Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West
Cultural and Economic Studies
The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies
Volume 1 | Issue 1
Article 2
November 1994
Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian
mandala
R. James Ferguson
Bond University, [email protected]
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm
Recommended Citation
Ferguson, R. James (1994) "Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala," Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre
for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol1/iss1/2
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Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
Abstract
Extract:
R. James Ferguson (1994) The overlapping interconnections and conflicting interests within Southeast Asia
can puzzle the outsider as well as complicate rational policy formation and diplomatic initiatives. This trend
has probably increased since the end of the Cold War: with the downplaying of older geostrategic
considerations based on superpower rivalries, Southeast Asia is marked by uncertainty and complexity at all
levels be they international, regional or national.
Keywords
mandala, international relations, culture, politics, government policy
This article is available in Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies:
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol1/iss1/2
Ferguson: Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
by R. ~ a m e sFerguson
'A wise nation will make sure that its survival and
well-being are in the interests of other states.'
Lee Hsien Loong, quoted by Leifer 1987,
p55, in Lim 1990, p144
A Complex Periphery or a Complex
Centre?
The overlapping interconnections and
conflicting interests within Southeast Asia can
puzzle the outsider as well as complicate
rational policy formation and diplomatic
initiatives. This trend has probably increased
since the end of the Cold War: with the downplaying of older geostrategic considerations
based on superpower rivalries, Southeast Asia
is marked by 'uncertainty and complexity at
all levels be they international, regional or.
national' (Snitwongse 1992, p258).
The problem is a political as well as an
academic one. As noted by Colin MackerraxChina may have been a single state, but
given the diversity within Southeast Asia,
historians have debated whether the region
can be considered as a unit of study at all.
Indeed, for a long time, Southeast Asia was
seen as being shaped by external
influences - first Indian, Persian, Islamic or
Chinese and later European. Studies since
World War 11, and especially the
independence of its countries, have
accorded the region its autonomous
identity and there is now an increased
sensitivity to the cultural distinctiveness of
the region as a whole and to its component
parts. (Mackerras 1992, plO8)
There are several cognitive paths to escape the
apparent complexity of the different nations,
states, peoples and languages in this diverse
region. One path is to regard it as part of the
periphery for larger civilizations, whether for
the penetration of Hinduism and Buddhism
from India and Ceylon, for Chinese influence
and population shifts from the north, or
impacted by Western colonialism and
modernization. Each of these models
trivialises both the importance and
originality of the cultures of the region. The
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attempt to view Southeast Asia either as part
of a 'Greater India', in cultural terms, or a
'Greater China', in economic terms, does
disclose certain realities. However, by
approaching the region from these adjacent
civilizations there is a danger of stereotyping
and oversimplification. Looking at Southeast
Asia through the prism of the value systems
and history of one of these great cultures will
result in a distorted and limited recognition of
ihdigenous developments. The region will also
tend to be interpreted through the gains and
losses, hopes and fears of external interests.
Even in historic terms, recent archaeological
work has indicated that indigenous Southeast
Asian cultures, though stimulated by Indian
religion and Chinese culture, had already
developed high levels of complexity and
centralization by 500 B.C. (Higham 1989,
pp307-8, p317; Wolters 1982, p9, ppll-12).
Alternatively, it is possible to raise the
spectre of Indochina as a natural geographicai
and economic unit, citing the orientation of the
Mekong, Red, Salween and Irrawaddy Rivers
i n their predominantly north-south
orientation, and the structure of the peninsula
and its coastlines as facilitating naval
communications. Such a view is tempting in
that a number of regional NETS (Natural
Economic Territories) and economic growth
circles have been identified as crossing
national borders, e.g. in the upper Mekong
linking Thailand and Southern China (for
more detail, see "Trading Ideas on the
Mekong", a Conference Report in this Bulletin),
as well heavy investment by Singapore in the
Johore region of Malaysia and Riau province in
Indonesia (Snitwongse 1992, p276). This
approach simply replaces the complexity of
national borders with the complexity of
different economic subzones, none of which
embraces all of Southeast Asia.
This search for regional understanding also
raises the dreaded question of regional
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Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
hegemony. An analysis of the real balance of
interests and intentions of Southeast Asian
nations does not provide a clearly dominant
power, at least for the present. Vietnam's
attempt to assert political solutions even in one
country, i.e. Cambodia, was expensive and, in
the face of Chinese and international
resistance, unsustainable. No single country in
the region clearly outstrips the power of its
major neighbours, though Indonesia has been
touted as the 'sole possible local hegemon in
the long run' (Emmerson and Simon 1993, p35).
Indonesia in the future might have the
potential, if not the will, for such a role. It is
important here to distinguish diplomatic
leadership, as might be demonstrated by
initiatives through organizations such as
ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian
Nations), and the clear dominance asserted by
a genuinely hegemonic power. In fact Thailand
and Malaysia would not be happy with such
a n outcome, and it is not likely within the
context of ASEAN that one local nation would
be allowed to assert its wishes too directly on
the members, even if it had the power to do so.
During the Vietnam War the U.S.A., in
conjunction with regional players such as South
Vietnam and Australia, was unable to assert
its power over the region without suffering
unacceptable economic, human, and prestige
losses. Traditional hegemonic models, (contra
Emmerson and Simon 1993), do not provide'
realistic historical or future-directed accounts
of the region.
A third approach is to hunt back into the past
to the largest dominant indigenous
civilization, and see the current map of
Southeast Asia as little more than a
fragmentation and decline from this 'base'.
Angkor perhaps, best fits this role as a
civilization which had devolved at an early
stage into regional power centred on the Tonle
Sap region and sustaining itself from A.D. 8021431 (Higham 1989, p320). Once again, this
perspective, though cognitively elegant, fails
to do justice to the wide range of peoples and
influences in Southeast Asia over the last two
millenia. The wax and wane of regionally
powerful kingdoms is itself complex, and
should take into account prominent dynasties
including Thai kingdoms, e.g. Sukhothai
(Sukhodaya, 1253-1378 A.D.), the Ayuthia
(Ayutthaya 1350-1767 A.D.) and the Bangkok-based kingdom (1767 onwards through the
modernizing reforms of King Chulalongkorn
1869-1910);complex Malay sultanates focussing
on Malacca (1400-1511); the Lan Xang kingdom
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of Laos; the Cambodian kingdom of Angkor
(803-1432 A.D.); several Vietnamese dynasties
from 938 A.D. (Gurney 1986, pp232-310;
Tambiah 1976, pp73-158; Higham 1989, pp321353, as well as powerful Javanese kingdoms
including the fourteenth century domain of
~ a j a ~ a h which
it
included Java, most of
Sumatra and other islands (Wolters 1982, p17;
Hall 1981, pp47-104). Furthermore, the
historical 'map' comprises a complex rise and
decline of powers which never quite embrace
the entire region. As such, historically,
subregional themes and complex local cultural
systems cannot be dismissed, even though
certain elements of political and cultural
organization were shared (Wolters 1982, p31,
p51).
A more fruitful approach to cope with this
complexity is to invert certain aspects of the
centre-periphery model. The centre-periphery
approach gained popularity with comparative
sociologists and neo-Marxists alike, and has
been applied to the Third World as well as to
Europe (Groom 1992, p43). From this
perspective a number of great civilizations
arise as foci of wealth, technology and social
organization, with their influence radiating
dut into adjacent regions, which are often
dependent on the core culture. Power from the
centre controls adjacent regions, semiperipheries and finds limitation on boundaries
determined by natural, cultural or political
barriers. The implications of this model are
quite clear. Tight control and power is held at
the centre, at least initially, and radiates out
and influences both distant territories and
foreign lands beyond. At the periphery, control
is less certain, borders may become permeable,
and a complexity of power regimes may exist
beyond the frontier. Furthermore, cultural,
technological and trade influences radiate
beyond the border. There is always the danger
of overextension, or if a strong opponent is
beyond the border, of the need to position
powerful military forces and sizeable economic
resources on the frontier. Certain smaller
centres of relative independence may be termed
'semi-periphery', and fluctuate between the
possibility of becoming new cores or wane to
become dependent parts of the periphery. Both
these trends can lead to centrifugal forces
which in the end collapse the centre. Such
models have been applied both to the sudden
fall of Mycenaean civilization, and to
different stages of strategic defense in the
Roman Empire (Renfrew 1989, pp133-135;
Luttwak 1976). More recently, it is possible to
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Ferguson: Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
see centrifugal nationalistic and ethnic forces
as contributing factors in the collapse of the
Soviet Union. There has also been speculation
in the West about Beijing's effective ability to
act as a dominant centre while much of China
undergoes radical economic reform, especially
in the south (Shambaugh 1994, p43). From this
perspective, it is understandable that the
concept of Chinese territorial integrity and
internal unity remains deeply rooted in
Chinese cultural traditions and a major focus of
their views on security (Pye and Pye 1985, p64;
Shambaugh 1994, pp45-46).
It is not possible to find in Southeast Asia one
traditional, unified controlling centre.
Interpretations written from specificperspectives, as noted above, have viewed the
region as a periphery of great civilizations
such as India or China, or the product of great
religious movements which were imported into
the region, e.g. Hinduism, Buddhism and
Islam. This approach, however, conflates
several perspectives. From a specifically
Eurasian perspective, the early modem period
displayed a number of discrete zones of power
in Europe, India, China and Southeast Asia (cf
Jones 1987). More importantly, Southeast Asia
is a complex overlapping of peripheries which
allowed zones of regional autonomy to develop,
both in the ancient kingdoms of the region, and
in the modem period of emerging nation-states.
Inverting the core-periphery model, I would
argue that so-called peripheries are often
crucial to the dynamics of adjacent 'core'
societies - the periphery are regions of
exchange, and often regions of military
challenge and of possible over-extension. The
periphery can be reinterpreted as a 'centre' of
interaction. From this perspective, Southeast'
Asia is a complex centre of interaction. The
power and influence of adjacent great powers
provide a fluctuating environment within
which regional issues and national goals are
pursued. External determinants are therefore
major factors in foreign policy for the states of
the region (Korany 1990, ~291,but do not
directly determine policy or national goals.
The Southeast Asian region acts as an
interesting geographical and political nexus
between several major blocks of power. Within
Asia itself, economic and military powers
include China and Japan to the north and India
to the west. To the east, the U.S.A. maintains
a major 'Pacific' presence as a military and
naval superpower, as a strong economic
investor, and as one of the arbiters of regional
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stability, even if this is defined within the
terms of its own interests. China's role in the
region is well known - as well as claims to the
Spratlys in the South China Sea, China has
strong economic and political interests in
Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand. China has
seen herself as a major balancer in political
a n d military conflicts, including past
restrictions on Vietnam's power, and a related
involvement in supporting the Khmer Rouge in
the Cambodian civil war. Since 1979, China
has normalized her relations with most of the
Southeast Asian states, but her economic and
security policies remain a focus of regional
concern (see below). The Soviet Union, in its
contests against both American and Chinese
interests, had once been a major military and
economic presence, e.g. it is estimated that
during 1978-85 Soviet aid in the vicinity of
US$ 2 billion had helped Vietnam support its
intervention in Cambodia (Porter 1990, p230).
Russia's current interests and abilities in the
area are now much more limited, though Cam
Ranh Bay is still operational, and Russia has
a possible role in helping balance limited
Vietnamese naval capability against Chinese
dominance in the South China Sea (Harris
1997, p18). Nor should Indian interests and
potentialities in the region be discounted. In
the 1980's India proceeded on a major naval
build-up which sparked Malaysian and
Australian concerns, though financial
restraints have greatly slowed this
augmentation (Snitwongse 1992, pp264-5;
Thomas 1993, p9, p48). Capability, of course,
does not directly indicate intention (Harris
1993, p28), and it is possible that India is more
concerned with maintaining a presence in
regional waters and with the potential to
project power 'to deal with long-term threats
as yet ill-defined' (Thomas 1993, p46). This
includes the potential to cope with unstable
conditions in the Middle East and Southeast
Asia (Thomas 1993, p47), though Pakistan and
her friendships to the West are of more
immediate concern. Nonetheless, cooperation
with Indian strategic concerns, less
complicated after a certain thawing in IndoU.S. relations, is one path to both reduce
threat perceptions of Indian naval power and
provide a westward balance for the region.
This Indian presence could act as a counter to
Chinese increases in naval power in the longterm (Thomas 1993, pp53-4; Buszynski 1992-3,
p95).
Within the nexus of geography and interests of
these major powers, Southeast Asia forms a
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Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
region of interactive complexity which
interlinks with the economic and security
concerns of adjacent regions. It must be stressed
that this region cannot be considered as a
simple 'buffer' or transition zone. Southeast
Asia, considered as a whole, has too great a
population, too much potential in terms of
future economic and military power (even if
never unified) to be viewed simply as a
periphery. The region has sizeable mineral
and petroleum resources, as well as major
agricultural and marine-resources potential.
With a population of over 454 million (based
on 1990 estimations, see Krien 1992), the region
will need to continue economic and educational
transformations to ensure basic standards of
living for its growing demographic base.
The question that can then be asked is how this
complex and strategically significant 'centre'
can be understood. Furthermore, the changing
economic and strategic patterns of the region, of
the adjacent South and East Asia zones opens
up the possibility of useful initiatives towards
the 'making of a new Southeast Asia' (Jawhar
1992, p295). Here, Mohamed Jawhar has
rightly noted that 'region-wide engagement in
Southeast Asia' is worth promoting, and that
'the region also makes for a natural
geostrategic entity bounded by the major
regional powers of China to the north, India to
the northwest, and Australia and the South
Pacific island chain to the southeast' (Jawhar
1992, p297). These boundary regions, however,
can be treated in an inclusive manner without
blurring regional imperatives. This can be done
by reconceptualizing Southeast Asia through
three traditional concepts found in Asian
international relations theory. These are the
political conceptions of mandalas, galacticpolities, and tribute systems.
Mandalas, Galactic Polity and Tribute
Three conceptions drawn from ancient Asian
views of international relations can help
reconceptualize relationships in the region.
The mandala concept, derived from Hindu and
Buddhist thought, provides one path of coping
with complex layers of power without rigid
borders. A related concept has been formulated
by S.J. Tambiah as the notion of g a l a c t i c
p o l i t y , in which numerous foci of relative
power interact dynamically. The t r i b u t e
s y s t e m refers to traditional patterns of
diplomatic relations and deference between
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stronger and weaker powers, in which the
weaker power often gains direct material
benefits. This pattern of relations is sometimes
called the 'tributary system' (see Borthwick
1992, p30).
These notions share the advantage of going
beyond bilateral or even trilateral studies of
regional power and foreign relations. One
interesting analysis of trilateralism in
Southeast Asia, focusing on S E A N - Japanese
- US. relations, discovered that the issues
became quite complex inJerms of 'theory and
practise', but that trilateralism was at least
partially feasible in the light of
complementary economic and strategic
capabilities (Nathan and Pathmanathan
1986, p189). At the same time, strong
differences in national interest priorities were
noted (Nathan and Pathmanathan 1986, p195)
and the fact that other regional players
needed to be taken into account meant that even
Japanese and American goals could not be
readily accommodated via a straightforward
convergence with ASEAN's interests. Here, a
greater level of complexity needs to be
provided for than that found in a triangle of
relations. This can be developed through the
political conception of the mandala.
Basically, a m a n d a l a is a 'diagram of
relationships' (Mackerras 1992, p94; also
discussed by Martin Lu in his article in this
Bulletin, see pp4-5). The mandala concept was
systematically developed i n the ancient
Indian political text, the A r t h a s a s f r a . As
summarized by Colin Mackerras: The mandala best known to the West
refers to those sacred diagrams of Buddhas
identified with the four or eight directions
depicted in Tibetan Buddhism. But the
word has a more general application in that
it defines a set of spatial relationships
around some central point, hence its
meaning as 'wheel' or 'rim' or
'circumference'. In the Indian political
treatise known as the Arthasastra, ascribed
to the fourth century B.C.sage Kautilya,
the term mandala is used to refer to the
circle of surrounding kingdoms with which
a ruler must necessarily enter into
relationships to ensure the security of his
own realm. Adjoining kingdoms are taken
as potential enemies; those beyond again
as potential friends with whom common
cause can be made to limit the ambitions
of common enemies.
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Ferguson: Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
Mandala in this sense stands as a
model of interstate relations. It was used by
O.W. Wolters in a paper published in 1968
to illustrate the way in which statecraft was
practised between Southeast Asian
kingdoms. In a later influential study,
Wolters modified the meaning to refer to
polities themselves as those which
originated prior to and developed
subsequent to the introduction of Indian
influence. (Mackerras 1992, p95)
In his 1982 study, O.W. Wolters described
mandalas in the following way:
-
In practice, the mandala (a Sanskrit term.
used in Indian manuals of government)
represented a particular and often
unstable political situation in a vaguely
definable geographical area without fixed
boundaries and where smaller centres
tended to look in all directions for security.
Mandalas would expand and contract in
concertina-like fashion. Each one
contained several tributary rulers, some of
whom would repudiate their vassal status
when the opportunity arose and try to build
up their own networks of vassals. Only the
mandala overlord had the prerogative of
receiving tribute-bearing envoys; he
himself would despatch officials d o
represented his superior status. (Wolters
1982, p17)
One of the main expositions of mandalas as
conceptions of statecraft is found in Kautilya's
Arthasastra. The central importance of the
ideas of Kautilya is that they deal 'with how
to conquer and govern an empire' and 'sets out a'
major theoretical analysis of international
relations as an integral part of the problems of
statecraft' (Watson 1992, pp78-9). This book
was not entirely of theoretical interest: it
described the complex and fragmented nature
of India during the fourth century B.C. It is
likely that Kautilya's doctrines directly
influenced Chandragupta, who established
the Mauryan Empire which came to
incorporate much of northern and central India
circa 325 B.C. (Watson 1992, p78). Kautilya
was a minister in Chandragupta's government
(Higham 1989, p243).
For Kautilya the elements of sovereignty were
'the king, the minister, the country, the fort,
the treasury, the army, the permanent ally
(and also the permanent enemy)' (Tambiah
1976, p51). When extended to nearby and
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remote kingdoms, however, a total of 72
variable components emerged as elements of
state power (Watson 1992, p79). This included
'four primary Circles of States, twelve kings,
sixty elements of sovereignty, and seventy-two
elements of states' (Arthasastra 261). Beyond
the neighbouring enemy was the enemy's
enemy, who thereby became a friend.
Interestingly, for Kautilya the 'enemy who is
equally of high birth [i.e. i s an equally
legitimate ruler] and rules a territory next to
that of the conqueror is a natural enemy' (in
Watson 1992, p80). Of particular interest are
two other types of international relationship
identified by Kautilya:
-
The king who occupies a territory
close to both the conqueror and his
immediate enemy in front and who is
capable of helping both kings, whether
united or disunited, or of resisting either of
them individually is termed a Madhyama
(mediatory) king.
He who is situated beyond the
territory of any of the above kings, and who
is very powerful and capable of helping the
enemy, the conqueror, and the Madhyama
king, together or individually, or of resisting
any of them individually, is a neutral king
(udasina) . . . (Arthasastm 261; see a similar
translation in Watson 1992, p80).
Even if the term 'king' is substituted with the
more general notion of 'government', the
Arthasastra remains a n informative treatise
i n statecraft. A n implication of these
extending circles of states is that a ruler needs
to actively gather political and military
intelligence from a n extremely wide region
stretching beyond his immediate neighbours.
Kautilya spends several chapters describing a
wide range of types of spies, the use of intrigue,
and the verification of intelligence through an
institute of espionage (Arthasastra 16-22).
Furthermore, some ancient Southeast Asian
leaders indeed d i d h a v e far-reaching
interstate contacts, e.g. an Angkorian king of
the 11th century was in communication with
the Tamil king of southern India as well as
with the Vietnamese court (Wolters 1982, p18).
Likewise, in 1592 the Thai king of Ayudhya
was willing to favour the Chinese court by
offering to invade Japan, which was then
attacking Korea and threatening Chinese
interests (Wolters 1982, p18). It is unlikely
that such an invasion was elther possible or
seriously entertained - the aim, rather, was to
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Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
embarrass the Japanese at the level of formal
state relations.
Bearing in mind the fluid and complex
relations of these mandala polities,
diplomacy, interpreted as means of influence.
and persuasion, was an essential tool of
government. As noted by O.W. Wolters: The other governmental skill required of a
successful mandala overlord was one of
diplomacy. He had to be able to dispossess
his rivals of their claims to space in their
own right, bring them under his personal
influence, and accommodate them within a
network of loyalties to himself, even though
they often lived in distant areas.
Administrative power as distinct from
sacral authority depended on the
management of personal relationships,
exercised through the royal prerogative of
investiture. . . . No clear distinction was
made between the purpose and conduct of
"internal" and "external" relations.
(Wolters 1982, p18)
Likewise, one of the notable elements of the
work of Kautilya is its emphasis on the
importance of economic activity as 'the basis
and support of the social and cultural orders'
(Tambiah 1976, p29). In fact the very title
'Arthashastra', commonly rendered as the
Book of the State (Watson 1992, p78) can be
translated as 'political economy' in the broad
sense (Tambiah 1976, p28). Although the
Arthashnstra regards war and strategic
interests as an essential component of
international relations, it also seeks peace in
preference to war, which is expensive in terms
of money and human beings, and where possible
economic means, even bribery and subversion,
are preferred paths to political goals (Watson
1992, p82). Kautilya also s p e n d s time
discussing how the riches, manufactures,
harvests, water resources, population a n d
villages controlled by the king can be increased
(Arthasastra 45-47, 62, 81-2). Mining is also
given close attention, since 'Mines are the
source of treasury; from treasury comes the
power of government' (Arthasastra 85). It also
argues that the happiness and wclfare of a '
king's subjects are essential to the power of a
state (Arthasastra 39).
Emerging mandalas in ancient Southeast Asia
a l s o relied o n 'monumentality a n d
magnificence' in temple and palace structures
( H i g h a m 1989, p263) and on carefully
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controlled ritual displays which emphasized
the wealth, power and prestige of the
averload (Higham 1989, p352). Here ritual and
the notion of a 'theatre-state' came together to
reinforce the power of a central domain and a
central ruler (Wolters 1982, p97; cf Anderson
1972 and Geertz 1982). Although the overlord
would try to monopolize the 'means of
destruction', this was not the prime means of
asserting his rule. As noted by Higham,
speaking of the rulers of Angkor : It was more effective to retain a hold on the
provinces by attracting the devotion of
regional landowners and spiritual leaders
than by coercion. Alienation of supporters
was not good government. The king was
everyman. He mediated with heaven for
the provision of rains, he was available for
mediation between individuals over
disputes. Metaphorically, he consumed the
land for goods, and redistributed them
among his retainers and servants. He
despatched his officials to all parts of his
m a n d a l a to gather information and
undertake his requirements. He patronised
the great aristocratic families and, in
return, anticipated their loyalty. The notion
of the mandala was abroad. The universal
ruler occupied the centre, and its
perimeter was represented by the ebb and
flowof shades of influence. Obeisance, not
border posts, defined boundaries. (Higham
1989, p342)
Indeed, Higham argues that one of the main
threads of continuity running through ancient
Southeast Asian cultural development was
'the attainment of status through the
attraction of followers, advertised through
ritual acts, monumental building a n d the
display of rare or highly crafted artefacts'
(Higham 1989, p360).
The connection between wealth, influence,
power, and territorial control is not lost on
modern Southeast Asian states. Thailand, for
ekample, even with its strong role for the
military, had recognized that the problem of
'Communist insurgency is directly linked to
conditions of poverty, corruption, and abuses of
power' (Ncher 1990, p198), and even Army
Commander-in-Chief Chavalit Yongchaiyut
had proposed a campaign of 'Politics over
Military' to help solve rural instability
(Neher 1990, p198). I t has been noted that in
spite of limitations in CNP per pcrson, the
countries of southern ASEAN (the four BIMS
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Ferguson: Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
states, i.e. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore) have accumulated some 81 billion
dollars of foreign reserves, an important factor
in their ability to operate in the international
arena of foreign affairs, investment and
security agendas (Emmerson and Simon 1993,
p26). In general terms, economic growth, as
distinct from democratic 'equity of benefits' or
quality of the environment, is seen as a central
factor in state security and the maintenance of
particular governments, i.e. r e g i m e
maintenance (Wurfel 1990, p297).
Likewise, although Kautilya was willing to
suggest Machiavellian strategies connected
with 'espionage, prostitution, lawless break-ins, opportunistic diplomacy, self-serving use
of force to bolster sovereignty, t h e
assassination of princes', these a r e
counterbalanced by the clearly stated
obligations of the king to the welfare of his
subjects (Tambiah 1976, pp30-31). This
tradition is thus aware of the 'dirty tricks'
needed to protect and use power, but also
recognizes the fundamentally reciprocal
relationship between a king and his subjects or
clients. In the modern period, nationalism and
economic growth have both been used as
legitimating grounds for current governments liberal freedoms and democratic rights have
been k r less important in terms of regime
justification. From the mandala perspective,
economic as well as military power, internal as
well as external stability, local zones of
varying control as well as defined borders form
essential elements in the security of a state.
These contrasting themes remain important for
contemporary Southeast Asia.
The nation of galactic polity bears some
similarity to this system in that there is a lack
of a iruIy centralized state formation but
rather 'cosmological, territorial, and politicoeconomic designs' which structure a series of
nested relationships radiating out from a
centre, with a 'pulsation between weaker and
stronger states' across ill-defined peripheries
(Tambiah 1976, p6). These types of traditional
polities in Southeast Asia were also
undergined by conceptions drawn from
Buddhist precepts, especially that related to
the cafkavatti, 'the world conquering king'
(Hall 1981, pp113-114). As noted by Tambiah: As a model of conduct for historical
Buddhist kings i t is the policy of
pacification after conquest that has been of
greater relevance. The cakkavatti in effect
Published by ePublications@bond, 1994
grants back their domains to the subdued
kings when they submit to the basic five
moral precepts of Buddhism. We thus see
the king represented a s the propagator of
the Buddhist precepts and as the overseer
and guardian of the morals of his subdued
tributaries. Indeed, in a sense the king
m u s t let conquered rulers keep their
thrones, since only as a king of kings is he a
world monarch. We cannot emphasize
strongly enough how important in the
actual history of Southeast Asian polities
has been this pattern of over-rule and
conversion to the dhamma of the
conquered rulers or subjected people. This
conversion is coextensive with the process
of political expansion by monarchs or of
political unification, which is more an
embracing of diversity around a centre
than a centralization of power itself. This
pacification model - which we find reflected
in the cakkavatti cycle - was first seriously
proclaimed and exploited by Emperor
Asoka, who in turn was the model for many
other Southeast Asian Buddhist monarchs.
(Tambiah 1976, pp46-7)
_
,
~
What is interesting about this account is that
concepts of truth and morality (dharma) play
a central role in legitimating and transmitting
political power. Tambiah, agreeing with the
concepts enunciated by Thapar, explains this
role in the following terms: The dharma doctrine aided the successful
centralization policy by eschewing ruthless
control through armed strength and
championing policy that undermined the
dominance of established orthodoxy, gave
support to the nonorthodox religious views
of the newly emergent sects that were
gathering support among the newly risen
commercial class. It also served as a
vehicle for unifying small political units, for
welding divergent groups and small
principalities into a larger whole. (Tambiah
1976, p63, following Thapar 1961, ppl44-145)
Today few countries use these legitimations so
directly, except perhaps Thailand, whose king
remains a Buddhist sovereign, and where
Buddhism and its inculcation does provide a
core of values that reinforce Thai nationality
and identity (Tambiah 1976). Although the
modern state of Thailand does not correspond
directly to the notion of a mandala of power
focusing directly on Bangkok, it has certain
aspects of a 'bureaucratic polity'. Only in
7
Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
recent years has this polity opened up to a
broader level of political involvement by
groups outside the bureaucracy and military
(Neher 1990, pp181-2). Likewise, the internal
structure of Cambodian political life does bear
some direct analogies to the notion of galactic
polity, even during the Pol Pot years (see 'The
Not-So-United-Nations: A Conference Report'
in this Bulletin).
At the same time, if this conception of dharma
is extended to embrace ideological and cultural
concerns, most Southeast Asian nations are
particularly concerned to present themselves as
centres of culture whose rule is inspired by the
welfare of their peoples. These conceptions
were embraced by the early revolutionary
programmes of Indonesia, Vietnam and Laos,
and by the anti-colonial stance of Thailand.
More recently, strong statements have been
made by Malaysian and Singaporean leaders
against what is seen as Western interference
and hypocrisy in policies towards the
Southeast Asian region. These trends should
not be underestimated. For example,
Indonesians apparently feel that they have a
certain natural relationship with Vietnam
because both shared difficult struggles for
independence: it has been noted that 'Indonesia
and Vietnam have common interests to pursue
several common strategic choices which can
alleviate some of the more intractableproblems of superpower and major power
intervention in our part of the world'
(Sudarsono in King 1990, p90). It seems likely
that Indonesia has played an important role in
sponsoring Vietnam as the most recent ASEAN
member (see below).
Regardless of the failings, and the criticisms
which can be made, of each of these
governments, the ideological and cultural high
ground has never been abandoned in their
claims. From the point of view of mandalas of
influence, such claims cannot be disregarded
since the very basis of worldly dominion
resided in the leader's regulative and social
role in applying 'universal cosmic law'
(Tambiah 1976, p52). Here i t must be
emphasized that while a realist analysis of
power maximization and balances of power
remains significant (for a useful analysis, see
Emmerson and Simon, 1993, p19), they are
inadequate to chart the full range of goals and.
decision-making processes brought to bear on
foreign policy formation a n d its
implementation in the region (see Holsti 1990,
pp13-14). Furthermore, the power-politics
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol1/iss1/2
approach does not adequately define the
national interests involved, and often assumes
the state to be a 'rational-unitary actor',
ignoring the complex groups and concerns
brought to play in the formation of foreign and
national policies (Korany 1990, pp23-25). This
c'an be seen in the complex facets of Indonesia
foreign policy. As noted by Dwight King: Nevertheless, foreign policy consistently
reflects a strong sense of national identity
and regional entitlement combined with a
sense of vulnerability due to economic
underdevelopment. Indonesians consider
economic underdevelopment a legacy of
colonialism and thus a symbol of the
limitations on Indonesia's independence.
Economic development, in other words, is a
means of giving substance to
independence. But this creates a dilemma:
foreign aid and investment are needed for
development, which causes dependence
and results in vulnerability. Related to
identity and entitlement is a further
characteristic, the aspiration in recent
years to become a major player in the
international system, for instance as
mediator in great power conflicts (King
1990, p74)
Within the late twentieth century, and
especially after the bloody history of recent
Indochinese wars, the concept of moral
conquest, dharma-vijaya (Tambiah 1976, ~ 5 . 9 ,
whether viewed as international ethics or the
role of cultural claims, can be seen to once again
play a mediating role in the international
forum. Speeches made by regional leaders are
full of claims which are intelligible in the
light of these cultural values, legitimating
both regional political styles and freedom from
external interference. Lee Kuan Yew (Engardio
1993, p26) and Dr Mahathir (Sheridan 1993b,
pll), for example, have both emphasized that
Asian states can no longer be taken for granted
by Western countries, nor do they need to
follow Western styles of government and
economic development.
We can see that states such as Malaysia and
Indonesia, both as particular governments and
as collective national entities, would be
extremely sensitive to claims which attack
their leadership or the legitimacy of their
government in moral terms. This is particularly
the case when such criticisms originate from
regional neighbours. Hence there has been
extreme sensitivity to, and from a Western
8
Ferguson: Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
point of view, overreactions to, Australian
press criticism concerning nepotism and
corruption in ruling circles. Contra Michael
Byrnes, EByrnes 1994, pp138-165, p242), this is
not some clever conspiracy to silence the foreign press - rather, it is a direct recognition of the
special role the cloak of cultural prestige adds
b political leadership. The conflict here is not
over the 'facts', but precisely over how
negative facts are used to reflect on systems of
authority. This is not merely a tactical concern,
but a deeply rooted recognition of the
relationship between cultural legitimation and
the abiliiy to maintain power.
In such systems status and symbolic displays as
well as military and economic resources help
define power relationships to a surprising
extent. This notion of a 'theatre-state' and
kymbolic state' may seem divorced from the
concerns of modern nation-states, but this is
precisely not the case in Southeast Asia. In
Cambodia the musical and creative activities
of a Sihanouk may seem shallow and even
absurd to Western eyes - from the perspective
of a cultural galactic polity they are the
necessary adjuncts to a ruler who wishes to be.
viewed as a King, a genuine arbiter of power
among factions, rather than just another prince
or leader of a single faction. Turning to
Indonesia, the unimpassioned displays of
Suharto have been interpreted as the mask of
Indonesia theatre, with a superseding and
almost suprahuman authority based on
Javanese cultural patterns (King 1990, p86; cf
Pye and Pye 1985). These types of display may
also be linked to traditional notions of the
spiritual control of a 'man of prowess' who
deserved to be distinguished as a leader above
his kinsmen (Wolters 1982, p6). One is
reminded of the Javanese localization of the
Sanskrit word s a n t o s a , originally
'contemplation' or 'satisfaction', which came
to refer to 'the completely unconcerned' state of
mind of a man in control of his emotions
(WoEters 1982, p50). Such a man might indeed
be a fit ruler in 'maintaining the law, and
ruling the world' (Moedjanto 1986, pp102-103).
The limitations of the Suharto regime may
seem all too apparent to Western journalists,'
but they remain secondary to the authority and
prestige Suharto has managed to build up
through political and non-political means. In
this context, Indonesian political culture has
been marked by 'circuitousness, innuendo,
formalism and reliance on intermediaries',
largely !inked towards creating a level of
consensus among a political elite or at least
Published by ePublications@bond, 1994
balancing factions (King 1990, p78, pp80-81). It
is precisely for this reason that the advent of a
post-Suharto period provides prospects for
change but also creates a destabilizing
uncertainty as to how political and cultural
power shall be allocated.
Mackerras has suggested that the mandala
system, with its spatial orientation, makes it
more effective a model than the 'model of
dynamic equilibrium implied by the term
"galactic polity"' (Mackerras 1992, p95).
Viewed from a perspective including the entire
region and the external powers in the four
cardinal directions, Mackerras seems to be
correct on this point. However, the notion of
'galactic polity' remains extremely useful in
understanding the internal politics of some of
these states, especially Thailand and
Cambodia, and the way events are played out
at the sub-regional level.
The third ancient Asian system of
iaternational relations is the tribute system. It
was the basis of ancient Chinese relations with
tribes and nations on its borders, and implied in
many cases positive economic benefits for the
weaker power in the relationship, while
enhancing the status and prestige of imperial
China. Once a state entered the tribute system,
it might find itself at least partially protected
(Mackerras 1992, p113) under the place it had
now found as a respecter of Chinese cultural
values. At the least, it would find trade and
diplomatic relations much easier (Mackerras
1992, pp109-111).
The tribute system, though officially defunct
once China lost Korea as a tributary ally in
1895 (Mackerras 1992, p112), nonetheless still
has some bearing on modern Chinese
conceptions. Modem Chinese diplomacy is still
concerned with the recovery of what Chinese
leaders see as China's proper place in Asia and
in world affairs generally (Dellios 1994;
Dellios forthcoming; Shish 1993). This
cbnception has direct implications for Chinese
relations with Vietnam, Taiwan, the two
Koreas, and in the long-term, perhaps more
problematically, with Japan. This conception
of China's rightful place is more significant
than straightforward border claims in
mapping potential future conflict in Northeast
Asia. Tribute in the past inferred recognition of
status. Today, though no physical tribute is
required, recognition of what China considers
its legitimate role in Asia is a major issue for
Beijing. Partly for this reason, the student
9
Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
occupation of Tiananmen Square was a direct
ideological challenge to the legitimacy and
prestige of the Chinese leadership. ~ e c e n t Chinese anger over the United States' attempt
to link human-rights with 'most-favourednation' (MFN) status is in part due to the
ethical and political implications that such
linkages have for this conception of role and
status. From this perspective, the Chinese
were extremely unlikely to make more than
token recognition of Washington's demands
over human rights - it was no surprise that the
Clinton administration was eventually forced
to grant MFN status even though only some of
its demands were met. From the perspective of
tribute systems, America was demanding
ideological tribute in return for the right of
'free trade' with China - for China, this would
have been a humiliating admission of
inferiority.
Likewise, China's recent indirect entry into the
security debate over North Korea can be seen as
another assertion of its 'rightful place'.
Firstly, it has refused to support stem sanctions'
through the Security Council, though it had
not publicly supported the North Koreans
either. Secondly, an unconfirmed report
originating in Hong Kong and reported in
Seoul's Choson Ifbo newspaper suggested that
China would be willing to offer up to 85,000
g~oundtroops to North Korea if it came under
attack (Lague 1994a, p10). It is possible that
this rumour may have been planted by Chinese
sources (Lague 1994a, p10) to signal that it
considered any use of force in the region as a
direct attack on its rightful interests in the
Korean peninsula. This offer, taken in
conjunction with the Japanese announcement
that they were not keen on the early
imposition of sanctions against North Korea
(Sheridan 1993c, p8) indicates a subtle but real
shift of balance in the region. In effect, China's
legitimate concerns in Northeast Asia have
been made clear and Japan has been reluctant to
accept a confrontational policy even when
supported by the U.S. administration. Takenin conjunction with South Korean reluctance to
rush into direct confrontation, it is indeed
possible that 'a new agenda for regional
security' may be broached (Lague 1994a, p10).
If so, the summit between North and South
Korea, brokered by ex-president Carter, may be
one stcp in redefining relations in Northeast
Asia. The problem here is not just the question
of alignments of power, but its application.
National will and the political process behind
the initial use and maintenance of force need to
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol1/iss1/2
be taken into account - here, the U.S. is at a
clear disadvantage in spite of a theoretical
power predominance. There are major political
and institutional constraints on the use of U.S.
military forces (Snitwongse 1992, p260). North
Korea, too, faces a period of internal
adjustment as the government and military
adjust to the death of Kim 11-Sung.
More generally, the differences between how
the Chinese come to conceptualise their world
role, and how it is envisaged by the U.S.A., can
lead to a major conflict played out at the
political, economic, and cultural levels. From
this perspective, the threat of armed conflict
is indeed one tool, but only one among many in a
broader contest for influence. In seems likely
that China views U.S. support for multilateral
dialogue on security in the region, based on
ASEAN, as deriving from U.S. interests
(Shambaugh 1994, p50). These factors, along
Gith U.S. conceptions concerning 'free' trade,
human rights and democratisation, may have
been viewed by China as part of a U.S.
strategy to dominate Asia at a diplomatic
level (Shambaugh 1994, pp50-51).
China might have hoped within Southeast
Asia 'to prevent the emergence of any strong
power close to its border and to maintain a
balanced state system in a region that it
viewed as within its general sphere of
influence' (Chanda 1990, p59). If China today
would like to see Southeast Asia as in some
sense part of this radiating tribute system, this
effort has only been partially successful. The
very fact that China had to engage in punitive
wars against 'the little hegemon', Vietnam, in
1979, clearly indicates that the international
perception of her prestige was not sufficient for
diplomatic control of adjacent states. The
'punitive expedition' against Vietnam may
have been a success in military terms, but was
probably more expensive and difficult than
Chinese planners expected. Once the dual
issues of the Cambodia problem and communist
insurgency were largely defused, relations
improved markedly between China and
countries such as Indonesia and Singapore
(Chanda 1990, p58). In fact Thailand and
Malaysia were willing to establish relations
with China even while the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP) and the Communist
Party of Thailand (CPT) were still active,
indicating a need to ensure their security once
the US direct presence was reduced after 1976
(Chanda 1990, pp61-62). By August 1990
relations had been restored with Indonesia,
10
Ferguson: Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
which had been extremely cautious in
developing links with China.
must be remembered that any form of turbulence
in Burma would tend to heighten regional
tensions and increase a potential refugee
problem which has already placed a serious
burden on neighbouring Bangladesh. If players
beyond the immediate region would like to use
ethnic groups like the Karen to destabilize
Burma, then it must be remembered that this is
in effect a return to the interventionist
strategies used in the 1960's and 1970's. An
escalation of even a small war can lead to
regional tensions. In 1991, for example, Burma
accused the Thai military of allowing Karen
rebels to operate from Thai territory
(Snitwongse 1992, p280). Such irritants need to
bk monitored closely. From a regional
perspective, it may be unwise to exclude the
Burmese from economic and political
involvement to the point where they have no
choice but to become a direct Chinese tributary.
Nor has Burmese isolation in any way eased
the suffering of the Karen and Mons minorities.
Chinese influence is quite strong in Thailand,
with miIitary supply agreements being signed
with Thailand since 1987, including the
provision of Chinese-made frigates (Chanda
1990, p55; Buszynski 1992-3, ~991,and a general
alignment on limiting Vietnamese influence in
Cambodia (Wurfel 1990, p311). At the same
time, this is clearly an alignment of interest
rather than a signification of Thai submission
to Chinese long-term goals - the conflict in
Cambodia embroiled the Khmer Rouge in a
way which weakened their independent power
in relation to Thailand. Nayan Chanda has
argued that 'Thai premier Kriangsak
Chomanond, in fact, quietly endorsed
Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia', though '
the level of the incursion may have come as a
great surprise to the region (Chanda 1990, p a ) .
Nonetheless, the Chinese focus of power
remains one in a series of balanced relations
the Thai have exploited to enhance their own
security. In the late 1980's Thailand sought 'to
balance its deep-rooted security ties with the
US by military and trade co-operation with
China and improving ties with Moscow'
(Chanda 1990, p71). This was part of the move
towards 'equidistance', which developed a
wider range of allies and friendly relations in
the region (Neher 1990, pp190-1). This move
towards omnidirectionality shifted Thailand
out of a patron-client relationship with the
U.S. towards enhancing ASEAN; combined
with a recognition of China's important role
(Neher 1990, pp193-4, following Cheow 1986).
This latter policy has caused some tensions
with other ASEAN states, e.g. Indonesia,
which sees a more accommodating relationship
with Vietnam as a way of reducing localtensions (Neher 1990, p195).
The tribute system, then, has a place in
helping understand regional attitudes to
China. It reflects one reality in so far as all the
states of Southeast Asia have had to come to
terms with the facts of Chinese military and
economic vitality, and the impact this has on
the region. However, this is only one model
among many, and one influence among several.
In the 1 9 9 0 ' ~with
~
the exception of the
unresolved issues of the South China Sea,
China has wished to present itself as 'a benign
and stabilising force' (Snitwongse 1992, p263).
Therefore, although China is a focus for threat
perceptions in many Southeast Asian countries
(Jawhar 1992, p292; Shambaugh 1994, p43, p53,
p57; Buszynski 1992-3, p91, p97; Harris 1993,
p18), direct military intervention alone is not
likely to meet Beijing's strategic or economic
goals in the region.
Also, there have been recent reports of Chinese
military presence in Burma, and the possible
building of port facilities on the Bay of Bengal
and the Andaman Sea (Shambaugh 1994, p49).
From the mandala perspective, this move
would mean that Burma and China could be a
useful foil against the growth of Indian naval
power, though China may also have economic
motives for these developments. Burma, in
turn, needs economic improvement to bolster its
political regime. Japan and Thailand also
seem willing to allow continued trade with
Burma, in spite of international concern over
human rights violations and the blatantly nondemocratic nature of the regime. However, i t
Some limiting statements need to be made
about the use of the mandala and 'galactic
policy' concepts. The modern states of
Southeast Asia and their relations do not
directly correspond to the ancient mandalas
which emerged between the 9th to 12th
centuries in regions such as Angkor, central
Java, or the Cham people on the central coast
of Vietnam (Mackerras 1992, ~ 1 0 1 )Both
.
the
mandala system and the form of 'galactic
polity' described by S.J. Tambiah are different
to the bureaucratic and governmental
institutions of the modern states of the region.
As noted by Mackerras, the independence of
these states was fought for and maintained
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11
Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
precisely by the ability of indigenous
nationalists to manipulate modern Western'
systems of political thought (Mackerras 1992,
~106).
However, there are unique aspects of the region
which suggest that the notion of the fully
autonomous, independent and insulated nationstate as the main international actor has
severe limits when applied to Southeast Asian
realities. The borders in the region, for
example, are either rather 'porous' (as in the
Thai-Cambodian border), or problematic in
that highland and forest territories, often
occupied by minority peoples, straddle key
areas. The Meo, the Karen, the Montagnard
peoples do not readily fit into one state region
or remain remote from complete state control.
These porous borders intensify the problems of
gun and drug smuggling, the issue of crossborder 'rebel' groups, and refugee exodus,
which can constitute a major security problem
for recipient nations (Harris 1993, p23; cf
Loescher 1992 and Lim 1984). In fact the powerof the ancient mandalas was based mainly on
the lowlands of Southeast Asia, with remote
hill peoples being much more difficult to
control (Wolters 1982, p32). Likewise, in
Southeast Asia today the major states have
developed along river basins or with access to
the sea, and in many cases minorities have
inhabited higher and less productive land,
often along borders (see Lim 1984).
There are also the problems of overlapping
maritime zones, disputes over fisheries, as
well as major shifts of legal and illegal
workers across national boundaries, e.g. there
may be as many as 200,000 illegal Indonesian
workers in West Malaysia and 150,000 more in
Sabah (Snitwongse 1992, pp272-3).
Environmental problems are also no respecters
of national borders, and can affect river,
marine and air resources in a region which is
rapidly industrializing and making increased
use of natural resources (Harris 1993, ~231..
Major geographical features and resources cross
the neat lines of borders; the Mekong and the
Red Rivers for example involve multinational
control of water and riverine resources. Even
off-shore islands such as the Spratlys do not
'naturally' adhere to one state, rather than
another.
Furthermore, major cultural and ethnic units
cross state boundaries - large numbers of
Chinese in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
and Indian minorities in Malaysia and
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol1/iss1/2
Singapore are only two features of this
complexity. Religion is another aspect which
crosses borders. Various forms of Buddhism
(especially Theravada Buddhism) have a
strong influence from Burma across to Vietnam.
Both Malaysia and Indonesia largely consist of
Islamic populations, but have significant and
sometimes influential minorities of Hindus,
Buddhists and Christians. However, a clear
distinction needs to be made been a country in
which Islam is the dominant religion, and a
state where Islamic institutions and Islamic
law dominate. The Malay culture itself has
variations which distinguish it sharply from
Islamic communities in the Arab world. Even
though the Malaysian State of Kelantan did
try to pass a Hudud Islamic Code in late 1993,
it has been made clear at the Federal level
that such state laws would not be enforceable
where they conflict with the general criminal
code (Parameswaran 1993, p15). Indonesia
itself has had to repress 'Islamic-inspired
regional rebellions' (King 1990, p78) which
have threatened its national unity (contra
Huntington 1993, who views Malaysia and
Indonesia as essentially part of an Islamic
culture grouping). Indonesia, like India, has
always had to emphasize that it is a secular
state in order to reduce major religious and/or
ethnic clashes. There is also a distinction
between fundamentalist, devout and nominal
Muslims. This distinction affects the way
people support modernization and modifies
attitudes towards the West, facts which
complicate national policy formation (King
1990, p83-4; see also Mutalib 1990; on
Buddhism see Handley 1991). Even Thailand,
which is 80-90% Buddhist and mainly of the
Thai ethnic group, has four southern border
provinces which are 70% Islamic and which
have not benefited greatly from Thailand's
economic boom (Neher 1990, p199; Snitwongse
p 9 2 , p282). It is in this context, that the
promotion of Buddhism may be seen to aid
Thai political and cultural unity but can never
be a completely inclusive national policy.
Likewise, though Cambodia also has high
religious and linguistic homogeneity (Wurfel
1990, p291), small but significant ethnic
minorities, especially the Vietnamese,
complicate the political picture.
This complex tapestry means that the
relationships between nations in the region are
far from straightforward and work at multiple
layers, with cultural, ethnic, religious,
business, military and government interests not
necessarily coalescing around the entity of the
12
Ferguson: Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
sovereign state. An example of this can be seen
at the cultural level in the Malaysian island
of Penang. In the suburb of Pulau Tikus a Thai
Buddhist temple has developed opposite a
Burmese one, both growing and developing into
major economic and tourist sites, promoting
their particular artistic and religious styles
within an important city of multicultural
Malaysia. At the same time, considerable
numbers of Hindu's engaged in various
Buddhist festivals, p e r h a p s viewing
Buddhism as a heterodox but acceptable
variant within the Hindu world view. In the
same city, the height of a Buddhist statue had
to be shortened so that it did not stand higher
than the top of the main Islamic mosque. This
was done, but at the same time the statue
remains one of the most visible monuments on
the Penang skyline. In this case, three major
religions and two 'national' styles of Buddhism
interacted within a third country in a vigorous,
even competitive way, but without violence or
direct confrontation. This high level of
proximity and influence without integration
remains a feature of the complex cultural map
of Southeast Asia.
c'ontrol foreign p e n e t r a t i o n a n d / o r
transnational processes' (Holsti 1990, p15).
Here dependency reversal, i.e. using a variety
of foreign aid and investments sources to build
u p economic growth so that it outstrips that of
donor countries, is one of the shared goals of
the region. Singapore has been particularly
successful at managing its 'external economic
relations' (Lim 1990, p135) to the point where
it is has become a major focus of wealth and
expertise in the region, and has begun in turn to
invest in parts of Southeast Asia and mainland
China. As noted by Linda Lim: -
Regional
operation
Malaysia in recent years has used the 'Look
East' campaign to strengthen its economic
relations with Japan a n d South Korea,
reducing its reliance on Britain and the U.S.
(Wurfel 1990, pp299-300). Likewise, active
trade with Singapore and other ASEAN
countries, plus an interest in continued trade
with Europe, has provided considerable
diversification in the Malaysian economy.
Even in the sphere of military purchases,
Malaysia has been willing to consider
purchasing British as well as American and
Russian aircraft (Sheridan 1993a, p8). David
Wurfel argued in 1990 that in general terms the
Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei or
Burma have not been very successful at this
'balancing of foreign influences' (Wurfel 1990,
p306). Since that time, however, both Vietnam
and Indonesia have made considerable progress
both in economic diversification and in
developing independent regional policies (see
below). Brunei as a rich microstate has
particular problems, while the military
regime of Burma has managed to use limited
Chinese, Japanese and Thai involvement to
generate slow economic growth. Recently
Thailand has invited Burma to attend the 1994
ASEAN meeting, indicating the economic gains
Thailand itself hopes to maximize through
bringing Burma into closer economic interaction
Convergence
and Co-
The cultural and political claims of the region
have the potential to converge on a range of
policies which challenge the orthodox
doctrine of 'great power politics' dominating
world affairs. Organizations such as ASEAN
and to a lesser extent the newly formed APEC
(Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), earlier
diplomatic initiatives such a the proposed
'Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality'
(ZOPFAN) and a Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone (SEANFZ), all seek to
limit great power intervention and the use of
the region for confrontations and proxy wars.
Regional convergences of interests a n d
enhanced cooperation need to be considered
from two related perspectives: economic
growth and enhanced security.
One of the aspects of this continued pursuit of
autonomy by regional states is that it no longer
involves the avoidance of dependence on, and
linkage into, the world economy. Rather,
attempts have been made to manage patterns
of trade and financing so that a high level of
multipolarity can be achieved. Part of this
process includes 'the ability to monitor and
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. . . Singapore's foreign policy does not
include policies to reduce its external
economic dependence, which is regarded
as both inevitable and, on balance,
beneficial to the economy as well as to
political survival. But diversification of
external dependence has been a policy
goal alongside maximizing trade and
foreign investment; as a result Singapore's
trade and foreign investment flows are less
concentrated by partner and investor
country than is the case for many
developing countries. (Lim 1990, p141)
13
Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
with the region. The Philippines, of course,
remains heavily reliant on U.S. investment
and loans (Wurfel 1990, p307), though this has
been scaled down in the 1990's. Kusuma
Snitwongse has noted that several ASEAN
countries have made attempts 'at creating some
sort of balance of presence among the great
powers' (Snitwongse 1992, p258). There have
also been stronger flows of investment from
Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, with'
estimates that before the year 2000 trade
between Southeast and Northeast Asia will be
greater than that across the Pacific
(Snitwongse 1992, p267).
Prospects for enhancing security in the region
are also good, though many of the moves
towards cooperation are still at the tentative
or provisional level. The earlier proposal of
'Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality'
(ZOPFAN), a policy promoted in the early
seventies and adopted as a long term goal by
1976 (Chanda 1990, pp62-3), was a clear
statement of an interest in limiting bipolar
conflict in the region. The neutrality aspect of
ZOPFAN remained problematic during the
19703, but many of the aims of this treaty were
promoted through other means. In 1976 a
'Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South
East Asia' also tried to develop regional
stability (see Appendix I to Jawhar 1992,
pp309-315). More recently (the late 1980's)Indonesia called for a Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone (SEANFZ), a - move
supported by Gorbachev but opposed by the
U.S. (Chanda 1990, p68). Generally, ASEAN
has tried to create the conditions for a regime
of non-aggression in Southeast Asia, in spite of
very real political differences among regional
nations, and number of nagging territorial and
sea-resource disputes. Furthermore, from the
time of the Bali summit (February 1976), the
United States, Japan, Australia, China and
the U.S.S.R. also gave their support to the
general ideals of ASEAN (Chanda 1990, pp6263), though for very different reasons. ASEAN
was seen as an economic stabilizer by both the
U.S. and Japan, while other countries felt that
ASEAN made it unlikely that one great power
would be able to dominate the region as a
whole (Chanda 1990, p63).
Furthermore, ASEAN and other organizations
have formed at a cooperative, international.
level an emphasis on limiting the hegcmonic
pretensions of countries from both without and
within the region. ASEAN is perhaps the
foremost regional organization which has
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stressed regional interests and national
egality. Although not in any sense a military
alliance, some recent indications have
suggested at least the likelihood of some
minimal military co-operation within the
ASEAN context. A recent trend towards a 'web
df bilateral' military contacts, exchange visits,
the sharing of intelligence, and joint exercises
(Snitwongse 1992, p274) have provided a
certain mutual confidence and openness in the
military posture of the ASEAN states. This
has culminated in proposals developed from
1991 through 1993 for special rounds of PostMinisterial Conferences. These have discussed
security relations among the ASEAN states
and a number of dialogue partners including the
United States, Japan, South Korea and
Australia (Buszynski 1992-3, p102; Harris
1993, p27). In the meeting at Manila in July
1992 China was present as an observer (Harris
1993, p31, footnote 45). These Conferences
provide the opportunely for smaller states to
develop higher levels of leverage on regional
security agendas, and for ASEAN to play a
central role in managing dialogue and
promoting stability.
On 25 July 1994 this trend reached fruition
with the meeting of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) in Bangkok. The meeting was
based around the core of ASEAN nations and
their seven dialogue partners (Australia, the
United States, Japan, South Korea, New
Zealand, Canada and the European Union),
with 'invited participants' including China,
Vietnam, Russia, Laos and Papua New Guinea.
This meeting not only discussed major issues
such as potential hotspots in North Korea, the
Spratlys and Cambodia, but also addressed the
issues of weapons proliferation, especially
devices of mass destruction and missile
technology (Sheridan 1994b, p2). Furthermore,
it seems that the mechanics of future Forum
meetings will be formalized, indicating the
prospect that this approach to regional
security will be continued.
In part, these efforts ensure a partial reversal
of traditional core-centre dialogues, in which
great powers negotiate without significant
regard for smaller states. ASEAN and its
Regional Forum allow collective regional
groupings to lead in setting the pace for the
development of regional security agendas.
They form an attempt to establish a degree of
autonomy which recognizes the role of 'great'
regional powers, but seeks a time delay in
which to develop relative independence. I t
14
Ferguson: Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
must be stressed that views of security in the
region do not focus just on military means.
'Total' security (as formulated for Singapore),
comprehensive security, and national
resilience, as found in Indonesian security
doctrines (Buszynski 1992-3, p96, p99), all
recognize the major role of economic
development and diplomatic dialogue in
promoting regional and national stability.
Furthermore, although all states within
ASEAN are modernizing their armed forces,
this does not constitute a genuine arms race. In
fact, expenditure on defense in terms of yearly
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)
remains quite low, and countries such as
Indonesia and the Philippines remain severely
'underpowered' in conventional defense terms
(Buszynski 1992-3, pp99-loo), thoughMalaysia has boosted its purchase of military
aircraft in recent years (Buszynski 1992-3, p98;
Harris 1993, p25). Arms purchases in the
region, in fact, seem aimed at bringing national
power up to more normal levels within terms of
the wider Asia-Pacific region.
At the same time, these security agendas do not
exclude a role for adjacent great powers.
Though Vietnam, Thailand and Burma, in
their own ways, have recognized the reality of
Chinese power and interests in the region,
these have been used in a complex tapestry of
relations. U.S. power has been cautiously
courted by Thailand, Singapore and to a lesser
extent Malaysia and Indonesia, and an
extended American presence in the region is
wekomed by all ASEAN countries. Indonesia,
pubEicly one of the most non-aligned of nations,
has even conducted joint military exercises
with U.S. forces from 1990 onwards (Buszynski
1992-3, p104). In economic terms as well, the
US. remains a major trading and aid partner, a factor which emerged in debates over APEC
membership. In the formation of APEC, with
some initial Malaysian reservations, all Asian
member countries sought American
involvement, since the U.S. remains one of the
major buyers of commodities from, and investors
in, the region. Recent proposals (mid-1994) by
the Malaysian foreign minister, Abdullah
Badawi, for slowing down APEC in favour of an
East Asian Economic Caucus, excluding
Australia and the United States, seem
unlikely to be accepted by Japan and most
ASEAN countries. In terms of naval and air
resources, of course, America remains the major
miIitary power in the Pacific. This indicates,
then, that though a certain 'tributary' aspect
enters into bilateral relations in the region,
Published by ePublications@bond, 1994
this Southeast Asian mandala in fact includes
antagonist and countervailing trends which
limit great power interests on this periphery.
This is possible now that Moscow-Washington
antagonisms no longer use the region for
confrontations and exercises in the 'balance of
power'. Cold War patterns of dependency were
often exclusive, with allies and enemies
clearly identified, and constructive neutrality
hard to maintain. Post-Cold War patterns
allow for inclusive and overlapping relations.
The tributary and hegemonic models, then, do
not explain the complexity of relations of the
region. This correlates with the historical fact
that with the exception of Vietnam, Indian
political conceptions had more impact
historically on the polities of Southeast Asia
than did Chinese models of statecraft. As
noted by Colin Mackerras: Though southern China was closer than
India to most of Southeast Asia, and the
political dominance of China was widely
acknowledged, the usefulness of Indian
ideas for the developing mandalas of
Southeast Asia is attested to by their
extension throughout the region. Even on
what is now the coast of central Vietnam,
the Cham population drew upon Indian
rather than Chinese religious and political
thought. Only in the Red River Delta of
northern Vietnam did the actual extension
of the Han empire lead to imposition of the
Chinese administrative model. (Mackerras
1992, p99)
Furthermore, the limits of the tributary model
also become apparent if applied to Australian
foreign policy. Australia traditionally had
sought a 'big protector' to look after its
international interests and help preserve its
security. This was at first Britain, and after
1941, the United States. More recently, there
has been critical consideration given to the
possibility of closer ties with Japan, which, at
least economically, could provide something of
the same role (McQueen 1991). Australia and
Japan, in some ways 'outsiders' to Asia, might
naturally become future allies. However, it is
unlikely that Japan would seek such a role, in
spite of suggestive comments by minor Japanese
officials, and the polite reception of Prime
Minister Keating's international avowals of
friendship (Collins 1993, p13; McCregor 1992,
p4).
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Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
In general, Japan has sought to pursue its aim of
comprehensive security via a wide range of
economic measures, through diplomatic
openness, and through maintenance of its
special military relationship with the U.S., in
spite of trade disputes between the two
countries. Furthermore, in terms of the
mandala model outlined above, a relationship
by one southern state with one power in
northern Asia is far too slim an involvement to
afford either regional or economic security.
Even if Japan greatly enhances it naval and air
power, and maintains its strong economic
position, it is unlikely to be willing to be drawn
proactively into questions of military stability
in Southeast Asia. Lastly, any rapid.
escalation of Japanese military power, even if
directed to legitimate concerns such as
protection of sea lanes, would alarm not only
China, but would be viewed as destabilizing by
a range of ASEAN and other Asian nations,
especially Malaysia and Singapore (Buszynski
1992-3, p94; Harris 1993, p17; Zakaria 1994,
p34).
One of the trends found in Australian academic
circles has been to form rather exclusive clubs
around the 'favoured' nation of special
attention, whether China, Japan or Vietnam.
This is a natural outcome of the need for
specialization, but can lead to an unfortunate
emphasis when academics consider policy
formation in the context of international
relations. From the viewpoint of a mandala of
regional relations, any kind of preferential
one-eyedness would not only fail to generate
regional security, but would tend to make
Australia less valuable an ally in the eyes of
the favoured nation. To play foreign policy
toward one selected nation, even great future
powers like China or Japan, would in fact limit
Australia's regional usefulness to that country.
To operate effectively and positively in the
international setting, a range of bilateral and
multilateral relations is required, and often
indirect means of negotiation through third
parties can be constructive in mediating
disputes or sensitive initiatives. Preventive
diplomacy, in particular, often relies on these
indirect methods to establish the ground work
before the parties engaged in a dispute even
reach provisional talks.
Fortunately, in recent years Australian foreign
policy has avoided the trap of playing to one
great patron, and has pursued a range of
beneficial relationships throughout the region.
It is precisely because Australia has managed
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to open up positive diplomatic and economic
relations with several countries in Northeast
and Southeast Asia that she has been able to
help promote more positive approaches to the
Cambodian problem and to regional security
issues (Evans and Grant 1992, pp107-110; Evans
1993, pp106-108). This has been demonstrated
in the July 25 1994 meeting of the ASEAN
Regional Forum where Australian proposals
concerning 'information sharing, military
transparency, arms registers, peacekeeping
training and preventive diplomacy' (Sheridan
l994b, p2) were well-received. An Australian
proposal for increasing maritime cooperation
was also circulated at this Forum (Lague 1994b,
pa).
The Southern Quarter
Southeast Asia Mandala
of
the
One of the key approaches adopted by many of
the states in Southeast Asia has been a
balancing of influences, dependencies and
foreign policy relations via a certain freefloating multi-laterality. This can be seen
clearly in Indonesian foreign policy whose
aspirations include an emphasis on national
security and territorial integrity in which
regional stability is an important factor (King
1990, pp92-98). Likewise, the balancing of 'aid,
debt, trade and investment' among a range of
foreign sources maintains Indonesian autonomy
in spite of a level of economic dependency on
external sources (King 1990, p99).
When viewed as a mandala, the complexity of
the region becomes a map of intersecting, nonexclusive relations in which certain
opportunities are present. In particular,
Australia, in spite of being no more than a
medium power in world terms, has the
opportunity of playing a significant and
productive role in relation to this international
order. From this perspective, Australia is not,
as expressed by one Indonesian minster, 'the
"appendix" of Asia, a somewhat irritating
organ, the purpose of which is poorly
understood' (Hill 1993, p17). In fact, Australia
and New Zealand, by reason of their position
as the southern 'border' of this nexus, and due
to cultural complementarities, are a necessary
part of the mandala of Southeast Asia. In part,
as one of the 'four quarters', Australia can
provide a counterbalance of interests and
activities to the other major 'quarters'. It must
ke stressed that this is not a question of
16
Ferguson: Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
working against Indian, Chinese, Japanese or
American interests. Rather, the diversity of
involvement both weakens dependence on one
powerful patron, and introduces competition
between influences which erodes thelikelihood of unequal relations of exploitation.
Hence, Australia has provided a useful lead in
its early aid, trade and investment
programmes in Vietnam, even though its
economic volume in all these areas will no
doubt be soon overtaken by U.S. involvement
once relations have become normalized (see a
Conference Report in this Bulletin, 'Forward
Thinking on the Environment and Economic
Development in Vietnam').
Another area where the mandala system can
help focus international relations is in
Australia's relation to Indonesia. Due to their
geographical proximity, Australia and
Indonesia face each other across a narrow sea
gap, with possible misunderstandings and
confrontations of interest in New Guinea
(Wanandi 1992, p322) and East Timor. Such
geographical proximity, combined with
widely differing cultural bases, provides a
potential security nightmare for both countries.Yet, there have been no major confrontations
between Australian and Indonesian forces. The
one direct clash developed out of Indonesia's
conflict with Malaysia between 1963-65. From
the mandala perspective, since neither country
is in a position to assert hegemony over the
other, Australia and Indonesia are in the
position of being either 'natural enemies' or
'natural allies'. Interestingly enough,
Australian relations with Indonesia, though
often critical and competitive in military
terms, only briefly veered towards strong
threat perceptions in the 1960's and early
1970's (Stewart 1994a, pl). In spite of the
usefulness of a postulated northern enemy in
securing strong military budgets and in
galvanizing war games in Australia's
Northern Territory, Australians are reluctant
to believe that Indonesia is in fact a serious
threat to their security. It is true that a 1989
AGB:McNair public opinion survey of
Australians listed Indonesia as the most likely.
threat, but this was recorded at only 16%
(Byrnes 1994, p137). This suggests that in
reality Australian threat perceptions are
dispersed and most citizens feel relatively
secure in the military sense. In return, the fact
that only 3-4% of Indonesians surveyed saw
Australia as a primary threat (Byrnes 1994,
p138) indicates that the time is ripe for a
further diffusing of Australian negative
Published by ePublications@bond, 1994
perceptions and a movement towards stronger
rGciprocal relations (Wanandi 1992, pp324-5).
The visit to Jakarta in mid-1994 by Prime
Minister Keating has reaffirmed commitments
by the Australian government to this process,
and the Prime Minister made it clear that
neither country was a security threat to the
other.
In fact Australia had been one of the first
Western nations to support and then recognize
Indonesian independence (Kobus 1994, p92). In
the 1979 Australia gave de jure recognition of
Indonesian control of East Timor after their
takeover of the island in 1975 (Evans and Grant
1992, p187). In 1989, in spite of Portuguese
challenges before the International Court of
Justice, Australia and Indonesia concluded
agreements to control oil resources in the Timor
Gap (Gum 1994, p4, p90, p161, p230). Nor have
the legitimate concerns of Australia's own
human rights lobbies seriously deterred a
policy of accommodation and dialogue. The
Australian government has felt that the East
Timor situation complicates rather than blocks
its relationship with Indonesia, as indicated
by questions directed to the Indonesian
ambassador during a Canberra hearing of a
subcommittee of the Joint Committee of Foreign
Affairs, Defense and Trade in early 1993
(Stewart 1993, p5).
Since the late 1980's Australia has pursued
closer and more converging patterns of interest
with Jakarta, even if this move has been of the
'slowly slowly' kind. The necessity for these
two nations to pursue cordial relations while
recognizing real differences in political culture
has been emphasized by Jusuf Wanandi,
Executive Director of the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies in Jakarta: The fact that Indonesia and Australia are
neighbours h a s i t s geopolitical
consequence, namely that they have to live
together in peace and to develop normal
relations. This also means that they have to
develop mutual understanding and a sense
of take and give, to cooperate in as many
areas as possible, as well as to promote
regular exchanges on assessments about
developments in the regional environment.
I t is of great importance as well that
developments in each other's country and
society be studied by both sides so that
many leaders and a growing segment of
the respective societies would know each
other better. (Wanandi 1992, p321)
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Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
One way of using Kautilya's mandala
approach to reconceptualize these relations is
to argue that Australia might transfer it role
from that of natural enemy or natural ally to
that of the m a d h y a m a , the mediatory or
balance-holding state which can ally withIndonesia, or draw closer to other regional
powers, on a selective basis. From this
perspective, Australia's interests will often
converge with Indonesia's, but Australia's
foreign policy will not be locked into either a
hostile posture nor a politically awkward
permanent alliance. This madhyama role is
not that of an influence-broker or a pivot in a
'balance of power' sense: Australia is not
powerful enough for such a direct role. Rather,
Australia could be one among several balances
and influences against large external powers
dominating the region. Furthermore, with
Australia's European-based culture and
technical and education focus, it can be a
mediator of positive Western elements without
being in any sense a threat to Southeast Asian
nations. Here cultural exchanges and
technological transfer (Wanandi 1992, pp3267) must be distinguished from political or
strategic manoeuvres driven by short-term
benefits. Australia can then be a source of.
positive influence without being a stalking
horse for external American or British
interests. The madhyama role also allows for
the possibility of persuasion and even criticism
of Indonesia, but on the basis of generally
positive relations and of an enduring interest
and influence on the Southeast Asian region as
a whole. It is precisely under such conditions
that Australia's voice would be taken
seriously, rather than being viewed as a
strident and shallow promotion of Westernism.
It is also possible that further IndianAustralian cooperation, which has already
begun at the economic and military level (e.g.
Indo-Australian naval exercises occurred in
December 1991), could provide a further
stabilization and convergence of interests in
the southern and western aspects of the
mandala. Certain complexities of course
remain, including India's nuclear policy which
recognizes the potential of South Asia to
become nuclear armed (Thomas 1993, pp60-77).
For this very reason, the Western side of the
Southeast Asian mandala cannot be ignored:
Burma, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan form
an important part of the strategic and cultural
landscape which can directly affect the
security of adjacent regions. Likewise, care
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needs to be given to Chinese friendship with
Pakistan and Bangladesh (Snitwongse 1992,
p265) in order to avoid any possible indirect
involvement in Pakistan-India confrontations.
Australia in the past has not been sufficiently
sensitive to this complexity - the agreement to
sell 50 of her old Mirage I11 fighters to
Pakistan (Thomas 1993, p57) was not taken as a
friendly policy by India, and was not
adequately balanced by dialogue with the
Indian government.
In this context, Mohamed Jawhar has rightly
noted that a 'Southeast Asian Ten would
provide a better balance to extra-regional
powers such as China and India' than ASEAN
can alone, and that some loose organization
encompassing all of Southeast Asia would
enhance the security of its members and make
them less likely to 'enter into arrangements
with outside powers' which might alarm their
neighbours (Jawhar 1992, p298). If such an
organization forms, operating alongside
ASEAN (Jawhar 1992, pp300-301), this would
indeed help stabilize the regon, and enhance
Australian security as well so long as Australia
maintains a constructive involvement with the
organizations and nations concerned. Here
Australia's
role
as
a
southern
mediator/balancer would be even more
significant, and directly contribute to regional
goals such as resilience and comprehensive
security (Jawhar 1992, p302). Hopefully, some
institutional involvement for Australia, either
as a dialogue partner or permanent observer,
might be acceptable to such a regional
organization. Jusuf Wanandi has already
suggested that if ASEAN moves towards
multilateral defence cooperation, 'the group
might also seek some defence cooperation with
Australia' (Wanandi 1992, p329; see below).
It must be stressed that Australia's natural role
in this Southeast Asian mandala does not
involve Australians becoming pseudo-Asians.
The term 'Asian' itself is problematic, and is at
best based on vague geographical, racial and
cultural similarities. At worst, i t is little more
than a form of stereotyping racism, developed
out of a colonial and imperial mentality. It is
not at all certain that the Japanese would wish
to be identified as Asians, nor that Chinese
and Indians, for example, would readily
understand each other in the context of a
shared Asian identity. The issue for Australia
is not one of becoming 'Asians' or 'culturallyChinese' or 'Confucians', but rather of
understanding and engaging with the
18
Ferguson: Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
distinctive and individual cultures of the
Asian region. In doing so, attention must be
paid to individual characteristics without
losing sight of the pattern of international
relations which is emerging to its north.
Here Australia can learn something from the.
example of recent German foreign policy.
Rather than emphasize a purely German
policy, Germany has sought to align its foreign
policy as distinctly European. Through
activity in collective agencies, from NATO and
the CSCE (Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe) to the European Union,
Germany has in fact played a major role in
international affairs without following an
overtly nationalistic programme (Zeman 1991,
pp314-5; Paterson and Smith, in Smith 1992,
p16; Schlor 1993, p4). It therefore has some
influence at collective levels of international
action, and although these policies are not
exclusively German, they in fact give Germany
a major leverage which is less intrusive and
less threatening than a more direct flexing of
German economic 'muscle'. Australia, of course,
does not have the central place or economic
power in its region which Germany holds in
Europe. However, the lesson is that
effectiveness in the international arena can be
augmented by engagement in such regional andinternational agencies.
The Problem of Instability i n
Southeast Asian Mandalas
One question to be faced is whether the
mandala system as outlined is inherently
unstable, a n d therefore potentially
destructive. In particular, ASEAN members
and indeed all states in the region would not
want to see the region once again become a zone
of major conflict, even at the economic and
diplomatic levels, between great powers (Lim
1990, p137).
Some forms of instability are not entirely
negative, however. Since most of the nations
involved would not see their current individual
and regional situation as optimal, change and
development is in fact expected and hoped for.A moderate level of instability is an
opportunity to allow natural change, and only
becomes dangerous when large scales of force
are applied by outside powers in an attempt to
freeze the mandala into a model of their own
preference. To prematurely force regional
Published by ePublications@bond, 1994
development along a path beneficial to the
interests of one power would indeed require the
application of considerable economic and
military power. In some ways French colonial
interests and American anti-communist
doctrines played this role in bringing to bear
massive levels of external power, each country
pursuing their interests in the region. The
result was the creation of sustained opposition,
both through nationalist and communist
movements within Southeast Asia, but also the
indirect intervention of Soviet and Chinese
backers. Even the Vietnamese incursion into
Cambodia required substantial economic and
military aid from the Soviet Union and
immediately created serious concerns among
most ASEAN nations.
At present Japan, China, India and the United
States do not seem to want to pursue these
aggressive unilateral approaches, even though
numerous potential flash-points exist. Here it
is important that the nations and
organizations of Southeast Asia play a
preemptive role in mediating such external
tensions, and in building regional confidence
which reduces the likelihood of 'greater
power' interests intervening at some stage and
using the region as a theatre of conflict. This
proactive approach does not require some sort
of Southeast Asian alliance system, nor does it
require complete accord in foreign policy.
Rather, it involves both regional and internal
strengthening, and a commitment to a dynamic
balancing of the mandala of external forces and
influences.
ASEAN, through its foreign ministers
meetings, can already negotiate some of these
agendas informally (Emmerson and Simon 1993,
p5). Although ASEAN does not represent the
entire region, Vietnam has recently improved
its relations with ASEAN (Emmerson and
Simon 1993, p10-ll), and it is possible that
both ASEAN and APEC might be useful
mechanisms for informal dialogue on much
more than merely economic issues. It is also
possible that a range of broader and narrower
fbrums than the current ASEAN group could be
strengthened or developed in future for specific
purposes, e.g. ESCAP (the Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific), PECC
(the Pacific Economic Corporation Council),
SCAP (the Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific) might have some constructive role to
play for broader issues. The only provision,
here, of course, is that the agendas of these
different tiers of organisations must be
19
Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
somewhat differentiated, with possible roleconflicts for nations involved in two
institutions with opposing goals being
carefully monitored (Barnett 1993, pp272-3).
At the level of regional security issues, the July
1994 meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) has been extremely successful at opening
up a progressive dialogue on a wide range of
strategic and diplomatic issues.
Likewise, the prospect of some organisation
including the 'Southeast Asian ten', i.e.
Indochina plus ASEAN, could also provide a
constructive forum for security and economic
issues. By mid-1994, ASEAN had announced
that Vietnam would be admitted as a full
member (Sheridan 1994b, p2; "ASEAN Opens
Up For Vietnam", The Australian, July 26,
1994, ~ 1 2 1 ,a trend which can readily be
developed to bring more of Indochina into
closer relations. Combined with Thai interest
in Burma, and the attendance of Laos as an
invited member to the ASEAN Regional Forum.
(Sheridan 1994b, p2), we can see that ASEAN
has already began to extend dialogue to the
entire region of Southeast Asia, nesting this
dialogue within broader regional debate
including Northeast Asia and significant
Pacific powers. Another path for this regional
trend to develop economic co-operation could be
an upgrading of the Associa tion of Southeast
Asian Nations Free Trade Area (AFTA),
especially if it is linked to the Australia-New
Zealand Closer Economic Relations agreement,
CER (Stewart 1994b, p4; Sheridan 1994a, p4).
Elsewhere, in Europe and in the Middle East, a
range of international organizations have
helped promote regional order. As noted by
Michael Barnett: Because international institutions offer the
promise of order and cooperation among
self-interested states, theorists and policy
makers alike have ventured from simply
discovering the existence of such'
institutions to proposing their wholescale
construction and application to confront a
series of international problems. To solve
current a n d future environmental
problems, states must build on and
strengthen such international institutions
as the United Nations Environmental
Program and the Montreal Protocols . . .; to
steer the international trading community
away from the beggar-thy-neighbour
policies which accompany increasing
uncertainty about future cooperation,
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol1/iss1/2
maintain and strengthen
institutions such as the General Agreement
,/ on Tariffs and Trade . . .; to head off chaos
and disorder in Europe, a myriad of
security institutions, many that had
emerged during the Cold War to confront
a very different strategic environment,
must be modified, developed, and
coordinated . . . In short, moves in any
substantive direction reveal a positive
evaluation of how international institutions
can mitigate the anxiety and insecurityproducing effects of anarchy, and,
therefore, promote stability and increase
interstate cooperation. (Barnett 1993, p272)
states must
Here, once again, relatively small players like
Australia can play a constructive role.
Promoting vigorous and more diversified trade
in the Asian region, acting as one conduit to
technological transfer without creating
patterns of dependence, the development of
joint scientific programmes (Hill 1993, p17) and
cooperating to develop regional security
agendas, e.g. securing sea-lanes, anti-piracy,
anti-terrorism, and a more co-ordinated
approach to international refugee and
environmental problems are likely areas
where cooperation can be developed (Wanandi
1992, p334) without compromising sovereignty
issues. Some initiatives have already been
taken in these areas. For example, ASEAN has
already embarked on a 'program of common
effective preferential tariffs' (CEPTs) which
will aid intra-ASEAN trade volumes
(Emmerson and Simon 1993, p15). As noted by
Emrnerson: Finally, will ASEAN security cooperation
move from bilateral to multilateral
arrangements as the 1990s progress? A
number of considerations favor the latter if
it is understood at the outset that ASEAN
will not become a region-wide defense
community. Barring that, multilateral
subregional cooperation has m a n y
attractions. They include more effective
exercises, training, and joint maritime
patrols, as well as the possibility of less
expensive joint weapons purchases,
stockpiles, and common repair facilities.
Moreover, joint defense, particularly if
linked to the United States or Australia,
would offer incentives to China to discuss
South China Sea issues and reassure Japan
with respect to regional stability.
Multilateralism would also reduce t h e
security dilemma w i t h i n A S E A N ,
20
Ferguson: Complexity in the centre: the new Southeast Asian mandala
reassuring neighbors that weapons
purchases were not being acquired against
one another. (Emmerson and Simon 1993,
~17)
Certain reservations need to be made to this
view. The complex of interests discussed by
Emmerson and Simon is too narrow. As has
already been indicated, Indian interests cannot
be ignored in the region, nor should Australianinterests be assumed to exactly coincide with
U.S. ones, even in the face of traditional
Australia-American treaty arrangements.
Furthermore, the notion of 'joint defense'
offering 'incentives' to China to discuss issues
such as the Spratlys should not be read as a
veiled 'stick and shield' approach. The 'big
stick held by foreign powers' tactic has not
been particularly effective in shaping Chinese
policy for the last forty years. Recently, the
threat of withholding MFN status in return for
improvements in human rights in China has
not been a strong success, forcing a partial backdown by the Clinton administration in early
1994. Likewise, it does not seem likely that
any defensive alliance arrangement involving
ASEAN and the U.S.A. or Australia will
really be able to frighten China off her claims
in the South China Sea. Indeed, China has
already moved to provide oil exploration
leases to one American company (Crestone) for
the development of oil resources in the region,
with Vietnam courting a different company'
(Mobil) to explore adjacent waters
("Flashpoint Fear as Oil Claims Row Becomes
Heated", The Australian, July 26, 1994, p8).
Nor is it likely that public opinion in
Australia or U.S.A. would seriously consider
military action over even an oil rich region in
the Spratlys.
Donald Emmerson is on a stronger line of
argument when he speaks of Chinese
willingness to enter into some sort of dialogue
with ASEAN on these issues (Emmerson and
Simon 1993, pp16-17). A loose security agenda
in the region would allow diplomatic
initiatives to be coordinated, so that even if
China is reluctant to enter into multilateral
talks, some progress on settling such disputes
could be made which, in principle, would be
acceptable to most of the concerned parties.
Any such regional security coordination, of
course, must not allow itself to be used by
hegemonic powers to pursue their own policies - in the case of Donald Emmerson's argument,
there seems to be an implicit American agenda
for the containment of 'Greater China'. A more
Published by ePublications@bond, 1994
positive approach would be to move the entire
argument onto a settlement by principle,
backed by growing shared understandings
within Southeast Asia. This would then place
the argument on the basis of dharma, in this
case dialogue based on principle, a practice
China well understands and which she has
sought to follow in maintaining a n
international h i g h g r o u n d based o n
interpretations of the connection between te,
moral virtue, and effective power (see Shish
1993; Dellios 1994; Dellios forthcoming).
China would be more likely to be brought to
the negotiating table if the debate is couched
in these terms, and might at least desist from
taking negative military actions which
seriously affect the status quo. It is precisely
for these reasons that the ASEAN Regional
Forum is likely to be a more fruitful base for
security issues than APEC, which has a clearer
trade and economics agenda.
Southeast Asia then, can be fruitfully
discussed as a region so long as an
understanding of its inherent diversity and the
complexity of its external relations are kept in
mind. Initiatives based around the ASEAN
organization have already moved towards
promoting regional stability. It is likely that
future trends will draw most of Southeast Asia
into a closer dialogue on comprehensive
security, based in large measure on the need to
continue economic development within a
competitive world economy. The region,
however, is a complex zone of interactions in
which national and external great power
interests need to be balanced. At present,
diversity of dependency, multilateral
agreements, and equidistance from great
'patrons' such as the U.S. and China seem to
offer the optimal paths towards avoiding
large-scale confrontations with Southeast
Asia.
Conclusion
From the point of view of a dynamic but nondestructive mandala of forces in Southeast
Asia, these trends of multipolarity and
complex interdependence should be developed
vVith even more commitment. Furthermore,
resilience in the region, whether viewed as
economic, national or strategic, should be
encouraged. This regional resilience is likely to
aid the stabilization of regional interests
without the need for the forceful intervention
21
Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
of great external powers. Australia, as a
southern quarter of the mandala of Southeast
Asia, has a direct and legitimate involvement
in the region. Small-to-medium powers like
Australia can play a positive economic,
military and diplomatic role while at the
same time furthering their own security
interests. Constructive engagements,.
recognizing shared interests as well as
differences in approach, are the most effective
paths to create a zone of low conflict, high
economic growth and improved standards of
personal welfare and human rights. Here
Australia, as a balancing and complementary
culture, can find many areas for convergence of
interests and mutual development. Where
differences of viewpoint exist, the role of
preventive diplomacy and persuasion through
regional institutions can make Australia's
criticism less strident and more effective.
Policies of containment, confrontation, or
hegemony, on the other hand, hoping to curtail
regional power and independence, will be both
ineffective and create security dilemmas
within Southeast Asia and in adjacent regions
to the West, South and Northeast.
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