On the Relation Between Metaphor and Simile:
When Comparison Fails
SAM GLUCKSBERG AND CATRINEL HAUGHT
Abstract: Since Aristotle, many writers have treated metaphors and similes as equals:
any metaphor can be paraphrased as a simile, and vice-versa. This property of metaphors
is the basis for psycholinguistic comparison theories of metaphor comprehension.
However, if metaphors cannot always be paraphrased as similes, then comparison
theories must be abandoned. The different forms of a metaphor—the comparison and
categorical forms—have different referents. In comparison form, the metaphor vehicle
refers to the literal concept, e.g. ‘in my lawyer is like a shark’, the term ‘shark’ refers
to the literal fish. In categorical form, ‘my lawyer is a shark’, ‘shark’ refers to an
abstract (metaphorical) category of predatory creatures. This difference in reference
makes it possible for a metaphor and its corresponding simile to differ (a) in
interpretability and (b) in meaning. Because a metaphor cannot always be understood
in terms of its corresponding simile, we conclude that comparison theories of metaphor
are fundamentally flawed.
Student: ‘I like the clouds …They’re, like, a metaphor.’
Professor: ‘They are a metaphor ... If they were like a metaphor, they’d be,
like, a simile’
(Russo, 1997).
1. Comparison or Categorization?
Contemporary psycholinguistic views of metaphor production and comprehension
fall into two broad classes: comparison and categorization. In the philosophical
literature, those who hold a comparison view see the difference between metaphors
and their corresponding similes as a distinction without a difference: ‘The simile is
also a metaphor. The difference is but slight’ (Aristotle, in Barnes, 1984).1
Comparison theorists, such as Fogelin (1988), are crystal clear on this issue:
We thank Kay Deaux, Geoffrey Goodwin, Phillip Johnson-Laird, Louis Lee, Susanna Reynolds
and the other members of our lab group for their valuable suggestions and comments on the
various drafts of this article.
Address for correspondence: Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton,
NJ 08540 USA.
Email: [email protected]
1
Whether or not Aristotle fully accepted a comparison view is unclear. He can also be read as
sharing a categorization view (Fogelin, 1988; Guttenplan, 2005; Stern, 2000).
Mind & Language, Vol. 21 No. 3 June 2006, pp. 360–378.
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‘A person committed to the comparativist account of metaphor will hold at least these
two theses: I. The literal meaning of a metaphor… is the same as the literal meaning
of the counterpart simile … . II. The figurative meaning of a metaphor…is the
same as the figurative meaning of the counterpart simile’ (p. 29). Hence, an
expression such as ‘my job is a jail’ is functionally equivalent to ‘my job is like a
jail’, differing, perhaps, in rhetorical force.
This view is shared in psycholinguistic comparison theories of metaphor. This
class of theory follows the view in linguistics, psycholinguistics and the philosophy
of language that accords unconditional priority to literal meanings. Any utterance
in any context is first interpreted literally. If the literal interpretation fails to make
sense in that context, or is ‘defective’ in any way (Fogelin, 1988; Searle, 1979),
then a search for an alternative interpretation is made. Metaphors are literally
false—e.g. one’s job cannot literally be a jail—and so an alternative ‘true’ interpretation
is sought. Any two things, even jobs and jails, can be alike in any number of ways,
and so any simile or comparison must be true. Hence, one way to interpret a
metaphor is to convert it into a simile and then work out just how the topic (e.g.
job) and vehicle (e.g. jail) are alike in ways that are relevant in context. More
specifically, the properties of my job and jail are identified, and then a relevant subset
of those properties is selected to constitute the ground of the metaphor (Bowdle and
Gentner, 2005; Ortony, 1979).2 Comparison theories, no matter what their form,
thus rely on the critical assumption that metaphors and similes are essentially
equivalent to one another. A metaphor can always be paraphrased as a simile. Indeed
it must be capable of being expressed in simile form if it is to be understood as
a comparison.
Categorization theories, in contrast, do not rely on this assumption. On the
categorization view, metaphors and similes are understood in their own right: the
metaphor as a categorization assertion, the simile as an assertion of similitude
(Glucksberg, in press; Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990). However, metaphors and
similes are not treated as equivalent assertions, even though it would seem, at first
glance, that a metaphor and its corresponding simile ‘mean’ the same thing.
How can a metaphoric categorization assertion mean the same thing as its
corresponding simile, and is this a necessary property of all metaphors?
1.1 Comparison vs. Categorization: Dual Reference
The very fact that a metaphor may be paraphrased in terms of a simile raises an
important issue, the paradox of unlike things compared. Why is it that metaphors,
which are said to compare two ‘unlike’ things, can be paraphrased as comparisons,
while literal categorical assertions cannot? For example, I can paraphrase ‘my
2
Contemporary comparison theories, such as Gentner’s structure mapping model (1983), are
more sophisticated than the thumbnail sketch provided here. However, the details of any
given comparison model are not relevant to the central issue addressed in this paper, the
relation between metaphors and their corresponding similes.
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S. Glucksberg and C. Haught
lawyer is a shark’ as ‘my lawyer is like a shark’ with no discernible change in
meaning. However, I cannot paraphrase ‘robins are birds’ as ‘robins are like birds’.
As Carston put it, ‘…it makes no … sense to say [of a man] that he is like a human
being, (given that he is one)’ (2002, p. 358). What accounts for this difference
between metaphorical categorical assertions and literal ones such that the former
can be paraphrased as comparisons while the latter cannot?
As we noted above, any two things can be alike in any number of ways.
Analogously, any single thing or concept can be categorized in any number of
ways. Consider the concepts apple, shark, and my lawyer. Both apple and shark
belong to the category of food, sharks are also fish, and sharks and my lawyer can be
categorized as predators, albeit each in their own ways (See Figure 1a). When I say
that my lawyer is like a shark, I am referring to the literal marine creature, the fishshark. When I say that my lawyer is a shark, I am not referring to that literal
creature. Instead, I’m referring to the shark-as-predator, and indeed I can use the
term ‘shark’ to name that category. The term ‘shark’ is polysemous and so can be
used to make dual reference: in the simile it refers to the literal fish-shark, in the
metaphor it refers to the abstract metaphorical category that the literal fish-shark
exemplifies (See Figure 1b). Following Carston (2002), we will denote the literal
shark as shark, and the metaphorical shark as shark* (as well as any ad hoc, constructed
concept as concept*).
FOOD
FISH
PREDATOR
vicious, aggressive,
merciless, etc….
APPLE
SHARK
MY LAWYER
Figure 1a Cross Categorization of Lawyer and Shark.
FOOD
APPLE
FISH
SHARK
SHARK*
vicious, aggressive,
merciless, etc….
MY LAWYER
‘Shark’ used as a metaphor vehicle refers to a type of
thing, whereas used literally it refers to an actual
token, shark.
Figure 1b
Cross Categorization of Lawyer and Shark.
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The paradox of unlike things compared is thus resolved. In literal category
statements, the predicate (the category name) is used to refer at only one level of
abstraction, to the superordinate category level. In metaphors, the metaphor vehicle
has dual reference: it can be used to refer either at the abstract superordinate level
(concept*), or to the basic-level exemplar of that category (concept).3 Metaphor
vehicles are polysemous in this way, with one meaning being a hyponym of the
other. Roger Brown recognized this special characteristic of metaphors when he
wrote ‘Metaphor differs from other superordinate-subordinate relations in that the
superordinate is not given a name of its own. Instead, the name of one subordinate
(i.e. the metaphor vehicle) is extended to the other’ (Brown, 1958, p.140).
Because metaphor vehicles are polysemous in this special way, metaphors can
usually be expressed either as comparisons or as categorical assertions. This implies
that metaphors can also be processed in either of two ways: as comparisons or as
categorizations. Comparison theorists have traditionally argued that metaphors—
whether in simile or categorical form—are always understood and processed as
comparisons. Categorization theorists have argued the reverse: whether in comparison
or categorical form, metaphors are understood and processed as categorizations
(Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990). As usual, extreme views such as these have been
tempered in the face of evidence. There is now general agreement that metaphors
can be processed either as comparisons or as categorizations (Bowdle and Gentner,
2005; Glucksberg, in press). The issue now is, when and under what circumstances
are metaphors processed as categorizations, and when as comparisons?
2. The Career of Metaphor: From Comparison to Categorization?
According to the career of metaphor hypothesis (Bowdle and Gentner, 2005),
metaphors are invariably processed as comparisons when they are first introduced, i.e.
when they are novel to a reader or addressee. This does not depend on their
grammatical form: whether expressed as comparisons or as categorical assertions, novel
metaphors are always understood in terms of their corresponding similes. Over time
and with repeated use in different contexts, ‘… there is a shift … from comparison
to categorization as metaphors are conventionalized’. This shift from comparisons
to categorization constitutes the career of any given metaphor: ‘… the initial act
of comparison … gives rise to conventional metaphoric categories’ (p. 197). This
most recent version of comparison theory recognizes the dual reference function
3
Dual reference is a commonly used strategy for naming categories that have no name of their
own, i.e. have not (yet) been lexicalized. Examples include using salient brand names to refer
to categories of products, as in Kleenex for paper tissues, Xerox as both a noun and a verb for
dry copying, and Scotch tape for transparent tapes. Apparent tautologies rely on the same strategy
of using a salient, prototypical exemplar of a category to name that category, as in boys will be
boys. The first mention of boys refers to literal boys, the second to the category of people who
behave in typical boy-like fashion. Note that in each of these cases, the categorical can be
rephrased as a comparison, as in Scotties are (like) Kleenex or boys will be (like) boys.
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S. Glucksberg and C. Haught
of metaphor vehicles. Initially, a metaphor vehicle has only referent … the literal basic
level concept, i.e. the predicate of a comparison assertion. With repeated use, the
metaphor vehicle becomes polysemous, and then refers simultaneously at the abstract,
metaphorical category level as well as at the literal basic level. Once conventionalized
then, metaphors can be understood either as comparisons or as categorizations. On the
assumption that lexical access is not constrained by context, both the literal (comparison)
referent and the figurative (metaphorical category) referent is activated. This
automatically initiates a comparison process in parallel with a categorization process.
The process that finishes first determines the outcome: categorization or comparison.
On this account, a metaphors and its corresponding simile must convey the same
meaning. Bowdle and Gentner are keenly aware of this critical implication: ‘because
metaphoric categories are created as a byproduct of figurative comparisons, they do not
affect the interpretation of these comparisons’ (2005, p. 198). Bowdle and Gentner do
note that when a metaphor vehicle (e.g. Shark* in the lawyer-shark expression) becomes
conventionalized and hence lexicalized, the ‘abstraction can contribute to the meaning
of a metaphor’ (p. 198), but it is not clear what such a contribution might be.
2.1 Do Metaphors and Their Corresponding Similes Convey
the Same Meanings?
How might metaphors and their corresponding similes differ? One possibility is that
metaphors might somehow be more ‘vivid’ (Fogelin, 1988; Ortony, 1979). Another,
more testable hypothesis is that metaphors convey different kinds of attributes or
properties to their topics than do similes, perhaps more ‘metaphorical’ properties?
To see if this might be so, we asked people to paraphrase either metaphors or their
corresponding similes. Half the participants in this experiment paraphrased metaphors,
the other half similes. For the expression ‘some ideas are like diamonds’, typical
paraphrases included responses such as ‘some ideas are rare and desirable’, ‘some ideas
are so interesting it is as though they shine and glitter’, and ‘some ideas are very
valuable’. Note that the italicized properties ascribed to the topic ‘some ideas’—rare,
desirable, shine, glitter, valuable—are all properties of the literal ‘diamond’. This
suggests that the predicate of a simile does indeed refer directly at the basic-level
concept, in this case the literal gem, ‘diamond’. In contrast, metaphors tend to
evoke emergent properties, properties that inhere in the superordinate category of
diamonds* as valuable entities, but not to literal diamonds. Typical paraphrases of
this kind were ‘some ideas are brilliant and insightful’ and ‘some ideas are fantastic
and creatively very unique’. Clearly, literal diamonds cannot be insightful, and creatively
very unique seems a stretch. Overall, metaphors tended to be interpreted in this
way, with many more non-literal, superordinate properties mentioned than literal,
basic-level ones. Similes tended to evoke about an equal number of each (Hasson,
Estes and Glucksberg, 2001; See Fig. 2). Clearly, metaphors are not just more ‘vivid’
than similes, they tend to be interpreted ‘more metaphorically’.
Although these data clearly show that metaphors and their corresponding similes
may differ in their interpretations, the case may still be made that these differences
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Attributions (Mean)
1.1
1
0.9
superordinate
0.8
basic
0.7
0.6
0.5
metaphor
simile
Trope Form
Figure 2
Mean Number of Attributions as a Function of Trope Form.
Significantly more basic-level (literal) attributions for similes than for
metaphors. Significantly more superordinate context-dependent attributions
for metaphors than for similes.
are rather subtle, and could well be produced by inferences drawn after initial
comprehension. If this is so, then the career-of-metaphor hypothesis might still hold.
Novel metaphors would be understood via a comparison process and so would not
differ in interpretations from their corresponding similes. Conventional metaphors
might be understood via a categorization operation, and be understood slightly
differently from their corresponding similes via post-comprehension inferences.
2.2 Are Novel Metaphors Always Understood as Comparisons?
The career-of-metaphor account fails to recognize an important consequence of
dual reference. If the metaphor vehicle is polysemous and refers to different entities
or concepts when in metaphor versus simile form, then people’s interpretations of
metaphors and similes could well differ in significant ways. Two relatively recent
examples from the news media illustrate this possibility. When the scandals
perpetrated by Enron were first reported, expressions appeared implicating other
companies in danger of being caught out in dubious accounting procedures, as in
the prediction that ‘WorldCom will be the next Enron’. An analogous expression
was used when concern was expressed for the Florida voting process in the 2004
American presidential election. Voting records had disappeared when computer
systems crashed after a primary election in Miami-Dade county, where presidential
votes had been disputed in the 2000 presidential election. Said the chair of the
Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition, ‘This shows that unless we do something
now—Florida is headed toward being the next Florida’. In these two cases, the
categorical form is clearly intended and is clearly appropriate. Indeed, neither can
be aptly paraphrased as similes: ‘WorldCom will be like the next Enron’ and ‘Florida
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S. Glucksberg and C. Haught
is headed toward being like the next Florida’ seem odd. A disreputable company
can be like Enron, but not like the next Enron. And, if memory serves, the ‘Enron’
and ‘Florida’ metaphors were not initially expressed as similes, as the career of
metaphor hypothesis would suggest. Indeed, if the career of metaphor hypothesis
were to be generally true, then new metaphors should always be introduced in
simile form. The categorization form should only be produced after a sufficient
degree of conventionalization has taken place. This seems unlikely, but of course
possible. So, more systematic evidence is needed.
We can look to two kinds of evidence to test the claim that metaphors must
initially be understood in terms of their corresponding similes. First, can we find
or construct novel metaphors that are equally apt and comprehensible in categorical
and comparison form, even though they might differ in interpretation? Second,
can we find or construct novel metaphors that are apt and comprehensible in
categorical form, but non-apt and uninterpretable in comparison form? If either of
these two kinds of metaphors can be found or created, then conventionalization
would clearly not be a necessary condition for metaphors to be processed as
categorizations.4
We have found such metaphors as counterexamples to the claim that novel
metaphors must be understood in terms of their simile counterparts. First, consider
the evidence that Bowdle and Gentner use to support their claim. In one
experiment, they found that people preferred the comparison over the categorization
form for novel metaphors, while showing no preference for either grammatical
form for conventional ones. A second experiment measured comprehension times
for novel and conventional metaphors in their two grammatical forms. In contrast
to some reports in the literature (cf. Blasko and Connine, 1993), novel metaphors
took more time to comprehend than conventional ones. More to the point, novel
similes were understood more quickly than novel categorizations, while the reverse
was true for conventional metaphors. In a third experiment, participants were
given novel similes with two different topics and then asked to provide a third
appropriate topic, e.g. ‘an acrobat is like a butterfly’, ‘a figure skater is like a
butterfly’, and then (Fill in the blank) ___________________________________
____ is like a butterfly. This ingenious procedure shifted preferences from similes
to categorizations, a sort of mini-conventionalization, if you will.
This is a convincing demonstration that at least some novel similes can, with
appropriate experience, be processed as categorizations. It is not a demonstration
that all metaphors require such experiences in order to be understood as
categorizations upon their first appearance. The novel metaphors used by Bowdle
and Gentner were, in a word, rather poor, including such items as ‘a fisherman is a
4
Conventionalization is clearly not a sufficient condition for metaphors to become apt
categorizations. Consider the highly familiar ‘sardine’ expression, ‘it was so crowded that I felt
like a sardine’. This expression is rarely if ever, produced in categorization form, perhaps
because there is no coherent category of ‘sardines*’, other than being crowded in a confined
space.
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spider’ and ‘a mind is a kitchen’. Not only were these novel expressions rated as less
apt than a set of conventional metaphors, they were also rated as less apt in metaphor
than in simile form. It could well be that differences in aptness, not novelty, are
responsible for the apparent preference for simile over metaphor for these expressions.
Differences in aptness could also account for the differences that were found for
comprehension times between novel similes and metaphors. More apt metaphors
should be understood faster than poor ones, irrespective of novelty or familiarity.
To counter this argument, Bowdle and Gentner report that the correlation
between aptness and response times within the novel metaphor items was not
reliable, but this could be due to restricted range of aptness within that set of items.
A more sensitive estimate of the relations among aptness, conventionality and
comprehension times are the correlations among these three variables over the
entire set of items, novel and conventional. We computed these correlations, and
found that conventionality and rated aptness were reliably associated, r = .77, p <
.001. Conventionality was also reliably associated with metaphor-simile RT
differences, r = -.38, p < .05, but so was aptness, and to the same extent, r = -.38,
p < .05. The more conventional the metaphor, the less the difference between
metaphor and simile forms; the more apt the metaphor, the less the difference
between metaphor and simile forms. Given this set of items, there is no way to
disentangle aptness and conventionality.5
Ideally, we would need to see how novel but good metaphors and similes behave
in order to test the career hypothesis. It is, to be sure, difficult to create good novel
metaphors. In any given language community, metaphors that are apt and familiar
already occupy much of the available metaphor space. New circumstances often
prompt new metaphors (as in the Enron and Florida examples, above), but without
such new circumstances, how could one find new metaphors that are not only
novel but apt and comprehensible? Faced with this task, Catrinel Haught, in the
course of designing her dissertation research project, hit upon a novel method for
generating novel metaphors that are both apt and comprehensible.
2.3 Can Novel Metaphors be Just as Good (or Better) Than Similes?
We began with relatively conventional metaphors such as ‘my lawyer was (like) a
shark’ and ‘my job is (like) a jail’. Such metaphors are equally comprehensible and
apt in either grammatical form, comparison or categorical (Bowdle and Gentner,
2005; Glucksberg, 2001). We then selected three different types of adjectives to
create novel variants of such metaphors, as shown in Figure 3. The three types of
adjectives illustrated in Figure 3 were used to produce three types of metaphors.
5
Jones and Estes (in press) have recently reported a study in which they empirically contrasted
conventionality and aptness of metaphors. Aptness reliably predicted preference for metaphors
over similes, as well as speed and ease of metaphor comprehension. Conventionality did not
reliably predict any aspect of metaphor processing.
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S. Glucksberg and C. Haught
1. Topic Applicable (TA) m-bias?
My lawyer was (like*) a well-paid shark.
Some ideas are (like*) theoretical diamonds.
2. Vehicle Applicable (VA) m = s?
My lawyer was (like) a razor-toothed shark.
Some ideas are (like) gem-cut diamonds.
3. Applicable to both topic and vehicle (TVA) m = s?
My lawyer was (like) an old shark.
Some ideas are (like) small diamonds.
Figure 3 Three Types of Adjectival Modifiers.
The three types of adjectives and their corresponding metaphors were:
1. Adjectives that would be applicable to both the topic and vehicle of the
source metaphor, e.g. ‘old’ for the lawyer-shark metaphor; ‘secure’ for the job-jail
one. We expected such novel metaphors to be as apt and comprehensible in
categorical form as in comparison form.
2. Adjectives that would be applicable only to the vehicle of the source metaphor,
but not to the topic, e.g. ‘razor-toothed’ for lawyer-shark, ‘barb-wired’ for job-jail. We
expected that these would also be comparable in categorical and comparison form.
3. Adjectives that would be applicable only to the topic of the source metaphor,
but not to the literal referent of the vehicle, e.g. ‘well-paid’ for lawyer-shark, ‘wellpaying’ for job-jail. This is the critical type. We expected these to differ between
categorical and comparison form, but in a direction opposite to that predicted by
the career-of-metaphor hypothesis. According to the career hypothesis, these are
novel metaphors and so should be more apt and more comprehensible in
comparison than in categorical form. However, consider this type of adjective and
the dual reference function of the metaphor vehicle term. In categorical form, the
vehicle term refers to the abstract metaphorical category, e.g. the metaphorical
shark, shark*. Such sharks can be well-paid because they include exemplars such
as lawyers and other people who work for a living. However, in comparison form
the term ‘shark’ refers to the literal marine creature, the fish-shark. Fish are not
generally thought of as being paid, let alone well-paid. Hence, such similes should
be non-apt and difficult to interpret (See Figure 4). For this reason, we expected
that these metaphors would be rated as more apt and more comprehensible in
categorical than in comparison form.
The first experiment using these materials was designed to see:
(a) if these novel metaphors would be as apt in categorical as in comparison
form when we used topic-and-vehicle adjectives (TVA) and vehicle
adjectives (VA).
(b) If the novel metaphors created with Topic-only-adjectives (TA, e.g.
well-paid shark), would be more apt in categorical form than in
comparison form.
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On the Relation Between Metaphor and Simile
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369
Well-paid Shark*
vicious, aggressive,
merciless, etc….
(is a)
Well-paid Shark
(like)
My Lawyer
Only the metaphorical shark* can be well-paid.
Figure 4
Metaphorical and Literal Sharks.
We asked college-student participants to rate each metaphor, one at a time, on a
1–10 scale of aptness, basing their ratings on how well each expression
communicated a speaker’s intent. In general, people find it easy to provide such
ratings, and do so reliably. Our participants were no exception, and provided
ratings that were consistent with our predictions. First, aptness ratings for the
original source metaphors did not differ between category and comparison forms
(See Figure 5). Both forms were rated as reasonably apt, about 6.5 on a 1–10 scale,
where10 is the most apt. The metaphors modified by adjectives that were applicable
to both topic and vehicle were rated as apt as their unmodified source metaphors,
despite being novel. More importantly, the categorical and comparison forms of
these metaphors did not differ from one another. Similarly, the metaphors modified
by adjectives that were applicable to the vehicle only were also comparable in
comparison and categorical form. These data argue that novelty per se does not
privilege simile over metaphor in terms of aptness. The third type of adjectival
modification, topic-applicable-only, provides an even stronger demonstration that
novelty, per se, does not privilege comparison over categorization. These novel
metaphors were, as expected, more apt in categorical (M = 6.5) than in comparison
form (M = 5.2), an outcome that is directly opposite to the career of metaphor
hypothesis. The relevant statistical analyses yielded the appropriate reliable effects.
Analyses of variance yielded a reliable interaction between grammatical form
and adjective type, reflecting the lack of any differences between categorical
and comparison forms except in the appropriate condition, topic-applicable
modification.
Pairwise comparisons within each adjectival condition revealed no reliable
differences except in that Topic-applicable condition, where the difference
between comparison and categorical forms was highly reliable (p<.001).
It might be argued that rated aptness is not the most appropriate measure of
the effect of novelty on preference for comparison versus categorization, and
so we repeated our first experiment, substituting comprehensibility ratings for
aptness ratings. The results were virtually identical. Again, as expected, the rated
comprehensibility of the original source metaphors were comparable for the two
grammatical forms: the mean rating for the categorical and comparison forms,
respectively, were 6.9 and 6.7. And again, as expected, categorical and comparison
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S. Glucksberg and C. Haught
7.5
7
Ratings
6.5
6
Metaphors
Similes
5.5
5
4.5
4
TA
Well-paid
VA
Razor-toothed
TVA
Old
NA
-
Type of adjective
Figure 5 Aptness as a Function of Trope Form and Adjective Type.
8.5
8
Ratings
7.5
7
6.5
Metaphors
Similes
6
5.5
5
4.5
4
TA
Well-paid
VA
Razor-toothed
TVA
Old
NA
-
Type of adjective
Figure 6 Comprehensibility as a Function of Trope Form and Adjective Type.
forms did not differ in the topic-and-vehicle and vehicle-only metaphor types.
Here, as in our first experiment, novelty did not privilege comparison over
categorization.
The topic-applicable metaphors, as expected, again produced results exactly
opposite to the career-of-metaphor hypothesis. These were novel metaphors,
and so they should be more comprehensible in comparison than in categorical
form. The reverse was true: the categorical form was rated as more comprehensible
than the comparison, mean ratings 6.7 and 5.7, respectively. The relevant
statistical analyses again yielded the reliable interactions and main effects. The
novel metaphors that we had generated were as apt and comprehensible in
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On the Relation Between Metaphor and Simile
371
categorical as in comparison form with the one exception, where we found that
the categorical form was privileged.
In order to confirm these findings, we turned to a standard measure of
comprehensibility, comprehension time. We presented the novel metaphors,
one at a time, on a computer screen, and asked participants to read each one and
decide whether or not the presented sentence was sensible or not. In addition
to the 32 test metaphors we presented 64 filler sentences, half of which made
sense and half of which did not make sense. On each trial, participants read
either a sensible metaphor or a filler sentence, then pressed a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ key as
quickly and accurately as they could. The results are consistent with the aptness
and comprehensibility ratings. Parallel with the ratings data, we found no
differences in comprehension time between categorical and comparison forms
except in the one critical condition, topic-applicable modified metaphors (See
Figure 7).
Consider, first, the time taken to understand the original source metaphors.
Mean response times for these were 1586 ms and 1622 ms for the categorical and
comparisons forms, respectively. These times were faster than those for the novel
modified metaphors, consistent with the expectation that familiar, conventional
metaphors can be understood more quickly than novel ones, especially when the
novel ones are uniformly one word longer than their conventional counterparts.
Second, the times taken to understand the topic-and-vehicle and the vehiclemodified metaphors did not differ between categorical and comparisons forms,
consistent with the expectation that novelty per se does not privilege one form
over the other. Finally, the topic-applicable metaphors in categorical form were
2400
2300
Response times
2200
2100
2000
Metaphors
Similes
1900
1800
1700
1600
1500
TA
Well-paid
VA
Razor-toothed
TVA
Old
NA
-
Type of adjective
Figure 7 Comprehension Time as a Function of Trope Form and Adjective Type.
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S. Glucksberg and C. Haught
understood as quickly as the other novel metaphor types. In contrast, the
comparison form took reliably longer to be understood.6
Interestingly, the proportion of ‘sensible’ judgments for the categorical and
comparison forms in this critical condition were about the same, 76% and 72%,
respectively. One possible reason for this is that people implicitly converted the
comparison into the categorical form so that they could be understood. This, of
course, must take time, and so the comparison form should take longer to judge as
sensible than the categorical form. We have no direct evidence that this, indeed,
was the case, but it is certainly consistent with the comprehension time data. This
is a complete reversal of comparison theory, which holds that metaphors in
categorical form are understood as comparisons. Our findings suggest that the
opposite may be the case. Whenever a comparison does not make sense but its
categorical counterpart does, then similes should be understood in terms of their
corresponding metaphors.
2.4 What About Really Novel Metaphors?
The novel metaphors that we generated via adjectival modification had
conventional vehicles. According to the career hypothesis, the metaphor category
for these novel metaphors would have been established through the normal
process of conventionalization. Therefore, these adjectivally modified metaphors
could be understood via a categorization process, even though they were
nominally novel. To convincingly test the career hypothesis, we would need to
show that completely novel metaphors can be acceptable as categorizations. One
way to do this is to modify Bowdle and Gentner’s novel metaphors in a way that
makes the comparison form less apt or less acceptable, and then to repeat one of
their experiments using these modified novel expressions. Bowdle and Gentner
used novel metaphors such as ‘a newspaper is a telescope’ to test their career
hypothesis. People were asked to indicate their preference for the comparison
versus categorical form for such metaphors, using a 1–10 rating scale. A rating of
1 reflected strong preference for the comparison form; a rating of 10 a strong
preference for the categorization form. The mean preference rating for these
novel metaphors was 2.8, indicating that people strongly preferred the comparison
form. In contrast, the mean rating for conventional metaphors was 4.3, suggesting
that as metaphors become conventionalized, they become more acceptable as
categorizations.
6
This finding, while unremarkable in itself, demonstrates the importance of using multiple
measures, particularly on-line measures to complement rating measures. The modified
metaphors were rated as apt and as comprehensible as their original source metaphors.
Nonetheless, the original, unmodified metaphors were understood significantly faster than
their modified counterparts. Clearly, direct measures of comprehensibility are more sensitive
than indirect measures such as rating scales.
© 2006 The Authors
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On the Relation Between Metaphor and Simile
373
However, aptness may have played a role here, as it did in their comprehension
time experiment. The comparison forms for Bowdle and Gentner’s novel
metaphors were rated as more apt than their corresponding categorical forms.
What would happen if we made the comparison forms less apt or more difficult to
understand? To do this, we applied our adjective-modification procedure to those
novel metaphors, using topic-applicable adjectives that should make the comparison
form more difficult to understand. For example, newspapers can be daily, but not
telescopes, and so ‘a newspaper is a daily telescope’ should be preferred to ‘a
newspaper is like a daily telescope’. Similarly, billboards can be advertisements, but
not warts, and so ‘a billboard is an advertising wart’ should be preferred to ‘a
billboard is like an advertising wart’. We asked participants to indicate their
preference for the comparison versus categorization forms for metaphors modified
in this way. The mean preference ratings for modified novel metaphors was 4.9,
comparable to Bowdle and Gentner’s rating of 4.3 for conventional metaphors!
Would our modified novel metaphors also be more comprehensible in
categorization than in comparison form? To answer this question we repeated
Bowdle and Gentner’s Experiment 2, in which they measured comprehension
times for novel metaphors in their two grammatical forms (Glucksberg and Haught,
2005). We used both their original, unmodified items, and our variants of them.
We asked college students to read sentences, on at a time, on a computer display,
and to press a response key as soon they had thought of an interpretation. Half the
items in each list were in metaphor form, half in simile form; half the items in each
list were Bowdle and Gentner’s original items, and half were modified.
The results were clear-cut. For the original, unmodified items, we replicated
Bowdle and Gentner’s finding that similes were understood more quickly than
metaphors, 3318 msec vs. 3786 msec., a difference of 468 msec. (comparable to B
& G’s mean times of 2872 and 3245 msec., respectively). However, for the
modified items, we found a complete reversal: a difference of 636 msec in the
opposite direction, with metaphors now understood more quickly than similes,
4535 msec vs. 5171 msec. The cross-over interaction of metaphor type with
grammatical form was highly reliable. These data clearly demonstrate that novelty
per se does not privilege comparison over categorization. The more likely
determinant is aptness or ease of comprehension.
3. Metaphors and Their Corresponding Similes Can Have Very
Different Interpretations
The dual reference property of metaphor vehicles that permits most metaphors to
be paraphrased as similes has another important consequence. Because the vehicle
is used to refer at two levels of abstraction—the literal, basic level, and the abstract
metaphorical category level—metaphors and their corresponding similes can have
quite different meanings. We selected adjectives that were applicable to both the
topics and vehicles of metaphors to create expressions that, in our judgment,
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S. Glucksberg and C. Haught
would be interpreted differently, depending on grammatical form. For example,
consider what ‘old shark’ refers to in metaphorical versus simile form. In the
metaphor ‘My lawyer was an old shark*’, the vehicle refers to a category of old
professionals, and so has the implication that the lawyer in question is competent,
aggressive, sly and experienced, much like an old pro. In the simile ‘My lawyer
was like an old shark’, the shark referred to is a fish. Old fish are not quite the
same as old pros, and so we expected people to understand the simile to mean that
the lawyer is relatively ineffectual, enfeebled, perhaps even weak and
(metaphorically) toothless.
To test this hypothesis we gave participants a set of such novel metaphors and,
for each metaphor, asked them to rate how well each of two candidate interpretations
captured the intended meaning of the expression. Each expression was presented
in either metaphor or simile form, with no expression repeated for any given
participant. For the lawyer-shark expression, participants rated these two alternative
interpretations (The first is metaphor-biased, the second is simile-biased):
(a)
The lawyer was very vicious and dangerous. He had been in law for a
long time and the experience had made him sly, sneaky and cunning.
(b) The lawyer was somewhat vicious and dangerous. He was still sly, sneaky
and cunning, but less energetic and weaker than when he was younger.
There were a total of 32 such item sets, including one of our favorite examples,
‘his job was a secure jail’ vs. ‘his job was like a secure jail’. In this example, the
metaphor form was interpreted in terms of job security, whereas the simile form
was interpreted in terms of a maximum security penal institution. In essence,
the adjectives that we used were interpreted differently when they modified a
literal basic-level concept than when they modified an abstract metaphorical
concept.
Figure 8 presents the mean ratings for metaphor-biased versus simile-biased
Interpretations. As expected, people preferred the metaphor-biased interpretations
for metaphors, and the simile-biased interpretations for similes, consistent with the
dual reference function of metaphor vehicle terms.
4. Conclusions and Implications
4.1 Comparison vs Categorization Reconsidered
Since neither a pure comparison nor a pure class inclusion theory is tenable, how
can we characterize these two processes for comprehending metaphors? The
career-of-metaphor hypothesis seemed promising, but it fails for at least two
reasons. First, novel but apt metaphors are not privileged in comparison over
categorization form. Second, and more important, similes may not have the same
interpretations as their corresponding metaphors, and so the theory must be able
to account for any changes in meaning as a metaphor becomes conventionalized.
© 2006 The Authors
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7.5
7
Ratings
6.5
6
Metaphor
Simile
5.5
5
4.5
4
Metaphor-biased
Simile-biased
Interpretation Type
Figure 8 Mean Interpretation Ratings as Function of Trope Form.
There seems to be no principled reason in the career-of-metaphor hypothesis to
motivate any such changes.
An alternative to the career-of-metaphor hypothesis might be the quality-ofmetaphor hypothesis. Really good metaphors work best as categorizations, and
sometimes work only as categorization assertions (like the well-paid shark*
example). In such metaphors, the vehicle concept is an ideal and salient exemplar
of the category it represents. Poor or limited metaphors might well work best as
comparisons, even when highly conventional. Recall the familiar expression ‘I felt
like a sardine’ in the context of jam-packed, crowded situations. It has a very
narrow, unidimensional communicative content: to be packed together like
sardines in a can. In no other respect is one characterized as a sardine: not fishy,
oily, small, or edible. Probably because the attribution of one, context-dependent
sardine property is intended, this familiar expression does not seem to work as a
categorization assertion, i.e. ‘I felt I was a sardine’ doesn’t quite capture the same
intention as ‘I felt like a sardine’.
For most metaphors, the comparison and categorical forms yield the same
interpretations. And, for most metaphors, when they appear in categorical
form they are understood as class-inclusion assertions, when they appear in
comparison form they may be understood either as comparisons or as implicit
categorizations. When, however, a metaphor and its corresponding simile yield
different interpretations, then the metaphor must be understood only as a
categorization, and the simile only as a comparison. Finally, when a metaphor
cannot be readily understood as a categorization, as in the sardine example or
as in the fisherman-spider example, then it may be reinterpreted as a comparison,
but as a narrowly constrained one. Comparison and categorization may thus be
viewed as complementary strategies for understanding metaphors, with the
choice of strategy dependent upon the quality and aptness of the metaphor.
Comparisons are resorted to when a categorization does not make much sense;
categorizations are used when the metaphor is apt, whether novel or
conventional.
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S. Glucksberg and C. Haught
4.2 On the Relation Between Metaphors and Similes
We have found that novel metaphors can not only be understood as categorical
assertions, but that they can also be privileged over similes. They can be easier to
understand, and they can be more apt. Analogously, conventional similes,
depending on their specific content, can be preferred over their corresponding
metaphors. We have also found that metaphors and similes can have non-trivial
differences in interpretation. These three properties of metaphors and similes stem
from the polysemous nature of metaphor vehicles. Metaphor vehicles refer to an
abstract category that includes the literal referent of the corresponding similes. In
turn, the simile predicate refers to a literal, concrete exemplar of the metaphorvehicle category. Metaphors and similes are thus not necessarily paraphrases of one
another.
They can, of course, function as paraphrases of one another in the usual or most
frequent case, when a metaphor and simile yield comparable interpretations. But
this most usual or frequent case is, paradoxically, a special case: it is not a universal
property of metaphors and their corresponding similes. We have resolved the
paradox of unlike things compared by appealing to the dual-reference function of
metaphor vehicles, only to replace that paradox with the paradox of the usual
being the special.
The implications for theories of metaphor comprehension are clear. If metaphors
cannot always be paraphrased as similes, then metaphors cannot, in principle, be
understood in terms of their corresponding similes, and vice versa. This means that
comparison theories of metaphor comprehension, which rest on the assumption
that metaphors and smiles are equivalent, are fundamentally flawed. For this reason
alone, the career of metaphor hypothesis fails: metaphors cannot start out as
comparisons and then develop into categorizations because in the course of such
development their interpretations might well change.
There is, however, an important implication of the career idea. A central issue
for language comprehension in general, and for metaphor comprehension in
particular, is the nature of pragmatic processes, particularly the distinction between
lexically encoded concepts and ad hoc concepts of the sort exemplified by metaphor
vehicles. Carston (2002) argues for a unified view of how word meanings are
modulated in context, a view that applies equally to literal as well as to figuratively
intended utterances. When either literal or metaphorical ad hoc concepts are
constructed, lexical concepts undergo systematic change. A lexical concept can be
strengthened by taking an encyclopedic property of that concept and ‘elevating’ it
to a content-constituent status of the ad hoc concept. Carston provides the example
of a single woman saying ‘I’d love to meet some bachelors’ when an appropriate
interpretation of bachelors* would include the property ‘eligible for marriage’.
The lawyer-shark metaphor provides a figurative example, where the property of
being sly or cunning is included in the ad hoc concept, the metaphorical shark*.
Analogously, lexical concepts can be loosened by dropping one or more of their
defining properties, e.g. the playboy sense of bachelor* may in fact accommodate
being married, and the metaphorical shark* does not have fins or sharp teeth.
© 2006 The Authors
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One question prompted by the career of metaphor hypothesis is, must people
continue to construct ad hoc concepts repeatedly, or can ad hoc concepts eventually
become lexically encoded? Perhaps we should frame the issue in dynamic rather
than static terms. For novel and non-apt expressions such as ‘a fisherman is a spider’,
people must engage in considerable pragmatic operations of the sort detailed by
Carston, among others. However, with repeated encounters with a metaphor vehicle
such as spider, it becomes polysemous to the extent that its meaning can be modulated
in context in the same way that any other word meaning can be modulated in
context—for example, by processes of pragmatic narrowing or broadening. At what
point might ad hoc concepts lose their ad hoc status and become lexically encoded? To
our knowledge, there are no clear criteria for distinguishing between ad hoc concepts
and lexically encoded ones. Similarly, we have no clear criteria for distinguishing
between metaphorical and literal uses of concepts, other than the distinction between
linguistic and extra-linguistic meaning. As Carston put it, ‘The use is a literal one if
the logical/definitional properties of the linguistic encoding are preserved; it is nonliteral if they are not’ (2002, p. 340). To identify any given instance of language use
as literal or non-literal therefore requires identifying the logical/definitional properties
of the lexical concepts employed. It is difficult enough to identify such properties at
any specific point in a word’s (or a metaphor’s) career. Tracking changes in such
properties over time would seem a hopeless task. Perhaps the literal/non-literal
distinction should continue to be drawn as a convenient fiction while we devote our
energies to discovering the processes that people use to understand language use in
context.
Department of Psychology
Princeton University
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