A comparative study of the transition to democracy and Islamist culture
in Egypt and Tunisia
Dina Wafa, Director GAPP Executive Education, School of Global Affairs and Public
Policy,
the American University in Cairo
[email protected]
Euro Mediterranean Dialogue on Public Management, MED 6
Cultures for change, changes through culture
October 7 – 9, 2013
Marseille, France
Little did the twenty six year old, Tunisian fruit vendor, Mohamed Boauzizi know that
when he set himself in flames on December 17, 2010 (Cornwell, 2011), in protest to an
unresponsive government, that the flames would soon spread to engulf the Arab region.
Rage against dictatorship regimes sprung in a domino effect across the Arab region, from
Tunisia to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. While slightly touching other areas in the
Arab world as well. During the process, four regimes were toppled. Today, two years
later the region is still in turbulence, each country at a different stage in its transition
toward democracy.
The rise of Islamist forces in the countries of the Arab Spring South of the
Mediterranean, brings forth the question will the religious culture of the people uphold
the rising Islamist regimes? This research attempts a comparative study of the transition
to democracy and Islamist culture in Tunisia and Egypt. The polarization between the
Islamist and the secular groups in both countries is evident. Though the two countries
were the leaders of the Arab Spring, and both hold several similarities, yet there are
marked differences to be considered. Two and a half years post the 2011 revolution
Egyptians were out on the streets again. This time it was to refute the Islamist regime rule
through a popular supported coup on July 3, 2013. Will Tunisia, the first country of the
Arab Spring to topple its dictator, follow suit? Some of the investigative questions in the
study include:
-
-
To what extent did a religious culture play a role in the rise of Islamist forces?
To what extent have the new regimes developed a comprehensive approach that
does not exclude liberal secular forces, while maintaining moderate Islamist
values?
Why Islamists failed to maintain power in Egypt?
Will Tunisia follow suit?
The methodology utilized relies on a literature review of primary and secondary sources
for grounded theory qualitative research.
The rise of Islamist forces
Post the Arab Spring revolutions both Tunisia and Egypt witnessed a rise in Islamist
forces to power. The main rising Islamist force was the Muslim Brotherhood through the
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt, the Ennahda Party in Tunisia.
During the past two years, Egypt witnessed two public referendums, one upper and lower
house of parliament elections, and a presidential election. Participation of citizens in was
high. In Egypt with a population of 81.3 million (CAPMAS, 2011) of which 49.2 million
were eligible for voting at the 2011 parliamentary elections (Elections Gate, 2011), for
many, this was their first experience to participate in parliamentary elections.
Furthermore, the 8 to 10 million Egyptians living abroad, and whose remittances amount
to $7,725 million in 2011, were, for the first time, allowed to exercise their citizenship
rights by participating in the voting process (El Baradei, Wafa and Ghoneim, 2012).
Voter turnout was quite high compared to previous elections in Egypt. For parliamentary
elections voter turnout reached 54.99% in 2012, as opposed to 16.16% in 2010; and for
presidential elections reached 49.62% in 2012 as opposed to 16.41% in 2005 (IDEA,
2013). In all elections and referendums, the outcome was primarily in favor of majority
Islamist groups with the Muslim Brotherhood FJP in first place, and the Salafist Al Noor
Party in second place. The FJP won 43% of the seats and Al Noor won approximately
25% of the seats in the 2012 parliamentary elections. Furthermore FJP and Muslim
Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi won the presidential elections in the second
round with a 51.7% (IDEA, 2013; and Wade, 2013).
Endorsed by 64% of voters in a national referendum, Egypt’s post revolution constitution
was passed in December 2012 (Amensty International, 2012; and World Bank, 2013).
Historically, authoritarian regimes utilized constitutions, laws and elections to their
advantage and to legitimize their rule (Owen, 2012). The new constitution and legislation
were to set the road map for the future course. Yet, electing a president and drafting a
new constitution were not sufficient to bring stability to a country that had witnessed a
powerful uprising on January 25, 2011.
Tunisians had a similar experience; as they too felt a new sense of ownership as they cast
their votes at the polling stations post the Arab Spring. In 2011 Tunisians elected a 217
member Constituent Assembly that would both draft the new constitution and govern the
country. Tunisians voter turn out was 53%, and Ennahda won eight-nine seats in the
assembly, through 41.7% of the votes All other parties did not receive more than 8% of
the votes (McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, 2013). Accordingly the Islamist party Ennahda
was the strongest power in the Assembly. Thus creating a situation quite similar to that
found in Egypt. However, there were differences to follow. Ennahda created a coalition
with the left wing nationalist party and the social democratic party. The coalition implied
inclusion of other forces: Hamdi Jebali, secretary general of Ennahda was appointed
prime minister of the new government; Moncef Marzouki, leader of the left wing
nationalist party was appointed president; and Mostafa Ben Jaafar one of the leaders in
the social democratic party was appointed head of the Assembly. The coalition agreement
went so far as to ensure inclusion in the government through assigning nineteen slots to
Ennahda, six to each of the other two parties and the remaining eleven to be selected
according to professional ability (Ghanem, 2013; and McMurray and Ufheil-Somers,
2013). To date, Tunisia’s new constitution has not yet been finalized, and its streets still
witness turbulence.
Reflecting on the outcome of rising Islamist powers in both countries brings forth the
question did the Islamist groups seek power?
First we have to be careful in differentiating and understanding the different Islamic
groups. The Islamist group winning majority leadership in both Tunisia and Egypt is the
Muslim Brotherhood political parties Ennahda and Freedom and Justice Party
respectively. In several initial Muslim Brotherhood writings and announcements prior to
the revolution and immediately before elections they claimed that they would not run for
presidency nor seek a majority in parliament (AlAbadi, 2013). In fact most senior leaders
would have till recently expected that they were more likely to serve in prison rather than
in a formal political position (Brown). However, in response to the evident outcome, they
claimed that they did not seek power for the sake of ruling, but because it was their
responsibility in front of God and the people, and to combat a conspiracy to oust them
from public and political participation (AlAbadi, 2013; and Abdellatif, 2012). The
movement’s first political participation came in 1987, sixty years after their initiation.
The Muslim Brotherhood was formed as a general reform movement on March 22, 1928
by its founder and general guide Hassan El Banna and only six members at the time
(Brown; Fawzy, 2012; and Shamakh, 2012). The movement’s members were known for
their high discipline and unity under its general guide (Brown, 2013). By 1937, the
Brotherhood had spread to include university students and chapters in Djibouti, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Bahrain, Yemen, Somalia, India, and France
(Shamakh, 2012). Politics was not their main concern, but rather a more social reform.
However, the Muslim Brotherhood first attempt to run for politics in Egypt was in the
1942 parliamentary elections, where they failed to win any seats (Shamak, 2012). It was
not 1987 parliamentary elections, that the MB were able to win 36 seats with two
prominent leaders running namely Seif Al Islam, Hassn El Banna’s son, and Maamoun
Al Hodeiby, the 2nd general guide’s son (Shamakh, 2012).
The Muslim Brotherhood more than eighty years of existence is divided into four main
phases. The first being the initiation period, followed by what they call the dark period.
The dark period was under President Nasser’s rule where they experienced imprisonment
and torture. This period coincided with their second general guide, Hassan El Hudaiby,
who was also imprisoned by Nasser. The third phase was with the initial release from
prisons by President Sadat, and the third general guide, Omar El Telmesany. Then came
the fourth phase of restructuring and spreading with the fourth to sixth general guides:
Mohamed Hamed Aboul Nasr, Mostafa Mashhour, and Mohamed Al Maamoun Al
Hodaiby. This phase witnessed the formation of the international guidance office and
Shurran council of the Muslim Brothrhood worldwide. This was followed by the fifth
phase where the eighth general guide, Mohamed Badei, witnessed the formation of the
FJP and its winning majority rule in parliament, and a MB member elected to president
(Fawzy, 2012; Shamakh, 2012;and Tammam, 2012).
During the third phase of the Muslim Brotherhood, and their release from Nasser’s
prisons, some members decided to follow the second general guide, Al Hodaiby’s preach
for forgiving others – preachers not judges. On the other hand, another group sought
revenge and formed the jihadists groups following the preaching of the likes of Ayman
Al Zawahry. While the remaining others followed the preaching of Salafist Sayed Kotb’s
rigid interpretation of Islam (Fawzy, 2012). The three groups, though Islamist yet they
held core differences.
The Jihadists, who were the most violent Islamist group, were formed mainly from
university students and lower income members. They inhabited Upper Egypt, and soon
after their formation claimed responsibility for the assassination of President Sadat
(Fawzy, 2012). They continue to feel that the MB reflects weakness, and is thus
committing suicide (Fawzy, 2012)
Salafism began with Nasser’s imprisonment of MB members. Several fled and
communicated widely with their counterparts in Saudi Arabia (Fawzy, 2012; and
Tammam, 2012). Salafism held a rigid interpretation of Islam. One of such
interpretations imposed a certain appearance. While the initial writings of the MB did not
impose a dress code, but rather encouraged its members to fit in with society. The
Salafists, however, set a dress code including growing a beard for men and a ‘niqab’ or
complete cover for women (Tammam, 2012). However, the Salafist groups till 2011 were
more concerned with preaching rather than politics, and many continue to “treat politics
with disdain” (Brown, 2013). Yet, the Salafist Al Noor Party managed to win 25% of the
2012 Egyptian parliamentary seats through its supporters, and continues be politically
active (Wade, 2013).
Given the differences amongst Islamist forces, and that the Muslim Brotherhood is
claimed to have approximately four million eligible voters in Egypt, and with an average
voter turnout of one third; the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to be able to win a majority
bloc in parliament, and put through a presidential candidate for a run off perhaps (Brown,
2013). However, the movement would need to win over other voters, from other groups,
to attain a clear victory. The Brotherhood was able to do so initially, however the support
declined tremendously over the past two and a half years.
Egyptians frequented the polling stations post the January 25th revolution in 2011 at a
declining rate. Their first experience was with the constitutional referendum in March
2011 with a voter turnout of 41%. The Brotherhood had campaigned for a amendment
and won by 77% (Wade, 2013). This was followed by the parliamentary elections, which
witnessed the highest voter turnout of 62.04% where the FJP won 43% of the seats and
Al Nour 25% (IDEA, 2013 and Wade, 2013). The second house of parliament, or the
‘Shurra’ council, did not receive as much voter attention, since there were calls to abolish
the council altogether. Turnout was as low as 10% winning the FJP 58% of the council
seats (Wade, 2013). President Mohamed Morsi came into office in 30 June 2012
elections with a 51.7 percent of the votes, and resigned his position in the Freedom and
Justice Party (FJP) (World Bank, 2013). Noteworthy was that voter turn out had slightly
declined to 51.85% from the previous 62.04% voter turn out for parliamentary elections
(IDEA, 2013). Following his appointment, President Morsi passed the new constitution
referendum. Endorsed by 64% of voters, with an even lower turnout of citizen voters of
32.9%, in a national referendum, Egypt’s post revolution constitution was passed in
December 2012 (All Africa, 2012; Amensty International, 2012; Wade 2013; and World
Bank, 2013).
Islamist regimes attempts at inclusion
The Tunisian experience of rising Islamist forces attempts at inclusion of other groups is
quite evident. Though the Islamist Ennahda party was able to secure close to half of the
seats of the Constituent Assembly, yet they opted to form a ruling coalition with the two
most prominent parties, the Left Wing Nationalist Party and the Social Democratic Party
(Ghanem, 2013; and McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, 2013). Thereby, dividing the power
amongst them, and including them in the newly formed cabinet.
The Constituent Assembly primary task is writing Tunisia’s new post revolution
constitution. Since its formation in 2011, the assembly has undertaken this task with
serious debate and concessions amongst all parties (Ghanem, 2013). However, Tunisians
have shown signs of dissatisfaction and unrest. An anti-Islamist rule is rising, with
protestors from various groups such as the leftists, the elite, and the Popular Front
coalition. The polarization is evident in a state where most Tunisians adopt a secular
culture. Such secularism has been ground rooted in Tunisian culture since the rule of
Habib Bourguiba (1956-1987). Bourguiba nationalized the Zaytouna mosque university
and reduced religious authorities influence (McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, 2013).
Attempts at enforcing Islamic rule were met with opposition. Already on the 2013
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, 78% of Tunisians express
dissatisfaction with the direction the country is taking.
In Egypt, the rising Islamist forces adopted a different approach. After the clear victories
in parliament and presidential elections the other opposing forces were ignored.
Following Muslim Brotherhood candidate election to presidency in 2012, a 100-member
constituent assembly was formed to write the new post revolution constitution. During
the process, several secular group members boycotted the assembly, since they saw that
the result “falls well short of protecting human rights” and ignores several minority
groups (Amnesty International, 2102; Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2012).
Furthermore, it risked turning Egypt into an Islamist state through articles 4 and 219.
Article 4 gave extensive rights to Al Azhar as the only source for any Islamic aspects
making “its voice in matters of Islamic law …decisive” and thus risking politicizing the
institution (Brown, 2013). Furthermore, Article 219 defined the principles of Islamic
jurisprudence. The result was a constitution lacking in representation, leading to a
“failure in making people feel that their political participation is effective”; a failure as
Przeworski would put it as a challenge usually faced by developing countries usually in
their attempts to implement democracy (Sarquis, 2012). Furthermore, it falls short of the
Muslim concept of ‘shura’ (consultation) ‘ijma’ (unanimous agreement) evident in the
early history of democratic Muslim communities (Sarquis, 2012).
The new much debated constitution was endorsed by 64% of voters, with an even low
voter turnout of 32.9% of voters, in a national referendum in December 2012 (All Africa,
2012; Amensty International, 2012; and World Bank, 2013). In a study of a purposive
sample of 47 Egyptians representing different groups, including: members in political
parties, civil society organizations, media professionals, members of academia, and other
citizens as representative as possible of the Egyptian society when asked to compare the
new post revolution constitution, passed in December 2012 to the 1971 pre-revolution
constitution, approximately 75% of respondents felt that the new constitution curtailed
freedom of expression, accountability, media freedom, and civil society more than the old
constitution (Wafa, 2013).
The new regime continued to alienate other groups and suppress freedoms in other
actions. In February 2013, the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs drafted a more
repressive law than the Law 84 currently in place. The new law would further restrict the
work of civil society, particularly with regard to freedoms, human rights and watchdog
activities. The new law would further allow “direct intervention by security services in
the work of civil society and the absence of mechanisms to ensure transparency,
participation and freedom of information” (Elagati, 2013). Thus, threatening citizen
engagement, and the sustainability of freedom and democracy.
Several Islamist figures were found suggesting actions, which were in defiance of
Egyptian culture. Some suggested banning all forms of tourism, a major source of income
in Egypt, with the exception of historic site visits while observing a conservative attitude,
explaining that Egyptians should not fear poverty since God takes care of his followers.
Others suggested that prisons are uncalled for and could be put to better use. Claiming
that all violations are to be duly punished according to the degree of violation either
through paying a penalty, or by lashing, or hand chopping, or a death sentence. Other
suggestions included that women voluntarily give up their jobs to men thereby solving
unemployment, transport and harassment issues (Abdellatif, 2012).
More than 80% of Egyptians felt they were worse off than they were during the Mubarak
regime just weeks prior to their ousting President Morsi (Gallup. Egyptians See Life
Worse now than before Mubarak’s fall. August 16, 2013). Several Islamists implied that
media played a conspiracy role against the MB and Salafist groups through spreading
rumors. Ibn Rushd center announced that MB and FJP have been subject to a campaign
of criticism of 120 TV hours,132 articles, and 150 newspaper pages over 50 days in the
presidential elections campaign, while they were allowed only a 6.3% opportunity to
respond (AlAbadi, 2013). However, what the Islamist groups may perhaps have missed is
that the Egyptians pious culture does not calculate into their supporting a more religious
Islamist state. A Pew Research Center report in 2013 claimed that 67% of Muslims were
concerned Islamic extremism. Quickly, Egyptians were discovering their political
differences (Beissinger, 2013; and Brown, 2013). Furthermore, what the new regime has
failed to do was address the citizens’ needs of freedom, a better economy and equity.
A look back at the root causes of the Arab Spring
The Arab Spring was driven through a need for a better quality of life, for freedom, and
for human dignity. Citizens had a newfound sense of ownership and hopes for a better
future. After decades of passivity, citizens demanded their rights for a responsive
government. They were eager to voice their opinion through protesting and participating
in elections and referendums in hope for a better future.
There were several protests in both Egypt and Tunisia that finally led to a revolt in 2011.
In Egypt, activist movements such as Kefaya and April 6 youth group and professional
associations and syndicates such as the lawyers and journalists rallied protests throughout
2004 till 2011 in Egypt. While more than 1.5 million workers protested through two
thousand strikes between 2004 and 2008 (McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, 2013). Their
main grievances were primarily economic and government corruption, as identified by
60% of Egyptians participating in the revolution (Beissinger, 2013). The gap between the
rich and the poor widened and inequality boomed. According to a Gallup study in
2011the percentage of Egyptians considered ‘thriving’ collapsed from 29% in 2005; to
25% in 2007; to 13% in 2008 and 2009; to 12% in 2010. This happened while GDP per
capita had increased from $4762 in 2005; to $5158 in 2006; to $5508 in 2007; to $5904
in 2008, $6114 in 2009; and $6367 in 2010 (Gallup, 2011).
Tunisia was not much different. The workers in the phosphate company at the town of
Rudayef continued to riot for six months (McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, 2013).
Tunisians main grievances were similar to those identified by Egyptians, primarily
economic and government corruption as identified by 47% of Tunisians who had
participated in the revolution (Beissinger, 2013). In 2010 only 41% of Tunisians were
satisfied with the availability of affordable housing as opposed to 74% in 2009. Other
basic services satisfaction rates had dropped as well: healthcare from 71% to 51%, Roads
quality from 59% to 50%, Schools from 73% to 67% (Gallup, 2013a).
While Tunisia had “gained eight points in the World Economic Forum’s Global
Competiveness Index, form 40 in 2009-2010 to 32 in 2010-2011” and had maintained its
Competitiveness Index rate yet other measures fail to appear on common GDP measures
(Gallup, 2013a). According to a Gallup study in 2011 the percentage of Tunisians
considered ‘thriving’ fell drastically from 24% in 2008; to 16% in 2009; and 14% in
2010. While GDP per capita increased from $7182 in 2005; to $7759 in 2006; to $8407
in 2007; to $8891 in 2008; to $9154 in 2009; and $9489 in 2010 (Gallup, 2011). The gap
between the rich an poor also widened with rural areas such as that of Sidi Bouzid, where
the revolution had erupted, having an unemployment rate as high as 30%, whereas the
national unemployment rate was 14%, and the coastal cities rate was as low as 7%
(McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, 2013).
The Arab Barometer conducted over spring/ summer of 2011; show that the uprisings in
both Egypt and Tunisia were mainly by the middle class (Beissinger, 2013). They had
their differences such that the uprising in Tunisia was sparked in the rural city of Sidi
Bouzid and spread through surrounding rural areas before it reached the urban cities.
While in Egypt it was the major cities of Cairo and Alexandria that led the uprising.
However, they both had a common cause; a call for personal dignity, for equity and a
responsive government. Therefore, overwhelming evidence suggests that the uprisings by
Egyptians and Tunisians highlight a better economic future. Therefore, any rising power,
including the Islamist forces that rose to power, main objective in order to maintain that
power was to satisfy the citizens well being.
In Egypt, Egyptians took to the streets again and backed by the army were able to oust
President Morsi on July 3, 2013. The main drive was a feeling of dissatisfaction.
Compared to the Mubarak ousted regime, Egyptians polled by a group of Gallup studies
two weeks prior to deposing of President Morsi and the Transparency International
Global Corruption Barometer of 2013: approximately 80% of Egyptians felt their country
was in a worse position and the economy was falling; 70% felt that employment
opportunities had dropped; those who rated their lives poorly had increased from 23% to
34%; 30% feel the country is worse off and 64% that corruption has increased (Gallup,
2013 c and e; and Transparency International, 2013). Furthermore, confidence in national
government dropped from 57% in November 2012 prior to President Morsi’s decree
granting himself supreme powers to 29% right before his ouster; and elections confidence
rate dropped from a remarkably high rate of 89% in 2012 to 60% by mid -2013 (Gallup,
2013 b).
Will Tunisia follow suit?
The scenario in Tunisia may be slightly different. Although, Egypt and Tunisia held
many similarities in their 2011 uprising: both were quick to oust a lifetime dictator, and
both called for the same demands. They are also quite comparable in how the Islamic-led
governments in both countries have failed to improve the economy or curb corruption,
which were the primary demands of the revolutionaries.
Tunisians confidence in their new government and leadership has plunged respectively
from 56% and 60% in 2012 to 32% and 23% in 2013 (Gallup, 2013 d). Compared to the
Ben Ali ousted regime, Tunisans polled by a group of Gallup studies and Transparency
International Global Corruption Barometer in 2013 show: a drop from 77% to 59% for
those expressing they are living comfortably; an increase from 59% to 71% for those who
claim they find difficulty finding a job; 42% feel the country is worse off; and 81% feel
that corruption has in increased (Gallup, 2013d; and Transparency International, 2013).
A group of anti-government protestors fled to the streets in hope of ousting the new
regime. The group is composed of leftist groups, the elite, and the Popular Front
Coalition. Their opposition may have been spurred due to the declining popular
confidence; mimicking the Egyptian Tamarod group that initiated the ousting of
President Morsi; the assassination of two opposition politicians; or the delay in finalizing
the constitution and completing the set road map. These protests led to the suspension of
the Constituent Assembly’s activities until the opposition and the government have
resolved their tensions.
Yet, a comparison between Egypt and Tunisia also shows marked differences, which may
lead to different paths. One simple difference is that Tunisia’s military has been weekend
by previous rulers, and is more of a police state, with 10.4 million in the police force
(McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, 2013). Therefore it is doubtful that the military would
side with the protesting group (Ghanem, 2013). Furthermore the Islamist Ennahda Party
was keen on being inclusive in sharing its power through a coalition. Thus, also sharing
responsibility and blame for any failures. It would also seem that perhaps the Ennahda
Party may learn from the mistakes of its counterpart in Egypt, the FJP, and avoid
alienating other groups and perhaps focus on the issues of highest priorities, namely the
economy and government corruption.
Conclusion
More than two years post the 2011 revolution in Egypt and Tunisia have brought forth
further polarization between the Islamist groups and the secular groups. Though in both
countries the Islamists groups rose to power, through the Muslim Brotherhood FJP and
Ennahda in Egypt and Tunisia respectively. Yet their success or failure depended on
their interpretation of their coming to power. A pious culture in Egypt was not sufficient
to uphold an Islamist regime that did not respond to the citizens needs of human dignity
and a better life. The FJP’s failure to maintain an inclusive leadership in Egypt’s
transition resulted in its carrying all the blame for the government’s failure leading to a
deteriorating economy and living conditions. Ennahda, on the other hand was shrewd in
adopting a leadership coalition including other major opposition groups to carry the
burden. It is early to foresee if Tunisia would follow Egypt’s path. Yet what is clear, is
that a pious culture is not to be interpreted as a society willing to accept an Islamist state,
as we have witnessed in the case of Egypt.
References
Abdellatif, G. (2012). The Muslim Brotherhood and Ruling Egypt (in Arabic) “alekhwan
al moslemoon wa hokm masr”. Alexandria: Horus International.
AlAbadi, S. R. (2013). The Psycholgical War on the Muslim Brotherhood (in Arabic)
“Al harb al nafseya ala elekhwan” Cairo: Ikraa.
All Africa (2012). Egypt: Voting Turnout in Referendum 32.9 Percent - Election
Commission.
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201212250046.html (accessed 2 July 2013).
Amnesty International (2012). Egypt’s new constitution limits fundamental freedoms and
Ignores the Rights of Women. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-snew-constitution-limits-fundamental-freedoms-and-ignores-the-rights-of-women
(accessed 17 January 2013).
Beissinger, M., Jamal A., and Mazur, K. (2013). The anatomy protest in Egypt and
Tunisia. The Middle East Channel. Available at:
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/4/15/the_anatomy_of_protest_in_egypt_and
_tunisia (accessed 16 June 2013).
Brown, N. J. (2013, April). Islam and politics in the new Egypt. The Carnegie Papers.
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2012). Available at:
http://www.cihrs.org/?p=5249&lang=en (accessed 14 May 2013)
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington D.C. Available at:
www.CanegieEndowment.org/pubs. (accessed 16 June 2013).
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics - CAPMAS. (2001). The
permanent migration of Egyptians 2000.
Cornwell, R. (2011) Ten people who changed the world: Mohammed Bouazizi, an
ordinary man who became the Arab Spring's figurehead. The Independent. Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/ten-people-who-changed-the-worldmohammed-bouazizi-an-ordinary-man-who-became-the-arab-springs-figurehead6282311.html (accessed 11 May 2013).
Elagati, M. (2013). Foreign Funding in Egypt after the revolution – Analysis. Available
at: http://www.eurasiareview.com/04042013-foreign-funding-in-egypt-after-therevolution-analysis/ (accessed 16 April 2013).
El Baradei, L., Wafa, D. and Ghoneim, N. (2012) Assessing the voting experience
of Egyptians abroad: Post the January 25 revolution. Journal of US-China Public
Administration 9: 11: 1223 - 1243.
Elections Gate. Available at: http://www.elections2011.eg/ (accessed 11 May 2012).
Fawzy, T. (2012) The Muslim Brotherhood Between Acceptance and Rejection. (in
Arabic) “al ikhwan al moslemoon bayn alrafd wal kobool” Cairo: Egyptian Center for
Strategic and Future Studies.
Freedom House. (2012). Freedom in the world 2012 report: The Arab uprisings and their
global repercussions.
Gallup. (2011, February 2) Egyptians’, Tunisians’ Wellbeing Plummets Despite GDP
Gains. Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/145883/Egyptians-Tunisians-WellbeingPlummets-Despite-GDP-Gains.aspx (Accessed 10 September 2013).
Gallup (2013 a). Tunisia: Analyzing the Dawn of the Arab Spring. Available at:
http://www.gallup.com/poll/157049/tunisia-analyzing-dawn-arab-spring.aspx (accessed
10 September 2013).
Gallup. (2013 b, August 2). Egyptians’ Views of Government Crashed Before
Overthrow. Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/163796/egyptian-viewsgovernment-crashed-overthrow.aspx (accessed 10 September 2013).
Gallup. (2013 c, August 8). As Morsi Ousted, ‘Suffering’ Shot up in Egypt. Available at:
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163877/morsi-ousted-suffering-shot-egypt.aspx (accessed 10
September 2013).
Gallup. (2013 d, August 13) Tunisians Lose Confidence in Government, Accessed at:
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163943/tunisians-lose-confidence-government.aspx
(accessed 10 September 2013).
Gallup. (2013 e, August 16) Egyptians See Life Worse now than before Mubarak’s fall.
Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/164015/egyptians-life-worse-mubarak-fall.aspx
(accessed 10 September 2013).
Ghanem, H. (2013, July 25) Will Tunisia Follow Egypt? Brookings. Available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/7/25-tunisia-egypt-democratic-reformghanem (accessed 29 August 2013).
McMurray, D. and Ufheil-Somers A. (2013) The Arab revolts: Dispatches on militant
democracy in the Middle East. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Owen, R. (2012). The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Pew Research Center (2013, September 10) Muslims Concerned about extremism.
Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/ (accessed 10 September 2013).
Shamakh, A. (2012). Ikhwan Proceedings (in Arabic) “alwakae3 alikhwaneya” Cairo:
Dar El Tawzee wal Nashr, Cairo.
Tammam, H. (2012). The Muslim Brotherhood: Post the revolution (in Arabic)
“alikhwan al moslemon: sanawat ma kabl althawra” Cairo: Dar El Sherouk.
Transparency International (2013). Global corruption barometer. Available at
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013 (accessed 1 September 2013).
Wade, N. (2013, August 30) Egypt: What poll results reveal about Brotherhood’s
popularity. BBC News Middle East Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-2346680? (accessed 10 September 2013).
Wafa, D. (2013). The perception of Egyptians on the development of vertical
accountability post the January 25th revolution. Conference Proceedings Joint Congress
of International Congress of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS)
and International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA): Public
Administration Futures: Professionalism and Leadership, Manama, Bahrain: June 1-6,
2013.
World Bank (2013). Egypt Overview. Available at:
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/overview.print (accessed 16 April 2013).