (against
CA
environmental
degradation)
Beijing
Sources: Personal Interviews, *Annual Reports, and †Chinadevelopmentbrief.com. 91
Data from these six NGOs are further supplemented by interviews with
additional NGOs, think tanks, and foundations. These included
international NGO goliath WWF as well as the small Chinese grassroots
organization Green Oasis. The think tanks and foundations interviewed
included the Blue Moon Fund, the Center for Asian Studies at the
University of Louisville, the China Environment Forum of the Wilson
Center, and the International Fund for China’s Environment. All told, three
main areas of emphasis emerged: recognition of unique Chinese
91
2011 Annual Report, Environmental Defense Fund, http://www.edf.org/annualreports/2011;
2010
Annual
Report,
Jane
Goodall
Institute,
http://www.janegoodall.org/report/2010; 2011 Annual Report, The Nature Conservancy,
http://www.nature.org/media/aboutus/2011-annual-report.pdf; 2010 Annual Report,
Natural Resources Defense Council, http://www.nrdc.org/about/annual/; Annual Report
2009-2010, Pacific Environment, http://pacificenvironment.org/downloads/Annual%20
Report%200910.pdf; Annual Report 2011, Wildlife Conservation Society,
http://www.wcs.org/files/pdfs/wcs-2011-annual-report.pdf.
2012]
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287
characteristics (social and political), attention to rules and regulations, and
concerted local focus combined with strategic partnerships.
A. CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
For decades international environmental NGOs have struggled with an
arrogant and even imperialistic image when they attempt to install
programs and shape policy in the developing world. The Nature
Conservancy was one of the first to experience the costs of such illprepared endeavors when it began to set up offices in Latin America in the
1980s—but did so often without due diligence on the nuances and
characteristics unique to their host countries.92 International NGOs cannot
be effective with such an approach, especially in China.
Zhexi Zhong, operations director with Shanghai Roots and Shoots,
argues that if an international NGO wants to come into China they need to
“first really understand the culture, the people, [and] the language so they
have a good assessment of what the local community needs versus what
they think they need.”93 The Chinese and U.S. offices of Environmental
Defense Fund echo this sentiment, asserting groups need to come to China
without preconceived notions as to how a problem should be solved. They
advise NGOs to “find the way that works”94 and “be prepared to work in
the Chinese way.”95 Again and again international NGO staffers reference
buzzwords and phrases such as the “Chinese way,” “guanxi,” and “with
Chinese characteristics.”
Guanxi means “relationship” in direct translation but has come to mean
much more in a practical context. It is used regularly in business, politics,
and everyday life to describe the process of networking, making
connections, and creating lasting contacts. In China, arguably more so than
many other countries, who you know and the type of relationship you have
with them is extremely important.
Since its founding, the People’s Republic of China has described itself
as following socialism “with Chinese characteristics.”96 International
NGOs should take a cue from this history and recognize that the emerging
Chinese civil society is one “with Chinese characteristics.” Most notably
amongst these characteristics is the discouragement of direct opposition. To
politically charge issues is to foment opposition, which of course is the
traditional Western understanding of civil society. Yet in China, civil
society is not a combative force that can check the government but a
92
Michael M. Gunter Jr., Building the Next Ark: How NGOs Work to Protect Biodiversity,
(Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 2004), 139.
93
Zhenxi Zhong (JGI Roots & Shoots Shanghai), telephone interview, July 13, 2009.
94
Ibid.
95
Lei Wang (Environmental Defense Fund US), in a telephone interview on July 13, 2009.
96
Joseph Fewsmith, “The Government of China,” in Introduction to Comparative
Government, eds. Michael Curtis et al., 5th ed. (New York: Pearson Education, 2006: 448–
99).
288
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system to complement government policy. This means more than avoiding
protests and human rights issues. It addresses general attitudes an
organization portrays on a day-to-day basis. For example, when discussing
environmental issues in China, “it’s an issue of how do we neutralize the
negative impacts of development. It’s not an issue of how individual rights
are violated.”97 The question of whom pollution affects the most, for
example, would undermine any efforts to curb the pollution.
Wording, thus, is important. Blue Moon Fund program associate
Christine Tsang gives another useful example, explaining that in her mind
the term “‘footprint’ is a very charged term. Looking at the impact and the
footprint is inherently saying something to the nature of . . . a negative
impact from China.”98 China Environment Forum Director Jennifer Turner
reiterates this philosophy, stating that it’s not just what you do, “it’s more
how [you] approach the issue. It’s no good doing anti-pollution type
campaigns. It doesn’t have to all be confrontational.”99 Indeed avoiding
confrontation allows the government to “save face.”
Beyond employing acceptable terminology, international NGOs must
grasp the conflicts and differences on a region-to-region and even a personto-person basis. The Chinese government is not one homogeneous
structure—local and national levels of government often have very
different agendas when it comes to environmental issues. 100 In fact, “Some
local governments have employed a deliberate strategy of ‘pollute first,
clean later,’ which involves promoting growth by intentionally treating
polluters leniently.”101 International NGOs must be extremely cautious in
negotiating these governmental tensions, but, at times, have unique
opportunities to serve both Beijing and the local community by reporting
local political officials that violate national environmental regulations.
B. RULES AND REGULATIONS
To cite regulations as an asset, though, requires considerable
qualification. As noted earlier, NGO registration remains one of the most
imposing obstacles for NGOs in China. An international NGO in China
may take many different forms. It can be registered or unregistered. It can
have Memorandums of Understanding with government organizations. It
can even register as a business. Many NGOs negotiate multiple stages and
statuses over time. Virtually none are registered immediately. 102
97
Xiu Min Li (Pacific Environment), telephone interview, July 24, 2009.
Christie Tsang (Blue Moon Fund), telephone interview, July 28, 2009.
99
Jennifer Turner (China Environment Forum), telephone interview, July 17, 2009.
100
Lu and Thompson, “China’s Evolving Civil Society,” 28.
101
Ru and Ortolano, “Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental NGOs,” 144,
quoting P. Ho, “Trajectories for greening in China: Theory and practice,” Development
and Change 37, no. 1 (2006): 13–14.
102
Gao Jie (Staff Attorney, NRDC Beijing), telephone interview, July 20, 2009.
98
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TWO-LEVEL GAMES
289
Some international NGOs do not even have a physical office within
China, at least initially. Members of the organization simply travel to China
for specific projects and short term stays. WWF operated in this manner
from 1980 until 1996.103 Similarly, from 1996 to 2006 the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) “had some local partners, some
engineers and some policy advocates. They worked together project by
project, but there was no daily office, no daily management.”104
Interestingly, both WWF and NRDC were able to use this initial foothold
in China to form the guanxi needed to set up more permanent bases. While
this undoubtedly precludes an NGO from having the initial impact it likely
seeks, it is also undeniably a useful first step.
Pacific Environment, Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and World
Conservation Society (WCS) are all un-registered and operating in Beijing.
According to one scholar, “Many Chinese NGOs are not officially
registered and have no legally guaranteed right to exist, but they are
tolerated by the government. As long as they do not challenge the authority
of the state, the officials keep ‘one eye open, the other closed.’”105 Because
it’s not officially registered, Pacific Environment had difficulties opening
an actual office. Instead, they operate out of a converted apartment. In
order to accomplish their mission of giving grants to grassroots
organizations, they must distribute their money not as grants, but as
charitable donations.106
Yan Xie, director of WCS Beijing, points out the bright side of
remaining unregistered instead of registering as a business, a route many
groups take to gain official status more quickly. She noted that because
they are unregistered they “actually do not have a place to pay the tax”107
and thus operate tax free. At the other end of the spectrum, NRDC is
registered as an international business, but was able to get tax-exempt
status.108 The Nature Conservancy is registered in Kunming with the
Provincial Policy Research Center, but not in Beijing. Their Beijing office
is a project office that still runs certain functions through the Kunming
office. The Beijing office also has Memorandums of Understanding with
various government organizations there.109
Roots & Shoots is an even more interesting case. Its Shanghai and
Beijing branches are completely independent from each other and have
different registration statuses. Shanghai Roots & Shoots began in 1999. In
2004 it received a special opportunity to become registered, which was
103
Li Lin (World Wildlife Fund Beijing), telephone interview, July 30, 2009.
Jie telephone interview.
105
Koon-Kwai Wong, “Greening of the Chinese Mind: Environmentalism with Chinese
Characteristics,” Asia-Pacific Review 12, no. 2 (2005): 53.
106
Li (Pacific Environment).
107
Yan Xie (Wildlife Conservation Society Beijing), telephone interview, July 20, 2009.
108
Jie telephone interview.
109
Rose Niu (The Nature Conservancy US), telephone interview, July 2009.
104
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only extended to a few organizations. They now have full registration status
with the Committee for Promoting Cultural and Ethical Progress. When
asked how this sponsor was chosen, Zhenxi Zhong said, “We basically
tried everybody and whoever said yes, that’s who sponsored us.”110 Beijing
Roots & Shoots, on the other hand, is registered as a local business.
NGOs’ finances appear to play a large role in determining what form
the NGO takes, even if they are actively trying to gain official NGO
registration. Registering as a business imposes on an organization a
sizeable income tax that not all small NGOs can pay; for some, business
registration is simply not an option. Others, such as Roots & Shoots, have
no choice but to register in some form, even if that means paying a tax,
because they depend on local funding. After all, “you can’t just approach a
business and say please wire $50,000 to this personal account.”111 If an
organization’s funding all comes from outside of China (for example,
through U.S. headquarters) and it doesn’t don’t draw negative attention to
itself, it should be able to work fine without registration.112
Knowing the written rules is only a small part of understanding the
legal and regulatory framework. De facto implementation does not
necessarily match de jure regulations. That is, NGOs can operate in China
without being officially registered, as long as they provide useful services
without causing problems.113 Timothy Hildebrandt, a fellow at the
University of Southern California, offers a fascinating analysis of how
registration regulations play out on the local level. He specifically points to
the regulations preventing NGOs from registering satellite branches in
more than one location and preventing multiple NGOs of the same type
from registering in the same location. According to Hildebrandt, these
regulations “make this very perverse incentive for the local government to
actually not abide by the central government dictates” because “if these
groups are viewed as service providers for the state, the more organizations
that get registered, the fewer service providers that you have.”114
Registering Roots and Shoots, for example, would prevent other similar
NGOs from registering in that area. If the local government really wanted
the aid of more than just one environmental education NGO, they would
likely allow unregistered organizations to operate.
There are, however, some additional legal issues both related and
unrelated to registration that are important to note. For one, international
NGOs cannot purchase land in China as they would in the United States,
which thus requires a high level of cooperation with the government for
110
Zhong telephone interview.
Ibid.
112
Jennifer Turner (China Environment Forum), telephone interview, July 24, 2009.
113
This fact is both directly confirmed by some of the interviewees and implied by the unregistered status of some of the groups interviewed.
114
Timothy Hildebrandt (University of Louisville), telephone interview, July 28, 2009.
111
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TWO-LEVEL GAMES
291
their conservation projects.115 Additionally, Rose Niu, deputy managing
director for The Nature Conservancy’s (TNC) North Asia division, points
out that with registration “we could open our own bank account, we could
recruit our own staff, and so on [and] so forth.”116 Without registration
fundraising can be difficult and third party sources might be used to hire
staff. Additionally, the Chinese government does not give a tax deduction
for donating to NGOs, which also adds difficulties in fundraising efforts. 117
To successfully navigate the legal atmosphere in China, NGOs often
require assistance from the inside; one needs good guanxi, as noted earlier.
Some NGOs hire former government members or people with expert
knowledge of the government. They might also partner with other
organizations such as universities, grassroots NGOs or businesses. Steve
Blake of TNC in Beijing explains: “You need a strong local staff and local
support. Any international group getting started in China, it will need some
international guidance, a small amount, but it is going [to] need a lot, a
majority, of in country support from locals because China is a different
world. Getting started here, there are so many intricacies involved with
working with agencies and other NGOs and how the whole system works
that you need heavy support.”118
C. FOCUS AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
The third and final category identified by individuals revisits the
comparison of campaigns against dam projects in Three Gorges and the Nu
River. To be effective, international NGOs need a local focus as well as
coordination with governmental representatives. NGOs that “don’t
understand China’s context and are not interested in what local people
really need . . . [will find, at best,] superficial successes.”119 Even though
international NGOs likely have global environmental issues in mind as a
driving force behind their interests in China, local issues need to drive the
discussion.120
International NGOs can foster China’s civil society by lending financial
aid and technical expertise to grassroots NGOs. Effective international
NGOs establish branches staffed by local inhabitants, lending legitimacy
and trust to their organizations. Two organizations in this study, Shanghai
Roots & Shoots and TNC, described a strong local identity as critical.
Shanghai Roots & Shoots’s Zhenxi Zhong explains, “We like to think that
we are in fact a local NGO with a foreign name. . . . The programs we run
here, we create them here. They are not borrowed from overseas. They are
115
Niu telephone interview.
Ibid.
117
Zhong telephone interview.
118
Steve Blank (The Nature Conservancy Beijing), telephone interview, July 14, 2009.
119
Tang and Zhan, “Civic Environmental NGOs,” 432.
120
Jie telephone interview.
116
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native programs, and we respect the local opinion. We want local
participation. That’s very critical to our success here. We don’t want to
come in as a foreign NGO saying that we know better.”121 Similarly,
scholar Timothy Hilderbrant describes TNC as “almost not an international
NGO in China. I would say it’s, more appropriately, even a de facto
domestic organization. The way that it behaves and the interactions it has
with the state [are] very much like the interactions that these indigenous
NGOs are going to have with the states.”122
This local focus becomes more effective when combined with a strong
relationship with the government. One NGO staffer even contended “that
the success of an NGO in China is completely determined by their ability to
work within the political structures that exist.”123 To forge constructive
government relations, NGOs target governmental organizations that share
similar goals to them. International NGOs should “recognize that although
working in isolation of the government is scarcely an option, choosing
helpful government agencies and partners is vitally important.”124
Taking this a step further, Li Lin, conservation director at WWF
Beijing, suggests NGOs work with more than merely governmental
officials. Lin argues, “Engaging all kinds of stakeholders, players in China,
would be very helpful to move the environment agenda in China. What I
mean is, government, think tanks, business, general public, media . . . also
the law . . . I think an NGO needs to go to all kinds of stakeholders, or
prioritize stakeholders for their own organization.”125
The importance of building connections was in fact a recurring theme
among a number of NGO staffers. David Gordon, executive director of
Pacific Environment in San Francisco, stated, “What’s incumbent upon
working wherever you are in the world is, how do you build allies and
build supporters, and help to bring a diverse set of actors together to create
change.”126 Pacific Environment is a U.S.-based NGO whose main focus in
China is local capacity building. Gordon elaborated, “I think in the long
run, really if we want to see effective environmental change in China, that
it’s not going to be created by groups that come in from overseas, it’s going
to be created by groups that come from in China. So our focus as an
organization is how do we help those groups in China be effective and
become more effective over time.” 127
121
Zhong telephone interview.
Hildebrandt telephone interview.
123
Tsang telephone interview.
124
Hsia and White, “Working Amid Corporatism,” 348.
125
Lin telephone interview.
126
David Gordon (Pacific Environment), telephone interview, July 29, 2009.
127
Ibid.
122
2012]
TWO-LEVEL GAMES
293
CONCLUSION
Academic attention to an emerging Chinese civil society is growing,
especially literature with a focus on local or indigenous Chinese NGOs and
the unique breed of government-organized NGOs within China.
Environmental NGOs, with their largely non-confrontational posturing and
technical emphasis, represent the first wave in this field. Little work exists
when it comes to analyzing the role of international environmental NGOs
within China, though. This is a noted deficiency, particularly in the context
of Robert Putnam’s two-level games where forces at both the domestic and
international level shape governmental policy. Within this context, our
analysis examines international environmental NGOs and argues they are
most effective not when they target the Chinese state but rather the general
public, including domestic NGOs.
This work follows the lead of those who emphasize that NGOs need not
be evaluated based merely on their degree of influence upon states but
instead on their influence on actual societal issues such as environmental
protection. Opting against a state-centric route makes all the more sense
within an autocratic system such as China where those that challenge the
state have short life spans. And ironically, by pursuing this nonconfrontational approach, international NGOs may actually do more to
facilitate a democratic transition in China than by following the East
European example of civil society and challenging the communist
apparatus directly.
It seems that broad reforms of state-societal relations have begun an
arguably irreversible path in China, thanks first to the PRC itself but also
now in concert with environmental NGOs both born within and based
abroad. What remains unknown, of course, is whether this path will
continue to be as incremental and largely non-confrontational as during the
past twenty plus years—or whether sudden changes in threats or tactics
might precipitate a repeat of the infamous events of June 4, 1989.
More specifically, this analysis also offers international NGOs a set of
broad best practices to follow when seeking entry into China. Three
fundamental recommendations exist. (1) International NGOs need to know
how to work in a Chinese context. (2) They must understand the nuances of
the regulatory system and how that system actually plays out. And (3) an
NGO must learn how to foster good relations with the government, local
community, and other NGOs. In part, these steps mimic what NGOs
already face in the United States, but with important differences that have
led to at times acrimonious debate about the role of China’s developing
civil society. The Chinese perception of civil society differs from that in the
West, and thus international NGOs require a degree of adjustment when
first establishing themselves.
The stringent registration process in China, meant to control and limit
civil society, leads to much stricter government oversight than seen in the
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United States. Like in the U.S., though, it remains important for NGOs to
have a strong relationship with governmental actors, the community, and
other NGOs. Still, in China the nature of these relationships and processes
for obtaining them requires unique considerations. In this context,
international NGOs need to be diligent in their historical research of China.
NGOs must identify how organizational goals fit into China’s political
climate. In short, with China’s civil society still in its early stages of
development, supporting grassroots NGOs, understanding local needs, and
cooperating with the government as well as other organizations are all vital.
Future research should continue to examine the degree to which twolevel games mold this process, specifically how international NGOs play at
the second level in foreign affairs but simultaneously play level one games
domestically. And more specifically there are interesting questions to ask in
terms of whether initiatives in other issue areas beyond the environment
will emerge. Some already suggest the health sector represents a second
wave of NGO activity in China. Are poverty-oriented NGOs next? What
does this ultimately mean for the future of the Chinese Communist Party
and the forces of democratization? And turning back to international
environmental NGOs, much more must be asked about how these particular
entities can further shape Chinese policy at home and abroad, particularly
in the context of the dangerous divide between China and the U.S.
concerning climate change governance.