The Impacts of the 2008 Government
Bailouts on the U.S. Automobile Industry
Peggy A. McNulty
Joel D. Wisner
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Marketing and International Business Dept., Lee Business School,
Las Vegas, Nevada, USA
ABSTRACT
Ford, General Motors and Chrysler faced financial ruin in 2008. By 2010, GM and Chrysler had
obtained $80 billion dollars in government-backed loans, but still filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection. The U.S. and Canadian governments made these loans to maintain employment and keep the
companies operating. However, as majority owners, the governments made decisions not usually allowed
under standard bankruptcy proceedings including paying unsecured creditors first, requiring them to
keep less profitable dealerships, directing the bailout recipients on which factories to keep open for
political reasons, and instructing the companies on what cars to build. A fixed effects model was used to
test the impacts of the bailouts and advertising on employment and sales. Results from the regression
indicated the bailout had a significant, yet negative impact on unit sales of vehicles and a significant,
positive impact on employment.
Keywords: Auto Bailout, General Motors, Chrysler, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
INTRODUCTION
President George W. Bush approved a bailout in December 2008 after the United States Congress
had turned down Ford’s, General Motors’, and Chrysler’s $25,000,000,000 request. The auto industry
CEO’s got off to a bad start when addressing congress, after an aide noticed their infamous usage of three
corporate jets to take them from Detroit to Washington, DC. The first area that seemed to miss the
attention of the Big Three auto designers began as gas prices escalated through the first several years of
the 21st century. By 2008, gas had reached $4.00/gallon. Ford, Chrysler, and GM continued to focus on
producing and marketing SUVs and light trucks, ignoring Americans’ desires to buy more fuel efficient
vehicles to save money and reduce emissions (Bezdecheck, 2011). Investors followed the consumers and
invested their money in other places. In addition, the mortgage crisis had a heavy negative impact on
consumers, many of whom could no longer afford to purchase a new car. As a result, new car sales
plummeted to their lowest level in 25 years in the U.S. (Bezdecheck, 2011).
Labor unions also played a role in the U.S. auto industry crisis. Ford, GM, and Chrysler were
paying manufacturing employees and average of $74/hour (Bezdecheck, 2011). U.S. auto factory
workers were earning approximately $148,000/ year in 2008, before overtime, which is $163,500/ year in
today’s dollars. (http://www.usinflationcalculator.com, 2014).
Automobile company management had also agreed to the creation of a Jobs Bank decades earlier.
The Jobs Bank was originally designed as temporary financial assistance for laid-off union workers. Ten
years later, many union employees with seniority could earn 95% of their pay for an unlimited time,
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doing no work at all, paid for by Ford, GM, or Chrysler (Ingrassia, 2011). It became a way for union
employees to earn their full pay, even when there was no work for them to do. It was also known as an
inverse layoff, and was highly valued among manufacturing employees. UAW retirees were eligible for
full retirement in their 50s, and only had to pay $285/year for healthcare compared to a typical Medicare
recipient paying out $4200/year (Fuelner, 2012).
The major Japanese auto companies operating in the U.S., however, paid their U.S. employees an
average of $44/hour, remained union free, and never had a Jobs Bank (Bezdecheck, 2011). Experts
would agree that the series of strikes and negotiations between the UAW and U.S. automobile
manufacturers also contributed to neither side paying much attention to the changing tastes of consumers
and the threat of foreign competition. The guidelines for UAW seniority alone were 16 pages of complex,
carefully negotiated rules. Dozens of union and company employees worked full time, on the company
payroll, creating, managing and negotiating complicated rules that limited role flexibility and created
labor waste (Ingrassia, 2011).
From 2005 through 2008, the Big Three accumulated losses of nearly $100 billion, despite laying
off over 300,000 employees (Ingrassia, 2011). GM ended its agreement with Tiger Woods to promote
their vehicles, whose income was more per year than GM’s, and its stock price sank to $3/share, the same
value it was at the end of World War II. On June 1, 2009, the former “most powerful company on Earth”,
filed for bankruptcy on its 100th anniversary (Ingrassia, 2011). During the same time period, Ford
changed CEO’s, even though that meant firing a direct descendent of Henry Ford, dumped car brands that
were losing money, and leveraged everything to avoid bankruptcy. They even began licensing out the
famous Ford logo (Ingrassia, 2011). The next section summarizes the relevant literature.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Bailout Process
Perhaps the best way to summarize how these three American car companies faltered, would be
from a statement by former president and great-grandson of both Harvey Firestone and Henry Ford,
William “Bill” Clay Ford, Jr in 2006 (http://www.forbes.com/sites/joannmuller/2014/03/09/william-clayfords-legacy-cemented-familys-dynasty/, 2014): “We’re an insular company in an insular industry in an
insular town” (Ingrassia, 2011, p.86).In order to survive, Ford borrowed $23.6 billion from private firms
and pledged company assets as collateral, but still lost $12.6 billion dollars (Ingrassia, 2011).
Meanwhile, GM was posting massive losses--$12.6 billion in 2005. The UAW did not believe the
losses were authentic, and hired Wall Street analysts to determine how dire the situation was. In quarter 3
of 2006, GM posted a loss of $1.6 billion. The UAW agreed to have its members pay a small deductible
for health care, but only for the retirees, not active employees. The savings were $1 billion per year, not
even enough to cover one quarter of the losses. GM’s CEO, Rick Wagoner, did not attempt to ask for
active UAW employees to pay any medical deductibles or premiums and also promised not to address the
Jobs Bank, despite the fact that the Jobs Bank cost GM over $800 million/year. Subsidiaries Saab and
Hummer were losing money regularly, but the executives refused to divest these businesses (Ingrassia,
2011).
The first quarter of 2006 did not fare well for Chrysler. This division of Daimler lost $1.5 billion.
Contributing to the loss was a refusal of Chrysler management to lower production of poorly selling
vehicles, leading to large inventories (Ingrassia, 2011). To solve the inventory problem, Chrysler
pressured its dealers to purchase their poorly selling models, known as channel stuffing, causing anger
The Journal of Human Resource and Adult Learning, Vol. 10, Num. 2, December, 2014 issue
21
and mistrust within its distribution network. To ease the tension, Chrysler began to offer discounts to its
dealers of up to $4,000/car. Despite these efforts, Chrysler still had over 100,000 unsold cars they were
forced to store at airport lots and fairgrounds until they could find a way to sell them.
Also contributing to the demise of the Big 3 might were the rapid sales increases at Honda, Toyota,
and Nissan with their more fuel efficient and higher quality vehicles. These companies faced high
inventories and financial difficulties, too. They received small U.S. government loans to develop hybrid
cars, and Honda and Toyota received Japanese government incentives to provide consumer loans at lower
rates.
The decision to bailout the auto companies were quite controversial. Many Americans resented the
bailout of the U.S. banks. Considering another bailout was a bitter pill for the American public to take
(Rattner, 2010). Congress realized the national sentiment, and rejected the request of loans by GM, Ford,
and Chrysler. Helping the Detroit automakers was a very unpopular decision made by first Presidents
George W. Bush using TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program, funds and then later by President
Barack Obama (Bezdecheck, 2011).
Some legislators questioned the constitutionality of both President Bush’s and Obama’s actions to
direct TARP payments without Congress’ approval (Ikenson, 2012). In Alabama, where three Honda and
Hyundai plants produce vehicles, the bailout was unfavorable.
The first bailout was approved in December, 2008, for General Motors and Chrysler. Ford decided
to not pursue funding, primarily because the Ford family would lose major stock voting rights if the
government assumed asset control (Rattner, 2011). Chrysler and GM requested another $22 billion from
President Obama (Bezdecheck, 2011). The president formed a task force to evaluate the best alternative.
His team recommended that only GM receive additional funding. The task force felt that if Chrysler went
out of business, then GM and Ford would benefit and become stronger as a result (Rattner, 2011).
Ultimately, President Obama decided to also bailout Chrysler primarily due to the 50,000
employees in the U.S. (Automotive News, 2009). In March 2009, President Obama committed to
continued support for both companies with loans from the U.S. government (Bezdecheck, 2011).GM was
granted additional bailout dollars without restrictions, but the government strongly endorsed a deal
between Fiat and Chrysler, and gave Chrysler $6 billion to support its acquisition by Fiat (Bezdecheck,
2011). Fiat was given 20% of Chrysler without any financial contribution, (Rattner, 2011) and the
decision to provide funding was made without the support of Congress.
GM, Ford, and Chrysler continued to spend heavily on advertising from 2005 to 2013. There is no
clear evidence that the heavy advertising had a positive impact on unit sales and company revenue. In
2010, Ford spent $3.9 billion and GM spent $4.2 billion on advertising (Laya, 2011). Since 2007, each
vehicle sold had $1,000 spent on advertising in the U.S. (Kantar, 2014). Data indicates that advertising
trails sales instead of promoting sales, and that the introduction of new car models was what significantly
increased new car sales (Kantar, 2014).
Would GM have successfully avoided a bailout by suppressing its excessive advertising? A
reduction by 90% over a 13 year period at this spending rate would have matched the federal bailout.
And the federal bailout offered GM more than it really needed, according to the Auto Task Force Czar
(Rattner, 2011).
Many believe that GM and Chrysler, their dealerships, and employees benefitted from the bailout.
The companies remained solvent and have become profitable since the bailout. Still others stated that
Ford was the big winner by being the only large U.S. company not receiving the bailout money.
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UAW employees came out as winners. Active employees did not take pay cuts, nor did they have
to pay any deductibles or co-pays for their health care. The UAW pension fund also received $10 million
from the federal government. They continued earning in the 98 th percentile of all Americans
(cbsnews.com, 2014). Pensioners and salaried employees, however, took pay cuts and reductions in
benefits in health care (Ingrassia, 2011).
American taxpayers still are out over $25 billion (Ingrassia, 2011). This does not count subsidies to
car dealerships, unemployment benefits, reduced pensions among salaried employees, bondholders, and
creditors. Nor does it include deals to the UAW and additional loans to other car companies to develop
hybrid cars.
General Motors…. were they a winner? With all the help they received, it is unlikely that even
poor managers would not profit. GM was given a $50 billion loan, all debts were expunged, cash came in,
sales rebates were underwritten, such as the Cash for Clunkers program, the government eliminated their
Jobs Bank and their 9% bonds were forgiven at the expense of bondholders (Ikenson, 2011). It is
interesting to note that about half of GM’s profit in 2011 was due to its sale of Ally Financial and Delphi
companies (Ikenson, 2011).
Ford, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, and other manufacturers’ did not benefit from the spoils of
competition, such as market share, profit, revenue, and better utilization of capital assets (Ikenson, 2011).
From this perspective, the companies that did not receive the massive U.S. government bailouts were
being punished by less benefit from free market trade. Ikenson points out that GM’s condition should not
be confused with the entire auto industry. The key point of debate will be in the analysis of sales and
bailouts in the methods and analysis sections of this paper.
The Impact of the Bailouts
The direct cost for the government bailout of GM and Chrysler was $78.9 billion, or about $800 per
American (Hopkins, 2009). In addition, the government backed $7.5 billion in GMAC loans, saving
GMAC $500 million/year in bond interest costs. The Cash for Clunkers program cost taxpayers another
$3 billion. This translates to over $10,700 per vehicle in subsidies over a two year period (Hopkins, 2009).
The government-held shares in GM lost $10.5 billion and the shares in Chrysler lost $1.2 billion.
Additionally, $1 billion was given to the UAW members’ pensions who had worked at Delphi, a division
of G.M. (Zywicki, 2014).
Conflicting opinions point out that the bailout did not stop bankruptcy proceedings, which would
have occurred without the bailout. Also, it is highly likely that GM and Chrysler would not have gone out
of business without a bailout. American Airlines faced a similar situation and filed for bankruptcy, but
kept planes flying the entire time. The company emerged from bankruptcy and is still in business today
(Roth, 2013).Zywicki (2014), stated that a standard Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding would have been
more appropriate than a government assisted bankruptcy (Zywicki, 2014, p. 2).A liquidation of these
companies was highly unlikely. In that case, the estimate of jobs saved is highly overstated. However,
supporters of the bailout state that because of poor financial conditions of lending institutions, private
financing might not have been available (Zywicki, 2014).
Declaring the bailout a success has been questioned by researchers. Fiat obtained Chrysler for no
financial cost and is not an American company. The Obama administration has been criticized for bailing
out an American company and giving it away for free to an Italian company. The bankruptcy judge in the
Chrysler bailout concluded that the “only beneficiaries of the government funding was the UAW”
(Zywicki, 2014, p. 2).
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Key losers in the Chrysler bailout were the secured creditors such as bondholders in the Indiana
Police and Teacher’s retirement funds, which were used to fund the UAW’s unsecured health care
benefits. This is against a key concept of bankruptcy law because secured creditors are supposed to be
paid first. Ultimately, the UAW received 44 cents on the dollar, and the secured debt holders only
received 29 cents on the dollar. Warren Buffet expressed concerns that the Obama administration’s tactics
would disrupt future lending practices (Zywicki, 2014).
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
While federal bankruptcy courts are in charge of the proceedings, the Department of Justice also
assigns a U.S. Trustee to each district. The U.S. Trustee serves as a watchdog over bankruptcy cases and
may act as the trustee in a proceeding (Silverman and Grabianowdki, 2005, p. 1). In the cases of GM and
Chrysler, the multi-decade utilization of the Jobs Bank, refusal to cut poorly performing brands, and their
large financial losses led the federal government to declare itself the bankruptcy trustee. This was the
first major deviation from standard application of the bankruptcy model.
Other key differences from the model were in the reorganization phase. Traditionally, these
decisions are made with creditors and by the company management, with the primary goal of exiting
bankruptcy proceedings in a much stronger financial position. Because the federal government was the
new creditor instead of private financial institutions, unsecured creditors (such as the UAW health and
pension plans) received priority over secured creditors (the bond holders). GM and Chrysler were forced
to make closure decisions based on political pressures instead of what was best for their companies
financially. And these companies were told by the Automotive Task Force, which models of cars to build.
The hypothesis for the paper is twofold. The first is that the government bailout actually hurt GM
and Chrysler. The damage to the companies potentially had a negative impact on unit sales and revenue.
The government also demanded job cuts from each company. To test for damage to the companies, two
fixed effects regression analyses were performed to determine the impact of the bailout on jobs and to
identify whether the bailout had an impact on auto sales. Finally, the fixed effects model will explain the
impact of advertising on sales.
METHODS
Secondary data was utilized for the analysis. The sources of data were from purchased databases
including Automotive News, Hoover’s, and Kantar Advertising. Additional data was located in annual,
quarterly, and monthly statements from the companies themselves. Some of the data was not available on
a monthly basis, such as number of car dealerships, company income, and national advertising spending
for the industry. The literature indicated that decisions and trends in the auto industry were gradual, not
volatile, (Ingrassia, 2011), and some data was calculated using an average trend for the year.
RESULTS
A fixed-effects, multiple regression analysis was run for 108 monthly periods on six companies
from 2005 to 2013. Table 1 represents the correlation matrix between the independent variables. Three
variables—company revenue, national industry employment, and national automotive advertising
spending were highly correlated with auto company employment, company income, and time. Income
better reflects repayment of liabilities, and company employment is a key factor indicated in the literature
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that motivated the bailout, so these independent variables were kept. Time could not be eliminated
because it is essential for a fixed effects regression.
Table 2 represents the descriptive statistics, composed of nearly 15,000 original data points and
having a sample size of 648. The data starts in January of 2005 and ends in December 2013. The
standard deviation for company income is greater than the average income. This is possible because of
the occurrences of both positive and negative income for five of the companies during this time period.
Only Honda did not lose money during this timeframe.
The fixed effects model was run in two different ways. The first regression used U.S. company
employment as the dependent variable because the driver for the government bailout was to retain
automotive jobs at U.S. factories for Chrysler and GM (Ingrassia, 2011, Rattner, 2011). The R squared
values and significance were determined. The adjusted r squared result, 0.946, indicates that 94.6% of the
variation of company employment could be explained by the independent variables. The output indicates
that the model was significant with p=0.000, and F = 754.718.
Two of the variables, U.S. sales by company and company ad spending, were not significant. An
explanation of this could be that the UAW refused to allow for pay cuts, co-pays and deductibles, and
resisted plant closings and layoffs (Rattner, 2011 and Ingrassia, 2011). This would make the dependent
variable, employment, more inelastic to changes in the marketplace. In Table 2, the bailout itself was
significant at 0.005, with a positive standardized Beta coefficient of 0.05 and positive unstandardized
Beta of 10,638, indicating that the bailout had a positive, significant effect on employment for Chrysler
and GM.
Despite the fact that employment was helped by the bailout and that sales did not have a significant
impact on the number of workers at GM and Chrysler, it is doubtful that this scenario can continue to be
successful. Direct labor is assumed to be a variable cost in traditional cost models, and is designed to be
unit dependent. By avoiding layoffs when there is not enough demand for the product, direct labor
becomes a fixed cost. GM struggled with high pension, Jobs Bank, and wage costs, leading them to
bankruptcy. Unless they make significant changes to their employment policies, long term viability is not
certain for them.
Table 1: Variable with Means, (M) Standard Deviations (SD) and Sample Size (N)
M
SD
US SALES (units)
73305.82
32239.98
Dealers by brand
4864.02
4118.29
Number of US Dealerships
19751.09
1843.46
Days of US Co. Inv. (FG)
64.86
20.029
Net Income ($M) Monthly
$283.10
$1,145.89
National car employment
855.0
157.45
Received bailout 1= yes, 0=no
0.19
0.39
Company ad spending
88,696,603.24
40,416,778.38
Industry Inventory (days)
64.97
13.21
Time
53.5
31.20
Ford dummy code
0
0
GM dummy
0.17
0.37
Chrysler dummy
0.17
0.37
Toyota dummy
0.17
0.37
Honda dummy
0.17
0.37
Nissan dummy
0.17
0.37
US Company Employment by company
199501.00
82860.70
The Journal of Human Resource and Adult Learning, Vol. 10, Num. 2, December, 2014 issue
N
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
25
A second regression used company unit sales as the dependent variable. The literature indicated
consumers were angry with the government, GM, and Chrysler over the unpopular bailout and were less
likely to buy a car from a company that received a bailout. The regression indicated this to be the case.
The model had an adjusted R square of 0.750 with a p=0.000. The F score was 130.119. The bailout was
significant regarding its impact on automobile sales. However, the unstandardized and standardized Betas
were negative, meaning that the bailout had a significant, negative impact on automobile and truck sales
for those companies receiving the bailout. This was supported by the strong involvement of the
government’s auto task force and politicians that pushed their priorities on GM and Chrysler by using
political pressure to keep less profitable dealerships and factories open, when the companies would might
have shut them down. The Canadian government also lent $10 billion to GM, and obtained a 10% stake in
the company. The government required that many jobs and factories remain in Canada, regardless of
economic impact on company income (Ingrassia, 2011).
Table 2: Results of Multiple Regression with Significance Identified for
Each Independent Variable, With Company Employment as Dependent Variable
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Model
T
B
Std. Error
Beta
(Constant)
169368.76
37875.65
4.47
US Sales (Units)
0.08
0.05
0.03
1.58
Dealers by brand
15.16
0.78
0.75
19.49
Number of US Dealerships
-4.58
1.97
-0.10
-2.33
Days of US Co. Inventory
531.07
72.78
0.13
7.30
(FG)
Net Income ($M) Monthly
-3.92
0.84
-0.05
-4.69
National car employment
58.74
10.40
0.11
5.65
Received bailout 1= yes,
10638.27
3772.30
0.05
2.82
0=no
Company ad spending
0.00
0.00
0.20
1.57
Industry Inventory (days)
-506.25
92.29
-0.08
-5.49
Time
-172.58
93.16
-0.07
-1.85
GM dummy
-72224.25
6194.76
-0.33
-11.66
Chrysler dummy
-196985.66
4375.56
-0.89
-45.02
Toyota dummy
171005.78
5092.73
0.77
33.58
Honda dummy
33220.89
4440.39
0.15
7.48
Nissan dummy
26694.76
4268.66
0.12
6.25
Sig.
0.00
0.12
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.12
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
In Table 3, income did not significantly impact unit sales, which is reasonable because sales figures
generate income and not the other way around. Days of company inventory also did not drive sales, which
is counter intuitive because the literature indicated that when GM and Chrysler inventory was high, the
manufacturers’ pressured their dealers to buy more cars and provided incentives to sell more. An
explanation might be that because the other four companies were not cited as using this practice, it muted
the effect of GM’s and Chrysler’s tactics. Company employment was not a significant factor regarding
unit sales. Based on these results, the question arises--is it more important to have higher employment
with lower sales due to the bailout, or would higher sales and less or lower paid hourly employees have
been preferred?
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Table 3: Results of Multiple Regression with Significance Identified for
Each Independent Variable, with Unit Sales as Dependent Variable
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
(Constant)
-74898.90
32055.93
Dealers by brand
3.73
0.81
0.48
Number of US Dealerships
3.16
1.65
0.18
Days of US Co. Inventory
-85.07
63.33
-0.05
(FG)
Net Income ($M) Monthly
0.94
0.71
0.03
National car employment
67.89
8.50
0.33
Received bailout 1= yes, 0=no
-13650.58
3129.93
-0.17
Company ad spending
0.00
0.00
-0.11
Industry Inventory (days)
-192.76
78.68
-0.08
Time
305.94
77.22
0.30
GM dummy
27157.22
5611.47
0.31
Chrysler dummy
-20218.79
7467.27
-0.23
Toyota dummy
42845.53
6903.90
0.50
Honda dummy
15104.12
3830.20
0.18
Nissan dummy
-885.43
3680.97
-0.01
US Company Employment by
0.05
0.03
0.14
company
t
Sig.
-2.34 0.02
4.60 0.00
1.92 0.06
-1.34 0.18
1.32
7.99
-4.36
-3.28
-2.45
3.96
4.84
-2.71
6.21
3.94
-0.24
0.19
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.81
1.58 0.12
LIMITATIONS
When is a bailout a bailout? Ford received some U.S. government funding, although a much
smaller amount, for the development of greener cars. Nissan received green car loans from the U.S.
government and Toyota and Honda received help from the Japanese government to provide low interest
loans to consumers as an incentive to purchase their cars and trucks. Because of the significance of the
bailouts for GM and Chrysler and the size of the bankruptcy filings, it was determined that only GM and
Chrysler were the “bailout recipients” due to the significant magnitude of the government involvement
and financial backing.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In early 2005, Hyundai experienced growth in sales in the U.S., mainly due to the introduction of
the Hyundai Excel in 1986. Korean auto companies have become large competitors in the U.S. market
(Green, 1992). In 2002, Hyundai constructed a $1 billion manufacturing facility in Montgomery,
Alabama (http://www.hmmausa.com/). Adding these Korean companies to the regression might be
interesting to investigate. The ripple effect of the bailout on parts suppliers’ employment and avoidance
of foreclosures would also be interesting to help understand the impact of the bailout on the entire
automotive industry.
The Journal of Human Resource and Adult Learning, Vol. 10, Num. 2, December, 2014 issue
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