Politcal Science
Do Terrorist Beheadings Influence American Public Opinion?
Sponsoring Faculty Member: Dr. John Tures
Researchers and Presenters: Lindsey Weathers, Erin Missroon,
Sean Greer, Bre’Lan Simpson
Addition Researchers: Jarred Adams, Montrell Brown, Braxton Ford, Jeffrey Garner,
Jamarkis Holmes, Duncan Parker, Mark Wagner
Introduction
At the end of Summer 2014, Americans were shocked to see the televised execution of a pair of American journalists in Syria by a group known
as ISIS. Both were killed in gruesome beheadings. The images seen on mainstream media sites, and on websites, bore an eerie resemblance to beheadings
ten years earlier in Iraq. During the U.S. occupation, nearly a dozen Americans
were beheaded, while Iraqis and people from a variety of countries were dispatched in a similar manner.
Analysts still question the purpose of the videos of 2004 and 2014.
Were they designed to inspire locals to join the cause of those responsible for
the killings? Were they designed to intimidate the Americans and coalition
members, getting the public demand their leaders withdraw from the region?
Or was it some combination of the two ideas?
It is difficult to assess the former. But we can see whether the beheadings had any influence upon American public opinion. Did they make Americans want to withdraw from the Middle East? And did the beheadings affect
the way Americans view Islam? To determine answers to these questions, we
look to the literature for theories about U.S. public opinion, as well as influences
upon it. We look at whether these beheadings have had an influence on survey
data of Americans across the last dozen years.
Beheading Cases
Daniel Pearl
Due to the recent beheadings done by the ISIS group, the memory of
the 2002 horror of American Journalist Daniel Pearl’s decapitation resurfaced.
ISIS, which is the newly formed terrorist group based in Syria, very closely emulates the early 2000s practices of the al-Qaeda group. Although ISIS is recreat168
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ing the act of beheading and despite popular opinion, “A statement posted on
jihadist forums Sunday…and purportedly issued by al-Qaeda’s General Command said ‘It has no connection with the group’ and blamed it for ‘the enormity
of the disaster that afflicted the Jihad in Syria (CNN 2014).’”
Al-Qaeda released gruesome viral videos starting with the beheading
of Daniel Pearl. Qari Hashim was accused of Daniel Pearl’s murder but was acquitted by the court on Friday, October 24, 2014. He was detained again under the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) rules one day after being acquitted. Three other men were sentenced to life terms. In addition to these men,
Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was said to be the “mastermind” behind Pearl’s beheading (BBC News 2014), was sentenced to death.
Nick Berg
Nick Berg, a 26-year-old young man that from Pennsylvania, was kidnapped by a group of al-Qaeda terrorists. It is believed he was executed by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, who was behind several bombings in Iraq. The execution
was recorded and posted on an Islamic website and it immediately went viral
and people all over the United States watched it.
According to Fox News, in the video that was recorded of Nick Berg
being beheaded, there were five men wearing scarves around their heads with
black ski masks standing behind a man that was on the floor in an all-orange
jumpsuit that looked just like a prisoners uniform. The video shows the prisoner
saying “My name is Nick Berg, my father’s name is Michael, my mother’s name is
Susan. I have a brother and a sister, David and Sarah. I live in Philadelphia.” The
video shows him on the floor with his hands behind his back, and then there
was a statement that was made that was read in Arabic. Then, one of the men
behind him takes a large knife from under his clothes, while one of the other
men takes Berg on his side. After that, the men take the knife to Berg’s neck and
thrust right through it. After they cut his head off, they hold Berg’s head before
the camera. Right before they thrust the knife through him, there was a phrase
that was repeatedly shouted. This statement that they were screaming was,” Allahu Akbar!” This is translated from Islamic meaning, ”God is great.” Berg’s body
was found on a Baghdad highway on the same day that he was beheaded, U.S.
officials say. (Fox News 2004a)
A former United States Navy Judge Advocate General, Tim Susanin,
told Fox News, ”To see this poor soul beheaded is gruesome and barbaric. We
are really seeing the difficulty that our troops are dealing with. They have now
been infiltrated by members of Al-Qaeda (Fox News, 2004a).” Michael Berg,
Nick’s father, said, “I knew he was decapitated. That manner is preferable to
a long and torturous death. But I didn’t want it to become public.” The Bush
Administration said those who beheaded Berg would be hunted down and
brought to justice.
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Owen Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley
In addition to kidnappings, murders, suicide bombing attacks, and
other acts of terrorism in Iraq, Al-Zarqawi was also accused of beheading two
Americans: Owen Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley.
Al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, released an audiotape
demanding his Mujuhadeen fighters in Iraq to battle in a holy war. Soon afterwards, he was linked to a car bombing attack on the Jordanian embassy. Two
weeks later he bombed the United Nations office in Baghdad (Faraj et.al. 2004).
Jack Hensley was beheaded on September 21, 2004. On that day, a
video showed the kidnappers beheading Hensley, an American worker from
Marietta, Georgia. The 49-year-old was a contractor in Iraq (Fox News 2004b).
The following day, Owen Eugene “Jack” Armstrong, the second of three men
kidnapped, was beheaded and videotaped after a trade for Iraqi female prisoners broke down (Fox News 2004c). The third man, a Briton, was also killed.
James Foley
James Foley was a writer for GlobalPost; he also made videos for other
shows, including the PBS show NewsHour. He truly believed that war was horrible and he stood by that. He tried to show the world this with his report “humanity amid the horror of war (Stelter 2014a).”
Foley was abducted while on a reporting trip to Northern Syria in 2012.
Later there was a video posted on August 19, 2014 that showed his loved ones
and the rest of this country what happened to him (Carter, 2014). “We have
seen a video that purports to be the murder of U.S. citizen James Foley by (ISIS),”
National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said. “The intelligence
community is working as quickly as possible to determine its authenticity. If
genuine, we are appalled by the brutal murder of an innocent American journalist and we express our deepest condolences to his family and friends (Carter
2014).”
Steven Sotloff
Steven Sotloff was a 31-year old freelance journalist who wrote for
multiple publications and reported for many Middle Eastern countries. Sotloff
was abducted in 2013 in Northern Syria. It is believed the abduction happened
near the city of Aleppo; he was then imprisoned by the “Islamic State” (ISIS) at
the location of Raqqa. About a year later on September 2, Sotloff was beheaded by the jihadist group ISIS, this made Sotloff the second American journalist
to be killed by ISIS.
Sotloff, who was Jewish, was a dual citizen of the United States and Israel. He studied journalism at the University of Central Florida. An article by BBC
said “Steven Sotloff… was described as an honest and courageous journalist…
He often focused on the human side of the conflict, writing about the plight of
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displaced civilians in Syria struggling without adequate food or shelter in early
2013 (BBC 2014).”
Now we know something about the cases of beheadings, designed to
rally supporters and intimidate opponents. But what we need to understand is
how these killings fit within the academic literature. What do we know about
American public opinion, and the role of international events for influencing it?
And how have beheadings played a role in this crisis, or any crisis?
Literature Review
Foreign Policy & Public Opinion
Many questions around the world surround what is the primary role of
public opinion when talking about foreign policy. Holsti stated that “the center
of persisting debates [is] between the liberal-democratic and realist approaches to foreign affairs (Holsti 1992, 440).” Holsti also stated that there is a long
liberal-democratic tradition, dating back at least to Kant and Bentham; the foreign policies of democratic countries are more peaceful, in part because the
public can play a constructive role in constraining policy makers. The question
that everyone really wants to know is do people of the world really have a clear
idea of foreign policy, for them to be able to listen to someone talk about it,
and maybe even hold a conversation about it? Some people don’t always think
that public opinion is important; they would rather hear about who was stuck
on the side of the road than hear about something that could potentially affect
their lives. According to Hans Morgenthau (1978) “public opinion is a barrier,
to thoughtful and coherent diplomacy, hindering efforts to promote national
interest that transcend the moods and passions of moment.”
Holsti (1992 440) stated that most realists would distinguish between
foreign policy and other public policy issues. He means that the public opinion
is volatile meaning the people opinion on foreign policy can change whenever
they want it to change.
Holsti also talked about how the diplomacy could be effective where
he stated it that it lacked certain points, which were, “secrecy, flexibility and
other qualities that would be seriously jeopardized were the public to have
a significant impact on foreign policy” (Holsti 1992 440). He also stated that
people could be stubborn and wouldn’t change their opinion, but was he contradicting himself when it came to what he really thought about people and
their opinions when it comes to foreign policy?
The average stereotype for a citizen when it comes to foreign policy
is that they have no idea about what is really going on. Do we think that they
will change their opinion for a point that they may really not care about to
hear? This brings us back to the question of this: Is foreign policy public opinion
volatile? In Holsti’s (1992 442) article, noted political scientist Gabriel Almond
said “Depicted that public opinion is volatile and [a] mood-driven constraint
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upon foreign policy.” This is an understandable quote, because honestly, we as
Americans react to things based on how we feel. If someone were to ask you
two questions but rephrase those using different words you would probably
give me two different answers, while still talking about the same question. “The
undertow of withdrawal is still very powerful. Deeply ingrained habits do not
die easy deaths. The world outside is still very remote for most Americans and
the tragic lessons of the last decades have not been fully digested (Almond, as
quoted in Holsti; 1992 442)”. Almond stated that Americans react off of how
they feel and not so much due to the knowledge they have about something.
They take their reactions overboard before sitting down and actually listening
to key points throughout the subject matter. They also make their opinions volatile, by changing their opinion when hearing something that they agree with.
Hans Morgenthau summarized the case against the active role for the
public that would get the attention of the some realists. “The rational requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the support
of a public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational (Morgenthau, 1978: 558).” The debate between liberals and realists has been a long
one; it was really intensified by World War I which might be best described as
the first public relations war.
The Allied and Central Powers both tried to win over the world opinion in many ways including publication by many governments of highly selective document (Holsti; 1992 440). The propaganda war during the conflict
was almost as intense as the one on the battlefield. President Wilson wanted a
postwar world order which he would have solely depended on democratizing
foreign affairs and diplomacy.
Elihu Root, once a Secretary of State summarized the position of those
who agreed and wanted a role with the public in the conduct of foreign affairs
“when the foreign officers were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger
of war in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies, the
danger of war will be mistaken beliefs…while there is no human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent people
from having an erroneous opinion (Root, 1922:5).” This Basically states that people opinions are easily influenced just as they are not easily influenced. They
will agree with you on certain things, while others will continue to be stuck in
their own ways and continue to believe what they think is right.
A Smart U.S. Public Opinion
John R. Oneal, Brad Lian, and James H. Joyner, Jr., believe that the public opinion on issues can be used to make smart decisions for our country. On
the contrary, Walter Lippmann wrote a book on public opinion in 1922 and truly believed “most citizens are too ill-informed and too fickle to make reasonable
judgments (261).” He felt that the American people do not know enough to
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influence decisions that the leaders of this country make about our army. Gabriel Almond was an author of the Almond-Lippmann consensus and he states
“the public’s view can be fluctuated dramatically, because they lack structure
and coherence and are driven as much by mood as by reason (262).” In his eyes,
the people think too much off of their emotions and do not fully understand
the situation that may be at hand and the outcome would be too inconsistent
and unstable. When we deal with problems in our country the public has to be
considered and how they will react. Of course they would rather the public to
agree on all decisions made but that is not how it goes.
Bruce Jentleson, a professor of public policy and political science at
Duke University, agrees with the authors saying, “The public has become ‘pretty prudent’ (262).” The use of military force was supported more when it was
used to “force foreign policy restraint on an aggressive adversary (265).” The
use of military force in order to take over another country is not as much supported by the public. He admits that the citizens of America should not have
such an influence on military action to force internal political change because
“it goes against the principles of sovereignty and self-determination and requires intimate knowledge of others’ history, culture, and society (263).” Lian
and Oneal (1993) point out that Jentleson’s conclusions on his data have to be
“accepted cautiously” because they were all formed from information solely
from the post-Vietnam period.
The revisionist view gives us a different way at interpreting public
opinion. It states that “the instability of public opinion has been exaggerated
(263).” Shapiro and Page believe that the public is stable and informed enough
to have a big influence on foreign policy. The authors reviewed around 1,000
questions about foreign affairs that were asked several times in surveys from
1935 to 1990. The results showed that the public was pretty steady with their
answers. When they did fluctuate, it was because of major events such as
World War II, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. They came to the conclusion
that “the public has stable beliefs and responds appropriately to international
events (263).” This research shows that the public is actually capable of having
an influence on foreign policy with consistent success.
Changes in U.S. Public Opinion
What exactly moves public opinion? This is the question posed and
answered by Page, Shapiro and Dempsey in their article, “What Moves Public
Opinion?” They approach the question by asking more: Does the public react
directly to objective events? Do experts or enlightened political leaders educate the public with helpful new information, or do they manipulate opinion
with false or misleading propaganda? Which influences are most important:
events, experts, politicians or interest groups? Do the mass media report relevant information accurately or inaccurately? The authors go on to examine
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the level of influence the media, events and politicians actually have on public
opinion, and also discuss their own research into the matter.
“Citizens’ preferences” are considered “primarily instrumental” when it
comes to controlling and manipulating public opinion. According to the text,
“policies are judged in terms of expected costs and benefits for the individual
and for his or her family (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 23).” In other words,
politicians measure the effectiveness of new policies by how it will affect “the
working man.” The working man’s interests matter to these politicians because,
in order to sway the public’s opinions towards policy, five pieces of criteria must
be met: “[information] must be (1) actually received, (2) understood, (3) clearly
relevant to evaluating policies, (4) discrepant with past beliefs, and (5) credible
(Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 24).” The underlying idea behind this is that
“if the conditions are met in the same way for many individuals, there may be
a change in collective public opinion (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 25).”
These changes are then measured by polls.
During the Cold War, for example, Americans were frightened by the
idea of Russia becoming a more powerful nation. Politicians were able to take
advantage of that fear easily, which resulted in a drastic rise in public support
for an increase in spending on national security. However, if new information were published by a “highly credible, well publicized (Page, Shapiro and
Dempsey 1987, 24)” source that conflicted with the idea, public support may
drop significantly.
Unfortunately, most people rely on what is described as the “cheapest
and most accessible” forms of media to learn about politics: “newspapers, radio, television [and] especially network TV news” (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey
1987, 26). The level of credibility that lies with these outlets is exceedingly difficult to discern. In fact, “news from such different sources is likely to have quite
a range of salience and credibility, and therefore quite a range of impact on the
public (Hovland and Weiss, 1951).” These forms of media are able manipulate
stories with ease in order to meet the five criteria listed above, which causes a
change in public opinion.
The authors go on to explain their own investigation into public opinion and democracy, in which they “[assemble] a comprehensive collection of
survey data on U.S. citizens’ policy preferences.” The information they were
presented with explored the “marginal frequencies of responses to thousands
of different policy questions asked by various survey organizations since 1935
(Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 28).” The authors focused specifically on
eighty repeated policy questions from the previous fifteen years.
The dependent variables in these cases are “the level of public opinion
at the time of the survey (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 28).” The independent variables are taken from the actions of a source. These, along with a few
other factors, are plugged into a mathematic formula in order to measure the
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amount of change in public opinion. In this case, the change came out to be
around 5%.
The study conducted by the authors observes how opinion changes
as time passes or as new information becomes more prevalent. The point of
plugging their research is to relay the effects that the public’s awareness of a
subject has on the public’s opinion. For example, if new information from “a
credible and well-publicized source” came about that detailed plans by Sweden to go nuclear and wipe America off of the face of the Earth, public opinion
towards the country would change.
In their first data table, the authors failed to ask participants where
they received their news. Political bias has an incredibly large effect on public
opinion, making it difficult to reach an objective conclusion. In the second table, they took this factor into account and reported accordingly. The researchers found that news sources “[tend] to have effects of different magnitudes and
directions (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 31),” and that news commentary
has the most drastic impact on public opinion, causing it to sway by four percentage points. As mentioned previously, however, news commentators as a
source can very easily manipulate both news and those who refuse to look at
news objectively. While other factors may have an important effect on public
opinion, their impact was negligible.
What exactly moves public opinion, then? The accessibility of information is very important. The interest in said information also plays a large role,
as does the credibility of it. Events, especially those on a large scale, also have
a drastic effect on public opinion. Unfortunately, the average citizen lacks the
time and patience to look into political policy on their own. Public opinion as a
whole is very difficult to measure, and, for the most part, only those interested
enough to participate in polling speak for the public.
The Role of Zeitgeist
Zeitgeist is how people react to the spirit of the times and they can
express how they feel by their ideas or beliefs of that time period. It has
been applied on a smaller scale and showing the growth and development
of young children (Boehnke et.al. 2007). Boehnke and the co-author’s study
finds that there was a weak general zeitgeist effect. This involves the spirit of
the times, stating that people are a product of their environment and will be
influenced by this behavior.
Agenda Setting Triangle & Perception of Foreign Countries
The perception of crucial issues in the United States is based on waves
of trends. The agenda-setting theory proposes that the public works together
with the mass media and policy-makers to determine what issues deserve the
most amounts of time and resources. Zhang and Meadows (2012) apply this
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concept both theoretically and through a study in order to determine the dynamics that sway the perceptions of foreign countries in the U.S. The dynamics
are assessed on two levels, the first being salience, or a country’s frequency and
importance of recognition, and the second being valence, or a country’s associated tone when being discussed. These two levels of analysis are used with the
agenda-setting triangle in order to develop six testable hypotheses. The stated
goal is to “investigate how media salience, public opinion, and policy agendas
influence the perceptions of foreign countries in the United States (Zhang and
Meadows 2012, 76).” In other words, these hypotheses are used to determine
the trendsetters for perceptions of foreign countries in the U.S.
The application of the agenda-setting theory has been limited not
only in foreign politics but in many other fields. Zhang and Meadows ground
the relevancy of their study by extending perceptions of foreign countries for
the need for nations to develop an “image” or “national brand” in order to take
part in globalization (Zhang and Meadows 2012, 77-78). The article cites Saudi
Arabia’s association with terrorists following 9/11, and the resulting damaged
reputation in the U.S., as a real-world application of the study’s results. The
“multimillion repair campaign” launched by Saudi Arabia could have been optimized by understanding more thoroughly how perspectives are influenced
and agendas are set (Zhang and Benoit 2004). The results, according to the article, could also be used to improve foreign economic relations. However, the
claim that “national image may provide a more favorable environment for tourism, international trade, the international job market, and political relations”
alongside the claim that “corporations [appear] to play an important role in
national branding (Zhang and Meadows 2012)” is circular and stated without
causal evidence. Despite this, one considerable application of the study’s overarching goal is established.
Another arguable weakness of the article is its heavy leaning on the
use of surveys, especially in the way of determining the public’s perception.
While surveys are exceptional for raw data collection, determining the cause of
the relationship between variables is an important part of supporting a claim.
The article recognizes this when discussing increased media salience in relation to public opinion, but further mention of causal relationships is negligible
(Zhang and Meadows 2012, 79).
The crux of the study is the combination of the agenda setting triangle
(political, public, and media) and analyzing how foreign countries are affected
on two levels, (salience and valence). The sum idea of the first analytical level of
salience is to determine if a country holds significance in terms of agenda setting (McCombs, 2005). Salience can be measured by observing how frequently
a country is mentioned. Another option is to conduct a survey directly ranking
the importance of countries to the U.S. The second level of valence is not if,
but how or in what way a country is perceived (Wanta et al. 2004). Valence is
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broken down into attributes of being perceived as positive, negative, or neutral. The study tests if there is a positive relationship between salience, valence,
and agendas (the independent variables) and the impact on foreign countries’
perceptions (the dependent variables). Specifically, the hypotheses on the first
level test the relationships between public opinion and media coverage; presidential papers (policy agenda) and public opinion; and media coverage and
presidential papers. The second level evaluated the same relationships but in
terms of valence, (again, the causation is being inferred from the correlation
and not concretely tested). The supposed idea is that if a country is discussed
frequently and positively (or infrequently and negatively) in one part of the
triangle, its perception in another part of the triangle will be mirrored (Zhang
and Meadows 2012).
The results of the study are interesting in that they reveal power dynamics both within the agenda-setting triangle and between policy-makers
and foreign countries. The only two hypotheses of the six that were solidly supported as having a positive correlation were the salience of countries in public opinion related to media coverage and the salience of countries in media
coverage related to presidential papers (Zhang and Meadows 2012, 84-85). In
terms of salience, presidential papers discussing countries frequently did not
increase the perceived importance of countries to the public. The fact that media coverage affects public perception and policy-makers do not means the
government has limited control over public perception, while foreign countries
can launch campaigns and engage in international trade (as discussed earlier)
in order to improve perception. This control could be considered a form of
soft power because of the public’s ability to influence policy makers under the
agenda-setting theory (Zhang and Meadows 2012).
The results of the hypotheses regarding the valence of foreign countries hold that in any agenda relationship, negative tones affect perceptions
consistently while positive tones have no definite effect (Zhang and Meadows
2012, 86-87). These results bode poorly for countries looking to increase their
support within the U.S. after any negative exposure is given, as they will have to
combat the resistance to change in opinion. For all three of these hypotheses,
the positive relationship is only partially supported.
The final conclusion that can be derived from Zhang and Meadow’s
study (2012) is that media coverage is most influential for foreign countries
in terms of salience. It can also be concluded that the context of a country’s
perception is significant only in terms of negative exposure, and that there is
no relationship regarding foreign countries between policy makers and public
opinion in terms of salience. These findings can be used by foreign countries to
assess and control their perception in the U.S., but they can also be expanded
upon to find causation in order to more fully understand how agenda setting
works within the U.S. in relation to international politics.
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Public Opinion & Territorial Conflict
How is this agenda setting sought out? Is it just publicly opinionated
or are there facts to determine these theories of war and territorial conflict?
Tir (2010, 413) says “[a]ccording to the diversionary theory of war, unpopular
leaders generate foreign policy crises to both divert the public’s attention away
from the discontent with their rule and bolster their political fortunes through
a rally around the flag effect.” Yet it is unclear whether it is an opinion or a fact.
Is this a cause from military? Tir proposed (2010, 413) “the cause of
some militarized conflicts is not a clash of salient interests between countries,
but rather problematic domestic circumstances. I argue that this puzzling lack
of support could be addressed by considering the possibility that the embattled leader may anticipate achieving their diversionary aims specifically
through the initiation of territorial conflict—a phenomenon I call territorial diversion.” Tir and Coser’s (1956, 413) informed the idea on military stance that
“[t]he use of military force is seen in the diversionary literature as attracting the
public’s attention, which, in the face of a perceived threat and via the ingroup,
outgroup mechanism, is in turn expected to translate into a feeling of loyalty
to the state and its leader.” Tir (2010, 413) also argues saying “that territorial
conflicts have a better capacity to elicit feelings of threat and unity than other
issues (e.g., trade, humanitarian intervention), in part because territory speaks
more directly and convincingly to the people’s instincts and their conceptions
of national identity.”
Is there a direct link between diversion and territorial conflict? Tir
(2010, 414) studied that “[i]n the voluminous diversionary literature, no prior
work has directly linked diversions with territorial conflict. In the territorial conflict literature, a connection with the diversionary theory is also not made.” Tir
(2010, 415) going off other works described that “concerns may be lessened
in the context of territorial diversion. First, the power projection capability is
not necessarily an issue because most territorial conflicts take place precisely
between neighboring countries (see Tir 2003; 2006 and Vasquez 1993 for more
details). Tir also stating that “[s]econd, diversionary action has to be perceived
by the population as so important that it is persuaded that the conflict (i.e.,
the diversion) is worth the cost of damaging or even breaking the otherwise
important ties (2010, 415).” This worries the population of countries and causes
an impact on their critical thinking before just jumping right into something.
Can territorial diversion cause advantages for leaders? Tir (2010, 415)
agrees saying “that territorial diversion can provide the leader with certain advantages, which are unlikely to be found in the realm of conflicts over other
issues.” Can land be a factor? Tir (2010, 415) believes “[p]eople have unique and
strong bonds to land, which can be manipulated by the unscrupulous leader
them to mask the true intents of their actions, which include rally effects and
retention of power.”
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The main independent variables throughout the sections follow. Tir
(2010, 418) shows that “[t]he ideal indicator of the diversionary incentive, the
leader’s popularity rating, is either unavailable for a broad range of countries
or cannot be trusted as it is subject to governmental manipulation.” Saying this
shows just how much public opinion can result in the upbringing of leaders
into a country. Tir relies strictly on two indicators. One indicator is that the citizens dissatisfied with the country’s government. Another is to take the country’s growth rate into consideration since the state of the economy, an important predictor of leaders’ popularity.
What could change the outcome? Tir (2010, 419) states saying that
“several influences that have been found to affect the likelihood of dyadic conflict, such as capturing a countries’ relative power.” Tir uses models and research
tables from various people to test different outcomes.
Did ISIS change public opinion on the outcome? Were the beheadings
effective in this cause? Reports show after the ISIS beheadings the American
population showed a dramatic change on the way they feel about this problem. Most Americans’ realistic views say that the U.S government is not doing
what needs to be done to lessen the threat of the terroristic group.
Tir (2010, 422) concludes by explaining how “diversionary works may
have underspecified the inner workings of the diversionary theoretical mechanism, by neglecting to consider that the leader anticipates that the population
may react to territorial issues in ways that are more consistent with the diversionary expectations.” Tir also shows that the diversionary theory has broad
roots that go beyond usual aspects seen or noticed. Tir (2010, 422) states in
his final paragraph stating “[t]his study points to at least two main directions
for future research. First, do territorial diversions actually cause the anticipated
rally effects? Second, forthcoming research should integrate the full scope of
options available to an unpopular leader, such as territorial diversion, diversion
over other issues, repression, implementation of policies to address the underlying grievances, resignation from office, doing nothing, etc.” Finally it should
be safe to say that territorial conflict is heavily urged by the public opinion because they have a bond or close connection to the land in which they live on
or own.
Public Opinion and Influence on U.S. Presidents
How much affect does the public’s opinion have on a president to use
military force in his foreign policy? Baum (2004, 187) writes “public scrutiny can
inhibit U.S. presidents from using force as a foreign tool.”
Baum creates the argument “My argument differs from existing theories of domestic audience costs in two principal ways. First, I argue that audience costs are not always worth the domestic political risk engender, and
hence, leaders will sometimes prefer to avoid them, especially if the strategic
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stakes in a given foreign crisis are relatively modest. And second, I argue that
leaders cannot perfectly control the processes through which audience costs
are, or are not, generated. I explicate both differences, and their implications, in
greater detail below.” (2004, 190)
In Baum’s theory, the public’s attentiveness is the independent variable, and the president’s likelihood to use military force as a foreign policy tool
is the dependent variable. This is a negative relationship, because as the public
attentiveness rises, the president hesitates to use force.
Baum argues by stating “presidents’ preferences regarding public attentiveness will vary under differing circumstances” (2004, 196) to back up this
argument he touches base on the fact that Somalia was considered a “lowstakes” operation for the military, and the public showed little interest.
Baum has examples all throughout his article to support his claim. He
touches base on multiple cases throughout his article. “Operation Restore Hope
spans two administrations and can be usefully divided into four major policy
decisions: (1) the August 1992 decision to forego a ground intervention, in favor of a low-risk humanitarian airlift; (2) the November 1992 decision to launch
a large-scale intervention; (3) the June 1993 decision to escalate the hunt for
Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed; and (4) the autumn 1993 decision to
end the U.S. intervention in Somalia. This provides substantial variation in my
dependent variables (going public and willingness to escalate/use force) and
my key independent variable (public attentiveness), while holding both the
strategic stakes and the probability of success constant (Baum, 2004, 199).”
The point is that Baum is emphasizing that public opinion influences the presidents’ decision making in foreign policy. The press was not heavily covering the situation in Somalia until Bush made a statement about the
situation (Baum 2004, 206). President Bush offered ground troops to lead a
take-over in Somalia; The New York Times and USA Today published between 33
and 38 articles about the statement (2004, 205). The public wanted something
done about the situation in Somalia (2004, 206). Baum claims that President Bill
Clinton ended U.S. involvement in Somalia because the public had a bad taste
in their mouth after certain events.
The big picture here is that after certain events the public opinion
changed, and the president responded accordingly. After the events that inspired the film “Black Hawk Down” incident the American public were divided
and wanted two things: on one hand the public wanted to retrieve the bodies
of the fallen soldiers in Somalia, on the other hand the public wanted to pull
out and leave Somalia to its own fate.
Ideas and Institutions
“What is the most resilient parasite? Bacteria? A virus? An intestinal
worm? An idea. Resilient...highly contagious. Once an idea has taken hold of
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the brain it’s almost impossible to eradicate. An idea that is fully formed - fully
understood - that sticks; right in there somewhere (Internet Movie Database
for Inception, 2010).” Do you think idea-infused, or “missionary” institutions
survive and thrive in a world of bureaucratic politics? Some may state that missionary institutions face tradeoffs between surviving and thriving.
Daniel W. Drezner from the University of Chicago said that “Ideas have
taken a renewed prominence in the international relations literature (Drezner
2000, 733).” Meaning there are several ways through which ideas and theories
are supposed to influence opinions, preferences; and outcomes. One of the
most important ways is that they are instilled into institutions. Many scholars
or professors emphasize constructivism, intellectually discussing and giving
feedback, and other approaches. Goldstein (1993), and Goldstein and Keohane
(1993) have highlighted roles of institutions in pursuing ideational agendas.
That may be true, but there is not a real strategy institutions pursue to survive
and thrive when competing against others.
Bloomfield notes “For it is then that an idea, however morally powerful
and however authentically grounded in the national political epistemology,
encounters the instruments, the forces, and the fallible human beings who
implement…foreign policy programs (1982, 2).” So ideas are relating to the
truth or moral someone has dealing with foreign policy. The idea is always supported, but has unquestionable evidence. With different knowledge between
foreign affairs, one’s ideas could be thwarted.
From a public view, some ask “How do idea-infused institutions survive and thrive ?” Well, containing the placement of one’s institutions in the
foreign policy structure helps to determine their chances of surviving and
thriving. Missionary institutions have to survive with the consistency of their
founding ideas (Drezner 2000, 733).
With the development of a strong organizational culture it will prevent a new missionary institution from compromising with the other agencies
insulated institution and harder to oversee bureaucratic divisions in spreading
its ideas. An, idea-infused institution in a powerful bureaucracy has a lower
chance of surviving with them alone. In the cast of idea-infused institutions
embedded more powerful bureaucracy, there have a lower chance of surviving
in the original form (Drezner 2000, 734).” Embedded institutions would thrive
over time. With testing the two cases with: The United States Peace Corps and
the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Jacobsen 1995). The ideas literature has been unable to disentangle the effect
of ideas from the effect of material interests. Van Evera (1984) implied “previous studies of foreign policy ideas, such the “cult of the offensive”, or, “strategic
trade theory (Goldstein 1993).” Do ideas survive in bureaucratic politics? We
know Allison (1971) studied the different levels of analysis with the description
of organizational interactions. Others (Welch 1992; Hudson and Vose 1995;
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Stern and Verbeek 1998) had different opinions that led to heated debates
about the salience of bureaucratic politics. Their test really was not a theory of
bureaucratic politics. They suggested that, “origins of bureaucratic preferences,
strategies to maximize organization utility, and likely outcomes (Drezner 2000,
734).”
According to Drezner (2000, 737) “Embedded agencies possess a different set of disadvantages and advantages in propagating ideas. Embedded
agencies are located within a larger and more powerful bureaucracy.” So long
term ideas might fight new ideas over time. We measure ideas with polls.
Do people’s ideas change? Yes, because people’s perspective on certain things change one once they get information about a certain subject or
topic that is being discussed.
Do events change public opinion? Yes, before a major event the public
may be behind you on certain foreign policy, but once you do something that
the public doesn’t agree with, their opinion will change quickly. For example,
before the Malaysian Plane was shot down, Vladimir Putin was considered a
good leader. After, the plane crash the public started to dislike him. They saw
an evil side of him. They found that Russia was involved with the downing of
the plane. The U.S. saw different vibe from Putin.
Application of the Literature to the Middle East & Islam
Iraq War
In their article “Poll: Iraq war still unpopular, divisive on 10th anniversary” Peyton M. Craighill and Scott Clement (2013) talk about how the public support for the war in Iraq has decreased. The authors continue by claiming that
the war in Afghanistan is the more popular war. Craighill and Clement (2013)
state “From 2007 to mid-2009, at least half the public said the war [in Afghanistan] was worth the sacrifice. During that same period, about six in 10 said Iraq
was not worth it.” Basically they are saying that the public feels as if the war in
Iraq was unnecessary and not worth the cost, while the war in Afghanistan is.
American Views on ISIS
Americans view ISIS as a major threat. The US government should
focus more attention on this national threat that is being directed across
the country. Citizens of the United States know that ISIS has established
themselves as a very dominant terrorist group that could attack the US and
leave a fatal mark on the country. A poll was taken in late September to see
how Americans felt about the government sending more air strikes to ISIS; in
this poll, 73% of the people agreed more air strikes should be sent, while 23%
disagreed with this idea (Preston 2014).
Many Americans think this will provoke ISIS to do more beheadings
of innocent people, and make matters worse. Another poll taken in
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September to see whether or not U.S. ground troops should be sent to fight
the terrorists. The poll found that 61% of the people opposed this idea of
ground troops, while 38% of the people favored ground troops moving
into ISIS territory to help combat terrorism (Preston 2014). Citizens think
that placing troops on the ground will spark a serious war between the
two countries. The latest poll, taken on November 8, questioned providing
humanitarian aid to those who are trying to flee ISIS; here 83% of the voters
favored this while 16% opposed the idea (Preston 2014).
Americans feel that Syria should be aided with a fresh start in a place
with less violence. At least 7 out of 10 Americans want president Obama to
seek congressional approval before he takes any actions towards ISIS and the
terrorists (Preston 2014). Americans are now keeping a close eye on ISIS to be
prepared if they try to attack just as al-Qaeda did on September 11, 2001.
American Fears of Islam
An example of American fears of Islam comes from Justin O. Smith
(2014). Writing on the blog site “American Thinker” Smith feels that for many
years now violence has become an integral part of the Islamic doctrine. He
claims that the Islamic people have been following the example set by its
Prophet Mohammed, and in the name of Islam and Allah, Muslims have been
murdering innocents, since 656 AD. Years after Mohammed’s death an Islamic
scholar by the name of Khuldan wrote what is known by the Muslims as the
“Muqaddimah.” This writing explains: “In the Muslim community, the holy war
is religious duty, because of the universalism of the Muslim mission and [the
obligation to] convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or force.”
Polling research was conducted worldwide by the respected Program
on International Policy Attitudes of the University of Maryland on the opinion
of attacks against Americans and they are shown below:
61% of Egyptians approve of attacks on Americans
32% of Indonesians approve of attacks on Americans
41% of Pakistanis approve of attacks on Americans
38% of Moroccans approve of attacks on Americans
83% of Palestinians approve of some or most groups that attack Americans
(only 14% oppose)
62% of Jordanians approve of some or most groups that attack Americans
(21% oppose)
42% of Turks approve of some or most groups that attack Americans (45%
oppose)
A minority of Muslims disagreed entirely with terror attacks on Americans:
Egypt 34%; Indonesia 45%; Pakistan 33%.
Smith (2014) also refers back to September 10, 2014 when President
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Barack Obama made assertions stating “that the Islamic State ‘is not Islamic’
and that ‘no religion condones the killing of innocents.’”
American Attitudes towards Islam and an Invasion of Iraq
Studies show that religion has been shown to play a crucial and powerful role in American domestic politics as well as playing an important role
in public opinion related into American foreign policy. It is all in the religious
standpoint, and how you see the invasion and how you see Muslims as a person, also how you and your religion see it.
In December of 2002, there was a table recorded of data of Americans
thoughts on the disarmament of the Iraqis, and Islamists, and the invasion on
Iraq (Smidt 2005, 258). The poll said that 66% of Americans thought that Iraq
were creating weapons of mass destruction and 80% thought the only way
to disarmament Iraq was to completely remove Saddam Hussein (Smidt 2005,
258). About 40% said that they would favor the invasion of Iraq and almost
30% would oppose to the invasion but altogether, all of these 70% said that it
all depended on the events that occurred in the weeks to follow. Lastly, almost
95% of Americans said that the Muslims encourage violence just as much, if not
more than other religions (Smidt 2005, 258).
Corwin Smidt’s article “Religion and American Attitudes toward Islam
and an Invasion of Iraq” states that the tendency in the moralism in foreign
policy is mostly reflected on their presidents and how their president stands on
the matter that is going on. If they see another country that they think can possibly become a threat to the country, they will see how their president reacts,
whether he thinks they pose a threat or whether he thinks they aren’t harming
anything, and then that’s when they make their decision on how they view the
country as well. For example when President Ronald Reagan was in office, he
viewed the Soviet Union as an “Evil Empire” and didn’t like the way things were
going. Also when George W. Bush was in office and the incident happened on
September 11, he saw them as an “axis of evil” and thought that they posed a
huge threat to us and didn’t like it. Once both of these presidents made these
statements on how they felt, the people of the country kind of followed in their
footsteps and started to feel how they felt because that was the leader of their
country.
In the public’s view, before September 11, we had no clue on earth
Iraq was because nobody thought that they posed a threat to the United States
because our president didn’t really say anything about them possibly posing
a threat to harm us. Therefore, nobody in the United States was really worried
about them, much less trying to figure who they were or where they were from
or anything of that nature because nobody really knew who they were. The
public was dependent on their president and he didn’t let them know, so they
were left out to dry when September 11 happened because it was like every184
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thing was coming out of nowhere, like “who is attacking us?,” or “who is hijacking our airplanes and trying to take over our country?”
As this paper has established, this was the act of al-Qaeda, a terrorist
group. Yet this section shows the power of a president’s thoughts. Many were
willing to believe that Iraq was responsible for this, based on words and deeds
by President George W. Bush.
After that happened, more of the United States started to find out a
little more information out about just who Iraq was, whether they were finding this out through the president talking about them, or them being curious
and figuring out themselves. More people were not being so dependent on
their president and just going by what he was telling them, a lot more people
wanted answers quick and wanted to know then.
Now that ISIS has become a big group trying to take over Iraq, more
Americans know more about them, not just from the beheadings that have
gone on or what the president has said about them, but because they have
been familiar with Iraq and they people there trying to overthrow their government the past decade. They have accumulated knowledge from the first time
about ISIS or Iraq.
The public opinion on Iraq and the groups trying to overthrow their
government such as ISIS has changed, but it has been more of a consistent
change; it hasn’t been a drastic change every time something has occurred.
At first when they attacked us, everyone thought “They are evil. Take them out
and that way we will not have to worry about anything.” After we sent troops
over there and started to get everything under control, people started realizing
that the Muslims might not be that bad after all. They might just have a group
or two trying to overthrow their government and they couldn’t do anything
to stop them. Then the beheadings happened and everyone in America hit
the panic button again and started freaking out. Now that some Muslims have
done something like this twice, Americans are starting to think that Muslims
will always be evil and there will never be any change in them no matter what
we do to try to stop them. There are some Americans that are saying that there
are some Muslims that are okay and are fine and they act just like we do, but
there are also some in Iraq that are crazy and that they need to be taken out.
Public opinion will always be something that will change. Whether the
cause of that is an event that goes on or takes place or multiple events that
go on or take place, it will always change. There will also always be a different
opinion coming from our president and leader of our country, which gives the
people of the country another side of the story to see and to change their opinion and how they feel about the situation.
Baiting Americans With Beheadings
A Huffington Post article written by Matthew Hoh (2014) at Huffington
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Post, titled “The Behadings Are Bait,” talks about the worldwide conflict against
ISIS has brought to light a brutal form of punishment, beheadings. As America
has been at war with Iraq and Afghanistan for the past decade, we have seen
Iraqi and Afghan militias brutally mutilate bodies of our soldiers, but the beheadings are not only new to us but are being used as a form of “bait” to try and
get a reaction out of our media and government. “The Islamic State is a parasite
of war. Its members and its narrative need war for their personal, organizational
and ideological validation and success (Hoh, 2014).” To eliminate the threat of
ISIS beheading more of the world’s innocent people, we must take away their
resources and take the war away from them. At this point we are playing into
our enemies hands. We have to stop taking the bait and understand that in the
grand scale of things, the beheadings should be looked at as bait.
Adam Taylor, who wrote “From Daniel Pearl to James Foley: The Modern Tactic of Islamist Beheadings,” talks about beheadings being a part of the
Middle Eastern culture. “The religious and cultural symbolism that the sword
carries with it in the eyes of the Muslims, particularly in the Middle East, is an
important factor in determining the terrorists’ choice to behead hostages (Taylor, 2014).”
The Significance of Beheadings for Islamic Groups
Islamic extremist groups have employed harsh scare tactics as a method of grabbing the world’s attention for hundreds of years. Recently, they have
turned back to an incredibly harsh and bloody ploy—decapitation—to get
their point across. Their justification for this comes from historic practices of the
Ottoman Empire and a Qur’an verse that quite literally translates to “when you
meet the unbelievers, smite their necks.” These are just a few of the points that
Timothy Furnish, an assistant professor of history at Georgia Perimeter College
in Atlanta, touches on in his article called “Beheading in the Name of Islam.”
He goes on to explain the significance of the Mahdi, and that, “according to Islamic tradition, the Mahdi, or ‘rightly-guided one’ will come before the
end of time to usher in a worldwide, perfect Islamic state (Furnish 2005).” Many
of the Islamic groups we see performing these beheadings believe that their
religious leader is the Mahdi. In the Mahdi’s mind, perfect justice needs to be
wrought on the infidels, and perfect justice can only be carried out by following the directions laid out in the Qur’an literally. What this means for the current Islamic groups is beheadings.
Psychological Significance of Beheadings on the American Public
Terrorism is unique from other forms of violence in that it has a larger
intention than its effect on the victim. As described by Strom and Irvin (2007),
terroristic violence “is used to send a message of intimidation beyond the immediate victims to a wider target group of secondary victims” with the inten186
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tion of creating “lasting effects far beyond the immediate incident, including long-term psychological and economic repercussions.” Because terrorist
groups do not have the means to physically threaten a national audience, they
must use psychological warfare to assert themselves.
Beheadings are useful to terrorists because only one victim is needed,
although a community-wide audience can be reached. With enough planning,
victims can be deliberately chosen to affect the largest community possible
and gain as much attention as possible. This is achieved more so with beheadings than any other form of execution because of the gruesome image it implants. In the case of James Foley’s beheading, an execution video was released
online by the terrorist group ISIS and made its way to Facebook and Twitter
before it was completely taken down, although it is still accessible through less
regulated sites (Stelter 2014b). Minimalizing the psychological effects of these
mass viewings can be more difficult than managing the effects of a natural
disaster’s trauma according to Grossman and Siddle’s work (2008) “Psychological effects of combat.” They propose that “the ultimate fear and horror in most
modern lives is to be raped, tortured, or beaten; to be physically degraded in
front of loved ones or to have the sanctity of the home invaded by aggressive
and hateful intruders (Grossman and Siddle 2008).”
Certainly viewers of beheadings vicariously experience the physical
degradation of the victim, if only for as long as the video lasts, as well as the
sense of being invaded as an American by aggressive and hateful intruders,
which can continue for days, weeks, months after the experience. Continued
fear felt from a significant experience such as this can ultimately be diagnosed
as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The article describes this reaction
to “intentional, overt, ‘human’ hostility and aggression” as a “universal human
phobia” that “assaults the self-image, sense of control, and ultimately, the mental and physical health of human beings (Grossman and Siddle, 2008).” Through
the videos, American viewers are mentally brought to the battlefield and sent
home without a debriefing, left to deal with the jarring images themselves. In
this fashion, terrorists can reach beyond the borders of their countries and instill fear not only in the soldiers on the frontline but also the civilians of the
home front.
Data Results
Findings From Iraq
If we compare polls taken over time to the timeline of events, we can
find how much of an impact (if it all) events have on public opinion. A Gallup
Poll collected data over a time span of seven years from mid-2003 to mid-2007
with 35 different measurements. The sample population was asked the question, “In general, how would you say things are going for the U.S. in Iraq?” The
potential options were: “Very well, moderately well, moderately badly, (or) very
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badly” (Gallup 2010). In this study, the portion of the sample that answered
either moderately or very badly is going to be used in concert with dates of
beheadings and killings of Americans in Iraq by al-Qaeda and affiliates to ascertain if events affected the public opinion significantly.
First, the data was processed to find the mean and standard deviation in order to see what time periods were significantly different in opinion.
Over the timeline, the average opinion that things were going moderately/very
badly is 50.33%. The standard deviation from this is 12.26%, so that time periods of significantly higher negative opinions have 62.59% or more and those
significantly lower have 38.07% or less. Using these numbers, we can find what
time periods had a significantly higher or lower percentage of people who
thought Operation Iraqi Freedom was going moderately or very badly. Those
periods one standard deviation or more above the mean indicate a more negative public opinion about U.S. involvement in Iraq; those periods one deviation
or more below the mean indicate a more positive public outlook about U.S.
involvement.
The comparison shows that at no point did a collection of six killings
over time affect the overall opinion about the affairs in Iraq. The first event used,
Nicholas Berg’s death, occurred on May 11 2004 (BBC 2004). The poll showed a
negative opinion of 57%, about six percentage points shy of being significantly
above the mean, (or more negative than usual). The next was Paul Johnson Jr.
during June of 2004 with a negative public opinion of 60%, which is 3% closer
to being significantly high (Toledo Blade 2004). However, this trend stops at Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley’s death releases on September 20 and 21,
2004 with 52%. There is a reported lull between Hensley’s death and the next
American death reported by an Islamic insurgent group (NBC News 2005). During this period, public opinion did not become more positive (or become closer
to a deviation below the mean) but stayed relatively close to the average. The
next reported death was Ronald Schulz’s on August 12, 2005. The next set of
numbers taken after this killing was not until October 21, but they showed an
insignificant rise of 57%. On June 8, 2006 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader allegedly responsible for all the deaths mentioned above, was reported dead after an American air raid. Public opinion at this time was measured at 53%, only
3% above the average. His death, nor any of these deaths, influenced public
opinion to show that things in Iraq were going moderately or very badly.
The only points at which public opinion about Iraq was significantly
negative were April of 2004, October of 2006, and January of 2007. The only
points at which public opinion was significantly positive was April, May, and
June of 2003, the first three measurements taken for the overall poll. Otherwise, somewhere between 38% and 63% of all poll participants thought at any
time that things in Iraq were either moderately or very badly. These numbers
could not be raised by killings of Americans nor lowered by the killing of a ma188
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jor al- Qaeda affiliate. The hypothesis that foreign affairs have an impact on
public opinion was proven false through this study.
If we compare polls taken over time to the timeline of events, we can
find how much of an impact (if it all) events have on public opinion. A Gallup
Poll collected data over a time span of seven years from mid-2003 to mid-2007
with 35 different measurements. The sample population was asked the question, “In general, how would you say things are going for the U.S. in Iraq -- [ROTATED: very well, moderately well, moderately badly, (or) very badly]?” (Gallup
2010). In this study, the portion of the sample that answered either moderately
or very badly is going to be used in concert with dates of beheadings and killings of Americans in Iraq by al-Qaeda and affiliates to ascertain if events affected the public opinion significantly.
First, the data was processed to find the mean and standard deviation in order to see what time periods were significantly different in opinion. Over the
timeline, the average opinion that things were going moderately/very badly
is 50.33%. The standard deviation from this is 12.26%, so that time periods of
significantly higher negative opinions have 62.59% or more and those significantly lower have 38.07% or less. Using these numbers, we can find what time
periods had a significantly higher or lower percentage of people who thought
Operation Iraqi Freedom was going moderately or very badly. Those periods
one standard deviation or more above the mean indicate a more negative public opinion about U.S. involvement in Iraq; those periods one deviation or more
below the mean indicate a more positive public outlook about U.S. involvement.
The comparison shows that at no point did a collection of six killings
over time affect the overall opinion about the affairs in Iraq. The first event
used, Nicholas Berg’s death, occurred on May 11 2004 (BBC 2004). The poll
showed a negative opinion of 57%, about 6% shy of being significantly above
the mean, (or more negative than usual). The next was Paul Johnson Jr. during
June of 2004 with a negative public opinion of 60%, which is 3% closer to being significantly high (Toledo Blade 2004). However, this trend stops at Eugene
Armstrong and Jack Hensley’s death releases on September 20 and 21, 2004
with 52% negative toward the Iraq invasion. There is a reported lull between
Hensley’s death and the next American death reported by an Islamic insurgent
group (NBC News 2005). During this period, public opinion did not become
more positive (or become closer to a deviation below the mean) but stayed
relatively close to the average. The next reported death was Ronald Schulz’s on
August 12, 2005. The next set of numbers taken after this killing was not until
October 21, but they showed an insignificant rise up to 57% (against the Iraq
War). On June 8, 2006 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader allegedly responsible
for all the deaths mentioned above, was reported dead after an American air
raid. Public opinion at this time was measured at 53% opposed to Operation
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Iraqi Freedom, only 3% above the average. His death, nor any of these deaths
of victims, impacted public opinion that things in Iraq were going moderately
or very badly.
The only points at which public opinion about Iraq was significantly
negative was April of 2004, October of 2006, and January of 2007. The only
points at which public opinion was significantly positive was April, May, and
June of 2003, the first three measurements taken for the overall poll. Otherwise, somewhere between 38% and 63% of all poll participants thought at any
time that things in Iraq were either moderately bad or very bad. These numbers could not be raised by killings of Americans nor lowered by the killing of
a major al-Qaeda leader. The hypothesis that foreign affairs have an impact on
public opinion was not supported through this study.
Results Concerning American Views On Islam
In this research we were trying to see if Islamic Religion were more likely to encourage violence among its believers or not encourage violence among
it’s believers. Our group chose to talk about Islamic without the violence. As
we researched different dates, the percentage of non-violence decreased as
well as it increased. The lowest percentage of viewing Islam as non-violent was
recently in 9/2-9/14 which was 39%. The highest percentage of seeing Islam
as non-violent came from 3/x/2002. The mean that we came up with was the
43.58333333, and the standard deviation was 4.212250652.
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In this research, we looked to see if the Islamic religion has influenced
U.S. public opinion based off of its actions over the past decade or so. Pollsters
have asked the public the same question starting in 2002 and have asked it
almost every year up until most recently in September of 2014. The question
that was asked was “Which statement is closer to your views, even if neither is
exactly right: The Islamic religion is more likely than others to encourage violence among its believers, or: The Islamic religion does not encourage violence
more than others.” We found that the average responses indicating that the
Islamic religion is more likely to encourage violence from 2002 through 2014
were 40.17 percent. The standard deviation was calculated to be 6.22. This
indicates that those responses that are one standard deviation above the mean
were 46.38, while those that are a full standard deviation below the mean were
at 33.95.
We checked to see if world events have influenced U.S. public policy
on whether or not the Islamic religion is more likely to encourage violence than
others. As we can see the latest survey was taken between 9/2/14 and 9/9/14
and turned out to the highest percentage of people who agree that the Islamic
religion is more likely to encourage violence. This may very well be a result of
the ongoing conflicts between ISIS and the United States. But having said that,
we do not have significant evidence that the Islamic religion has encouraged
violence and affected public opinion. The year after the terrorist attacks on
9/11/ 2001, we would think that public opinion would have agreed that the
Islamic religion encourages violence, but the survey responses show the opposite with only 25 percent saying it encourages violence at that time.
The theory that world events influence public opinion is not supported. Public opinion was not dramatically increased or decreased by Islamic
events. If we tested the theory again at a later date we may see more trends
in the public opinion surveys. As the crisis with ISIS continues the public may
be more or less influenced to believe that the Islamic religion encourages violence.
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Conclusion
This data set is meant to express the opinions of different people in
regards to how likely Islam is to encourage violence and how that opinion has
changed with the rise of terrorism. To gather the information, the Pew Research
Center (2014) looked at polling data from 2002 to 2014. It came to our attention
that as time went on, especially after the threat of ISIS became public knowledge, only 39% of people believed that Islam did not encourage violence. The
mean public opinion response of people that believe Islam does not encourage violence is only 43%, with a standard deviation of 4.2%.
It is important to understand how significant of an impact the threat
of terror can have on public opinion. In most cases, a steep drop in the mean
public opinion was in response to a terrorist threat or occurrence. In 2004, for
example, there are nearly hundreds of documented terrorist incidents. This was
also the year with the lowest recorded public opinion response of 37%. The correlation between these two variables cannot be ignored.
Public opinion can, and always will be, changed by the events of the
time. Before terrorist threats became a part of everyday life, it was hard for the
layperson to view Islam as a religion that encouraged violence. That’s why in
2002 only 25% of people viewed Islam as a violent religion, and by 2014 that
percentage doubled to 50. And while the religion of Islam itself is not necessarily violent, it is easy for people to confuse it with the intentions of terror groups.
Our research concludes that the beheadings of Jeremy Foley and Steven Sotloff did increase the American public opinion to believe that Islam does encourage violence.
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