HAUNTED BY THE GHOST OF WILLY BRANDT:
GERMAN OSTPOLITIK RECONSIDERED
Kristian L. Nielsen, University of Tartu, Estonia
Michael Nolan, Western Connecticut State University, USA
FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION
Abstract
In the early 1970’s, Willy Brandt signed the Treaty of Moscow with the Soviet Union,
and in 1972 the Basic Treaty with the German Democratic Republic. These agreements
marked the culmination of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, which signalled a radical departure in the
Federal Republic’s policy toward the East Bloc. Ostpolitik was controversial in the FRG
at the time, but has over the years come to be widely seen as an act of statesmanship by
Brandt, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in 1971.
In spite of the changes in government since then, and in spite of the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989 and German reunification in 1990, the continuity in German-Russian
relations since the Brandt era has been remarkable. Governments of all colours have
pursued some variation of Ostpolitik, even as that has frequently led to strained relations
between Germany and its partners in both the EU and in NATO.
This paper offers a somewhat revisionist account of Ostpolitik and its long-lasting
impact. While acknowledging that a certain flexibility in German foreign policy was
needed in the 1970’s, the critique of Ostpolitik we advance here is two-fold: Firstly, that
the overall policy was flawed on its own terms, took little or no account of the general
international system, strained existing alliances severely and needlessly, while ultimately
contributed little to ending the Cold War. Secondly, that the long-lasting impact of that
Cold War era policy has been far from positive. At a time of increasing Russian
assertiveness, continued Ostpolitik is creating problems for Germany itself in its dealings
with friends and partners in the EU and NATO. Furthermore, continued German
adherence to the special path of Ostpolitik hampers any prospect of the EU emerging as a
strong, independent global actor in the 21st century. Thus in this respect, the legacy of the
Cold War is very much with us still.
Introduction
Willy Brandt is a larger than life character in German politics. A youth spent in
opposition and exile during the Nazi regime before becoming a leading figure in the
Federal Republic’s Social Democratic movement, his democratic credentials were second
to none. For nine years the mayor of West Berlin, Brandt became a household name the
world over as East Germany forcibly divided the city. During his time as Chancellor,
from 1969 to 1974, he recast German foreign policy through pursuit of Ostpolitik, thus
radically breaking with the Hallstein Doctrine. Brandt’s outreach to the central and
eastern European countries was powerfully symbolized in the ‘Kniefall’ at the Warsaw
Ghetto Memorial in 1970. The picture of the Chancellor kneeling in contrition went
round the world, and Brandt received the Nobel Peace Prize the following year. Although
controversial at home, his policy enjoyed broad popular support, as seen by the SPD’s
clear victory in the 1972 election. Although the Guillaume espionage scandal forced
Brandt from office, his public reputation did not suffer for long and he remained active in
SPD politics until 1987. At his death in 1992 Brandt was given a state funeral, while in a
2003 TV vote on ‘the Greatest German ever’ he placed fifth, only the winner Konrad
Adenauer being higher ranked among politicians.1 Most recently the Berlin city
government decided to name the city’s airport, scheduled for opening in 2011, in
Brandt’s honor.
Yet Willy Brandt’s achievements in foreign policy were not unproblematic. Although
his beloved Ostpolitik led to improvements in relations between the two Germanys,
including mutual recognition, and also to an easing of the restrictions on families divided
by the Cold War, the policy’s wider impacts were far from positive. At the time it led to
no small amount of tension within both NATO and the EC. It complicated Germany’s
position within the alliance, while contributing little to the eventual ending of the Cold
War. Moreover, many of the problems created by Ostpolitik in the 1970’s are still very
1
‘Unsere Besten’, ZDF.
much plaguing Europe today. Few things so divides today’s EU as energy policy and the
cozy relationship Germany enjoys with Russian energy interests. This gas dependency
has become one of the major factors in Germany’s stance on all things Russian, leading
to frequent accusations of kowtowing to the Kremlin. This sorry state of affairs, however,
is a direct consequence of the deals Brandt struck with the Soviets as part of his
Ostpolitik agenda, and any consideration of his foreign policy achievements must thus
include the question whether the short term gains of his policy were worth the long-term
damage that was wrought?
The Formative Years of Willy Brandt
The German historian Fritz Fischer and his disciples famously argued, beginning half a
century ago, that there was a continuity between the foreign policies of Imperial Germany
and the Third Reich, and that a primacy of domestic politics in the formulation of
German foreign policy was to blame for the outbreak of the First World War. At the root
of Fischer’s thesis was the notion that Germany followed a Sonderweg, or peculiar path
to modernity, departing from the well-worn path followed by other Western countries. It
is our contention that a similar continuity links the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt with the
present-day policies of the Federal Republic of Germany toward Russia. This peculiar
path is marked by a primacy of foreign policy, though buttressed by domestic economic
and political concerns, most notably energy policy.
Whatever the original good
intentions of Brandt and his advisors, however, it now seems clear that the policy
provided borrowed time for the Soviet bloc, and that the evolution of Ostpolitik in recent
decades has had many unfortunate consequences not envisioned by its creators.
There are three main factors that we shall consider in the development of
Ostpolitik, before turning to the policy’s later development. The first is Willy Brandt’s
own childhood and youth, as well as the early years of his involvement in the left wing of
the Social Democratic party, first as a rising star in the party’s youth movement, and then
in exile in Norway from the Nazi regime. These early years were punctuated by a series
of dramatic events that had a profound effect on the development of Brandt’s
Weltanschauung, but also served as fodder for his later political opponents, who sought
to emphasize his obscure and humble background and revolutionary convictions. The
second factor is the political experience of Brandt and his entourage in the 1950’s and
1960’s as Brandt rose to the leadership of the SPD, against the background of shifts in the
Cold War order in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe that occurred particularly after
Stalin’s death in 1953 and eventually led to a rethinking of the Federal Republic’s eastern
policy. Finally, we shall consider the gradual transformations that were already under
way in German society by the early 1970’s, and which continue to the present day, in
particular the growing awareness among younger generations of Germans of the extent
of the Holocaust and the crimes committed in the occupied Soviet Union during the
Second World War. All of these factors contributed to a remarkable sea change in
German policy toward Russia, driven by a combination of good intentions, economic
interests, and Realpolitik, but having a long-term impact that has not always been in
Germany’s best interest.
Willy Brandt, born Herbert Ernst Karl Frahm, was the only child of a single
mother and had no contact with his father, though he had a close relationship with his
maternal grandfather. For someone born in the conservative German society of the early
twentieth century, this was a real stigma, and it left Brandt with a lifelong craving for
love and acceptance, both in his personal life and in his political career. That this
acceptance was not always forthcoming should come as no surprise. In a milieu bound
by rigid social conventions, Brandt’s illegitimacy was a considerable handicap, but as his
own subsequent career demonstrates, hardly an insurmountable one.
However, his
political opponents never hesitated to raise the issue of his illegitimacy, usually in
indirect fashion, and this bastard child was constantly subjected to reminders that he was
an outsider and an interloper.2
Contributing to the sense of betrayal and disillusionment on the part of the young
man was his involvement in the turbulent decade of the 1930’s in the Social Democratic
party, which drew disapproval from teachers and other authority figures in his life.
Brandt’s bitterest disappointment, however, was reserved for the aging Socialist
leadership, which dithered in the face of the rising threat from the National Socialists and
refused any suggestion of cooperation with their rivals to the left, the Communists . The
2
Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen (Frankfurt a. M.: Propyläen, 1989), __. Brandt published two memoirs, one
shortly after leaving office, and this one in 1989.
divisions between Social Democrats and Communists were deeply rooted, extending
back to the bloody suppression of the Spartacist uprising in Berlin by a Socialist
government in 1919. The opposition between the two parties was exacerbated by the rise
of Stalin, and the slavish devotion of the German Communist Party, or KPD, to
Moscow’s directives. In the early 1930’s, German Communists were referring to the
Social Democrats as “Social Fascists,” and indeed considered the latter as even worse
than the Nazis. The failure of Socialists and Communists to patch up their differences in
the early 1930’s, though probably inevitable, had profound and disastrous consequences.
Brandt and other young Socialists were growing increasingly alarmed at the
inaction of the SPD. Many chose to go over to the Communists who, like the Nazis, were
reaching a high water mark of support in the early 1930’s. Brandt himself chose to join
the Sozialistische Arbeiter Partei in 1931, hoping that a third way could achieve unity on
the left and bring down the Nazis. The capitulation of the Socialist-dominated Prussian
state government to demands for dissolution by a right-wing Reich government in the
summer of 1932 was a profound shock for Brandt and his comrades. Within six months,
a coalition of conservative elites, hoping to harness Nazi electoral support, had
maneuvered Hitler into power. The Social Democratic leaders refused to take effective
action, though Brandt and others were convinced that a general strike or even a broad
uprising against the new government would have been eagerly welcomed by the party
rank and file. Within a few months the SPD was smashed, many of its leaders arrested
and the party organization driven underground.3 Brandt was fortunate in being able to
flee into exile in Norway, adopting the pseudonym of Willy Brandt which became his
nom de guerre.
While in exile, Brandt had plenty of time to mull over the failures of his Social
Democratic elders and the increasingly alarming results of their hesitation. The failure
of German Social Democrats and Communists to put aside their differences and combine
their forces in the face of the Nazi peril was, for Brandt, the Urkatastrophe, the primal
disaster that was the catalyst for all subsequent catastrophes.
During the thirties, with
Norway as his base of operations, Brandt took part in the operations of the Sopade, the
3
Brandt, Erinnerungen, 93-95.
underground organization of the SPD, in Prague, Paris, and even in Berlin. Brandt was
able to observe developments in the Soviet Union, where by 1936 Stalin’s purges were
under way. Any doubts Brandt may have had about the Communists were dissipated as a
result of his brief service among Republican forces in Barcelona in the Spanish Civil
War, where he witnessed their suicidal insistence on controlling the government and their
ruthlessness in dealing with other parties of the left. Such intransigence contributed to
the final defeat of the Republican cause in Spain. The signing of the Nazi-Soviet NonAggression Pact in August 1939 removed whatever remaining illusions Brandt and others
of his generation might have had about Stalin’s Soviet Union.
At the same time, however, Brandt himself was moving away from his more
radical earlier beliefs toward a more pragmatic, reformist socialism, influenced not least
by his experiences with Norwegian Social Democracy, which from his point of view
successfully combined the best elements of reformism and revolution.4 Brandt, unlike
many of his comrades on the left, was never very interested in the fine points of
revolutionary theory.
He liked to remind his fellow socialists that ordinary people
preferred mundane things like eating, drinking, romance, and playing football. And so, in
spite of his deep dislike of the Communists, Brandt never abandoned hope that they
would return to the fold and recognize the error of their ways. His rage for the absent
father—his own, the leadership of the Social Democrats, and later political father
figures—far exceeded his loathing for the wayward comrade. Once it began to become
clear to Brandt and his advisors that Stalinism was a thing of the past, and that a more
pragmatic (though still brutal and authoritarian) brand of Communism was in power, they
convinced themselves that it was possible to do business with the Soviets and their East
European clients.5
After all, how could any outcome from cooperation with the
Communists possibly be worse than the coming to power of the Nazis? Many of the
apparent contradictions of Brandt’s subsequent political career become less puzzling if
we keep these assumptions in mind, whether Brandt was fully aware of them or not.
4
5
Brandt, Erinnerungen, 106.
Contrast this with the statement by Kurt Schumacher, the older SPD leader, that the Communists were
“rotlackierte Nazis.” Manfred Uschner, Die Ostpolitik der SPD: Sieg und Niederlage einer Strategie
(Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1991).
Following the German invasion of Norway in 1940, Brandt went into exile a
second time in Sweden, but also became an active member of the Norwegian resistance.
This too counted against him in the ferocious political campaigns of the 1960’s. The
growing revelations of war crimes committed by the Germans profoundly shocked
Brandt and his fellow exiles, and left a lasting mark on many anti-Nazis of his generation.
The awareness of German guilt and the desire for atonement became one of the leitmotifs
of Brandt’s chancellorship, just as the legacy of German racial and occupation policy in
the east raised considerable obstacles to the implementation of Ostpolitik.
The Development of Ostpolitik
Brandt’s postwar political career, of course, centered in West Berlin, where he succeeded
Ernst Reuter as mayor in 1957. As a rising star in the opposition SPD, and the head of
government in the western half of the divided city, Brandt was a figure to be reckoned
with by the ruling Christian Democrats. Most important among the latter was Konrad
Adenauer, often a bitter political rival, but driven by the circumstances to form a close
working relationship with the younger man. This unlikely pairing was undoubtedly
another source of rejection and humiliation for Brandt. In spite of being political rivals, it
is clear from Brandt’s memoirs that he looked up to Adenauer, and also saw him as a
masterful politician. However, Adenauer never forgot that he was dealing with a political
rival, referring to Brandt in the contentious 1961 elections as “Brandt, né Frahm” for
example.
Brandt begins his first volume of memoirs, published in the mid-1970’s, with the
Berlin crisis of 1961, giving the reader the impression that the episode marked a radical
break with his earlier thinking about eastern policy. In reality, there was a certain degree
of awareness on the part of Brandt and his circle that there had been missed opportunities
for a resolution of the “German question” and a host of other issues that centered on the
triangle of Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin, notably following the death of Stalin in 1953 and
Khrushchev’s “thaw” of the late fifties. However, the Berlin Crisis and the building of
the Wall convinced Brandt and his advisors that the existing Ostpolitik of the Federal
Republic was a cul de sac, and that a thoroughgoing re-evaluation was necessary, not
least because of ordinary families and friends who now found themselves on opposite
sides of the Wall. The prevailing Hallstein Doctrine, whereby the Federal Republic
refused to recognize the existence of the German Democratic Republic and severed
relations with those countries that recognized the latter (such as Yugoslavia in 1957) was
clearly outmoded, but what would take its place?
Brandt and his advisors did not, for the most part, seek precedents in the foreign
policy of the Social Democrats before 1933. The SPD in the period of the Weimar
Republic did not concern itself with foreign policy issues to the same extent as the
“bourgeois” parties. For Brandt, the most useful milestones included the Treaty of
Rapallo of 1922 between Germany and the Soviet Union, most closely associated with
Walther Rathenau, which brought about rapprochement between two pariah powers in the
aftermath of the First World War, while also bringing extremely useful trade and military
links. Equally important was Gustav Stresemann’s policy of establishing closer relations
with France in the mid-1920’s, a plan that faced formidable obstacles, but which bore real
fruit by the end of the decade. These constructive efforts at engagement found their echo
in Ostpolitik. 6
Brandt was hardly alone in believing that a new vision of the Federal Republic’s
relations with its eastern neighbors was necessary. In formulating the Neue Ostpolitik, he
had important input from his inner circle of advisors. Foremost among these was Egon
Bahr, his press secretary. As a journalist, Bahr was acutely aware of the need for a
sustained campaign to sell Ostpolitik to a skeptical public. Bahr shared Brandt’s realist
perspective on the Soviet bloc, noting in his memoirs that he no longer feared
communism because it was based on pure coercion rather than ideology.7 He also
believed that the failure to recognize eastern realities under Adenauer had merely allowed
the East German government to consolidate itself.8 Attempts to rise up against Soviet
control, in East Berlin in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, were
6
Brandt, Erinnerungen, 178-179. A more somber vision of Rapallo can be found in Peter Krüger, “A
Rainy Day, April 16, 1922: The Rapallo Treaty and the Cloudy Perspective for German Foreign Policy,” in
Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922, ed. by Carole Fink, Axel Frohn, and Jürgen
Heideking (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
7
Egon Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit (Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag, 1996), 139-140.
8
Ibid., 154-155.
put down with violence and did not lead to constructive outcomes. It was Bahr who
coined the phrase Wandel durch Annäherung (transformation through rapprochement)
that represented the essence of the thinking behind Brandt’s Ostpolitik. One of Brandt’s
key advisors on policy toward the Soviets was the prominent Sovietologist Richard
Löwenthal. Löwenthal was struck by the transformations that had occurred in the Soviet
system since Stalin’s death, and the apparent pragmatism and relative moderation of the
Soviet leadership under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. As he described it, the Soviet regime
was an “authoritarian bureaucratic oligarchy” rather than a “totalitarian” system, and was
driven by more traditional economic, security, and domestic political issues rather than
ideology.9
Implementing Ostpolitik
The centerpiece of Ostpolitik for Brandt and his advisors was, of course, the
improvement of relations between West and East Germany, and subsequent investigators
have also focused on this aspect of the program. However, we are concerned primarily
with relations between Germany and Russia, so we shall devote our attentions to what
Brandt considered a preliminary step, though a very important one. Brandt recognized
that “the road to Berlin goes through Moscow,” and that no alteration of the existing
landscape of relations in Central Europe was possible without Moscow’s approval. The
obstacles on both sides to a normalization of relations were considerable, but there was
also a mutual desire for rapprochement.
Even Konrad Adenauer recognized the
necessity. In one of his last public speeches, before a gathering of Christian Democratic
deputies, Adenauer made the rather elemental observation that Russians feared Germans
because of the millions of dead caused by the German invasion of the Soviet Union in
1941. Many in the audience apparently assumed that der Alte was losing his grip on
reality.10 However, the coming of age of a younger generation in Germany, beginning in
the late 1960’s, was bringing profound cultural changes in its wake, not least a growing
awareness of the crimes of war committed by German troops and occupation authorities
9
10
See, for example, Richard Löwenthal, Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1974).
Brandt, Erinnerungen, 43.
in the occupied Soviet Union. The early stages of this transformation coincided with the
period of Brandt’s period in power, 1969-1974. It is crucial to keep this in mind when
considering the long-term consequences of Brandt’s foreign policy.
Brandt’s accounts of his meetings with the Soviet leadership provide some of the
most interesting passages in his memoirs, not least in the light that they cast on Brandt’s
own attitudes, perceptions, and understandings. One factor that is quite striking, in the
light of later developments, is that Brandt tends to downplay the importance of trade and
investment in describing the genesis and implementation of Ostpolitik, when in fact these
considerations bore considerable weight.
The Soviet leaders, by contrast, even in
Brandt’s version, are clearly fixated on the concrete benefits of improved relations and
the prospects that Russo-German cooperation offered, particularly in the exploitation of
natural resources. “Neither of us is a welfare organization,” Alexei Kossygin confided to
Brandt, and Leonid Brezhnev was even more forthcoming in his pragmatic approach to
economic issues.11
Nevertheless, one has the impression that for Brandt, economic
interests were a secondary consideration in comparison with other concerns.
The relationship between Brandt and Brezhnev is striking, not least because they
seemed to have no trouble finding common ground. Though too polite to mention it in
his memoirs, while serving as foreign minister in Kurt-Georg Kiesinger’s coalition
cabinet (1966-1969), Brandt often became physically ill while sitting in the same room as
Kiesinger, a former member of the Nazi party. Brandt found Brezhnev, however, “nicht
unsympathisch,” while Brezhnev later stated that Brandt was his favorite head of state to
work with.12 Brezhnev might express admiration for Stalin,13 while Brandt might convey
concerns about the fate of dissidents,14 but neither allowed such unpleasant topics to mar
the conversation. The tone was cordial, and at times quite jovial. The outcome was
highly satisfactory for both sides. The Federal Republic received a green light for
initiatives to normalize relations with the German Democratic Republic and other East
11
Ibid., 205, 210-211.
12
Ibid., 198.
13
14
Ibid., 197.
Ibid., 204-205.
Bloc countries, as well as long-term commitments for German investment, technological
expertise, and equipment for the exploitation of oil and natural gas in Siberia and
elsewhere in the Soviet Union. The Soviets received tacit German recognition of their
sphere of influence in eastern Europe (a prelude to the later Helsinki Accords), as well as
the investment and human capital they needed to develop their energy resources. The
fortuitous onset of the Energy Crisis in 1973-1974 added the glow of wisdom and
prudence to the proceedings, ex post facto. It may well prove that the elements of the
agreements between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union concerning energy
exploitation, which were of great concern to the Soviet leadership but less so to Brandt,
are the most important legacy of Ostpolitik in the present day.
The increasing
profitability to German firms of these arrangements did much to mute the hostile
reception to Ostpolitik by the Christian Democrats.15 In the aftermath of the Oil Embargo
in 1973-1974, the Federal Republic had, in effect, traded energy dependency on one part
of the globe for another.
Interdependence with the USSR
Much as many aspects of Ostpolitik were laudable for their effect at the time,
particularly the human rights improvement for East Germans, but also the necessary
break with the needlessly inflexible Hallstein Doctrine, the policy was not unproblematic
even then. Although Henry Kissinger was for a long time supportive, and French
President Georges Pompidou’s concerns that Brandt’s focus on Ostpolitik would lead to a
lessening of West Germany’s commitment to European integration proved unfounded,
the policy did lead to a certain unease among Germany’s partners and allies in the West.16
Whereas Adenauer’s policy towards the USSR had been one of Western strength as the
basis for any rapprochement, Brandt was far more willing to seek economic
interdependence in order to secure a change in Russian behavior. As we have already
seen, the increase in economic links between the USSR and the FRG, especially, as we
15
Clay Clemens, Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1989).
16
It should also be noted, that Brandt did to some extent force French acquiescence to Ostpolitik by
linking this with German contributions to the EC Common Agricultural Policy, a policy with serious
problems of its own, but one of immense importance to France.
have seen, in the energy field, served that end.
In many ways Brandt’s Ostpolitik was quite in line with the general tendency towards
Détente in the early 1970s, at which time the conventional wisdom was that through
increased exchange between the blocs stability would spread. In a sense it also fitted well
with the notion of Europe coming into its own as a new form of ‘civilian power’, using
economic means towards creating interdependence in the world and eventually
“domesticating” relations between states.17 Indeed, it could well be argued that Brandt’s
policy was a sophisticated attempts at playing several policy dimensions in order to
achieve a recasting of Germany’s international relations. However the willingness of
Willy Brandt to create such close interdependence between the economies of the Soviet
Union and the Federal Republic was some way ahead of what anybody else were doing,
even at the time of Détente. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did indeed seek to
promote trade with the Soviet Union, offering grain exports and non-weapons sensitive
high technology as part of their linkage strategy. But the US linkage strategy clearly
envisaged certain quid pro quos, and led to tangible outcomes, in terms of enlisting the
Soviets in ending the war in Vietnam and in securing the first SALT treaty. Brandt’s
Ostpolitik tended to be more geared towards offering concessions to the Soviets in the
fields they most wanted, energy exports and recognition of the Post World War II
borders, without getting much concrete in return. And some of these concessions would
come back to haunt the NATO block as a whole within a decade of Brandt’s policies
being enacted.
Already by the late 1960s the Soviet economy was entering its terminal decline. To a
large extent, it was the unexpected windfall from increased prices on its oil and gas
exports following the 1973 oil crisis that allowed it to limp on into the 1980s. But even as
the Soviet Union was raking in money as a result of this crisis, it didn’t translate into
economic growth.18 While Soviet economic reporting was always suspect, it was clear to
observers, even at the time, that something was not right with the Soviet economy. Thus
17
Francois Dûchene, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Mayne, Richard (ed.) Europe Tomorrow: 16
Europeans Look Ahead, London: Chatham House, 1972, pp. 32-47.& ‘The European Community and the
Uncertainties of Interdependence’, in Kohnstamm, Max & Hager, Wolfgang (eds.) A Nation Writ Large?
Foreign Policy Problems Before the European Community. London: MacMillan, 1973, p. 1-21.
1972, 1973,
18
John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, 2005.
by seeking closer links with the Soviet Union in possibly the only field where they had
something of real value to export, and in the process becoming dependent on these
exports, the policy of the FRG essentially amounted to propping up the Soviet economy
just as it was weakening. Possibly, Brandt saw this as a price worth paying for the
political gains he secured, but it certainly did nothing to hasten the end of the Cold War.
Quite to the contrary, it may have allowed for the Soviet military adventurism of the later
Brezhnev years. It did, however, undermine the solidarity of the Western block in terms
of economic policy, as became even clearer in the 1980s, as the Reagan administration
sought to isolate the Soviet Union economically. One plank of this policy was to lower
the world prices on energy, something achieved through tacit agreements with Saudi
Arabia, thus starving the Soviet economy of Western currency on which it was
increasingly reliant. However the FRG, once set on the path of close energy relations
with the USSR, could not easily accept such a policy. Instead of joining in the US effort,
the energy relationship was further developed through the 1980s.19
What made the energy interdependence between the FRG and the Soviet Union so
problematic was that from a wider political perspective it was an unnecessary concession
too far. The several concessions inherent in the main outreach parts of Ostpolitik, the
abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine, the formal recognition of the till then de facto
borders in Central and Eastern Europe, and the agreement to begin the CSCE process,
provided much ‘red meat’ for the Soviet leadership, and would have been enough to
secure a good few concessions in return on the human rights front. None of that truly
required so extensive integration with the Soviet economy, nor the creation of a
relationship of such asymmetric interdependence. Arguably, the framers of Ostpolitik
failed to fully understand the limitations of a civilian power strategy. As Hedley Bull
forcefully argued, such power is “a contradiction in terms”, since civilian power can only
operate in a strategic climate provided by other, military powers.20 West German policy
did nothing to sustain the balance of power which it was relying on for its freedom of
maneuver. Rather than seeking to mainly strengthening its alliances within NATO, the
19
By then this was not only an SPD policy. The CDU governments of Kohl, partly under pressure from
German business interests, continued this policy. In 1983, Kohl also authorized a loan of 3 billion
Deutschmark to the GDR, thus also staving off financial collapse for that regime.
20
Hedley Bull, ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms’, Journal of Common Market Studies,
FRG was to a certain extent backing both sides in the Cold War, by striking these
bilateral deals with the Soviet Union.
Ostpolitik and the Cold War Refreeze
Willy Brandt left office under a cloud in 1974, his private secretary having been
exposed as an East German spy, and his problems with alcoholism, womanizing and
depression coming under increased scrutiny. However he retained his position as leader
of the SDP, and thus continued to exert significant influence on politics, during the
chancellorship of his party colleague Helmut Schmidt. From this position Brandt
continued arguing for pursuit of Ostpolitik, even as Détente was coming apart and the
Cold War entered the ‘refreeze’ period.
The developments of the late 1970s, particularly the Soviet deployment of SS-20
missiles in its satellite states, with the potential of ‘decoupling’ US and Western
European security interests, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, gradually
pushed Schmidt moved in a more hawkish direction. NATO’s Double Track Decision of
late 1979, envisaging a buildup of NATO INF if negotiations would not succeed in
having the SS-20s removed by 1983, largely came about as a result of Schmidt’s
initiatives and ability to persuade the Carter administration to take this course. Brandt, on
the other hand, remained committed to the idea of further Western concessions to the
USSR to induce better behavior. Although he publicly professed loyalty to Schmidt’s
policies, he nevertheless did work to create dissent internally in the SDP. The resulting
split in the party would eventually undermine Schmidt’s position to the point that the
governing coalition collapsed in the autumn of 1982. No sooner was Schmidt out of
power than Brandt came out openly against the implementation of the Double Track
Decision, aligning himself with the Peace Movement, and pushing the SDP Congress to
adopt a stance that completely repudiated Schmidt’s policies of the previous years.21 That
this development did not become a problem to the point of the FRG being unable to live
up to its commitments was largely thanks to the leadership of Helmut Kohl’s CDU
government, which pushed the final decision in favor of the Pershing deployment through
21 (2), 1982, pp. 149-182.
21
Noel D. Cary, ‘Reassessing Germany’s Ostpolitik. Part 2: From Refreeze to Reunification’, Central
the Bundestag in late 1983. But not before the NATO alliance had been strained almost to
breaking point.
To fully understand the danger of the policy pursued by Brandt during these years, it is
worthwhile to briefly consider a counterfactual. Had the SDP been successful in blocking
the implementation of the Double Track Decision, it would certainly have been taken by
Kremlin hardliners as a vindication of their strategy, and might well have strengthened
their position against the reformist element. Inside NATO, the fallout from the FRG
backing out of its commitment would have been devastating, tearing years of common
strategies to pieces, undermining mutual trust, and shattering all pretensions towards a
common sense of purpose. Brandt and Bahr, of course, had by this time moved in a
direction of seeing the potential for recasting the alliance systems in Europe through
further outreach towards the Soviet Union. In this analysis NATO was already becoming
an anachronism, and needed to be transformed into a “security partnership”, thus
overcoming the divisions at the superpower level.22 Naturally, given the inherent
weakness of the Soviet Union’s command economy, and the regime’s lack of genuine
legitimacy in the eyes of its own people, it may well be argued that the Cold War would
most likely have ended the way it did anyway. But it would probably not have happened
as soon as it did, and the story would certainly have been rather different.
Ostpolitik as Western Soft Power
What many defenders of Ostpolitik have pointed, and which Brandt himself envisaged
as a major strength of the policy, was the way in which it would open up Eastern Europe
to Western influence. In a modern expression, it would allow the West to expose the East
to its ‘soft power’. As defined by Joseph Nye, soft power is “the ability to get others to
want what you want”, mainly through the shaping of others’ perceptions of a country and
its values.23 Greater cultural exchange and increased openness between the blocs would
achieve this aim. Willy Brandt’s visit to Erfurt in 1970, during which his hotel came
under virtual siege from excited East Germans chanting his name, served as a reminder to
European History, 33(3) 2000, p.372.
22
Ibid. p. 375.
23 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 2004, p. x.
the East German leadership of just how shallow foundations their state truly rested.24
But a serious question can nonetheless be raised as to whether the soft power exposure
the gained through Ostpolitik was truly what shook the socialist systems. An argument
can possibly be made that this was the case in the GDR. After all, the two Germanys
were not, in Willy Brandt’s words, foreign countries to each other. West German culture
played well in the East, with most people in the GDR being able to watch West German
TV. But soft power, in Joseph Nye’s sense, is not only derived through cultural appeal. It
is in equal measure derived from the policies a state pursues and the consistency with
which it does it. Timothy Garton Ash argues that the policy of Ostpolitik was less about
changing regimes in either the GDR or Eastern Europe as whole, than it was about
playing to the domestic gallery.25 In fact, if the purpose of creating contacts was to
gradually undermine the regimes in Eastern Europe, it is striking how little it translated
into actual support for dissident movements in Eastern Europe, such as the Polish
Solidarity Movement. In many ways, it seemed a greater premium was placed on stability
in relations between the rulers on both sides, rather than change in the Eastern bloc.26 If
so, it goes somewhat against the logic of soft power.
None of this is to say that Western soft power did not play an enormous role in
undermining the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. The lure of Western culture,
everything from films to rock music to fashion design, was clear, just as was the
attraction of the Western way of life and its perceived affluence and freedom. But in
Eastern Europe, outside the GDR, it was by far American soft power that was most
noticeable. As important an element of soft power as culture is, however, policies can not
be dismissed as being of equal importance. Brandt, in his memoirs, dismissed the notion
that the West’s confrontational stance in the early 1980s had contributed to the end of the
Cold War.27 Yet it was Western leaders like Margaret Thatcher in 1987 and Ronald
Reagan in 1988, both of whom had taken very principled stands against communism, that
were mobbed by the crowds on the streets of Moscow. Outside of Germany, Eastern
Europeans hold Western leaders like those in higher esteem than they do Willy Brandt
24 Mary Elise Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, 2001, p.
25
Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 1993.
26
Noel D. Cary, ‘Reassessing Germany’s Ostpolitik. Part 1: From Détente to Refreeze’, Central European
History, 33(2), 2000, pp. 249-250.
and those who thought like him.
As Brandt himself declared at the outset of his Ostpolitik, “the road to Berlin goes
through Moscow.” And so it proved; the Cold War ultimately came to an end, and the
Berlin Wall fell as a result of a change in outlook in Moscow. It was Mikhail Gorbachev
who renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, and gradually opened up for the democratic
revolutions that would sweep Eastern Europe in the summer and autumn of 1989. But it
was leaders like Thatcher and Reagan who made the breakthrough with Gorbachev. In
East Germany, Erich Honecker was one of the last holdouts against the winds of change,
trying to stave off the inevitable, seeking even at the very end to enlist Soviet help in
cracking down on the growing protests.28 Only when it became clear that no such help
was forthcoming did the Socialist Unity Party depose Erich Honecker. Although Brandt
and Bahr had argued through the 1980s, that Germans must be in control of their own
destiny, it was ultimately events elsewhere - with which Ostpolitik had had little do; in
fact, may even have made more difficult – the abandonment of Détente, and a more
effective combination of sticks and carrots, that led to the developments which opened
the door to German Reunification.
Continuing patterns from Ostpolitik
Although the Cold War ended, and Germany was reunified, the concept of Ostpolitik,
or of a special German approach to dealing with Russia, has continued to be a powerful
part of German foreign policy. And many of the patterns observable then continue to be
seen today. Just as West Germany was one of the Soviet Union’s most important trading
partners, united Germany has remained so for the Russian Federation. Throughout the
1990s, Germany continued seeking close economic ties with Russia, attempting to
support the process of Russian “normalization”. Under the leadership of Helmut Kohl
until 1998, though, the relationship remained fully within the bounds of Germany’s
commitments to closer Western integration.
That started changing after the election of Gerhard Schröder of the SDP to the
chancellorship in 1998. Announcing that Germany under his leadership would follow a
more pragmatic political course in its foreign policy, it would place its own national
27
Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics, 2000, pp. 321-322.
interests more centrally than had hitherto been the case.29 Central to this pursuit of
national interest has been the close relationship with Russia. Germany was a driving force
behind the crafting of a common EU strategy on Russia in the late 1990s, and remains
today one of the leading proponents of closer ties between the two. However since the
beginning of Schröder’s second term in office, the special relationship with Russia has
especially been nurtured through bilateral deals. Personal involvement by the two
countries’ leaders was instrumental in bringing this about. Echoing the Brandt-Brezhnev
relationship of the 1970s, the personal rapport and camaraderie between Gerhard
Schröder and Vladimir Putin was noticeable.30 The rapport was established early in
Putin’s presidency, and was strengthened further when the two ganged up with France to
oppose the US-led invasion of Iraq in early 2003. In political terms the parallel to the
early 1980s is also striking: Just like the SDP government then declined to condemn
Poland’s imposition of martial law in late 1981,31 so Gerhard Schröder emerged as
arguably the most fervent defender (with only Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi as a possible rival
for the honor) of Russia’s human rights record under Vladimir Putin.32
Energy policy has, more than shared geopolitical outlooks, been the main glue of the
relationship. German remains Russia’s main export market, its consumption of Russian
energy resources having steadily increased, today amounting to some 25% of the total
energy mix. Justifying the close intertwining of the two countries’ economies, FrankWalter Steinmeier – a former chief of staff for Gerhard Schröder, and as foreign minister,
and thus chief guarantor for continued Ostpolitik, in Angela Merkel’s Grand coalition coined his own variation on Bahr’s old dictum of change through rapprochement, now
calling it “Annäherung durch Verflechtung” (“rapprochement through interlocking”).33
But the implication of this bilateral relationship is felt beyond the two partners. As Russia
has in recent years become more wont to use energy deliveries as a political weapon
28
Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1995.
Graham Timmins, ’German Ostpolitik under the Red-Green Coalition and EU-Russian Relations’,
Debatte, 14(3), 2006, p. 301-302.
30
In his memoirs, Schröder even described Vladimir Putin as a “flawless democrat”, while considering
George Bush an altogether more sinister character.
31
Cary, part 1, op. cit., pp. 249-250.
32
Timmins, op.cit. p. 311.
33
Constanze Stelzenmüller, ’Germany’s Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe’, Foreign Affairs,
Mar/Apr2009, Vol. 88, Issue 2, pp. 89-100
29
against neighboring countries, including some of the newer EU member states, energy
policy has become an issue of EU-wide importance.34 Yet Germany’s response to
Russian bullying of Ukraine and others has been to involve itself even more closely in
Russia’s energy policy.35 Instead of seeking to strengthen the EU’s energy policy, as
might have been the response in the past, Germany has emerged as one of the main
blocks to closer integration in this area. Developing the North Stream Project as a
bilateral solution to the problem of getting caught up in Russia’s conflicts with other
countries, rather than going the multilateral route, has caused no small amount
consternation among Germany’s Eastern European partners.
The cost to European unity
Just like as the framers of the original Ostpolitik steadfastly maintained that their
actions were for the good of Europe, so the makers of modern German policy insist the
same for their seeking of integration with Russia. Yet the German definition of a
‘European’ interest is not uncontroversial. What German decision makers see as outreach
and engagement with Russia, is by many others seen as undue deference to Russian
interests. In many ways Germany has been a blocking influence on developments of the
EU, which might have run counter to the interests of the bilateral relationship. Likewise,
Germany’s continued pursuit of an Ostpolitik, and concessions to Russian sensitivities,
has served to compromise the security of Europe’s neighbors, leading to significant
strains in both the EU and NATO, and, in some quarters, to a diminishing of Germany’s
reputation as a trustworthy partner.
For a number of years now, the European Commission has been tabling proposals for a
more common energy policy, opening the markets and integrating supply networks. Such
proposals have largely stalled, not least due to the resistance of the larger EU members.
In many ways, European energy policy resembles a large-scale prisoner’s dilemma; with
the larger members, Germany leading among them, being mostly keen to accept ‘sweet
34
See Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the West, 2nd edition,
London: Bloomabury, 2009.
35
Christopher S. Chivvis & Thomas Rid, ‘The roots of Germany’s Russia Policy’, Survival, 51(2) 2009, p.
111-112.
deals’ from Russia, often to the detriment of their smaller partners and the Union as a
whole.36 Russia is, of course, pleased enough to conduct its business via bilateral
channels, rather than engage the Brussels bureaucracy directly. Yet the willingness of
powerful Western states to play along these lines has allowed Moscow to play a deft
game of divide and rule in Europe.
While it would, naturally, be wholly unfair to suggest that Germany takes its cue from
Moscow, or that the definition of Germany’s national interest is done anywhere but in
Berlin, the closeness of the relationship has certainly led Germany to develop a very keen
sensitivity to Russian concerns in a number of important ways not always conducive to
wider European security. The plans of the Bush administration to build a missile defense
shield, partly on sites in Poland and the Czech Republic were met with criticism for not
taking sufficient account of Russia’s view on the matter.37 When the plan was later
shelved by the Obama administration, there were few tears shed in Berlin. A proposal for
the EU to become involved in solving Georgia’s frozen conflicts in 2005, by posting a
minor contingent of unarmed monitors in the region, and thus warding off any potential
escalation in the region, was vetoed by France and Germany, for the reason that Russia
was opposed to the move.38 When the issue of granting MAP status to Ukraine and
Georgia came up for discussion at the infamous NATO summit in Bucharest in April
2008, Germany was the leading country blocking the move.39 Although this latter stance
was justified in terms of it being too soon, and doubts about the credibility of any NATO
commitment to these countries, the combined effect of these two moves was to make the
war of August 2008 more, not less, likely. Yet when the war came, many German policy
makers felt vindicated for not having opened the door to NATO, and resistance to further
enlargement of the alliance has strengthened across the political spectrum.40 In a similar
vein, Germany continued espousing, even after the war in Georgia, the conventional postCold War wisdom that Europe faced no territorial threat, hence the need for NATO
36
Mark Leonard & Nicu Popescu, A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations, European Council of Foreign
Relations, pp. 31-36.
37
Chivvis & Rid, op.cit. p. 108.
38
Vladimir Socor, ‘ France Leads The EU's Nyet To Georgia Border Monitoring’, Eurasia Daily Monitor,
2(76), 18 April 2005, http://www.jamestown.org.
39
See Ron Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West, New
York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2010, pp. 111-140.
40
Chivvis & Rid, op.cit. p. 108.
contingency planning for the Baltic states was unnecessary. Only a very public stance to
the opposite effect by the Obama administration made Germany change its view on the
matter in the spring of 2010.41
In the context of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, Germany’s insistence
on conducting its own policy towards Russia, in spite of misgivings from several
partners, has not made the emergence of the EU as an effective international actor –
always a troubled prospect – any easier. Germany has consistently been among the most
restrained in criticizing Russian behavior in Chechnya and elsewhere, or its human rights
record in general. This tendency led to some debate in Germany during Schröder’s
chancellorship, but Angela Merkel’s line since 2005 has not been markedly harsher.
When, in August 2008, the European Council discussed imposing sanctions on Russia in
response to its invasion of Georgia earlier that month, Germany was resistant to giving
such sanctions real teeth, and among the fiercest for getting even the weak sanctions
agreed lifted again in double quick time – without the conditions set having actually been
met. The overriding imperative, even against clear evidence of Russia’s aggressive
treatment of its neighbors, has been that Russia must not feel isolated.42 During the past
year, Russia and Germany have together peddled plans for a new EU-Russian “Security
Committee” to handle frozen conflicts on the continent.43 This seemingly without much
thought to the fact that Russia is the main force keeping those conflicts alive.
The attitude towards the prospect of further eastwards enlargement – in the region
Russia terms its “Near Abroad” - has also remained consistently negative from the
Schröder to the Merkel governments. Off the record, Commission officials largely
attribute the difficulties in upgrading the Union’s relationship with Ukraine to German
opposition to any such moves.44 Although such resistance is usually presented as being
for reasons of the Eastern CIS states’ lack of readiness for EU membership, the suspicion
that Russian sensitivity about the matter is also a factor is not far below the surface for
41
42
‘Guess who’s coming for dinner?’, The Economist, 9th of April 2010.
Chivvis & Rid, op.cit. p. 118.
43
Andrew Rettman, ‘Germany and Russia call for new EU security committee’, EUObserver.com, 7th of
June 2010
44
‘Questions abound over Ukraine's European future’, Euractiv.com, 31st of July 2009.
those Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004. Whether or not
this German position amounts to a tacit acknowledgement that spheres of influence do
after all exist in Europe, it certainly is a far cry from the European values Germany
claims to be espousing. When Willy Brandt launched Ostpolitik, he did so arguing that
Germany had a duty to the “hostage nations” in Eastern Europe, but was accused by his
political opponents of accepting the Cold War status quo. Today keeping the door to
European integration firmly shut to countries still seeking their way out from under
Russia’s thumb, for the sake of maintaining good relations with an authoritarian Russia,
does, in an odd way, bring the Ostpolitik of the past forty years full circle.
Conclusion
The aim of Brandt’s Ostpolitik and the ideas it was meant to serve should not be
dismissed out of hand. The desire for normalization on the part of many ordinary
Germans, spurred by memories of German crimes in the Second World War, is a
perfectly understandable, even laudable, development. Unfortunately, the road to hell is
paved with good intentions. Ostpolitik may well have bestowed on the Soviet system
(and not least the German Democratic Republic) a certain legitimacy and a new lease on
life, without dramatically improving the lives of their citizens. It did not make the world
any safer or more peaceful, nor did it significantly help the spread of democracy. At best,
Brandt’s achievements, which won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971, now appear to be
a decidedly mixed bag.
The gains of the policy now seem rather marginal when set against the problems it
created both at the time, but particularly over the longer term. And these problems have
come to bedevil not just modern Germany, but the whole European Union. In the final
analysis, Willy Brandt’s visionary Ostpolitik stands as an example of the folly of seeking
interdependence with powers whose goals are opposing your own. Germany has certainly
reaped significant economic rewards from the policy. However, it and other European
states now find themselves increasingly tied to a problematic eastern power as their prime
energy source, and are unable to craft successful common policies for dealing with this
power. The legacy of this Cold War era policy is still very much with us.